A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CASEBOOK

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A Psychological Warfare Casebook

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PREFACE

The preparation of this casebook was undertaken by the Operations Research Office as the third in a series of three manuals (other two: ORO-T-214, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare," and ORO-T-222, "Target Analysis and Media in Propaganda to Audiences Abroad") designed to serve as training guides and reference sources for personnel assigned to or interested in psychological warfare planning and operations. Although this casebook was prepared primarily to meet the particular needs of Army personnel, it early became evident that it would be impracticable to dissociate the foreign propaganda activities of psychological warfare personnel in the Army from those in the Navy and Air Force and from such civilian agencies as the World War II Office of War Information (OWI) or the present-day US Information Agency (USIA). Thus "psychological warfare," as defined and used in this study, is an all-inclusive term. As used in this casebook the term encompasses both peacetime and wartime activities and is designed to support both military and political operations. Thus, it is believed that this study may prove useful to more than the limited number of individuals within the Army who may be assigned psychological warfare responsibilities.

It was indicated in the preface of the first two manuals of this series on psychological warfare that the Operations Research Office undertook the preparation of these training guides and reference works when the need for them first became apparent and at a time when only ORO was actively engaged in a research effort designed to support the Army psychological warfare program. However, the preparation of manuals such as this casebook is not considered to be the normal function of an operations research agency.

It is believed that the large fund of knowledge of past psychological warfare operations — the methods, techniques, and achievements — that is the heritage of World War II and earlier struggles, when considered along with the generally disorganized state of this knowledge and the various theories as to the nature of psychological warfare, makes a case-study approach to the subject a useful one for training and reference purposes.

The compilation of case materials presented in this study is not put forth with any sense of finality. The contents reflect the considered judgments of those responsible for its preparation. It is recognized that the casebook is restricted in scope owing to the limited horizons and experiences of the authors and the inadequacies of the reporting system for past actions.

It is believed, however, that the preparation of this casebook will have been justified if it serves to induce participants and observers of past and current actions to record their experiences more adequately for possible inclusion in later revisions or in new approaches to works of this kind. It is hoped that the volume will be of real value in itself; and in addition, through use and critical review, that it may serve to focus further thought on the subject of psychological warfare and how it may be utilized more effectively in the future as a supporting weapon in our nation's political and military establishments for the attainment of national objectives.

WILLIAM E. DAUGHERTY

BETHESDA, MD.
November 1957

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This casebook is truly the result of the inspiration, ideas, and painstaking work of a host of friends and acquaintances. Without the assistance of these friends in the government service, in private communications media, on the university campuses, and within the Operations Research Office this study could not have been brought to a successful conclusion. To all who in any way have contributed to this study the authors are grateful.

Listing individuals and organizations for particular recognition is always risky, for in doing so there is the danger that a dimmed memory may cause the omission of a particular individual or organization whose contribution may have been as significant as any listed. In this instance the danger is especially great because the preparation of this work has extended over a period of many months. If there are any whose contributions to this casebook are not properly recognized the senior author can only express his sincere regrets for the oversight.

The authors and contributors of case studies, journal accounts, and original memoranda are recognized in bylines and footnotes throughout the study. It is to be understood that the thanks of the Operations Research Office is extended to each person and publishing firm that has so graciously permitted the reproduction of copyrighted and original material; no separate listing of publishers is made.

Throughout the many months it has taken to collect, organize, and tailor the accounts appearing in this casebook the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare (previously named the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare), US Army, has frequently and continuously expressed an interest in the early completion of the work. The initial planning for this casebook was undertaken during the period that the late Maj Gen Robert A. McClure served as Chief of Psychological Warfare (1951–1953). This work was brought to a conclusion during the tour of duty of Brig Gen William C. Bullock as Chief of Psychological Warfare (1953–1956). The patient and continuing interest of both General McClure and General Bullock in the completion of this work sustained the senior author during periods frequently characterized by varying degrees of frustration associated with bringing a study of this length and diversity of subject matter to an early end, notwithstanding long periods of time when personal commitments

and administrative decisions made the continuous processing of material all but impossible.

Others to whom the authors are indebted for ideas, criticisms of draft manuscripts, and for help in tracking down illusive case material include the following:

Department of the Army: Col P. J. Black and Drs. Paul Blackstock, C. D. Leatherman, and W. J. Morgan, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare; Col Edson D. Raff, Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; and Lt Col Wallace L. Clement, Operations Research Division, Office of the Chief of Research and Development.

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Others: Dr. Thomas Andrews, University of Maryland; Dr. Alfred di Grazia, Stanford University; Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Louis Nemzer, Ohio State University; Dr. Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Wilbur Schramm, Stanford University; and Dr. Douglas Waples, University of Chicago.

In addition to the many to whom personal recognition can be extended for contributions, criticisms of early drafts, etc., there are a number who of necessity remain anonymous. Typescripts of lectures, journal articles of unknown authorship, and unsigned memoranda have been located in archival deposits in both the Pentagon and the National Archives. Some

of these were thought worthy of reproduction, but in a few instances it was found to be impossible to identify the author of the account. Also, the references cited in some contributions are incomplete. Although great effort was made to complete these references, in a few instances it could not be accomplished. In such cases the reference is reproduced exactly as it appeared in the original publication.

The authors of this casebook are also in debt to the library staff of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare and to the archivists in the National Archives. Through interlibrary loan facilities the ORO Library has made available the rich collections of the Army Library and the Library of Congress. Without the cooperation and assistance of many librarians, most of whom labor in anonymity, this work would not be so complete.

The one to whom the senior author perhaps owes more than to any other is Morris Janowitz. It was Dr. Janowitz who first suggested the compilation of a casebook as a training medium for individuals assigned to the field of international communications and psychological warfare. He helped in the drafting of the original outline for the study and provided many of the contributions (identified by the initials M. J.) out of his rich store of knowledge and experience. If it were not for the time that it has taken to process material for the book and to pretest a draft version on many interested and critical reviewers, and for Dr. Janowitz's prior commitments to other government agencies and his university teaching career, this work might well have appeared with him as the senior author. To him must go much of the credit for many of the ideas and innovations that appear in the study. However, it is only fair to say that he should not be held responsible for any of the imperfections or errors of omission or commission that may mar the end product because he has seen none but early drafts of this casebook.

One final note of acknowledgment needs to be added. Several accounts included in this casebook involve personal experiences of the writer during World War II and during a part of the armed conflict in Korea. (All accounts prepared by the senior author are identified by the initials W. E. D.) It is to be hoped that these personal accounts are not out of keeping with the general tone and contents of the volume. Without the happy circumstance that superiors within the Intelligence Section of a US Marine division in World War II made the writer responsible for the *ad hoc* improvisations in psychological warfare within the division's zone of action on Okinawa in 1945, and the fact that the Director of the Operations Research Office assigned him to assist the Eighth US Army in implementing a revitalized and expanded psychological warfare program in Korea in the early months of 1951, the writer's contribution to this casebook might have been far less.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nature and Scope of Psychological Warfare

There is a growing body of literature — books, journal articles, and monographs — devoted to the principal subject of this casebook. Each successive year, during the past decade, new and valuable additions have been made to the expanding bookshelf set apart for books on this subject. However, when one closely examines these books he discovers there is anything but unanimity of view on what to call the general subject matter discussed.*

Writers have been more successful in describing the activities that are encompassed by the subjects variously described by such terms as "psychological warfare," "political warfare," "foreign information," "propaganda," "mass communications," "international communications," "overseas information," "war of wits," "the battle for men's minds," "ideological warfare," etc., than in gaining any widespread acceptance for the use of any term that either they or others have proposed for adoption and use.

The editors of this casebook realize that all these terms have their proponents, that the use of any one term confers certain advantages, but that all have their limitations in revealing the range of activities covered or that may be covered by personnel assigned to work in this field of human endeavor. In Chap. 2 the attempt is made to describe the dynamic character of the subject and the wide range of thought relating to it, including suggestions of alternative names to label the activity.

It matters little which term is used so long as there is understanding between the writer and the reader. It is the desire of the editors to avoid entering into a debate with others on the general subject matter whether this study should have been called a casebook in political warfare, propaganda warfare, international communications, or foreign information, rather than one in psychological warfare.

As the term is employed in this work, psychological warfare may be used interchangeably with many of the others suggested. For purposes of

* See the list of references at the end of this chapter for the names of a few of the books dealing with the subject of psychological warfare and foreign information operations, published during the past decade.

clarity in presentation, however, psychological warfare may be defined as the *planned* use of *propaganda* and *other actions* designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, and friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.

The attention of the reader should be directed to the italicized words in this definition. First there is the word *planned*. It is the contention of the editors that for any act to be described as falling within the purview of psychological warfare the action undertaken should have been planned and not the result of some accidental occurrence. To be sure the point may be raised by readers of this casebook that many of the actions described herein were not actually preplanned. This may very well be true, for the intentions of participants of past actions are not always evident to the readers of historical records. This is especially true in the field of psychological warfare, where so much of our past activity has been improvised and inadequately reported.

Because it is not possible in many instances to assess accurately what a planner intended, the editors have taken the position that for purposes of this casebook an undertaking may be described as an act of psychological warfare if the action could have been the result of some prior planning. In this connection it should be pointed out that psychological warfare actions may be, and frequently are, the result of the planning and operational activities of officers and officials who do not look upon themselves as in any way involved in anything that could conceivably be described as psychological warfare. The action of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in writing an open letter to Senator Borah in February 1932, described in Chap. 3, is an excellent illustration of this.

Propaganda is the second word in the definition that should be given close scrutiny. Among the many definitions of propaganda, the following will suffice for purposes of this volume. It may be defined as the planned dissemination of news, information, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific group. Propaganda is often classified in accordance with what appears to be its source as either overt (white) or covert (black).

Overt propaganda is that whose true source is clearly acknowledged. Covert propaganda is that which appears to originate from a source other than the true one. Some writers describe still a third class of propaganda — gray, or that which avoids identification either as of friendly or of enemy origin. Still others maintain that gray propaganda is nothing more than poorly disguised covert, or black, propaganda.

A third concept in the definition that should receive the reader's attention is the phrase *other actions*. Acts can, and often appear to, play as important a role in opinion and attitude formation as propaganda. Thus throughout this casebook numerous acts have been characterized as psychological warfare even though they do not involve the use of propaganda.

Psychological warfare activities, as envisaged by the editors of this volume, are not to be identified exclusively as the acts of either military or civilian officials. A psychological warfare planner and/or operator may find himself serving within a civilian agency such as the Department of State, the USIA, or some other nonmilitary establishment, or he or she may be concerned more directly with the more limited military aspects of the use of psychological warfare, in which case he or she may be either a military or civilian official in one of the three military services. Regardless of his organizational affiliation, the operator may be addressing his psychological warfare output to one or more of the following: allied, neutral, or enemy target groups; and the activity may take place either before, during, or after the end of hostilities. Such a scope and definition of psychological warfare implies that this casebook will treat military psychological warfare and cold war or peacetime informational activities as involving similar problems.

In collecting illustrative case material for inclusion in this work psychological warfare operations are viewed as a rational continuous process involving a number of separate and distinct phases, each one of which is thought to be a suitable topic for separate chapter treatment. Chapters 4 to 9 discuss many of these processes in the normal chronological order in which these phases are likely to enter into the propaganda administrator's consciousness. These are, namely, organization and personnel requirements for psychological warfare; policy goals and planning; operational objectives; intelligence support, research, and analyses; media, methods, and techniques; and finally, evaluation of effectiveness.

In addition to these six chapters there are two added preliminary chapters and one final chapter containing selected cases on Soviet uses of psychological warfare. The two preliminary chapters describe the dynamic character of American thought concerning psychological warfare and provide illustrative examples drawn from history of American employment of psychological warfare techniques from the Revolutionary War period to the very eve of World War II. No example of psychological warfare usage in American history for any period more recent than the 1930's is included in Chap. 3 since most of the illustrations given in the later chapters are drawn from World War II and post-World War II experiences.

Casebook Approach to the Study of Psychological Warfare

This volume is not intended as a technical manual in psychological warfare, nor is it intended to provide the uninitiated a complete course of instruction in the subject. Instead it seeks to bring together a number of cases illustrating important aspects and principles of psychological warfare usage. As such it may serve as a training aid and reference volume for policy makers, planners, operators, teachers, and students of the subject. The volume may also be relevant to civilian and military officers who although not primarily responsible for psychological warfare operations may nevertheless come into close contact with psychological warfare operators in the course of their normal duties.

Since this volume employs the casebook approach to psychological warfare, it is necessary to answer the question what do the editors mean by a "case" and on what basis did they select their "cases." A psychological warfare case includes a report of either a specific operation or an entire campaign that is illustrative of a central problem in psychological warfare. The range of problems treated is limited by the outline, which in turn is conditioned by the extent and nature of the editors' experience and contacts with planners and operators who were or are engaged in past or current psychological warfare operations. Materials for this volume were drawn not only from the experiences of US psychological warfare efforts before, during, and after World War II, but also from those of our Allies and enemies.

The editors in undertaking to prepare a work of this magnitude and degree of comprehensiveness faced many difficulties, not the least of which was the inadequacy or unsatisfactory condition of the archival records of the past experience. Few historical, military, or general social science texts, etc., devoted any space to the discussion of propaganda, psychological warfare, or international communications, with the exception of diplomacy, prior to World War II. Few books printed during the war mention the subject. Actually it has only been within the past 5 to 10 years that writers discussing military or international subjects have given sufficient attention to any aspect of this subject to warrant any listings of psychological warfare, propaganda, etc., in the index.

It was only during World War II and afterward that special military units and civilian agencies were provided on a quasi-permanent basis to wage the propaganda battles of the country. Many of those who participated in the activity have had little time to write books and monographs on the subject. Those who have had the opportunity to write books all too frequently have had to rely on the most meager of official documentation.

Psychological warfare units of the past were seldom in a position to prepare well-documented histories or after-action reports of their activities, as was the standard procedure for more orthodox military units. Thus, in preparing material for inclusion in this casebook, widespread use has been made of personal interviews with participant-observers of past operations. Accounts of events and activities, wherever possible and feasible, have been reconstructed from such relevant records and personal memoirs as have been located.

However, it should be pointed out that even documentary reconstruction is difficult since in the speed and pressure of events a great deal of vital information concerning planning and operations never was recorded. In particular it was impossible to gather information on the effectiveness of many psychological warfare campaigns since information on such matters as what happened in response to a particular action all too frequently was never collected and recorded by the personnel involved.

On the other hand, where evidence exists concerning the impact particular actions had on a target, vital data concerning background planning or details of the operational history of a campaign are limited or lacking. Thus, instead of choosing a few campaigns and describing the various chronological phases and factors that influenced the outcome, an altogether desirable goal, the editors set as their objective the description of the crucial aspects of a much wider sample of psychological warfare experience. A crucial problem thought likely to be encountered repeatedly in future actions was the first criterion utilized in selecting cases for inclusion in this volume.

The scarcity of adequate original material complicated the application of the second criterion, namely, that a case should be concrete and detailed in every respect possible. Clearly one of the basic objectives of the casebook is to supply the reader with a "feel" for the realities of a psychological warfare operation, and thus through such means to enrich his experience directly without exposing him to the events themselves.

The collection of material on which to base or to construct many of the cases given in this work required prolonged efforts at documentation. Official histories, classified original documents in archives and record sections, personal memoirs, newspaper accounts, trade, professional and academic journals, and other such materials were exploited. Every reasonable effort was made to check the accuracy of the evidence and the veracity of the conclusions.

In seeking to increase the accuracy of the case material collected and used in this work, individual accounts and draft versions of the over-all manuscript were circulated to personnel known or believed to have been

participant-observers in the actions described. This is believed to have reduced the margin of error, but even here no claim is made that the problems of documentation have been adequately solved.

One of the most difficult problems to resolve in collecting case material was to what degree credence was to be given to first-person accounts, largely taken from memoirs, when there appeared to be an undue expression of optimism, if not outright exaggeration, of the degree of success obtained. Ego involvement in events appears to occasionally lead one to overstate the importance of his own contribution to the outcome of a particular campaign or event. Such accounts are included in this volume.

Some critical reviewers of a draft version of this study proposed that the reader be cautioned concerning the accuracy of certain observations made in particular case studies. After careful deliberation this was not thought to be feasible for reasons stated in the following paragraph.

It would obviously be an impossible task to vouchsafe the complete accuracy of each fact and each conclusion in every case in the volume. To attempt to implement such an objective would obviously involve the editors in censorship operations more dangerous to scholarship than the inclusion of an inadvertent misstatement of fact, no matter how crucial to a particular case.

It should be stated, however, that no hypothetical cases or cases manufactured without a firm basis of known facts have been included in this study. By the same token no case, from whatever source, has been included if the facts given were believed to be lacking in essential accuracy.

Principles Applicable to Psychological Warfare Operations

The selection and preparation of case material was oriented to the objective of emphasizing crucial problems which appear to highlight principles believed to be generally, if not universally, applicable to future psychological warfare operations. It is abundantly clear to the editors that there exists at present no code or set of principles widely accepted as currently applicable. It is likewise clear that current research, as well as current efforts to understand our past experiences, will not of itself produce in the near future a universally recognized body of such principles. In fact extreme care will have to be exercised in order to ascertain whether a set of principles that appear to be evolving will, in fact, be applicable in such new situations as American psychological warfare personnel may in the future have to operate.

The lack of agreement concerning the full contents of a code of principles should not imply that there is a lack of substantial agreement with respect to any one phase of psychological warfare operations. Those who object to the codification and the organization of such knowledge as we now

possess of past psychological warfare operations are probably as greatly in error as those who believe that psychological warfare operations can readily be transformed into an exact science. The task facing publicists in this field is therefore to extend the frontiers of agreement to include the acceptance of such principles as may be generally, even if only tentatively, accepted by the practitioners of the art of psychological warfare operations. The editors of this casebook have not been unaware that they may have chosen cases implying the existence of principles on which there may not now be any full measure of agreement. However, it is thought that the focusing of attention on these aspects of problems and the encouragement of free discussion may induce further research and/or observation, thus in the end permitting an extension of the frontiers of knowledge or areas of agreement on such matters.

In the introduction of each chapter and subsection of the chapters the editors have attempted to present a very brief but accurate summary of the case material that follows. Where it was feasible and appropriate, an attempt was also made to derive and state such principles applicable to psychological warfare operations as the case material suggests.

Daniel Lerner, Daniel Katz, and Wilbur Schramm have each compiled and edited an excellent volume of readings dealing with the general subject of propaganda and psychological warfare, all within the past 5 years.* Every attempt has been made in the present work not to duplicate needlessly any of the material found in their books. A careful examination of the three volumes indicates that each of the three editors operated under one rather serious limitation; i.e., it was necessary for each to tailor the outline of his volume to fit the material unearthed through scholarly excursions in public libraries. With few notable exceptions, it was not possible to extend the limits of discussion far beyond the material already published, either in academic journals or more formal books.

This work varies markedly from the others. Because of this major difference it may have deficiencies and limitations not readily apparent in the others. A reverse procedure was followed in the construction of the outline of this casebook. Before any case material was collected and edited, an outline was made of those aspects of psychological warfare operations believed to be crucial to the success of any campaign or effort. Important elements were discussed, discarded, or adopted for inclusion in a table of contents irrespective of whether or not suitable case material could be located and tailored to illustrate and supplement the outline.

In the task of searching for material to supplement and illustrate the outline it is possible that preoccupation may have caused the editors to

* See the list of references at end of this chapter.

overlook material pertinent to the subject, which if collected and used would have provided valuable extensions to the outline. A more serious difficulty encountered, however, was the inability to locate suitable case material to illustrate certain key problems and conclusions in the original outline.

It is thought that the casebook approach to the study of psychological warfare is especially appropriate at this state of development in the so-called "science of international communications." There is far from a unanimity of view as to what the principles applicable to sound operations are. The editors believe that even if they should overstate a principle or discover later that principles emphasized were reversed in the light of additional experience, the casebook approach would still have considerable validity, for an attempt has been made to identify the central issues involved in various situations in which a future planner or operator may some day find himself.

It is the hope of the editors that prescriptive admonitions, etc., which are implicit in the reproduction of certain material, will not stand in the way of a resourceful operator using his creative imagination and flexibility of mind to find adequate solutions to meet new problems as these arise. It is especially the hope of the editors that they may have produced a study that provides the uninitiated with possible solutions to guide their thinking constructively as they prepare for service in a highly important and growing field of endeavor, since both military and civilian agencies are becoming increasingly concerned with present-day international communications.

Some claim that, since so little knowledge about psychological warfare can be usefully codified at this time, even tentative guiding principles cannot be illustrated by the case-study method. Those who hold to such a point of view seldom voice the next equally logical conclusion that there is little that can be taught about psychological warfare through any other method or approach.

There are also those who object to stating even tentative principles concerning psychological warfare because many appear to be so obvious to the reader. Such a point of view avoids the basic issue. Many of the crucial issues in psychological warfare involve the selection of operational guideposts from what might appear to be two obviously contradictory principles. The line of reasoning that leads to the selection of one rather than the other may be the basic matter. Moreover, it is striking that again where obvious principles ought to have guided action, circumstances prevented their appropriate line of development. Here the issue is how such principles were disregarded. It is the hope of the editors that the

cases included in this volume may shed some light on these questions for the guidance of future planners and operators in the field of foreign information and psychological warfare operations.

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CHAPTER 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DOCTRINE

There is a general lack of agreement among both publicists and practitioners of the art or science of international communications as to the meaning of the term "psychological warfare." To some writers and officials it encompasses activities that can only be conducted in times of armed conflict or grave international crises. To others, all activities designed to influence the minds and behavior of foreign target groups, whether in times of peace or war, are described as acts of psychological warfare. Some individuals define the subject so narrowly as to include only those acts which may be characterized as propaganda in direct support of military operations, whereas others would include a much broader range of activity such as nonverbal acts designed to mislead or to deceive target groups as to one's own capabilities, intentions, or desires. Thus US citizens differ as to whether the use of psychological warfare by adherents of democratic precepts is consistent with the true and lasting interests of the American people.

Most people who write or talk about psychological warfare use the term as Humpty Dumpty did in his discussions with Alice concerning "glory." He told her, "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more or less." Thus, as with Humpty Dumpty, if there is to be intelligent discussion or fruitful exchange of views concerning the subject, it becomes necessary that one ascertain how the writer or the speaker uses the term.

Doctrine is far from set with respect to proper usage in the field of international communications. The last few years have witnessed some clarifications in thought, but disagreements or differences in views concerning psychological warfare are still far more significant than the points on which there is a near approach to agreement.

Six articles, some especially prepared for this volume, are presented in this chapter to show the range of thought concerning psychological warfare, its definition, its limitations, and the proper manner of its utilization. Since thinking on all aspects of the field is exceedingly fluid, it is exceedingly difficult to treat the subject in any definitive manner.

CHANGING CONCEPTS

By W. E. D.

Official sources and publicists are in lack of agreement on the proper terminology and scope of "psychological warfare."

The major subject matter of these series of volumes is one in which there is general lack of agreement as to definition and scope. One authority has characterized psychological warfare as a recent name for an old idea about how to wage successful war. Today it would be just as accurate to describe it as a rapidly vanishing name on how to wage war successfully and to pursue diplomatic and political objectives both in times of armed conflict and in times of peace.

Psychological warfare was defined for the first time in the addenda of the 1951 printing of *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language.*[1] The term gained recognition first in the early days of World War II when a group of Americans translated some important German literature for the purpose of showing American military and civilian leaders that the lessons of psychology could and should be employed in all phases of warfare under modern conditions.[2]

The term gained relatively rapid recognition during the course of the conflict in both Europe and Asia. By the end of the war there was established in every American military theater and major command either an *ad hoc* or a regularly constituted agency to carry on those activities which in World War I had been described as combat propaganda. As the term developed during the war it was confined largely, if not exclusively, to military propaganda activities. The broadly strategic political propaganda, largely conducted by the Office of War Information, was called by various names, but seldom, if ever, were these activities described as psychological warfare.

Although the term "psychological warfare" gained wide acceptance in military circles in World War II its usage in postwar literature came into being slowly.[3,*] Aside from the book that described German psychological warfare,[2] published in 1941, the first American author to use the term formally as the title of a book was Professor Paul M. A. Linebarger.[4] His book was followed a year later by Daniel Lerner's *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day.*[5]

Until after the outbreak of the armed conflict in Korea other authors were slow to speak of the term, except as it was used in reference to the title of a branch, section, or division of a military agency in World War II. Professor Leonard Doob in his very excellent book *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, published in 1948,[6] nowhere uses the term except when referring to the title of a military branch or division. There are very few books, including personal memoirs, textbooks, or those concerned with current world problems published prior to 1951 in which the term appears in the index. However, the situation has been gradually changing so that today there are few books in which a discussion of international information, propaganda, etc., is relevant that do not define or use the term psychological warfare.

*The term is nowhere defined or described in the latest *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1948, University of Chicago, or in any *Britannica Book of the Year* for the period 1948–1955. However, an article on psychological warfare appeared in the Britannica's *10 Eventful Years*,[3] 1947.

After the American and United Nations involvement in armed conflict in Korea in 1950 and the inauguration by President Truman of the American strategic "great new Campaign of Truth" or "greatly intensified psychological offensive" the term psychological warfare came gradually to be used in public discussions, in congressional hearings, and in newspapers to describe those activities conducted in peacetime by civilian agencies of the government that previously had been characterized by such terms as "overseas information" and the like. By 1953 and 1954 there was an increasing awareness that the term had come to be used in a manner wholly inappropriate to describe the wide range of international communications extending from combat propaganda on the battlefield to peaceful interchange of scholars and opinion leaders between friendly nations at peace with each other.

Defining Psychological Warfare

It is beyond the scope of the present work to propose a different term. There is certainly great need for a new term, but before an acceptable one can be coined it is first necessary that there be greater agreement as to the scope of the activity that has been described as "psychological warfare."

Even among the American military services the concept has undergone rapid transformation in recent years, and today there exists no definition accepted by all the services.

One of the first definitions of psychological warfare, ostensibly agreed upon by the three military services, characterized it as "the employment of *any non-lethal means* designed to affect the morale and behavior of *any group* for a specific military purpose."[7]

Less than a year after the issuance of the above quoted definition, which one would have assumed had received official acceptance by all three of the services, the Army Ground General School published a small text that defined the concept as follows: "Psychological Warfare — comprises the use of *propaganda* against an *enemy*, together with military operational *and/or other measures* which may be required to supplement such propaganda."[8]

About 18 months later the US Army issued a new dictionary of Army terms in which the subject of psychological warfare was defined still differently.

> "Psychological warfare — the *planned* use by a nation *in time of war or declared emergency* of *propaganda measures* designed to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes and behavior of *enemy, neutral,* or *friendly foreign* groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of its national policies and aims."[9]

Three years later the Department of the Army published a later version of its dictionary, wherein important changes are to be noted in the definition.

> "Psychological warfare — the planned use, by a nation or group of nations, of propaganda and related informational measures directed toward enemy neutral or friendly groups, to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior in such a manner as to support the policies and aims of the using nation or group of nations."[10]

The most significant change between the earlier and the later definition is the deletion of the words "in time of war or declared emergency." This deletion was evidently inspired by the then current popular practice of describing the activities of the International Information Administration (IIA), of the Department of

State, as psychological warfare. Yet, it is significant to note that the new Army dictionary was published well after the time when the employment of the terms psychological strategy and psychological warfare to characterize our international information came under official disapprobation by the William H. Jackson Committee which, in 1953, carried out a thorough-going review and analysis of the nation's foreign information programs.

What Acts Are Included and/or Excluded?

The discussion immediately preceding is not given merely to show that there has been lack of agreement or that there has been change in the thinking of official agencies with respect to the nature of psychological warfare. We are passing through a very fluid period. Changes in thought are to be expected in such a dynamic field. However, the separate agencies and the American people are apparently no nearer today to an understanding of the nature of psychological warfare as is evidenced by the following official and private definitions.

The Department of the Army in March 1955 released a revised field manual, presumably incorporating the latest official views on Army concepts and doctrine in psychological warfare.[11] This manual defines the subject as follows:

> "Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other actions that have the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives." (pp 6–7)[11]

One should note that this definition does not restrict the employment of psychological warfare to time of war or declared emergency, and it includes the "planned use . . . of other actions." Compare this then with the definition in another official US military publication, printed in May 1955:

> "Psychological warfare — the planned use in time of war or declared emergency of propaganda directed at enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign groups for the purpose of supporting the accomplishment of national aims and objectives."[12]

One may well ask does psychological warfare include the use of "other actions" and is it restricted to employment only "in time of war or declared emergency?" The answer could be, "that depends on which manual or regulation you accept." The real answer, however, seems to be — doctrine is not, as of this writing, fixed on these points.

If one accepts the broader concept as the more realistic one, that is, that the words "other actions" are to be included in the definition one should define this concept more precisely.

A Navy unpublished manuscript, prepared about 1946, reproduced in 1950, and disseminated thereafter on a limited basis, has this to say on the subject:

> "The basic mission of psychological warfare is to impose our will on that of the enemy in order to control his actions, by other than standard military and economic means.
>
> "Psychological warfare is both short range and long range in its operations. Its short range activities include (a) strategic propaganda, (b) combat propaganda, (c) dissemination of news, (d) planned, organized and controlled deception of the enemy, and (e) clandestine propaganda.
>
> "Long range psychological warfare consists largely of the continuous dissemination of ideas by various means to support the foreign policy of a nation, to enhance its prestige and to win sympathy and support. It may be compared to the 'showing of the flag' in a broader sense."

The fact should not be overlooked that there may still be another criterion by which to judge what is included and what is excluded in the concept of psychological warfare. A draft version of the present study was circulated among interested agencies in several government departments during 1955 to obtain critical evaluation and comment. Comments received from more than one reviewer suggest by implication that "psychological warfare includes only those activities performed by psychological warfare and foreign information personnel, but excludes those things done by ordinary military strategists and tacticians in such fields as cover and deception and those activities performed by military personnel assigned to Civil Affairs and Military Government."

The foregoing comment is but a logical extension of suggestions received that all case studies that involve military deception and military government should be deleted from this study. Psychological warfare doctrine may have evolved to the point where there is general agreement that no part of cover and deception and military government activities is to be included within the working definition of the term; however, if such be the case it has not been convincingly demonstrated to the satisfaction of at least one writer.

Popular Concepts of Psychological Warfare

Terms are given popular meaning not alone from the considered acts and thoughts of official government agents and the compilers of dictionaries, encyclopedias, and manuals. Technical terms are frequently given a frame of reference by the writers of popular accounts, memoirs, etc. It is therefore of interest to note the following definitions given by military and national figures of considerable prominence.

General Mark Clark has written,

> "The broad term 'psychological warfare' includes any action that forces the enemy to divert men and equipment from the active front, to tie down men and arms in preparation for defense against an attack that never comes. Our amphibious feint off Wonsan was just such a maneuver. We forced the enemy to expend a great deal of effort, move a large number of men and much equipment to bolster the defenses of a beach we had no intention of attacking."[13]

Chester Bowles, former Governor of Connecticut and more recently US Ambassador to India, expresses less admiration for the activity he calls "psychological warfare."

> "Psychological warfare is a cynical phrase borrowed from Goebbels and Stalin. If we insist on employing it to describe our activities we will continue to lose the respect of millions of people throughout the world who were brought up to believe that America is more than a clever gimmick or a cynical maneuver."[14]

Former US Secretary of the Department of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, has also characterized psychological warfare as implying the use of deceit in our relations with others.

> "Psychological warfare is a bad term because the word 'warfare' implies that deceit is justifiable if it serves our purpose. Deceit is standard practice in the tactics of war. It is not correct practice in peacetime, whether it be directed toward our own people, to our friends, to those who have not taken sides, or to the peoples enslaved by Russia and China. It is neither consistent with our principles nor is it good business.
>
> "Psychological warfare had its extravagances a while but they have been put to rest by the definitive report of a committee headed by William H. Jackson which recommended that the US give up psychological warfare. It said that the existing Psychological Warfare Board [sic] should be abolished because it was founded on the misconception that psychological strategy somehow exists apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in the field." (p 126)[15]

Notwithstanding categorical implications of the conclusions presented immediately above, Finletter continues his discussion with what appears to be a self-contradiction:

> "This is not to say that psychological warfare should not continue as a military tactic nor that the US should stop explaining its policies to its Allies, to the neutrals and to the enslaved peoples, providing the explanations are meticulously truthful." (p 127)[15]

Is "Political Warfare" a Better Term to Use?

The British describe the activities that Americans broadly characterize as psychological warfare as political warfare. During World War II, one of the principal agencies of the British for waging an aggressive foreign information or propaganda program was the Political Warfare Executive. However, the reader should bear in mind that even this term means all things to all people, British as well as Americans.

Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, World War II Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive, has described political warfare as "the application of propaganda to the needs of total warfare . . . its main purpose is to soften the way and render easier the task of the armed forces."[16] This concept does not differ in any important respect from a definition of psychological warfare given in the works of the accepted American writers Linebarger, Lerner, and Lasswell, to name only a few. However, this narrow view of the nature of political warfare does not necessarily represent British doctrine, notwithstanding the high positions Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart has occupied in British political and propaganda agencies.

An official paper of the British government gives quite a different slant to the concept of political warfare and what it includes. This paper says,

> "Political warfare may be defined as a form of conflict between states in which each protagonist seeks to impose its will on its opponents by methods other than the use of armed force. For practical purposes, the principal weapon of political warfare may be described as the combined operation of diplomacy and propaganda."[17]

The concept of political warfare advocated by Lockhart is clearly slanted toward its employment only in times of armed conflict; contrary to this, the official British

statement suggests that it is something for use largely, if not exclusively, in times of peace or cold war.

The term political warfare has entered American vocabulary and may be found in the writings of a number of American publicists. However, there is a wide difference of opinion as to how the term should be defined.

Ladislas Farago, the one man probably most responsible for popularizing the term psychological warfare in the US, describes political warfare as synonymous with psychological warfare.

> "Political warfare is a British term. In other countries the activity is called by different names. . . . In the United States it is called psychological warfare.
>
> "It is that form of intelligence operations that uses ideas to influence policies. It deals with opinions and with their communication to others. It is organized persuasion by nonviolent means, in contrast to military warfare in which the will of the victor is imposed upon the vanquished by violence or the threat of it."[18]

John Scott, an American author and foreign correspondent, has written a book titled *Political Warfare; A Guide to Competitive Co-existence.*[19] In this work he defines the term as including those activities the Army has chosen to call "unconventional" and the Navy "special" warfare.*

> "The basic aim of destructive political warfare is to weaken and, if possible, destroy the enemy by the use of diplomatic maneuvers, economic pressure, information and misinformation, provocation and intimidation, sabotage and terrorism, and by the isolation of the enemy from his friends and supporters. . . .
>
> "A major means of waging political warfare is the communication of ideas." (pp 28–30)[19]

Both Professors Lasswell† and Linebarger characterize political warfare as a more all-inclusive term. Linebarger defines it as follows:

> "Political warfare consists of the framing of national policy in such a way as to assist propaganda or military operations, whether with respect to direct political relations of governments with one another or in relation to groups of people possessing a political character." (p 47)[20]

Official usage within the military services affords little additional insight into the proper use of the term. The current dictionary of US Army terms reflects Professor Linebarger's definition of political warfare[11] and the current "*Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage*"[12] does not define the term at all.

Conclusion

One of the suggestions received following the circulation of an early draft edition of this work was that the title should be changed to political warfare and that this term should be substituted for psychological warfare throughout the volume,

* The Navy manuscript previously referred to suggests that "special warfare" is a term used by the US Navy to describe all activities that are not strictly military in nature, but nevertheless may be of considerable value in support of military and naval operations. Such operations include psychological warfare.

† See case study "Political and Psychological Warfare" later in this chapter.

except in those instances where the discussion is directed exclusively to military applications. These, the reviewer suggested, should be labeled "military psywar" as special cases.

This suggestion is not without merit. However, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, even as ambiguous as the term "psychological warfare" has become, both in official and popular parlance, the term "political warfare" is no better in this respect. Whether it is called psychological or political warfare there is no escape from the fact that the concept dealt with is one on which doctrine has been changing and on which authorities are far from agreement. The readings that follow are intended to shed further light on changing thought with respect to the subject regardless of whether the concept is psychological warfare, political warfare, or just plain propaganda.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE — A MISNOMER*

By Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.

The term "psychological warfare" has proved a handicap when used in reference to peacetime international communications, thus a new term for the activity is suggested.

The concept of psychological warfare presents handicaps. The productivity of research imagination and planning depends heavily on the conceptual climate within which it occurs. In this case the central concept itself has been in large part responsible for a number of mistaken expectations and decisions, as well as certain deficiencies in research planning and in specific research design.

Under present conditions in Washington it is difficult, if not impossible, to plan a systematic, coherent research program in support of psychological warfare, largely because of the unsystematic and, to me, unintelligible allocation of responsibilities among the various agencies of the government. Administratively and policy-wise it may make sense to say as we do that communication with countries with which we are at war will be the responsibility of the military forces, otherwise it is to be in the hands of the State Department and related agencies like the US Information Agency. Moreover, it is probably necessary for each of the three military services to have its own psychological warfare responsibility. Finally, it may be necessary for each agency to have its own psychological warfare and intelligence research capability.

I say these things may be necessary. It doesn't make sense to me, or for that matter to anyone who has to operate in that situation. The processes and problems involved in communicating with the peoples of the world, interpreting our actions and intentions, persuading, cajoling, confusing, or threatening them do not divide themselves readily in accordance either with the bureaucratic structure of the government or the ambiguous distinction between states of war and peace. This problem will remain a serious one until responsibility for this field is centralized in an effective agency directed from the top level of government.

The Term Psywar Has Handicapped Operations

It has been my impression that far from being a clarifying concept that structures a field and guides action, to say nothing of research effort, the term "psychological warfare" is ambiguous and leads to confused thinking and action. It lends

*Excerpts from "Social Research and Psychological Warfare," a paper presented to the American Sociological Society, Washington, D. C., 2 Sep 55. Reprinted with permission of the author.

itself to use for covering too much or too little and to mistaken decisions as to appropriate divisions and responsibility in action programs as well as research responsibility.

In the first place, the term "psychological" naturally misled unsophisticated administrators into assigning primary research planning responsibility to psychologists. Now the best psychologists in the government are in the physiological, clinical, testing, selection and training, and human engineering fields. They are by and large a well-trained and able group of men and women. But it is indefensibly unrealistic to ask those whose competence lies in these areas and whose theoretical orientation is essentially monadic and whose methods are primarily oriented to rigorously controlled laboratory experimentation on individual characteristics and learning, to plan or pass judgment on, or to supervise and defend research budgets for research in a field that is essentially communicative and interactional, requiring methods not appropriate to the conventional fields of psychology. As a result of just this sort of thing research of a too limited conception was planned in many instances, or work in this area simply languished. However, it is gratifying to report that there has been steady improvement in this respect in the last few years; but much time and effort were required to educate agencies and officers to the necessity for a genuine inter-disciplinary attack on the research problems of concern here. Let me note here that I recognize the importance of the role of psychological theory and research methodology for the area we are discussing. The strategic error the psychologists have tended to make, with notable exceptions of course, is that they did not rapidly move to supplement their own imaginations and skills with top quality competence in the other relevant disciplines, especially sociology, anthropology, social psychology and political science.

In the second place, the term "psychological warfare" has encouraged a naive and only partially conscious assumption on the part of some in responsible decision-making positions that there existed somewhere a bag of slick tricks and black magic by which advertising psychologists and other modern spell casters could put across ideas and beliefs in populations we wish to influence; that it was possible even to fight and win some wars with only words; and that somehow a lot of psychological warfare could be carried on in a vacuum with little or no relation to what was going on in more tangible economic, political or military aspects of international activity.

Now those of you who follow such things recognize that propaganda is most effective when it is tied closely to a consistent affirmative program of action which is readily comprehended. If our propaganda efforts abroad sometimes appear somewhat anemic, it may frequently be due to the fact that rightly or wrongly we are made to appear as having no affirmative action programs with which to challenge those of the enemy and we seem to be following a defensive negative strategy of merely stopping the advance of Communism without offering a feasible alternative. The only formula for putting power into our propaganda is that of positive action. There is nothing the soap salesman can do until that condition is met. All of this is to say that theory and research design oriented to the magic word conception will be quite different from that oriented to a more mundane view.

If you think I am overstating the situation you may be right; but let us remember that something very like this conception was offered to the electorate as one way the incoming administration would cut military expenditures, and I suspect in many instances this was sincerely believed by those who made such claims. In this connection you may recall the flurry and buzz in Washington, and especially in the Pentagon, about psychological warfare after the election, with many people

and agencies climbing on the small band wagon. There was quite a boomlet for a while until it was recognized that the top administration had no particular plans for channeling large funds and energies into this field. Psychological warfare then went into one of its recurrent slumps and again became an easy mark for the hatchetmen.

A third difficulty with the term "psychological warfare" is that the logic of the situation leads to responsibilities, action, and requirements beyond the natural connotations of the term, and hence it has to cover too much for precise communication. Thus, while you wish to use communicational means to confuse the enemy and undermine his will to fight, you also wish to use the same kind of capabilities to reassure and strengthen your friends. It is a bit awkward to talk about psychological warfare targets in referring to those you hope will remain your allies.

Now let me assure you the problem is something more than a matter of esthetics and public relations. The natural foci of attention indicated by the term are enemies, and the natural unconscious research tendency is toward a preoccupation with problems of communicating with a resistant target. Unless one is constantly on his guard he may easily neglect the problem of communicating with allegedly friendly targets. I need not remind you that this sometimes requires a great deal of knowledge and skill and is far more than a problem of mere access to mass media channels. Even when we are dealing with a combat target, only a part of the psychological warfare effort is directed toward creating confusion, fear, panic, and similar negative conditions. Quite as much, if not more, effort is made to communicate credible news, to reason with, to persuade, to convince the enemy you regard him as an intelligent reasonable human being who, given half a chance, would clean house and establish a decent government for his country, and so on.

Political Communications — A Suggested Name

To be sure all of this may be trite, obvious, and therefore boring. Nevertheless it suggests the possibility that by giving this rose another name we make it smell a lot sweeter to scientific noses. Furthermore, we can expect the inhalations to stimulate and enrich the scientific imaginations far beyond that evoked by the present label. But now that we propose to give psychological warfare "the deep six" what shall we put in its place? I have no sure-fire, super-concept to unveil at this point, but my own thinking about making more adequate use of social science in this field is greatly facilitated by regarding this area as political communications. I should indeed be surprised and a little disappointed if you could not quickly supply a more efficient designation. But at least it will serve to indicate a direction I believe our thinking might take with some profit. And before you toss this one out as another case of operation mountain and mouse, I might point to some gains, should it prove possible to take seriously the shift in orientation implied and to follow its implications.

1. Quite apart from the stimulus to a broader research perspective, some such term underscores the fact that a large proportion of that which we label psychological warfare falls well within what democratic cultures guarantee as an inalienable right — namely to convince other people that you are right and that they are wrong. Indeed, we are committed to the technique of the free-for-all competition of ideas as a way of crystallizing our opinions on public issues. The kind of reciprocity implied in this concept might well make the Politburo nervous.

2. It places psychology as a contributing discipline instead of sole proprietor and thus relieves it of the burden of an inappropriate role. At the same time, with due

care, we should, I hope, be able to prevent the illusion that the field now belongs to the political scientists, though this might be quite acceptable if that discipline should become more of a behavioral science.

3. It should help to dissipate any remaining implicit assumptions of magic and hocus-pocus.

4. It explicitly includes friends as well as foes, self as well as others as objects of interest and effort.

5. More relevant to our concern for the research implications is the fact that it designates a field which social scientists can get hold of in terms of current theories and methods; and, what is more, they can work at this — mobilizing present knowledge, developing new theory, and doing new basic research without the hampering effects of security regulations.

6. All of this would seem possible and at the same time permit or indeed facilitate the recognition of a substantial residue of operations and attendant research problems which can properly be treated as psychological warfare in a stricter and more precise sense instead of having them confused by the broader operations and problems of political communications. There is potentially, if not actually, a body of doctrine and tactics for the military use of nonlethal weapons of light, sound, smell, taste, as well as of symbolic communication in either white (overt) or black (covert) operations to induce neutralization, defection, and surrender of enemy populations. Special research support of these operations is necessary, and most of it is and should be done under secure conditions just as any weapons research is.

To be sure, war is politics, and moreover today it is total. Thus psychological warfare in the more limited sense in which I have just used it can and probably should be regarded as a special division of a more general area of political communications. Actually there are no sharp boundary lines here. But these considerations should on no account be allowed to obscure my main argument, that under cold war conditions and to a substantial degree under hot war conditions, what has been called psychological warfare is better described as political communications; that the relevant research problems are better structured in that orientation; and that the major tasks of conceptualization and of basic research can better be done outside the handicapping context in which we are now working.

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By Harold D. Lasswell

Psychological warfare — a new name for an old idea — uses mass communications to destroy the enemy's will to resist. Political warfare covers more than the use of mass communications.

Psychological Warfare is a recent name for an old idea about how to wage successful war. The idea is found in the oldest manuals of military strategy. Sun Tzu's *The Book of War*, written in China in the fifth century B.C., stressed the importance of destroying the enemy's will to fight through such means as surprise and noise. "In night fighting," Sun Tzu wrote, "beacons and drums are largely used; in day fighting, a great number of banners and flags, and the enemy's eyes and ears are confounded." The same aim could be accomplished by spreading tales of the treachery of trusted leaders and of the overwhelming forces at the

*From Daniel Lerner's *Propaganda in War and Crisis*, George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1951, pp 261–66. Reprinted with permission of Dr. Lasswell and George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., the copyright holder.

command of the enemy. *The Book of War* also advised the assassination of enemy leaders in order to create panic. Another suggestion made by Sun Tzu was that a commander should avoid struggle to the bitter end and gain victory at a minimum cost.

Essentially the same guiding principles can be found in the military literature or the prevailing maxims of the ancient empires of India and the Near East. The East Indian political classic, Kautilya's *Arthasastra*, for example, contains advice on how to destroy enemy morale and build up one's own. Secret agents, it suggests, should circulate among the enemy soldiers and spread rumors of their certain defeat. As for one's own forces, "Astrologers and other followers of the king should infuse spirit into the army by pointing out [its] impregnable nature."

The basic idea is that the best success in war is achieved by the destruction of the enemy's will to resist, and with a minimum annihilation of fighting capacity. The political aim is limited destruction. Neither the enemy's armed forces nor the whole population nor the physical facilities should be totally obliterated. On the contrary, the political goals are limited. Usually the purpose is to see that in the enemy country there be installed a leadership that will turn it into an ally, or at least into a non-hostile power.

In the case of our own wars with Germany, at no time was it our serious policy to destroy the whole German people. In World War II, the destruction of German lives and property through bombing was intended to bring the conflict to the quickest possible conclusion. The ultimate object was the substitution for the Nazi regime of leaders and forms of government willing to support the sort of national structure and international order in which we have confidence.

In World War II, strategic air power was clearly not a "psychological" instrument in the same sense that radio broadcasts to the German people were. Yet in war, all strategy and tactics aim at *an economy of means in the accomplishment of its objectives*. How, then, can we distinguish Psychological Warfare from other forms of warfare?

The most distinctive act of Psychological Warfare is this: — *it uses the means of mass communication in order to destroy the enemy's will to fight.* When the old Chinese armies went into battle with an array of musical instruments and a forest of banners to impress the enemy soldiers, they were relying upon the use of means which are ordinarily specialized for the communication of emotion or information. The same was true of the use of tale-bearers to undermine the unity of the enemy by exaggerating the strength of the forces on the other side or by stirring up sedition against the leaders.

Mass communication, it should be stressed, is not exclusively a matter of the word, spoken or printed, or picture. It uses other media also, such as physical acts and material devices. This is notably true of assassination. While the act of killing cannot be considered a conventional method of communication, yet it has been used often to affect political attitudes. *The act of assassination was expected to have an impact upon the intention of the enemy to fight that would be far out of proportion to the physical damage done to his capacity, or to the physical capacity made use of in the killing.* We are looking at the conduct of war in the perspective of psychology when we are seeking to widen the gap between the physical destruction of capabilities on both sides and the magnitude of the impact upon the enemy's intention to resist.

By this time it should be obvious that Psychological Warfare is a reminder of the fundamental conception of all strategy rather than a specific technique. Why, then, do we speak of it at all?

The fact is that fundamental principles of warfare are continually falling into neglect from which it is necessary to rescue them. Generals and admirals are always caught between two opposing tendencies in using their tools of war. One tendency is to magnify the specific importance of the physical and personnel instruments; the other is to subordinate these instruments to a larger plan in which they may be economized, and hence cut down somewhat in apparent importance. This means that men who specialize on ships become devoted to every detail of how the ship can be built, supplied, and handled in war. Artillery specialists are absorbed in the designing, building, and tactical application of guns. Regardless of the physical weapon, or of the personnel devoted to the weapon, there is a vast concentration of understanding and loyalty, the result of which is to magnify the visible role of the weapon in the conduct of war. "Gadget love" is a snare for the unwary in the same way that love of the horse, or the camel, or the elephant appealed to the cavalryman of the past.

A term like Psychological Warfare comes into vogue when circumstances appear to confer some new importance upon economy in the use of physical weapons as a means of destroying the enemy's will to fight. In World War I the word that performed this task was "propaganda." That, too, was not a conception limited to the printing of newspapers or of leaflets for clandestine circulation among enemy soldiers and civilians. There was "propaganda of the deed," a term borrowed from social revolutionaries, which emphasized the importance of assassinating or the taking of emotionally significant cities or the importance of surprise and the cultivation of revolutionary aims against enemy governments.

World War II saw the term Psychological Warfare performing the function that had been performed by propaganda in World War II. The word originated and gained significance in Germany as the Germans who were defeated in World War I began to look into the causes of that "collapse." The experts for the German General Staff believed that they had been bested in the use of the instruments of mass communication (often referred to by the term "propaganda"), and also by the failure to exploit all of their weapons with the maximum impact upon the enemy's will as the chief criterion.

The vogue of the expression "Psychological Warfare" came in part from the rapid expansion of specialized psychologists in Germany, the United States, and in other Western countries. The psychologists wanted "a place in the sun;" that is, they were eager to demonstrate that their skills could be used for the national defense in time of war. Early in the Second World War a group of Americans translated some of the important German literature into English for the purpose of opening the eyes of the military to the usefulness of psychology, not only in testing for specific aptitudes, or in propaganda, but in considering every phase of the conduct of war under modern conditions.

When we say, therefore, that Psychological Warfare is a new name for an old idea, and for an idea that is continually growing dim, we are in no way detracting from the importance of the term. Although the Russians paid little attention to the expression, they were even more completely aware of the essential idea than the Germans. For the leaders of the Soviet Union had seized power largely by

combining propaganda with other acts upon tottering governments and upon discontented masses. The vocabulary of the Soviet leaders did not have to be refreshed by another word for conceptions thoroughly understood and applied.

Actually, the idea of Psychological Warfare is somewhat less comprehensive than other terms with which it is closely linked. The more inclusive conception is that of "political warfare," which covers the use of more than the means of mass communication or the handling of weapons in order to maximize impact upon the will to resist. Political warfare adds the important idea that all instruments of policy need to be properly correlated in the conduct of war.

Diplomacy, for example, can be used to keep potential enemies neutral, or to detach allies from the enemy. Diplomacy may also be used to bring the war to an early end by making secret arrangements with disaffected elements in the enemy country. When we speak of diplomacy, we have in mind the making of official commitments. Whereas mass communication aims at large audiences, diplomacy proceeds by means of official negotiation. Representatives of various powers deal directly with one another. Often diplomacy can be made most effective when it is properly correlated with Psychological Warfare (in the sense of both symbol propaganda and "propaganda of the deed").

Political warfare also includes the use of economic means besides the instruments which have been enumerated above. In order to preclude the use of minerals or other resources by an enemy, available stocks may be purchased in neutral countries. It may be important to coordinate propaganda with these operations in order to gain the tacit cooperation of officials in neutral countries who might otherwise interfere.

In considering Psychological Warfare and other instruments of policy connected with it, it should be kept in mind that they can be employed in peace as in war, with the necessary change of emphasis. The difference between war and peace is not always sharply defined, as is seen by the current "cold war." War can be said to exist when active hostilities are going on between two powers, or when the resumption of hostilities is expected at any moment.

The chief instruments of policy in war and peace are:

Diplomacy
Propaganda
Economics
Arms

In war the emphasis upon arms is of outstanding importance:

Armed Warfare
  Physical Warfare
  Psychological Warfare
Political Warfare
  Diplomatic Warfare
  Propaganda Warfare
  Economic Warfare

Peacefare and warfare are the two patterns which are assumed in the instruments of total policy at all times.

Political warfare thus includes operations in relation to allies, neutrals and the home audience. Psychological Warfare includes propaganda directed against the enemy, together with the use of arms to create the greatest impact upon the enemy's will to fight at the least cost of capability. Enemy intentions are the target.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REAPPRAISED*

By Roland I. Perusse

"Psychological warfare" and "cold war" are unfortunate terms that should be discarded in favor of more descriptive terminology.

INTRODUCTION

" 'Cold war' and 'psychological warfare' are unfortunate terms. They do not describe the efforts of our nation and our Allies to build a world of peace and freedom. They should be discarded in favor of others that describe our true goals."[21]

This pronouncement, made in June 1953 at the highest level by a group of the nation's foremost authorities in foreign affairs (The President's Committee on International Information Activities), fell like a bombshell on the elaborate structure of "psychological strategy" theory that had been erected during the preceding decade. The result has been a year of rethinking, reappraisal, and reevaluation of the general technique of influencing foreign peoples. This process of reappraisal is by no means complete; indeed, it is and should be a continuing one. However, a number of significant trends and new philosophies have already emerged, and it may be useful at this time to analyze some of the changes that have taken place in psychological warfare theory and practice since the revolutionary pronouncement of a year ago.

THE SETTING

For those to whom the subject of psychological warfare is new or who have been confused by the multitude of popular and professional writing and commentary on the subject in recent years, a brief survey of the evolution of psychological warfare as a force in international relations may be helpful as background for understanding the June 1953 pronouncement and the developments that followed. Especially useful, it seems, is some indication as to just exactly what is meant by the term "psychological warfare," and a brief analysis of developments in this field over the years.

Definitions and Scope

It is absolutely necessary, prior to any discussion or assessment of psychological warfare as an instrument of national policy, to agree on terms of reference. Most of the misunderstandings that have arisen during the past few years as to the proper role of psychological warfare in a democratic society, and as to its capabilities and limitations in helping attain foreign policy objectives, have arisen as a result of confusion over terminology. Interpretations have varied as to the scope of the field covered by psychological warfare and as to the relation of this particular discipline to the other, more firmly established fields of foreign affairs activity and knowledge.

The difficulty of defining psychological warfare can be appreciated from the great variety of terms that have come into common usage to characterize the peculiar international crisis in which the US finds itself today, and the more unconventional policies that have been adopted to meet this crisis. A few of the more common terms are:

1. Cold war
2. War of ideas
3. Struggle for the minds and wills of men

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4. War for the minds of men
5. Thought war
6. Ideological warfare
7. Nerve warfare
8. Political warfare
9. International information
10. Overseas information
11. Campaign of truth
12. Propaganda
13. International propaganda
14. Propaganda warfare
15. War of words
16. Indirect aggression
17. Agitation
18. International communication

Some of these terms have actually been used as synonyms for psychological warfare by writers on the subject, as for example, equation of psychological warfare with propaganda.

A further difficulty arises from the fact that generally accepted official usage of the term "psychological warfare," in the US underwent rapid evolution and expansion during the 5 years 1948 to 1953, whereas many nongovernmental specialists clung to narrower definitions. The term is not defined in the dictionary,[1] and meanings vary from expert to expert.

Definitions of psychological warfare vary from narrow usage during World Wars I and II as an adjunct to military force in time of war, to the broad concepts underlying establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board by President Truman in 1951, and President Eisenhower's appointment of C. D. Jackson as his psychological warfare adviser early in 1953.

Perhaps one of the best definitions of military psychological warfare has been formulated by Paul M. A. Linebarger, a pioneer in systematizing knowledge on the subject. In his well-known text, *Psychological Warfare*, published in 1948, (2d ed 1954)[20] Professor Linebarger defines psychological warfare in the narrow sense of "the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a military, economic, or political nature as may be required to supplement propaganda."(p 40)[20] Military propaganda he defines in turn as "planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose."(p 39)

It was at about this time that the term "psychological warfare," was borrowed from the military by civilian proponents for a vigorous peacetime overseas information program by the Department of State. In the years 1945 to 1948, the US had undergone a period of psychological disarmament comparable only to the disarmament that had taken place at the same time with respect to conventional weapons and military manpower. It was an act of overcompensation on the part of civilian information specialists that led to the borrowing of this term from the US military vocabulary and, incidentally, to many of the difficulties that ensued. For purposes of definition, "psychological warfare," as "civilianized," came to take on some such

meaning as "the employment of modern media of communications for the purpose of reaching mass audiences in order to persuade them to accept certain beliefs or ideas."(p 6)[22]

It was not long, however, before "psychological warfare" assumed an even more exalted position. In the broad sense, Linebarger had defined psychological warfare as "the application of parts of the science of psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or military actions." (p 25)[20] Authorities such as Harold D. Lasswell and Edward W. Barrett began to speak of the four arms of US foreign policy (diplomacy, military, economy and propaganda). (p 265)[23] A "psychological strategy board" was established in the US, directly under the National Security Council, top policy organ of our government, for the purpose of coordinating the policies of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Mutual Security Agency for maximum psychological impact abroad.

Finally, psychological warfare was given the meaning of "the struggle for the minds and wills of men" by no less of an authority than President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his famous 8 October 1952 campaign speech in San Francisco. Said General Eisenhower:

> "We must adapt our foreign policy to a 'cold war' strategy that is unified and coherent. . . . In spirit and resolve, we should see in this 'cold war' a chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace. . . ."[24]

Thus, by 1953, psychological warfare had been closely identified with the cold war, i.e., the global struggle between Communism and the Free World. Its supreme status as the governing factor in US foreign policy was exemplified by President Eisenhower's appointment of a personal adviser on psychological warfare matters in the person of C. D. Jackson, publisher of *Fortune* magazine and a "psychological warrior" of renown as Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, during World War II.

Because of the wide variety of meanings that the term has assumed, as well as changes in thinking that have occurred in the past year (discussed in the next section), no attempt will be made to assign a specific definition to the concept of psychological warfare in this paper. Rather, the term will be placed in context each time it is used, so that the reader may know the particular meaning that is intended in each case.

Before dismissing the question of definition, it may be well to refer once more to the 18 terms listed above and to explore their meanings.

The first five terms (cold war, war of ideas, struggle for the minds and wills of men, war for the minds of men, and thought war) are situational; they describe psychological processes in international relations and very dynamic ones indeed. Cold war would seem to encompass the widest field; presumably, cold war is being waged today by all means short of outright mass military offensive action. The other four terms are descriptive of the ideological part of this struggle.

Ideological warfare, nerve warfare, and political warfare can have both situational meanings, i.e., definition of the existing crisis between Communism and the Free World, and a methodological meaning, i.e., description of the techniques being used to meet the crisis. Political warfare is a distinctively British term, used to

convey the idea of co-relation of all instruments of policy (diplomacy, economics, arms, etc.) in time of war. (p 264)[23] It comes closest to the meaning of psychological warfare in the broad sense. Nerve warfare is a more strictly psychological term, and because it entails purposeful heightening of tensions, is usually reserved for operations against an enemy in time of outright hostilities.

The terms "international information" and "overseas information" are applied in the US to the process of distributing facts and knowledge that would help offset misinformation about the US being circulated by hostile groups. Propaganda is defined by Lasswell as "the calculated selection and circulation of symbols with a view to influencing mass behavior."[25] Accordingly, international propaganda can be defined as "the calculated selection and circulation of symbols with a view to influencing mass behavior on controversial *international* issues."[26] Propaganda warfare is merely a more dramatic term for the same process, while war of words would pertain to the selection and circulation of word symbols only.

Indirect aggression is a broad term that embraces concepts of sabotage and subversion as well as the use of information and propaganda for offensive purposes. Agitation is a peculiarly Soviet term, used to describe propaganda conducted among the masses as contrasted to the elite.[27] International communication, aside from its purely technical meaning, is used to characterize *who says what to whom, when, and with what effect* in international relations.[28]

There has been an element of each of the foregoing concepts (depending on the definition of psychological warfare that one accepts) in psychological warfare as waged in the past, and/or psychological warfare has constituted an element of each of the concepts.

Background of Psychological Warfare

Whether considered in the narrow military sense, or in the widest possible strategic sense, psychological warfare, in fact if not in name, has been practiced by man since the earliest records of civilization. Linebarger cites the use of panic by Gideon in his battles against the Midianites about 1245 B.C.(pp 3–5)[20] One of the best-known historical examples is use of the Trojan Horse by the Greeks to capture the city of Troy.[29]

Propaganda was never used on a broad scale, however, until World War I. The first organized effort by the US was the Committee on Public Information (better known as the Creel Committee), which had the sympathetic interest of President Wilson and did an acceptable job from 1917–1919 in rallying morale on the home front and exploiting the Fourteen Points in Europe.[30,31]

The term "psychological warfare," had its origins in World War II. German psychologists, anxious to rationalize Germany's defeat in World War I, seized on the Allied psychological attack as an excuse for the military collapse.(p 264)[23] The Germans proceeded to forge the most terrifying psychological weapons of all time, combining propaganda, fifth-column terrorism, and violence with *blitzkrieg* military action.[32]

The US itself engaged in an extensive program of psychological warfare, principally through the Office of War Information[33] and the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Europe (SHAEF). The British program was carried on through three agencies: the Political Warfare Executive, a secret organization for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries; the Ministry of Information, which dealt with the British public and Allied and neutral countries; and the Overseas Services of the British Broadcast-

ing Corporation, which broadcast to all countries, receiving guidance from the Political Warfare Executive and the Ministry of Information. (p 16)[33] Psychological warfare was recognized and accepted as a military instrument, sharing honors, powers, and responsibilities with the military, economic, and diplomatic agencies of modern war. (p 11)[22]

The period 1945 to 1948 marked the virtual psychological disarmament of the US. The American people and Congress failed to appreciate the menace of Communist propaganda to American security and to grasp the possibilities inherent in the psychological approach. The value of propaganda as a wartime instrument was admitted, but its potentialities as an instrument of national policy during time of peace were not generally recognized. There was wide opposition from US commercial press, radio, and film media, which feared government competition abroad. Many of the most able and skilled personnel in the fields of information and psychological warfare left government service. Their loss was tragic and irreplacable. During this period, the US information program was reduced to little more than educational exchange under the Fulbright Act and cultural exchange with Latin American through the Pan-American Union. The low point was reached in the spring of 1947, when Soviet propaganda was at an all-time postwar high and US world prestige at an all-time postwar low.

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (Public Law 402) gave first Congressional authorization for a world-wide US international informational and cultural program in time of peace. US objectives were to be "to promote better understanding of the US in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the US and other countries." It remains the basic legislation for the conduct of the US information program today.

By 1950 the US had thoroughly awakened to the Soviet threat. There was no longer any disagreement on the need for a program, and President Truman was given a record appropriation of $121,000,000 to carry on a "Campaign of Truth" against Communism.[34] An official peacetime role, in name, was assigned to psychological warfare with the creation of the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in the Department of State.

On 20 June 1951, psychological warfare was placed on an even higher plane with the creation, by Presidential directive, of the Psychological Strategy Board, responsible to the National Security Council, the nation's top policy-making body. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological approaches to the nation's problems and to help influence opinions, attitudes, and behavior abroad in support of national objectives.[35] Regular members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other agencies, such as the Mutual Security Administration, participated as needed. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal adviser, and the Board's director was appointed by the President.*,[36]

Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Presidential candidate, gave his views on the scope of psychological warfare in the San Francisco address previously cited:

> "Many people think 'psychological warfare' means just the use of propaganda like the controversial 'Voice of America.' Certainly the use of prop-

* The organization, mission, and operation of the Psychological Strategy Board and related US Agencies in the field of psychological warfare is discussed in a series of articles by Anthony Leviero; included in which is an elaborate chart depicting the entire US national psychological warfare organization as of December 51.[36]

aganda, the written and spoken word, of every means known to transmit ideas, is an essential part of winning other people to your side. But propaganda is not the most important part of this struggle. . . . There are many peaceful tools that must be used through every medium of communication, mutual economic assistance, trade and barter, friendly contacts through travel, and correspondence and sports — these represent some of the political means to support essential programs for mutual military assistance and collective security. . . ."[24]

During the 1952 campaign the Republican party strongly attacked the policy of containment of Communism inaugurated by the Democratic Administration and pledged a "roll-back" of Communist influence and peaceful liberation of peoples enslaved by Soviet Communism.[37]

On 16 February 1953, President Eisenhower appointed C. D. Jackson as his personal adviser on psychological warfare, thereby placing the coordinated direction of psychological factors in US foreign affairs on the highest level of government.

REAPPRAISALS, 1953–1954

One of President Eisenhower's first acts as Chief Executive was to appoint an eight-man committee to study the problem of psychological warfare.[38] Called the President's Committee on International Information Activities, this group, headed by W. H. Jackson, New York attorney, interviewed over 250 witnesses in the 5-month period, 30 January to 30 June 1953.

The committee's startling conclusion has been cited in the introduction to this paper. In addition, the committee had this to say about "psychological strategy":

> ". . . the existing Psychological Strategy Board, established in 1951, does not meet the real need which exists in Government and should be abolished. It is founded on the misconception that "psychological strategy" somehow exists apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this field.
>
> "In reality, there is a 'psychological' aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military policy and action. This implication should receive more careful attention, both in the planning and execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of other factors.
>
> "Except for propaganda, there are no 'psychological warfare' instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy. Every significant act of virtually every department and agency of government has its effect, either positively or negatively, in the global struggle for freedom. The important task is to build awareness throughout the entire Government of the impact of day-to-day governmental actions and to coordinate and time such actions so as to derive from them the maximum advantages. . . .
>
> "The primary and overriding purposes of the information program should be to submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their own aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace are supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the US.
>
> "The efforts of all media — radio, press, and publications, motion pictures, exchange of persons, and libraries and information centers — should be directed to this end: to show the identity of our goals with those of other peoples. These goals and desires, which we hold in common, must be explained in ways that will cause others to join with us in achieving them.
>
> "In carrying out this purpose, American broadcasts and printed materials should concentrate on objective, factual news reporting, with particular selection and treatment of news designed to present a full exposition of US actions and policies, especially as they affect the particular country addressed.
>
> "The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandistic note should be avoided. The information services should not, however, be precluded from making forceful and factual refutation of false Soviet accusations. . . .
>
> "New terms are needed (instead of 'psychological warfare' and 'cold war') to express the solidarity of freedom-loving men and women everywhere."[38]

The announcement should not have come as a complete surprise. There had been earlier indications of such trends in thinking about propaganda and psychological warfare. In fact, as early as 1948, Carroll had used practically the same words as did the committee in presenting his views of what the US overseas information objective should be: "American foreign policy will be successful only to the extent that it can convince the peoples that American aims are in harmony with their aspirations for peace and freedom and personal liberty." (p 192)[33]

Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1950–1952, had recommended that our information program be persuasive but not propagandistic in tone; that all arguments be supported by facts.[39]

Reports had come in from foreign countries that campaign talk, pro and con, about "psychological warfare," "liberation," and "roll-back" had excited apprehensions abroad.[40] In some places it was feared that President Eisenhower, as a former general, would be overly concerned with military matters; and would want to launch another "Crusade in Europe," dragging the Free World into a needless war.

There had already been at least one bit of evidence of changed practices: President Eisenhower's 16 April 1953 speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. This speech, in which President Eisenhower called for atomic disarmament and use of funds saved thereby for technical assistance to underdeveloped areas, had profound psychological impact in countries around the world. Yet it was not termed "psychological warfare" except by the enemies of the US, who hoped thereby to distort US intentions.

The findings of the W. H. Jackson committee had far-reaching effects on the reorganization of US "psychological" strategy. Presidential Reorganization Plan 8, approved by the 83d Congress, and made effective 1 August 1953, took the overseas information function out of the Department of State and assigned it to a new and autonomous US Information Agency (USIA). The Director of the Agency was made directly responsible to the President through the National Security Council, and he received foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The information responsibilities of the Foreign Operations Administration and Technical Cooperation Administration were taken over by USIA, although the exchange-of-persons program was left in the Department of State.[41]

President Eisenhower, on recommendation of the National Security Council, issued a directive dated 22 October establishing the basic mission of the Agency as

follows: "To submit evidence of peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace."

This mission was to be accomplished by:

1. "Explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government;
2. "Depicting imaginatively the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world;
3. "By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the Government of the US;
4. "By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States."[42]

Under the new mission, the agency was to concentrate on objective, factual news reporting, with appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important US actions and policies, especially as they affect individual countries and areas. Tone and content of material was to be forceful and direct, but a strident or antagonistic tone was to be avoided.[43]

At the same time the Psychological Strategy Board was dissolved and an Operations Coordinating Board was established. The function of OCB is to coordinate the broad foreign policy of the US in all its aspects — economic, military, and political — with psychological factors being considered in the formulation of all policies.

On 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower made a second major policy speech in keeping with the new concepts of US "psychological" relations with foreign peoples — the famous "Atom Pool" address before the United Nations. Peoples of the world were quick to identify "their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace" with the President's proposal — so quick, in fact, that the Soviet Union was obliged to reverse its initial position branding the offer a mere propaganda stunt and at least to go through the motions of entering into negotiations with the US on the matter.

On 1 April 1954, C. D. Jackson resigned as the President's adviser on psychological warfare, having played a vital part in formulating new concepts of the place of psychological factors in international relations.* The position, as carried out by Jackson, was not filled, pointing up once more the readjustment that has taken place: psychological factors are no longer considered in isolation and superior to other elements in foreign policy formulation and execution but are considered a vital and integral part of every action.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal lesson to be derived from the reappraisal of psychological warfare that has taken place over the past year is that the term itself had best be avoided in any characterization of either our informational output or our foreign relations generally. The term has decided negative connotations, both at home and abroad, and warfare of all kinds had best be left to the military. It is no exaggeration to say that the US, by announcing to the world that its policies were governed or would be governed by "psychological strategy" and "psychological warfare,"

* C. D. Jackson served as a member of the W. H. Jackson Committee and had a hand in the preparation of both of the President's atomic energy speeches.

raised unnecessary fears among peoples abroad and gave grist to the Communist propaganda claim of US warmongering. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda claiming Communist monopoly of peaceful intentions, though transparently fraudulent as evidenced by Soviet actions in Korea, the United Nations and elsewhere, made headway as a result of the failure of the US to identify itself more fully with the universal desire of mankind for peace.

The term "psychological warfare" never did set well with the American people. Military personnel have always been annoyed at the "theft" of this term by civilians in government. Much confusion resulted from the attempt to transfer the concept from its wartime setting to applications of national strategy in time of peace. Political officers of the Department of State resented what they regarded as invasion of a field that has been traditionally their domain. Many persons in and out of government found it difficult to understand how "psychological warfare" could be conducted in time of peace, particularly against neutrals and friendly countries. Foreign countries, in turn, did not enjoy being the object of any kind of "warfare," especially when initiated by a supposedly friendly power.

All these difficulties arose, of course, either through genuine misunderstandings of the concept of "psychological warfare" by friends of US policy or as a result of purposeful distortions by hostile groups. It did not help to explain to people at home or our friends abroad that psychological warfare meant essentially the taking of psychological factors into consideration in dealing with foreign peoples — an objective that the most vehement of critics could hardly condemn. However, the fact remains that words are words, that people are naturally inclined to consider words first and foremost according to their primary meanings, that we have not always had the opportunity to explain that by "warfare" we have meant "peacefare," and we have necessarily assumed a ridiculous posture (something akin to Communist corruption of word meanings) every time that we have made the attempt. In brief, those in the business of explaining US policies abroad through a judicious choice of word symbols had failed to choose an appropriate word symbol to characterize their own operations. To try to confine the term of official usage, "within the family" of persons who do "appreciate" the "true" meaning of the word, did not help; not only did interpretations vary between experts but official terminology inevitably crept into popular usage.

Abandonment of the term, however, should by no means result in the abandonment of any of the processes involved in what has been known professionally as "psychological warfare." There will always be a need for "psychological intelligence," i.e., the kind of information on foreign societies that anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and area specialists can provide. It will always be necessary to take psychological factors into consideration in shaping policies toward foreign nations. Those persons having specialized knowledge about dealing with foreign populations, whether called "psychological strategists," "psychological operators," "psychological warriors," or just plain cultural anthropologists, social psychologists, or foreign information and area specialists, will always play a vital role in the conduct of foreign policy in this era of popular government. Even the twentieth century dictator makes no pretense at absolute rule; he is anxious to give his government an aura of "popularity" and so keeps his ear tuned to public opinion, if not to be guided by it, then in order to "correct" it where he deems it necessary. It is the duty of persons cognizant of psychological factors to keep diplomats, political and military officers, economic experts, and others who have dealings with foreign peoples and foreign governments informed of the climate

of and changes in public opinion in foreign countries and to let such persons know of the probable public reaction to policies contemplated. In this way, many moves that could cause resentment can be avoided, or if they must be taken, regardless of probable adverse public opinion, because of the other overriding factors, the psychological specialist, if we want to call him that, can offer suggestions as to how effects may be mitigated or cushioned. Such a specialist also has a duty to come up with suggestions for actions that will create favorable public reaction abroad.

Propaganda is another term that is best avoided, again because of negative connotations at home and abroad. Many Americans were shocked when they learned to what extent British propaganda activities in the US during World War I had pushed the US into the war on the Allied side.

Communist world revolutionary propaganda in the US following World War I,[44] together with the activities of Dr. Goebbels and Japanese propagandists, helped reinforce American suspicion and abhorrence of propaganda and propaganda techniques, and to associate propaganda with dictatorship. The use of propaganda by the Communists in the post-World War II period has seemed to confirm the deepest distrust of propaganda and propaganda operations as something basically and intrinsically evil.

It has helped little to point out that propaganda, technically speaking, is essentially a neutral term, that one can have both good and bad propaganda, that the word actually has a religious origin (from propagation of the Catholic faith during Counter Reformation), and that "to propagate" means little more than "to disseminate." (And who is against diffusion of knowledge?) Popular conception has converted "propaganda" from a positive, or essentially neutral, to a negative word, and rather than try to reverse the process, it is better to let the term ride as a proper definition for totalitarian efforts and to characterize the activities of democratic societies as "information." From a strictly academic point of view, the distinction is not valid; but from a practical and public relations point of view, the entire task of dealing with foreign peoples will be made easier if we go along with the tide of public opinion, at home and abroad, and drop the word completely from descriptions of our own efforts.

The expressions, "psychological strategy," "psychological operations," and "target" should also be avoided. US observers can vouch for the discomfiture of foreign peoples at being considered by us as a fitting subject for manipulation in the interest of achieving certain of our strategic objectives vis-à-vis the USSR. The terms, "foreign policy," "foreign relations," and "foreign peoples" have much longer standing and much more positive connotations.

The announced purpose of the US information program (as seeking to show that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance the legitimate aspirations of foreign peoples for freedom, progress, and peace) should offer further suggestions for substitute terminology. It would seem that such terms as "peace," "security," "prosperity," "solidarity," and "cooperation," when properly compounded with such concepts as "mutuality," "reciprocity," and "collective" or "united action," should provide a more fitting description of what we as a nation are striving for in our relations with other countries.

In summary, then, the conduct of foreign affairs today demands identification and consideration of psychological processes in international relations. USIA, having, as its principal objective, identification of US policies with the legitimate aspirations of foreign peoples, must necessarily be able to identify and assess these aspirations. It must know which psychological approach is most likely to achieve

the desired result and to act accordingly. From a strictly professional viewpoint, this is "psychological warfare," pure and simple, as everyone who has engaged in any aspect of such activity will recognize, but for the better chances of its success, it would appear wise not to call it that, but rather, as recommended by the President's Committee, to concentrate on finding other terms that describe our true goals.

THE CREED OF A MODERN PROPAGANDIST*

By W. E. D.

A statement of the views of a leading British propagandist on how and when to employ psychological warfare.

A survey made during 1950 among a limited number of American World War II propagandists resulted in the finding that more of them believed that Richard H. S. Crossman possessed outstanding qualities as a successful propagandist than any other person of their acquaintance. Dick Crossman, as he was known to his World War II colleagues, is a Britisher. He was the Deputy Director of PWD/SHAEF, a prewar Oxford professor, and a postwar Labor Party member of the British House of Commons.

Britishers as well as Americans viewed Crossman as one of the outstanding if not the leading propagandist of World War II. One writer listed his outstanding trait as the possession of an "imagination to see the machinations of the enemy," whereas another American who knew Crossman has pointed to the fact that his strength as a propagandist stemmed from his "intimate knowledge of German and of the German character."

A British colleague of Crossman in World War II, Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, has gone on record as saying that ". . . he has had more experience of the practical application of psychological warfare than probably anybody else in the World. . . . I would say that most, if not all, of what the Americans learned about psychological warfare they learned from Mr. Crossman."

In February 1952 Mr. Crossman addressed the British Royal United Service Institution on the topic of "Psychological Warfare." From this account principles of propaganda have been deduced and are stated below as positive propositions. Most of what follows remains in Crossman's own words, and largely in the order in which he placed them.

1. Many objectives may be sought through the employment of psychological warfare.

   a) ". . . the object of psychological warfare is to do certain things to the enemy: first to demoralize him; secondly, . . . to exdoctrinate him, to undermine his belief in the totalitarian doctrine he has been given; and thirdly, to begin the process of indoctrination.

   b) ". . . on the other side of the enemy lines you have not only the enemy . . . you have also friends who are behind the enemy lines, not because they

*Adapted from "Psychological Warfare," by Richard H. S. Crossman, a lecture presented to the British Royal United Service Institution, reported in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 97: 319–32 (1952). Excerpts reprinted with the permission of Mr. Crossman and the publishers of *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.

are on his side but because they are compelled to serve him. You can assume that they are on your side; your job is first to keep them on your side, and second, to keep them quiet. It is not the job of psychological warfare to organize their resistance; that is the job of other subversive operations. The job of psychological warfare is to keep them quiet until such time as their activities might be useful to us, and not suicidal to them.

c) ". . . in peace-time, the task [of psychological warfare] is extremely limited. . . . It is limited to the job of building up credibility, studying the enemy, getting the organization set up so that, if the day comes for a more positive propaganda, it can be carried out effectively.

"Anybody who believes that it is our job to cause trouble behind the Iron Curtain in a period of peace has learned absolutely nothing from the lessons of war. You have no right to put your friends in danger of death when you will not rescue them in time."

2. There are three stages of a successful psychological warfare campaign against an enemy.

"We went through three stages during the war: first, the defensive stage, when we had not much to say to the Germans except that we were not going to give in; secondly, the offensive stage, when we had sufficient military power for our words to be listened to with some respect; and thirdly, the occupation stage, when the military job was over and the political job began of winning the fruits of war; if we were competent to win them."

3. Psychological warfare possesses important limitations that must be understood by personnel assigned to it.

a) "There is no such thing as operational psychological warfare. Operations must be left to the Services responsible for operations. If psychological warfare gets itself mixed up with, or thinks that it is undertaking, operations, then it will get in the most grievous trouble.

b) ". . . psychological warfare may do more harm than good unless it is strictly coordinated with diplomatic and military activity.

"Almost by mistake, the BBC, in 1941, started the V Campaign — the V sign for victory — and this spread like wildfire over the Continent, which was hoping for a second front. So successful was the campaign that it created the impression in Western Europe that the invasion of Europe was imminent. It created false hopes among our friends; it made many of them do risky things and pay the penalty.

". . . A lot of Frenchmen lost their lives as the result of the elaborate propaganda campaign to suggest that we were going to have a second front in 1943. It was a very cold-blooded attempt by propaganda and other means, physical as well as by propaganda, to make it appear that this was the beginning of the real show. A number of German divisions stayed in the West which would otherwise have moved."

4. The psychological warrior must regard himself as a part of the military organization, and all that he does must be fitted carefully and meticulously into the over-all strategy of the war.

a) "Unfortunately, soldiers, sailors, and airmen usually resort to psychological warfare when they are in a fix and can think of nothing else to do.

b) "Psychological warfare is not an independent arm; it is not something which can do miracles on its own. . . . The greatest mistake of the psychological warrior is to suggest that he has a mysterious substitute for military action, a way out of military difficulties. If the psychological warrior ever 'sells' himself in this way, he has destroyed his profession.

c) "Psychological warfare must remain strictly subordinated to Foreign Office policy and military strategy. . . . It can be successful only if it is the advanced guard of policy which is clearly defined and if it times its activities in relation to existing operations, whether of the Foreign Office or of the Chiefs of Staff."

5. The employment of white or overt propaganda, under ordinary circumstances, is to be preferred over the use of black or covert propaganda.

"Looking back and reflecting a great deal on my job (in World War II) . . . all I would say about the 'black' is that, on the whole although we found [its] activities enormous fun, although a vast amount of talent went into them, although I am sure they entertained the *Gestapo*, I have grave doubts whether 'black' propaganda had an effect in any way commensurate with that of ordinary straightforward propaganda from the enemy to the enemy.

". . . put your best talent on to the 'white' propaganda; do not be diverted into the vastly entertaining and endless delicacies of the 'black' varieties (for which, I must say, soldiers had a strange addiction when they were told anything about them!)."

6. In psychological warfare it is important to select the proper media of dissemination in order to reach desired targets and to accomplish declared objectives.

a) "Radio is an instrument ill adapted for tactical use, because there is no way of preventing people who are not meant to hear it from hearing it.

"By tactical . . . , I mean propaganda addressed to a specific group . . . a division in a predicament . . . an encircled garrison . . . a narrow group of people at high level within, shall we say, the *Gestapo*. . . .

b) "It was discovered . . . that radio was an instrument of strategic propaganda with very few tactical applications. . . .

"By strategic propaganda I mean propaganda which is spread to the whole of the enemy nation. . . .

c) "Radio *can* however be used tactically in dealing with totalitarian countries where radio listening is forbidden, where it is a high privilege to read monitored reports of enemy radio.

"If you want to get a rumor read by important generals, admirals, and air marshals, there is nothing like getting included in a report marked 'secret'. . . .

"A monitored report, typed out and circulated secretly, has a great effect in spreading a particular rumor that you want to spread.

d) "The leaflet is essentially a tactical weapon.

"In the last war we wasted a great deal of paper on strategic leaflets. . . . It was a very wasteful way of getting information to the enemy when the radio could do it much better. I am doubtful therefore whether, in dealing with a large country, strategic leaflets are a very effective form of propaganda.

[In World War II] "the real importance of the leaflet was evolved only when leaflets were dropped tactically on a particular unit to which we wanted to give a particular message.

". . . the drafting of tactical leaflets requires the greatest skill and cannot be left in the hands of the average local commander. He does not know the nuances of the enemy's psychology, and if he drafts the leaflet it will almost certainly be dismissed as propaganda.

"The whole art of the leaflet is to appear as a simple, honorable offer by one honorable soldier to another. . . . The job of [drafting leaflets] . . . is not usually a job for the fighting soldier; he is unlikely to understand the enemy's peculiar psychology, the peculiar sense of honor which each army has and which differs in each army with which one has to deal."

7. In propaganda truth pays.

"It is a complete delusion to think of the brilliant propagandist as being a professional liar. The brilliant propagandist is the man who tells the truth, or that selection of the truth which is requisite for his purpose, and tells it in such a way that the recipient does not think that he is receiving any propaganda.

"The art of the propagandist is never to be thought a propagandist, but seem to be a bluff, simple, honorable enemy who would never think of descending to the level of propaganda."

8. One must hate propaganda to do it well.

". . . in the last war the British did better propaganda than any other nation in the world.

"We British were ashamed of our propaganda and therefore took more trouble to conceal what we were doing.

"The Russians undoubtedly did the *worst* propaganda [during World War II]. The Americans in many ways had the failings of the Russians in the propaganda field.

"The Germans, because they *loved* propaganda could not do it. Lord Haw-Haw was a disaster to the Germans because he was obviously a propagandist. Anybody who listened to his voice knew that he was."

9. The central substance of propaganda is hard, correct information.

"If you give a man the correct information for seven years, he may believe the incorrect information on the first day of the eighth year when it is necessary, from your point of view, that he should do so. Your first job is to build the credibility and the authenticity of your propaganda, and persuade the enemy to trust you although you are his enemy."

10. Many of the techniques employed by journalists and advertisers are not applicable to propaganda operations.

a) [It was a mistake] "to believe that propaganda had something to do with exhortation. . . . Exhorting an enemy to desert stiffens his morale. . . . Nor is it any good pouring out the most moving exhortations to become a democrat because the enemy knows that this comes from the enemy, and writes it off as propaganda.

b) ". . . it is no good giving the enemy soldier the most soothing entertainment . . . do not think that you will buy the enemy with jazz . . . nor with brilliant descriptions of British [or American] culture. The enemy knows enough not to be taken in by that sort of thing.

". . . you must remember that the enemy listener is listening under grave danger of his life. There is risk attached to listening to foreign stations in totalitarian countries . . . propaganda to the enemy, listening under risk and physical inconvenience, has to be as concentrated and as apparently objective, informative, and concise as possible. You must not disguise that it is coming from the enemy.

"We drew our propaganda technicians chiefly from two groups, the advertising profession and the journalists. [Although] they were the most proficient people at the job, each had grave deficiencies.

"The advertiser believed that somehow one could get people to surrender by giving them sales talk. . . . That sort of thing does not work; it is too obvious . . . the usual advertising methods are not efficacious in propaganda and have to be drastically modified.

"The advertiser was correct, however, in one respect; he understood that you have to go on saying the same thing, however boring it is to you.

"The journalist . . . hated the advertiser and his slogans. The journalist said that the thing to do was give hot news, and to make every effort to get the news as hot as possible . . . he forgot [however, that] hot news is a journalists' . . . fiction . . , that it does not matter to the enemy listener whether the news is hot or cold, so long as it is new."

11. The art of propaganda is not telling lies, but rather selecting the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear.

[In writing news bulletins and news leaflets] "we had to order our journalists (it was agony to them!) to repeat the same news day after day in forms in which it did not look the same. . . . 'News creation' does not mean invention; it means looking through all intelligence reports, looking through all the . . . newspapers and selecting true items from them, . . . [for example] assume that you have been instructed to create the impression that typhus is prevalent in the enemy army. If you see that the fourth item in each news bulletin (not too high up, because if you put it as No. 1 item it is obviously propaganda) is about a case of typhus, . . . if you see that over three weeks the bulletin never lacks one true item about typhus, if . . . your leaflet newspaper [reports] a new case of typhus each day — and if they are all true — then you are doing good psychological warfare. . . .

"The art of propaganda was to make the journalist form his newspaper or his news bulletin or his radio broadcast according to a strict directive which told him the kinds of news he had to use and the weight he had to give each kind. . . . Our leaflet newspapers and radio news-casts had to be designed to keep certain themes *constantly* to the fore, whether or not there was any news about them in the daily newspaper. . . ."

12. The most successful propagandist is the person who cares about education.

"The job of propaganda is not merely to enter into some arid debate with the Government of the other side; it is to stimulate in people of the country thought for themselves, to make them begin to be, not cogs in a machine or units of a collective organization, but individuals. Individualism is the first act of disloyalty to a totalitarian government, and every individual who begins to feel he has a right to have a view is already committing an act of disloyalty. . . ."

13. Effective propaganda requires that intensive and continuous research for means of improving propaganda output be undertaken.

"In leaflets, we concentrated on the famous safe-conduct pass. We spent a vast amount of money on research in getting the color right, Eisenhower's signature right, the language right . . . . We discovered that we could estimate the morale of the German Army by the percentage of prisoners who had put a *Passierschein* into their wallet, because the act of picking it up and putting it away was an act of disloyalty."

14. In good, effective propaganda news must take priority over views, facts over preaching, and — above all — one must avoid threats.

"In 1940 and 1941, the only thing we could do was tell the truth, and we got an immense amount of good will in Germany by admitting defeat. . . .

"From the point of view of psychological warfare, a defeat is a great opportunity, especially if you are skillful and say that your defeat is worse than it is. You must be frank about it, franker than the facts. Then you really begin to gain the enemy's confidence. . . .

"It is easier to tell the truth about defeat than about victory . . . the curious fact is that in retreat you know how much ground you have lost, whereas an advancing army is rarely aware of where it has advanced to. . . .

"The first really big raid on Berlin was a terrible disaster owing to conditions of the air, and a great number of planes were lost. We announced the losses of the RAF before the German *communiqué* came out, and our admission of our losses was larger than the German claim. That was the greatest psychological warfare triumph of the year!"

15. When the enemy is doing well the propagandist may be able to "commit" the enemy beyond his resources.

"When the Germans were advancing into Russia, we said, 'If they cannot reach Kiev in 10 days, then the whole campaign will break down.' We calculated that it would take 12 days for the Germans to get to Kiev, and therefore we said 10 days. When it took 12 days, that represented a defeat or, at any rate, it took the edge off the victory by suggesting that it ought

to have been much bigger. If that sort of thing is done effectively, the people in the enemy country can be made to believe that they have done badly in the middle of the glorious victories."

16. It is necessary to make truth sound believable to the enemy.

[If the BBC home bulletin had been put out] "in German, it would have been written off as flagrant propaganda. . . . Our bulletins in German were the most objective sober bulletins of all that were put out by the BBC. . . we could not afford to be caught in any inaccuracy . . . the German listeners would not swallow anything, because they were on the lookout to prove us liars . . . we had to be 101 per cent accurate. We had to claim less than we actually did. There is nothing more effective than saying that there has been a moderately severe raid on Essen, when 2,000 people have actually been killed. That sort of thing gives the enemy cold shivers.

"All British leaflets were classified as 'secret.' Members of Parliament, if they could have discussed in Parliament what we were saying to the Germans, would have complained that the propaganda organization was 'appeasing' the Germans. It was essential to make the leaflets credible *to a German* — not to the House of Commons!

"You have to eliminate a great many things which are true if the enemy will not believe them to be true."

17. The propagandist, or psychological warrior, must have empathy, not sympathy — he must feel himself into the mind of the enemy.

[At PWD/SHAEF] "we had to establish a very large unit called Psychological Warfare Intelligence. This unit's job was that of studying the enemy's mind.

'I think our propaganda to Russia should be done on the supposition that we are talking to Communists. If you talk to the Russian peasant as though he is your friend and is opposed to the [Soviet] regime, he may patriotically turn off his wireless because he is a *patriot* as well as a peasant.

". . . there were many Germans who did not like the [Nazi] regime, but if you appealed to them as *traitors*, they did not take the propaganda. They were much more content to overhear you talking to a Nazi. If a democrat overheard you scoring off a Nazi he could enjoy it without feeling he was a traitor, whereas if he heard you appealing to him direct, he often switched off his set. . . .

". . . you have to over-estimate the patriotism of the enemy in order to do good propaganda. To treat him as a potential traitor before your armies are actually approaching is to court disaster. . . ."

18. Psychological warfare intelligence is necessary in order to provide a number of required services in addition to that of studying the enemy's mind.

"One ancillary task of Psychological Warfare Intelligence was to remind our leading generals and politicians not to believe our own propaganda. . . .

"Propaganda intelligence has [still] another use. As we studied the enemy's propaganda we were able to deduce from it the directive on which it was

based. From that we could deduce the enemy's estimate of his own civilian and soldier morale . . . it is a perfectly simple job to reconstruct the enemy appreciation and directive week by week.

"The work of psychological warfare intelligence is work which should be done in peace-time as well as in war-time."

19. To be effective, propaganda operations must be related to strategic requirements and prepared where policy and higher military strategy are known.

"For the Ardennes counter-offensive we designed four leaflets for the four stages of the advance. We did the work *while the German offensive was still going on* and got the leaflets dead right, because we were given the advance information as to exactly the lines on which the counter-offensive would go. This means that the propagandists must be in on the inmost secrets of Supreme Headquarters. This is the reason why political warfare was a secret department in Britain. . . .

". . . toward the end of the war we found that actual planning of the propaganda had to be done at AFHQ and SHAEF rather than in London, because that was the only point where both Government policy and the higher strategy was known. It was found that SHAEF had to work upward to Governments and downwards to the armies, instructing them on this integrated propaganda policy, because precise timing in relation to the campaign is the vital thing to the success of this particular job. . . ."

20. The propagandist's task is not to make or to question policy but to operate strictly within the terms laid down by his government.

". . . In April 1944, General Eisenhower, as a result of advice by his psychological warfare staff, sent a paper to President Roosevelt which said, 'We accept the policy of unconditional surrender, but we would like to be able to tell a German general in Normandy how he should surrender if he wants to.' There was a curt message back via Stettinius that politics were to be left to the politicians. As a result, as we now know, generals who wanted to surrender were unable to do so. But we [the propagandists] could not do anything about it.

". . . the demand for unconditional surrender set us, as propagandists, a very difficult problem . . . . [However] the more difficult the problem, the more fun it is to solve it. I doubt whether any propagandists were ever set a tougher problem than to make unconditional surrender attractive to the Germans . . . it postponed the end of the war by a year, because it prevented the military conspiracy of 20th July from being a success. But this had nothing to do with propaganda; it had to do with policy. . . . One must therefore distinguish the policy consequences of unconditional surrender from the propaganda consequences. . . .

"From the point of view of propaganda to German soldiers [the unconditional surrender policy] had one advantage. Germans had been told by Goebbels all about President Wilson and his promises. The policy of unconditional surrender prevented us from making any promises, which would not, in any case, have been believed. . . . We had to tell the truth and to issue instructions. . . . Into instructions [to German civilians] we managed to insert a whole mass of propaganda by referring to the restoration of trade

unions and other things that would happen when Eisenhower came. These things were not said as promises but were given in the form of instructions to civilians facing the advancing, unconquerable general. . . . Our propaganda was the propaganda of command and we tried in the course of it to give the impression that we were decent people, but we did not do this by making promises.

"I do not think from the point of view of propaganda we lost; from the point of view of policy — which is a very different question — we lost a great deal [by unconditional surrender]."

The address given by Mr. Crossman on the occasion of his first visit to the Royal United Service Institution was so enthusiastically received by the members and guests that he was again invited to address the organization a year later, in February, 1953. On the second visit he not only elaborated on the remarks given in February 1952, but extended them to include his views as to the role and limitations on the use of psychological warfare under conditions short of widespread armed hostility. The excerpts reproduced below are taken directly from the printed report of his second lecture.*

"The accurate way of defining our problem is this. *What use should we make of propaganda in a period when the great Powers are pursuing their policies by all means short of a general war — including the means of small local wars?* Or put it another way. How far can we use the techniques and the organization that we employed in a general war, at a time when there is not a general war but only a number of small wars plus a struggle for power?

"*I would suggest to you that the whole idea that in such a period we could use psychological warfare is ruled out straightaway for a very simple reason. There is no agreed policy between the democracies.* We could not have had any psychological warfare during the war unless Britain and America had had an agreed policy. We could not have had what is called a Western democratic psychological warfare offensive as long as the various nations of the West had no agreement on that at which they were aiming.

"Of course, our opponents suffer under no such disadvantage! It is the definition of a totalitarian state that it behaves in periods of peace exactly as though it were at war, and it merely eschews the actual fighting for the reason that it thinks it can do better without it. The fact is that the Russian Communist State not only feels itself to be at war with the rest of the world, but its whole organization, internal and external, is that of a nation at war. Therefore, it has a simple overriding purpose — to win the war. The problem of the Western democracies is that one of their purposes at present is to avoid a war, and another is to win a war if it comes. That means in effect not having one overriding purpose, but two conflicting purposes. You cannot conduct a psychological warfare campaign if, not only between two Powers but inside one large Power, there is not a simple overriding aim but a conflict of aims. . . .

*Excerpts from "Psychological Warfare," by Richard H. S. Crossman, a lecture delivered 18 Feb 53 and reported in *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 98: 351–61 (1953), reprinted here with the permission of Mr. Crossman and *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.

"May I now, in following up that argument, expose yet another cliché. People talk about working a 'strategy of cold war.' But it is only possible to have a strategy of real war, and the 'strategy of cold war' is a very misleading way of talking about diplomacy and propaganda. It is a grave mistake to talk as though we could evolve a strategy when our aim is to prevent the necessity of having to evolve a strategy. I would suggest that instead of talking about the strategy of cold war, we ought to discuss how to conduct diplomacy and propaganda when the great Powers are not in a general war. In that connection I would put forward two suggestions."

"The first is this. We should never use psychological warfare as a substitute for real war. There is, of course, a great sense of frustration among democracies who have set upon themselves quite artificial limitations in respect of their power to hit the enemy. We all feel it about the problem of Korea, where self-imposed limitations seem to thwart victory.

"But there is one rule we observed in actual war. It was that, when the soldier came to us and said, 'I cannot solve my problem by military means; would you please provide me with a psychological warfare substitute?' we always replied, 'No; I cannot, I will not, I must not.' *Psychological warfare is no substitute for action.* It is, at best, an accompaniment to action, something which slightly accelerates the process of military force or the process of diplomacy. It is not some mysterious trick of its own which can be used when you are prevented from using conventional weapons. Those who deceive themselves that it is merely find themselves involved by their psychological warfare in problems which they never expected. . . .

". . . Clever psychological warfare tricks as a substitute for action against the enemy causes far more alarm than they do behind the enemy lines.

"Now let us turn to an example of what can be achieved by propaganda to cause alarm and despondency in the enemy. In the past eight or nine weeks something has occurred in the Balkans of great importance, the understanding between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Here is something on which propaganda can get to work. It can put over to the other side a solid achievement of Western democracy. Here is a basis for genuine propaganda. Here is something which we ought to be developing day by day in our radio, the solid achievement of that alliance. . . .

"So far as the use of psychological warfare in the cold war is concerned, I suggest that we should never permit it to negate our strategic aims or to come into conflict with our policy. It is one of the problems of being half at peace and half at war. Let me take Malaya as a hypothetical case. We have in Malaya an area where psychological warfare can and should be applied to demoralize the Chinese Communists, etc. What is very creditable is that the quite legitimate use of psychological warfare in the military campaign has not come into conflict with higher strategic and political requirements.

"An example of where conflict has occurred is in Korea. Here you will find a history of confusion — a confusion of motives, a confusion of departments, and a confusion of policies. I suggest that the trouble has been due to lack of coordination between those in charge of prisoner of war policy, those conducting psychological warfare, and those conducting armistice

negotiations. The United Nations might have found itself in a far stronger position if we had in advance seen the complications which would arise from letting them all go their separate ways without coordinating their activities.

"I cannot help repeating that the psychological warfare warrior is a very dangerous sort of person in a cold war. He must be kept under the closest and severest control by the Foreign Office as regards policy and diplomacy, and by the Chiefs of Staff as regards his conformity with their requirements. He must never be allowed to feel that he is on his own winning his own psychological war, as a substitute for winning the real war. He is not there to win his own war. He is there to assist the Foreign Office in putting over foreign policy and to assist the Army in imposing its will on the enemy. Whenever he does fight a psychological war of his own, he creates chaos, and the greater his success the more difficult it is to sort out the muddle after it has taken place.

Conclusions

"Let me now set down my conclusions. My first is that in a cold war, as in a hot war, the major aim of propaganda is to achieve credibility. Long before you try to demoralize, exdoctrinate or indoctrinate, the first job is to be believed. It is no good having a most brilliant 'agitation' if you are not believed. That is the reason why the BBC is still superior to the Voice of America; it confines itself to telling the truth as accurately as it can and thus makes itself a most valuable weapon.

"To make your news credible in a totalitarian country demands a tremendous effort of imagination. For what is credible in America and Britain when translated literally into Russian is often incredible. It has to be re-expressed in terms the enemy will believe. That is why psychological warfare departments should be secret departments. If I write a leaflet which members of Parliament will describe as good propaganda, it will probably read as such crude 'propaganda' that it raises the morale of the enemy. In order to make it really credible to the enemy it must sound a long way off from what most members of Parliament or Congress regard as the 'good tough stuff' to tell the enemy.

"The credibility which the BBC achieved in the 1939–1945 War remains the biggest factor in the conduct of the cold war. To maintain it will demand the construction of a large propaganda intelligence department. This department must think itself into the mind of the Communist, soaking itself in his phrases and clichés until it writes and thinks them naturally. Those who carry out military intelligence always have the tradition of being on the side of the enemy, and the same applies to the propaganda intelligence officer.

"So the way to carry out good propaganda is never to appear to be carrying it out at all. We discovered this in 1940, when we had nothing else to do but tell the truth because we were being defeated so badly. I remember speaking to an American who was in Berlin in 1940 about the news which was being broadcast about the blitz. He said he turned his radio on to a British home station and heard a voice saying, 'And now I will tell you

about a series of talks which we shall be giving next December on the life of Charlotte Bronte'! The American told me that a little thing like that boosted his morale more than all the propaganda in the world. The British BBC was planning a series of talks on the life of Charlotte Bronte when it was due to be wiped out the following week! That proved that Britain had not been defeated.

"A second instance was when Hitler made his last appeal to reason. I happened to be in the BBC at the time when his speech came over. We were listening to it and I said to the head of the BBC service 'Let us put on a reply after he has finished and start writing it now together.' This we did and, sure enough, after the conclusion of his speech we put out a reply. I fear we had not consulted the Foreign Office or the Chiefs of Staff, but you will discover if you read Bill Shirer's *Berlin Diary* that one of the things that impressed Germany was the fact that Churchill only spent 20 minutes before giving his reply! These are things which really matter in propaganda. For it is a combination of candour, integrity, and sympathy which demoralizes a totalitarian state.

"But you may ask, 'What are we to do about our disagreements with the Americans and the continual rows in British party politics?' Handled successfully, our disagreements and divisions can be a positive asset in a period of cold war. We had much evidence in Germany that the more we explained to the Germans how people could get up and criticize Churchill during the war, the more they drew 'operational' conclusions about what they themselves could not do. One can, in fact, by reporting a bitter controversy in the democratic world (it has to be done skillfully), give an example to the enemy which is highly subversive. We have some evidence from Russia that the high-ups who listen to BBC are fascinated by the picture of a society where free discussion can take place. It is something which they have not themselves. So our own disagreements, when skillfully reported, are a weapon of propaganda against a totalitarian state.

"On the other hand, we must exercise great care in respect to stories which we tell the peoples of totalitarian countries about themselves. Ten good truthful news stories about Russia will be cancelled by one mistake. We found this throughout the war with Germany. If one mistake was made about something which Germans could check, they would write off the rest of our propaganda as lies. Therefore, that which is written about what goes on in an enemy country must not only be checked and double checked for fact, but it must be written in such a way that it sounds credible to the enemy and not to us. This requires a combination of self-restraint and imagination of which very few of us are capable.

"This is yet another reason why in the cold war we should take a great deal of trouble to build up our propaganda intelligence sections. It is possible to obtain more knowledge about the Communists from reading their newspapers, by listening to their radio, and by studying their monitoring, than from millions of pounds spent on secret service agents. A totalitarian is methodical; he acts according to principle and according to a rigid table. We discovered, for instance, during the war that it was valid to deduce from a study of German propaganda the morale report given to Goebbels that week; the output of German home propaganda faithfully reflected the

Germans' study of their home morale. And it was therefore possible, by watching the output, to determine the morale. In a cold war you also need to deduce the mood of the men who are in control on the other side. To understand their actions, taken to placate their public opinion, is of enormous value quite apart from any propaganda you may carry out. As for psychological warfare in the narrow sense, there is plenty of it to do in areas where the war is going on. Areas in which we can experiment are Malaya, Indo-China, and Korea. I hope that considerable sums of money and men of good enough calibre are being used in those areas, testing out the well-tried methods under new conditions and with new types of treatment. But let us in a period of cold war confine psychological warfare to these areas, and let us with regard to the remainder of our propaganda understand that unless we ourselves become totalitarian, it will be impossible to reply to Russia's psychological warfare with anything that corresponds to it. All we can do is to tell the truth, to build up credibility, to understand our purpose, and not to try the kind of technique which can only be used when actual fighting has begun."

PROPAGANDA THEORY OF THE GERMAN NAZIS*

By Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm

In a totalitarian society, propaganda is an accepted additional power weapon to be exploited as the objectives of a movement dictate.

Investigators in a democratic atmosphere tend to view propaganda as a separate entity from the other functions of leadership, even as a function to be rather ashamed of and sometimes hidden. Propaganda action in a totalitarian country, on the other hand, is only an additional power weapon. Its ethics are those of the regime, its methods are shaped by the goals of the movement. Such questions as truth and consistency, often immensely important in democratic studies of propaganda, become relatively unimportant in modern totalitarian propaganda. The criterion in regard to truth is simply whether truth at a given time will further the aims of the movement. The criterion in regard to consistency is whether the output remains congruent with basic philosophy and assumptions.

Propaganda in a totalitarian state is an instrument of social control. In Nazi Germany, as in Soviet Russia, it went through the stage of being used as an aid in gaining control, into the stage of being used for maintaining control. In both these stages it was combined naturally and easily with coercion of many kinds and degrees.

In a totalitarian situation, propaganda and ideology, words and action, are inextricably intertwined. At times it becomes almost impossible to separate propaganda from principles, persuasion from coercion. When one looks at Nazi Germany propaganda, one can argue that the whole Nazi program was a system of propaganda, at which point the term propaganda loses meaning. We shall attempt

* Excerpts from "The Propaganda Theory of the German Nazis," pp 37–49 of a monograph, *Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory*, prepared for the US Information Agency, by University of Illinois, Urbana, Jan 55. Reproduced with the permission of the authors and USIA.

in this brief résumé of German propaganda theory to limit ourselves to a consideration of the Nazi use of symbols as a weapon. It must be remembered, however, that this is an artifice, adopted to delimit the subject. Actually, Nazi words and Nazi deeds blended together, Nazi diplomacy, military action, organization, and propaganda all merged, under the driving force of the ideology of Nazi socialism.

The total impact of Nazi propaganda in Germany was to create a picture of reality shaped according to the wishes of the leaders of the movement. Monopoly control of the mass media dinned this picture incessantly into the German people. Keckskemeti sums this up by remarking that although public opinion as we understand it cannot exist in totalitarian states, its place is taken by an official image of the world expressed through the media of mass communications. The individual may not believe this image to be true, and indeed often tries to look beyond it, since he sees it as an effort of the bureaucracy to control him. Nevertheless, he usually is forced to accept it, partly for want of something better and partly because of the power he knows stands behind it. In the totalitarian state, both safety and advancement depend upon conformity, and the mass media provide a model to which the individual has to conform. . . .[45]

The way Nazism emerged undoubtedly helped to determine the nature of its propaganda. Hitler came to prominence in a country still hurting from defeat and occupation. Like most other Germans, he felt that Germany had really not been beaten on the field of battle, but by other means. Hadamovsky, in one of the first Nazi books addressed to German intellectuals, gave an official explanation: "The German nation lost the war against the entire world not because of inadequate weapons and the weakness of her soldiers, but because of the bureaucratic sterility of her leading statesmen. The German people were not beaten on the battlefield, but were defeated in the war of words and because their spirit was broken. The Germans were sent into this mighty battle with not so much as a single slogan while the enemy nations took up arms 'against the Hun,' 'for world peace,' and 'for the League of Nations.' In politics, those who are fertile and creative will always win over those who are sterile, bureaucratic, or . . . mere diplomats . . . . Today, every school child knows that we did not merely have to fight a military war, but that we were also exposed to economic warfare, and that the latter, coupled with the weapons of propaganda (psychological warfare) finally caused our downfall."[46] In fact, the Nazis gave the Western Allies rather more credit for their World War I propaganda than the Allies are inclined to give themselves. And it is not surprising that Hitler, when he came to building his own movement, should build into it a large component of ideology (nationalism, the Aryan myth, etc.), slogans, and other devices of symbol warfare. . . .

. . . When the Nazis tried to carry their ideology and slogans to the German people, they found the liberal press and the "undisciplined" radio again standing in their way. They were forced to use and develop to a high perfection the weapon of the mass meeting. From this experience they learned to respect the power of the spoken word. Soon after they came to power they "disciplined" and "organized" the radio. They lectured the liberal press on the "false ideals" of freedom and objectivity, established a national news service to feed the press, established official Nazi papers, restrained other papers by economic or political coercion, did their best to keep anti-Nazi messages from getting to the German people. Thus from the very first, they saw the advantages of controlled and consistent media.

And from the first, as we have been trying to suggest, symbol warfare was integrated with organization and the other power weapons. For a while the symbol

weapon was the only effective one the Nazis had. As they combined it with organization, they became able to use action symbols along with verbal and pictorial ones. They came gradually to have significant fire power, and later the police, economic, and diplomatic power of a national government. The importance of the evolution may not be at once apparent, until one remembers that, to most of the western governments, organized propaganda came last of all the power weapons, and was grafted on — rather unwillingly in many cases. With the Nazis, propaganda was *always* a weapon, trusted and used and integrated with the other weapons in the arsenal.

It may well be, as the British are fond of saying, that the Nazis "loved propaganda" too much to use it well. If so, the reason may be in large part in the origin of the movement, and to the extraordinary success which their combination of coercion and persuasion achieved in post-war Germany.

But let us turn now to some of the principles which the Nazis seem to have developed, from doctrine and trial, to guide their propaganda.

1. The Nature of the People

> *The bulk of society is made up of people whose political knowledge is low and whose political decisions can be controlled. The intellect of the people is such that they act through sentiment and emotion rather than through reason. Issues are seen as black or white and any discussion of shades of gray results in confusion rather than clarification. A movement, by the proper use of coercion and persuasion, can sway people into following it.*

One must necessarily turn to *Mein Kampf* for basic Nazi propaganda theory. There Hitler assesses the public in this fashion, ". . . The political understanding of the great masses is not sufficiently developed for them to arrive at certain general political opinions by themselves and to select suitable persons. What we mean by the word 'public opinion' depends only to the smallest extent on the individual's own experiences or knowledge, and largely on an image, frequently created by a penetrating and persistent sort of so-called 'enlightenment."[47] He further states,

> "The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so feminine in their nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment. This sentiment, however, is not complicated but very simple and complete. There are not many differentiations, but rather a positive or negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie; but never half this and half that, or partially, etc."(p 237)[47]
>
> "The first foundation for forming authority is always offered by popularity . . . . Any supporter of such an authority . . . must endeavor to improve and to safeguard this authority by creating power. In power, therefore, that means in force, we see the second foundation of all authority. . . . If popularity and force unite, and if thus combined they are able to last over a certain period of time, then an authority on an even more solid basis can arise." (pp 764–65)[47]

There is no reason to believe that Hitler's propagandists did not share his point of view. Goebbels is said to have remarked, "Our propaganda is primitive because the people think primitively." Again, "Masses are unformed stuff. Only in the hands of the political artists do the masses become a people and the people a nation."[48]

Hadamovsky[46] says flatly, "There is no such thing as spontaneous public opinion."(p 53) And again, "the slogan of the freedom of public opinion must be buried without tears" (p 50), but it must be buried skillfully by a combined application of "idea, propaganda, and power."

II. The Purpose of Propaganda

Propaganda is an instrument of politics, a power weapon, a device for social control. As such, its purpose is identical with the objectives of the movement. The function of propaganda is not essentially to convert. Rather it functions to attract followers and to keep them in line. Membership is the task of organization. The task of propaganda, given suitable avenues, is to blanket every area of human activity so that the environment of the individual is changed to absorb the movement's world-view. Within Germany, the specific task is to create a political type fashioned after the model of the leader.

Hitler's conception of propaganda was one based on controlling the reins of government. In *Mein Kampf*, he was quite emphatic about the political nature of propaganda. Goebbels' task, once the Nazis were in power, was to see that this power was maintained.

Hitler was specific in stating the roles assigned to members and followers of the party. The acquisition of members was the duty of the party organization, the attraction of followers was the area of propaganda. He said,

> "Every movement, at first, will have to divide the human material it has won into two great groups: into followers and members. The task of propaganda is to attract followers; the task of organization is to win members." (p 849)[47]
>
> "The first task of propaganda is the winning of people for the future organization; the first task of the organization is the winning of people for the continuation of propaganda. The second task of propaganda is the destruction of the existing condition and the permeation of this condition with the new doctrine, while the second task of the organization must be the fight for power, so that by it it will achieve the final success of the doctrine."(p 851)[47]

Niemeyer remarks on this point by noting that propaganda and organization

> ". . . have essentially the same task, namely to win the hearts and minds of men to a common will representing a common set of convictions. Propaganda plays the role of the general premise, an organization that of the conclusion. Or one might say that propaganda furnishes the building material and organization the structure — or even that the two are like thought and action."[49]

It is interesting to compare with this the Soviet distinction between the functions of "symbol warfare" and of their "organizational weapon. . . ."

Finally, let us quote Goebbels again. Nazi propaganda has no basic methods, he said in a speech; rather, "it has only a goal: the conquest of the masses. Every means which can help to achieve this goal is good. Anything which does not hit the target is bad. Success is its only criterion."[50]

III. Relation of Propaganda to Other Activities of the Movement

Propaganda must be based in ideology. Although a valuable weapon, propaganda must not be used alone, but rather in conjunction with other force and action, potential or real. By the same token, actions should be coordinated with propaganda and the psychological effects and implications of every action should be considered.

Hitler maintained that it is common adherence to a "world view" that makes people capable of achieving power. Propaganda is to achieve the victory of this "world view." Propaganda moves the masses emotionally toward action for political unity and sustains this movement.[49] Hitler wrote, "The greater and the more revolutionary, essentially, an idea is, the more active will its members become, since for its supporters the revolutionary force of the doctrine involves a danger; which appears suitable for keeping off small and cowardly petty bourgeois."(p 853)[47]

The managing director of the Hanse Press wrote, "One may say that no historical revolution has taken place without preparation in the shape of propaganda. The propagandist is the herald and, at the same time, the believer in a great idea."[51]

Two German writers once said, "Propaganda alone is not capable of deciding the war, it is designed to prepare the struggle for success, to support and expand it by making use of clever tricks and ruses."(p 56)[50]

Hitler also did not think that propaganda could stand alone. In most Nazi propaganda, some referrable action was presented. Often this action involved the use of force. Goebbels believed that propaganda must not only be supported by force but that the propaganda content itself should include a tone or an urge to violent action.[52] Hadamovsky wrote that "propaganda and terror are not opposites. Violence, in fact, can be an integral part of propaganda."(p 56)[50]

Hitler said, "The victory of an idea will be the more possible the more extensively propaganda works on people in their entirety and the more exclusive, the stricter, and stiffer the organization is which carries out the fight in practice."(p 850)[47]

Goebbels emphasized the importance of propaganda coordination with other activities. "There must be absolute certainty that words are followed up by corresponding events," he once remarked.[48] In practice, this was a difficult thing to do, especially after mounting German losses. German propaganda was so closely tied with German military success that defeat found propaganda in a difficult position.

From 1935 on, German diplomacy was a peculiar combination of military and political operation in which the Germans applied political, economic, and psychological pressure to accomplish their ends without actual warfare in the conventional sense. But at no time did they apply such pressure without the necessary military force kept in readiness to be sent marching if the objectives could not have been achieved by "peaceful" means.(p 47)[50]

Goebbels was an astute hand at surmising the propaganda effect of action. He was not able to coordinate action and propaganda in all instances but made every attempt to do so. He wrote in his diary, "The gentlemen of the Foreign Office busy themselves a lot with propaganda, but have no faculty whatsoever for calculating psychological effects in advance."(p 204)[48] Again, "I believe that when a propaganda ministry is created, all matters affecting propaganda, news, and culture within the Reich and within occupied areas must be subordinated to it."(p 476)[48]

The largest of the sections in the Propaganda Ministry was the Propaganda Coordination Division. There, campaigns were planned to get full effect of timing and to ensure combined propaganda operations.[53]

The fields into which Goebbels extended himself can be surmised from the following excerpt:

> "Embarrassing consequences have resulted from the irresponsible and unpsychological publication of various court decisions. Hereafter I am having all court verdicts of any national importance released jointly by the Ministry of Justice and ourselves. Our courthouse reporters don't have the necessary feel for selecting and publishing verdicts according to psychological considerations."(p 122)[48]

IV. *Organization and Control of Propaganda*

> *Control of propaganda activities will be centralized under one responsible authority. The propaganda function will be considered as of equal importance with any other government function, and propagandists must be given access to all information and plans of other agencies. Propaganda opportunities will be exploited by the propaganda agency; no other agency should be allowed independent action in this area. Only dedicated and trusted members of the movement, who are also technically competent, will fill propaganda jobs of responsibility. Monopoly control of all media of mass communication within the movement's zone of influence must be accomplished. These include music, art, theater, architecture, books, tourist trade, fairs, exhibitions, and schools, as well as the usual channels. If possible, however, control of communications will be exercised in such a way as not to give an impression of direct manipulation.*

The first week after the Nazis gained power, Hitler got a decree signed by Hindenburg creating a Propaganda Ministry. Under this plan, one man — Josef Goebbels — became the director of all propaganda. As a government minister he was subordinate to no one except Hitler. Thus Goebbels became all-powerful in the three propaganda organizations, the Propaganda Ministry, the Party Propaganda Department and the Reich Chamber of Culture. As head of each of these organs, he was responsible only to Hitler.

The place of Goebbels as the third ranking Nazi meant that his ministry was a powerful force in government. At times it seemed as if the whole German government operated as a subdivision of the ministry. Policies were carried out or discarded, depending on their propagandistic effect. The power of the ministry was the result, not only of Goebbels' direct access to Hitler, but also of knowledge of plans of other government agencies. Goebbels' diary has numerous instances of his manipulation of plans of others. At one point he wrote, "With Gutterer I discuss our tactics with reference to other ministries. I consider it my duty not only to keep my own Ministry in order, but also to proceed generally against the defeatism prevalent in Berlin Government quarters." At a later date, "I am wondering whether I ought not to send Party comrades as observers into the various courts so that they may quietly inform me and enable me to take measures against verdicts that do not correspond to the times."(pp 35, 127)[48]

Confidential and secret reports from other agencies flowed into the ministry. The Propaganda Ministry kept close touch upon the war situation and was fully informed about unfavorable as well as favorable events. The state of public opinion was determined not only by the reports of the various branches of the Propaganda

Ministry but through such agencies as the SD, the security service of the Gestapo, which undertook opinion surveys. Besides these sources, regular intelligence agencies fed basic material to the ministry. Some of the organizations undertaking this work were: the Institute of Political Geography, Bureau Ribbentrop, Foundation of German Activities Abroad, German Academy, Working-Community of Geopolitics, German Academic Exchange Service.(p 50)[50]

The Propaganda Ministry tried to put into effect the principle of sole control of propaganda, but was not wholly successful. At one time, however, the Propaganda Ministry had control of propaganda in diplomacy. Goebbels succeeded in placing propaganda attaches under the control of the Propaganda Ministry into every foreign post. In minor posts, where diplomatic experience and skill were not considered necessary, the minister was the propaganda attache and most likely a propaganda trained rather than a diplomatically trained individual.(p 115)[54] Other agencies of government came to use the propaganda ministry as the vehicle for their publicity. These powers were handed over officially to the propaganda ministry soon after its establishment.

Goebbels organized his Ministry on the basis of a nucleus of elite propagandists. He picked these from among Nazi party propagandists who had proven their ability during the earlier days of struggle. Into purely administrative posts were put experienced civil servants.(p 81)[55] The reason for this can be seen in Goebbels' attitude. In a speech at the Sports Palace he said, "As we National Socialists are convinced that we are right we cannot tolerate anyone besides us who claims he is right too. For if he also is right he must be a National Socialist, but if he is no National Socialist he can't be right."[55] He himself was a fanatic adherent. After a meeting with Hitler, he wrote, "Up in the sky a cloud takes the shape of a swastika. A flickering light shines in the heavens. . . . These days have shown me the way and the direction. . . . Now my last doubts have vanished. Germany shall live. Heil Hitler!"(p 32)[54]

The Propaganda Ministry maintained a political college, *Hochschule für Politik*, to train propagandists. The ministry also took over the German Institute for International Affairs and made it into a training school for Nazis to be assigned abroad.[56] Some idea of the type of training may be seen in the schooling of speakers. Their training was split into ideological and technical parts and the syllabus with which each student had to be familiar included such works as *Mein Kampf*, Rosenberg's *Nature, Principles and Aims of National Socialism*, Goebbels' *Kampf um Berlin*, a book on racial theory by Guenther. The final examination was held before a jury composed of representatives from the Propaganda department, Office of Ideological Training and the Party Training College.(pp 43–44)[53]

The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, as soon as it was set up, wrested control of all propaganda outlets from other government departments. The divisions of the Ministry are testimony to the extent of control: Foreign, Troops, Entertainment, Film, Music, Theater, Fine Arts, Literature, Broadcasting, Home Press, Foreign Press, and Tourist Traffic plus a Propaganda Coordination division. In addition, Goebbels was head of the Party Propaganda Department and later became president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This Chamber was created to control the producers of output and was divided into seven parts. These seven parts corresponded to professional guilds of artists and intellectual workers.

The Propaganda Ministry made no overt moves, however, to take over any additional outlets of communications except the radio system which was govern-

ment owned from before. The newspapers and magazines were left in the hands of their former owners, although some periodicals were purchased by the Nazi Party and became Party organs. The main pressure toward a uniform output was exerted through tight control of the sources of information. Since all publicity for the government was handled through the Propaganda Ministry, that became the only place where one could get information. Censorship was applied by a thinly veiled threat of punishment and reprisal. The newspaper editor and the film maker could make public items unfavorable to the regime, but the spectre of the concentration camp and possible confiscation of their enterprises kept these people in line.

The Reich Chamber of Culture provided the necessary pressure in the arts. Since one had to belong to the Chamber if he were in the artistic or intellectual field, the Chamber instead of the Ministry could whip members into line.

The threat of extinction of independent information outlets was great, however. Any newspaper could be eliminated on the basis of its being "unsound competition." Publishers and their wives had to prove Aryan descent back to 1800. This too was made to appear not as a government measure but as a rank and file movement of newspaper readers.[57]

A great deal of Hadamovsky's authoritative *Propaganda und Nationale Macht*[56] is given over to a discussion of how to attain the constant reiteration of "correct" slogans and interpretations which the Nazis insisted upon. He calls for a maximum use of "public organizations, cooperatives, and associations" which may "superficially appear to be complicated, but which in reality only conform to the diverse conditions of life. Their own official propaganda pursues strictly and to the point the aims essential for the life of the whole nation, and the executive power of the state renders impossible any active or passive attempt to cross these aims." (p 54)[56] The message of these organizations will be reinforced by a monopoly of the mass media, and by the full cooperation of the schools. German schools, he said, must abandon their "homage to the principle of liberalism and individualism. . . . In future, the general tasks of nationalist propaganda [must] include the determination of the substantive content of educational institutions," insofar as it pertains to anything political.(p 226)[56] He warns the media of the consequences of failing to cooperate fully with the movement: "If our intellectual elite will *voluntarily* place itself in the service of our nation's mission with passion and devotion, there will be no need to curtail the freedom of the press through censorship or legislation. It will suffice to make it legally possible for the professional associations . . . to purge the undesirable elements of their profession and put a stop to their activities."(pp 186–87)[56]

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Chapter 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The idea that the employment of psychological warfare by the US, either in connection with regular peacetime international relations, or wartime military and diplomatic operations, is a comparatively recent innovation rests on a misunderstanding of the character of psychological warfare and American history. American historical experience from the days of Tom Paine and the Revolutionary War Committees of Correspondence to the very present is replete with examples of American usage of what is today called "psychological warfare." This fact is not too well understood by the great majority of the American people.

As recently as 14 February 1953 a leading American daily newspaper in one of its editorials described psychological warfare as "antithetical to the American way of life" and characterized many of the techniques of psychological warfare as having "been lifted out of the box of tricks in the totalitarian arsenal." The inference was given that its employment today was not consonant with either the past experience or the present-day interests of the nation.

Any objective view of American history and psychological warfare should lead one to the inescapable conclusion that the only thing relatively new about psychological warfare is its name. It is true that the term did not gain currency until World War II and even then much of the activity of military and civilian planners and operators active in the field of propaganda and psychological warfare took place within agencies bearing such innocuous titles as: Coordinator of Information (COI); Office of Strategic Services (OSS); Office of War Information (OWI); and Special Studies Group (SSG) of the War Department General Staff.

It was only in the field and during the course of actual military operations in World War II that the term "psychological warfare" attained a sufficiently high degree of respectability to come into common usage. Thus, there came into being during World War II psychological warfare sections (PWS), psychological warfare divisions (PWD), and psychological warfare branches (PWB), in various military theater headquarters or subordinate

military echelons, depending on the status of the activity in the echelon concerned, and its place in the scheme of things in the minds of the military commanders involved.

Although the name "psychological warfare" is of comparatively recent origin, it does not follow that the US is without experience in its usage. In fact the very document that was to declare the nation's independence as a free state, the Declaration of Independence, was a propaganda document. It was not the document that gave the nation its freedom, but rather the victories of the colonial soldiers on such battlefields as Saratoga and Yorktown.

Although it is true that the Declaration of Independence announced the birth of the nation and laid down a political philosophy that was to become a dynamic force in the entire Western World for the century and one-half that followed, one should not lose sight of the fact that among the reasons given by its authors for its promulgation none appears to be more significant than the statement that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that . . . [we] should declare the causes which impel . . . [us] to" separate from Great Britain.

On the field of battle between the British and Colonial forces that both preceded and followed the promulgation of the Declaration of Independence, in point of time, there are numerous instances known where psychological warfare practices were attempted with varying degrees of success. Douglas Southall Freeman in his definitive biography of George Washington[1] described a technique utilized by Washington's men to confuse the enemy and to create discontent in their ranks. This

> ". . . was to tie to a rock and then to throw to the redcoats a strip of paper that had been printed to this effect:
>
> | Prospect Hill | Bunker Hill |
> |---|---|
> | I Seven Dollars a Month | I Three pence a day |
> | II Fresh Provisions and in plenty | II Rotten salt pork |
> | III Health | III The Scurvy |
> | IV Freedom, ease, affluence and a good farm | IV Slavery, beggary and want."[1] |

The illustrative examples of the use of psychological warfare in American history that are reproduced in this chapter are included in order to combat the widespread erroneous impression that it is only in recent decades that psychological warfare has been employed to support the achievement of diplomatic, political, and military objectives.

In most of the cases reproduced the individuals involved in the activity described did not believe they were engaged in any sinister or unethical

action. However in the light of our present-day understanding of psychological warfare and from the descriptions gleaned from the historical records of particular objectives sought in the separate cases, it is clear that today the various actions described might well fall under the purview of psychological warfare agencies or advisers assigned the task of coordinating the nation's activity in such fields as diplomatic negotiations, military operations, and economic and political discussions with foreign groups and heads of foreign states.

Eight articles or illustrative case histories, covering American experience from the Revolutionary War period to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Controversy in 1931 are reproduced in this chapter as representative of American historical experience in psychological warfare. Each case was chosen not alone because of its intrinsic interest, but in addition because it contained some common element crucial for an understanding of the nature of psychological warfare. In every case included in this chapter there is ample evidence that the planners of the action deliberately sought to influence the attitudes and the behavior of one or more target groups in certain desired ways. All cases stress important lessons for those who are interested in widening their knowledge of how to conduct psychological warfare more effectively.

Three of the eight case histories illustrate the employment of psychological warfare by military commands in purely tactical situations. Three may be said to be illustrative of the use of psychological warfare in times of conflict to influence both political and military decisions and thus lead to an end of the conflict. One case history describes the dispatch of the US fleet in 1907–1909 on a world cruise. This case study is included as an example of a series of coordinated acts, other than propaganda, employed as a means of deterring a would-be aggressor from making additional warlike gestures.

The eighth and last case study included in this chapter describes the use of a psychological warfare technique to motivate members of at least five separate target groups. This study describes how a letter written by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson to Senator Borah, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was released to the general public for the specific purpose of dramatizing the issues of an international conflict in such a way as to stir not alone the American public to action but in addition a number of unnamed foreign addressees: the League of Nations Assembly and the government and peoples of China, Japan, and Great Britain. In drafting the message for one of the groups it was very necessary that the implied message to this group not be canceled out by the implied message to any of the others. Thus great care had to be given to the preparation of the letter.

The account of the Emancipation Proclamation and the 1907–1909 world cruise of the US fleet are other excellent examples of well-planned actions designed to reach more than one specific target group. Several of the case histories illustrate the importance of detailed target analysis, proper timing, and coordination with other services and with events of the day.

Two case histories — "The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" and "Sisson's Account of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points"— illustrate the ever-present requirement for high-level political support if success is to be attained in major psychological warfare ventures. The American Continental Congress in the first instance and the President of the US, who was the recognized political leader of the Allies in World War I, in the second instance, gave this support. Thus, operators on the spot were able to take bold and aggressive propaganda action.

One case — "Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War" — is quite short, and yet it is of sufficient length to illustrate the value of detailed target analysis of the group addressed and the desirability of pinpointing a propaganda assault against known grievances of the foe. The case should also be of interest to those who might have thought that successful appeals for US troop surrenders were first made during the Korean conflict.

The case history of "The Propaganda of the Confederacy" is an abridgement of a chapter appearing in Burton J. Hendrick's *Statesmen of the Lost Cause.*[22] It describes in considerable detail the backgrounds, training, personal characteristics, and problems that faced two Confederate political agents sent to Europe during the Civil War to win French and British support to the Southern cause. The study of the activities of the two agents provides an interesting comparison of personalities, which in the one instance seemed to make for success, and in the other, for failure. In addition, this case history eloquently illustrates the principle that with an unpopular cause to espouse, in this case human slavery, there are limitations to what may be accomplished through the use of propaganda and other forms of psychological warfare.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN 1776: THE JEFFERSON-FRANKLIN PLAN TO CAUSE HESSIAN DESERTIONS*

By Lyman H. Butterfield

Psychological warfare in the form of appealing handbills was instrumental in causing German mercenaries to desert from the British army during the revolutionary war.

From Kew on November 12, 1775, at "2 min. past 7 P.M.," George III addressed Lord North a note saying he had "no objection to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel

*From *Proceedings of American Philosophical Society*, 94: 233–41 (1950). Reproduced with permission of Dr. Butterfield and the editor of the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*.

and the Duke of Brunswick being addressed for troops to serve in America."[3] This was a perfectly natural and even routine decision for His Majesty. The British government had long been accustomed to hiring manpower to fight its wars, and George III's relatives in Germany were accustomed to renting out their troops in order to pay their own debts. But it was a fateful decision, and one fraught with ironies that were apparent as soon as it became known. A few decades earlier the King's own progenitors had been instrumental in sending over whole shiploads of Germans to America — the Palatine redemptioners who settled in New York Province and later elsewhere. Captain James Luttrell, a member of the Whig opposition who had spent some years in America, did not fail to remind ministers of both the danger and the irony of their policy when the treaties with the German princelings were presented for ratification. He named over some of the prosperous German settlements scattered through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. He did not doubt that the mercenaries about to be sent over to America would enjoy the prospect of settling there, nor did he doubt that inducements would be held out to them to do so. In short, he concluded, "These warlike transports we are to fit out may, then, be considered as good as the Palatine ships for peopling America with Germans." (No. 6, p 283) [45]

The treaties were ratified; the ministers and their royal master breathed with relief, for they were glad to get troops even at the exorbitant prices demanded; and the unfortunate subjects of all this chaffering moved toward northern ports amid difficulties that would have discouraged less avaricious men than their several sovereigns. Thanks to Ralph Izard, Arthur Lee, and other informants in England, news of these events reached America with extraordinary speed *, [6] And it had a profound effect. As early as January 19, 1776, Edward Shippen reported that in Philadelphia, as a result of rumors about the hiring of mercenaries, "Conversions (to the patriot party) have been more rapid than ever under Mr. Whitefield," and that even Mr. Dickinson had been heard to say that he saw no alternative but independence or slavery.[7] The Philadelphia patriots began writing to England that the sending of the mercenaries was really a stroke favoring America, "because we know that the Germans . . . will find it much more preferable for their present comfortable subsistence, as well as a prospect of future happy settlement, to join us."[8, 9] General Washington himself was persuaded likewise. On May 11 he asked President Hancock whether it might not

> ". . . be advisable and good policy, to raise some Companies of our Germans to send among (the mercenaries), when they arrive, for exciting a spirit of disaffection and desertion? If a few trusty, sensible fellows could get with them, I should think they would have great weight and influence with the common Soldiery, who certainly have no enmity toward us, having received no Injury, nor cause of Quarrell from us." (No. 5, p 36)[10]

* On September 8, 1775, Ralph Izard wrote from Weymouth, England, to Thomas Lynch in South Carolina: "The Prince of Hesse, is now in London. I am of opinion that German troops, will be sent to America in the spring. Proper rewards offered to them, would probably, draw them to you. Give my compliments to Dr. Franklin and consult him on this subject. The leading people, among the Germans of Pennsylvania, should likewise be consulted." (No. 1, pp 124–25)[6] Izard told his son in June, 1774, that "The Treaty with the Germans, was the Bill of Divorce between Great Britain and America," and that he had predicted to the British ministers that it would be. (No. 1, p 304)[6]

On the other hand, rumors filled the papers all spring about the enormous numbers of hired troops on their way and the extraordinary skill and ferocity of the Germans as soldiers. The Jagers, it was said, were "amazingly expert" in marksmanship, for they were trained especially to shoot boars in the forests of the German princelings.[11] Was it going to be possible to appeal to the better instincts of these professional killers, or was it not? That remained to be seen.

Authentic news arrived early in May through one George Merchant, who had marched with Arnold to Quebec, had been captured there, taken to England, and then returned to Halifax. Soon afterwards he escaped south and brought with him, sewn in the waistband of his breeches, copies of the British contracts with Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Hanau for the total of some 17,000 troops.[12, 13] (No. 5, p 56–57)[10] Congress ordered the treaties published; the citizenry read them and felt a proper indignation at the terms of these bargains in human flesh. Franklin read them on his return trip from Canada and wrote his fellow commissioners, still in Canada: "The German Auxiliaries are certainly coming. It is our Business to prevent their Returning."[14] Franklin's indignation, deep and lasting, eventually produced his celebrated letter on the sale of the Hessians, a hoax so successful that it still deceives twentieth-century readers. (No. 7, p 27–29)[14], *, [15] The direct connection between the hiring of the Germans and American independence is clear. When the Virginia Convention resolved on May 15 to instruct its delegates in Congress to move for independence, it recited among the causes for its action "the aid of foreign troops engaged to assist (the) destructive purposes" of the British king.[16] One of the Virginia delegates in Congress was chosen, as it turned out, to write the paper that declared America independent. Thomas Jefferson did not fail to include among the crimes of George III that "he is, at this time, transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy." The King's routine decision of last November had borne bitter fruit.

Congress on May 21 had read the papers brought by George Merchant and had appointed John Adams, William Livingston, Thomas Jefferson, R. H. Lee, and Roger Sherman a committee "to extract and publish the treaties; . . . to consider of an adequate reward for the person who brought the intelligence; and to prepare an address to the foreign mercenaries who are coming to invade America."(No. 4, p 369)[17] The committee performed two of its assignments, but did not complete the third. One of the members — it might have been any one of them, but it is thought to have been most likely Jefferson — asked George Wythe, who was not a member of the committee, to draft the proposed address. Wythe complied, and his draft is still among Jefferson's papers in the Library of Congress. It was a production very characteristic of Wythe, and, from our point of view, at least, an eloquent appeal. No one knows how well it might have served its purpose for it was never used. It reads:

> "The delegates of the thirteen united colonies of America to the officers and soldiers of. . . .

* Though not included in Ford's *Franklin Bibliography*,[15] this pretended letter from Count von Schaumburg to the Hessian Commander in America, lamenting that the Hessian losses at Trenton were not still greater than they actually were, has long been accepted as Franklin's and is of a piece with other literary-political hoaxes known to be by him. . . . In Germany the letter became known as "Der Uriasbrief" and was learnedly refuted and discredited every few years during the nineteenth century.

"It is with no small pleasure, when in this first address we ever made to you we must call you the enemies, that we can affirm you to be unprovoked enemies. We have not invaded your country, slaughtered wounded or captivated your parents, children, or kinsfolk, burned, plundered, or desolated your towns and villages, wasted your farms and cottages, spoiled you of your goods, or annoyed your trade. On the contrary, all your countrymen who dwell among us, were received as friends, and treated as brethren, participating equally with our selves of all our rights, franchises, and privileges. We have not aided ambitious princes and potentates in subjugating you. We should glory being instrumental in the deliverance of mankind from bondage and oppression. What then induced you to join in this quarrel with our foes, strangers to you, unconnected with you, and at so great a distance from both you and us? Do you think the cause you are engaged in just on your side? To decide that we might safely appeal to the judicious and impartial — but we have appealed to the righteous judge of all the earth, inspired with humble confidence and well-grounded hopes, that the lord of hosts will fight our battles, whilst we are vindicating that inheritance we own ourselves indebted to his bounty alone for [sic]. Were you compelled by your sovereigns to undertake the bloody work of butchering your unoffending fellow-creatures? Disdain the inhuman office, disgraceful to the soldier. Did lust of conquest prompt you? The victory, unattainable by you if heaven war not against us, which we know of no good reason you have to expect, or we to dread, shall cost you more than the benefits derived from it will be equivalent to; since it will be disputed by those who are resolved inflexibly to live no longer than they can enjoy the liberty you are hired to rob them of, and who are conscious of a dignity of character, which a contempt of every danger threatening the loss of that blessing seldom fails to accompany. Were you tempted by the prospect of exchanging the land you left for happier regions, for a land of plenty and abhorrent of despotism? We wish this may be your motive; because we have the means, and want not inclination, to gratify your desires, if they be not hostile, without loss to ourselves, perhaps with less expense, certainly with more honour and with more advantage to you than victory can promise. Numberless Germans and other foreigners, settled in this country, will testify this truth. To give you farther assurance of it, we have resolved.

"Mistake not this for an expedient suggested by fear. In military virtue we doubt not Americans will prove themselves to be second to none; their numbers exceed you and your confederates; in resources they now do or soon will abound. Neither suppose that we would seduce you to a treacherous defection. If you have been persuaded to believe that it is your duty, or will be your interest to assist those who prepare, in vain we trust, to destroy us; go on; and, when you shall fall into our hands, and experience less severity of punishment than ruffians, and savages deserve, attribute it to that lenity, which is never separate from magnanimity. But if, exercising your own judgments, you have spirit enough to assert that freedom which all men are born to, associate yourselves with those who desire, and think they are able to secure it, with all the blessings of peace, to you and your posterity."(No. 1, p 146)[18]

On the day that independence was voted, General Howe arrived from Halifax at Staten Island with a formidable army which, during the next several weeks, was repeatedly reinforced. Against expected British forays along the Jersey coast Washington had worked out with Congress a plan of defense which was given the picturesque name of "the flying camp." An amateur outfit clear through, the flying camp was made up of recruits drawn from a citizenry half thrilled and half terrified by the prospect of a war in its own front yard. The recruits marched and the supply wagons rumbled through the Jerseys to an encampment at Perth Amboy, hardly more than a hundred yards across the narrow sound that separates the foot of Staten Island from the mainland.*, [19, 20] Here the young Pennsylvanians from Bucks, Delaware, and Chester counties could see the British transports arriving in Lower New York Bay and could exchange pot shots with the men cantoned opposite them. On August 12 a British fleet of 107 sail arrived and began unloading troops, among whom were the long-expected Hessians, seven or eight thousand in number.[21] No doubt for the purpose of giving the Americans a good view of them, the Hessians were ordered within a week to take post at Amboy Ferry, immediately across from the American camp.[22]

Now was the time if ever, to see whether the hired troops would be glad to throw down their arms if given a chance to do so. On August 9 Congress resolved

> "That a committee of three be appointed, to devise a plan for encouraging the Hessians, and other foreigners, employed by the King of Great Britain, and sent to America for the purpose of subjugating these states, to quit that iniquitous service: The members chosen, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Stockton."(No. 5, p 640)[17]

The committee reported on August 14. Curiously, no copy of the report can be found in either the Papers of the Continental Congress, where it belongs, or in Jefferson's papers, where drafts of scores of committee reports he prepared or assisted in preparing are preserved. In the form of a resolve of Congress it was, however, spread on the Journal and read as follows:

> "Whereas it has been the wise policy of these states to extend the protection of their laws to all those who should settle among them, of whatever nation or religion they might be, and to admit them to a participation of the benefits of civil and religious freedom; and the benevolence of this practice, as well as its salutary effects, have rendered it worthy of being continued in future times.
>
> "And whereas, his Britannic majesty, in order to destroy our freedom and happiness, has commenced against us a cruel and unprovoked war; and, unable to engage Britons sufficient to execute his sanguinary measures, has applied for aid to certain foreign princes, who are in the habit of selling the blood of their people for money, and from them has procured and transported hither considerable numbers of foreigners.
>
> "And it is conceived, that such foreigners, if apprised of the practice of these states, would chuse to accept of lands, liberty, safety and a communion of good laws, and mild government, in a country where many of their friends and relations are already happily settled, rather than continue exposed to the toils and dangers of a long and bloody war, waged against a people, guilty of no other crime, than that of refusing to exchange freedom for slavery; and that they will do this the more especially when they reflect, that after they shall have violated every Christian and moral precept, by invading, and attempting to destroy, those who have never injured them or their country, their only reward, if they escape death and captivity, will be a return to the despotism of their prince, to be by him again sold to do the drudgery of some other enemy to the rights of mankind.
>
> "And whereas, the parliament of Great Britain have thought fit, by a late act, not merely to invite our troops to desert our service, but to direct a compulsion of our people, taken at sea, to serve against their country!
>
> "*Resolved*, Therefore, that these states, will receive all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America, and shall chuse to become members of any of these states; that they shall be protected in the free exercise of their respective religions, and be invested with the rights, privileges and immunities of natives, as established by the laws of these states; and, moreover, that this Congress will provide, for every such person, 50 acres of unappropriated lands in some of these states, to be held by him and his heirs in absolute property."(No. 5, p 653–55)[17]

* An interesting journal was kept by Captain Benjamin Loxley.[20] For some strictures by a professional soldier on the flying camp see Butterfield's article.[19]

There is no proof that this paper came from Jefferson's hand, but the style is perfectly characteristic of him; and, as we shall see, it was he who drew the very similar appeal to the Hessian officers ordered by Congress two weeks later. These are good reasons for assigning the authorship to Jefferson, and there are no good reasons to assign it to any other person. Congress thought it a business-like performance and directed the same committee, augmented by Dr. Franklin, "to take proper measures to have it communicated to the foreign troops." Copies were sent promptly to General Washington at New York, and Washington wrote President Hancock two days later: "The Resolution . . . respecting the Foreign Troops, I am persuaded would produce Salutary Effects, If it can be properly circulated among them; I fear it will be a matter of difficulty: — However I will take every measure that shall appear probable to facilitate the end." (No. 10, p 450–51)[10] Next day he asked for, and received, more copies. . . . (No. 10, p 463–64)[10]

By August 26 Washington was able to announce with satisfaction that "The Papers designed for the foreign Troops, have been put into several Channels, in order that they might be conveyed to them, and from the Information I had yesterday, I have reason to believe many have fallen into their hands." (No. 5, p 491)[10] Washington's "Channels" are not known, but one of them was almost certainly Christopher Ludwick, one of the most engaging adventurers of the eighteenth century. Ludwick was a native of Hesse-Darmstadt, had fought against the Turks, and was shortly to become "Baker General" of the Continental army.[23] Early in August he had volunteered his services gratis as baker to the flying camp at Amboy.[20] He, if anyone, would have heard of the proposal to suborn the Hessians, and he was in fact summoned to Headquarters by Washington on August 18. Moreover, an account of Ludwick's extraordinary career by a contemporary (Benjamin Rush) records the following incident:

> "From a desire to extend the blessings of liberty and independence to his German countrymen, he once exposed his neck to the most imminent danger. He went, with the consent of the commanding officer of the flying camp, among that part of the British army, which was composed of Hessian

troops; while they were encamped on Staten Island, in the character of a deserter. He opened to them the difference between the privileges and manner of life of an American freeman, and those of a Hessian slave. He gave them the most captivating descriptions of the affluence and independence of their former countrymen in the German counties of Pennsylvania. His exertions were not in vain. They were followed by the gradual desertion of many hundred soldiers, who, now in comfortable freeholds or on valuable farms, with numerous descendents, bless the name of Christopher Ludwick. He escaped from the Hessian camp, without detection or suspicion."[24]

Rush knew or remembered nothing of the address from Congress to the mercenary troops, and perhaps he applied some gilding to the incident here related. But nothing is more plausible than that Ludwick, at Washington's request, performed such a mission in order to convey the handbills prepared by Congress to those for whom they were meant.

Meanwhile in Philadelphia Benjamin Franklin, who had been added to the committee to oversee the distribution of the address, had had a characteristically ingenious idea. On the twenty-fourth he wrote Thomas McKean, then serving as colonel with the volunteer forces at Amboy:

"I heard your letter read in Congress relating to the Disposition of the German Troops; and understanding from Col. Ross that they are canton'd on the Island opposite to the Jersey Shore. I send you herewith some of the Resolutions of the Congress translated into their Language, as possibly you may find some Opportunity of conveying them over the Water, to those People. Some of the Papers have Tobacco Marks on the Back, it being suppos'd by the Committee, that if a little Tobacco were put up in each as the Tobacconists used to do, and a Quantity made to fall into the hands of that Soldiery, by being put into a Drift Canoe among some other little Things, it would be divided among them as Plunder before the Officers could know the Contents of the Paper and prevent it." (No. 2, p 59–60)[25]

No copy of the German handbill bearing Franklin's "Tobacco Marks" has been found. In fact, for some time it seemed as if no copy of any sort could be found, for none has so far been located in the Papers of the Continental Congress, in the voluminous papers left by Washington, Jefferson, Gates, and Franklin, or in the broadside collections of a dozen major American libraries specializing in Revolutionary materials. The copy reproduced here is in the German State Archives for the District of Cassel at Marburg.[26] The Director reports that this copy of the handbill was presumably enclosed (though not mentioned) in a letter from Lieutenant General von Heister to the Landgrave himself, dated September 3, 1776. It was later pasted on a mounting sheet, from which it has now been removed so that back as well as front could be photographed. The back is blank.

At Amboy a Colonel James Wilson (there were nearly as many colonels as privates in the flying camp), who is not to be confused with the Pennsylvania "singer" and member of the committee of August 9, saw some of the German handbills and was convinced they would have powerful effects. Writing Hancock on the twenty-second, Wilson expressed surprise that so good a scheme was not applied more widely: "Perhaps it is not yet too late to offer additional rewards to

officers in proportion to their rank and pay." (No. 1, p 1110)[5] Congress acted immediately on the suggestion. A new committee, consisting of Jefferson, Franklin, and John Adams, was appointed on the twenty-sixth. These gentlemen were used to collaborating, and the case was urgent. On the very next day they reported a resolution in the form of an address to the foreign officers serving with the British, and it was promptly adopted. (No. 5, p 705–08)[17] Their report is not in the Continental Congress Papers, but a draft of it, in Jefferson's hand, is in the Jefferson Papers in the Library of Congress, together with a partial draft, which was rejected by the committee, in the hand of John Adams*, (No. 5, p 655)[17], (No. 2, p 299)[18] Jefferson's draft reads as follows:

Aug 27 1776

"The Congress proceeding to take into further consideration the expediency of inviting from the service of his Britannic majesty such foreigners as by the compulsive authority of their prince may have been engaged therein and sent higher for the purpose of waging war against these states, and expecting that the enlightened minds of the officers having command in those foreign corps will feel more sensibly the cogency of the principles urged in our resolution of the 14th, instant, principles which being derived from the unalterable laws of god and nature cannot be superseded by any human authority or engagement, and willing to tender to them also, as they had before done to the soldiery of their corps a participation of the blessings of peace, liberty, property and mild government, on their relinquishing the disgraceful office on which they have been sent hither. Resolved that they will give to all such of the said foreign officers as shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America and chuse to become citizens of these states, unappropriated lands in the following quantities and proportions to them and their heirs in absolute dominion. To a colonel 1000 acres, to a Lt. Col. 800 as. to a Major 600 as. to a Captain 400 as. to an Ensign 200 as. to every noncommissioned officer 100 as. and to every other officer (or) person employed in the sd. foreign corps and whose office or emploiment is (not) here specifically named, lands in the like proportion to their rank or pay in the said corps: & moreover that where any officers shall bring with them a number of the sd. foreign soldiers, this Congress, besides the lands before promised to the sd. officers and soldiers, will give to such officers further rewards proportioned to the numbers they shall bring over & suited to the nature of their wants. Provided that

* It is printed in the Ford edition of the journals[17] but is there wrongly associated with the address of August 14 to the private soldiers. It reads:

"Whereas it is probable, that among the officers of the foreign Troops, now in the Service of the King of Great Britain, there may be many, of liberal Minds, possessed of just Sentiments of the Rights of human Nature and the inestimable Value of Freedom; who may be prompted by the Feelings of Humanity, and a just Indignation at the disgraceful service to which they are devoted by an infamous Contract between two arbitrary Sovereigns and at the Insult offered to them by compelling them to war against an innocent People, who never offended them, nor the Nation to which they belong, but are only contending for their just Rights; to renounce so dishonourable a service. Therefore "Resolved that all such officers who shall abandon the service"

such foreign officers or soldiers shall come over from the sd. service before these offers be recalled, (or within after such).” (No. 2, p 298)[18]

The address to the officers was translated into German and printed overnight. (The report as submitted was doubtless used as printer's copy, just as had apparently happened in the case of a more famous collaborative effort of these three men — the Declaration of Independence. Haste thus accounts for the absence of the committee's manuscript from the official files.) On August 28, Franklin sent to Gates in New York a letter covering a packet of “both sorts” of handbills (for private soldiers and for officers), so that, “if you find it practicable, you may convey them among the Germans that shall come against you.” (No. 1, p 1193)[5] Washington acknowledged this further move by Congress in a letter to Hancock of the twenty-ninth. He said — a little ruefully, for the battle of Long Island had occurred in the interval — “As to the Encouragement to the Hessian Officers, I wish it may have the desired effect, perhaps it might have been better, had the offer been made sooner.”*, [27] (No. 5, p 496)[10]

What were the results of this Jeffersonian eloquence, these Franklinian devices? What effect did the handbills have upon the mercenaries for whom they were intended? They had very little effect at first, and for reasons easily understood. For one thing, not many reached their marks. The Hessians' own diaries and letters so far as they have been printed, do not mention them; and the historians who have used the pertinent manuscript sources scarcely mention the incident. One of the first Hessian prisoners, a private soldier named Christian Guiler captured on Staten Island, deposed on October 16, 1776, that “they [the hired troops] saw no papers of any kind among them from us; if they knew that they would be well treated by us, would all lay down their arms; have no desire to return to their regiment again.” (No. 2, p 1073–74)[5] General Mercer, commandant of the flying camp, forwarded Guiler's testimony to Washington, to whom no doubt it proved heartening. But the British command had been shrewd enough to put the mercenary soldiers to work as soon as they arrived. The battle of Long Island took place within a few days after the last of the foreign troops had disembarked. It was the biggest battle that had yet been fought in North America, and the result was nearly disastrous for Washington's raw army. By the same token it must have been very satisfying to the Hessians since war was their business. The Americans had a much more serious desertion problem in the fall of 1776 than the Hessians did.

An “Extract of a letter from Fort Lee,” dated November 14, 1776, and printed in the Philadelphia newspapers, contains the earliest mention of a Hessian deserter I have seen:[28]

> “This morning a Hessian soldier deserted to Fort Washington, the very first that has done so — He encourages us to hope that many of his countrymen will follow his example, as soon as they are assured the Americans will not hang them for meddling in the present war; a notion that has been so industriously planted, and is (so) firmly rooted, that it will be difficult to eradicate it.”

* No copy of the handbill addressed to the officers has been found. Edward J. Lowell states that there is a manuscript copy in one of the Hessian regimental journals in the State archives at Cassel.

This suggests that the British had indoctrinated the mercenary troops against expected American propaganda, and not without effect.*,[29] But all such indoctrination was bound to evaporate as the war continued and as the British met reverses — especially those reverses which resulted in the capture of German troops, as at Trenton and Saratoga. The American leaders took full advantage of these circumstances. The first Hessians captured in the fighting around New York were put under the care of their compatriot Ludwick, who showed them in Philadelphia and the country round about how Germans lived in the New World. President Hancock wrote Washington on November 16, 1776, proposing an early exchange of these prisoners. “They have been treated in such a Manner during their Stay in this City,” he observed, “that it is apprehended, their going back among their Countrymen, will be attended with some good Consequences.” † (No. 2, p 153, No. 2, p 399)[25] After the action at Trenton, Washington ordered the separation of officers and men among the captives, so that the privates especially, “may have such principles instilled into them during their Confinement, that when they return, they may open the Eyes of their Countrymen, who have not the most cordial Affection for their English fellow Soldiers.”(No. 6, p 453, 464)[10]

There can be no question about the effectiveness of this policy. Though widely scattered, there is abundant evidence to show that large numbers of the German auxiliaries deserted during periods of captivity at Bethlehem, Lancaster, Carlisle, and Charlottesville. Their names appear on the rolls of state regiments, on tax lists, and sometimes as schoolmasters or clergymen, usually accompanied by the rubric “Hessian” (which may mean anything from an Anspacher to a Waldecker). ‡

* On this point there is a very revealing passage in the diary of the Reverend Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, himself an immigrant from Germany, under date of 8 November 1776:

> “Several Hessians were brought to Philadelphia as prisoners. One of them happened to meet an inhabitant who was his aunt. The aunt asked him what had made him come here to do violence to his own flesh and blood. He replied that he had been torn out of bed, away from his wife and children, and forced into the service. Others were asked why they had fought so violently against the Americans in the battle of Long Island and treated the wounded so pitilessly. Answer: The English officers had told them that the Americans were savage cannibals, especially those who were shaggily clad, whom they must exterminate first of all if they were not to be tortured and eaten alive by them. This was therefore a minor stratagem of war; for the American chasseurs or sharpshooters, who shoot with rifles and are called *riflemen*, have a peculiar form of dress, much like that of the savage Indians, shaggy like the pictures of fauns and satyrs, and most of them are enlisted nativeborn men of English and German extraction.”[29]

† It was reported that a Hessian band composed of captives taken at Trenton played at the celebration of the first anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia.

‡ It is an interesting fact that during the invasion of Virginia by British forces, accompanied by German mercenaries, early in 1781, Governor Thomas Jefferson thought it worth while to renew the offer of 50 acres of land tendered by the Continental Congress to the Hessian private soldiers in 1776, “further promising to all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty while in this state and repair forthwith to me at this place, that they shall receive from this Commonwealth a further donation of two cows, and an exemption during the present war from all taxes for the support thereof and from all militia and military service.”[18]

(No. 4, p 505–06)[18], (No. 1, p 354–55)[30] Most of these men were inconspicuous and doubtless preferred to remain so, but a remarkable case is that of Friedrich Valentine Melsheimer, chaplain of a Brunswick regiment, who preferred to quit the service rather than to be exchanged and who became a Lutheran pastor at Manheim and Hanover, first Professor of Languages at Franklin College in Lancaster, a writer of authoritative works on American etomology, and a member of the American Philosophical Society.*,[31, 32] There were 785 desertions among the German Convention Troops alone between the surrender at Saratoga in October, 1777, and August 1, 1779.[33] The German princelings hired out about 30,000 troops to their British colleague and relative George III during the American Revolution. Of these, between 17,000 and 18,000 returned to Germany. Among the more than 12,000 lost, somewhat more than half may be accounted for by death from combat or illness. Between 5,000 and 6,000 must therefore have deserted. (No. 1, p 356)[30] These are old figures and contain elements of conjecture, but there is no reason to doubt that they are approximately correct.†,[34, 35] They suggest one of the reasons why the British failed in America: George III's decision to employ mercenaries was a bad one; and both the Germans who came and the Americans who received them capitalized on his error.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE MEXICAN WAR‡

By Marshall Andrews

The Mexicans' appeals for desertions from the American Army on religious grounds met with a sufficient measure of success for them to form the San Patricio Battalion.

Psychological Warfare, as we now understand it, was employed with marked effect by the Mexican Government in the Mexican War of 1846–1848.

Early in 1846, several months before the declaration of war on 13 May, the Mexican authorities had issued proclamations addressed to US soldiers of foreign birth, particularly Irish Catholics, offering 320 acres of land to privates who would desert and enter Mexico. These efforts, General Zachary Taylor reported on 6 April, "have met with considerable success." Up to the time of Taylor's report, four men had been drowned attempting to swim the Rio Grande and two had been shot by pickets. Nevertheless, at least 30 men made their way across the river to form the nucleus of what was to become the San Patricio Battalion of US deserters in the Mexican Army.

The most fruitful appeal, however, was on religious grounds and the very great majority of deserters to Mexico were Irishmen who had become convinced by Mexican propaganda that they were on the wrong side in a religious war. Another factor that encouraged desertion, and strengthened Mexican propaganda, was the

* Dr. Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., has collected data on individual deserters and has kindly allowed me to consult his notes.

† There has been no recent study of the German mercenaries in the Revolution, and there never has been one of desertion among them.[34] Such a study if it were to analyze the relations between the mercenary troops and their officers, between the German and the British troops, and between the Germans and the American troops and citizenry, would be of great value. An important new source for such a study has become available in the Von Jungkenn Papers now in the William L. Clements Library.[25]

‡ Original text prepared for this volume.

treatment of soldiers in the US Army of that day. A Scottish soldier in the Regular Army wrote 5 years after the war that "various degrading modes of punishment, often inflicted by young, headstrong, and inconsiderate officers, in their zeal for the discipline of the service, [were inflicted] for the most trivial offenses. . . ."

There is no firm record of the ultimate strength of the San Patricio Battalion, but its existence and its fighting quality were well known throughout the US Army. Most of the heavy loss in storming the fort at Churubusco 20 August 1847 was attributed to the skill and desperation with which the Mexican guns were served by members of the San Patricio Battalion.

At Churubusco 69 members of that battalion were captured. A dozen of these prisoners (including their ringleader, a man named Riley) who had deserted before the declaration of war, were flogged and branded on the cheek with a "D." Sixteen were hanged at San Angel 9 September, and four at Mixcoac 10 September. Thirty more were hanged 13 September while Chapultepec was being stormed and in sight of the battle, having been "let live long enough to see the flag raised on the castle," according to the *American Star*, published in Mexico City by two American civilians.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By M. J.

The Proclamation was addressed to several specific target groups and its public release was so timed as to produce the greatest possible reaction among the several audiences.

The Emancipation Proclamation of 1862–1863 was one of the most significant political warfare instruments in American military history, to be compared only with the Declaration of Independence issued at the beginning of the American Revolution. Probably no other American propaganda document had been so long contemplated before being issued. Certainly no other document had its contents more scrupulously planned, nor its timing more carefully considered.

Lincoln's remarkable qualities as judge of political and psychological situations were nowhere better demonstrated than in the course of his deliberations on the advisability of proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War. The record of these deliberations seems to show that in spite of the demands of the abolitionists in the North and Lincoln's own distaste for slavery as an institution, he was finally brought to issue the Emancipation Proclamation at the time he did, and in the form he gave it, by military considerations alone. The famous attack upon Lincoln made in 1862 by the abolitionist editor, Horace Greeley, accused him of indifference to Northern hatred of slavery. To this, Lincoln replied by explaining that his policy was based entirely on pragmatic considerations, that he was interested, first of all, in winning the war and suppressing the rebellion:

> "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery. . . I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. . . .

"I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."(p 158)[36]

"Audiences" of the Proclamation

Lincoln considered a decree emancipating the slaves to be a plan that could have the most diverse consequences for the progress of the war, depending on what psychological effects it had on each of several different groups. Important reactions to such a decree could be anticipated from at least six major "audiences":

(1) The white population of the Confederate states was an audience that would probably react in a way prejudicial to the success of the Union cause. A proclamation emancipating the slaves would most likely strengthen the determination of this group to prosecute the war against the North. On the other hand, such a proclamation might materially lessen their power to wage war if it had certain effects on other groups. For instance, should the proclamation actually have the effect of freeing large numbers of slaves, or in leading large numbers of them to believe that freedom would be the ultimate outcome of the war, then the basis of Southern resistance, the principal root of the war, would be weakened greatly. By achieving this, Lincoln hoped that he might "deprive the disaffected leaders of all hope of winning over the more northern slave states. So to deprive them, he thought, would substantially end the rebellion."(p 164)[36] Thus, the reaction of this first group depended in part of the reaction of a second group.

(2) The slave population of the Southern states was also an important target audience for the proclamation. So great was the hope that proclaiming the emancipation would bring large numbers of ex-slaves to the ranks of the Union armies that three Union generals had already proclaimed emancipation of the enemy's slaves in their theater without prior authorization from the President. This had been done partly in the hope of gaining new recruits to the Union armies and partly in the hope of disrupting enemy forces. Not only might the Negroes, directly supporting the armies of the South, be a vulnerable target for emancipation thereby deserting to the Union side, but it was also hoped that the civilian Southern Negroes on farms and plantations might slacken their efforts or even desert their masters if Lincoln declared them to be free. On the other hand, Lincoln was inclined to believe that even if they did desert en masse there were many problems yet to solve. ". . . supposing they did throw themselves upon us in large numbers, what should we do with them? How could we 'feed and care for such a multitude?' " (p 156)[36]

Moreover if, as Lincoln suspected was the case, the white masters had full control over their slave populations, the edict certainly could not be enforced by the Union armies until they had succeeded by arms in actually conquering the Southern territory. In that case, the proclamation might seem ridiculous. The President made this argument in resisting some of the proemancipation advice given him: "What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do. . .? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must . . . be inoperative like the Pope's bull against the comet."(p 156)[36]

(3) Still a third group, from which significant reactions to emancipation might be anticipated, was the white population in the slave states still on the side of the North — more commonly known as the "border" states. This sector of public opinion (in Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri) might well feel so

threatened by a Presidential decree proclaiming emancipation of slaves in the Confederacy that it would itself go over to the side of the South as a result of it. Lincoln said of the proclamation he was urged to make: "I would do it if I were not afraid that half the officers would fling down their arms and three more States would rise." (p 153)[36]

Randall thought that this consideration was a major one in Lincoln's calculations on the advisability of emancipation: "Especially he emphasized the importance of fifty thousand Union bayonets from the border slave states; if in consequence of a proclamation they should go over to the enemy, it would be a very serious matter."(p 157)[36]

(4) A fourth group was composed of Northern abolitionists — a group that might be expected to react favorably toward an emancipation proclamation thereby furthering the Union cause. This group was, perhaps, the most politically influential and articulate one in the North. The continual criticism by members of this group, aimed at the Commander-in-Chief for his caution, destroyed the unity of Union supporters and harassed the President by making difficult his relations with his colleagues in the administration and the Congress. It was expected that the morale of the abolitionists would be greatly heightened if the war were openly declared to be a "crusade against slavery."

(5) Although an emancipation might silence the abolitionists and heighten their morale, it might also alienate many Northerners, especially Democrats, who were opposed to challenging Southern slavery. Lincoln, himself, had been elected on a Republican platform that declared its opposition to any interference with the property claims of the South. Lincoln had "sold" the war to many Northerners on the simple basis that it was necessary to defend the Union against violent rebellion and secession. Although the abolitionists ardor for the Union cause might be increased by proclaiming an emancipation of the slaves, the more passive anti-abolitionists in the North could be weakened greatly in their already none-too-fierce determination to prosecute the war. A firm and united policy against the South could be threatened should emancipation alienate much Northern support. One Lincoln scholar writes:

> "There was indeed grave danger of splitting the North in two if he appeared unnecessarily to change the issue from Union to Liberation." (p 342)[37]
>
> "Of the bulk of the Northern Democrats it would . . . be fair to say that their conscious intention throughout was to be true to the Union but that throughout they were beset by a respect for Southern rights which would have gone far to paralyze the arm of the Government."(p 290)[37]

(6) The British formed a sixth and most important group whose support might be gained as a result of decreeing the slaves freed. Well into 1862 a large part of the English public was identified as sympathetic with the Southern cause. Economic ties with the South and feelings of cultural kinship with Southerners led many English statesmen to favor giving the South more tangible and open support than mere economic cooperation. Many in England believed that the Yankee cause was not specifically an antislavery one. During the year 1862, English recognition of the Confederacy as an independent state was discussed in Cabinet meetings and seemed imminently threatened.[38]

Many Americans, including the Ambassador to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, believed that English leanings toward the Southern cause would persist

officially only so long as the English could keep up the pretext that the Union forces were not waging a crusade against slavery. Once the rebellion was officially declared to be a war between slavery and individual freedom as well as one against disunion, the British, who were not only morally opposed to slavery but who had also freed slaves under their own dominion, would very likely cease threatening the Union cause by inclining toward more active help of the South.

Timing of the Proclamation

The contents of the so-called "preliminary" proclamation of emancipation issued on 22 September 1862 were designed to take the utmost advantage from the psychological effects of appropriate timing on the expected different reactions of those diverse audiences that have been discussed above.

When Lincoln first proposed a proclamation of emancipation at a Cabinet meeting in the summer of 1862, Secretary Seward pointed out that the particular point reached in the course of the war, then marked by defeat for the Union armies and gloom for the Union cause, made the time inappropriate for such an edict. It has already been seen that Lincoln feared that the proclamation might seem to be "whistling in the dark." Hence he readily admitted the aptness of Seward's point. A contemporary reporter described the decision to postpone the proclamation as follows:

> "[Seward] doubted the expediency of a proclamation issued as a time of depression in the public mind, dreading the effect of such a step following so closely upon recent reverses. . . . It 'would be considered a last *shriek* on the retreat.' The secretary . . . said: 'I suggest, sir that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success . . . .' The 'wisdom' of this view struck Lincoln 'with very great force.' 'The result was,' said Lincoln . . . 'that I put the draft of the proclamation aside . . . waiting for a victory.' "(pp 155–56)[36]

Accordingly, Lincoln bided his time in the hopes of a Union victory. During all the 3 months this waiting required, he had to keep his intentions secret from the public. For this reason, he put up with and put off as many writers and persons as he was able — persons who, in calling on him, persuaded the very move he had decided to make:

> "Such complaints . . . Lincoln had to endure while all the time he was awaiting the appropriate public opportunity for launching the proclamation on which he had determined. To supply this much-to-be-desired opportunity rested with McClellan and his men. Major Union victories were not so frequent in '62; if McClellan had not checked Lee at Antietam, Lincoln's proclamation, withheld in hope of Federal triumph, would have been indefinitely delayed. From the day [July 22, 1862] when Lincoln put the famous paper aside on Seward's suggestion . . . no important triumph for the United States came, except for Antietam, until July 1863."(p 159)[36]

Thus, after the victory at Antietam, the opportunity was seized in order to issue the proclamation.

The "slow composition" of this first emancipation proclamation "extended over anxious weeks," but even when it was finally and opportunely issued, it was not to take effect immediately. After 100 days had elapsed, when a supplementary

edict should have been issued, on 1 January 1863, it was brought into effect. Thus all chances were to be maximized that the South or some Southern states, as a result of the proclamation, might repent of secession or despair of ultimate victory, by "giving notice" of the contemplated emancipation.

Accordingly the decree declared that the states in which slaves were to be considered free should not be designated until the final edict on 1 January 1863, and that those states would be the ones that did not have "Congressional representation at Washington, by men chosen at an election wherein a majority of qualified voters participated," i.e., those states still in rebellion on the appointed date.

Lincoln himself observed that when he "conditionally determined to touch" slavery, he "gave a hundred days' fair notice . . . to all the States and people, within which . . . they could have turned it wholly aside by . . . becoming good citizens of the United States."(p 163)[36]

Contents of the Proclamation: Designed to Maximize Effects on the Audiences

By the provision that the proclamation should apply only to states in rebellion, slaveholders of the border states, not involved in the secession, were to be exempt from the emancipation order. It was hoped that as a result of the proclamation this would be appeased as far as they might react toward the Confederate side. Moreover, Tennessee, a state already on the Confederate side, but one that was wavering toward the Union, was likewise omitted from the states named on 1 January 1863.

The tone of the first decree was distinctly and entirely military. It opened "with a declaration that reunion (not abolition) was the object of the war."

> "At the outset Lincoln designated himself as the 'commander-in-chief of the army and navy,' using a phrase which was not customary in presidential proclamations and which did not appear in the call for troops in April 1861. Thus Lincoln began his document with a military wording and a non-abolitionist flavor."(p 162)[36]

Ideological antagonisms to abolitionism in the North and ideological wrath from the enemy were to be minimized as far as possible by the suggestion of military expediency. Apparently it was thought that the substance of the decree would be sufficient to satisfy the Northern abolitionists. In keeping with this strategy, in the final decree of 1 January, Chase framed the beginning of the concluding sentence, "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice." Lincoln himself significantly added, "warranted by the Constitution *upon military necessity*."*(p 168)[36]

Lincoln had been apprehensive that the proclamation might resemble a declaration "against the comet," since it was unenforceable except where Northern armies were predominant. The edict itself did not "free the slaves." Instead it *declared* that the slaves were "and henceforward shall be, free"; and that the "Executive Government will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons." Yet, by the provisions of the first edict, Union armies were only to "recognize" and "protect" this freedom, not explicitly to achieve it.

Although fugitive slaves were not to be returned, and the fact of freedom was to be recognized by the Federal armies, specific incitement of slave rebellions against their masters was avoided in the second edict by enjoining "the people so declared

* Author's italics.

. . . free to abstain from all violence," and by recommending "that . . . they labor faithfully for reasonable wages." These recommendations were apparently inserted to avoid the imputation that Lincoln was arousing such rebellions, and so further enraging the enemy. Confederate spokesmen made this very imputation, however, Lincoln's caution notwithstanding.

Effects of the Proclamation

As had been anticipated, there was much agitation over the Emancipation Proclamation among the conservatives of the North and the population of the "border" states. With the Northern conservatives, the proclamation became part of the case against Lincoln's supporters in the Congressional elections of 1862 and the Presidential election of 1864, without, however, a triumphant outcome being attained. In the "border" states there were complaints, sometimes violent, but the ultimate effect of the proclamation, Randall asserts, "gave impetus to the movement for state laws to sweep away the institution of slavery as it remained within Union lines," and thus became favorable to the Union cause.

The pragmatic and military rather than ideological tone of the proclamation irritated some abolitionists, but most were satisfied, as is shown by the fact that this group was inclined to give the credit for its publication to their favorite heroes rather than to Lincoln. The proclamation even occasioned the beginning of William Lloyd Garrison's practical retirement from public life.

The matter-of-fact tone of the proclamation had more serious consequences in England, however, where Lord Russell, British Foreign Secretary, said it was "of a very strange nature."

> For, said he: "It professes to emancipate all slaves in places where the United States' authorities cannot . . . now make emancipation a reality, but . . . not . . . where . . . emancipation, if decreed, might have been carried into effect."(p 176)[36]

The English, as has been previously mentioned, were inclined to believe that the Northern cause was not a "principled" one. The fact that "A business community, which had seemed pretty tolerant of slavery, was now at war on some point which was said to be and said not to be slavery, was a little hard to understand."(p 279)[37]

Nevertheless, popular English acclaim of the edict made it evident that official British policy could no longer consider overtly supporting the Southern cause. Our ambassador wrote home to a friend that "The President's Proclamation has had a great effect here, if not in America. It has rallied all the sympathies of the working classes, and has produced meetings the like of which . . . have not been seen since the days of reform and the corn laws."(pp 179-80)[36]

As for the anticipated effects of the proclamation on the slaves themselves, one writer said that he doubted whether it "freed anybody anywhere." (p 189)[36] Another qualified this in the following words:

> "On the one hand it did not appear to make free any slave by its own operation during the year . . . . On the other hand it tended to awaken . . . sympathy among the slaves for the Union cause, which held out . . . the promise of certain freedom by its success. . . ."(p 190)[36]

It is observed that the Emancipation Proclamation did not have the immediate effect of "unshackling" the Southern Negro, changing his social status, and enlisting him on the side of the North. As Randall comments, "This was the more

impossible since freedom was proclaimed not by his own protectors and rulers but by an alien and an enemy."(p 195)[36] Moreover, slave rebellions in the South did not take place: ". . . the absence of such uprising is one of the attested facts of the period."(p 196)[36] As had been anticipated, it required actual conquest of the South to bring about even nominal Negro freedom:

> "As the Union armies proceeded to occupy one area after another . . . military contact with the population enabled more and more slaves to find freedom in the shadow of the army and thus to taste the results . . . of Lincoln's proclamation."(p 199)[36]

Despite the limitations of the immediate effects of the proclamation, "its inspirational and slogan value," as Randall puts it, cannot so easily be overestimated. The proclamation is properly compared with the Declaration of Independence, and the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, because by giving the Union cause a principle based on conceptions of universal justice and natural law, it put the people of the North on the side of humane and enlightened progress, not only in the eyes of the Northern abolitionists, but also from the vantage point of the democratic conscience of a much wider section of mankind.

PROPAGANDA OF THE CONFEDERACY*

By Burton J. Hendrick

The Confederate agent Hotze, notwithstanding inadequate financial resources, achieved outstanding success in England, whereas De Leon, with a much larger budget, proved to be a bungling misfit in France.

Anyone who thinks that the publicity agent is a modern character should turn to the propaganda service of the Confederacy in Europe from 1861 to 1865. Its labor in this heroic field presents a study in all the crudities and refinements of the art. The North, it is true, did not entirely neglect the influence of public opinion as helpmeet to its Army and Navy; as its cash resources were larger, so were its expenditures on a more lavish scale; but it is doubtful whether its press agents attained quite the skill in reaching foreign sentiment as did at least one of the Davis representatives.

The [Confederate] State Department entrusted this task of spreading the "truth" in Europe to two men. One of them, Henry Hotze, a native of Switzerland, well-educated, shrewdly intelligent, full of youthful fire, had had a brilliant journalistic career on the *Mobile Register*. His companion worker, Edwin De Leon, the Confederacy's spokesman in France, fell far behind Hotze in ability and finesse. De Leon, indeed, ended his career as one of the most entertaining casualties of the time. His pre-war experience in the United States consular service and his close personal friendship with Jefferson Davis seemed to provide an exceptional equipment for his delicate task. These very advantages, however, especially his association with Davis and other leaders, inspired in him ambitions far transcending those of maker of public opinion and largely explained his undoing. Certainly he could not complain of niggardly treatment by Richmond. The starved Confed-

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erate Treasury gave Hotze $750 as a working fund for publicity in Great Britain and De Leon $25,000 for the same missionary purpose in France. And Hotze's task was a more exacting one than De Leon's. In those days the work of inspiring fervor in the breasts of French journalists was no difficult or complicated labor. The formula was simple to the last degree. Editorial opinion in the joyous days of the Second Empire, especially in the newspapers that had been lukewarm to the Confederate Government, was a matter of bargain and sale. De Leon began distributing his $25,000 in lavish fashion, with fairly magical results. Papers that had violently opposed Jefferson Davis now became his most valiant champions. Only one stumbling block stood in the way of complete success. French newspaper readers, as cynical as the press itself, recognized the long-familiar mechanism of fabricating public sentiment; and De Leon's efforts added much to the gayety of a capital trained to lively humor by the operas of Offenbach and the comedies of Scribe.

De Leon sounded a less entertaining note when he published a brochure, under his own name, on the rights and wrongs of the Confederacy, the chief feature of which was a fervid defense of slavery. As the French people hated nothing quite so vehemently as this "peculiar institution," De Leon's rhetoric did far more harm than good. On the whole the man's literary adventures did not prove to be a great success. He might have survived these misfortunes, however, except for certain personal failings. For other complications rendered him an odious embarrassment to Davis and Benjamin. On leaving Richmond, the Secretary of State had given De Leon extremely confidential letters from Benjamin to Slidell. One of these was the message in which, as previously described, Benjamin had sought to bribe Napoleon III into recognizing the Confederacy and breaking the blockade. On the voyage to France, De Leon opened and read these communications; when he presented the documents, with broken seals, to Slidell, that diplomat's anger knew no restraint. The experience made him instantaneously De Leon's enemy. Slidell refused to introduce him to French officialdom, or to facilitate his missionary efforts in any way. De Leon retaliated by writing an abusive despatch about Slidell to Secretary Benjamin; at the same time, evidently stung by French ridicule of his journalistic approaches, he expressed most unfavorable opinions of the French people and their Government. Unscrupulous Yankee spies obtained possession of these official papers, and, in due course, published them, with conspicuous emblazonry, in the pages of the *New York Tribune*. Both De Leon and Benjamin were Jews, but no fraternal feelings deflected the Secretary of State from his duty in the premises. His published correspondence, Benjamin wrote De Leon, was of such a nature "as not only to destroy your own usefulness in the special service entrusted to you, but to render your continuance in your present position incompatible with the retention in the public service of our commissioner to Paris." De Leon dejectedly returned to Richmond, and fame knew him no more.

If the respective sums of money given to De Leon and Hotze measured the value placed upon their respective services, the Government of Richmond made a great error of judgment. For Hotze proved to be as great a success as De Leon had been a failure. In mental and literary equipment, Hotze was by far the superior man. Only 28 years old, he possessed a suavity, a subtlety, and silence in method that would have distinguished an experienced diplomat. As far back as 1862, he introduced into publicity procedures those "psychological methods" upon which so many modern exemplars pride themselves. No bribery for Hotze — at least, no open, flagrant bribery; he approached his problem in far more insinuating

guise. No press agent quite so noiseless as Hotze has ever plied his craft. Indeed, it was not until the publication of his official papers as recently as 1922 that many Americans had ever heard his name. In comparison with Hotze's suppleness and comprehension, James Murray Mason appears a slow-witted blunderer and even John Slidell looks like an unscrupulous marplot. Yet Richmond, at the time of Hotze's appointment, knew nothing of the man's deft qualities. Clearly no great results were expected from this youthful propagandist.

Only one point in common did Hotze and De Leon evince; this was a considerable contempt for the nations whose good will it was their duty to conciliate. The difference was that De Leon published his opinion broadcast, while Hotze displayed his only in carefully guarded communications to his Government. His earliest reports — reports that were well-written and disclosed a sure grasp of English politics and European statesmen — disclosed also complete disillusionment on British motives in the American contest. Do not look for help or sympathy, he insists — unless such an attitude will promote British interests! No other than material advantages were guiding British party leaders. The Government, the upper social casts, the merchants, individuals, and professional men — such was his diagnosis — welcomed American strife because it meant the lasting dissolution of the American Union. That would be a good thing for England because it would open a vast profitable market to her manufactures. The North, by insisting on a protective tariff, had closed this field to English goods; it was the avowed intention of the South to prohibit Yankee importations and to adopt free trade with Europe. Here was the only explanation, Hotze wrote Benjamin, for such sympathy as prevailed in England for the Confederate cause. "Intense selfishness," he wrote Benjamin, August 2, 1862, "overshadows all other national characteristics and this selfishness is narrow-minded, because there is not now any truly great individual intelligence to shape the national policy. Lord Palmerston's blood is chilled by extreme old age; Earl Russell thinks procrastination the perfection of statesmanship."(pp 505–06)[39] "Reconstruction by the triumph of either party over the other is what the government and the people of Great Britain would make every sacrifice to prevent."(p 536)[39]

Of the London press, whose favor it was his duty to conciliate, Hotze's opinion was not much more complimentary. The editors of those staid journals who were quickly swept within his orbit would have been shocked had they read the secret dispatches their friend was constantly transmitting to Richmond. "The English press is not so exaltedly pure," Mr. Benjamin was informed soon after Hotze's arrival, "nor is that of any other country, but that a man entering its ranks with purse held up would find himself practically and in no dignified manner illustrating the classic fate of Actaeon" — by which he seems to imply that such an attractive victim would be torn to pieces by mercenary journalistic staghounds. From such a fate Hotze was safeguarded by the trifling sum assigned him for purposes of lubrication. As his usefulness dawned upon Benjamin and Davis, Hotze's paltry appropriation was increased to $10,000 a year, but even then he never descended to the vulgar methods that had brought such discredit on De Leon. Nor, with lofty-minded journals like the *Times*, the *Morning Post*, the *Standard*, the *Saturday Review*, and the other organs of public opinion that were ultimately swept within the Confederate influence, would financial approaches have been conceivable. Here a high order of Jesuitry could alone achieve success.

The London of that day supported a trained group of editorial writers, attached to no particular paper. "Professional leader writers," they were called; like other

literary journeymen, they wrote their articles and submitted them on the chance of acceptance. At least eight or ten of this brotherhood were sufficiently successful to make a satisfactory living. The pay was not bad as newspaper writing goes — two to ten guineas, $10 to $50, for a contribution of ordinary editorial length. The London press, Hotze informed the department, was "the most fastidious in the world," and would "never accept an editorial without paying for it" — a punctiliousness which facilitated his operations. Hotze had one great advantage for his job. He was a man of culture, well versed in European history and contemporary politics and himself master of an energetic journalistic style. That is, his talents qualified him for the role of "professional leader writer," and such he became, in most unobtrusive fashion. He penned most informing interpretations of what was known in England as the "American question," and presented them gratis to chosen favorites among this little fraternity. No one knew the secret except the two parties in question. London leader writers, like all followers of the craft, had weary moments when they liked to avoid exertion, and well-written acceptable essays such as Hotze's proved godsends — especially as all profits accrued to their advantage.

Hotze's lucubrations, quietly promoted in this fashion, sometimes attained the loftiest sanctums in London. He was able to twist comment on the fall of Fort Donelson in a way that made it look almost like a Confederate victory. Among the papers inspired to take this view was the Thunderer itself; "in one at least of the *Times* articles," Hotze reports to Richmond, "almost my very words are reproduced." (p 361)[39] On February 22, 1862, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated permanent President of the Confederate States; this happening would have passed unnoticed in the British press had not the leading editorial in the *Morning Post* hailed it as a great historic event. The *Morning Post* was the personal organ of Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister, and the medium he constantly used to broadcast unofficially his views and policies. This conspicuously displayed editorial caused a great buzzing in London clubs. It was even hailed as pointing to British recognition of the Confederacy. Whispers went about that Palmerston had written it himself. His lordship had no claim to this distinction, for the only begetter of the famous editorial was Henry Hotze, though the financial reward was reaped by one of the "professional leader writers" whom he had made confidential friends. "I have the honor," Hotze wrote the Secretary of State, "to enclose my first contribution to the English press, the leading editorial in yesterday's issue of Lord Palmerston's organ, the *Morning Post*. In reading it you will make due allowances for the necessity under which I felt myself of studiously maintaining an English point of view and not advancing too far beyond recognized public opinion." (p 346)[39]

But this was only a beginning. Soon Hotze discovered an even more ingenious way of utilizing for the Confederate cause his little select company of free-lance journalists. On May 1, 1862, the first number of one of those weekly reviews for which London has always been famous appeared on English newsstands. It bore the title of *The Index*, and, in format, typography, dignified literary style, and general arrangement of contents, seemed to be a fit companion of such influential periodicals as the *Spectator*, *Saturday Review*, and the like. That it was greatly interested in presenting the Southern viewpoint in the American conflict was obvious — indeed this was its advertised mission; that it was in any way directly promoted by the Confederate Government did not stand so plainly on the surface. As far as one could conclude, the *Index* was an English publication, founded by

Englishmen and devoted to the Confederate cause. Yet the *Index* was the creation of Henry Hotze. He financed the venture in part from his private resources; Confederate devotees in the South made contributions, and another gentleman who has already figured in this narrative — Emile Erlanger, who made so comfortable a killing in Confederate bonds — also came to his assistance. Just how much the *Index* accomplished in directing public sentiment and official policy in England is not clear. Necessarily it had a limited circulation, confined largely to a free mailing list. In reality, however, the ostensible purpose of the *Index* concealed an adroit scheme of corruption. It provided subtle machinery for bribing the press — no less palpable because the victims themselves hardly suspected the truth. Hotze attached to the *Index*, as salaried members of the staff, six or eight of the most successful of his beloved "professional leader writers." These employees, now having steady jobs, — salaries may have been small, but they made a welcome regular increment to the journalistic income, — became accomplished students on the issues of the American conflict, and, in a reasonable period, were as competent as Hotze himself to discuss them editorially.

Week after week, for nearly four years, this group turned out leading articles for the *Index*. In his private communications, Hotze frankly declared that their work for his weekly paper itself was not the point at issue. While earning their salaries as Hotze's assistant editors, these writers kept up their work as contributors to the great London dailies. The information and opinions they had absorbed as *Index* workers inevitably formed the groundwork of their contributions to leading London organs of public opinion. Thus they received double payment. Hotze paid them as salaried workers on his staff; the London papers paid them for the same articles when warmed over for their editorial columns. This wider field was the important one; their contributions to the *Index* were a secondary matter. Hotze's real purpose was to "educate" — the word constantly figures in his reports — a group of able writers who had a pecuniary interest in spreading Confederate gospel in England and Europe. Repeatedly in his letters to Hunter and Benjamin he proudly surveys his handiwork. "Popular circulation for the *Index?* Frankly, nothing much is expected on that score. The value of an organ," he writes, "not merely as a means of reaching public opinion but as a channel through which arguments and facts can be conveyed unofficially to the government itself, appears to me difficult to overrate. The value of the paper as an agency through which connections can be established through other journals is scarcely less . . . . Every additional contributor I am able to employ becomes an ally in the columns of some other paper and I frequently employ writers with no other object." "The writers employed by me for the *Index* are among the first in their profession, and through them I inspired the columns of some of the most influential publications in this country."

He instances as an ally of whom he is especially proud

> "Percy Greg, Esq., one of the most talented leader writers of London, who, besides being a valuable contributor to the *Index*, is one of our most efficient supporters in the columns of the *Saturday Review* and other literary and political periodicals of high standing. . . . Honourable men might honourably take their customary fee for the labor of their brains performed for me, and the ideas and information thus engrafted would bear fruit many fold and on many different trees. . . . One writer usually writes for several publications and I have thus the opportunity of multiplying myself, so to speak, to an almost unlimited extent. . . . Few suspect [writes Hotze to

Benjamin, August 27, 1863] none know, the silent, unobtrusive agency through which it [the *Index*] has operated upon its contemporaries."

Occasionally Hotze completely threw off the mask. Thus, in January, 1864, he placed on the *Index* staff, as Paris correspondent, one Felix Aucaigne, at a salary of fifty francs a week. "You will not be required to write for the *Index*," he informs this new recruit. "Your duty will consist in propagating through the French papers the views and the intelligence published through the *Index*." The mention of Percy Greg indicates the quality of the men Hotze drew within his net. Greg was no gutter journalist, but one of the most distinguished contributors to the *Manchester Guardian* and the London *Standard*, besides the *Saturday Review*. He was also a novelist, a historian, a religious and political leader. In after life his hatred for America knew no bounds, and his *History of the United States* is one of the most violent polemics ever committed to paper. How much of this lifelong hostility sprang from Hotze's "education" (at the expense of the educator) is not recorded.

Any idea that propaganda in wartime is a modern invention thus rests upon a misapprehension. Just how effective was this attempt to subsidize public sentiment? It did not accomplish its great purpose — recognition by foreign governments. Hotze, just like Mason and Slidell, had his blind side. None of them successfully handled the one spectre that always rose and thwarted their efforts. The existence of slavery in the South constantly blocked their arguments at the most inauspicious moments. It enraged Hotze as it annoyed his diplomatic confreres. Everywhere he turned this ogre crossed his path. This was one lesson that his salaried writers balked at absorbing. On constitutional grounds they most eloquently pleaded the cause. An oppressed nation struggling to be free always fired their pens. But the spectacle of black men in the South — of property rights in human beings — proved a more difficult subject. If his "leader writers" could swallow this institution, the editors of the journals for which they wrote set up the bars and articles portraying the beauties of the slave system seldom attained publication. Hotze, usually imperturbable, lost patience. Like most Southerners — like Mason and Slidell, who constantly met the same undisguised dislike of slavery — Hotze never understood European aversion to what, in his opinion, was a beneficent institution. The "editorial tyrants," as he called them, who would not admit apologies for slavery in their columns, represented the greatest obstacle to success. Hotze's correspondence illustrates, even more clearly than that of Mason and Slidell, the baleful effect of slavery in defeating the Southern cause in Europe.

THE WORLD CRUISE OF THE US NAVY 1907–1909*

By Penelope Babcock

President Theodore Roosevelt in dispatching the US Fleet on a world tour in effect announced for all to hear, "the US has major interests in the Pacific area and is prepared to defend them."

On a winter morning in 1907, (p 261)[40] the people of Norfolk and Newport News, Va., watched with unbelieving eyes as the mighty US Naval Fleet steamed out of Hampton Roads, headed for the Pacific Coast by way of Cape Horn. Sixteen

*Original text prepared for the Operations Research Office in connection with this volume.

battleships loomed on the gray horizon, the strongest assembled unit the world had ever seen, (p 261)[7] and the first fleet of a world power to attempt maneuvers on such a grand scale. As the fleet turned southward, the whole world seemed to vibrate with outbursts of indignation, praise, and fear. Newspapers and yellow sheets renewed their vitriolic attacks upon the action; Westerners on the Pacific Coast hailed the cruise as a momentous step; authorities in the large Eastern cities shuddered to think what the consequences might be with their shores unguarded from a European attack; and the countries around the globe waited in silent apprehension to see what the fleet would do.

"Fighting Bob" Evans, Commander of the Fleet, was a confident man — confident that the voyage would be a successful one and confident that many valuable lessons would be gained as a result of it. During a speech he had presented at the Lotus Club's farewell banquet in New York, he had frankly asserted that the people of the US would not "be disappointed in the fleet, whether it . . . [proved] a feast, a frolic, or a fight." (p 261)[40]

The man who shared his confidence, the instigator of the whole trip, was President Theodore Roosevelt. His words came to the American people with assurance: "The fleet is in good condition, [Admiral] Evans is a good man. . . . The wisdom — indeed, I may say the absolute need — of going . . . to Japan has been amply demonstrated." (p 260)[40] But to understand the intensity of the world situation that surrounded Roosevelt's decision, one must take a retrospective glance over the years preceding the voyage. Events coupled with emotions had mounted to the breaking point, and Roosevelt was certain that the time had come for a "showdown."[41] Friction had arisen between the Japanese and American people, when only 3 years before the two countries had been on extremely friendly terms. What had caused this relatively swift change in their relationship?

The answer to this question began on 9 August 1905, when peace negotiations for the Russo-Japanese War commenced at the Portsmouth Navy Yard in New Hampshire. President Roosevelt had been requested by the Japanese nation to serve as mediator, and, although he did not wish to assume the responsibility, he accepted in the best interests of the US. As the days passed, a noticeable change in attitude toward the Japanese took place, simply because Russia maintained an effective method of propaganda. Counte Witte, the Russian delegate to the peace conference, helped to derogate the Japanese cause to American reporters. Moreover, many Americans had opened their eyes with astonishment to note the power that Japan had displayed during the war. Mr. Dooley, the famous newspaper character of journalist Finley Peter Dunne, remarked about it:

> "A few years ago I didn't think anny more about a Jap thin about anny other man that'd been kept in th' oven too long. They were all alike to me. But to-day, whiniver I see wan I turn pale an' take off me hat an' make a low bow." (p 569)[42]

With the signing of the treaty in Portsmouth, Japan gained a considerable amount of territory and received the right to free play in South Manchuria and Korea — a right that helped to establish her as a dominant power in the Far East, but caused more friction between the Japanese and American businessmen in Manchuria. One reporter claimed that the Japanese had become powerfully influential since the victory over the Russians and were looking covetously on the Philippines. "In the navy," he said, "it is generally believed that we will have to meet Japan's fleet on the Pacific before the century is old."[43] The friendly

mediation of President Roosevelt helped Japan win these advantages, but the tax-burdened Japanese masses, who had counted very much on an indemnity, were embittered against the US and their own statesmen. Roosevelt's intervention was interpreted as an attempt to deprive Japan of the full reward of victory over Russia. Still more alarming was the news from the Far East that anti-American riots had taken place in Tokyo.

Although America's popularity was fast declining in Japan, many Japanese veterans, restless and tax-burdened in their native country, looked to California as the golden land of opportunity. A steady flow of Japanese into West Coast cities began to take place, and the Californians, goaded into action by belligerent newspapers and unhindered by Congressional action, decided to take matters into their own hands. The San Francisco Board of Education in October, 1906, passed an order requiring all Japanese children to attend a public school specially set aside for them. The excuse that the Board of Education offered was that the Japanese children were crowding the American schools, but a closer glance at the number of Japanese children in the schools revealed that there were only 93 children in question. What the San Francisco officials were actually objecting to was the steady influx of cheap coolie labor from Japan. Various labor and political groups in California had labeled this movement a menace to American institutions and to the American standard of living. Newspaper sensationalism and political agitation had created a burning issue in the West.

When the Japanese learned of the Board's order, they immediately took offense. As Roosevelt put it: "The Japanese are proud, sensitive, warlike, and flushed with the glory of their recent triumph, and are in my opinion, bent upon establishing themselves as the leading power in the Pacific."[44] The suggestion of racial inferiority, especially after their recent victory, was too much for the Japanese. Their presses attacked the US for what they believed was an open and entirely unwarranted insult to the national honor. They demanded revocation of the school board's ruling and redress for the injury to Japanese pride. The cry went up from one Japanese newspaper:

> "Stand up, Japanese nation! Our countrymen have been HUMILIATED on the other side of the Pacific. Our poor boys and girls have been expelled from the public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and merciless like demons . . . . Why do we not insist on sending [war] ships?" (p 569)[42]

But the Californians became more and more violent in their insistence for action against all Japanese immigrants. Roosevelt was convinced that the San Francisco school board had committed a crime against a friendly nation, and that, unless some step was taken, war would come. His only alternative was to dispatch a firm but conciliatory reply to the Japanese protest and to intervene directly with the San Francisco authorities in such a way as to result in the cancellation of the segregation order. Roosevelt "realized that if he were going to unsnarl the school tangle he would have to change his methods and resort to finesse. This he did when he invited the entire San Francisco school board to junket across the continent at government expense to discuss the problem with him." (p 571)[42]

At that conference, which was held in February 1907, Roosevelt promised to halt the immigration of Japanese coolie labor if the school officials would allow the

Japanese children to attend school with the whites. The problem was temporarily settled and carried out by the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907–1908, an arrangement not entirely conclusive in any one document but an informal understanding through which Japan undertook to withhold passports from coolie labor seeking to enter the US, if the US would not put on the statute books a formal law excluding people of Japanese origin.

Roosevelt, during this period, was known to be conciliatory and pacific. He felt that the US had been wrong as far as the anti-Japanese agitation in California was concerned and he believed that in the aftermath of a successful war, public opinion in Japan might actually force the government, over its own better judgment, to take up arms in defense of national honor. In the US, however, Roosevelt's moderate policy seemed so much out of character, that he received a great deal of criticism. Mr. Dooley again made an observation: he described Roosevelt as hiding under the bed "with a small language book trying to say 'Spare us' " in the Japanese tongue. (p 289)[44] Somehow the idea had arisen that because Roosevelt was sympathetic with the Japanese, he was afraid of them. Despite the attacks made on his attitude of conciliation, Roosevelt was prepared to stand up for American rights if Japan should carry her protests too far. He was ready to maintain the political supremacy in the Pacific, which he considered America's destiny, by strengthening the US Navy. "He confided to a friend: 'I am exceedingly anxious to impress upon the Japanese that I have nothing but the friendliest possible intentions toward them, but I am none the less anxious that they should realize that I am not afraid of them and that the US will no more submit to bullying than it will bully.' " (pp 571–72)[42] Once again the peculiarly Rooseveltian character was stirred into action, and thus, the plan to send the US fleet around the world came into being — a spectacular plan, but one designed to convince Japan that the US was prepared to counter any warlike gesture. It was not so much a threat, however, as it was a demonstration and a reminder to Japan that the US Navy was the second largest in the world.

There were many persons opposed to Roosevelt's plan and some who actively tried to prevent it. The chairman of the Senate committee on naval affairs, Eugene Hale, claimed that Congress would not appropriate the money for such a disastrous voyage. To this New Englander, Roosevelt flatly replied that he had: "enough money to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific." (p 553)[45] Having silenced that faction of the opposition, Roosevelt had to contend with the violent campaign of the jingo newspapers, chiefly the Hearst chain, that either lambasted the idea or precipitated so much trouble that war with Japan seemed inevitable. Fortunately by October 1907 this campaign had lost its driving force and had not succeeded in drawing the American public into its camp.

There were a number of reasons, however, why Roosevelt found opposition to his plan, and they were not all unfounded reasons. No other power had dared to accomplish such a dangerous trip around Cape Horn, and whether or not this voyage would be successful, people feared that the unit would be gravely injured as a fighting group. The trip would either impress or provoke foreign nations, depending on whether it was interpreted as a friendly or a hostile move. And of

most importance to the American public was the idea that the Eastern shore, once stripped of its main defense, would be left open to an enemy attack.

On the other side of the fence, Roosevelt and his supporters held out that their motives were of valued importance. By sending the fleet, America would not only impress on the people of the world that her Navy was a strong and powerful one but would also prove to herself that such a maneuver was possible. The Pacific Ocean was as much a location for Naval maneuvers as the Atlantic, and Roosevelt stressed the point that the American Fleet on the West Coast was no more a threat to the Asiatics than the American Fleet in the East was a threat to the European powers. The voyage would stand as a bold announcement of American interest in the Pacific, with the intention of underlining America's ability to defend that interest if the need should arise. Perhaps Roosevelt was trying to convince the militaristic elements in Japan that their country could not afford to pick a quarrel with the US, but behind this motive, as behind all the others, stood the chief purpose of sending the fleet: to maintain peace by a show of strength. Roosevelt was proud of this last idea. In a letter to Carl Schurz his most memorable words read: "In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world." (p 548)[45] Years later, his opinion of the importance of the world cruise had not been altered:

> "When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the world whom we had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful an outlook.
>
> "When the fleet returned after its sixteen months' voyage around the world I went down to Hampton Roads to greet it. The day was Washington's Birthday, February 22, 1909. Literally on the minute the homing battlecraft came into view. On the flagship of the Admiral I spoke to the officers and enlisted men, as follows:
>
> " 'Over a year has passed since you steamed out of this harbor, and over the world's rim, and this morning the hearts of all who saw you thrilled with pride as the hulls of the mighty warships lifted above the horizon. You have been in the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres; four times you have crossed the line; you have steamed through all the great oceans; you have touched the coast of every continent. Ever your general course has been westward: and now you come back to the port from which you set sail. This is the first battle fleet that has ever circumnavigated the globe. Those who perform the feat again can but follow in your footsteps . . . we welcome you home to the country whose good repute among nations has been raised by what you have done.' " (p 557)[45]

The cruise had succeeded in its purpose. The reception at Yokohama on 18 October 1908 had been overwhelming in its warmth and enthusiasm. Tens of thousands of school children from Japan had greeted the Fleet, and their singing of American national songs had been whole-heartedly and genuinely delivered. The Japanese hospitality had made a profound impression on Americans. Above all, and including all factors, the world cruise was a decisive psychological warfare technique, well calculated as to the results and well executed in its endeavor.

SISSON'S ACCOUNT OF WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINT SPEECH*

By Edgar Sisson

The clear enunciation of US policy objectives by the President, in a speech to the Congress was used by a skillful American propagandist in Russia in creating dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial Germans.

When the threats of "Peace Break" came on December 31, 1917, I [E. Sisson, George Creel's representative in Russia] began to search in mind for ways it could be made a factor of pressure against Germany on American behalf; and at the end of three days concluded that at least the hopeful situation of dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Germans could be encouraged best by the voice of President Wilson. Keeping my own counsel, I called for that voice.

To avoid the delay of coding and decoding, I put the message on the open cable, confident that the contents would expedite it through both the Bolshevik and the British censorships. It made, in fact, record passage to Washington. The cable:

> "Creel, Compub, Washington.
>
> "January 3 — If President will re-state anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America thousand words or less, short almost placard paragraphs, short sentences, I can get it fed into Germany in great quantities in German translation, and can utilize Russian version potently in army and everywhere.
>
> "Experts from previous statements will not serve. Need is for internal evidence that President is thinking of the Russian and German common folk in their situation of this moment and that he is talking to them.
>
> "Can handle German translation and printing here.
>
> "Obvious of course to you that disclosure German trickery against Russia in peace negotiations promises to immensely open up our opportunities for publicity and helpfulness."

The cable continued then with business details, requests for film equipment and additional personnel, neither of which had practical outcome, material and escort being unable to get through to Russia.

Words, however, may pass under the sea and through the air. Creel, I was to learn long afterward, went at once to the White House with the appeal, all his own force behind it. The time was opportune. A speech of Lloyd George's had given another reason that the President soon should enunciate his Peace terms, their substance already ripened in his reflective mind. My appeal very likely had an effect in shaping and simplifying the external form of the "Fourteen Points," decided the moment of their expression, and led the President to address to the Russian people the general introduction to the concrete Peace terms. He spoke as if to them, his text the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference.

*From *One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of Bolshevik Revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931. Reproduced with permission of Mrs. Edgar G. Sisson, sole legatee of Mr. Sisson's estate.

From Creel I received on January 10 the cable that a "wonderful three thousand words are going to you today," with the personal tonic, "Congratulations on great work — Go the limit." The cable presumably had left Washington the night of January 8, following the delivery of the President's speech before Congress. The speech itself was coming in when I got Creel's word.

Besides cabling an account of progress to Creel, I included longer description on January 13, in a serial letter I was writing to my wife, the chapters to be forwarded together on the next trip of a courier outward, always an indefinite date. I wrote:

> "Three days of tumult, but happy work in the fine cause of the President's mighty message of January 8. I had the feeling in the early hours of Thursday morning that a new brew was mixing. It so happened that the outlook was so peaceful and the machine running so easily that I had mapped the day as the only purely pleasurable one since my arrival in Russia. In the morning I intended to shop for a birthday present for Mildred (Sisson's daughter), and in the afternoon had accepted an invitation to share a box at the opera of 'Boris Godunov.' That left the evening for work if it developed. The Russian day, let me enlighten you, ends at 2 o'clock in the morning. I've done a good day's work from six o'clock on many a time."

But in this case the beginning was at 10 o'clock in the morning when a friend who was translating the morning papers for me read a paragraph from Stockholm referring casually to the fact that President Wilson had made a speech before Congress. That was all, but I grabbed for my over-shoes, over-coat, and cap. I knew that the meaning was that a cable was on its way to me somewhere, and right at that second I had the suspicion that it was hung up at the Embassy — which is a mile and a half from the hotel. I drove first to our Compub office, 4 Gorokhovaya, picked up Bullard there, and went on to the Embassy.

I found that the message had got in, addressed to me, at midnight, and that the error had been made, first of not notifying me, and second of breaking the seals and starting to make Embassy copies for its different uses. If the thing had not been serious it would have been humorous as an exemplification of the redtape habit. No damage of irreparable nature had been done, fortunately, as several portions of the message had not come. Still it made a delay of several hours in starting translation.

I did not blame the Ambassador for wanting to see the message, but we agreed that he would have it just as soon for his purposes if I sent him a copy of the transcript. For the rest of the day the telegrams were sent to my office unopened. For days I had expected that messages would be coming direct to the Gorokhovaya but it took another cable to get them finally directed there.

Some vital parts of the message were strangely delayed, either in England or in Russia itself. One last bit of a hundred words did not get here until Friday morning. Translation, however, could begin at once, and two teams of translators and typists were set at it in our offices, one team doing Russian and the other German. Three of us worked at parts of the cable transcription simultaneously. I have not pounded a typewriter so fast since old newspaper days.

By six o'clock the translation of all parts of the text we had was done into Russian, and I started with several sets and an interpreter for Smolny, bent on shooting that much of it to the Russian Peace Commission sitting in Poland at Brest-Litovsk inside the German lines. I wanted it to begin to get in its work as anti-

German ammunition where I knew it would do the most good. I did not expect the Bolsheviks to welcome aid. They didn't. They smiled at me and asked what new caper of the Imperialistic American Government was this.

Alexander Gumberg, interpreting for me, may have told them that they were a lot of children and that it was time to stop playing and grow up, but I do not think he did. He did, however, by his own original methods impress upon one or another of them that their destinies depended upon their ability to be sincere toward sincerity. The satisfactory outcome was that the message started by courier within an hour's time for Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. The trouble was that Lenin as well as Trotsky was out of the city, and little people left in charge. I make one exception — Trotsky's secretary, the big girl. She sees things quick and far, and she got the courier herself.

The translation of the full message was finished early the next afternoon, and with that, Col. Raymond Robins of the Red Cross, Gumberg and I went again to Smolny.

This time Lenin was back, and we were able to get direct to him. It did not take one minute to convince him that the full message should go to Trotsky by direct wire. He grabbed the copy and sprinted for the telegraph office himself. We were told afterward that it began to go in five minutes, all other messages side-tracked.

It was the first time either Robins or I had met Lenin, for until now, while I have worked all through Smolny, attending Soviet and garrison meetings, and have had channels running to every seat of power, I have camouflaged as a newspaper man, and have kept out of any situation that could have been interpreted as giving the government recognition that Washington did not desire to give. Even on this occasion I went only as the head of the American Press Bureau.

He (Lenin) welcomed the message as an unexpected but not undeserved staff, but he did not let us forget for a moment that he regarded it as coming not from a fellow thinker but from a just and tolerant class opponent. It will be a mistake for any one to believe that our political democracy can merge with this industrial democracy. The latter will seek revolution against capital until it conquers or is conquered.

But on the specific matter of general peace Lenin saw the potency of the speech and accepted its help. "It is a great step ahead toward the peace of the world," he said — and in English, which he speaks very well. He was as joyous as a boy over the President's humanly understanding words to Russia, and his recognition of the honesty of Bolshevik purpose.

"Yet I have been called a German spy," he said, and smiled and threw up the palms of his hands.

His only criticism was on the colonial clause, which is the only weak clause in the message. When he went unerringly for it, I knew that he had the gift for finding the cracks in any armor. But he wasn't fanatic and took the practical view that the word "equitable" could be turned in Bolshevik direction no less than in an Imperial direction.

Yet at the last he ran true to Bolshevik form, for he said, "This is all very well as far as it goes, but why not formal recognition, and when?" That is the Bolshevik idea — ask more and more until you get it all.

Robins went away after we left Lenin, and then I sought the Smolny press bureau to start the real job of getting the full text into the government papers. One of them, the lesser, the *Pravda* ("Truth"), is pronouncedly anti-American,

and while it took the copy, did not print it in full and was both unfair and unintelligent in its editorial comment. The big one the *Izvestia* ("News"), which circulates free to all Soviet headquarters throughout Russia, and as a selling newspaper has the biggest circulation in Petrograd, not only took it, but allowed us to black face the passages we desired — all clauses relating to Russia — and printed a comment that this was a sincerely meant recognition of the idealism of the Soviets, and a present aid of invaluable consequence. The appearance in the *Izvestia* alone guarantees that every Russian soldier will get the message, for the *Izvestia* is read aloud to soldiers who do not read.

Other papers printed such sections of the speech as fitted their political purposes. The anti-government papers, for instance, carefully left out all the good references to Russia, because they were good also for the Bolsheviks. Such is the newspaper method of Russia. The formula is, "Lie about your enemies."

But all Petrograd is getting the speech. Already 100,000 poster copies of the speech are printed, and although this (the 13th) was Sunday and New Year's Eve, 30,000 are on the walls of Petrograd, posted there since noon — on the third day since the message entered the town, and the second since it got here completely. It cost money, for the presses had to run on double-pay overtime Saturday night to make the delivery. But the results are worth it. Not even money will get work tomorrow, New Year's day.

On Tuesday the posting will be finished. I am re-setting in hand-bill form for a distribution of 300,000 on streets, in theaters and public places, and that distribution should be completed by Friday night. A German version of one million copies will go to press Tuesday night. The YMCA volunteered the distribution of this number of German copies along the lines, and while I have seen signs of quitting on the fullness of the job, I am going to drive them through. The volunteering was done enthusiastically and at no urging from me, for my best German plans are elsewhere. They have the men, the facilities, and I am putting up the money for extra costs. They will work, I am quite sure.

Sent a man to Moscow last night with Russian copy for printing posters there, and as the office there is ready with its plan, both the poster and the street distribution should be completed there also in five or six days. Will print about a million and a half copies there, 800,000 of them for YMCA in Russian. Will print Polish and Ukrainian pamphlets there, also the permanent pamphlet form for mailing list distribution.

The deepest German drive, aside from what Trotsky may do in the way of gunnery at Brest-Litovsk, will be in the Bolshevik propagandist organ for Germany called *The Torch*. It is printed in about three quarter of a million daily gobs and fed to German soldiers by Russian soldiers and by various contrived mediums. Its aim is German Revolution. It is the chief cause of the German yell against Russian literary efforts behind and across German lines. We have the promise of its use Wednesday morning. Perhaps I write too soon, but I have reason for confidence.

Nor was my confidence misplaced.

On the Russian version of the speech, too, I placed prominently a subhead crediting the *Izvestia* with the first printing of the original text. It had the effect of an order to the Bolshevik organizations and armies to help to circulate the posters, and as an order it was obeyed. No proclamation of Lenin's or Trotsky's ever got a wider or a faster distribution throughout Russia or along its borders than President Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech.

In its different handbill, poster, and pamphlet forms the printed issues of the speech totaled 3,463,000 copies issued from Petrograd and Moscow presses, and this sum took no account of the millions of distribution through the *Izvestia* and other newspapers, nor of handbills printed at Odessa, Tiflis, Kiev, Chita, Omsk, and Ekaterinburg, where the text of the speech was telegraphed to American Consuls and to representatives (in several places) of the International Harvester Company, and in each place circulated in quantity. The American Consul at Vladivostok received text of the address by direct cable from the US. The entire circulation in Russia and Siberia otherwise — whether by wire or in printed form — was from the Committee on Public Information (Compub), Petrograd.

Of the one million copies of the speech printed in German — entirely apart from the printing in *The Torch* — I wrote in 1920 in a report published in George Creel's book, *How We Advertised America*. Of this quantity 300,000 were put across the northern line and 200,000 similarly at the central and southern front. Half a million copies went to German prison camps in Russia, for the reason that these prisoners were soon to return to Germany.

It would have been more accurate to have said German cantonments than prison camps, although the Germans still were in nominal custody, pending formalities for their transfer. Like the Russian soldiers, the tendency of the German bodies was to remain where they were sheltered, although the lack of Russian discipline encouraged much restless moving about.

The distribution of the German edition was done by an organization of soldier package carriers formerly in the service of the YMCA and secured from that body, becoming a part of our machinery of diffusion. In February when the German army advanced into Russia, the package men worked along the line scattering German and Hungarian versions of President Wilson's later speech of February 11 in territories about to be occupied by the Germans. The head of this organization was B. Morgernstern, a sturdy personage, and able. . . .

[After the war, Sisson commented on the estimate of the effectiveness of the circulation of the speech!]

As far as Russia was concerned there was not much immediate military utility in this distribution. The military utility was against Germany, our first heavy and organized attack upon her morale. But for Russia, although shattered, still remained the question of the future, which in Russia is more a matter of years than of days, of decades more than of years, and of peasants more than of Bolsheviks.

Text extracts from President Wilson's Fourteen Point Peace Program Speech, delivered January 8, 1918:

> "Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.
>
> "The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented a settlement, which if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was

added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied — every province, every city, every point of vantage — as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

"It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. [Note: An error. The Russians threatened to break the negotiations; the Germans paid no attention. The Embassy reported the situation correctly to Washington. The dispatches evidently were delayed in arrival. E. S.] The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination. . . .

"But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. . . .

"There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statements of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her Allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. . . .

"There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose, which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe.

"They call to us to say what it is that we desire; in what, if anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and

frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace. . . .

"We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence.

"What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peaceloving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

"The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

"1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

"2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

"3. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"5. A free, open minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty and interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

"6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of all the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

"7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this

will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they themselves have set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

"8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

"9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

"10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe-guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

"11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded access to the sea; and the relations of several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

"12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

"13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

"14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE COLLAPSE OF GERMAN MORALE IN 1918*

By George G. Bruntz

Propaganda proved to be an effective instrument of warfare in the struggle of 1914–1918. Its use by the Allies contributed to the earlier collapse of German resistance.

In no previous war in history did propaganda play so important a part as in the world conflict of 1914–18. Most of us know that neutral countries were bombarded with propaganda from civil authorities of the Allied and Central powers, few of us

*From "Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918," reprinted from the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2: 61–76 (1938). Reproduced with permission of the author and the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder.

perhaps realize the importance placed upon propaganda as an instrument of warfare by the military authorities. The destruction of enemy morale by the dissemination of defeatist, disheartening, and revolutionary leaflets, pamphlets, books, and propaganda "newssheets" was recognized as an important part of the offensive against the enemy. While the Allied artillery was pounding the German troops with shells, the propaganda sections were bombarding these same troops and the German people behind the line with arguments. The seriousness with which this attack of "word bullets" was regarded by the military machines on both sides, and the effect that Allied propaganda had upon the morale of the German troops and civilians behind the lines, is the story of the paragraphs that follow.

During the first two years of the war the governments were busy with the task of bringing public opinion at home to war pitch, and with the more strictly military side of the war. But by 1917 propaganda was recognized as a valuable instrument of offensive warfare against the enemy. The Allied Powers were the first to recognize the significance of this weapon and every Allied country set up official organizations for the dissemination of propaganda in the enemy countries. England had its Crewe House, at the head of which was the arch-propagandist, Lord Northcliffe. In France the unofficial *Alliance Française* started the work, and later the government set up the famous *Maison de la Presse*. The United States disseminated propaganda to the Germans through the Military Intelligence Section of the United States Army, the famous Committee on Public Information (CPI), the Friends of German Democracy and other organizations.

The ultimate aim of the propagandists of the Allies was to shatter the faith of the Germans in the military machine and to prepare the way for the overthrow of the Imperial Government. The various propaganda agencies were organized on a large scale and carried on an intensive warfare by word of mouth, in the press, and through leaflets, books, and pamphlets. As Karl von Vetter puts it:

> "In those days the Briton shot not only with thousands of cannon, tens of thouands of MC; he not only shot from hundreds of aeroplanes; he not only rammed with thousands of tanks against us; but he flooded us with millions of leaflets . . . . How could they help but have an effect on the used-up, half-starved troops? . . . The GHQ put a high premium for the delivery of the leaflets. It did not receive many."[46]

On July 31, 1917, the Chief of the German General Staff of the Field Army issued a circular in which he lamented the feeling of "profound depression" at home. This symptom he attributed in part to the real distress among the German people. But for the most part this situation resulted, said the circular, from the agitation of certain enemies of state within Germany.[47] On September 14, 1918, the widely read shipping journal *Hansa* of Hamburg lamented the "despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads" (Vol 6, p 20) that could be seen everywhere in Germany. The spirit of defeatism "is visibly surrounding the German people, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening our temper." It continued:

> "Today we can recognize the origin of this depression of German will power. It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente directed against us under England's lead and under the special direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal Northcliffe."[48]

The feeling within Germany was further described by Dr. George Herron after his fifth conversation with Dr. de Fiori:

> "The peasants and workers of Germany are already asking questions which predict the possibility of a revolution . . . . All through Germany, he declared, the peasants and workers are saying to each other that if the whole world is against Germany there must be some reason for it. It must be that they have been deceived about the war from the beginning. And why should they go on being killed and starved for masters who tell them only lies? It is better that they should kill their masters."[49]

The *Suddeutsche Monatshefte*, in April 1924, went so far as to credit the Allied propagandists with having taken over the leadership of the German people in the last few months of the war. By the fall of 1918 "the majority of the German people placed greater trust in Woodrow Wilson than in their own leaders."[50]

REPORTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSECTION

However, in estimating the effect of Allied propaganda upon the German troops and the people behind the lines we must consider, *first*, the Reports of the Psychological Subsection of the US Army; *second*, the efforts on the part of Germany at counter-propaganda; *third*, the desertions among the enemy troops; and *fourth*, German Army Orders dealing with propaganda.

The Psychological Subsection of the US Army kept a closer watch on the morale of the German troops than any of the propaganda agencies or intelligence sections of the Allied countries. This Subsection set up a detailed system for watching the deterioration of the German morale. Agents prepared daily reports which contained all news in any way relating to the morale of the Germans. After studying these daily reports carefully, the officers in charge made general interpretations of the drift of the enemy morale in a weekly report.[51] Using as a basis for its estimate, material contained in these weekly reports, supplemented by information obtained from every source open to the Military Intelligence, the Psychological Subsection worked out its famous *Chart of German Civilian Morale*, which recorded the ups and downs of the enemy morale.

Photostatic copies of this chart were supplied to the writer by the War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence Division (G-2). The copies are not suitable for reproduction here, but the accompanying drawing (greatly compressed horizontally and showing only two of the five component lines) (Fig. 1) will suggest the nature of the original. The chart was drawn on a large sheet divided into sections each of which represented a day. A heavy black line shows the wavering morale of Germany's civilian population.* Starting in August 1914 at the top of the chart, the line runs fairly straight until the Battle of the Marne in September when there is a slight decline. It runs along quite steadily above 90 per cent until January 1916 when there is a slight drop, which is, however, regained by March. From April to September 1916 there is a rather sharp drop to 66 per cent. This resulted from the reverses at Verdun. By December it had returned again to 75 per cent and by March 1917 it was up to 81 per cent again. From March we have another decline so that by May the morale stands at 65 per cent. It remains at

* Other lines also depicted the German military situation, the degree of political unity in Germany, the situation in Austria-Hungary, the state of food supply in the Central Powers, and the U-boat sinkings.

almost this point until the latter part of October and early November when it rises sharply again because of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. During February and March 1918 it stays near 95 per cent. But from April to May when the propaganda began to take effect, there is a gradual drop. Toward the last of May 1918 there is a sharp drop to 58 per cent and after August it goes plunging down to almost the bottom of the chart where it ends on November 11.



Fig. 1—German Civilian Morale

To get information for their daily reports agents of the Subsection interviewed Germans in the Allied prison camps. From these interviews they got valuable information concerning the feeling among the German troops and the people beyond the Rhine.

During these conversations the German officers were "often bored" while the private was gratified and "we found him sick of the war, doubtful of his leaders, and passionately curious about America's war and peace." (p 518)[52] Occasionally, however they also found officers who talked freely. An artillery lieutenant, L., who was described as an "admirer of Ludendorff" said of the propaganda in one of these interviews:

> "I can only talk as a soldier at the front, but there its effects were disastrous and especially so in the past six months. Even the little *flugblatter* after you read them, you imagined you read the truth, that our government was lying to us. I remember one, after I read it, I felt like blowing my brains out. I never let one of our men read them — but it was difficult — they were everywhere." (p 524)[52]

Checking up on the initial propaganda campaign in the spring and early summer of 1918, the Intelligence Section found that German commanders were reporting lowered morale in the ranks of their troops. The German soldiers had become uneasy and rapidly were losing faith in their officers as a result of the information scattered from the air.[53] In the *Kölnische Zeitung* for October 31, 1918, a "High Officer on the Western Front," analyzing the military reverses wrote:

> "What caused most damage was the paper war waged by our enemies, who daily flooded us with hundreds of thousands of leaflets, extraordinarily well arranged and well edited."[54]

In an American Divisional Summary of the 28th of January, 1919, is found the following from the interrogation of S., an infantryman:

> "One of the things that made a great impression on the German soldiers and which S. believes helped to shorten the war, was the propaganda dropped by American planes. Despite orders the soldiers continued to obtain the papers. Many sent them home to their families." (p 524)[52]

GERMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

From the very beginning of the war, Germany, like all of the warring nations, conducted a campaign of patriotic propaganda at home to keep up the morale of the German people and the troops. This work had been put into the hands of the *Kriegspresseamt*, which had also the task of issuing war news to the German press. This double duty resulted in a failure to organize an effective propaganda system in the Fatherland, since the *Kriegspresseamt* concentrated its efforts mainly on war news. This deficiency was not noticed during the first few years of the war, but when the Allied organizations began hammering at the German front with their *flugblatter* the Germans became aware of their weakness. But even then the military leaders failed to act, since the majority of these leaders did not understand the psychology of the war. As for the Minister of War, he was "a soldier with military duties and he was more interested in the conduct of the war from a military standpoint than a moral standpoint."[55] By the spring of 1917 Germany was feeling the effects of Allied propaganda. In May of that year the minister called a meeting in which the leading military officials, the Imperial Chancellor, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of Education took part. The Confidential Report of their meeting issued by the War Ministry throws some light on the propaganda activities of the Allies.

> "Z No.4240/17 G.A.I.
> War Ministry
> *Strictly Confidential*
> Report of the sitting of 25 May 1917 regarding the enemy anti-monarchistic activities and discussion of steps to be taken. . . .
> The enemy endeavors to bring about anti-monarchical feeling among the fighting forces and the people have taken on a wider field recently and are supported by highly suspicious material spread in a most vigorous manner. For the most part the enemy is concentrating on leaflets in word and picture, which are being dropped from the air, or come in from the outside and are disseminated here. It is high time that the strong undermining work of the enemy be countered with similar propaganda in even more active manner."(Vol 5, p 130)

Then follows a discussion of the steps to be taken to fight the demoralizing activities of the Allied propagandists. In the Foreign Office there was to be set up a central agency for the collection of propaganda, and close cooperation between this and the press was to be established. Important people were to be enlisted to write articles for the press, or to give speeches in towns and villages all over Germany to combat enemy propaganda and harmful rumors. The churches, schools, and military hospitals were to be used as agencies for "enlightenment." Teachers and wounded officers were to conduct lectures on patriotic subjects in an effort to raise the morale of the mass of people and the soldiers behind the Front.

The army officials also took steps to raise the morale of the men at the Front. In a memorandum drawn up and submitted by General Ludendorff to the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, under date of July 29, 1917, we read:

> "Everything which is likely to prejudice the morale of the troops, e.g. leaflets sent down from the air by the enemy or sent out from home, must be kept at a distance."[56]

By September 15, 1917, the *Vaterlandische Unterricht unter den Truppen* was set up with which it was proposed to raise the morale of the German soldiers. The army high command was to see to it that patriotic instruction was given to the troops. The officers were reminded that they carried the greatest responsibility for the patriotic instruction. They were to keep from the troops all unfavorable material such as enemy leaflets, and were to bend every effort to strengthen the will to victory among their men.

The patriotic instruction was to be done through lectures, films, field preaching, and army newspapers. It is significant that "discussion during the instruction is not permitted." The points to be stressed in this work were: (1) The causes of the war, reasons Germany entered, and results, especially to the German worker, if they lost; (2) The great strength of the German military machine, the victories of the U-boats, and the work of the great munitions factories; (3) The necessity and significance of the cooperation of all classes — military, governmental, industrial, and commercial; the necessity for authority on one side and obedience on the other. Faithfulness to the Kaiser was especially to be sought.

One great weakness of this attempt at patriotic instruction was that it was left in the hands of the military leaders. These were too busy with military details to bother about the *Vaterlandische Unterricht*. To be sure, a great deal of work along that line was done, but, as one German writer put it, "What good would it do to try to oppose the cry of the enemy for a struggle for freedom and justice against the militarists of Europe?"[57] Furthermore, the *Kriegspresseamt* was not capable of enlightening and arousing the people at home. To accomplish this, a *Reichspresseamt* would have been necessary, but such an organization was never set up by the Germans. The result was that the Allied propagandists were more successful in Germany than the German propagandists themselves. This fact the German leaders admitted when they said in the final issue of one of their propaganda publications:

> "In the sphere of leaflet propaganda the enemy has defeated us. We realized that in this struggle of life and death, it was necessary to use the enemy's own methods. But the spirit of the enemy leaflets will not permit itself to be killed. . . . The enemy has defeated us not as man against man in the field of battle, bayonet against bayonet. No! Bad contents in poor printing on poor paper has made our arm lame."[58]

"(Not to be taken into the Front Line). To be issued to the rank and file by companies for perusal, then collected again and filed by Regimental Staffs for occasional reissue and collection. For a man to allow himself to be taken prisoner by the enemy without having defended himself to the utmost is a dishonorable act equivalent to treachery.[64]

The document then told how the German prisoners were tortured by the Allies. It warned them emphatically not to talk or give away military secrets."

That German soldiers became recruits for the Allied propagandists in the last few months of the war is evidenced by the Army Order of August 12, 1918.

"15th Infantry Division
"On the afternoon of August 9, propaganda tracts of a seditious character, probably dropped by hostile aviators, were distributed along the road from Bac D'Arblincourt to the canal by German soldiers to passing soldiers. Everyone will be strictly warned that all tracts, whether loose leaves or packets tied up with a string, dropped by hostile aeroplanes, or found, will be immediately turned over to your officer. Every man in whose hands such a tract has been placed is in duty bound to ascertain the name and unit of the distributors and report it." (Vol 3, p 1054)[62]

General von Hutier's order of August 29, 1918, gives us an idea of the extent of Allied propaganda against Germany. Incidentally, it also tells us what the German authorities thought of the head of the British propaganda agency, Lord Northcliffe.

"XVIIIth Army August 29, 1918
Army Order
"The enemy begins to realize that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying a last resort: While engaging to the utmost his military force, he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other methods of which he is the past master, to induce, in the minds of the German people a doubt in their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special Ministry, 'The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence,' at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing scoundrel of all the Entente, Northcliffe. . . . The letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous manner; tracts and pamphlets are concocted to which the names of German poets, writers and statesmen are forged . . . . His thought and aim is that these forgeries . . . may suggest a doubt even for a moment in the minds of those who do not think for themselves and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered . . . .
"Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to your commanders. . . . You will thus help the Command and you will help to hasten the hour of victory. VON HUTIER." (Vol 3, p 1126)[62]

Many other Army Orders were of the same tone. Always the appeal was for the troops to disregard the leaflets or for the officers to take steps to counteract them. During the months of September and October the German high officials appealed directly to the people and the troops to disregard the propaganda and to keep their fighting spirit. On September 2, 1918, von Hindenburg issued his famous address to the German people which was printed on large placards and posted throughout

the Empire. In this he told of the attacks the enemy was making on the spirit of the German soldiers and people behind the lines. "The enemy," he said, "wants to poison the spirit of the Germans and believes that our military force will cease when the spirit is destroyed. We must not take this plan of the enemy too lightheartedly." He closed with an appeal to the soldiers and people to resist the "poisonous leaflets" and to remember that they came from the enemy.

The appeals of the high officials, however, were of no avail. The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* gives us an idea of how they were received when it says in the issue of November 2, 1918:

> "For the Crown of Wilhelm II; to uphold the military apparatus and the power of Hindenburg the people are being goaded on to continue the fight. No more war! Immediate peace! Full political freedom! Down with militarism! . . . Long live the Socialist Republic."[65]

The people behind the lines and the soldiers had been swamped by enemy propaganda. The morale of the troops had dropped to the lowest possible level. Ludendorff wired to Berlin to request an immediate armistice of the Allies. On October 3, Hindenburg and a major of the General Staff appeared before Prince Max of Baden and told of the precarious condition of the Army. Von Kuhlman recognized the impossibility of a victory for Germany in view of the state of mind of the army and the home front. Germany had been "hypnotized by the enemy propaganda as a rabbit is by a snake."[66]

It cannot be denied that the propaganda of the Allies hit the German armies very hard. Allied authorities were generally agreed that, sooner or later, Germany would be defeated, but even the most authoritative people thought that this defeat could not be accomplished before August 1919. Thus propaganda probably helped to hasten the end of the war. Speaking of this the *London Times* stated:

> "Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the saving of thousands of millions in money and probably at least a million lives."[67]

On November 10, 1918, the day before the Armistice, Lord Northcliffe was entertained in Paris at a *dejeuner d'honneur* by the *Continental Daily Mail*. In the course of his speech on the war situation he summarized the work of the propagandists as follows:

> "We have conducted our propaganda through many channels and in increasing volume, and our leaflets and other publications have amounted to many millions of copies every week. If we have to some extent hastened the end it was due to the fact that we are a company of experts and enthusiasts, and from the outset there has been a concentration of purpose born of complete unity. . . . Ours has been a bloodless campaign and a costless one. I wish that we had embarked upon it at an earlier stage of the war."[68]

Dr. Phillip stated before the Committee of Inquiry that, while it is difficult to measure the influence of enemy propaganda, "I do not believe that without its successful help the German downfall could have succeeded as it did."(p 167)[47] Propaganda was an important instrument of warfare during the world conflict, and without a study of the part it played, no historian can come to a real conclusion as to the causes of the collapse of the German Empire in 1918.

SECRETARY STIMSON'S LETTER TO SENATOR BORAH*

By W. E. D.

A published letter was employed to influence at least five separate target groups in behalf of at least three major political objectives.

During the night of 18 September 1931, Japanese troops of the Kwantung army drove out the Chinese garrisons and seized Mukden, Changchun, and several other south Manchurian cities. The attack was carried out with such "swiftness and precision" that the League of Nations' Lytton Commission, months later, concluded that the military moves, carried out under the implausible pretext of self-defense, were in actuality the first step of a carefully matured plan for the military occupation of all of Manchuria.

On 21 September, China appealed to the League of Nations, which had just assembled, to take cognizance of the breach of peace and to use its good offices to repair it. At the same time China called on the US, as sponsor of the Kellogg-Briand antiwar pact, to take such steps as would ensure the preservation of peace in the Far East, and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

This appeal from China did not fall on deaf ears, either in the US or in League of Nations' circles. The Secretary of State informed Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League, that the US was following developments closely, and that he, Stimson, was mindful of the obligations not only of the Kellogg Pact but also of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which the US, China, and Japan were all parties. Stimson assured the League Secretary of an attitude of "co-operation and frankness" and gave the added assurance that all information received from Manchuria would be passed along to the League. From that moment the US, under Stimson's leadership, integrated its diplomacy closely with the procedures of the League.

Despite the efforts of Washington and Geneva to clear up the trouble in Manchuria, the results achieved were disappointing. China accused Japan of unprovoked aggression. The Commander in Chief of Japanese military forces declared publicly that Japan would no longer recognize the government of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese governor of Manchuria. On 8 October a squadron of Japanese planes bombed Chang's provisional capital at Chinchow. These and other activities of the Japanese army drew fresh calls for help from Peking, and led Stimson into a series of increasingly ambitious attempts to guide the activities of Great Britain, the League Council, and others so that they would adopt policies that would support the American government's position and that would in time induce Japan to abandon her conquest.

Unimpressed by what was happening in the Western capitals and in the League halls in Geneva, the Japanese army methodically extended its operations from southern into northern Manchuria, capturing Chinchow, 2 January 1932. Soon after the middle of January, fighting broke out in Shanghai, as the result of an effective anti-Japanese boycott that had been adopted by the Chinese in retaliation for the invasion of Manchuria. With the extension of hostilities to Shanghai, Stimson redoubled his efforts to secure British cooperation and in asking the League of Nations to bring judgment against Japan. While doing these things, he continued to search for means to impress Japan to drop her conquests.

*Adapted from *On Active Service in Peace and War*, by Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947, pp 243 ff. Copyright, 1948, by Henry L. Stimson.

Shanghai provided a flaming lesson to the West on the nature of the Far Eastern crisis. During February and March there occurred a series of events in Western diplomacy that showed how deeply Shanghai had affected the situation. On 7 January the US had announced a policy of nonrecognition. Was this a sufficient expression of the American position? Was that all the US would do? The question was discussed at length in Cabinet meetings on 26 and 29 January. The three principal participants in the discussion were the President, Stimson, and Secretary of War Patrick Hurley. On 26 January, after Stimson had briefly stated that the situation was serious, Hurley opened the discussion, making the argument that notes and diplomatic representations were not going to do much good unless backed by force, since in his view the Japanese, in Shanghai as in Manchuria, were executing steps in a far-flung plan of imperial expansion that could be blocked only by war. If the US was not prepared to fight, she would do better not to waste her breath in protests that would be ignored.

President Hoover believed that the integrity of China could be forcefully defended by the Chinese themselves. He agreed with Hurley's analysis of the intentions of Japan, but he believed that by their mere size and persistence, the 450 million Chinese would eventually frustrate the Japanese grand design. In any event, according to the President, it was not a proper area or occasion for a war by the US. In referring to the President, Secretary Stimson recorded in his diary for 26 January 1932, the following:

> "He pointed out strongly the folly of getting into a war with Japan on this subject; that such a war could not be localized or kept in bounds, and that it would mean the landing of forces in the Far East which we had no reason or sense in doing. He said he would fight for Continental United States as far as anybody, but he would not fight for Asia."

The President, however, did not at all agree with Hurley about notes and remonstrances. He believed that the Kellogg Pact could become a great moral force against aggression, and he thought that the doctrine of nonrecognition of 7 January was a splendid first step in mobilizing opinion behind the principle of the pact.

> "He said that he thought that that note would take rank with the greatest papers of this country, and that that was the safe course for us to follow now rather than by getting into a war in China."

Since Mr. Hoover was the President, and since he believed that any policy of embargo or sanctions might lead to war, his position effectively blocked any governmental support for economic sanctions. This was a point that Stimson had argued with Mr. Hoover several times. The President was always willing to listen, but he was never persuaded. On 20 February he said, "he hoped that his mind was not closed on anything, but he admitted that it was as much closed as possible on the question of calling an embargo." He believed that the enforcement of the treaties to which the US and Japan were parties was a moral obligation to be met by moral pressures.

Debarred from any advocacy of sanctions, Stimson in early 1932 was hard put to it to find a policy that would be effective. He was finally driven to a double course: a bluff of force and a strong restatement of principles. The bluff was not a very good one; the statement of principles he considered one of the best things he ever did. Let us look first at the bluff.

Words alone were unlikely to be effective in blocking the Japanese. It was necessary that they have some ground for concern about the attitude of the government which spoke the words. Thus far Hurley was clearly right. Even if the US was unwilling to impose sanctions and still more unwilling to fight for the "peace of the Pacific," might it not be possible to bluff the Japanese? As Stimson put it to Mr. Hoover after the Cabinet meeting of 26 January,

> "The only difference I could see between his point and mine was the reliance which I felt we could put upon America's strength both economically and militarily. I quoted Theodore Roosevelt's saying, 'Speak softly and carry a big stick!' . . . I was against putting any threat into words. I thought we had a right to rely upon the unconscious elements of our great size and military strength; that I knew Japan was afraid of that, and I was willing to let her be afraid of that without telling her that we were not going to use it against her."

The policy of bluff on which Stimson was forced to rely was not an easy one to execute, for it was a bluff that could not be expressed. The American government could not intimate by word or deed that it favored sanctions; any such intimation was barred by Mr. Hoover's position. Stimson even felt it necessary to deny reports circulated privately in Geneva that the American government was coming round to support of sanctions. All that was possible was to keep silent on future intentions, and the silence was not very impressive. And when friendly governments attempted to sound out the American position, the bluff became still weaker.

In spite of this basic weakness in his position, Stimson remained throughout the Shanghai incident the leader of opinion against Japan. For by a restatement and elaboration of the basic position of the US, toward the end of February, he set the tone for the only affirmative action taken by the League. This was accomplished in a public letter to Senator Borah that was in many ways the most significant state paper Stimson ever wrote.

To Stimson it seemed time for a new move in the continuing campaign to mobilize world opinion. Secretary Hurley's warning that public opinion would not do the job would certainly prove correct unless the moral disapproval of the US should be reinforced by that of other major nations.

The obvious ground for a new statement was the Nine-Power Treaty. The first article of that treaty was precisely applicable to the situation in Manchuria; "no human language" could be more clear than its statement of the obligation of its signatories "(1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

The obvious partner for a new *démarche* was Great Britain. It was on Mr. Hoover's suggestion that Stimson presented his plan to the British Ambassador on 9 February and discussed it in detail with Sir John Simon in five transatlantic telephone calls during the following week. He tried to persuade the British that the interests of both nations would be served by a joint reassertion of the Nine-Power Treaty. These conversations were friendly enough, and Sir John approved of Stimson's plan in principle. In practice, however, he held back. There were various reasons for his reluctance to accept Stimson's suggestion — some good and some less good. Among the good ones were Britain's membership in the League, where measures indicating adherence to the nonrecognition doctrine were

pending; it was reasonable then that the British should pace their actions to those of the League. Among the bad ones were Sir John's inability to take Chinese territorial and administrative integrity very seriously and his feeling that the question of Shanghai, as a direct threat to Western interests, should be considered separately from that of Manchuria, which he thought a dangerous subject in view of Japanese feelings. Such a separation seemed to Stimson wholly wrong — it would have been a tacit admission that aggression in Manchuria was less reprehensible than aggression in an area where there were extensive British interests.

On 16 February the League appeal was duly passed by 12 members of the Council, not party to the Far Eastern struggle. Although very politely worded, this appeal to Japan implied support of the nonrecognition doctrine and called Japan's attention to her obligation under the Nine-Power Treaty. In the days that followed, Stimson at last became convinced that the British government felt reluctant to join in his *démarche*. He was not especially annoyed at this situation. For a time he considered abandoning the idea of a new American statement, since it would be dangerous to make an official appeal to Japan and find that it went unsupported by other signatories to the same treaty.

On 21 February he decided on the Borah letter. The Japanese had launched a major attack the day before and public feeling both at home and abroad was at a new high. It would not do to let this moment pass without an American statement. At the same time, although he had failed to budge Mr. Hoover in his opposition to an embargo, Stimson had the President's strong support for a further effort to mobilize world opinion. In order to avoid or at least minimize diplomatic knifing, Stimson decided to cast his statement in the form of an open letter to Senator Borah; he recalled that Theodore Roosevelt had often used this technique in similar circumstances. On the evening of Washington's Birthday and the morning of 23 February, with the help of three of his trusted advisers, he wrote the letter. It was at once approved by the President and by Borah as suitable for publication.

The letter to Borah, as Stimson later wrote, "was intended for the perusal of at least five unnamed addressees." It is an excellent example of a document designed to influence the behavior of leaders and people well beyond our own borders. With the full knowledge that such a letter would be transmitted to the furthermost corners of the world, that is, would be translated into many languages and thus seen by individuals in positions of responsibility everywhere, it was well designed to serve as a vehicle of communications in psychological warfare, although that term had not come into use by 1932.

The letter to Senator Borah is an excellent illustration of how one instrument may serve to support a number of objectives. First it was designed to encourage China to continue to offer resistance to Japan, and thus, it was in support of a specific long-term political objective of the US, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. Second it was intended to exhort the League of Nations Assembly, which was about to meet, and thus, it was designed to influence the deliberations of an international agency. Third it was addressed indirectly to leaders of the British government to serve as a gentle reminder that they, through Lords Salisbury and Balfour, were joint authors with the Americans of the Open Door Policy and the Nine-Power Treaty. Thus, the letter was designed to support the short-term political objective of stirring up the British people and leaders, to cause them to adopt a course of action for the Far East in support of Anglo-American policy objectives. Fourth it was expected that the letter would be read and con-

sidered by the Japanese and thus that it might serve to deter them from further aggressive acts. It was hoped that the message would remind Japan that, if she chose to break down one of the group of treaties agreed on at the Washington Conference, other nations might feel themselves released from some of those treaties that were as important to her as the Nine-Power Treaty was to the US. Finally the contents of the letter would serve as a means of informing the American people about US policy.

The letter, which follows, was made public 24 February 1932.

"February 23, 1932

"My dear Senator Borah:

"You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine-Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification, and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this government.

"That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles: (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between Japan and China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress, Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion.

"He said:

" 'The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.'

"He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced.

"In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, expressed himself 'most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the US.'

"For twenty years thereafter the 'open door' policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by the various powers. But in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallized into the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed:

" '1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

" '2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

" '3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

" '4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.'

"This treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the people of this earth. At the time this treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed — and the whole history of the development of the 'open door' policy reveals that faith — that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interest not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

"During the course of the discussions which resulted in the treaty, the chairman of the British Delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that —

" 'The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of interest" was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government were concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.'

"At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidehara, announced the position of his Government as follows:

" 'No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny. . . .'

"It must be remembered also that this treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortifications was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

"Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine-Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

"The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which having been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved: for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation had developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact

who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

"That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

"On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those Governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

"In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual good will. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its Government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were forseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the 'open door' was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference, who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable William E. Borah
United States Senate"

As might well be anticipated, this letter was not effective in achieving all the objectives outlined. It did succeed, however, in arousing the American people to the dangers inherent in a continuation of the Far East controversy. Professor Shotwell, of Columbia University, described the letter as belonging in the same general categories of public documents as the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. The *Literary Digest*, after surveying the editorial comments in dozens of papers in all parts of the US, agreed with the *Christian Science Monitor* that the Stimson letter "ranks with the most important state papers in American history."

With respect to what, if any, effect the letter had on the League of Nations, it is well to note the following:

"Shortly afterward, Secretary Stimson received world-wide approval for his earlier non-recognition doctrine. On March 11, fifty nations of the Assembly of the League of Nations agreed to a resolution which incorporated in one part almost verbatim the American Secretary's pronouncement — non-recognition of the spoils won in wars of aggression."[69]

It would be difficult indeed to ascertain what, if any, effect the message and the League action had on Japan and China. Nearly two months after the League resolution, peace terms were signed by China and Japan. The last of the invading Japanese troops left the Shanghai sector on May 31. It would be unrealistic to ascribe Japan's action as in any direct way due to the action of Secretary Stimson. It appears that the determined resistance of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, in the defense of Shanghai, had involved her in a conflict of unanticipated proportions. This, plus the diplomatic pressures exerted through old-fashioned channels of diplomacy, probably had more to do with the decision to desist from further aggression at the time than any act of international propaganda, no matter how subtle in form, or direct in communication.

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CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Organization for Psychological Warfare

Six accounts are presented in this chapter outlining some of the features and activities of organizations and agencies to which have been entrusted the American psychological warfare and foreign information efforts of the past and present. The first account, written not long after World War I, describes the pattern of organization for propaganda agencies that emerged during that struggle in four countries: the US, England, France, and Germany. The type of organizational arrangement that emerged differed in each of these countries.

The second and third articles are "US Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War II" and "Post-World War II Developments." The most obvious conclusions to be drawn from these accounts are the following: much of the activity and the type of organization that emerged during World War II was the result of trial-and-error improvisations; for a large measure of effectiveness in propaganda operations a considerable degree of decentralization of responsibility is indicated; a central organization is required to provide logistic support and to ensure proper coordination of effort as between policy objectives, planning activities, and dissemination of output; however, where operational direction is extended to minute details of field activities, the effectiveness of the propaganda activity is likely to suffer.

"RIAS: The Story of An American Psywar Outpost" and "The Far East Regional Production Center" illustrate further post-World War II developments, namely, the administrative practice of decentralizing propaganda while concentrating printing establishments in a few centers, far removed from Washington, not too distant from the areas where the propaganda material is planned and where it will be disseminated after it is printed.

The article on RIAS was prepared by an American journalist long interested in psychological warfare operations, first as an observer of German operations in Northern France in 1940 and later as an operator in the American effort during and after World War II. "The Far East Regional Production Center" was specially prepared for inclusion in this volume by a onetime director of the center.

Not all the propaganda activities of Americans in the post-World War II period was and is government sponsored. The sixth article, "Non-Governmental Agencies Engaged in Cold War Propaganda Operations," describes the organization and activities of two agencies, supported by private funds, that are actively engaged in the cold war psychological warfare effort against the Soviet Union and its satellites. These are *Radio Free Europe*, financed by the Crusade For Freedom, at one time headed by C. D. Jackson, and *Radio Liberation*, sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., headed by a former US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Having only the most tenuous and indirect connections with the government these agencies are enabled to speak with more vigor on topics relating to evils of Soviet Communism than a government agency would normally attempt.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENCIES IN WORLD WAR I*

By Harold D. Lasswell

The organizational arrangements for foreign and domestic propaganda that emerged in England, France, Germany, and the US during World War I differed in important respects. Inter-allied coordination of their separate propaganda efforts was virtually nonexistent.

Inside a democratic country there is a certain presumption against government propaganda. As Representative Gillett, commenting upon the Creel Bureau, said, admitting that it has not been conducted in a partisan spirit:

> "That is the great danger of such a bureau as this, because we must all admit that if any administration has in its power a Bureau of Public Information, as it is called, but really an advertising bureau, a propaganda bureau, a bureau of publicity, to exploit the various acts and departments of the Government, it is a very dangerous thing in a Republic; because, if used in a partisan spirit or for partisan advantage of the administration, it has tremendous power, and in ordinary peace-time I do not think any party or any administration would justify it or approve it."[1]

The truth is that all governments are engaged to some extent in propaganda as part of their ordinary peace-time functions. They make propaganda on behalf of diplomatic friends or against diplomatic antagonists, and this is unavoidable. While, therefore, the presumption exists against propaganda work by a democratic government, this statement should not be taken too literally.

During the war-period it came to be recognized that the mobilization of men and means was not sufficient; there must be a *mobilization of opinion*. Power over opinion, as over life and property, passed into official hands, because the danger

* From Chap. 2, "Propaganda Organization," pp 14–26, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1927. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Lasswell, the copyright holder.

from license was greater than the danger of abuse. Indeed, there is no question but that government management of opinion is an unescapable corollary of large-scale modern war. The only question is the degree to which the government should try to conduct its propaganda secretly, and the degree to which it should conduct it openly. As far as the home public is concerned, there is nothing to be gained by concealment, and there is a certain loss of prestige for all that is said, when secrecy is attempted. The carrying power of ideas is greatly increased when the authority of the government is added to them. With certain insignificant exceptions (the smuggling of propaganda material into adjacent enemy countries), nothing is lost, if all propaganda operations in neutral and allied countries are carried on openly. Otherwise, indeed, suspicion and distrust may exist where complete confidence and understanding are indispensable. The United States Committee on Public Information was undoubtedly correct in notifying neutral governments of what they wanted to do inside neutral borders.

It is bad tactics, however, to announce blatantly to the enemy that a "Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries" has been named. As Sir Herbert Samuel said in the House of Commons, when Lord Northcliffe was appointed to this post in 1918:

> "Possibly the Germans may regard Lord Northcliffe, the proprietor of the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News*, in much the same light as we may regard Count Reventlow. What should we think, if we heard that an official announcement had been made by the German Government, that they had appointed Count Reventlow as the Director to carry on propaganda in the United Kingdom, and in other Allied countries?"[2]

Assuming, in principle, that propaganda should be conducted in the open by a belligerent government, the problem of organization presents itself. What agencies should carry on the work, and to what degree is unity of command practicable? The work of carrying on the war brings several government services into the active control of certain streams of information, and international attitudes are to some degree involved with the rest. There is the Foreign Office at home, and the Diplomatic and Consular staffs abroad. There is the War and Naval Department at home, and the Military and Naval Attachés abroad. There is the General Staff and the Field Headquarters. There are the various service ministries engaged upon problems of supply and internal regulation. The mere enumeration of these agencies is sufficient to remind one of the evident proposition that the influencing of attitudes is implicit in every function, and that it is incapable of complete segregation in anything like the degree to which, let us say, the purchasing of horses can be confined to a particular agency.

Disunity brings dangers. The Foreign Office and the Field Headquarters may hold out contradictory inducements to the enemy and cast the whole propaganda of demoralization into disrepute. The military people at home may announce the destruction of public buildings in the occupied zone, much to the consternation of the diplomatic representatives in neutral countries. There is always the possibility that bad news of different kinds may break simultaneously and produce an unwonted state of depression if each service gives its own news to the public. The news of a naval loss, a military loss, and an aviation loss may come when there is a shortage of flour, and when there is a prickly set of wage and price problems agitating the prints at home. If this news were handled through a central clearing house, it could be distributed over a period of time and nullified by the more favourable aspects of the general situation.

Disunity leads to a considerable duplication of effort. If the military people publish the same pamphlet that the diplomatic service publishes, and distribute it through the military attachés abroad when the diplomatic attachés have already doled it out, no good purpose can be served. It is difficult to work out a revision of general policy in the light of propaganda efforts, where there is no continuing mechanism for keeping tab on the whole range of propaganda work. The backwardness of certain departments, which may be opposed to publicity, may produce a repercussion of uneasiness and distrust. There may be delay in shifting the personnel devoted to propaganda work to the sectors where the most effect can be secured.

Some of these dangers may be offset by the dangers of unity. Any scheme of unity runs the risk of antagonizing the *amour propre* of some service and of ruining morale. If the control of foreign and domestic propaganda were integrated too tightly in the hands of one man, the one or the other might suffer from the preconceptions of the responsible head. Their requirements are so different that only a rare combination of talents can be relied upon to develop both of them to the highest efficiency.

The balance seems to point toward unity as more desirable than disunity, but it seems to justify a scheme of organization which preserves a considerable degree of autonomy to the constituent services. What are the possible forms of organization? There might be a single propaganda executive. There might be a committee of executives, each responsible for some branch of propaganda work, such as propaganda against the enemy, propaganda in neutral and allied countries, propaganda among civilians, and propaganda in the fighting forces. In any case, the propaganda work in training camps, at the front, in rest camps, on shipboard, and in transit, would vest largely in military and naval authorities. A third method is to arrange a common Press conference for all departments, but to leave all other forms of effort to the regular agencies affected, which would especially be the Foreign Office, General Headquarters, the War Department, and the Ministry of the Interior. Broadly speaking, the United States adopted the first expedient in the last war, Great Britain, the second, and Germany, the third.

A Committee on Public Information was appointed, by order of the President, soon after the entrance of the United States into the War. It was composed of the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments, the Secretary of State, and Mr. George Creel. This was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for propaganda, in fact, and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home and abroad. One result of this method of organization was to confer upon the representatives of the Committee abroad something of the prestige of three great government departments, and to satisfy the self-esteem of each one.

While the American system sprang into existence at a single stroke, and remained substantially unaltered during the War, the British system went through a long and intricate series of changes. As Major-General Sir George Aston wrote:

> "Party politicians are suspicious folk, unwilling to trust any Government with money to spend on propaganda, for fear that they will spend it in their own interest rather than the country's. So the Parliamentary War Aims Committee was established with representatives of all parties. The Committee was charged with Home Propaganda, and came in for much criticism."[3]

A small department was set up at Wellington House in the office of the Insurance Commissioners to prepare pamphlets and leaflets. Wellington House initiated the Bryce Report, which was one of the triumphs of the War, on the propaganda front, but most of its material was put out as though it were a private and not an official agency. A films and wireless committee was later set up under Mr. Mair, but its relation to the Home Office and the Foreign Office was uncertain. A Press Bureau was improvised in August, 1914, and was later adopted by the Home Office. The Foreign Office was meanwhile engaged in the following activities, according to a statement in Parliament by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Acland):

> "We are taking steps to see that there is supplied to the Press in neutral countries not only news strictly so-called, but also news which we take here to be rather commonplace, but which is of real interest to other countries, as to the condition of this country, and information with regard to trade, and with regard to employment, and with regard to recruiting, and with regard to all such matters as to which the condition of this country is really of interest to our friends."[4]

In January, 1917, the Department of Information was organized. Colonel Buchan had charge of four widely scattered services, and was responsible to the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister. An Advisory Committee was established, which consisted of Lord Northcliffe, Lord Burnham, Mr. Robert Donald, and Mr. C. P. Scott. When Lord Northcliffe proceeded on his mission to America, Lord Beaverbrook was appointed to this Committee, and later, Sir George Riddell was added. Things were still at loose ends under this system, and Sir E. Carson, a member of the War Cabinet, was asked to co-ordinate the various agencies. The War Department had organized a separate service for the purpose of conducting propaganda against the German Army, and the civilian peoples. Finally, in February, 1918, Lord Beaverbrook was made Minister of Information, occupying the post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. At the same time Lord Northcliffe was named Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, and Directors were appointed for neutral countries for intelligence, and for cinematograph propaganda. Lord Northcliffe was technically responsible to Lord Beaverbrook in respect to finance, but, in fact, he had the right of direct access to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Confusion was worse confounded by locating the Enemy Propaganda Department in the British War Mission with which Northcliffe had been working for some months past. Informal conferences were inaugurated to co-ordinate efforts, and later a Propaganda Policy Committee was presided over by Lord Northcliffe. A working unity was actually achieved, although at the expense of many weary months and years of bickering and duplication.* The Italians arrived at this same method of organization.

* The attitude of the Foreign Office clique toward the Beaverbrook ministry is reflected in the comments of the author of *The Pomp of Power*.[5] He says that a group of experts on foreign affairs refused to work under the direction of Beaverbrook and migrated to the Foreign Office. Beaverbrook relied upon Canadians "whose experience of foreign affairs and whose knowledge of foreign languages was as limited as his own." Beaverbrook has told his own story in *Politicians and the Press*.[6] Lord Bertie, British Ambassador to France, lamented that for two years (until 1917) the Foreign Office failed to establish a press bureau in Paris.[7]

The most important difference between the American and the British plan was that the latter put foreign and domestic propaganda in the hands of co-ordinate officials. When the technicalities of the matter are allowed for, the British system clearly made no distinction between Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, for instance, who both had direct access to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. The British, in effect, laid equal emphasis upon the necessity for departmental autonomy in dealing with home, empire, neutral, allied, and enemy propaganda. The extraordinary diversity of foreign interests to which the British were appealing probably justified this procedure, because the problems which were presented were highly distinct.* The Americans came into the War, when it was neither their business to win the neutrals, nor to play one group against another. They had a very simple propaganda message to get across (American preparations; a Wilsonian Peace), and it could be vested in one executive without much danger.

It was the Germans who had a minimum of co-ordinated propaganda effort. Each Department went ahead in its own way, and the only formal co-operation was in the Press conference, which met two or three times a week. The War Ministry, the General Staff, the Navy Department, the District Military Authorities, the Colonial Office, the Post Office, the Interior Department, the Treasury Department, the Food Ministry, and eventually the Foreign Office took part. The chairmanship was passed round in a rotating system, and the co-operating journalists chose a committee to speak for them.

The Military Authorities had to build their work from the ground up.† At the outbreak of the War there was but a single official who had contact with the Press. But they soon evolved an extensive Press service to report military operations, to edit the Field Press, to control the admission of home papers to the army, and to carry on propaganda against the enemy.

The Foreign Office was slow in clearing for action, but in October, 1914, when the check on the Marne had deferred the prospects for peace, a special *Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst* was created. This was a very busy bureau and published an imposing array of propaganda material.

As the War developed, the conflict between military and civil authorities became more and more acute. The military men went into a paroxysm of rage when the peace resolution was moved by Erzberger in 1917, as they had when Bethmann-Hollweg held out the olive branch in 1916. The military authorities had no patience with palaver about peace; they wanted a victorious peace of dictation. Ludendorff granted an interview to the Berlin Press in which these views were put before the people. Instantly the Left and Centre took up the challenge, and assailed the military for trying to interfere in politics. The Chancellor, to avoid being caught between partisan fires, refused, as had his predecessor, to create a separate Minister of Propaganda. The military authorities had proposed this on three different occasions, for they had already begun to feel the effects of Allied propaganda. At last the G.H.Q. tried to reach the home public directly by establishing a special Press service called the *Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*, which, in spite of the opposition of the large papers, prospered. At the direction of General Ludendorff an

* This will appear especially in connection with a later point.

† Nicolai complains that the Reichstag failed to vote them enough money to develop a satisfactory press section before the war, because "in peace times the press was conceived as a partisan instrument." (p 53)[8]

elaborate plan of patriotic stimulation was drawn up July 29, 1927. It was designed to reach the civilian and the fighting population. (p 119ff)[8]

There were other tentative gestures toward the formation of a special propaganda agency to co-ordinate German efforts at home and abroad, but all of them failed. Private citizens organized the Wagner Culture Committee, to spread pro-German propaganda very early in the War, but its work lacked both prestige and deftness. Germany suffered from the overzealous efforts of private persons to fill the gaps left by Government omissions. Professor Lamprecht spoke with contempt of the educated man who "obtained the largest possible goose quill, and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realize what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that, in many cases, their conduct required some excuses. . . . . The consequences were gruesome." In 1916, some of the civilian authorities commenced the movement to form a *Deutscher National-Ausschuss*, but this was still a private venture. Chancellor Hertling at last took some steps toward unified control in August, 1918, but his measures were both inadequate and tardy.

The French kept their propaganda in the hands of the established diplomatic, military, and naval agencies. Occasionally they supplemented the work abroad by sending out a High Commissioner, who combined propaganda, economic, and other functions, as did the temporary war missions of all the allied powers. The *Maison de la Presse* had its agents attached to the legations abroad.*

When Allies are fighting together, the problem of co-ordinating their propagandas and their policies arises. Inter-Allied co-operation in the last War was in a rudimentary stage at the time of the Armistice. When Lord Northcliffe became head of the British Enemy Propaganda Department in February, 1918, he called a preliminary conference on inter-Allied propaganda. One of the participating experts, Mr. Wickham Steed of *The Times*, writes that M. Henri Moysset, chief private secretary to the French Minister of Marine, spoke as a French representative, and insisted upon the imperative necessity for creating a "Thinking General Staff" to unify the effort exerted by the Allies in enemy and neutral countries. The Conference did actually appoint Professor Borghese (Italy), Mr. Steed and M. Moysset, with the expectation that they would co-operate in Paris, but jealousy of Moysset is said to have prevented the full development of the work.[10] The Allies conducted a formal conference in August, 1918, and their most successful common venture was a Permanent Inter-Allied Commission at the Italian G.H.Q.

Although the problem of organizing international propaganda campaigns was not satisfactorily solved in the late War, the experience of the Allies in certain other projects was complete enough to reveal sound principles of administration. Sir Arthur Salter, who digested his experience with the Inter-Allied Shipping Control with such skill, has generalized the conditions of continuing co-operation upon executive matters between independent governments.

> "Contact, and indeed regular contact, must be established between the appropriate permanent officials of the several national administrations. It is important that these officials should (where possible) continue to exer-

* A committee to conduct artistic propaganda abroad was formed in the spring of 1918 under the direction of the Minister for Education and Fine Arts. Besides the *Maison de la presse* there were unofficial members from organizations like the Chambre syndicale de la haute couture.[9]

cise executive authority in their own departments and, where geographical reasons prevent this, that they should, at least, be specialists, and continue to exercise a decisive influence on them. The officials must enjoy the confidence of the respective ministers, must keep in constant touch with their policy, must, within a considerable range, be able to influence their action, and they must have an accurate knowledge of the limits of their own influence."[11]

He declares that they must work together in sufficient intimacy to develop trust or knowledge of the limits within which they may trust one another, and that they must endeavour to develop such relations as will enable them, without disloyalty to their own governments, to discuss policy frankly in the earlier stages before it has been formulated in their own countries. The formal authority may best be supplied by the occasional meeting of the responsible ministers. Formal meetings of international representatives ought to be solely for the purpose of ratifying agreements already arrived at informally. Even minor negotiation should never be in the nature of a bargain.

Salter argues that the arrangement which he suggests, is an appropriate solution of the role of committees in administration.

"Nothing is so ineffective as a committee which consists of persons, each of whom has no specialized function and no personal executive authority, and yet tries to direct executive action. But if a number of persons, each of whom has a direct executive authority, which he continues to exercise in his own special sphere, meet from time to time, in order to dovetail their common measures and adjust them to a common plan, and then return to their departments to put into effect what they have agreed the committee is an effective instrument of co-operative action."[11]

US PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

By W. E. D.

US propaganda agencies created during World War II were more the result of trial and error planning and ad hoc *improvisations than of careful blueprinting.*

Introduction

When war came to the American people on 7 December 1941, the task of disseminating propaganda to foreign audiences was in the hands of two emergency agencies: the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), which confined its activities to Latin America, and the Coordinator of Information (COI), which operated in the rest of the world.

The Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, was created on 16 August 1940, with the mission of developing good inter-American relations. The information aspects of the CIAA's program — the press, radio, and motion-picture activities — was regarded as an integral part of its general cultural and commercial relations program carried out in close cooperation with the Department of State. When war was declared CIAA helped convince the Latin American people that hemisphere solidarity was necessary for the proper protection of western hemisphere interests. The agency

very ably supplemented the commercial news services with the dissemination of special feature articles, through local information activities, through film distribution, and by means of short-wave radio programs beamed from the US.

Coordinator of Information

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was established by a military order of President Roosevelt on 11 July 1941. It was assigned two major functions: the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces; and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America. The second of these two missions was not clearly stated in the order establishing COI. At the time the US was trying, to be sure without great success, to observe the outward signs of neutrality between those forces fighting Nazi Germany and those associated with it. Although it was not specifically stated in the order establishing COI, it was clearly understood by the Coordinator, Col (later General) William J. Donovan, and the President that a Foreign Information Service (FIS) was to be established as an integral part of COI. This service was directed by the President not to engage in domestic information activities.

Colonel Donovan appointed Robert Sherwood, an intimate confidant of the President and the White House staff, as the director of FIS. Its major headquarters was established in New York City. In accordance with its mission, this service, which from the very beginning was virtually an autonomous agency, undertook to spread the gospel of democracy, the cause of the United Nations and to explain the objectives of the US throughout the world, except in Latin America. In accordance with its directives, FIS cleared those aspects of its plans and projects that dealt with US foreign and military policies with the State, War, and Navy Departments and attempted to implement its operational objectives in close cooperation with the British government.

The FIS operated on the basic assumption that a democratic country cannot successfully undertake a Goebbels-deception type of foreign propaganda and that truth was the only effective base on which to build an American information program. Accordingly it attempted to establish a propaganda program with the day's news as the chief ingredient.

When the war came to the US in December 1941, both the CIAA and FIS were developing programs for the use of short-wave broadcast facilities. However, in only a few languages had programs already been beamed overseas. It was not until several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, that the first Japanese-language short-wave program was directed to the Japanese Empire by FIS from transmitters located on the US west coast.

Notwithstanding the employment of psychological warfare on both the strategic and tactical levels in World War I, Americans began similar types of operations in World War II with little if any reference to the lessons learned in the earlier struggle. In addition, top-echelon leaders from the President down were, first, deeply engrossed in problems of general military and political strategy, and, second, they were either ignorant of or indifferent to the potentialities and limitations of the use of psychological warfare in the world-wide struggle against the Nazis and the Japanese. As a consequence, thinking on the kind of organization required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent, with the result that confusion in this area was widespread in the 6 months that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This confusion on how to handle the nation's program of war information, domestic and foreign, was such as to lead to numerous suggestions on how best to reorganize the effort. All reorganization plans had these three features in common: all recognized that the existing situation was not good, all suggested that the lines of administrative responsibility should be clearly fixed, and all provided for a better integration of planning and a system for the coordination of output.

Office of War Information

By Executive Order 9182, dated 13 June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was established. This order was based on suggestions contained in a memorandum on the reorganization of war-information services submitted to the President by the Director of the Budget on 7 March 1942. Nelson Rockefeller, the head of CIAA, successfully resisted the Budget Bureau's suggestion that his agency be integrated into a single organization engaged in foreign information work. As a consequence, the order establishing OWI left CIAA out of the new organization.

The OWI was created by the transfer of various information services, domestic and foreign, to it. Included among the war-information agencies or services merged into OWI were the following: Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), Office of Government Reports (OGR), the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and FIS of COI.

It is the organization and activities of the FIS of COI that is of particular interest to the student of psychological warfare. Upon merger into the OWI, FIS became its Overseas Branch. The Domestic Branch of OWI, originally comprised mainly of the personnel transferred from OFF, OGR, and OEM, is of less concern to those primarily interested in international propaganda and foreign information.

The remaining functions of the disbanded COI — those involving the collection and analysis of intelligence data on foreign areas — were transferred to a new agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the leadership of Col Donovan. OSS was made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The order creating OWI did not clearly establish a division of responsibility between it and OSS for the conduct of psychological warfare.

During the first year of OWI's existence the domestic-information activities of OWI were dominant. The Overseas Branch continued until late spring or summer of 1943 much as FIS had in COI — as virtually an autonomous unit. During the period of time from the establishment of OWI, in June 1942 until 9 March 1943, three important factors were to influence the character of the organization that emerged from the war experience. First, the overseas activities of both OWI and OSS were vaguely defined. Second, the psychological warfare organization — OWI, OSS, and CIAA — were all rent with interagency and intragency disputes. Third, although the major efforts of the top-echelon leaders in OWI were largely concerned with the OWI domestic program, OSS under the dynamic leadership of General Donovan developed far-reaching plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in connection with the then forthcoming military campaigns. These plans were not accepted by Robert Sherwood, Chief of the Overseas Branch, or Elmer Davis, Director of OWI.

JCS in December 1942, during the first extensive US military operation of World War II, tried to resolve the conflict between OSS and OWI by the issuance of an order stating that OSS was to have complete authority "to plan, develop, coordinate and execute the military program of psychological warfare." It turned

out that the issuance of this order was an unfortunate occurrence. The order did not get to the basic problem of organization — the lack of adequate integration and coordination.

The rivalry of the empire-building agencies continued unabated. The compartmentalization of the various information-dispensing agencies prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were planning or doing. The JCS directive proved not to be the answer to the problem, for it gave all too little emphasis to the prevailing American philosophy or political concept, i.e., that propaganda, if not all psychological warfare, is first and foremost a civilian and not primarily a military responsibility. As a consequence both Mr. Davis, head of OWI, and Mr. Rockefeller, head of CIAA, appealed directly to the President, protesting the military usurpation of a presidential delegation of authority.

Following the appeal to the President an executive order, No. 9312, was issued on 9 March 1943, which set forth more clearly the responsibility of OWI in the overseas commands. The new executive order stated that OWI was to be the agency to conduct foreign information and overt propaganda operations abroad but "in areas of actual or projected military operations" all plans and projects "should be coordinated with the military plans" and would "be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the approval of the theater commander. . . ."

This order did not clearly define what, if any, psychological warfare functions were retained by OSS. For example, the order did not state whether OWI or OSS had jurisdiction over subversive activities, covert propaganda campaigns, etc. The order did little to resolve the difficult problems of coordination as between the separate agencies. However, the progress of the war tended to resolve the intensity if not the subject of the interagency disputes.

Psychological Warfare Agencies within the Military Establishments

At various times during the course of the war the military establishments in Washington displayed a slight, though inconsistent, interest in psychological warfare operations. The Navy Department established a highly secretive Special Warfare Branch (OP-16W) within the Office of Naval Intelligence to plan and to assist with the conduct of special operations in the area of psychological warfare and fields related to it. Captain (later Admiral) Zacharias was one of the moving spirits in this organization. In addition to Zacharias's appeals to Japan in 1945, the most noteworthy operations of the small psychological warfare staff of the Navy were those associated with the "Commander Norden" appeals to Nazi submariners.*

In the War Department headquarters in Washington, support for psychological warfare was neither as intensive nor as consistent as in the Navy Department. A Special Studies Group (SSG) was set up prior to the actual outbreak of war, but it was more a high-level strategic planning group than strictly a psychological warfare planning or operational agency. During its relatively short life its major activities involved the establishment of liaison with COI and CIAA, providing these agencies unclassified military information that might present the US in a better light to the world at large. One of its major accomplishments was the recommendation for the establishment of a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) within JCS, which was implemented.

* See "Commander Norden and the German Admirals," in Chap. 7 of Vol II of this study.

JPWC was a military organization, its membership being composed exclusively of military personnel. Its functions were defined as follows:

> ". . . to initiate, formulate and develop psychological warfare plans. . . [and] under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other US governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy."

This was an ambitious task for a military group to undertake in view of the aggressively ambitious programs sponsored by civilian agencies that ostensibly had White House backing. Quite naturally nothing very pretentious ever came from the JPWC. After the establishment of OWI the latter organization refused to cooperate with JPWC. JCS reorganized its JPWC, which in the course of time became inundated in handling the numerous administrative problems of OSS. By late 1942 JPWC ceased to be active and was finally abolished by the JCS. Following this move no JCS committee possessed or attempted to exercise any consistent responsibility for psychological warfare operations.

Psychological Warfare Organizations in the Overseas Military Commands

Executive Order 9312, dated 9 March 1943, redefining the respective functions of OWI and OSS, was in large measure responsible for the character of the psychological warfare organizations that developed during the war in the overseas commands. That portion of the order that provided that "all plans and projects . . . should be subject to the approval . . . of the theater commander" was rigidly adhered to and greatly influenced the type and extent of operations conducted.

The organization for psychological warfare operations everywhere was improvised and largely established on an *ad hoc* basis. There was relatively little interchange of information from one major military command to another. The result is that one cannot describe with one stroke of a pen the characteristics of the organization that existed in the Army for the conduct of psychological warfare operations in the field. There were important differences in structure from one command to the next.

The area in which the US began its first major military psychological warfare effort of World War II was North Africa. The character of the operation (joint Anglo-American) and the personality of the Commander (General Eisenhower) were such as to set the tone of the organization that was to carry through to the campaigns on the continent in 1943–1945. General Eisenhower's concept of military organization required that a military staff established to plan and to supervise psychological warfare operations be, in fact, a joint undertaking of the Americans and the British.

Under General Eisenhower's command the basic concept on organization that prevailed was first, a complete integration of available British and American talent; and second, the utilization of personnel in positions of major responsibility, in accordance with their individual abilities, irrespective of whether or not the individual was a member of a military service or of a civilian agency. As a result, in General Eisenhower's commands (North Africa, 1943, and Northwest Europe, 1944–1945) the top position in psychological warfare was assigned to an American general.

Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

The task of planning for the use of psychological warfare and of carrying out actual operations in the area of continental Europe was entrusted to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). The division was actually a special staff section of SHAEF. Unlike the other divisions of the Command, PWD was assigned both staff planning and operational functions.

The missions of PWD were:

(a) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy.

(b) To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.

(c) To conduct so-called "consolidation" propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries.

(d) To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

Through most of the history of PWD until the beginning of the posthostilities phase of the German Information Control operation, the Chief of PWD was assisted by four deputies, one assigned from each of the four civilian agencies that contributed personnel to PWD, namely, the two American agencies — OWI and OSS — and the two British agencies — the Political Intelligence Department (PID of the Foreign Office) and the Ministry of Information (MOI). For a short period there was still a fifth deputy — a representative of the American military service. This officer served as the Chief's deputy on purely military matters. A few months prior to the German surrender the civilian deputy representing OSS was withdrawn for other duties and was not replaced, and later still the post of military deputy was abolished.

While the four civilian deputies functioned they divided the various operating and staff sections among them as their primary responsibility. These sections were:

Plans and Directives	Press
Intelligence	Films
Radio	Publications and Displays
Leaflets	Special Operations

In the separate sections, branches, and subsections of PWD, some were headed by British, others by Americans. Whenever a Britisher headed a section, his deputy invariably was an American and vice versa. This practice tended to force the personnel involved to think, to plan, and to act in concert, as an inter-allied team, rather than as representatives of civilian or military agencies of this or that country.

Another characteristic of the organization and the manner of utilization of personnel in Europe has to do with the source and other features of the manner of assignment of personnel. Propaganda personnel were assigned to the theater by the British Army, PID, MOI, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and by the following American services: the Army, OWI, and OSS. Some were members of the regular army, others reserve personnel, some were career public servants,

and still others, civilians volunteering to work in civilian agencies for the duration of the war.

Assignments to specific tasks both at headquarters and to field units were made on the basis of what was believed to be the qualifications of the individual irrespective of his or her civilian-military status and, within reasonable limits, without great regard to military-rank status of personnel. For example, loudspeaker teams, composed of an OWI civilian linguist and an American or British military technician, often were assigned to support front-line military operations. Personnel involved in such actions frequently did not realize the different organizational affiliations and in some instances even the ranks of their colleagues.

In the separate American army groups and field armies special staff sections were organized to coordinate the staff planning and operational problems of waging psychological warfare. To these army groups and field armies were assigned field units known as "mobile radio broadcasting companies." The organization of these companies was the result of hasty improvisation in the US in 1943 and 1944. In all, five such companies were activated during the war and sent to Europe, the first being sent to the Italian front and the last four to the Northwest Europe front.

The separate army groups and field armies seldom found it advantageous to keep the companies intact. Experience demonstrated that the most effective manner of utilizing the personnel was to dispatch personnel and teams on detached duty to specific locations or to certain units for certain designated operations. When the operation for which they were assigned was completed the personnel involved were returned to the parent company for assignment elsewhere.

Psychological Warfare in the War against Japan

In the Pacific area in the war against Japan, there were several separate US military commands or subcommands and in each the type of psychological warfare organization that emerged during the war differed from that in other areas in several important respects. In one command, the South Pacific (COMSOPAC), which was merged with the Southwest Pacific Area Command in June 1944, personnel of American civilian agencies (OSS and OWI) were refused clearance for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in the area of COMSOPAC for a psychological warfare planning staff or for operational personnel to engage in propaganda operations. Admiral Halsey, the area commander, simply did not want to have anything to do with psychological warfare. The only propaganda operations ever conducted in the area under his command were the improvised, largely uncoordinated, efforts of enthusiastic Japanese language and intelligence personnel desirous of capturing a larger number of Japanese prisoners for interrogation purposes.

In the Southwest Pacific Area, under General MacArthur, a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was established in June 1944, just as the headquarters of this command began drafting its final plans for the reconquest of the Philippines. At the headquarters a quasi-special staff section (actually called a branch) was established under the direct supervision of the Military Secretary to the Commanding General. In this unique setup the Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch enjoyed direct access to the commanding general of the theater.

Within the headquarters planning staff the psychological warfare personnel were divided about equally between military officers and OWI civilians, with the military personnel, as time went on, assuming an increasingly dominant role, and

with the OWI agency serving largely as a major source of needed equipment and special supplies required in propaganda output. There was little, if any, attempt made to establish a highly integrated staff of the type that emerged in Europe.

In the lower echelons of this command—in the Sixth US and the Eighth US Armies — special teams composed largely of military personnel were dispatched on limited liaison-type assignments from the theater psychological warfare staff agency. Where coordination or supervision of the psychological warfare teams were attempted by the lower echelons, it was usually through the intelligence section (G2) rather than through the operations section (G3) of the command involved.

In the Central Pacific Command (CINCPOA), under Admiral Nimitz, psychological warfare activities as a recognized coordinated instrument of military operations was even later in coming into being. Notwithstanding indifference and lack of understanding of the nature of psychological warfare operations by top-echelon staff personnel, small-scale, uncoordinated, unsupervised propaganda attacks were tried as improvisations by intelligence personnel in nearly every military campaign in the Central Pacific area where American units of regimental size or larger were involved.

An OWI outpost in Honolulu provided some logistic support to division and corps military operations. Standard appeal leaflets were prepared in limited numbers in advance of actual landings and were carried to the scenes where they were later dropped on enemy forces. Loudspeaker equipment was often assembled and improvised on-the-spot broadcasts were made to Japanese troops by division language personnel and even on rare occasions by Japanese prisoners of war. The success attained on such occasions was such as to win a slow but grudging respect from military commanders for this type of military operation.

Late in 1944 or early 1945 the joint intelligence center JICPOA at Nimitz's headquarters set up a small planning staff to plan propaganda operations against Japanese troops. Personnel assigned to the JICPOA Psychological Warfare Section, with few exceptions, were composed exclusively of young navy or army officers who had studied the Japanese language in military-sponsored schools as a part of their previous service experience.

During the Okinawa campaign (1 April – July 1945) the Tenth US Army was supported by a small psychological warfare team dispatched from this Central Pacific Headquarters in Hawaii. This team was small in number and inadequately supported by its own intelligence staff, and as a consequence was able to engage in only the most general type of planned propaganda activity. There was no one on the Tenth Army Staff immediately responsible for psychological warfare operations. The Army G2 served as the spokesman when psychological warfare interests were involved, often with little coordination or liaison with the psychological warfare team on temporary duty with the Army. In addition to the activities of the formal psychological warfare organization within the Army, on several occasions corps and division intelligence personnel improvised psychological warfare attacks for use against the Japanese enemy.

It was just 5 days before the surrender of Japan that the Central Pacific Command reached the decision that psychological warfare was a sufficiently potent support weapon to deserve the status of a special headquarters branch. Accordingly, a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) was established at Nimitz's headquarters. Had the war continued much longer surely a much larger organization would have come into being, and thus psychological warfare might have attained

even greater recognition in a command headquarters where naval personnel predominated.

In the Southeast Asia Command the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten, desired to create a psychological warfare organization and program modeled after that of General Eisenhower's in SHAEF. This would have meant, among other things, a British chief for psychological warfare, with an American deputy and alternately a British and an American as head of the various subsections. However, because of differing concepts on political matters, such as the problem of colonialism, the US did not deem it wise to become directly associated with British propaganda output in South and Southeast Asia.

Owing to these differences in political orientation personnel in OWI, the US State Department, and American military personnel in the Southeast Asia Area Command refused to become members of a joint British-American psychological warfare effort. Furthermore, although Southeast Asia continued throughout the war to be an area of great strategic importance to the US, as compared to other regions it was not one where large numbers of American military personnel were involved.

The American military activity in the area was largely centered in North Burma. Here an OWI psychological warfare team was organized to support the military reconquest of that land. In addition to the OWI information personnel who were given the mission of inducing the various Burmese racial groups to cooperate with the allies, a psychological warfare team was organized for the purpose of inducing Japanese soldiers to lay down their weapons. The members of that team were composed almost exclusively of OWI civilians, ably assisted by a group of Japanese prisoners of war.*

In China, even though American political and military interests were great, military operations did not involve a large number of American personnel. The type of psychological warfare organization that arose was similar to, but not identical with, that which emerged in Burma. OWI provided the bulk of the personnel and most of the equipment used in the propaganda effort. The major difference between the program in China and that in Burma would appear to be this. In China a larger number of military personnel were directly involved, and during the later stages of the war a coordinating committee was established to oversee operations. An Army field-grade officer was assigned as chairman of the coordinating committee.

Number of Personnel Involved

It is not possible to give more than an informed guess as to the number of Americans, civilian and military personnel, involved in the psychological warfare efforts in the separate military theaters or subareas during World War II. In the original group of Psychological Warfare personnel that landed in North Africa, not more than 40 Americans were involved. Including natives, who were employed later to assist in the effort, nearly 1000 men were employed in various psychological warfare and information capacities in North Africa. In the SHAEF psychological warfare organization probably not more than 600 men were employed. The number engaged in similar work in the Southwest Pacific area probably did not exceed 200, exclusive of natives assigned to purely housekeeping functions. In Burma and China it is estimated that about 80 Americans in the two areas combined

* See "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War" and "Personnel Problems of the OWI Assam Psywar Team" in a later section of this chapter.

were involved in the purely military phase of the psychological warfare effort. The work of these men was supplemented by that of an undetermined number of indigenous personnel. In the Central Pacific area, not counting intelligence personnel devoting only part time to psychological warfare work, probably not over 25 individuals were engaged in planning and operational activities in psychological warfare at any one time prior to 1 August 1945. The number of individuals employed in the Overseas Branch of OWI is not known to the writer. But it is evident from an examination of the facts that the number involved in the World War II worldwide psychological warfare program is insignificant when compared to the many millions engaged in the more conventional type of military action.

Summary

The major lesson relative to psychological warfare organization to be learned from a discussion of American World War II experience would appear to be this. There was little preplanning. Most of the organizations that emerged during the war were based on hasty improvisations. In no single instance did the personnel involved come to have a real sense that the organization of which he was a part was all that it might have been. The American experience, indeed the free world's experience, in the use of psychological warfare is limited. Thus it is necessary to recognize the dynamic character of psychological warfare organizations and the fact that there is an ever-present necessity for further observations in order to learn how to organize an effort more effectively to accomplish the various missions undertaken or assigned.

POST-WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS

By W. E. D.

A number of significant developments that have occurred since the close of World War II are believed to be well designed to increase the effectiveness of the American foreign information effort.

Little more than 10 years have elapsed since the end of World War II. In this period many changes have taken place in the organization and personnel of the US agencies engaged in foreign information and psychological warfare activities. In a few short pages it is impossible to do more than to describe rather crisply some of the more important of these changes, with little discussion of the conflicting political pressures — domestic and foreign — that have led to the alterations in organizational structure and the increased or decreased emphasis on continued propaganda output that has occurred from time to time.

OWI Liquidated — 1945

President Truman on 31 August 1945, 2 days prior to the formal surrender of Japan, by Executive Order 9608, established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) in the Department of State and transferred to it the overseas information functions of OWI and the information activities of CIAA. The executive order authorized the Secretary of State to continue within the Department of State such foreign information functions as he considered necessary, to abolish any he thought desirable, or to transfer any to other executive agencies.

The order also provided for the liquidation of OWI and IIIS by 31 December 1945. In the meantime the Secretary of State was to study the problem of continuing a foreign information program and to recommend a solution to the President.

William Benton (later Senator from Connecticut) was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and as such was made the responsible head of the new IIIS. Benton drew most of the key personnel for the new agency from OWI and CIAA. Among the major tasks facing him in his new office were these: to win congressional understanding and approval for a new peacetime propaganda service including the necessary funds with which to operate; to gain from top-echelon and rank-and-file members of the Department of State a sympathetic understanding of the requirements of the new service; and to establish effective liaison, adapted to peacetime conditions, with responsible intelligence-collecting and policy-making officers both inside and outside the Department of State.

As a result of the study requested by President Truman, the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established in the Department of State in early 1946. The activities of this office remained largely unchanged until 1948; however, its name was later changed to the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange.

When funds were being considered for the 1948 fiscal year (FY48) Representative Taber, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the 80th Congress, called attention to the fact that Congress was being asked to appropriate money for an agency for which there was no enabling legislation. As a result of congressional action, funds for the overseas information program were drastically curtailed. However, thanks to the efforts of Senator Smith of New Jersey and Congressman (now Senator) Mundt of South Dakota, the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 was passed. Funds appropriated for a foreign information service for FY49 were then more than doubled.

US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948

The Smith-Mundt Act directed the Secretary of State "to provide for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad." The administration of the act was placed under the International Information Administration (IIA) of the Department of State.

With the passage of the 1948 act the major objective of the information service became that of promoting abroad understanding and trust of the US. This line was undertaken largely as a response to the Soviet campaign of vilification of the US and distortion of US international intentions. This objective was interpreted as a gigantic advertising campaign, carried on for the most part by the broadside telling of America's story. However, by 1950 it came to be recognized that the advertising method adopted to tell the "American Story" sometimes overwhelmed and confused people abroad, not infrequently leading to increased resentment rather than better understanding.

In 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the emphasis of the program shifted sharply from a "full and fair picture" of this country to one with more definite objectives. Programs were designed specifically to deter further aggression, to help maintain the stability and cohesion of the countries of the non-Communist world, and to inspire in them confidence in their mutual capacity to meet any eventualities. With this change came the development of a system of priorities among countries in programing and a highly specialized approach to each country or area and to the various social or economic groups within them. In

short, an attempt was made to adjust the content and the techniques of the program to needs growing out of the widened schism in the world.

The shifts in emphasis through the years have been reflected in changes in the organizational pattern of the agency principally responsible for administering the information program. Major changes occurred in a reorganization in January 1952. From a position subordinate to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, IIA was reconstituted as a relatively autonomous unit of the department. The role of Assistant Secretary in the program became essentially that of a channel through which foreign policy and information policy could be coalesced. Authority over operations formerly divided among the general manager of the information program, the Assistant Secretary, and the regional bureaus of the department was concentrated in the Administrator.

Foreign Information Activities of Other Executive Agencies

With the capitulation of Germany and Japan in 1945 and the occupation of their territories, the US military authorities assumed two major functions with respect to the political reorientation of former enemy people: the control of information activities in these former enemy areas, and the dissemination in these areas of information and propaganda from the US. The control of information services was historically, if not logically, a natural outgrowth of combat psychological warfare operations in Europe, but somewhat less so in Japan.

The control of "information services" in former Nazi areas was placed under the jurisdiction of an Information Control Division (ICD) with the dissolution of PWD/SHAEF. Much of the original work undertaken by ICD/USFET (later OMGUS) stemmed directly from planning undertaken earlier by PWD. Information control for Germany and Austria combined three related goals: destruction of the Nazi propaganda machine; guided reconstruction of German information services; and fostering of desired ideas and attitudes among the German people. The attainment of these objectives was sought through censorship of German media of communications, by a reorganization and restaffing of German information activities, and by means of a positive Allied information and propaganda program. In the course of time many of these activities were phased out, and the remaining functions undertaken by the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). One of the most effective of the information activities sponsored by the US in occupied Germany is discussed in the next case.

US information control differed sharply in Japan from that in Germany. There were fewer American propaganda specialists with wartime psychological warfare experience in the Far East struggle available for postwar service in Japan. Further a Japanese government was still in being after the war and many actions that were deemed desirable could be carried out through orders transmitted by Americans to the appropriate Japanese officials. The Civil Information and Education (CI&E) section of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) headquarters put its main emphasis on breaking the connections established during and prior to the war between the Japanese government and the various media of communications. In addition CI&E launched a number of propaganda campaigns to support specific objectives of the occupation.

In the military establishment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological warfare ceased with the end of World War II hostilities. Several months after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, in June 1950, the Department of the Army created the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special

staff section. The duties of this office are largely planning and advisory in character. The Department of the Air Force later established a Psychological Warfare Division in the Air Force headquarters' Directorate of Plans. This division was a relatively small one and after several months in being was renamed the Subsidiary Plans Division. Planning for the future use of psychological warfare in the US Navy headquarters involved even fewer individuals, the task being entrusted to a branch of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

In addition to the three military services and the Department of State's IIA, at various times in the post–World War II era the following US agencies operating in the international field also possessed their own overt international information service: the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) (of the Department of State); the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA); and Mutual Security Administration (MSA).

Coordinating the Efforts of Various Agencies

The seemingly ever-growing tendency for the various agencies interested in international operations to engage directly in propaganda and information activities, as well as the increasing awareness that acts of governments themselves carry great psychological warfare implications, led to the demand for some coordinating machinery on the US government executive level. Accordingly on 17 August 1950 President Truman announced the establishment of a national psychological strategy board that in time came to be known as PSB. At the time of its establishment it was stated that the mission of PSB would be to coordinate "foreign information and psychological strategy in situations where joint action by more than one agency of the Government is required in this field."

The original PSB was in fact only an interdepartmental committee. It was composed of the following: a representative of the Secretary of Defense; a representative of JCS; a representative of the Director of CIA; and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs serving as chairman. Representatives of a few other agencies sat with the board as observers and advisers. In late 1951 a new PSB was established, this one presided over by a specially appointed chairman and with the following members: the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director of MSA. PSB was given a small operating staff. The members of the original board on the establishment of the new one became the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The precise line of demarcation of authority between the new PSB and the coordinating committee was never clearly defined. In general, however, the principal functions of PSB seemed to lie in the planning for long-term objectives, whereas the mission of the interdepartmental committee lay in the direction and determination of current psychological operations and policies.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett, who headed both the original PSB and the Interdepartmental Committee, has written concerning their achievements:

> "Both did some good in coordinating strategy and operations. Both have thus far fallen far short of being cure-alls. In retrospect, it appears that both have attempted too much Washington masterminding of complex tactical problems that could best be solved by first-rate men in the field."[12]

After General Eisenhower became President he appointed a special committee to prepare recommendations for reorganizing the foreign information and psychological warfare effort of the US government. This committee was headed by

William H. Jackson, Chairman, with C. D. Jackson, White House adviser, as one of several members. Following the report of this committee two major changes were accomplished. PSB was abolished and replaced by an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), with membership comparable to PSB, but with a revised and smaller supporting staff.

US Information Agency Established — 1953

A second and equally important step in the reorganization of the US foreign information program was the creation of the US Information Agency (USIA) on 1 August 1953. This agency was given independent status, with the director reporting to the President through the National Security Council. The agency was made responsible for all US information activities overseas, except for those that might fall under the jurisdiction of a military commander in time of armed conflict (Fig. 2). Thus information activities formerly carried out by IIA and TCA of the Department of State and by MSA were transferred to USIA. The administration of the Exchange of Persons Program was retained by the Department of State.

The activities of the USIA, although not identical with, nevertheless closely follow, those of the predecessor agency, IIA of the Department of State. The major media of communications employed in reaching overseas targets are shortwave radio (VOA); press material radioed to Public Affairs officers overseas, and placed by them in local newspapers; films; and information center service, including circulation of books and the supplying of reference material. To ensure that the agency speaks with authority on foreign policy matters it receives from the Secretary of State complete, day-by-day guidance on matters involving US foreign policy.

Recent Developments

In the more than 3 years that have elapsed since the establishment of USIA as an independent agency a number of developments have occurred that are of great significance in the field of international communications, propaganda, and psychological warfare. Many of these developments occurred as the result of efforts to correct deficiencies in the manner in which the US foreign information effort was being planned and administered. Many of these changes suggest that some of the criticisms of past efforts, implicit in some of the accounts appearing in this casebook, are no longer valid.

Recent Developments with Respect to Administration and Coordination of USIA Effort. A number of significant steps have been taken to increase the status of the Director of the agency within the Executive branch of the government and to improve the effectiveness of liaison and coordination between USIA and other agencies, either directly or indirectly concerned with the administration of the foreign information program. During the first half of 1955 the Director of USIA was designated a member of OCB and the agency was given representation on OCB's staff. Thus the agency became a full-fledged participant in the deliberations of OCB. Along with this important development, the Director was invited to become an observer at the meetings of the highly important National Security Council.

In addition to the formal recognition of importance accorded to USIA, a number of administrative and procedural arrangements have been undertaken that add greatly to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. The Director and key members of his staff have met regularly once a month with the President. Close and continuing liaison has been established at various echelons between officers in



Fig. 2—Organization of US Information Agency
Source: "*First Review of Operations, United States Information Agency,*" August–December 1953, p 22.

the agency and appropriate personnel in the Departments of State and Defense and in such *ad hoc* agencies operating in the field of foreign relations as the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA).

Further evidence of the far-reaching changes that signify the new importance attached to effective planning and implementation of a foreign information program is the designation of one top-level presidential assistant to devote his major effort to this field of endeavor. A number of prominent men, well known for past accomplishments in the field, have been assigned this duty by President Eisenhower. These have included: C. D. Jackson, a World War II civilian deputy director of PWD/SHAEF, and a member of the special committee, appointed by the President in 1953 to prepare recommendations with respect to future psychological warfare efforts; Nelson Rockefeller, World War II director of CIAA; and, William H. Jackson, a former deputy director of CIA, and chairman of the 1953 Presidential Commission on Foreign Information.

As a result of top-level planning and the recognition accorded the effectiveness of foreign information activities, four individuals from the Office of the Assistant Director for Policy and Programs were assigned as working members of the US delegation to the conferences held in Geneva in 1955. The idea incorporating the President's "Summit" proposal that the US and the Soviet Union agree to mutual aerial reconnaissance and open exchange of military blueprints actually originated during preconference deliberations conducted by Presidential assistant Nelson Rockefeller.

Personnel from key overseas areas, as well as from Washington, were in attendance at Geneva during both the Summit conference and subsequent Foreign Ministers Conferences. In addition to their advisory functions, such personnel performed two other important duties: They directed the flow of information from the American delegates to the world's press and provided on-the-spot news coverage to US posts around the world. This development truly marked a wide departure from the practices followed at prior international conferences.

Another relatively recent development that has led to the improvement of liaison and coordination between separate officers within USIA as well as with outside agencies and departments in Washington was the move of the VOA's studios from New York to Washington, completed in November 1954. This move, directed by the Congress, greatly improved integration of the broadcasting services within the agency and made possible closer liaison with other governmental departments.

Improved Facilities For Intelligence, Research, and Evaluation. During the latter half of 1954 the Office of Research and Intelligence was created in order to provide facts and analyses about foreign conditions and issues to both planners and output personnel. This new office inaugurated a greatly expanded program of internal research on world wide Communist activities, including analyses of their current propaganda "line." A widened program of public opinion polls was undertaken to provide policy planners more informed estimates of peoples' reactions, anxieties, etc., in foreign areas.

"Country plans" for every key area in the world have been revised on the basis of the agency's restatement of mission and new estimates of the situation abroad. Objectives in each area and country have been stated with greater clarity and simplicity. These are changed as circumstances dictate.

Developments with Respect to Evaluation and Improved Operational Efficiency. In order to assist and advise the Director of USIA on the proper management of the agency's resources, at home and abroad, a small independent inspection staff was

established in 1954. A Broadcast Advisory Committee and a Committee on Books Abroad continue to advise relevant sections of the agency on specialized activities that come under their separate jurisdiction. The US Advisory Commission on Information is the principal channel for reports of effectiveness to Congress. This commission, consisting of five citizens, is charged by the Congress with the task of making an independent assessment of the foreign information services of the US government.

Expanded Operations. The expansion of output operations of USIA have kept pace with developments in the field of expanded internal services, the development of better planning facilities, and the establishment of improved liaison with all other government departments. VOA, the radio voice of the agency, has expanded operations to include transmissions in 41 separate languages and to 56 or more foreign countries or autonomous areas. In recent months President Eisenhower's pronouncements on "Atoms for Peace," "Mutual Inspection for Peace," and similar themes, have been highlighted in output in all media operations.

The number of program hours broadcast to the Soviet Union has reached 79 daily. Programs in Cambodian, Hindi, Tamil, and English, addressed to crucial areas in south and southeast Asia and Africa, have been added. Programs suitable for rebroadcast over local facilities are prepared and sent abroad to be aired.

Among the more significant recent developments, however, are these: Films that are especially suitable for release over local television outlets have been prepared and sent to overseas areas where that medium of communication is increasing in importance. Private groups, particularly universities and private industry, have been encouraged to undertake or expand foreign operations in line with information objectives of the agency. Also there has been a greatly expanded utilization of exhibits and participation in trade fairs by the US government and private interests.*

The increase in the use of films for overseas television outlets was occasioned in part by requests from abroad for coverage of special events in the US. Material of this type has been in widespread demand so that, by the end of 1955, films were being sent to more than 100 stations overseas. In order to increase the opportunities for information dissemination by this new medium, the USIA has provided, on request, technical assistance and advice to local television stations abroad.

The Office of Private Cooperation had been in existence for quite some time prior to the creation of an independent USIA, but it has only been in recent months that its efforts have begun to bear real fruit. All manner of American groups, extending from corporate cities through veteran and civic organizations to private industry, have undertaken projects in furtherance of our international information objectives. Foreign cities have been saluted with appropriate musical programs, etc., by American cities. The Veterans of Foreign Wars and Rotary International have purchased and placed in foreign schools a 99-volume specially selected *American Bookshelf*. Local chapters of various industrial and advertising councils have been induced to undertake projects to inform peoples abroad of US national aims and policies, and many magazine publishing firms have made unsold copies of their journals available for use by people abroad. In addition some American firms have been induced to see that these magazines reach a foreign reader.

The story of American participation in trade fairs abroad has been given separate treatment in this casebook, and therefore little need be added here. However, the

* See "The USA Goes to the Fair" in Chap. 8.



*This is not a true picture of the organization of the Department of Navy. The Navy is organized horizontally whereas the Army and Air Force are organized vertically on the General Staff System.

Fig. 3—US Organization fo

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

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Fig. 3—US Organization for Psychological Warfare as of 1954

— — — Units having a psychological warfare function

employment of specially prepared exhibits is another matter. There have been exhibits established at these fairs, but the ones that have received the greatest acclaim have been those mounted on wheels and carried directly to the people. "Atoms for Peace" exhibits were widely shown in Yugoslavia, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Japan, India, Pakistan, Italy, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Denmark in 1955 and 1956.

A photographic exhibit, "Family of Man," selected and arranged by the Museum of Modern Art, was shown widely during the latter half of 1955 and 1956 in Germany, Mexico, Guatemala, France, Belgium, Holland, England, and Italy. The exhibit in Berlin is reputed to have drawn many visitors from the Communist-controlled East Sector. Along with television and trade fairs, exhibits are rapidly becoming an important channel for impressing foreign audiences with the peaceful intentions and non-warlike objectives of the American people and their allies.

RIAS: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN PSYWAR OUTPOST*

By Edmond Taylor

The American radio outlet in Berlin, "Radio in the American Sector," has proved to be a valuable adjunct to the American effort in the propaganda struggle against communist forces of East Germany.

RIAS, the US-sponsored "Radio In the American Sector" of Berlin, . . . has long been recognized not only as the most successful of all official US operations in the foreign information field but also as the epitome of dynamic "psychological warfare." Its aggressively anti-Communist programs are particularly admired by the more advanced American devotees of *Realpolitik*, and their effectiveness has been certified by such diverse authorities as Stewart Alsop; the *New Leader;* Representative John Taber, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee (who stunned State Department witnesses at a budget hearing last spring with the remark, "We don't need to spend much time on RIAS; we all know what a wonderful job it's doing"); Fulton Lewis, Jr.; and Gerhard Eisler, who, as East German propaganda chief, considered it necessary to spend more than RIAS's total annual budget of some $3 million just to denounce the station in the Soviet Zone.

Its Audience

There is fairly substantial evidence for believing that about ten million of the Soviet Zone's eighteen million inhabitants listen to RIAS regularly and that it is the favorite station of between eighty and ninety-five per cent of these listeners. In addition, it has a substantial "eavesdropping" audience in West Germany, and — though it broadcasts only in German — in several of the satellite countries as well. An American diplomat in Warsaw has reported the appearance in a circus there of a clown whose anti-social behavior was explained to the spectators by "RIAS" printed on his shirt.

RIAS broadcasts have forced authorities in East Germany to take action on a variety of issues ranging from restoring holidays and granting Christmas bonuses to workers, to installing ventilators in a smoky factory and cleaning up a filthy washroom. The public prosecutor in an East German town was once so moved

* From "RIAS: The Voice East Germany Believes," an account in *The Reporter*, 10 Nov 53, pp 28–32. Reproduced with permission of *The Reporter*, copyright holder.

by a RIAS political soap opera about a Communist public prosecutor that he emulated its hero in releasing two prisoners he was interrogating and escaping with them to West Berlin. The station also deserves a large share of credit for the phenomenal success of the US government's food-package campaign in Berlin last summer.

RIAS and the Uprisings of June 1953

Although RIAS did not instigate the mass uprising of workers in east Berlin last June (1953), its special labor programs had been working up a mood of rebellion in East German factories since 1950, and when the storm finally broke in the Soviet sector of the city, the station was ready to exploit it. Sober American and Allied observers are agreed that RIAS broadcasts were the main factor in converting a local riot overnight into what was virtually a national revolution throughout the Soviet Zone — a revolution from which the discredited Communist regime has still not fully recovered. No "psychological warriors" in history have ever furnished a more dramatic illustration of their art.

If RIAS were merely a relay station for the standardized broadcasts of the Voice of America, or even if it were closely responsive to the guidance of the master strategists in Washington, no particular lesson could be drawn from its success — as compared with the inconclusive record of most other government information programs — except that East Germany is an unusually fertile field for political propaganda. Actually, only four per cent of RIAS's programs are relayed from the Voice, and ninety-three per cent are produced locally by the station's staff of 480 Germans and 6 Americans. As to guidance from Washington, the staff makes a reasonably conscientious effort to hew to the official line, but since directives from headquarters reach Berlin from two days to two months after the events that inspired them, RIAS has to develop most of its own strategy as it goes along.

Its Operational Methods

Thus, even after making substantial allowance for the unique position of Berlin as a western bridgehead behind the Iron Curtain and for the special psychological climate in East Germany, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the superior results achieved by RIAS over other information activities conducted by the US government — and perhaps over those of all other governments — can only be explained by examining the differences between its operational methods and attitudes and those of other such enterprises.

As a former member of the psychological warfare fraternity myself, I had long suspected that this was the case, but it was only recently when I returned to Berlin as a visiting journalist that I was able to measure the gap that separates the staff of RIAS from other practitioners of the same art — American or foreign — and to understand how much of the station's success can be traced directly to its respect for certain homely aspects of human reality that tend to be disregarded, both in our social science laboratories and in the Orwellian world of contemporary bureaucracy.

The relationship first became clear to me in a conversation with Gordon Ewing, a forty-year-old native of upstate New York, who was the political director of RIAS for several years and now runs the whole organization.

We were alone in his office in the semi-deserted building late on a Saturday afternoon, and an early fog was already blurring the gaunt skeletons of the surrounding ruins. Ewing, a tall, slow-spoken man with a small mustache, used to

be an English instructor in a Midwestern university and he still looks the part. He was reminiscing about his role in the events of last June. RIAS, he explained, had not called on the East German population to revolt, because that is not its style. But on the night of June 16, when he broadcast an appeal for a general strike that had been put out by the West German trade unions and accompanied the appeal with commentaries prepared by his German staff stressing the ineptitude of the East German police and the successful mob tactics of the Berlin rioters, Ewing was well aware that he would be pouring gasoline on the flames.

Policy Direction

Ewing had no instructions from Washington and no possibility of getting them in time to do any good. He knew that if RIAS went too far it might conceivably start a world war. On the other hand, if its broadcasts were not militant enough he would certainly be blamed for missing the best opportunity to shake Communist rule in East Germany that had arisen since 1945. Neither of these two considerations, however, was uppermost in his mind when he faced and finally made his courageous and lonely decision.

"The thing that made me hesitate the most," Ewing confessed, "was the thought of the massacre that would take place if those Russian tanks really started firing into the crowds."

This is the kind of purely sentimental consideration with which our neo-Machiavellians have small patience, but the experience of RIAS demonstrates that it is sound strategy not merely to seem, but actually to be, a little sentimental at times. Over the years RIAS has systematically tempered its subversion of Communist authority with a humane regard for the safety of its listeners. At times it has deliberately passed up opportunities to make trouble for the East German government when its staff did not think the political gain would be worth the cost in human suffering.

Instead of reading its audience sermons on the need for resisting Communist tyranny at all costs, it gives them technical instructions on how to resist it without endangering their lives. Instead of calling for a superhuman effort to overthrow the regime, it shows the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone how, with a little courage and a lot of ingenuity, they can band together to win limited victories that can make life under a totalitarian regime a little less harsh for them. The result is that RIAS listeners have developed great confidence in the station, and this is precisely what made Ewing's decision on the night of June 16 so dramatic.

"An occasion like that gives you a terrible sense of responsibility," Ewing remarked in his quiet, slightly hesitant voice. "It's all right for the advanced psychological warriors to tell you to give them both barrels, but when you know that your listeners will actually go out and do what you tell them, it makes you think."

The Calculated Risk in Psywar

For all his scruples and hesitations, there was nothing Hamlet-like about Ewing's eventual decision to broadcast the story of the east Berlin riots in a way certain to generalize the revolt throughout the Soviet Zone. This time, the calculated risk had to be taken, and Ewing took it deliberately. He was sure that the Soviet forces would not invade west Berlin, and he believed that they would not fire into the east Berlin crowds if they could possibly help it. He realized that eventually the revolt would be crushed, and that inevitably there would be many victims, but

he felt confident that the spirit of resistance in East Germany would be immeasurably strengthened by even a temporary victory over the Communist regime.

Only history can tell whether the losses of the uprising — those who were killed at the time and those arrested in the subsequent repression — were justified by the gains. When you raise this question in talking with the RIAS staff, however, you get a great deal of light on the kind of men who are successful at persuading other men to risk their freedom and even their lives. In evaluating the results of the June uprisings, RIAS staff members may refer in passing to the important political objectives that they think were achieved — they seem to have no doubts on this score. But they are more inclined to talk about such intangible gains as the reawakened sense of human solidarity and the increased sense of personal dignity the East Germans won in their heroic struggle. As G. M. Gert, Ewing's enthusiastic American deputy, puts it, "The East Germans proved to themselves that men can be men, even under a totalitarian dictatorship."

One might be a bit dubious about this tendency to invoke the ethical implications of anti-Communist resistance, particularly in connection with other men's sacrifices, if it were not so obviously sincere, or if it were primarily the RIAS vocabulary of public rather than of interoffice communication. In fact, one of the remarkable differences between RIAS men and most other political propagandists I have met is that whereas the latter talk among themselves in terms of interchangeable priorities and objectives and reserve their moral abstractions for public occasions, at RIAS the process is reversed: There is a great deal of talk inside the office about human dignity, talk that is finally implemented in broadcasts which stress better factory conditions or how to deal with Soviet tanks.

The RIAS Staff

RIAS is staffed by passionate political idealists, naively dedicated democratic activists. This is particularly true of the youthful German staff which sets the emotional tone of the whole organization. But their idealism is disciplined by several factors that save them from becoming merely political fanatics like their opponents. One of these factors is the almost religious respect that RIAS men have not merely for truth in the abstract but for plain facts.

All RIAS men like to think of themselves primarily as journalists, and in many ways they are more like old-fashioned American crusading newspapermen than official propagandists. They are forever working some political point into a musical program, a sports event, or a variety show, but the news, in their eyes, is sacred. The station's exceptionally full program of world news is as balanced in selection as that of the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Like all good journalists, the RIAS staffers realize that telling the truth involves more than avoiding deliberate lies.

"In this business," Wolfgang Kohl, RIAS's Soviet Zone editor, explained to me, "it's the little things that count. It's not enough just to tell people that Communism is terrible. You have to tell *how* it is terrible, and you must be right, down to the number of potatoes in the prisoners' soup. But sensing the exact mood of the people is just as important as accuracy about material details, and when the mood changes you have to alter your approach. A false emotional note shakes the listener's confidence as much as a wrong fact."

Kohl, a pudgy, rather Latin-looking veteran of Hitler's Wehrmacht, is particularly attuned to the mood of the Soviet Zone because he used to live there

himself. In fact, he once wrote his scripts at home, with his wife smuggling them into west Berlin in her blouse. Like other RIAS editors, Kohl is greatly helped in his work by the two to three thousand letters the station receives every month from listeners in the Soviet Zone, and even more by a large number of visitors from the East who risk arrest by slipping into RIAS for a quiet talk whenever they have the chance. Some of these visitors occupy strategic positions in the East German government, and it is not uncommon for RIAS to broadcast the full details of a closed party meeting or a hush-hush official conference within a few hours after it has taken place.

This intimate contact with its listeners enables the station's staff to keep constantly in touch with political reality behind the Iron Curtain. But more than that, it helps them maintain the feel for human reality which both bureaucrats and political idealists are prone to lose. As a result, the people at RIAS often understand better than some sober American statesmen the restraints anti-Communist leadership must impose upon itself to be effective and the adjustments it must always be ready to make to changes in the political climate. They know that there are times, such as last June, when you have to take risks to exploit success, and times when you will lose the confidence of your followers if you keep urging them forward into danger.

They realize that freedom can seem a cold word unless it is warmed by real human sympathy and an understanding of human weakness. They know that even the most implacable enemies of Communism sometimes grow weary of purely negative opposition, that they need something to love as well as something to hate, and that the average man is reluctant to destroy what his own hands have helped to build, even if he has been forced to build it. Above all, they have learned that American nationalism is not a cause for which Europeans will gladly die, that to influence other men you must be willing to be influenced by them, and that you must adjust your objectives to their needs rather than call upon them to adjust their interests to your cause.

The Strategy of Constructive Subversion

Out of all these lessons, RIAS has developed over the years a curious, flexible, almost Gandhian strategy of constructive subversion, a technique of open conspiracy against which the Communists seem to have no effective psychological defense. By constant probing, it has discovered in the conscienceless East German regime areas of political sensitivity that amount almost to a sense of shame. When Eisler, shortly after his return to Germany, denied in a press conference that any German technicians had been shipped off to the Soviet Union, a member of the RIAS staff telephoned the post office in east Berlin to ask how he could mail a package to a mythical uncle who he explained had been deported to Moscow. A postal employee obligingly gave him full instructions. RIAS recorded and broadcast the whole conversation, and two days later Eisler publicly retracted his statement.

When directors of the official East German youth organization announced that there would be free and democratic elections for local chairmen of the organization throughout the Soviet Zone, RIAS did not call on its young listeners to boycott or sabotage the elections. Instead it instructed them to insist on electing chairmen who would respect the avowed aims of the group by giving them sports and wholesale entertainment instead of political indoctrination. Naturally, there

was a landslide for the RIAS-backed candidates. Then, when the Communist authorities attempted to invalidate the elections on various pretexts, RIAS attacked them so scathingly that they had to back down.

Time after time, RIAS has waged similar constructive yet insidiously dissolvent campaigns for limited social or economic objectives in East Germany; and time after time it has scored rapid, almost unbelievable victories, shamed the Communist authorities into keeping old promises, and frightened them out of undertaking new oppression — while winning the gratitude and confidence of its listeners.

It is hard to say whether this strategy of attacking Communism in terms of its own professed ideals and forcing the Communists to behave in an un-Communist way by seeming to take them at their word could be applied more generally in the broader framework of American foreign policy. Similarly, it is not easy to see how the organizational attitudes which are the secret of RIAS's phenomenal success in Germany can be adapted to the requirements of our foreign information program as a whole. At the very least, both these problems seem worth some serious study. . . .

THE FAR EAST REGIONAL PRODUCTION CENTER*

By Earl J. Wilson

To ensure more prompt and efficient production of American printed material a regional production center was established in Manila, in 1951, to serve the needs of the many Far East outposts of USIA.

When North Korean Communist forces knifed across the 38th parallel, American information personnel overseas in the Far East were still grappling with the gigantic task of seizing the psychological offensive in the face of a rapidly disintegrating political and military situation that was being fully and skillfully exploited by Communist propagandists.

Only a short time before had Congressional appropriations finally made available funds for the long overdue "Campaign of Truth." The outbreak of war found the entire program of the US Information Service in the difficult process of switching from "a full and fair picture of America" to a hard-hitting psychological offensive against communism.

Clearly the urgent need was to lose no time in reaching millions upon millions of Asians with the message. But how was this to be done? Part of the answer was found in the establishment of an organization called the Far East Regional Production Center at Manila, which has since become one of the most important single US psychological offensive weapons in Asia.

It was recognized that publications in great volume at the "rice roots" level of comprehension were required to reach the xenophobiac, illiterate, and antiforeign target of the newly awakened masses, and that to be fully effective such publications would mostly have to deal not only in local languages and dialects but also in familiar symbols and that many of them would have to appear purely indigenous if they were to gain acceptance.

Based on such reasoning, the theory of "regionalizing" and decentralization from the department [of State] gained favor and the RPC — as it came to be

* Original text prepared for Operation Research Office by the Chief Editor of the Far East Regional Production Center in 1955.

called — was set up in a quonset hut on the shores of Manila Bay. It consisted of a small editorial-technical staff of Americans, reinforced by Filipino artists, editors, and technicians, and of modern offset printing equipment.

During 1951 — the first full year of operation — more than 35 million finished publications were shipped out to the field posts!

It was quickly established that, owing to the increasing complexity of US propaganda, the department would have to give field operators the widest latitude in determining what type of publications would be most suitable and effective for their particular country. In other words it was decided, that although Washington would be responsible for over-all policy guidance, the field operator, under his mission chief, would have the last word in local execution.

RPC therefore was set up as a sort of "middleman" to service USIS operations in the Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya in three basic ways (in addition to the actual printing): (a) to adapt for the Far East "pilot models" of publications originally prepared in the department, (b) to assist posts with the preparation of publications, and, (c) to prepare RPC "pilot models" as well as periodicals that are all offered to the posts for adaptation, blanket acceptance, or rejection. Each post retains complete control over what publications will be distributed in that particular country.

Each post is entirely responsible for its own translations. RPC has no translation staff whatever. Using the photo-offset printing method makes this possible. Text from an English-language dummy is translated and typeset in each individual country, then pasted down over the original copy and airmailed to the RPC where the page is then photographed, printed, and shipped back to the post in bulk for distribution.

RPC is believed to be the first to operate in such a crisscross of languages and dialects on so wide and fast a scale. Material has been turned out in Burmese, Bicolano, Cambodian, Chinese, Cebuano, English, French, Hiligaynon, Indonesian, Ilongo, Ilocano, Korean, Laotian, Malayan, Tagalog, Thai, Tamil, Visayan, Vietnamese, and Pampangonese. Generally speaking, there is not one country in the area where just one language or dialect will suffice.

One of RPC's most popular and useful publications is a monthly magazine called the *Free World*. This is published in 11 languages with close to 400,000 copies produced. *Free World's* editing is unique in that it aims at putting out 11 *different* magazines to suit the linguistic and cultural patterns of the various racial groups, as well as being tailored to local political, economic, social, and military problems.

To achieve this RPC puts together in dummy form once a month what is termed the "base model" of the magazine with picture stories furnished by the department, by the posts, and by RPC's own roving photographer. In addition to the "base model" RPC sends out along with its monthly dummy a number of "optional" layouts, most of which are made from photographs furnished by the posts themselves.

By building up a large "bank" of "optional" stories in each country it is possible for the local operator to tear the base model apart in order to construct a more suitable finished product. The optional layouts are simply pasted down over the unwanted stories, the English text translated, typeset locally, and returned to RPC for printing.

At the same time surveys are under way that will undoubtedly result in some decentralizing of the printing of *Free World*, thus saving time and shipping costs, as well as entering the commercial field for maximum distribution and production

at minimum cost to the American government. *Free World* is reaching out. For example the Cambodian version of the *Free World* is the first magazine ever to be printed in Cambodian; the distribution of this periodical in the strategic Communist-threatened area has resulted in precipitating near riots among eager would-be readers.

Another RPC innovation is the weekly production of more than 250,000 copies of a wall sheet called the *World Photo Review*, which is also made up from photographs furnished by the department and the posts. Intended mainly for villages, and secondarily as a newspaper insert, this publication reaches untold millions and is published in some 13 languages. Again to mention Cambodia, the Buddhists there, for example, post the weekly sheet on some 9000 temple walls, opening up a huge mass audience heretofore virtually untouched except by the Communist-led Vietminh propagandists.

Each week, after photographs for the *World Photo Review* have been selected (on a basis of fundamental themes, policy guidance, current events, and human interest) a telegram containing the English captions and the space allotted for each is sent out to the nine posts.

This makes possible the immediate processing of the photographs themselves and the printing of the background color, while at the same time posts are translating, typesetting, and airmailing the captions back to the RPC for final printing.

World Photo Review week after week hammers away at certain basic themes thereby building stereotypes through the use of actual photographs. In addition to using the wall sheet in numerous schools for the teaching of current events, many posts utilize local newspapers, which in turn use the blank reverse side of *World Photo Review* for the printing of their own local picture page. The result of this is an indigenous-appearing local product.

RPC early discovered the rather obvious fact that it is much more difficult to deal in simplicities than in complexities. How it can be explained, for example, to an illiterate Thai farmer that his son is fighting in distant Korea for international peace through collective security, while the Communists din into his ears that his son has been sent to Korea to die for the American imperialists?

Consequently one of RPC's most successful illustrated pamphlets was written on the premise that the reader would know little of America, nothing of Russia, little of democracy, and nothing of communism. The pamphlet was aimed at the Filipino *tao*, with the intention of exploding the Communist myth parroted by the Huks, and to awakening him to the democratic concepts around him that he could easily identify with his own existence. Moreover, it was based on the best research available on present Filipino psychology.

This type of magazine is used, for example, by psychological warfare (civil affairs) officers of the Philippine army to explain page-by-page to barrio folk the dangers of communism. This technique has been especially effective when a village has been attacked by a Huk band. While the armed forces pursue the culprits, the civil affairs officers use the pamphlet to put in context the local action with the over-all danger from within and the threat of aggression from abroad.

One of the chief advantages of RPC is that it has the use of an independent plant that enables it to maintain control of capacity without having to get in line with customers in commercial plants who have long contracts for the printing of such things as cigar bands, soap wrappers, labels, etc. In a crisis, RPC's entire facilities can be turned full force on producing given material, often shipping out the completed publications in a matter of only a few weeks.

RPC publications are often the result of cooperation in a number of countries and in the department. One recent example was a cartoon book, *The Story of Doctor Liang*, which tells the story of a Chinese doctor who completed his medical education just after the Communists took over the country, and goes on to tell how he was drafted into the army, sent to Korea and finally captured by the UN forces. It is a true story, and Dr. Liang speaks of his gradual awakening to the Communist threat in his own words.

The basic material for this cartoon book was founded on information volunteered by prisoners of war in Korea. It was then put together as a text in the department and sent to the RPC, where it was illustrated as a cartoon book. Since its main target was the overseas Chinese, and since Hong Kong is the central translation center for Chinese, the finished dummy was channeled there. On completion of the Chinese text the book was offered to all posts.

To reach the mass audience of densely populated Asia takes, of course, millions on millions of publications. One of RPC's first efforts was a cartoon book, *When the Communists Came*. More than a million copies were printed in numerous languages and dialects of the Far East. These cartoon books, 1/8 inch thick, if placed in a single stack, would tower nearly 20 times as high as the Washington Monument.

And yet this represents but a mere scratch on the vast wall of ignorance, misunderstanding, and distortion that separates America from the peoples of Asia. The task of contacting and influencing these teeming millions is so vast as to stagger the imagination and to cost immense sums of money. However, new techniques are being explored that will probably lead to a certain amount of "reverse" decentralization making possible the stepping up of publication production far above present RPC limitations. This would involve the making of negatives and plates at the RPC for shipment to other countries for local printing of tailored publications that would enter commercial sale and become thereby self-perpetuating.

At the same time much progress is being made in restudying the "mass" and finding exactly what is meant by it, and what elements of the mass audience should be reached, and with what tools. Countries have been resurveyed in light of prime targets, and specialized publications are being developed to meet these needs. In all of this, RPC will unquestionably play an important part.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ENGAGED IN COLD WAR PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS*

By John Scott

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation compete with government propaganda agencies for audiences in Soviet dominated lands.

Radio Free Europe

While the Voice of America, an official agency of the US Government, is bound by certain diplomatic niceties, *Radio Free Europe* (RFE), privately financed and operated, is not. The principal objective of RFE is to reveal the Communist regimes in the worst possible light. Though the total volume of RFE operations is far

*From *Political Warfare: A Guide To Competitive Coexistence*, John Day Company, New York, 1955, pp 32–37. Reproduced with permission of the author and copyright holder.

smaller than that of the Voice of America, this station represents, along with Radio Liberation, something unique to the US — a non-governmental, free-enterprise organ of political warfare.

RFE was organized in December 1949, to conduct psychological warfare against the Soviet-imposed Communist regimes of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.

It is financed by the Crusade for Freedom, a fund-raising project of the American Heritage Foundation. Both the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe obtain support from the Crusade — which has received millions of dollars of public contributions since its establishment in 1950. RFE thus has no juridical connection or responsibility to the US Government. When it champions governmental policy, it does so, not as an instrument of that policy, but because the United States is a powerful country in the free world — and because the future of the captive countries is inextricably linked with the Western philosophy of freedom, and consequently with American policy.

RFE's broadcasting policy is designed to encourage the enslaved peoples of captive countries in their hope of regaining national freedom as well as individual liberty; to demoralize the regimes by nourishing the natural anxieties of Communist functionaries, sowing seeds of dissension and threatening retribution; to convince friends behind the Iron Curtain that they are inherently strong, and that regimes that must rely on terror to maintain power are fundamentally weak; and to remind all listeners of the eternal spiritual values of the Western world and the political and economic benefits which European federation holds for captive countries once they are again free.

RFE has twenty-one short-wave transmitters and two powerful medium-wave transmitters, located in Germany and Portugal. Seven of these transmitters broadcast simultaneously twenty program-hours daily into Czechoslovakia; six others beam sixteen and a half hours into Poland. Three transmitters beam alternately three hours of broadcasts into Bulgaria and three into Rumania. However, the allocation of these transmitters is flexible. When occasion warrants it — as it did on the occasion of Stalin's death — all transmitters are simultaneously employed to saturate alternately Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, overpowering all jamming for a considerable period of time.

RFE's news-gathering service includes sixteen branch offices from Scandinavia to Turkey. All reports go to Munich for evaluation. This operation is impressive. In the card index of the Hungarian section alone there are 42,000 cards. The central newsroom has a staff of 7 Americans and 10 Germans, distributing an average of 350 stories daily to the 5 national desks (Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Rumanian). Most of the spot news is written in Munich, but a good deal of other program material originates in New York.

A typical day's broadcasting by RFE would include international commentary, a satirical press review, article-of-the-week (the most interesting article of the week on world politics), radio magazine (a digest of news briefs from free-world magazines), "black book" (naming Communist informers and dangerous agents unsuspected by the listening audience), and messages — from refugees to their families.

Most of the newscasting is done live. The shows are written in the original languages, approved by each language desk chief — then translated into English for logging and control.

RFE is an American organization, and is directed by Americans. Policy directives come from the New York office, and the Czechs, Poles, Bulgarians, etc., who comprise the majority of the organization's employees in Europe represent RFE rather than any national committee or party of their native countries, although many of these employees are members of various committees and political parties. . .

Radio Liberation

. . . Radio Liberation was established and is supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism Inc., now headed by Howland Sargeant, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. It has its studios in the large, imposing building which used to be the Munich Municipal Airport. The actual broadcasting facilities are located a number of miles away in Central Germany, and until quite recently programs were taken to the broadcasting station by courier. Direct communications have been established, however, and the broadcasts are made live from Munich.

The program director of Radio Liberation is Professor Wladimir Weidle, St. Petersburg — born *émigré* author; the program advisor for Russian-language broadcasts is Victor Frank, son of the Russian philosopher Simeon Frank, and former director of the Russian desk for the BBC; the American advisor is Manning H. Williams, formerly with the staff of the US Embassy in Moscow.

Broadcasts are programmed by a staff of *émigrés* of various USSR nationalities who operate nine area-language desks, and broadcasting is done in the following languages:

Three Slavonic languages	Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian
Nine Turkic languages	Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar-Bashkir, Azerbaijan, Karachay-Balkar, Kumyk, and Chechen-Ingush
Six Caucasian languages	Georgian, Armenian, Avar, Ossetin, Adyge, and Kabardin

The programs are broadcast on three or more transmitters simultaneously. Radio Liberation broadcasts no music and very few sound effects. Hour long programs in Russian are on the air twenty-four hours a day, and, quite apart from its straight Russian programs, Radio Liberation beams a total of 357 hours per week to the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union alone.

About half the features broadcast by Radio Liberation emanate from the New York program section headed by Boris Shub (former political advisor to RIAS in Berlin), who solicits the co-operation of former Soviet writers, scientists, and military personnel, as well as older Russian *émigré* scholars. Radio Liberation Munich staff handles the rest of the feature material, together with news programs and commentaries. The whole Radio Liberation staff totals about 160 employees.

Radio Liberation aims to be the voice of the democratic anticommunist emigration, and its main purpose is to promote disaffection within the Soviet Union. Testimony from escapees and defectors from Soviet armed forces in occupation areas indicates that Radio Liberation is heard by large numbers of Soviet officials and officers.

Frequently Radio Liberation takes issue with the position of Western governments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It opposed, for example, General Mark Clark's 1952 offer of $100,000 for a North Korean, Russian-made MiG and said so. *Émigré* contributors to the station's programs, with a more intimate understanding of the psychology of their fellow-countrymen, realized that a purely materialistic appeal could be taken as an insult to long-suffering listeners who might measure things according to a different set of values. Radio Liberation's objection was based on the principle that fighters for freedom cannot and should not be bought.

Here is a translated sample from a Radio Liberation script (recorded in Berlin during a broadcast to Soviet occupation forces endeavoring to quell the revolt of East Germans, June 17–18, 1953):

> "Workers of East Berlin are fighting for the cause of all mankind, and for delivery of the whole world, including our Motherland, from Communism. Help them! When ordered to fire on the demonstrators, remember they are not enemies of our country, but defenders of our freedom. Soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army: the German workers' struggle against Kremlin oppression is unfolding before your eyes. The demonstrators are protesting against a government which on the Kremlin's orders attempts to set up a concentration camp system like that in our country. You Soviet fighters were not sent to Germany as cops! Look at the demonstrators' faces! They are working people like yourselves, not capitalists. In 1917 your fathers, then serving in the Czarist army, were ordered to shoot at workers' demonstrations. They refused and turned their weapons against those who issued the orders. . . ."

Personnel Selection

Publicists who have written on the subject of psychological warfare are in general agreement that adequate personnel is an important key to success or failure of any propaganda effort. Past experience appears to suggest that money and elaborate schemes of organization are not adequate substitutes for competent personnel.

American academic institutions and business establishments do not normally train individuals to perform this highly important function, only comparatively recently accepted as a proper peacetime activity of the government. In view of this there is no one logical source to which administrators may turn to recruit needed staff. As the US has accumulated experience in psychological warfare activities, a few writers have ventured to suggest those attributes of training, experience, and aptitude most likely to lead to success in propaganda work. Excerpts from the writings of some of these publicists have been combined with the major conclusions of a formal research investigation in the lengthy discourse "Personnel Qualifications for Psychological Warfare." The conclusion emerges from this study that few, if any, men may be found who combine all the skills, knowledge, and aptitudes useful in waging psychological warfare against any given target. Thus, in order to ensure that all interests and areas of knowledge are represented in a propaganda effort the team approach must be utilized. It is desirable to recruit a number of people, so that the skills, knowledge, etc. that any one person brings to the task complements those brought to the same effort by others.

The two accounts "Personnel Problems of the OWI Assam Psywar Team" and "Selection of Information Service Personnel in Occupied Germany" are the products of experience gained during World War II. The first study consists of excerpts taken from an official wartime report by field representatives of the OWI, whereas the second article is a personal account describing the screening procedures used in the selection of indigenous personnel employed to work with the American occupation officials in postwar Germany.

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By W. E. D.

Effective psychological warfare operations require many skills and individuals with varying training and aptitude.

In discussing personnel requirements for psychological warfare operations it is well to recognize that psychological warfare is not a simple, homogeneous activity. Thus it is not possible to describe in a few words the qualifications to be sought in personnel to be employed in psychological warfare or in activities related to it.

Although psychological warfare has been used by Americans throughout our history as a free nation, it was not until World War II that it achieved a recognition or status of a reasonably well-organized effort. Prior to that time, relatively little thought was given to the determination of what type of person was most effective as a propagandist. It was fashionable for the majority of those who wrote on the subject to declare that "a propagandist is born not made."

Although one may agree that propaganda work requires certain innate intelligence, this is not to say that much of the information required for success cannot be acquired. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the dubious thesis that there is little that can be done to teach the skills and knowledge required for propaganda work, this is not to say that there is any less need for a set of criteria by which to separate the potentially successful propagandists from those candidates less likely to succeed. In other words, what are the indicators that tend to suggest that one man or woman is more likely to be successful than another in psychological warfare?

Paul M. A. Linebarger, by implication, does not agree that a man cannot be trained as a propagandist, for he has written

> "America does not normally produce psychological warfare personnel in peacetime, and if such personnel are to be needed again, they will have to be trained especially and in advance." (p 99)[13]

Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart, one of England's most able foreign propagandists during the past quarter century, has written at length relative to personnel qualifications for psychological warfare as he observed these from his background of expe-

rience in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (PID) and as the Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), during World War II.

> "I cannot say that PWE was an easy team. Every good propagandist must possess the qualities of a prima donna or, as Ernst Toller once said, must be born with one eye. The department was composed almost entirely of temporary officials who had plenty of *esprit de corps* but considerably less knowledge of official procedure. There was no lack of brains, especially in the organization at Woburn where Rex Leeper had assembled and trained a varied array of talent which gave the form and shape to the propaganda policy which was finally adopted. . . .
>
> "The composition of PWE was extraordinarily varied. It contained a handful of professional soldiers and civil servants. The rest were drawn from almost every walk of life and included journalists, business men, advertising experts, school-masters, authors, literary agents, farmers, barristers, stockbrokers, psychologists, university dons, and a landscape gardener. I do not think that any one profession provided any initial advantage of training. A propagandist is born and not made. The journalists were undoubtedly the best exponents of propaganda. They wrote the best leaflets. They had the best understanding of the value of the spoken and written word, and in a department which had always to work at top speed they alone had the requisite sense of urgency. Being used to ephemeral work, they were not so good on policy and sometimes felt frustrated by the hampering necessity of consistency. Our schoolmasters were excellent. The dons included some brilliant men, but were inclined to resent criticism. With one exception the advertising experts were a disappointment. I have an open mind about psychologists. We employed three, and one, at least, did useful work for our German section. Psychological analysis has undoubtedly a place in political warfare, but it was not sufficiently tested in the war to justify any firm conclusions. My personal view is that in propaganda an ounce of first-hand experience of a country is worth a ton of theoretical knowledge, and this theory applies not only to our psychologists but to all the propagandists we employed." (p 155)[14]

Linebarger has stressed the team character of work in the field of psychological warfare planning and operations. He states

> "Effective psychological warfare requires the combination of four skills in a single individual:
>
> "(1) An effective working knowledge of US government administration and policy, so that the purposes and plans of the government may be correctly interpreted.
>
> "(2) An effective knowledge of correct military and naval procedure and of staff operations, together with enough understanding of the arts of warfare, whether naval or military, to adjust propaganda utterance to military situations and to practical propaganda operations in forms which will dovetail.

> "(3) Professional knowledge of the media of information, or of at least one of them (book-publishing, magazines, newspapers, radio, advertising in its various branches), or of some closely related field (practical political canvassing, visual or adult education, etc.).
>
> "(4) Intimate, professional-level understanding of a given area (Italy, Japan, New Guinea, Kwangtung, Algeria), based on first-hand acquaintance, knowledge of the language, traditions, history, practical politics, and customs.
>
> On top of these, there may be a possible fifth skill to make the individual perfect:
>
> "(5) Professional scientific understanding of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, or a comparable field.
>
> "The man who steps up and says that he meets all five of these qualifications is a liar, a genius, or both.
>
> "There is no perfect psychological warrior.
>
> "However — and the qualification is important — each psychological warfare team represents a composite of these skills. Some members have two or three to start with, the others virtually none. But all the personnel, except for men with peculiarly specialized jobs (ordnance experts; cryptographers; translaters; calligraphers), end up with a professionalism that blends these together.
>
> "They may not meet professional standards as officials — officers — journalists — Japanologists — psychoanalysts when they return from psychological warfare operations against the Japanese, but they have met men who are one or more of these and have picked up the rudiments of each skill — enough, at least, to suspect what they do not know.
>
> "The advertising man or newspaperman (skill 3) who goes into psychological warfare must learn something of the enemy, neutral or friendly groups whom he addresses (skill 4), something of United States civilian government procedures (skill 1), something of military or naval organization and operations (skill 2) and ideally something of psychology or sociology or economics, depending on the topic of his work (skill 5)." (pp 99–103)[13]

Dan Lerner[15] rejects the view that propagandists are born not created. He holds the view that "good propagandists can be 'made.' " He says,

> ". . . we may start from the view that an indispensable ingredient in the propagandist mixture is intelligence. Since this qualification would seem to be required in all 'intellectual' occupations, it tells us nothing about the distinctive characteristics required of the propagandist.
>
> ". . . Mr. Crossman [stresses two factors] empathy and timing. By these terms, he intends to isolate as factors in the personality structure of the propagandist the ability to project oneself into the way of thinking of one's audience and the ability to recognize, in the moods of that audience, the correct moment for saying something (or saying nothing) with optimum effects. . . .

"Stated in general terms . . . some essential qualifications for the propagandist are:

"(1) Intimate knowledge of the background of the audience — its language, history, myths, institutions, practices, social composition, and politics.

"(2) Detailed knowledge of the current developments among the audience — its unifying beliefs and practices; its divisive beliefs and practices; its current grievances; its current fads in dress, speech, and manners; and its 'propaganda case-history' (the recent flow of propaganda from all sides to which its attention has been exposed).

"(3) A systematic 'policy conception' of the propaganda process, which requires constant awareness that the purpose of sykewar is to use the target's hopes, fears and wishes (in addition to one's own) in manipulating symbols to achieve policy purposes.

"(4) A systematic conception of the psychocultural process of opinion-formation, which constantly involves awareness that sykewar operates within a vast environment. Any element of the environment is capable of affecting the attitude-structures of any target. The skill required of the propagandist is the ability to discover the decisive affective elements in a given target and how to manipulate them.

"(5) A 'nose for politics.' This characteristic is harder to define than to recognize. It is not important that a propagandist's nostrils should dilate when a political theme is raised. It is important that he should sense the political (as well as psychological) consequences of any theme, whether it deal with high doctrinal symbols or the most elementary symbols of life in a primary social group.

"(6) A 'flair for expression.' For a sykewarrior, the verbalizing tendency, which is characteristic of diverse personality types, should be present but brought under control. The effective sykewarrior probably will not be an *emmerdeur* [a crude term roughly meaning 'baloney artist']. Ease and grace and fluency of expression are uncommon skills — as is the 'gift of tongues.'

"These are not intended as an exhaustive catalog of characteristics required to make a propagandist. They are intended merely to indicate the kinds of talents and interests, acquired by experience and education, which 'the propagandist' can convert into usable skills.

"Additional specific skills are required for specific functions: the policy-maker must know how to convert into propaganda policies the political purposes he serves; the leaflet writer must know how propaganda policy can be most effectively converted into texts designed for the eyes of the audience; the broadcaster must know how to do the same with texts designed for the enemy's ears; the intelligence reporter must know how to select, observe, and systematically record the data on which all the other members of the propaganda team depend.

"Here we enter the field of 'know-how' — which Americans will readily recognize as the outcome of experience and training. Given the requisite factors of knowledge outlined above, and an intelligence adequate to convert such knowledge into usable skills, training can short-cut the trial-and-

error methods of unaided common sense by providing systematic summaries of past experience. Such training would involve, for optimum results, many years of travel and education. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, regarded by some as the Navy's outstanding sykewarrior in World War II, shows uncommon insight into his own career as a propagandist when he begins his autobiography by reprinting the Navy order which, twenty years earlier, sent him to 'shore duty beyond the seas' explicitly 'for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language and the Japanese people.' With all his intelligence, Zacharias could not have become an outstanding propagandist without this long prior training. Even with both his intelligence and his training he would not, for example, have been an outstanding contributor to Sykewar against Germany. Knowledge of the specific target, through long experience and education, is the basis of training for successful propagandists.

"It is quite clear that training of the kind which has been emphasized here will not automatically produce great individual propagandists or guarantee that all propagandists so trained will be equally efficient. Differences among individual propagandists involve psychiatric problems of personality which this writer recognizes but is not competent to discuss. Certain it is, however, that training will produce a higher level of propagandists, among whom the most brilliant individuals will readily be detected by their performance. Perhaps more important than brilliant individuals, in the long run, training will produce those 'skill-clusters' which are essential to sustained team work." (pp 88–91)[15]

In 1950 a survey of individuals who served in a psychological warfare capacity in World War II was made. Both military and civilian personnel were interviewed in the course of the project. Among the questions raised in the interviews was one dealing with what special skills, aptitudes, knowledge, and training, in the opinion of the respondents, are required for effective work in psychological warfare. The analysts who evaluated the answers given came up with the general conclusion that it was unwise to generalize with respect to all personnel involved in psychological warfare activities. The major emphasis in the survey was directed to a determination of the kinds of personnel and organization required by military forces operating under field conditions, however, many of the conclusions reached, are believed to be equally valid for situations other than those experienced under combat conditions. Excerpts taken from the report prepared after the completion of the interviews follow:

". . . for purposes of this analysis, qualifications required of psychological warfare personnel must be discussed in terms of a job classification scheme. . . . A systematic approach to the problem of personnel selection must proceed by defining the kinds of functions psywar personnel actually perform.

Idea Men

"The general directives issued by the key psychological warfare executives must be interpreted in terms of the particular target group before they can be translated into propaganda. This function, a vital one in any effective psychological warfare operation, is performed by what a top-

level administrative aide at PWD/SHAEF called the 'idea men.' They are 'the men who will provide the spark' for really good propaganda.

"At first glance, the problem of deciding what qualifies an individual for such a role seems almost insolvable. Time and again, in talking about the outstanding 'idea men' of World War II, respondents referred to a certain intangible quality of mind in trying to account for the extraordinary ability these men displayed. . . . such phrases as 'born propagandist' and 'a kind of talent or genius' do not solve the problem of criteria for selecting 'idea men' in the future. It is equally obvious, however, that 'the imagination to see the enemy from the inside, to know what would get under his skin' does not appear out of nowhere. It must, in fact, be based on a knowledge of the enemy. In other words, while the creative propagandist may possess certain elusive qualities (imagination, sensitivity, perception) to a higher degree than other people, these abilities must be supplemented by a backlog of experience, knowledge, and attitudes in order for them to be useful to psywar. These latter qualifications, at least, can be defined and identified.

"In short, it is possible to approach the problem of qualification for the idea men 'through the back door.' The successful 'idea man' in psywar must have, at the very least, the following qualifications:

"(1) *He must have an intimate, first-hand knowledge of the target people.* In order to 'embarrass the enemy,' as a Crossman admirer points out, one has to know a great deal about the enemy:

" 'He [Crossman] had a thorough knowledge of Germany and of the Germans. . . . A man who knows all the languages in the world, who can't project *himself* in the enemy country and see the things the enemy would, doesn't make a good propagandist. Cynical accurate knowledge is important to being a good propagandist.'

"Familiarity with the target group was a distinguishing characteristic of the 'idea men' in general. The man in charge of field radio operations for the First US Army stated the prime requisite for the 'idea man' in psywar as follows:

" 'I think he must have a pretty broad knowledge of people . . . number one. The area in which he is to operate is the first important thing. If he has traveled that area before, if he has had any opportunities at education which made him aware of the psychological traits of these people, their traditions, their general artistic and educational levels, the general economic situation of the country. Much of this he can learn. . . . The men who were best were those who knew the area, who had some personal interest in it, maybe relatives, maybe travel, maybe school there, and who had come to know that nation pretty well.'

"Such 'a thorough understanding of the prejudices, the emotional enthusiasms, the likes and dislikes of the particular audience for which you're shooting,' to quote a member of Col Hazeltine's group [in PWB/AFHQ, North Africa] is the *sine qua non* of the effective propagandist. The person most likely to have the kind of understanding called for is someone who had been a resident of the country in question.

"(2) *He must be a well-educated man.* Without setting up any standard for 'well-educated,' most respondents seem to assume that the men who are most capable of absorbing the necessary information about a foreign country are those with better than average education and intellectual approaches to their experience. . . . The experience of having lived on foreign soil is, of itself, no guarantee that the individual will assimilate the things that can be useful to a psywar worker. A man who had acted as liaison officer for a psywar operation contends that 'in the main, the academicians would have the cultural and historical background in a way to really understand these people fully, in the way that somebody else, who may have been there with a commercial firm, wouldn't have the cultural background.' However, as the field radio administrator made quite clear, it is not necessary for such previous education to have been acquired through formal channels. . . . The respondent who recommended academic people thought that men with the right kind of background might be found among the journalists:

" 'Their residence may have been with the intention of teaching in the universities, or for some other reason. . . . Somebody who has been in journalism would probably have the same qualifications (as the academician). Had he been in newspaper and magazine work, he would have to acquire enough of the culture, the history, and the background to understand why they feel the way they do, today.'

"A high-level administrator who worked in the Near East observed that Crossman 'was and is an able journalist.' He knew how 'to put his ideas into words, he knew how to write.' Later on, speaking of Wallace Carroll, 'another good propagandist,' he recalled that 'he again was an old-line journalist and newspaperman.'

"(3) *He must be politically aware.* A superior education may stand a man in good stead, but the studies and the interest are most valuable when they have a certain direction. As a psywar operator with a Ph.D. in political science pointed out, 'In essence, psywar is politics; it isn't psychology; it's politics. It's political behavior; it's attitudes of individuals and countries and groups, and how to get into them.' On the basis of this contention, he goes on to say that the creative thinker in psywar should have a flare for politics:

" 'He . . . has to have political awareness. He has to be politically minded. . . . . Men who work in this field must have a kind of political sensitivity with which only certain people are born. One cannot do it by just reading a book on politics. One has to be passionately interested in politics — politics and world affairs.'

"Whether one goes along with this extreme view of how political awareness is acquired, the major point still stands: the man of ideas in psywar should be one who is interested in political affairs. It is for this reason that someone who wrote directives at Radio Luxemburg qualified his remarks about the need for well-educated men:

" 'Basically, they must be people with pretty damned good education. Education, not because they had to, but driven by interest: in history, in political science, in economic conditions.'

"(4) *He should know the language of the target.* Someone who has lived in a foreign country for a considerable length of time, and is also a man of intellect, normally knows the language of the people among whom he has lived. Crossman, for instance, knew the German language thoroughly, and, according to at least one respondent, he applied this knowledge consistently:

" 'I can remember some silly mistakes made in leaflets because they didn't know that a certain customary phrase was used as a derogatory expression, in this area. Crossman was always seeking these.'

"This respondent states, however, that language 'is not a must' but that 'if you're actually printing leaflets or running a radio station, you must have language experts with you.'

"In connection with the 'idea men,' therefore, fluency in the language is more often considered a symptom of genuine feeling for the target group than a necessary qualification for the job. A member of the staff at Radio Luxemburg went so far as to say that linguistic skill could be over-emphasized:

" 'I think the idea that the language is of utmost importance can easily be overdone. What goes with it is a knowledge of national character and behavior and background.'

"(5) *He must have a certain liking for the target people.* In order to conceive of ways in which to attack the moral fiber of the enemy, the psywar operator must "understand the enemy's thinking processes, his patterns of behavior, his attitudes, his logic, and try to meet it — fight it."

"Hate, as several respondents observed, is a barrier to such understanding. A former member of the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, who had his own program to the Dutch, in Germany, stressed this fact:

" 'The best propaganda man, from our viewpoint, is a man without hate. If you hate, you're biased. And you cannot be biased. . . . If you're unbiased, then you're understanding. First you must think of what you want to achieve. You must determine what reaction you want to get. And you cannot think clearly of the reaction of these people if you're blinded by hatred. You should plan your action on a completely clear, unhampered point of view. Then you can say — if A is going to have reaction B, that's not the reaction I want, and so on down the line until you find the reaction that you really want. A man that hates cannot do that.'

"The political scientist previously quoted made the same point: 'You cannot do effective work if you hate. Hate is a private reserve which should be kept at home.'

"The 'idea man' may be a strong individualist, and he is not necessarily a man everyone will like. A pleasant personality and the ability to get along easily with all kinds of people are important in other phases of psywar work, but 'idea men' do not need to have these characteristics. Respondents did not make this point directly, but implied it by their comments on the men they considered outstanding propagandists.

"Men capable of thinking up the 'dirty tricks' for psywar are likely to be strong-willed, opinionated, and possibly even eccentric. They will provoke admiration, but they will also provoke antagonism and disapproval. Such was the case, for example, with Hans Habe. Two of the men who had contact with Habe during their service in psywar indicated the ambivalence with which he was regarded:

" 'I think Habe is an excellent study case for the psywarrior because . . . I think he combines all of the best and some of the worst in these people. He was a colorful character, and some people hate him violently, but with more violence than I think is justified because I don't think he was anybody's real enemy, except the Germans. I think he caused real havoc among some of his German listeners with some of the ideas that he had. Some of his personnel like him very much, some dislike him very much, and I don't think there are too many in between. Lt Habe was ridiculed frequently by the other officers. . . . Habe had many of the faults of a human being. He was vain, for instance, and he overdressed, was a thorough extrovert. . . . But he was an excellent officer as well as an excellent propaganda person. One of the best.'

"Richard Crossman was the object of similar criticism. A top-level administrative aide, who considered him an 'ace propagandist,' described him also as 'a rather appealing personality, but quite a dangerous type — most of us think that and would tell him so to his face.'

"Crossman was considered 'a dangerous type' by his fellow workers primarily because they found him both personally and politically unpredictable. At the same time, however, they recognized that this was part and parcel of what made him so keen a propagandist.

"Thus, the potential 'idea man' in the psywar organization may be highly individualistic, provided: (a) he has certain additional qualifications such as having lived in a foreign country, having absorbed the spirit of the people, and having been curious enough to learn its cultural, political, economic, and social history; (b) he has sufficient background to interpret this knowledge; and (c) he does not hate the people of that country so strongly that his hatred interferes with his political or propagandistic judgment. Such individuals, according to the weight of opinion in these interviews, would most likely be found in academic or journalistic circles.

"Locating men with all these qualifications is not an easy task. People like Crossman and Habe, who possess an extra indefinable spark, are probably even more rare. Fortunately, however, not many such men are needed in psywar. A top-level administrator made this quite clear:

" 'Actually in psywar very few real propagandists are required. If you have a half dozen people who are professional propagandists in the organization, that will be sufficient.'

"This respondent went on to say that too many 'brains' would make the psywar organization top-heavy:

" 'You need 90 percent of people who are good workers in regular skills. And then you need only a few people who are specialists in area, who are specialists in ideas.'

"This, if true, considerably lightens the personnel recruitment task for psychological warfare. In all probability, moreover, this respondent's estimate that 'two or three guys will do the trick . . . one of those fellows, or several of them to every area of high policy level' is fairly accurate:

"Another administrator suggested, if it is impossible to find someone who has all the qualifications, it may be possible to get two or three people whose combined capabilities would be an adequate substitute:

" 'In this whole business of being a propagandist, sometime you won't find the combination — a person who knows a lot about the people he's talking to and about, and also knows how to say it in a way that it gets across. So there you have to make a compromise. You have to get an area specialist and a good newspaperman or a writer of some kind. . . . I suspect, more often than not, that was what happened. You had a combination. At least until the time came along where, after a few months, your good writer had picked up enough savvy about the kinds of things that made sense to the Germans to do it himself.'

Administrators

"No large-scale business or industrial concern would underestimate the need for men to handle the mechanics of organizing, managing, and implementing plans. However, during the last war, according to reports of top-level personnel and those involved directly in field operations, trained administrators for psywar were a neglected category. A civilian administrator who served with PWB/AFHQ said, such officers were hard to find.

" 'In setting up future operations, you'll make a big mistake if you don't get more and better administrative personnel than we had. . . . Our major weakness in PWB in this last war was on the administrative side.'

"This shortage may have been in part the result of inadequate planning, for there were other respondents who complained that in their particular operations there were 'more . . . administrators than you can shake a stick at.' . . . A commanding officer from one of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company units pointed out, organizational know-how does not inevitably turn up in combination with a talent for developing propaganda lines:

" 'There were many large brains in psywar who could plan the over-all strategy of an operation, but could not personally follow through. That was where I felt I was of most use. Given a certain job, I could organize the men I needed. I could pick such teams, and I was able to lead such teams. In other words, a man who is able to put a plan into action is very necessary.'

"There is, then, a recognized need for persons with special qualifications along purely administrative lines. But it is not enough to say, as one respondent did, that 'as far as administration is concerned, men with the administrative ability [are needed].' The question arises, what precisely constitutes a good psywar administrator? For example, is just any person who has had administrative experience qualified to manage a psywar operation? Are the skill requirements for the administrator who serves

in the field the same as, or are they different from, those desired of the administrator at the policy level?

"Some answers to these questions can be found by looking into the backgrounds of men who were considered by their associates as good psywar administrators in World War II, and by looking into the statements of respondents who were concerned with the problem of administration. On the basis of these two types of data, the following statements can be made about the 'ideal' psywar administrator:

"(1) *He is an experienced executive.* Although drawn from a wide variety of fields, the men who did well in high administrative posts in psywar operations during the last war were all experienced in forming and running large organizations. They were men of demonstrated responsibility and initiative; they were used to routine and to keeping an eye on details: and, even more important perhaps, they were skillful in handling subordinates. All these qualities are necessary components of the psywar administrator.

"An OWI Administrator emphasized the importance of being able to delegate authority:

" '. . . When I started the German magazine, for which McClure would have been responsible, I went to see him. I told him that I was supposed to run this from London, because I have other magazines there. And you are responsible for what I am doing. How are you going to control me? You've got to control me somehow. He said: "There's only one way to control you. You are in charge of that magazine. If it's bad, it goes into the wastepaper basket." He knew how to delegate authority. He knew that there were some things that he himself had no experience in. He also knew that there were things he knew better than we.'

"An executive officer who served in PWD/SHAEF stresses another facet of the administrative personality. He has the ability to subordinate personal gratifications to the success of the job:

" 'An Executive Officer is one who's willing to say "no" at the risk of his own personal popularity. He knows that one of two things may be accomplished: either the achievement of what seems to be the over-all objective in the face of what might seem to be immediate pressures (which later turn out to be important), or leaving the matter open for the commanding officer so that he doesn't have to be the one to say "no." So the basic characteristic of a commanding officer is to be willing to place what you feel is the achievement of the job above the personal consideration of popularity. You can't be both popular and effective. . . .'

"These qualities are basic to any good executive; they do not set the psywar administrator apart from other businessmen. But there are situations that the psywar administrator must meet that narrow the field from which to choose such personnel.

"(2) *He has done work that has sharpened his sensitivity to public reactions.* Since he is to deal with fast-changing situations involving foreign nationals, the psywar administrator must be a flexible person sensitive to the reactions of the people he deals with. He cannot afford to be provincial in

his outlook, for he must be aware of the implications of his decisions for people of backgrounds different from his own.

"One respondent, a civilian who had been head of publications for OWI in the Middle East touched on the administrator's need for a broad outlook:

" 'In terms of personality, the most important thing is the ability to get along with people of all backgrounds, and educational and social and national backgrounds. A democratic feel. You must have respect for them.'

"Another civilian, a top-level administrator from PWB/AFHQ, suggested that the psywar administrator should be a man who 'has learned to adapt himself to foreign conditions and foreign peoples.'

"Indeed, almost without exception, the psywar administrators in World War II, who were rated highly, were men whose studies, business, or pleasure trips had taken them to foreign countries. They came, as their records show, from a variety of professions: journalism, radio, publishing, politics. These are the same fields the respondents mention as developing the breadth of understanding and adaptability that the psywar administrator needs.

"The respondent quoted above feels, for example,that business managers of newspapers are cut out for administrative work in psywar because 'in handling the writing, publication, and distribution of printed material or radio programs, I don't think there's any substitute for the kind of experience they've had.'

"Another respondent, formerly chief of publications for the psywar team attached to the Seventh US Army for the invasion of Southern France, has a further candidate, namely, 'a successful business executive with an editorial sense, who also has a very high interest in world affairs':

" 'A publisher. He would be an ideal executive for psywar. It could be the head of an ad agency. The head of a news service. I'm not very much for an editor, a man who is only on the editorial side of any publishing enterprise. To head up a psywar operation, you must have top executive ability. And writing is just one phase of it. . . . That is, of course, for the printed forms of psywar. Radio, and other forms, you would go to the other industries for them.'

"(3) *He knows something about military procedures.* Since psywar must in wartime work hand-in-hand with the military, it is important that the administrator be conversant with military procedures, and understand the relationship between psywar and the over-all military operation.

"Unfamiliarity with Army procedure was a stumbling block for many World War II psywar operators. According to an operator who had taken part in both planning and administration:

" 'The great weakness of many of the psychological warriors was that they found it difficult to adapt themselves to the Army forms and the Army paper work, and very often success with what you want to achieve in the Army depends upon your knowledge of Army framework and Army procedure.'

"(4) *He is not a specialist.* It was generally agreed by the respondents that the man placed in charge of administrative affairs does not have to be a specialist in any particular phase of the operations. . . . The job of the administrator demands that he have a clear grasp of his goal and that he be capable of gaining the full cooperation of his men in accomplishing it. Technical jobs can be handed over to specialists.

"(5) *He has an understanding of the various psywar operations.* For effective control of the men under him, however, the administrator must have an understanding of the various operations for which he is responsible. This knowledge would include some acquaintance with both the technical and creative sides of the work. The managing editor of a psywar publication in the Philippines referred to the administrator's need for sympathetic understanding of the problems faced by writers:

" 'A well-knit unit should have an officer (if it's going to be military psywar) who is acquainted with the general problems of producing, writing, and creating. You've got to be flexible enough to operate in an ad-lib operation.'

". . . In short, a good administrator, to use the phrase of one respondent, is a 'jack of all trades,' with a wealth of background and experience in executive, public-related jobs to draw upon, and a personality that makes it possible for him to get along easily with both civilians and military men.

"The picture of the ideal administrator varies, to be sure, with the position he is to occupy within the psywar structure.

"A respondent who bemoaned the fact that Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, [Director and Deputy Director of OWI] were not administrators, spoke at considerable length about the need for an 'administrative type' at the very top of a psywar organization:

" '. . . you should have as the head of it, a man of very considerably recognized stature. I would say that maybe he should be a general, but maybe better still one whose stature in this general area is recognized by the average guy in the street. . . . I think that whoever heads it up, whether it's a full-time job or a number two assignment to somebody — there should be somebody really on the top level — who is interested in it to the point that he insists that it gets coordinated.'

". . . Lower in the administrative scale, face-to-face personal contacts are more important than public contacts. Here, as the same respondent pointed out, the administrator does not need prestige. He must, however, be a 'leader':

" '. . . In the field, what you really need in heading up the operation in any given area is a leader. Leadership is more important than any other single thing in that job. You can get guys who know the area, who are good technicians, proficient writers in terms of whether you want radio writing or leaflet writing or whatever — you can hire all those. But I stress that leadership and management are all-important in getting something done.'

"Insofar as specific operations such as leaflets, publications, or radio are concerned, men with more than a dilettante knowledge of the particular operation are evidently needed.

". . . Even at the technician level, personnel will be called upon to control the behavior of, for instance, foreign nationals hired in the field. A technician placed in this position, as a printer pointed out, must establish his authority by setting a good example to his subordinates, by treating them fairly, and by knowing his job.

". . . The administrator cannot be chosen without regard to the position he is to occupy within the organizational hierarchy. It may be all right for top-level administrators to have only a nodding acquaintance with the ways of printing machinery, but as one moves down the scale to the man actually in charge of the print shop, anything less than a thorough understanding of the process may have unfortunate consequences. In each case, decisions as to what individuals are to occupy control positions should be based, in part, on the character of personnel and the type of operation they are to administer.

Liaison Men

"In order to carry out its objectives, particularly in its tactical phases, psywar must rely on cooperation from many other agencies. If, for example, it is to get the information on which to base leaflets, radio broadcasts, or loudspeaker appeals, psywar must have access to prisoners-of-war and to intelligence reports. This necessitates working closely with G-2 (Intelligence Section). The dissemination of leaflets, to cite another instance, requires the services of the Artillery and the Air Force. In cross-the-lines operations, combat troops must cooperate to the extent that they not hinder the operators' attempts to persuade the enemy to surrender. Occasions may arise, finally, where psywar must avail itself of assistance from allied or enemy nationals. In a thousand and one different ways, therefore, psywar needs some personnel who are capable of smoothing the way with, and getting cooperation from, non-psywar organizations and individuals.

"During World War II, certain individuals held the title of 'liaison officer' and were called upon, in theory, to establish needed rapport with non-psywar officers. In actual practice, however, these men carried additional responsibilities that got in the way of their nominal tasks.

"It may perhaps be assumed that, in the future, better indoctrination will reduce the need for salesmanship on the part of so many psywar operators. In such circumstances, the functions of the liaison officer would presumably fall into a sharper pattern than that described above. He would be responsible for establishing contacts with Intelligence sections, for arranging for leaflet dissemination via Artillery or the Air Force, and for acting as a buffer and factotum vis-à-vis the extra psywar needs of his colleagues. Thus the liaison job would be more specialized than in the past, and could be assigned to individuals chosen specifically for it. The following statements can be made about the qualifications such an individual should bring to this work:

"(1) *He should be able to get along easily with all kinds of people.* One after another, respondents reported that successful relations with non-psywar outfits had invariably resulted from good personal relationships which it was hard work to establish.

". . . The very nature of the different kinds of groups that the liaison man must contact helps to determine the qualities he must have.

"First of all, the men charged with the responsibility of establishing connections between psywar agencies and Army Intelligence or any other branch must be 'regular guys.'

". . . Thus, in order to be able to get along with both the average soldier and professional psywar personnel, a liaison man must be a person who understands human beings. This quality is perhaps even more important than being a 'regular guy' or being 'well enough educated.'

"(2) *He should be a man of initiative.* A respondent who had not had the title of liaison officer, but had been engaged in setting up radio stations as the Army moved up through enemy territory in the ETO, told how relations improved as soon as the psywar personnel manifested an interest in helping other outfits:

" '. . . when we tried to find out what they needed, they liked us pretty well, . . . when it came to the Rhine crossing and the pontoon bridges, and we broadcast eight times a day the flood levels of the Rhine River, so that the engineers could adjust their pontoon bridges to the level of the Rhine, nothing was too good for us. Here we were actually participating in military action that was helping them to do something they couldn't do themselves. They loved it. In Sicily . . . the Italians were trying to quit but didn't know where to quit. We told them where to go, and it was wonderful.'

"This same respondent concluded: 'It wasn't a matter of saying, "This is what I can do." It was a matter of going out and doing it. You had to go out and do it and prove it. And you had to fight sometimes to be able to do it.'

"(3) *He should be courageous.* Not infrequently, the sort of thing the liaison officer had to do in order to get cooperation from members of other branches required considerable physical courage. This was particularly true of the men who worked with the Air Force. An intelligence officer who had served with PWB/GHQ, SWPA, emphasized the fact that the Air Force liaison men have 'to get along with the pilots and their crews, not (be) afraid to go out on a mission with some leaflets and throw them out.'

"(4) *He should have a thorough knowledge of psywar.* The respondents familiar as they were with the difficulties faced by the liaison officers, placed much emphasis on salesmanship and the ability to win friends and influence people. However, most of them recognized that charm alone is not enough. As the respondent who had served in Burma put it, a liaison man who is to deal with the military 'should know what he is talking about. He should not ask them what to do, he should tell them about psywar and be able to back up everything he says.'

". . . The liaison man is also at an advantage if, in addition to understanding 'the over-all strategic and tactical propaganda objectives,' he has a thorough knowledge of the mechanical techniques of psywar. The man who knows the technical side of things commands respect. For example, the civilian air liaison man who went out with the pilots on their dissemination missions was able to explain the technical problems involved, and he was even able to suggest to the pilots the use of new techniques:

". . . Finally, a liaison officer who is familiar with previous and current psywar operations is more likely to do a good job than one who is not. A member of the 4th MRBC, who headed a loudspeaker unit, claimed that 'being able to show instances of effectiveness was helpful in securing cooperation, being able to show that it was more effective than anything else.'

"To secure cooperation from other groups, then, the liaison man must have a well-rounded knowledge of his work. He must comprehend its goals, know enough about actual operations to be able to evaluate situations from the point of view of how psywar can contribute to them, and be sufficiently acquainted with past operations to cite cases and offer concrete evidence of psywar effectiveness in similar situations.

"(5) *He should understand the organization and capacities of the military.* Since he must work with representatives of the armed services, it is essential for the liaison man to know how the military is organized and how it functions in order to keep from antagonizing the very people whose cooperation he is after.

"Know-how vis-à-vis the military is important. A former member of the 4th MRBC made this point as follows:

" '. . . Besides helping the liaison man avoid blunders, familiarity with the military would be of use to him in all discussions as to where and how psywar could be used.' A former artillery liaison officer stated that 'as far as artillery liaison goes, the special skill that might be needed is special training as an artillery man.' Understanding the problems facing the military was also suggested as a requirement by the man who became general theatre liaison between psywar and the Air Forces in North Africa. As he put it, the job 'involved not only telling the Air Forces what we wanted to have them do, but also working with Air Force Headquarters and finding out what their capabilities were.'

"It is a short step from recognition of the importance of knowing the military side of the picture to the recommendation that the psywar liaison man be a military person himself. This was the conclusion of a civilian who was a former air liaison man in Burma, who recounted his success in establishing good relations with the Air Force personnel who distributed his leaflets. He believed that the psywar liaison officer 'should be military. He should understand the military. Not merely to kow-tow to them, but he should be an equal.'

"The requirements for the liaison man, as set forth here, evidently grew, in large part, out of the peculiarities of the psywar situation in World War II. The liaison man's functions at that time were twofold: he had

to break down the resistance to psywar on the part of the military personnel; and he had to act as an intermediary between civilians and the military, who were, more often than not, hostile to one another.

"As psywar comes to occupy a less ambiguous position vis-à-vis the military establishment, the basic qualifications for the psywar liaison man in the field will perhaps be somewhat simplified.

"It will, to be sure, remain necessary that the liaison man have a winning personality, that he be intelligent, and be 'a regular guy. . . .' He will still have to be a specialist of sorts in the area where psywar and strictly military functions meet. However, in the future the liaison officer may not be obliged to ride along with the bombs that carry the leaflets, and he may not have to solve the technical problems that arise on each side of the gap he bridges, or to devise ways and means of 'bribing' reluctant military men who have not been convinced of the value of psywar.

"Psychological warfare at higher levels often involves contact with both civilian and military personnel from countries other than the US. For the purposes of these contacts, the liaison man perhaps does not need to be a military expert, but he should have a pleasant personality, and certain further qualifications that would not be required of other men in the US Armed Forces.

"As an artillery liaison man who had worked with Allied Military units indicated, liaison with the French and British was no different from liaison with US units insofar as personal relations were involved. He put it in much the same terms as the interviewee who had worked exclusively with US troops: 'Relations were pretty good. More on the basis of personalities, I would say, than by any other basis. . . .' This respondent did not, however, explain in detail the foundation upon which his good relations with foreign groups had been established.

"(6) *He should know the foreign group with which he is working.* The man who had functioned as liaison for psychological warfare with the French Radio Group had spent some time as a student in France. He knew the French people and he knew the Americans. Consequently, he was able to work well with the French, and was especially qualified to step into the picture as a soothing agent when friction developed.

"(7) *He should know the language of the foreign group.* Fluency in the language of the foreign group with which liaison is conducted may usually be taken for granted in the man with knowledge of the people and the culture, and vice versa. Nevertheless, as the man in charge of field operations in France for PWD/SHAEF pointed out, 'if an American officer is able to establish language liaison with an opposite number, his battle is won.' It would seem that the ability to speak the language, even if it is not accompanied by thorough understanding of the people and the culture, serves liaison personnel in good stead.

"(8) *He should not be provincial in his attitudes toward foreigners.* It is extremely important that the man who is chosen to deal with allied or other foreign nationals be someone who does not 'look down' upon for-

eigners. A respondent who had lived in China for 20 years, and who had returned there as a representative of the OWI, put considerable emphasis on this point:

" '. . . the important thing for any information man or propagandist, is to be a very good American — in all contacts with the hundreds and thousands of people that you should see in your work [in order] to get over the idea of acting democratically, of being fair . . . a good American. . . . Americans are just naturally provincial. It's hard for them to adapt themselves to countries where there are no flush toilets, no running water. They begin to separate the world into first-class people and second-class people. The first-class people are those that have all the refinements we have in America. I think, almost automatically, that if you do that you're going to be condescending in your attitudes toward people. . . . Too many of the people that I've seen in information work were just not their best; they didn't treat the people as equals. They didn't treat the people with whom they were accredited in the same way they treat fellow Americans. There was a definite barrier between them. I think that Orientals, in particular, can feel any condescension. I think that's very important.'

"Thus, in addition to being a likeable person in his own right, the psywar operator who is to deal with foreigners should be someone who is capable of genuine sympathy with foreign peoples. Ideally, he should be a person whose experience includes the kind of familiarity with foreign populations that comes with having lived abroad.

Creative Men

"The creative men determine the form and substance of psywar messages and are thus the vital core of psywar operations. They are the men who translate the policies and bright ideas into the day's activities, and each day they create ideas of their own for leaflets, radio programs, and loudspeaker broadcasts. They are mostly writers or artists, the former, however, outnumbering the latter. They should have at least some of the qualifications of 'idea men.' But World War II showed that they can function adequately without that extra spark that distinguished Richard Crossman and some of the other 'propaganda geniuses' of World War II.

"Specifically, the following statement can be made about the qualifications of the writer who will contribute most to psywar, whether behind a desk at headquarters or in an office on wheels:

"(1) *He should know his target thoroughly.* Since part of the writer's job, in the words of a former top-level OWI administrator, is that of 'interpreting that area, and . . . taking the fundamental policy and . . . making sense to that particular area' a basic requirement for the writer is that he know his target thoroughly. The administrator just quoted, one of whose functions had been to integrate field office operations and Stateside directives, explained why this interpretive function must be left to the writer:

" 'There is no way that Washington can sit down and say this is exactly what you ought to say to the Italians, or the French, etc. About all they can say is: these are our beliefs; what we generally feel about that part of

the world and what our general line should be. Only on the local level, it seems to me, can you do a good job in interpreting that in the light of day-to-day conditions as they go along.'

"The writer, like the 'idea man,' must be capable of looking at the world through the eyes of the target, with understanding and without hatred, in order to anticipate the way in which the target will interpret the content of his leaflet or broadcast. An Army officer who performed psywar functions in the Central Pacific area touched on this subject:

" 'I think first of all the man has got to have a basic knowledge or understanding of the people he's working against. He has to have some comprehension of the way they think and the way they act because . . . a man might do a tremendous job doing leaflets against the Germans and then turn around and be nothing but a miserable flop trying to do leaflets against the Japanese. The Germanic philosophy and actions and reactions and attitudes toward certain things would be completely different from the Asiatic reaction, for certain things. So I think that basically, any man that is going to try to design propaganda or counter propaganda has got to have a knowledge of the people that he is directing his propaganda against.'

"It seems generally agreed that residence in the area is the best way for the writer to acquire the kind of knowledge he needs. A former leaflet writer who served with the OWI in Assam explained one of the advantages of having lived in the country:

" 'If you've lived in a country, you can always throw in that little touch in a leaflet of the commonplace to the person addressed that makes it seem that you're in communion. In other words, experience in the country itself is valuable.'

"(2) *He should be fluent in the language.* Since the creative people are dealing directly with the written or spoken communication, it is more important for them than for the idea men to have a thorough knowledge of the language. This does not necessarily mean text-book knowledge. The leaflet or the broadcast, in order to be effective, requires treatment of the language in its living, colloquial form.

"Men who worked through translators were sensitive to the shortcomings of this means of overcoming the language barrier between writer and target. In the words of a respondent who had done loudspeaker work for the V Corps of the First US Army:

" 'To do creative propaganda work toward the enemy, you've got to know the language 100 percent, or don't do it. For example . . . if you write a leaflet and make one spelling error there, I feel that the whole leaflet might as well be burned.'

" '(Interviewer: Couldn't you use a translator?) A translator would lose the touch. If I would sit down and write something in English and then translate it, somewhere, something gets lost. Your greatest weapon is to show that you know everything about them — facility in their language is vital.'

"(3) *He should have the ability to express himself clearly and accurately.* It was pointed out by a number of respondents that psywar does not require 'great' writers or 'great' artists. It is, however, the writer's or the artist's task to convey the import of the directives in a form that will be meaningful to his audience, and this calls for a certain minimum of proficiency as a writer or draftsman. However, as a member of the 4th MRBC who had his own program at Radio Luxemburg discovered, a professional novelist is not ideally suited for this type of activity:

" '. . . there's one chap who's a brilliant writer. But he is too much of a writer, inside. He only wanted to write what he felt. He knew that his talent was wasted on it, as it was. Great writers are selfish; they want to write the things they see and feel. And they want to choose the subject.

"What is needed are people who have the ability to express themselves simply and easily through writing or the spoken word. One of the people who had taught propaganda techniques to men going to the Far East, himself a well-known novelist in civilian life, stressed this point:

" '. . . literary skill has absolutely nothing to do with leaflet writing. When we first started recruiting people for leaflet writing, we naturally turned toward writers, either of fiction or newspapermen, radio writers, and so on. While many of these people turned out to be excellent leaflet writers it was not because of their special skill with words. What it really required was a basic intelligence — I would say that that is the basic requirement in almost any field — so that a man or a woman can grasp quickly what the elements of a leaflet are, for example. The capacity to write would have nothing to do with it; the capacity to understand the necessity for saying something briefly even if ungrammatically, was important.'

"The respondents imply that people whose interest in writing is primarily literary are not necessarily the best people for psywar, but none of them questions that some facility with words is essential. A former chief of the leaflet section for PWB/GHQ, SWPA, pointed this out:

" 'If one can't express himself in writing, he can hardly expect a person who reads what he writes to know what he's talking about. . . . He should also be able to express himself clearly in speaking. He may have occasion to speak to the enemy via radio or some other means.'

"When the creative worker does not happen to have a facile command of the language of the target groups, it is even more important for him to have the ability to express himself accurately, intelligently, and clearly.

"(4) *He should be politically aware.* Again like the 'idea men,' the writers, since they are dealing with living and changing situations, should be men who are sensitive to the political implications of what they are doing. A former officer in charge of a loudspeaker unit said that 'a comprehensive outlook on what is happening' is essential for the creative man in psywar: 'He has to have a very firm foundation in the political aspect.'

"(5) *He should be emotionally well-balanced and adaptable.* Various factors in his working environment make it important for the creative worker in psywar to be both stable and flexible.

"In the first place, as a former instructor in psywar techniques observed, 'There are so many things happening behind the scenes and at long distances that ultimately affect what you are doing, that you have to get into a philosophical frame of mind about the inconsistencies of the people who are directing you, or the people with whom you are working and getting information that they give to you that seems insane and misguided and unintelligent.' He added that people who 'are thrown into a tizzy' by changing directives or similar inconsistencies are not good risks for work in psywar. In the words of a field administrator, the creative man must be disciplined enough 'to take a directive and carry it out whether he approves of it personally or not.'

"Secondly, the creative man must be able to get along easily with his fellow workers, who may have extremely varied backgrounds.

". . . Thirdly, the writer or the artist must be able to adjust his style and his techniques to the taste of his audience. A former leaflet writer who served with OWI in New York, London, and Paris made this point:

" 'Above all else, he has to have an easy ability to have his mind changed because, so often what appeared to an American, fresh over there, to be an ideal way to convey something to the Frenchman was not the ideal way. He had to be able to change his mind and then go off on a tangent, perhaps, and take what might have appeared to him to be the second best way of doing it. . . . Very often, particularly in the case of artists who came over, they changed their minds drastically and sometimes painfully.'

"Thus, for example, the writer or the artist employed in psywar must be capable of controlling his personal feelings, subduing his individualism, and allowing the situation to dictate his behavior to a greater extent than might be necessary in other work.

"Needless to say, some creative men in any psywar operation will be working in or around a combat zone. Those who go abroad must, evidently, be willing to face the fact that the living conditions they encounter will not always resemble those to which they have been accustomed. As for the creative man who operates in a combat situation (for example, a writer attached to a roving loudspeaker unit), he must be able and willing to withstand the dangers of this life, without grumbling.

"(6) *He should be in good physical condition and be physically courageous.* To survive the rigors of life at the front lines, men must be 'in top shape' physically. An individual whose health is less than perfect, will not only hinder operations, but will risk further deterioration of his health. When operating at the battlefront, the creative man is no less exposed to danger from bullets and shrapnel than the infantryman. He must, therefore, if he is 'to do the job that an advance echelon requires' have 'a certain amount of real personal courage,' according to a man who worked on the preparation of radio broadcast materials in the Philippines.

"(7) *He should have some background in military matters.* There are two reasons why a man who is to do creative work at the front should have had some combat experience and military training. In the first place, he must be able to protect himself when he is in an exposed position, as the respond-

ents learned from actual experience. In the words of a former non-commissioned officer with a PA unit:

" 'For a man who did loudspeaker work on the front lines, like myself, you had to have military training. You had to dig foxholes, you've got to know what to do when you're being shelled or when you get into small arms fire, and you've got to know how to use your weapons. . . .'

"Secondly, in order to be able to make the most effective and efficient use of their particular weapon, psywar operations must know how it relates to the actual military situation. Respondents who had engaged in this tactical aspect of psywar appear to have felt that they could not emphasize the point too strongly.

"(8) *He should be able to think 'on his feet.'* In a combat area, the situation may change quickly and psywar materials for example may become obsolete before they have been disseminated. At such times the man who is attached to a loudspeaker unit must be capable of rewriting his address on the spot. As the man just quoted went on to say:

" 'I think that psywar personnel must be resourceful, in that they must improvise, think of new ideas on the spot, because there is not much time, like a selling job: you never know what your partner, or in this case the enemy, will think up; and you have to improvise on the spot and still get the maximum use out of every situation, because things don't always proceed according to plan, as we well know.'

"To summarize, the men who do the creative work for psywar should have a detailed knowledge of the target group, fluency in the language, and the ability to write and speak clearly and concisely; they should be politically aware, and disciplined but flexible. The closer they are to the front, the more important it becomes for them to be in excellent physical condition, to have some background in military matters, and to be able to think 'on their feet.'

Researchers

"An integral part of any psywar operation is the collection and evaluation of intelligence, upon which much of the propaganda output must be based.

"The intelligence function calls for personnel capable of monitoring enemy radio broadcasts, reading the enemy's written propaganda and captured documents, interrogating prisoners of war, and evaluation of all information gathered from these sources in terms of its usefulness for psychological warfare purposes.

"The persons assigned to this aspect of psywar should be highly qualified in several respects. In part, the standards of selection for researchers resemble those for the creative personnel. For the most part, however, a researcher should be a man of a distinctive type from the standpoint of both background and personality.

"(1) *He should be an expert in the language of the target audience.* Language tends to be mentioned first among the qualifications of the researcher. Unlike the 'idea man' or the writer, he cannot fulfill his mission without it.

An interrogator, for example, would be utterly lost unless he were able to speak freely with the prisoner he was interviewing. This means that the interrogator must be, to quote a man who had worked in psywar intelligence with the Fifth US Army, 'not just . . . a guy who speaks the language academically; he is a man who must speak it as if he were native born.' This same kind of skill with language is, of course, necessary for the man who monitors and evaluates enemy broadcasts or who follows the trends in the enemy press.

"(2) *He should know the target people.* For evaluating the material culled from the mass media, and in face-to-face relations with enemy soldiers, research personnel need intuitive understanding of what various events, ideas, or symbols may mean to the enemy. Such understanding comes only from knowledge of the target audiences' *culture*, in the broadest sense of that term. An OWI civilian who served as an analyst of German propaganda described the background needed for the task he had performed:

" '. . . it's important . . . let's say in analyzing German propaganda to know something about Germany, to know the language, and to know German reality in order to appreciate the contents of the propaganda. . . . By German reality I mean precisely German folkways, German mores, German institutional ways and the German literature and the psychology of the people, the geography of the country. It's important to know where Berlin is and what Berliners are like and what meaning, let's say, the *Kaiser Wilhelme Gedachtes Kirche* has to the average Berliner, and what a hit, let's say, by a British or American bomb on one of these buildings means, to the average Berliner or to particular groups of Berliners. . . . What is the *Brandenburger Tor* where all the victorious armies of Germany marched through, much like the *Arc de Triomphe* in Paris. If you don't know what that is, of course, then any talk by a Berlin commentator about the *Brandenburger Tor* might not mean very much to you.'

"This same type of detailed background information is extremely useful to the men who interrogate prisoners of war. The chief of the propaganda section of the 4th MRBC, who occasionally interrogated German POWs, stressed the advantage of knowing as much about the target group as possible.

" 'If you can tell a man that you know his home town, or that you've been to his home town, or if you're familiar with expressions that he uses, it's invaluable. If you can sympathize with him and discuss things with him, it puts you at a great advantage if you don't have to ask him where this and that is. It surprises the man that you're interrogating and makes him feel that you know a lot and that he won't give anything away by telling you more.'

"(3) *The interrogator should be skillful with people, and should be emotionally mature.* In order to make headway with a war prisoner, and get the kind of information from him that is needed, the interrogator must be adept at establishing rapport. 'You have to talk to them on their own level,' a former Information Control Officer for one of the MRBCs said. You have to make it easy for him to 'pour his heart out to you like a big brother.'

" 'You cannot sit above them, because then you won't get what you want. That might be fine for tactical interrogation, when you want to find out where a gun is located, but if you want to get morale information, if you want to know how he feels — to get at the truth of it — you have to talk to him on the same level.'

"While it is necessary to put the POW at his ease, the interrogator must also carry the weight of authority. Some of the interrogators themselves regard this delicate balance as having been more easily achieved by older men than by the very young.

"This was, in part, a matter of the age level of the prisoners of war. An interrogator with the 2nd MRBC stressed the 'maturity' factor:

" 'What I think is most important is that he's mature. Not too young. If you talk to an older man (and most of the POWs were older men) and you are very young, you cannot make an impression on such a man.'

"(4) *The analyst should possess a background in the social sciences.* As a former member of the 3rd MRBC commented, those who collect and analyze written or broadcast material, as distinct from the men who deal with people, 'don't need much personality, they just have to be fairly well educated.'

"Respondents seemed to agree that considerable academic training is necessary for the type of evaluations required of the propaganda analyst. A researcher who is analyzing the enemy's propaganda output should be a person who has studied the sciences dealing with human relations, history, political science, economics, psychology, sociology, public opinion, and propaganda. The former OWI analyst already quoted expanded on this point.

" 'I think he needs a good background in propaganda and public opinion devices and techniques, familiarity with the techniques of propaganda. . . . I think you need a man who is familiar with or trained in psychology, and in this particular branch of psychology, that is, applied psychology, and who has sufficient political and historical background to appreciate the significance of particular items that occur in the texts. It ought to be a man who is sufficiently articulate, also, to convey his observations accurately. It ought to be, in other words, a man with some sort of scientific training. I believe that's extremely useful. Men also who know how to make quantitative analyses, and don't rely on first impressions only and don't make rash generalizations, but wait for evidence before he passes judgment on whether a trend actually exists or a trend is changing and in what direction that trend is changing.'

"It is a man with this type of background who will best be able to fulfill the analyst's function. The latter, according to a former OSS man, who had worked in Intelligence, is essentially 'to understand quickly when he reads something . . . what does it mean,' to distinguish between 'rumor and fact, between nonessential and essential information.'

"Thus, although the research personnel need the same kind of knowledge about the same area as the 'idea men' and the writers do, they should

possess, however, an analytical rather than a creative turn of mind. Instead of *building* something out of their knowledge, it is the job of the research men to *break down and evaluate* the material passing through their hands. The creative men may well have acquired their skill through experience in a variety of places. The propaganda analysts, by contrast, will probably have acquired theirs in an academic environment.

"In addition, the research people should know the language of the target like natives. This applies equally to the men who work with earphones, at desks, and to those who are out interrogating prisoners of war. Although interrogators must have sufficiently out-going personalities to enable them to acquire the confidence of prisoners of war, personality is a relatively less important attribute for the propaganda analysts, monitors, and translators.

Technicians

"The backbone of psychological warfare consists of the men who set the type, run the presses, operate the radio transmitters, and, in general, provide the mechanical means for disseminating the propaganda conceived by the creative staff. They are not only essential to psychological warfare; they constitute the bulk of its personnel. A former administrative assistant at PWD/SHAEF said: 'You need 90 percent of people who are good workers in regular mechanical skills.'

"Even if this estimate is somewhat extravagant, the technicians certainly form a large group within the organization, and for this reason and for no other, deserve more attention than most respondents tended to give them. Almost invariably the subject of technical personnel was dismissed with a 'you can get guys . . . who are good technicians,' or a casual 'if he were a technician, he'd have to be a good one,' with no further attempt to define or describe what constitutes a good technician for psywar.

"There were, however, a few people whose interests and experiences prompted them to discuss the technician in somewhat greater detail. It is, therefore, possible to construct from the respondent's comments a composite portrait of the skills or attributes the technician should have to work effectively in psychological warfare. The technician should possess the following characteristics:

"(1) *He should know his job.* It goes without saying that the man assigned to a linotype machine or to a Davidson press must know how to operate it. More than mere automatic performance is often required of the technician. He may be confronted with supply shortages, failures of irreplaceable parts, or the need for immediate restoration of broken machinery. The technician qualified to surmount operating obstacles of this nature must know his tools so well that he can treat a crisis as a challenge rather than as a reason for giving up.

"(2) *He should be emotionally well-balanced.* Since he must work frequently under the most unfavorable conditions and be exposed to exasperating shortages of normally essential items, the technician must have an uncommonly even disposition.

". . . It is not impossible, however, for the technician who has acquired the skill required to have also the kind of temperament that will survive the frustrations of work in a combat zone. In the opinion of the man who had supervised a printing plant, the 'people who go into that type of production work — have a good deal of patience . . . you've got to have a lot of patience with that type of condition that you might run into.'

"In addition to being a mechanical expert, the psywar technician must have a stable personality — that is, he must be the kind of man who is not 'thrown' by unprecedented situations.

"(3) *He should be interested in ideas as well as machines.* Several respondents noted that technical personnel do not have to be language or area experts. However, in order for them to function most efficiently within the organization, it is helpful for them to have some notion at least of what psywar is trying to do.

". . . Such training would, however, be wasted upon persons not susceptible to ideas. On the other hand, intellectual facility, although an asset to the technician, is no substitute for his mechanical aptitude and knowledge of the job.

"To summarize, the ideal technician for psywar activities is a man who is expert in all phases of the operation he is chosen to perform; he is emotionally well-balanced; and he possesses an outlook broad enough to enable him to take an interest in psywar's long-range goals.

"Although respondents did not say so explicitly, the technician, who may be called upon to serve in a combat zone, must be in good physical condition.

Service Personnel

"The men who selected support personnel for psywar units during World War II evidently assumed that anyone who could drive a truck, cook a meal, or rig an antenna is qualified to perform these activities in a psywar organization. Experience, however, proved that this is not the case.

"A number of respondents complained of friction and even hostility between 'those people who do . . . intellectual work and the others, who furnish and produce the food, drive the trucks, and so on.'

"One respondent, formerly propaganda chief of the 4th MRBC, claimed that the service workers sometimes even interfered with the execution of the psywar tasks: 'Cooks wouldn't want to make an early breakfast for people who had to get on the radio at three or four in the morning and had to go to bed early.' In his opinion, however, the tension between the two groups could have been avoided by more careful selection of men who were to provide service support for the units.

" 'One suggestion would be that the service personnel be picked specially, not at random. We had some pretty low-class people there. They weren't good enough to become soldiers so they put them in there to become our service people. They antagonized and sometimes spoiled our work. . . . I think that the officer who selected our service men . . . put in a bunch of

eight-balls. . . . That can and did disturb a unit a great deal. It's a thing that could be eliminated and could be a lot better.'

"A psywar group is clearly, from the standpoint of its own efficiency, not the place for the traditional army 'eight-ball.' Reports of the difficulties encountered by higher level personnel in World War II suggest two basic qualifications for the serviceman.

"(1) *He should be of average intelligence.* Although the service worker may not be called upon to perform any functions unique to psywar, he must be able to understand the latter's significance and his role in it.

"As the former propaganda chief of a mobile radio company explained, one of the basic reasons for the friction between creative workers and the service personnel was that 'the riggers and so forth couldn't understand people that were sitting around and batting at their typewriters and not doing a good day's work according to their lights.'

". . . Although the indoctrination of service personnel is a matter that can and should be taken care of during an orientation period, it is relevant here as a reminder that service workers, if not because of their native qualities, then as a result of indoctrination, must be men who are capable of grasping the meaning and importance of psywar in its varied manifestations. With this in mind, the propaganda chief already quoted suggested that a high school education be considered a minimum requirement for psywar service personnel.

"An understanding of psywar is essential not only to ensure cooperation on the part of the service workers, but also to guard against the 'sense of futility' that overcame some of the workers. Inevitably, the service workers will be struck by the difference between the war with symbols and the war with guns, as well as with the difference between the type of work they and the creative personnel are doing. This may easily result in a morale problem. An orientation course pointing up the significance of psywar and, at the same time, the importance of their jobs, might give service personnel a sense of belonging, and so help to smooth over the obvious differences between them and the psychological warriors.

"(2) *He should be a mature individual.* Age appears to be another factor that must be taken into account in selecting support personnel for psywar. There is some indication that the youngsters who were drawn into the service units showed no particular interest in the activity.

". . . The service personnel must also be sufficiently mature to appreciate, and work harmoniously with, people with different backgrounds from their own. Young servicemen of limited experience did not always show adequate understanding of older men with European backgrounds. This is not to say that the European men did not themselves sometimes contribute to the tensions by their obvious lack of appreciation for the American-born service personnel. Actually, the situation was quite complex. The service personnel were often frustrated at not being in a fighting group, and they especially disliked being identified with 'a bunch of screwballs.' These dissatisfactions were further aggravated by the strong

differences within the outfit between themselves and the European intellectuals. The prejudices at work on both sides in this situation indicate the futility of relying solely on 'orientation lectures' as a means of reducing the tensions between these two groups.

". . . Since the older, foreign-born personnel contribute skills that are essential to the operation, the service personnel must be men who can establish and maintain good working relations with Norwegian bankers, Austrian writers, or Russian refugees.

"The possibility of getting men whose experience has brought them in contact with individuals of varied origins would, it appears from the above, be increased if the service personnel were not recent high school graduates, but men of more mature years, perhaps with some business experience.

"In any case, care should be taken in selecting the drivers and cooks who are to work with psywar operators. The service worker will apparently be a better member of his team if he does not fall below the average of intelligence, if he has completed his high school education, and if he is mature in outlook as well as in years.

"Once again, it should be mentioned that the man who is likely to serve in a battle area, regardless of his job, must be in good physical condition. This qualification was evidently taken for granted by the respondents, because the service men during the last war had been taken from Army pools, which meant that the men had already satisfied the military's physical standards.

Some Over-all Considerations in the Selection of Psywar Personnel

". . . There are two additional points that should be kept in mind in applying the resultant criteria:

"To promote high morale among psywar personnel, and to guarantee optimum use of their talents and skills, care must be taken that the men selected for positions in psywar be individuals who really want to work in it. This point was made by respondents who had participated in many different phases of psywar during World War II. A former executive officer of the 4th MRBC stated that the psywar worker must have a 'liking for the job. He's got to live the job, to really want to work. . . . He's got to give his all.' His remarks embody the consensus on this point among the interviewees.

"When it comes to the actual selection of personnel, the standards discussed in preceding pages need not be rigidly applied. Psywar end products represent the combined efforts of many people; they are, that is to say, the result of team-work. This fact leaves room for a certain degree of flexibility in the choice of personnel for most psywar operations.

"The criteria described here are meant primarily as a guide to the selection of a group of individuals capable of performing together the over-all psywar job. The important thing, as far as recruitment is concerned, is to seek individuals each of whom will fit smoothly into a unit, and who will provide a needed part, however small, of the complex of skills required, rather than to try to match individuals to sets of job qualifications." (pp 22–71)[16]

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF OWI ASSAM PSYWAR TEAM*

By an OWI Psychological Warfare Team

Members of psychological warfare team assigned to operate against Japanese forces in Burma, in World War II, recorded their observations of "what makes a successful propagandist tick."

The complexity and geographical diffusion of the [Assam OWI Psywar] team's operations and the heterogeneous nature of its staff made administration a very difficult and an especially vital part of the over-all direction of the work. In addition to a sizeable base establishment, there were never less than two and often as many as five forward units to be supervised. Efficient routine had to be coupled with a flexibility that could adjust the entire organization instantaneously to the requirements of military developments that often require staff members to work through the night. But probably the unusual human factors involved in fusing a staff with 12 distinct racial or language groups into a smoothly operating organization were the most challenging and certainly were the most interesting elements of the administrative task.

The team was fortunate in having as its Executive Officer a man with many years of administrative experience, the majority of them spent in India. He had a fluent command of the language and an intimate knowledge of the customs of the country that were of immense value to the organization and to the maintenance of the physical establishment. His qualifications made it possible for virtually all administrative responsibility to be delegated to him, leaving the Chief and the Deputy Chief [of the Psywar Team] free to give concentrated attention to the propaganda job itself.

The American staff, which included newspaper reporters, advertising men, missionaries, artists, radio engineers, teachers, and mechanics was sufficiently diverse to tax administrative ingenuity to achieve the desired degree of team work. Add to this group such additional elements as a Shan prince, a British bishop, a Rangoon lawyer, Indian Moslems and Hindus of various castes, Chinese radio monitors, Japanese-educated Chinese, and a Kachin agriculturist and it will become apparent why we regard the democratic team spirit which was generated as one of the most enriching aspects of our total experience.

By the end of 1944, the Assam staff included 28 American civilians, 10 attached American and British Army personnel, and 25 others whose diversity of background is indicated in the foregoing paragraph. Most of these persons were directly engaged in the propaganda activities of the team — a comparatively small group handled the complex tasks of administration, services, and supply.

The propaganda staff grew steadily during the team's operation. The original nuclear group of American civilians was augmented frequently during 1944 and early 1945 — one or more men arriving during almost every month. In assimilating the frequent new arrivals, in training and adapting men to new tasks, in maintaining both discipline and enthusiasm within a wholly self-contained group — in these tasks, the leaders of the Assam team found some of their most serious problems.

On the whole, the Assam Propaganda Staff functioned well, enthusiasm continuing to the last day of the operation. But along the way there were a number of disappointments, some of them bitter. Mistakes were made, both in original

* Extracted from an OWI report, "Combat Propaganda in Burma, Apr 1945.

personnel selection and in personnel handling in the field, mistakes that in the light of present experience might have been avoided.

In the following discussion, personnel have been divided for convenience into two groups: *propagandists* (chiefly executive, intelligence-liaison and editorial personnel), and *specialists* (language, arts, reproduction, and air liaison personnel).

THE PROPAGANDISTS

Executive, Liaison and Editorial Personnel

One need was apparent early in the operation, and passing months only served to underscore its importance. This need was for men with a full understanding and interest in the entire propaganda assignment.

The chief and the deputy chief of the operation, the liaison men working with Army headquarters, the editors in charge of leaflet production, the leaders of forward PW units, the chief of air liaison — all these men, to do their jobs well, needed a full knowledge and interest in the entire propaganda operation — plans, intelligence, editorial production, targets.

The Assam team received sixteen Americans who might have fitted this need, who theoretically were equipped to handle one or another of the key propaganda jobs. Actually, of the sixteen, nine men filled such key positions quite successfully, seven less so. It should be useful to examine the points of difference.

Those Who Worked Out

The men who worked out successfully as combat propagandists had much in common. Most of them were young — thirty was an average age. All had held writing jobs before joining OWI — six in newspaper work, three in radio and advertising. All had had several years of successful experience in their own professions. While the men differed individually, as a group they were emotionally stable and politically mature. They were, on the whole, energetic and enthusiastic about their work.

Recommendations

Executive, liaison and editorial personnel can be discussed as a group. While responsibility and duties vary, the qualifications for all key propaganda positions, in the Assam operation, are basically similar.

The qualifications listed below may seem high, yet from the Assam experience, they are necessary. It is reassuring that a majority of the OWI men sent to Assam for executive, liaison, and editorial positions met most, if not all, of these requirements.

1. *Experience:* A background of successful professional experience is necessary, several years of it if possible, including:
   Professional *writing* experience (persuasive writing, for publications, journals of opinion, advertising agencies, seems a better preparation for PW work than academic writing, fiction, movie writing).
   Executive or administrative experience.
   Demonstrated ability to work within a group as well as under supervision.
   Also important, although not essential: knowledge of graphic arts production, knowledge of radio production, military training.
2. *Personal Background:* Should be a mature person, well informed, with considered social and political opinions. Detailed knowledge of the Far East and of Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language or other Far Eastern languages, while extremely valuable, is not essential. [Note: remember that this statement was prepared about April, 1945, while we were still at war against Japan, when it still looked as though the war against Japan might continue for a considerable length of time.]
3. *Personality:* Several traits proved all-important:
   a. Ability to *get along* with people, being reasonably thick-skinned, tolerant, and stable.
   b. Ability to *work with people,* subordinating personal opinions to group decisions.

      These two points were the cause of serious personnel problems in Assam. Men otherwise qualified would not fit themselves into the group. Such traits are admittedly difficult to uncover in personnel selection, but they are as important, perhaps more important, than professional training.

   c. Enthusiasm and curiosity.
   d. A reasonable appetite for work.

Another personnel problem in Assam concerned application. A number of the men approached their jobs half-heartedly, took it easy, refused to assume and exercise responsibility. The results of this lethargy became increasingly serious as the staff grew. Part of the fault lay with conditions at the Assam base, and perhaps with the team's handling of new arrivals. But a part of the fault also was with the men. Personnel screening certainly should have taken into account this fact — irresponsible men, no matter how skilled, become a liability in the field.

Those Who Did Not Work Out

The men who did not prove adaptable are somewhat harder to analyze. A few had excellent qualifications; their original engagement and overseas assignment are entirely understandable. Yet in Assam, these men did not readily adapt themselves to group living. They may very likely be successful in their new outposts — they do have the necessary qualifications. Part of the blame for the difficulties in Assam certainly rests on other members of the team.

A larger portion of the men in this group, however, should never have been sent overseas. Inexperience in the case of some, deep personality difficulties in the case of others, should have disqualified them. Although the shortcomings of these men seemed sufficiently evident to have been detected, they were not discovered, and the men served chiefly as a burden on the Assam operation.

Some Specific Cautions

The Assam experience suggests the following cautions in the selection of personnel for overseas PW work:

1. Very young men with limited experience are more likely to need continuous instruction and supervision, even though they may work out well in the field.
2. Lone Wolves. Psywar field operations are essentially group operations. Men preferring to work alone, disliking or resenting supervision and coordinated activity, can be expected to handicap a field operation. Even if such men are highly skilled, it will be difficult to fit them into PW combat work.

3. People who were unsuccessful in their regular civilian work. This point may seem obvious — it is made here only because such people have sometimes been sent overseas.

4. People who are highly emotional. This characteristic may be difficult to judge, but it is important. A record of frequent job changes and indications of dislikes or grudges against previous employers, if investigated, might reveal an unstable emotional condition.

5. Personnel returned from other outposts. Those persons should be investigated as carefully as new personnel before being given a new overseas assignment. This investigation should include, if possible, a frank off-the-record report from the previous outpost. The same caution should apply to personnel in OWI's home offices who are being considered for overseas assignments. The Assam team received one or more persons in each of the above categories, who were unable to adapt themselves to field operations.

Specialists

The language, art, reproduction, and air liaison staffs presented a somewhat different problem in Assam. Here, specific specialized skills were more important, grasp of over-all propaganda operations less so. However, most of the points made above, with regard to experience, personality, and background, apply equally to the specialized PW personnel.

Language Specialists — Japanese

Japanese propaganda can only be as good as the Japanese in which it is written, and writing Japanese well requires a considerable amount of formal Japanese education and practical experience. For these reasons, most of the Japanese-speaking Americans are unqualified as Japanese writers. Even most Nisei [American citizens of Japanese parentage], having spent all or most of their lives in America, are unqualified to write propaganda in Japanese.

Nisei engaged as writers should, if possible, have been educated in Japan, preferably being graduates of Japanese universities, and if possible, graduates of Japanese military schools. Practical writing experience is important. Men who wrote for Japanese language newspapers in West Coast cities or in Honolulu, or who have other professional writing experience would be particularly valuable.

Candidates for PW work should be reviewed by someone having a thorough knowledge of Japanese, preferably a Japanese who is himself a qualified writer.

The Japanese language man must have an intimate knowledge of Japanese psychology. This requirement can probably be filled only by men who have lived in Japan. Preferably, they should have lived in Japan in recent years. Without this personal knowledge, the language man cannot be expected to write propaganda that will provoke a positive response from a Japanese audience. The language man should also have a knowledge of recent Japanese history and of political developments in Japan in the last fifteen years.

Radio men (*i.e.*, announcers) need not have advanced Japanese education. The main requirements are a good accent, a good voice, and delivery. (For front-line loudspeaker work, the requirements are somewhat higher. A man is needed who is naturally articulate, well able to *ad lib*, and thoroughly familiar with propaganda techniques and objectives.)

Japanese-speaking Caucasians can form an extremely valuable addition to any PW staff. Their function, however, will usually be limited, in a language sense, to interrogation, translation, and propaganda guidance.

Other Language Specialists

Only a few suggestions are necessary here. Language knowledge and familiarity with target areas are vital to any propaganda operation. In selecting area and language specialists, these points should be kept in mind:

1. *Recent* knowledge of the target area is important. Guidance based on knowledge ten or more years old is of limited value.

2. Knowledge of customs, political organizations and conflicts, racial, and economic problems is as important as knowledge of language.

3. Knowledge of the *people* in the target area is important. Missionaries, educators, and some governmental people might be expected to have this knowledge — commercial people might not have it.

4. Men who will write or translate propaganda messages should be *experts* in the language. A "working" knowledge of a language, while useful for interrogation and simple translation, is never enough for the preparation of effective propaganda messages.

5. A background of newspaper or other professional writing experience in the language of the target area is most valuable.

Area Experts as Propagandists

One fact the Assam team learned early in its work: qualifications as a language or area expert do not necessarily make a man a good propagandist. These qualifications frequently, in fact, handicap him as a propagandist.

Too often, the area men tended to base their views on their own personal experience, rather than on impartial evidence. Personal beliefs and theories tended to replace objectivity.

Men approaching the work purely as propagandists, even though they had no personal specialized knowledge of the target, were better able to achieve objectivity. In Assam, evidence obtained from refugee interrogations often proved to be more useful than the advice of the team's well-qualified Burmans. The evidence of POW interrogations and captured documents was needed to supplement the advice of those members who spoke Japanese and had lived in Japan.

The area "experts" and language men made an invaluable contribution to the work, but the Assam team found it advisable to check that contribution against other sources with more recent and less limited knowledge of the target. With one or two exceptions (in the team's Japanese language staff) none of Assam's area and language experts developed into well-rounded propagandists.

Air Liaison Men

Requirements for most PW air liaison assignments should not be difficult to meet. Personality of an individual is probably the most important. A man should be interested in the Air Force, and have a personality which will enable him to get along well with men who are engaged in daily combat operations. It is also important that the air liaison man believe sincerely in the value of propaganda operations, and have some knowledge of propaganda planning and operations.

A chief air liaison man, in charge of target planning and leaflet distribution, is another matter. Qualifications for this assignment should be considered much the same as the qualifications for any other key post in a propaganda organization. He should have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the planning, intelligence, and editorial, as well as air, operations.

Artists and Art Directors

The Assam team had on its staff at various times eight different men who were assigned as artists or art directors. An examination of their qualifications is interesting. Of the eight, only four could draw well. Two could do simple visualizations, two could not draw at all. Several of the men were extremely well-qualified, with years of experience. Three men, however, had no layout experience. One man had no apparent experience at all — he was unable to complete his first leaflet assignment, and was eventually transferred to other work.

Before outlining personnel recommendations in this field, it might be helpful to explain the terms "artist" and "art director," as used here. An art director is somewhat similar to an editor. He supervises and directs the preparation of art work. He designs leaflets and makes layouts. He may or may not do the finished drawings himself. An artist is primarily an illustrator, not a designer or layout man. The two functions, artist and art director, become somewhat interchangeable, in the field. In the commercial art profession, however, they are quite distinct.

Most of the qualifications, in personality and experience, that were listed for editorial men, apply just as strongly to art men. Professional experience is essential, several years of it. Energy, and the ability to get along with all of the staff — these are also essential qualifications. The art men will usually be under pressure from both editorial and reproduction staffs — skill, speed, and an easy temperament can mean everything.

A PW artist, when he gets in the field, must immediately face one disturbing fact — he is on his own. The former advertising man will have no art studio and paste-up boys to fall back on, no photostat service to help out corners. Frequently he may have to do the whole job himself, from initial design to the final layout.

In selecting art men for overseas work, these points should be kept in mind:

1. Advertising *art directors* have better background for PW work than most newspaper artists, commercial artists, illustrators, etc. The reason for this is a fairly simple one. In the field, versatility, knowledge of layout and design, and knowledge of reproduction techniques become all-important, and these qualities are all a part of the advertising art director's regular work.

2. The PW art man must be able to *draw*. (This may seem odd, but actually, many art directors and commercial designers are layout and idea men only; commercial artists are hired to finish their designs.) Ability to present simple visualizations of people, situations, weapons, buildings, etc. is a minimum requirement.

3. When *artists* or illustrators are hired, they should be selected with extreme care. Most successful commercial artists have carefully specialized, limited styles. The limitations of some artists' styles may handicap them for PW work. Versatility, in this case, is an important attribute. Artists who have styles similar to popular Japanese art styles can be most useful. Nisei artists, particularly Nisei who have had commercial art training in Japan, would be particularly valuable.

4. Commercial *lettering* men and advertising agency *renderers* having several years of professional experience, can provide a valuable reinforcement to any PW art staff of more than two or three men. A good renderer is capable of doing perhaps 80 per cent of the work required of a PW artist — all the finished lettering, retouching, and paste-ups. In filling these functions, he can relieve the PW artist for more important work.

Reproduction Men

Here, the recommendations can be extremely simple: professional printing experience is essential. Men with a few weeks' or months' training cannot be expected to operate even Davidson presses under field conditions. The Assam team was in operation a full year before competent reproduction men arrived. Only then was continuous leaflet production possible.

While the recommendations in this section may seem difficult to fulfill, the writers of this report can only point out that field experience has indicated their importance. Men who can do capable work at home may not do equivalent work overseas under conditions of group living, in remote, lonely, and even dangerous areas. Discipline, which can be enforced in Army organizations, must be replaced by friendly cooperation in OWI field units.

SELECTION OF INFORMATION SERVICE PERSONNEL IN OCCUPIED GERMANY*

By David M. Levy

A psychiatrist describes the type of test used to screen indigenous personnel for service in the American Information Control Division.

. . . The need of a screening center became evident after a brief experience with the problems of selecting Germans to fill posts that were under the jurisdiction of Information Control Division. One of their functions was the granting of licenses in the United States Zone to applicants for a variety of enterprises summed up in the words "information media." The "media" were books, newspapers, magazines, music, radio, movies, theater. Applicants for licenses included publishers, newspaper personnel, orchestra directors, producers, and many other employees in the field of entertainment. This licensing power is very important because it involves the selection of people who have a big share in shaping public opinion in Germany.

According to the principles used by the Information Control Division in granting licenses, consideration of the candidate's personality, experience, and ability in his vocation is necessary, besides his political and military affiliations. Since this important work was, and is, done largely by non-professionals, although in some instances they became quite expert, the idea of a consulting center where key people might be sent for thorough study was received with enthusiasm by the chief of intelligence (of Information Control Division).

The method of investigation at the Screening Center in the United States Zone differed from that employed in the Office of Strategic Services center in Washington in its concentration on the lengthy three- to four-hour interviews for political and psychiatric examinations, and in the use of political attitudes tests. After the founding of the Screening Center, the British organized a similar service in

* From D. M. Levy, *New Fields of Psychiatry*, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1947, pp 106–117. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Levy and W. W. Norton & Co., Publishers.

their zone. It was larger than ours, examined key people in every phase of political and cultural life, and resembled more closely in method the Office of Strategic Services stations.

In our own center, the political analyst was a key figure. He reviewed all the preliminary reports of the candidates. He had expert knowledge of Nazi party, of military organization, and of the political history of Germany. The director of the old Office of Strategic Services government school functioned in that capacity. He investigated the entire political background of each candidate and finished his report with a summary statement of the candidate's political classification.

Psychiatric and psychologic studies were made to determine the mental status of the candidate, especially important in Germany where the long reign of Nazi terror had produced much psychic illness. This held true also for those who were not victims of physical brutalities. The psychologic effects of the twelve-year Hitler regime are seen most commonly in a variety of anxiety states, cautious manner, apprehension, diminished energy, reduction of social contacts, a host of psychoasthenic symptoms, and exaggerated submissive attitudes. The Nazi regime especially intensified those personality adjustments that help to make survival possible in a tyrannical state — obeisance, opportunism, constant purposive thinking at the expense of spontaneity and phantasy, resulting from the necessity of always watching your step, sizing up every individual you meet, allying yourself with people who count, ruthless separation from friends to the point of denunciation when they might in any way imperil your safety. The centralization of German psychic energy into channels of this variety has resulted in an enormous cost in terms of creative thinking in the arts and sciences, in normal emotional responsiveness, and in mental health. At the Screening Center, study of the emotional damage traceable to life during the Nazi period was an absorbing task. We had an opportunity to study also people who suffered from direct violence and brutality.

The evaluation of mental status as a factor in the recommendation of a license was quite flexible. Generally, if other findings were satisfactory, only severe aberrations were given weight. A candidate for a license to publish an agricultural magazine, a member, in his day, of a Catholic political party, had been beaten almost to death for active opposition to the Nazi party in 1933. A long hospital internment followed. When examined at the Center he showed disturbance in equilibrium and evidence of the kind of intellectual difficulty one sees in organic brain damage. Nevertheless, because of his past record, his special knowledge of the field and the fact that his memory was intact, license was recommended with the suggestion that he work in close association with an assistant.

A candidate for a publisher's license who claimed to have organized a resistance movement in Germany, for which he gave as evidence numerous photostats of documents, was found to be a pathologic liar and swindler. This psychiatric finding was later confirmed by political investigations. I cite this case not as an example of the dire results of the Nazi regime, but to illustrate a function of the psychiatric investigation in determining mental status. A number of candidates were referred to the center previously primarily for that reason.

A second function of psychiatric studies was the determination of character, of personality structure. In line with the policy of the Information Control Division, as part of the problem of security, regardless of political reliability, our purpose was to keep out of position candidates who were found to be domineering,

militaristic, brutal, on the one hand; or overly dependent, passive, and suggestible on the other. Such candidates were considered too grave a risk in that they might actively or passively perpetuate the type of psychology sympathetic to aggressive wars. On the other hand, we favored all those who gave evidence of broad sympathies, who could tolerate and accept criticism, who were generally democratic in the sense of respecting their fellow men.

Some candidates who were politically acceptable were referred primarily for personality study. Thus a candidate for a license to run a publishing house revealed in our investigation an adjustment to a despotic father so remarkably passive that it seemed impossible, however inwardly antagonistic to authority, that he could have withstood, as he claimed, Nazi party pressure. Later it was revealed he had made numerous concessions. Politically and personally, he was not suitable to a job that involved so many important questions of policy.

Another publisher was not acceptable for a license because though politically at least gray, if not white, he was so rigid, pedantic, and authoritarian that, however efficient, he could not be recommended for a top position.

Personality study represented the major activity of the psychiatrist. Along with determination of mental status, they required most specifically, psychiatric training. The determination of Nazi and anti-Nazi attitudes, as also the determination of special qualifications for the job, in terms of leadership, superior endowment, etc., two other functions of the Center examinations are well encompassed in the psychologist's training. A fifth function, in which psychiatric, psychologic, and political studies were linked together, consisted in the determination of the reliability of statements made by candidates, the crucial issue in the investigation of certain cases.

A summary of the findings in one record will illustrate the cooperative nature of our enterprise. In this enterprise a successful integration of psychiatry with other fields was fully achieved. The final report was a true synthesis of three types of investigation.

An engineer applied for a license in the field of publication. He was one of a group of five candidates who arrived at our Center, then situated an hour and a half's ride by jeep from the city of Frankfurt. Like the others, he had already been screened by American investigators. Dossiers of all the preliminary investigations and recommendations were handed to us by the driver. The candidates arrived on Sunday evening. They were all prepared to stay the three-day period of the study, until the following Wednesday. For that entire period we lived in the same house and had our meals in the same room. The atmosphere was always friendly. Methods of intimidation were never employed. Our studies required an attitude of cooperation. Subsequent investigations revealed the fact that candidates looked back at their experience in the Screening Center as a happy one. Several wrote, "I wish we could have stayed there three weeks instead of three days." There were several reasons besides the friendly atmosphere — American food and comfortable surroundings.

Monday morning was devoted to group tests. They included intelligence tests, political attitude tests, and essays on various phases of the Hitler regime and on the German attitudes toward the war. The tests were designed to reveal aptitudes, intelligence, personal, and political attitudes.

In the afternoon the long interviews began, first a three- to four-hour political, later a three to four-hour psychiatric. Those not scheduled for interviews were

given tests by the psychologists — the Rorschach and other tests of that variety. By Tuesday evening tests and interviews were nearly over. That evening, starting around 9:00 P.M., staff and candidates assembled for a social get-together. Refreshments were served. Around 10:30 each candidate was asked to tell a story, any personal experience he cared to talk about, something preferably non-political. Such stories, apparently chosen at random, were often very revealing. By midnight the session was over, the candidates retired for the night. The staff then assembled at midnight to consider each candidate in the light of the story he told, the behavior he revealed to us and all others, in correlation with the findings of all tests and interviews. After breakfast the next day, Wednesday, candidates were given a novel opportunity. They were asked to evaluate each other. They were asked to answer questions about the other candidates; for example, which candidate they found most friendly, which one most trustworthy, most dogmatic, etc. Usually by noon the candidates left. During the afternoon the staff members tried to complete their reports. On Wednesday evening another batch of candidates arrived. The Screening Center provided a very busy, exciting, and highly concentrated type of experience.

Let us follow our engineer into the political interview. The political analyst, as usual, carefully considered every item in the military questionnaire and other reports in the dossier, to derive leading points of inquiry for his interview. The kind of thinking and knowledge involved in this process will, I am sure, claim your interest. Sleuthing the record requires a type of intellectual activity similar to historical criticism. Every item is judged in terms of its specific meaning and historical background.

Take, for example, the item of religion. If it is designated as *gottglaubig* (God-believing), it signifies most likely an official separation from a previous religious denomination. If this separation took place in 1933 or thereafter, the presumption arises that it was done to gain advantage in the Nazi party. Questionnaires of Nazis show many more such designations than non-Nazis. There are, of course, numerous separations from the church for other reasons. There are also a few German pagan sects who used this designation before World War I. In any case, it is an important point of investigation.

Consider the item, vocation. As an engineer our candidate was a member of the Union of German Engineers (*Verein Deutscher Ingenieure*). During the Hitler regime, all professional bodies were absorbed in the Nazi scheme, reorganized, and renamed. In this transformation each professional group had its own history depending on how important it was thought to be in relation to war and propaganda, and on such accidental factors as the particular personalities involved. The engineering group was affiliated with the National Socialist Federation of German Technicians (National Sozialist *Bund Deutscher Technik*). All of those who retained membership became members of the Nazi party in 1934 to 1937. Furthermore the most important group in the Bund of technicians, after 1937, was the Union of German Engineers. Hence, when it was clear to the engineer that the political analyst had at his command the facts about the engineering group, he made a hasty correction, after preliminary denials, and added his membership in the NSBDT to the list in the questionnaire, thereby exposing his connections with the Nazi party. That fact made clear a number of contracts he had during the war, otherwise quite puzzling. This same type of knowledge is applied to every organization and to all other biographical data.

Reports of candidates include concise statements under four headings — biographical, political, psychological, and recommendation. Reference has been made to the biographical section.

In the political section, the points of investigation from which one drew conclusions about the engineer concerned the relation of his organization to the Nazi party, the significance of a position he had in the armaments industry, and of certain valuable contracts his firm managed to obtain. All these data added up to the fact that the engineer had been closely involved with Nazi officials and had various connections with the Nazi party which he concealed.

The political analyst made notes on the behavior of the candidate, besides his response to questions. He noted, for example, that when the crucial point was brought up about the relation of his engineering society to the Nazi party, the engineer emptied his pipeful of fresh tobacco. As you know, tobacco is a highly valuable item in present-day Germany.

In the psychologic section only those findings derived from the psychiatric interview and test procedures were utilized which had direct bearing on the problem of licensing. In regard to the engineer it was noted that he had always been a very anxious individual, and had had a series of nervous breakdowns.

A physically weak, only child, he was brought up in aristocratic style by an indulgent, widowed mother. He became a member of very select social groups. As a young man he had the trying experience of meeting the requirements of a responsible executive position, made possible by family connections.

His severe anxieties intensified the struggle to accumulate wealth and maintain a position of social importance. This required a good deal of scheming, of soliciting favors from relatives and politicians. In turn, these activities generated conflict anew because his early training in life had adapted him to the role of one who dominates and demands, of one who never bends the knee. The psychologic picture was consistent with the findings in the political interview and explained also the manifest personality characteristics of an unusually obeisant manner with an occasional break-through of arrogance.

In the report cited, I selected a case in which the political interview is more important in determining outcome than the psychiatric. Previously I presented brief illustrations of case studies in which the psychiatric findings play a primary role. As a rough estimate, I would say that in little more than half the consultations at the Screening Center, the political analyses were of primary importance; in somewhat less than half, the psychiatric. In the majority of cases the various psychologic, psychiatric, and political examinations all helped to supplement each other.

In order to maintain a high level of competency in the Screening Center in Germany, research work was conducted concurrently with the practical program. New events were constantly turning up in Nazi archives. A special library was important. Candidates were themselves sources of new information. Psychologic research in testing methods went on repeatedly. Candidates were quick to inform their friends of the methods we used. Increasing numbers became test-wise, thus lessening the effectiveness of the tests. To illustrate one which every so often needed revision, a political attitudes test may be used. It contained forty incomplete sentences. For example, "Only that kind of art and literature should be allowed in the new Germany which —." Three blank lines follow. The completed sentences varied from such replies as "which agree entirely with democratic prin-

ciples," to "which express the honest intent of artist or writer." The differentiation of sincere from clever, placating replies required careful analysis. It is quite interesting that with any effort to fake a "democratic" answer, candidates easily fall into a Nazi type of reply, especially when the sentences were outside the realm of politics.

In screening candidates for military missions at the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, or German candidates for licenses in Germany, a reorientation of the psychiatric examination had to be made. In the Office of Strategic Services, the primary consideration was the ability of the personality to function according to the special requirements of a mission. In Germany, the primary consideration was the ability of the personality to function in constant resistance to Nazi, to military, and to authoritarian influence. . . .

Utilization and Activities of Personnel

Modern propaganda operations to be maximally effective require in personnel a combination of skills, knowledge, and experience rarely if ever found in full measure in Americans, even among those who may have emigrated in years past from the land of a particular target people. During World War II, in the Korean campaign, and in the postwar operations of the USIA and its predecessor agencies, ample precedents have been established for the employment of prisoners of war in times of armed conflict and personnel indigenous to the target area in peacetime.

Relatively little has been written concerning the pitfalls to be avoided and the conditions to be observed in the employment of indigenous personnel. However, with respect to the use of prisoners of war we are somewhat more fortunate for there have been a number of official and unofficial accounts of their employment. Two such accounts are presented on following pages.

The Employment of Prisoners-of-War in Psychological Warfare Operations. Two case studies drawn from World War II experience in psychological warfare operations against the Japanese are presented to suggest a number of the more important "do's and don't's" to observe in order to ensure the most effective use of such individuals. The story concerning "Kobayashi" describes how an extremely effective worker was smothered by kindness and attention from American service personnel and thus was weened away from his primary interest of persuading other Japanese to desert. As Kobayashi learned to drink American beverages, to play cards with American soldiers, etc., he became significantly less effective as a psychological warrior against his former comrades in the Japanese armed forces.

The second account, "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War," is taken from a report prepared by an OWI field team in Burma, during World War II. It is believed that this team made especially effective use of such individuals. The records from the European theater and the military operations in Korea, although noting that prisoners were used, do not suggest in any way the attainment of the same degree of effectiveness as was reached in Burma in 1944 and 1945.

Wartime Activities of American Personnel. Two accounts are reproduced to show some of the range of activities that occupied the attention of personnel engaged in the World War II psychological warfare effort against Japan. "Indoctrination of Friendly Troops" was dictated to the editor by a military officer who served in the psychological warfare organization in the Southwest Pacific Area in World War II, and in that of the Far East Command, during the Korean Campaign in 1951 and 1952. At the time his account was recorded, the officer was on the staff of the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.

This officer's account of his World War II activities suggests that it may have been more difficult to produce effective results in psychological warfare in the struggle against Japan for the reason that military leaders knew less about the capabilities and limitations of the subject; many of the officers and men held erroneous ideas about Japanese motivations and sense of values; and few were sufficiently sympathetic with the objectives of combat propaganda to adopt a course of action that made the effective use of psychological warfare possible. Yet, even though this situation may have improved in recent years, it was found that many of the same prejudices, doubts, etc., existed in the Korean struggle as existed 5, 6, and 7 years earlier in the war against Japan. Thus, this account may be more relevant to future operations than the casual reader may think.

"Personnel Utilization for Psychological Warfare Evaluation" describes the organization and activities of the personnel who served in the Washington-based offices of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) cosponsored by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff and the Office of War Information.

Activities of US Civilian Personnel Abroad Who Are Engaged in Foreign Information Work. Two studies are presented to illustrate a possible range of activities performed by US civilians sent abroad to further the objectives of the information program. The first study, "USIE Korea — An Experiment in a Wartime Operation" describes a few of the problems and some of the frustrations that information personnel had to face in a wartorn country like Korea in 1950 and 1951.

The second study, "The Public Affairs Officer," is a more prosaic account of what a typical information officer, operating under somewhat "normal" peacetime conditions, may be expected to do. The military officer would do well to project this description of what a civilian does at a peacetime overseas post against the situation, conditions, etc., that

prevail at a field army or military corps headquarters. It is believed that a close parallel may be drawn between the range and general type of activities undertaken by a Public Affairs Officer on an Embassy or Legation staff and those that may be undertaken by a unit psychological warfare officer on the headquarters staff of a military unit — division, corps, or field army.

KOBAYASHI*

By Gordon Cotler

The effectiveness of a prisoner of war as a psychological warrior was greatly lessened by American personnel smothering him with attention and unnecessary favors.

According to newspaper dispatches, the North Koreans have been dropping a series of propaganda leaflets over the American lines by plane. One of these leaflets was in the form of an open letter from three captured American officers and three enlisted men, urging their comrades to surrender to the "People's Army." It began, "Dear friends of America. We all prisoners are very happy and free than you who are not yet captured," and went on for seven more paragraphs with approximately the same incidence of grammatical error. Another such open letter started off, "Immediately oppose our intervention in the internal affairs of Korea!" and contained the arresting sentence "I have quite regulated our lives from the dark fear of death." Obviously, the Korean Communists have fallen short of quite regulating their propaganda, and unless they can line up a cooperative American, their inadequacy in this department will continue.

In the war with Japan, one of my duties as an Intelligence officer (with a limited knowledge of the Japanese language and culture) was to persuade enemy soldiers to surrender, so I know in a general way what the North Koreans are up against. The Japanese were so vigorously opposed to the idea of surrendering that some of them still haven't given themselves up. Every now and then, I read of the Navy's dropping Tokyo newspapers on some Pacific isle in an attempt to convince the diehards that the war is over. It was tougher in my day, when the war *wasn't* over, but I was in a better position — at least for a while — than the Korean Communists are now. I had a cooperative Japanese.

I was stationed at a base in the Marianas that had been captured months before. My section conducted loudspeaker campaigns against enemy troops hiding out in the mountains on our island and on others nearby. We also helped with the preparation of leaflets and radio broadcasts that were directed against Japan's home islands. A few of the Nisei in the section were highly proficient in Japanese, but they all thought as Americans, and we needed somebody who understood the Japanese mentality and how to appeal to it. We eventually found him in the person of Second Lieutenant Kobayashi. He was about thirty, broad, and short, even for a Japanese, and he had learned English in school. He had a worried look

* Reprinted from *The New Yorker*, pp 50–53, 26 Aug 50, with permission of the author and *The New Yorker* magazine, the copyright holder.

when he was brought in by a patrol that had been making a routine sweep, but it was not the usual anxious look of the new prisoner. He seemed, instead, to be a perpetual worrier.

Kobayashi had been living in a cave, subsisting on snails and writing poetry on American V-mail stationery he had salvaged from an Army refuse dump. I read some of his poems later and found them very hard going. They were in the seventeen- and thirty-one-syllable Japanese literary forms that have as their subject some static situation in nature. Kobayashi told me that after he had watched the number of American ships in the harbor increase steadily month by month, the supply dumps on the beaches grow, the giant bombers fill the whole sky, he suddenly knew, as well as he had ever known anything, that the Americans were going to win the war. And so he had come out of his cave and surrendered.

In the husky voice that indicates sincerity among his countrymen, he said that since Japan was going to lose the war, it was best that she lose it as quickly as possible, so that the suffering of his country would be minimized and it could turn to the task of rebuilding. If there was anything he could do to help shorten the war, he would like to be put to work at it immediately. He had always been an advocate of a more democratic Japan, and perhaps a national defeat would bring about an opportunity for people who thought as he did.

We took him into the hills with us for our next loudspeaker broadcast, and he delivered an eloquent appeal for surrender. He did not mention democracy. Instead, he skillfully made it seem that if anybody was going to lose face by the surrender of the Japanese in those hills, it was the Americans, who were obliged by the International Red Cross to provide for their prisoners. He could testify that his food, clothing, and shelter were superior. The Americans were proud of what they had given him. The more Japanese the Americans had to take care of, however, the greater the strain on their resources. Kobayashi appealed to his comrades to come and help strain our resources. His response wasn't bad. Soon we had him broadcasting almost every day.

Keeping Kobayashi at the prisoners' compound was too much of an administrative problem, and after a few days he was moved to a tent near our office. The other occupants of the tent, some Signal Corps men, promised to keep an eye on him. We put him in Army fatigues with a big black "PW" on the back of the jacket, and he went around with his face straight ahead, his eyes downcast. We set up a makeshift desk for him in a corner of our office. Between broadcasts, he wrote propaganda leaflets. He was a demon worker. We practically had to pull him from his desk when the office closed at night. He was ready to broadcast at any time and would tramp up and down hills, speaking for hours.

Kobayashi wrote English passably, and I never saw him at a loss for an ideograph. Our conversations were always about business until one day when, after we had returned from a particularly hot and dusty session in the hills, I asked him into my tent for a can of beer. He accepted it with a short bow and sat stiffly on a foot locker, holding the can in both hands. He told me that he was the son of an "important official," unmarried, and a graduate of Waseda University. I asked him how he liked American beer, and he said it was delicious but not quite as good as Sapporo beer. Sapporo is the Milwaukee of Japan.

After observing several of Kobayashi's broadcasts, I stopped accompanying his party into the hills, in order to attend to other business of the section. His work

continued to be extremely valuable for many weeks; it is hard to say exactly when he began to change. I realized that something was wrong only after I became aware of a difference in the attitude toward Kobayashi of the GIs and sailors who came into the office. One of my jobs was to clear military souvenirs for shipment to the States. Troops from all over the island and sailors from passing ships were continually turning up with everything from swords to Japanese love letters. At first, such callers ignored Kobayashi, sitting stiff and alien and hard at work in his corner. One morning, three men in succession went up to his desk and asked, "Is this where the souvenirs are checked?" I took a good look at him; he no longer seemed out of place in the room. He was sitting hunched over, with one elbow on the desk and his chin resting in his hand, chewing a wad of gum. I picked up the weekly report of the broadcasting expeditions and saw that the yield of prisoners from Kobayashi's appeals had dwindled alarmingly.

During the next two or three days, I kept a close watch on him. Occasionally he braced his feet against the front of his rickety desk and tilted his chair back. He was ready to leave when the rest of us were, and sometimes he would knock off work early to read one of the Armed Services miniature magazines. I found out he was sitting in on late poker sessions with his Signal Corps tentmates.

I decided to observe one of Kobayashi's broadcasts, and selected a day when a new area was to be tried, a valley in which large numbers of Japanese had made their presence felt. The loudspeakers were set up on a high ledge, and the microphone was handed to Kobayashi. It was immediately apparent that he wasn't the Kobayashi of some weeks earlier. The formal pattern of Japanese speech-making had been replaced by the slick, easy, intimate manner of the American disc jockey. He spoke mellifluously, instead of in the hoarse voice that indicates Japanese sincerity. The content of the broadcast was worse than the delivery. It had to do with free speech, which, Kobayashi explained, was guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. Any Japanese who surrendered was exercising his right of free speech and would be placed under the protection of the Constitution. There was a great deal more, and it revealed very clearly that Kobayashi had seen too many American movies, listened too attentively to the Armed Forces radio, read too many American magazines, and associated too closely with those Signal Corps boys. If the Japanese in the hills comprehended any of his talk, they probably went deeper into hiding.

When we returned to the base, I again asked Kobayashi into my tent for a beer. This time, he accepted the can without bowing, sat down on my cot, and said casually, in English, "What's up, Lieutenant?"

I told him I was disappointed in him, that his work was slipping.

"To say the truth, Lieutenant, I have noticed the same thing," he said. "I am not as interested in Japan any more. To say the truth, I don't care about going back there. What I would like to do after the war is open a small fruit stand in Los Angeles or San Francisco. There's pretty good money in that. I am trained as a lawyer, but I haven't much interest in the law at this time."

I said that it would be impossible for him to go to America.

"Aren't all the prisoners sent there?" he asked. "I would like to arrange to stay on in America."

I told him why I thought that would be impossible.

"How about Hawaii?" he asked.

Again I told him no.

He was silent for a moment, staring at his beer. Then he drank it down and said, "That's good beer."

I said I was going to send him back to the prison compound.

He nodded slowly, in agreement.

"It's a rough war, eh, Lieutenant?" he said.

USE OF JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR*

By an OWI Psychological Warfare Team

A psychological warfare team in Burma, in World War II, made effective use of a group of POWs as a consultative panel to pretest leaflets and to discuss propaganda ideas.

One of the most fruitful experiments carried out by the Assam psychological warfare team has been the formation and development of its Japanese prisoner-of-war group.

In the Pacific, individual POWs have occasionally been persuaded to write surrender appeals or to broadcast to enemy troops by loudspeaker, but no attempt was made to organize and train a picked group of POWs for continuing propaganda activity. In Assam, the POW group has been made a permanent, working part of the team, and while it probably only scratches the surface of the potential use of Japanese prisoners in psychological warfare, the resultant improvement in our propaganda output alone has been great enough to make the experiment thoroughly worth while.

More important, the successful functioning of the group amply demonstrates the practicality and value of setting up similar groups in other theaters where OWI is carrying on propaganda against the Japanese. Should this be undertaken, it is hoped that the material contained in this section will provide a useful background of experience on which to build, and a preliminary and suggestive guide as to methods of selection, training, indoctrination, and work.

Formation of the Group

The original setting-up of the POW group came about not by design but as the outgrowth of a fortuitous combination of circumstances.

Throughout the Hukawng Valley campaign in the spring of 1944, there was but a meager trickle of Japanese prisoners back through Ledo. In the small, rat-infested POW ward at the 20th General Hospital, there were never more than four prisoners at any time. But with the fall of Myitkyina early in August, the trickle suddenly became a torrent. POWs filled two new large wards at the hospital, and a special POW enclosure set up at the Ledo MP stockade was jammed with as many as 170 able-bodied prisoners.

Because of the rapid influx, G-2 and OWI Nisei interrogators had a hard time merely keeping track of new arrivals. In order to relieve them of this burden,

* Extracted from "*Combat Propaganda in Burma*," an OWI report, Apr 45. This account is from a classified study officially declassified in 1956.

three POWs headed by a lieutenant were chosen to perform clerical duties and take charge of the internal organization of the stockade. These three men eventually became the nucleus around which the POW group was formed.

At this stage of the operation the job of prisoner interrogation was of primary importance because we were still groping for the most effective lines of propaganda. Direct interrogation, however, did not always produce completely frank expressions of view, particularly on such basic subjects as Bushido and attitude toward surrender. The Nisei interrogators therefore hit upon the idea of promoting *zadankai* (group discussions) among the POWs themselves with no OWI personnel present. The plan was put up to the lieutenant, and he and his assistants agreed to cooperate. Several discussions were held with different groups of POWs participating. They covered Bushido, the future of POWs, postwar Japan, Allied propaganda and its effectiveness. A complete record of each discussion was taken down by one of the lieutenant's assistants and afterwards written out and placed in the interrogator's hands. Outside of the clerical group, however, none of the participants knew that they were talking for the OWI record, and the discussion was therefore frank and illuminating.

Later, a different kind of group discussion was organized. By now, these discussions indicated that a small number of POWs seemed particularly willing to cooperate with us. Thereupon the idea occurred of setting up a permanent group to assist us in propaganda work. One of the OWI (Nisei) interrogators, a graduate of the same Japanese university as the lieutenant, first broached the idea to him and the two other members of the clerical group. Three additional men were then tentatively selected, and a meeting of all six, in addition to Sgt ——— of OWI, was held to discuss the proposal. The members of the group decided that they would work for us, subject, however, to four conditions:

1. That in helping to overthrow the militarist-financial clique in Japan, its members would not be asked to do anything involving disrespect toward the Japanese Imperial House;
2. That their six names would be stricken from the official Allied list of Japanese prisoners of war;
3. That they be excluded from any future exchange of prisoners of war; and
4. That they be permitted to make new lives for themselves in the United States or in American-governed territory after the war.

On the first point, we were able to offer them satisfactory assurances on the basis of established OWI policy. On the other three conditions, however, we had to explain that these matters were outside of our authority, and that the best we could offer was the promise to refer the problem to Washington and do what we could to assure the future security of the group. This promise was not much of an offer, but the group decided to accept it. As a precaution against their identity becoming known to other Japanese POWs, all six of the men decided to adopt assumed names.

With these essential preliminaries out of the way, it was now necessary to legalize the retention of the group in the Ledo stockade. A complicating factor was the existence of an official arrangement whereby POWs taken by the American command in North Burma were to be handed over to the British as expeditiously as possible. When approached on the matter in September, Colonel ——— (the G-2) officially declined to authorize retention of the men at Ledo in view of this arrangement, but unofficially consented to our keeping them on an informal basis.

Later in September Colonel ———, who had become theater psychological warfare officer, made an attempt to regularize our retention and use of the POW group by drafting a memorandum which was issued as a theater letter on September 15. This letter set forth the limitations under which POWs might be used for propaganda work. Although it was couched in terms of what we could *not* do, it, nevertheless, was intended to authorize our use of POWs subject to two principal limitations: (1) that we do not use them in a combat area; and (2) that no propaganda exclusively done by the POWs be directed to Japanese combat troops. These prohibitions barred the use of POWs for front-line broadcasting, but they did not limit leaflet propaganda inasmuch as the production of all leaflets involved the use of OWI production facilities.

Despite the intent of the letter, it was interpreted at NCAC headquarters as blocking our use of the POWs, and thus, Colonel ——— (G-2) was even less willing than before to permit us to retain them. On October 24, therefore, ——— wrote a letter to Colonel ——— (Theater Psychological Warfare Officer) asking specific theater authorization for the retention of the six men. This request was approved on October 26 in an indorsement from Theater Headquarters signed by the Assistant Adjutant-General by Command of General Stilwell, addressed to the Commanding General NCAC. It said:

"Inasmuch as the six POWs mentioned in basic communication are contributing materially to the work of the OWI in that area, it is requested that they be allowed to continue on that work. . . ."

This statement constituted the final written authority on which the POW group was established as a permanent adjunct to the Assam (Psywar) team. On receipt of this communication, Colonel ——— officially recognized the project as a legitimate and regular procedure.

General Composition of Group

The POW group comprises one second lieutenant who acts as the leader, three corporals and two superior privates. All were from various units of the 18th Division (Kiku Butai), which was the main Japanese combat force in the 1944 battle of the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, and all came from Kyushu, the southern island of Japan. Their ages range from 23 to 32, and their periods of army service from 1½ to 4½ years. In civilian life the lieutenant was an electrical engineer, two of the men were office clerks, one was a factory worker, one a school teacher, and one a truck driver. Only the lieutenant is a university graduate. Two of the men had no more than the minimum of eight years primary schooling. The others had varying degrees of intermediate education. The school teacher was the only member of the group who voluntarily surrendered. The others were captured in the Kamaing and Myitkyina campaigns.

Personalities, Motivations and Capabilities

Lieutenant ——— ———, assumed name, Takayuki Yoshikawa: He is 30 years old and a graduate of Waseda University, one of Tokyo's two main privately-owned colleges, in electrical engineering. Before entering the Army, he worked in the Japanese Mazda Lamp Company factory near Tokyo. He had 3½ years of army service and was commissioned after attending officers' candidate school. Quiet and soft-spoken, he is the antithesis of the usual Japanese young-officer type and is genuinely sincere in his anti-militarist convictions. He forms the ideological backbone of the group and provides it with an efficient leadership

based on the complete respect and loyalty of the men rather than on any attempt to "pull his rank." His intelligence is keen and practical, and his propaganda judgment sound, but in writing ability he is mediocre. He understands spoken English fairly well and is competent to handle English written copy.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Juji Aso: 32 years old, he is a normal school graduate and former school teacher. He had served 2 years in the army and, while in China, was assigned to propaganda work. In North Burma, he served as a machine-gunner until, near the close of the Myitkyina siege, he deserted with a younger comrade and walked over to our lines. Paradoxically, he made no secret of the fact that before the war he was an extreme nationalist, and he whimsically told of how, as an Army executioner in China, he had lopped off 29 Chinese heads. Although his conversion to anti-militarist thinking may have been partly opportunistic, he handles anti-militarist arguments with skill and apparent conviction. Because of his questionable background and the circumstances of his surrender, he was made the object of an especially careful security check. Nothing was found to indicate the slightest unreliability, and it was even learned that he devoted his spare time to giving anti-militarist pep talks to the two least-convinced members of the group while no OWI interrogators were present.

——— is the principal writer of the group. He is fertile and original in his propaganda ideas and a willing, hard worker. His only fault lies in his school teacher's propensity toward a difficult, literary style of writing far above the heads of the average Japanese soldier. To keep him down to a level of easy understanding requires constant prodding. He is also the best calligrapher in the group.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Renya Usami: 23 years old, he graduated from middle-school in Japan and then spent 3½ years in North China where he worked part time for the Japanese-run North China Railway Company as an office clerk, spending the rest of his time attending the Japanese College in Peiping. He speaks, reads, and understands Mandarin fairly well. He has had 1½ years in the Army. ——— is the group's artist. He has had no formal art training but took it up as a hobby. His technique is still amateurish, but he has great artistic talent, versatility, and eagerness to learn. He also has good, original ideas for propaganda visualization, and he accepts criticisms and suggestions readily. He is proficient in grass-writing (free flowing shorthand style for writing Japanese) but he is not as good as ——— for regular, printed-style calligraphy. He does not seem to have done much thinking about political matters previously, but now appears genuinely converted to anti-militarist ideas.

Corporal ——— ———, assumed name, Teruhiko Kosho: 26 years old, he is a graduate of a commercial school, worked as an office clerk before the war and was 4½ years in the army. Of quick intelligence and happy disposition, he is a general handyman and good at administrative and clerical duties. Besides being the internal manager of the stockade, he transliterates all *Domei Romaji* copy into Japanese characters and keeps an up-to-date, classified file of *Domei* news reports. He also is a fair calligrapher and takes an active part in the discussion of proposed leaflets. Like Usami, he joined the group without any strong political convictions but seems to have absorbed a certain amount of anti-militarist indoctrination.

Superior Private ——— ———, assumed name, Shinya Takiguchi: 25 years old, he had only 8 years' primary schooling, was formerly a truck driver, and has served 4 years in the army. Before entering the army he had some semi-professional experience as a story-teller of the kind commonly appearing in popular Japanese

vaudeville houses and will be useful both for radio work and recording scripts for front-line public address. Uneducated politically, he joined the group largely out of a desire to stay with Lt Yoshikawa but since has probably been influenced to some extent by the thinking of the others.

Superior Private ——— ———, assumed name, Hideo Nakano: 26 years old, he also had only 8 years' education, owned a small shop selling dried fish products in civilian life, and has served five years in the army. He possesses average intelligence, is politically naive and probably represents the ordinary type of Japanese soldier better than any other member of the group. He and Takiguchi are valuable to the group primarily as a sounding-board for leaflets and propaganda ideas. Also, they perform KP and other internal duties, freeing the others for the creative side of the work.

Life in the Stockade

Since January, 1945, the POW group has been quartered in a newly built enclosure within the Ledo stockade, about a 20-minute jeep ride from Psywar Team headquarters. Surrounded by the usual barbed-wire, it measures approximately 25 yards in length and 10 in width, allowing adequate space for two tents, a separate screened-in kitchen and mess hut, and a small sanitary latrine. The only drawback is that it does not afford adequate space for physical exercise and games, which would help keep the men fit and give them a much-needed form of recreation.

One of the two tents serves as living quarters and is furnished with six army cots. The other is used as the office and has been completely equipped by OWI with tables, chairs, filing cabinets, reference books, maps, art supplies, and other requisite paraphernalia of work. Both tents are fitted with electric lights. The POWs keep their own files of propaganda material, captured Japanese publications, news and news-photos, and leaflets. Documents with a security classification that are temporarily placed in their hands — such as captured documents and propaganda material — are kept locked up in a foot-locker. A work chart on the side-wall of the tent shows what jobs are in progress and who is assigned to them.

The men spend most of their working hours at work. There is little else to give them an outlet for their energies. Whenever an OWI staff member dropped in unannounced, he would find them engrossed in their work. Only the two cooks might be amusing themselves in a game of *hana-fuda* with home-made cards. ——— devotes his leisure moments to practicing calligraphy on sand. ——— is always busy with his paints and brushes. It would be difficult to find anywhere a group more enthusiastic in its application to the job.

Despite being surrounded by the barbed wire of a prison the men have often remarked that they have a strange new sense of freedom. In the Japanese army their thoughts as well as their acts had to conform to the prescribed pattern, and even human feelings had to be suppressed. Now, their bodies are imprisoned, but their minds are free and they can express themselves. They feel as if the spiritual shackles that bound them have been broken.

It has been found of primary importance to develop close, friendly personal contacts with the group. This not only facilitates a mutually valuable exchange of ideas but makes the men feel that we accept them as human beings, that we are anxious to give them a real place in the organization and do not regard them merely as propaganda machines to be exploited for our own purposes. It must be remembered that the POW who works for us, however convinced he may be that

his course is morally right and for the best interests of his country, is extremely sensitive because he knows that to most other Japanese he seems a traitor. He must therefore be treated with sympathy and understanding and never be given to feel by any thoughtless remark that we regard him simply as a tool.

We have tried to develop personal contacts with the men by having various members of the staff, both Nisei and non-Nisei, visit the stockade frequently for informal bull sessions and propaganda discussions. Besides, occasional Sunday dinners were arranged, the stockade cooks preparing Japanese-style dishes with extra food materials bought and furnished by the office. The Nisei and other staff members attended these dinners, occasionally bringing along a portion of their beer rations to liven the party.

As far as personnel limitations permitted, one of the Nisei team-members was assigned more or less exclusively to work with the POW group. He spent most of his time at the stockade, often eating his meals there and maintaining a constant directive supervision over the work. We found it essential that the man chosen for this task be someone personally liked and respected by the POWs. He must do everything he can to strengthen his personal relations with them.

Working Procedures

The part played by the POW group in the propaganda work of the Assam PWT developed and expanded gradually. In the initial phase, which lasted from its formation in August until December (1944), its function was largely consultative. The group criticized and made suggestions on draft leaflets thought out and written by the PWT staff, but it did no real creative work of its own. It did, however, have a large share in the preparation of the new standard Surrender Pass that improved and supplanted the original one produced in April. On this project the group worked under the close direction of the Japanese-language section, but it was responsible for the central idea of couching the surrender appeal in a dignified military language considered proper for a message by a high commanding officer, and the text itself was written by the group. All prisoner reactions obtained on the Surrender Pass have indicated that this appeal was considered by Japanese troops highly impressive and moving. During the initial period, one other leaflet originally produced by OWI Chungking was re-written almost entirely by the group for our own distribution.

In the second phase beginning in December, the group began to do a complete creative job. With the guidance of Sgt ——— (Nisei), then in charge of work at the stockade, the group originated, thought out, discussed, and wrote up draft leaflets complete with original art work by Cpl ———. The first completely POW-done leaflet was "Castaways" (an adaption of SWP's leaflet "Ships"), followed by the "New Year Greeting," a series of new prisoner-treatment leaflets, a novel cartoon leaflet called "Amusing Comfort-Kit," the first and second issues of "New Life" — a stockade newspaper by and for POWs, and two long-range leaflets for distribution in Lower Burma and Thailand.

In addition to these, the group produced other leaflets along lines suggested by the Japanese-language and editorial staffs, and all leaflets drafted in the office were submitted to them for revision before being put into final form. By the close of the operation, no leaflets, other than brief news extras, were being produced without passing through the POW group.

The regular procedure followed in the production of leaflets at the stockade may be summarized as follows: First, the ideas are thought out and discussed among

the principal members of the group and members of the OWI Japanese-language staff, then either ——— or ——— undertakes the writing of the original draft, while ——— undertakes the preparation of the art work. Second, the draft text and art work are discussed by the entire group, and if changes are agreed to be desirable, a new draft is written and revised art work prepared. No leaflet to which Pvts ——— and ———, the least educated and most typically GI, react unfavorably, or which they find difficult to understand, is passed. Third, the leaflet then goes to the Japanese-language editor, who translates it for the consideration of the other members of the PWT editorial staff. If further changes are found necessary, it goes back to the stockade for a final revision and finished calligraphy. The art work meanwhile has gone to the PWT Art Director, who either redoes the final drawings himself or sends them back to the stockade with suggestions, allowing ——— to complete the finished art.

Leaflets prepared by the PWT staff are usually translated or written up in draft form in Japanese and then placed before the POW group, with or without art suggestions. From then on, the working procedure is the same as for leaflets originated by the group.

Besides leaflet work, the group performs other useful functions. All leaflets received from other theaters are submitted to them for criticisms that they write out in brief and attach to the leaflets. Had it not been for inadequate translation facilities, this could have been developed into a service useful to all OWI outposts engaged in Japanese leaflet work. The group also goes through captured Japanese material, culling out items of propaganda value. It has prepared scripts for front-line broadcasting and given detailed suggestions on the types of music suitable for both PA and radio. The group would have been useful for radio work had personnel limitations not prevented the projected expansion of the Japanese-language news broadcasts over North Burma Radio.

Re-education and Indoctrination

The Assam team has never been adequately staffed with Japanese-language personnel to undertake an ambitious and systematic program of POW re-education such as has been done in Yenan. However, the necessity for this was to some extent obviated by the fact that we started out with a small, selected group, of which the leader and at least one other of the principal members were inclined to accept our anti-militarist idealogy. Their thinking, which has grown stronger since the group began functioning, has conditioned and guided the thinking of the whole group.

Nevertheless, we did make some contribution to the re-education process. At first, informal discussions between Nisei staff-members and the POWs were the main medium, and the study and discussion of our leaflets also served a similar purpose. At the same time, anti-militarist materials from Yenan were made available to the group. A daily newsfile was also provided, including both Domei and Reuters so that they could compare the news from both sides.

During the final phase of the operation, regular semiweekly discussion meetings were held at the stockade. At one of these, a member of the Japanese-language staff gave a complete round-up of the week's news, pointing out developments in the war situation in the various theaters on maps and explaining their strategic significance. Whenever films were available the news resume was supplemented by the showing of OWI shorts, newsreels and Army combat bulletins, with a member of the Japanese-language staff explaining the films orally as they were run off.

These films had to be viewed in advance in order to make sure that they contained no scenes of such a nature as to wound the sensibilities of the group.

The other semi-weekly meeting was reserved for discussion of new propaganda approaches and techniques, new leaflet ideas, OWI policy, and American aims with regard to post-war reconstruction. These meetings were attended by members of the Japanese-language staff and at least one non-Nisei member of the editorial staff, whose function was to lead the discussion and answer the questions put by the group.

Despite the somewhat haphazard methods used, at least a working minimum of re-education and re-indoctrination has been accomplished. It is hoped that the process will be continued if the group is attached to another OWI outpost for further propaganda activity.

Physical Treatment

One of the thorniest problems which the Assam PWT had to tackle in connection with the POW group was that of explaining to the Army the necessity of according the minimum degree of good physical treatment required to keep the POWs in a contented and cooperative frame of mind. Ledo being just a temporary stopping-place for POWs on their way back to British prison camps, there were no regularized arrangements for taking care of them. The food provided was insufficient and often so spoiled that it was inedible. Clothing and shoes were not issued. There was no provision for cigarettes. The G-2 authorities nominally responsible for the treatment of prisoners were uninterested, and the MP officers at the stockade unsympathetic. Efforts by OWI personnel to obtain an improvement often met flat rebuff on the ground that a civilian agency had no jurisdiction in Army affairs.

For a considerable period the PWT Nisei personnel solved the problem by obtaining cigarettes and whatever small necessaries were available from the Red Cross, giving the POWs their own castoff clothing and shoes, and buying out of their own pockets toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, towels, a regular supply of fresh vegetables, and occasionally candies and meat. Eventually these expenses were taken care of by the creation of a POW fund donated by members of the PWT staff on a wider basis, but in the future it is essential that regular funds be made available for such purposes.

In January (1945), a vast improvement was finally secured through the efforts of ——— ———, who after joining the team had been entrusted with all dealings with the Army concerning the POW group. ——— went about this task with vigor and a conviction that the group was vitally important to our operation. By fortunate coincidence, he had travelled across the Atlantic on the same plane with Lt Colonel ———, the newly appointed Provost Marshal for the entire Ledo and North Burma area. ——— explained to Colonel ——— why the POW group needed treatment consistent with their importance to our operation. Upon Colonel ———'s orders, the new officers in charge of the stockade immediately saw to it that the POW enclosure was improved, electric lights installed, and the food and clothing difficulties solved.

At various times subsequent to the formation of the group, the question was raised with the army of setting up a special enclosure adjacent to PWT headquarters, so that the delays and inconveniences of having to travel back and forth between the office and stockade would be eliminated. However, both NCAC headquarters and the theater ruling on our use of POWs insisted that army security regulations be strictly observed, which meant that a complete detail of MPs would

have had to be assigned to guard the enclosure on a 24-hour basis. As the MP detachment in Ledo was already inadequate, this could not be done.

Earlier, in August, a group of POWs had been brought to PWT headquarters in Powai under guard, by special arrangement with G-2 and the stockade authorities, to make some recordings for frontline broadcast purposes. Owing to the impossibility of setting up an enclosure close to the office, a renewal of this arrangement on a regular 3-times-a week basis was proposed by ——— ——— to Lt Colonel ——— in January. Colonel ——— was willing to go further; he said that it would be much simpler to put the POWs on parole so that they could leave the stockade daily, without armed guard, to come to PWT headquarters, and he promised that, if we would write a formal request to this effect, he would place it before General ———, CG of Base Section 3, with his endorsement. This proposal, unfortunately, was turned down both by General ———'s office and by Colonel ——— (G-2).

This did not eliminate the alternative of having the POWs come to PWT headquarters under guard, but Colonel ——— (G-2) and Major ——— at NCAC strongly advised against it on the ground that, in the event of an escape attempt or any other untoward incident while the POWs were in our hands, our authorization to use them would be ended regardless of the fact that guarding them was officially the army's responsibility. In actual fact, the risk of such a happening seemed so small as to be almost negligible, but that is where matters stood at the close of the Assam operation (April, 1945).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The success of the Assam experiment has given additional and convincing proof that POWs can make a vital contribution to psychological warfare against the Japanese. They assure that our methods of approach and the tone of our propaganda will be the right methods and tone to be effective on the Japanese GI mentality. They assure us that we will talk to enemy troops in authentic Japanese GI language, and at the same time in Japanese which is both grammatically acceptable and not in a phraseology which is an obviously mechanical translation from an English text. As regards art work, they assure us that our illustrations will be free of ridicule-provoking errors of detail such as showing incorrectly wrapped puttees on a Japanese soldier or a Japanese *ojosan* (unmarried lady) wearing the hair-dress of a married matron. Furthermore our art should possess that indefinable something known as "Japanese quality." Above all, the employment of POWs reduces to a minimum the danger of putting out leaflets — as we did earlier, and as other theaters have done — which in the judgment of our POW group "will do more harm than good."

The Assam experiment, furthermore, demonstrates the practicability of forming new POW groups for employment elsewhere to function as an integral part of OWI psychological warfare teams.

The Assam experiment opens the possibility of setting up an American-sponsored POW organization on the Yenan model, which will make propaganda to the Japanese in its own name as a Japanese organization committed to the overthrow of the present militarist government. As Yenan's achievements indicate, this can be a most effective form of psychological warfare against Japan.

As the situation now stands, the Assam POW group is highly proficient in propaganda techniques, enthusiastic and efficient in its work and anxious to expand its efforts. When ——— ———, chief of the OWI Psywar detachment in Kunming,

visited Ledo in March, he was deeply impressed by the spirit and capability of the group and returned to China determined to secure its transfer to Kunming and to provide the best possible conditions for the continuation of its work. Since then, the Delhi office has initiated steps at India-Burma headquarters to facilitate the transfer from this end, and the initial response has been encouraging.

In the event that the transfer is successfully effected, there are a few suggestions which we think might be useful to Kunming in enhancing both the effectiveness and the contentment of the group:

1. If possible, the physical arrangements should be such that the POWS will have access to the OWI office, at least to the Japanese-language department, to facilitate work and to give them the feeling that they are a trusted part of the organization.
2. Within the limits of Army security regulations and consideration for the POWS' own safety, the Provost Marshal's office might be approached regarding the possibility of a parole system whereby the POWS could occasionally leave the stockade for specified periods of time during the day for recreation or other purposes, accompanied by a member of the PWT staff.
3. If possible, better recreation facilities should be provided and movies including entertainment features, shown to the group at least once a week.
4. The process of re-education should be continued at least to the extent of the regular news and propaganda discussions initiated in Assam.
5. The group should be allowed as much initiative as possible in leaflet work. They get a great boost out of seeing their leaflets produced without too much emasculation, and it is wise to respect their judgment as to what approach is the most effective.

In the event that additional POWS are added to the existing group or new POW groups formed, the selection of the men is vitally important. Nisei staff members through personal contact, will be best qualified to form a reliable estimate of the POWS sincerity and trustworthiness, and when new groups are formed, it is essential that at least the leader be a man with genuine and strong anti-militarist convictions. Once the leader is found, he will be able to assist greatly in picking out other POWS who are cooperative and can work harmoniously together as a propaganda unit. When adding new men to an existing group, the group leader should be permitted to make the final decision as to whether individual candidates are acceptable. Always the POWS approached should be given a full understanding of the nature of the work and its consequences for them, so that they will not undertake it lightly or merely out of a desire to obtain better treatment. They must be prepared to face the fact that their action, temporarily at least, places them in the category of traitors to the present Japanese government.

In any new group, it is highly desirable that one or more of its members be able to read and understand some English. It is also important that the group represent different levels of education in order to assure that its propaganda will be pitched at the right level of understanding for the audience. As far as possible, different professional backgrounds should be represented as well.

Finally, the Assam PWT feels that the matter of guarantees of future security to POWS who undertake to work in such groups requires consideration and decision on the highest level in Washington. What is needed is the authority to give concrete assurances to these POWS that they will not be returned to Japan as prisoners of war at the close of hostilities, unless they so desire. They share the common attitude of nearly all Japanese prisoners that they are disgraced, and on top of that they have the added fear that, should their activities become known,

they will be denounced at home as traitors. Actually, when the war ends and the militarist regime is overthrown, the vast majority of the Japanese POWS will probably desire to return home as soon as they see that conditions are such that they can do so without stigma. However, we must expect that many POWS will hesitate to undertake psychological warfare work for us unless the assurances mentioned above are given to them in advance. In view of the contribution they can make to our war effort, we consider that such guarantees would be not only reasonable and just but pragmatically sound.

INDOCTRINATION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS*

By W. E. D.

The indoctrination of front-line officers and men of the 1st Cavalry Division led to greater cooperation and thus to increased effectiveness of psychological warfare in World War II.

The practice of detailing military personnel, trained in psychological warfare, to staff duties in the lower echelons was not widespread in World War II. For the most part, in North Africa and in Europe, psychological warfare personnel were assigned to a division for a specific mission and were withdrawn as soon as the objective was reached. The contact that psychological warfare officers had with front-line and service personnel was limited largely to those occasions when loudspeaker broadcast missions were conducted in or near the front lines. Occasionally these missions aroused the enemy's ire to the point that artillery shells were returned in retaliation. Such experiences did not serve to increase the American infantrymen's sympathy for or understanding of the mission of the combat propagandist.

In the various subareas, or military theaters of responsibility in the Pacific, in the war against Japan, the practice of assigning psywar personnel for duty within combat divisions varied greatly. In a few divisions staff officers permanently assigned to the unit were designated to perform duties essential to psychological warfare on a part-time basis. This same practice was almost universally followed in the American divisions of the UN Command in Korea during the years 1951 and 1952. In still other divisions in the Pacific area, in World War II, psychological warfare specialists were dispatched from corps and army headquarters on temporary duty assignments for service during specially designated periods of time or for specific campaigns.

Since psychological warfare on the tactical level was not a highly developed activity there was neither a doctrine nor an SOP to guide personnel assigned to psychological warfare duties in the lower echelons. The nature and extent of the work preformed by lower echelon psychological warfare personnel depended largely on the enthusiasm, interest, and knowledge of the enemy possessed by the designated personnel.

It appears to be axiomatic that units whose troops best understand the requirements, limitations, and potentialities of psychological warfare achieved the most effective results in its employment. The following account was prepared by an

* Adapted from an original account dictated by Major David Tuke stationed at the time at the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.

officer who served in a psychological warfare capacity with a combat division during World War II, as well as on the planning staff of a psychological warfare agency in the UN action in Korea. The story he tells well illustrates how he utilized his equipment and time during the war against Japan to inform the combat troops why it was essential for them to cooperate in the psychological warfare effort launched against enemy troops.

"During World War II, I was lucky enough to be in at the beginning of the American psychological warfare campaign in the Southwest Pacific. I was lucky because I learned a lesson in psywar operations we were not taught in the psywar school classes conducted in Brisbane, Australia, in August of 1944. It was a lesson I recently found to be still as necessary to know and to practice in the Korean campaign as it was throughout World War II. In Brisbane we were taught that our target was the mind of the Japanese soldier. We were taught how to operate against it, and how to use the necessary equipment, such as leaflets, loudspeakers, etc., in order to accomplish the assigned mission. We were then sent back to New Guinea, believing that we understood the fundamental necessities for waging an effective psychological warfare campaign against the enemy soldier.

"My sergeant and I were assigned to I Corps in September of 1944. I Corps at that time was busy mopping up isolated pockets of Japanese soldiers remaining in the area around Hollandia. The sergeant and I offered our services but the troops were too busy to make use of the combat weapon about which they knew little and cared less. The troops had been told nothing about psychological warfare, and quite naturally they looked upon us with suspicion for we carried a bizarre and fantastic name which to them would have appeared to be more at home in the Pentagon than in combat. We were looked upon as a nuisance by those in command and as something of a hairbrain joke by the enlisted personnel.

"I understood then, that we had only been taught the last lesson in the book, that is, how to reach the mind and win the will of the enemy soldier; about how to conduct an effective operation in a psywar campaign we were not told. The first lesson had been completely neglected. Absolutely nothing had been mentioned on how to reach the minds and win the wills of our *own* soldiers so that they would cooperate fully in the program. It was obviously impossible to hit the enemy target effectively if the minds and wills of our own men were either ignorant of the mission or apathetic about it.

"The 1st Cavalry Division was slated to make the D-day invasion of Leyte Island, in the Philippines, in October 1944. I therefore requested an assignment to that division as the psychological warfare officer, and when my request was approved spent the rest of my time with I Corps Headquarters making up orientation displays and briefings suitable for combat troops. I joined the 1st Cavalry Division in the Admiralty Islands just in time to make the invasion armada. Throughout the long sea voyage to Leyte, my sergeant kept our psywar leaflets constantly on exhibition and I periodically briefed both officers and men on the purpose and potential usefulness to them of psychological warfare. We neither persuaded nor impressed anyone.

"By the time we hit the beach at Leyte, I knew that we had at least two missions to perform. *First,* we would have to begin our indoctrination by associating psywar with something that our own troops could identify, or associate with themselves. *Second,* psywar would have to prove its usefulness. In Tacloban, capital city of Leyte, we got our chance to start work on the second mission. The town of course, was in a state of total confusion, the Philippine people were bewildered about just what to expect of us, and just what we expected of them, and because our two-man psywar unit had the only loudspeaker equipment available, the Provost Marshal called on us to broadcast a dozen times a day, both in Tacloban and in the surrounding villages, directing refugee traffic, keeping the main highway arteries open, issuing directives, and telling the people just what to expect of us and just what we expected of them.

"The mission worked both ways, in the way the Provost Marshal expected and in the way we hoped it would work with our own troops. We became known throughout the division, down through the regiments, in the companies, and even in the platoons. Our potentialities slowly began to be understood, the potentialities inherent in the use of psychological warfare.

"We installed ourselves in the G-2 office and followed closely the situation maps and the intelligence reports. We submitted daily recommendations as to just where we thought our leaflets could be dropped most effectively, and where loudspeaker broadcasts might bring results. On occasion, General Mudge, the Commanding General, called on us for a specific mission.

"When the 1st Cav established its permanent headquarters in Leyte, we got our first opportunity to work on the second half of our mission, that is, relating psychological warfare to something our own troops were hungry for, news of the world, news of the campaign in Leyte, the same kind of information we were disseminating to enemy soldiers in our psywar leaflets, in our news sheets, and more briefly in our loudspeaker broadcasts. By this time we really went to work on our own troops. Using a loudspeaker unit mounted on a weapon's carrier we really put the show on the road. We made daily visits to every outfit in the division, tying in the operations with our broadcasts to the enemy. We played jive music, gave daily newscasts in English to the 1st Cav troopers, and displayed prominently on the side of our weapon's carrier copies of our psywar news sheets, designed for use against the Japanese. After each newscast, we announced briefly that this was exactly the kind of broadcast we were just about to give, or had just given to the enemy. News was given of American victories in Leyte, throughout the Pacific and Europe and Japanese defeats on both land and sea. The troops got the idea and thus began to volunteer assistance. They helped us by packing leaflets and news sheets in artillery shell, by bundling leaflets for air drop, by giving us cover when in and near the front lines. From there on out in every single loudspeaker broadcast, directed against the enemy, psychological warfare to them was no longer a weird and improbably activity, dreamed up by impractical Pentagon pen-pushers. They had seen it in action, they had seen it clean out caves in which isolated but desperate enemy soldiers were holed up. Often this was accomplished without the loss of a single

American life. In time we lost that improbable name, psychological warfare. We became known with the usual kidding affection soldiers reserve for other outfits for whom they have developed a healthy respect as the 'paper bullet guys.'

"This indoctrination program provided us the opportunity to convince our own front line soldiers that we were with them to assist in doing a necessary job — that is, to inflict defeat on the enemy. However, as we pointed out, in order for us to help them to the utmost, it was necessary that the troops first help us in various ways. It was necessary that enemy soldiers attempting to surrender be treated in accordance with the terms we promised in our loudspeaker broadcasts and in the leaflets disseminated to them. Second, intelligence of value to an effective psywar program, such as can only be collected in the front line areas, was always needed, and should be gathered and promptly transmitted to the rear where it could be employed in reducing enemy resistance."

PERSONNEL UTILIZATION IN STRATEGIC PSYWAR EVALUATION*

By Alexander H. Leighton

Personnel trained in various academic disciplines and with varying vocational experience were fused into a team to conduct strategic evaluation and intelligence studies for the OWI and the military services during World War II.

PURPOSE AND TASK OF THE RESEARCH UNIT

During the war [World War II] an acute need was felt in many quarters for a better understanding of Japanese social and psychological characteristics as they related to military morale on the battlefront and to civilian morale in Japan. It was recognized that knowledge of Japanese thought and behavior was essential for dealing with the Japanese both as an enemy during the war and as a defeated nation in the postwar international world. The need for better understanding was felt particularly by those agencies charged with conducting psychological warfare against Japan. The Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) of the Office of War Information was organized to see how these problems could be illuminated by the application of social science methods and procedures to a particular body of wartime source materials made available by Allied military and civilian agencies.

The research was centered on two fields of interest — first, military morale at the battlefront and, second, civilian morale and internal social conditions on the homefront. The analysis of military morale was first concerned with clarifying the character and mainsprings of the Japanese soldier's morale, with determining whether the traditionally accepted picture of uniformly high and impregnable morale was a true one, and if not, with discovering its vulnerable points and the conditions under which it had wavered or was likely to weaken or break. The research unit explored the question, for example, of whether Japanese soldiers

* From A. H. Leighton, *Human Relations In A Changing World*, E. P. Dutton Co., Inc., New York, 1949, pp 295–311. Reproduced with permission of Dr. Leighton, the copyright holder, and E. P. Dutton Co., Inc., publisher.

inevitably lived up to their ideal of suicidal, last-ditch resistance, of how their patriotic and religious indoctrination had been achieved and maintained, of the circumstances under which resistance weakened and surrenders took place.

The study of civilian morale and internal social conditions in Japan was likewise carried forward with the purpose of discovering any variations in civilian morale and support of the war effort and of estimating vulnerable points. FMAD was prepared to investigate critically the assumption of a populace uniformly and effectively mobilized in support of the war. It was interested in determining the effects of increased food shortages and physical hardships, of air raids, evacuation, and the disruption of normal life. It wanted to know how these hardships affected the capacity for war production and how they might influence the will to resist in the event of Allied invasion of the homeland. It gathered data on tensions existing between classes or factions within Japan — industrial workers, farmers, women, students, intellectuals — and asked whether any of these groups showed signs of uncooperativeness or dissatisfaction with the war. Current information about such internal social conditions and attitudes of the people was felt to be of immediate importance during the war and of long-range significance for the occupation and administration of a defeated Japan.

These military and civilian fields of interest were not so sharply divided as might at first appear. The average Japanese soldier came from, and could be expected to return to the civilian population. His military and patriotic indoctrination was part of the larger Japanese ideology. Even the professional soldier represented an element in the greater Japanese community. From both fields it was hoped to obtain information that would throw light on Japanese cultural patterns of thought and behavior that appeared so baffling and incomprehensible to the Western mind.

Military and civilian intelligence reports were the source material upon which the research was based. These documents were brought together from all battlefronts and from a variety of civilian agencies. As it was received, the information of social and psychological importance was mingled with other kinds of operational or strategic data concerning order of battle, military installations, and economic or political affairs. The initial task of the research unit was to devise methods and procedures for handling this great volume and variety of source material and for systematically culling out, recording, and cataloging the data pertinent to its special interests. This recording, extracting, and analysis had to be managed under wartime pressures at a time when it was necessary not only to keep abreast of the continuous flow of incoming documents but to have the results of analysis immediately available. Also the recording had to be carried on in a way which would give time perspective and show current developments against the background of previous conditions. The review of documents and systematic recording of data were of such dimensions that they required a team of analysts. Uniform procedures for recording and extracting had to be worked out so that processing of a given document could be done by any one of the team of analysts with comparable results.

On the basis of the system which was developed, the research unit was prepared to supply information about Japanese morale and internal social conditions to military and civilian war agencies whenever it was requested or when it was thought that it would be helpful. In practice the specific activities and aims of the research unit became channelized along certain lines. As an OWI unit one of its primary aims was to provide information of use in the central planning of Allied psychological warfare policies and programs. Its analyses of military morale were based

on comparative source materials from all battlefronts and were thus strategic in character and supplementary to tactical analyses of similar but more localized material made by operational units in the field. (Such tactical units did not, however, employ social science methods and concepts.) Thus it was possible to supply an over-all picture which often gave perspective and comparisons to those in particular theaters. The use of the information was not limited to OWI units but extended also to the military and to such civilian agencies as OSS and the State Department. Aside from this specialized aim of the research in psychological warfare, the unit proposed as far as possible to supply other intelligence of a strategic nature, particularly for the War Department, as it was requested or as the research itself revealed significant leads. Although these two information and intelligence functions were primary, the FMAD also participated in training programs for overseas Civil Affairs and intelligence (OSS) personnel. Despite the wartime pressure to provide information of immediate utility, throughout the research the importance of the findings for occupation and reconstruction policies was taken into consideration.

The social scientists who conceived and directed the research project brought to it the point of view and accepted methods of the social sciences in general and of sociology, psychology, social anthropology, and psychiatry, in particular. They were impressed with the usefulness and necessity of applied social science and the utilization of scientific methods in the clarification of the social and human problems of our own civilization. A basic premise of the research was that social phenomena are susceptible of scientific analysis through systematic observation and classification and the consequent formulation of inductive generalizations. The body of general social science propositions about the nature of society and the behavior of its members formed part of the background of the research. Commonly accepted techniques of definition, classification, and measurement of social phenomena were used as far as was permitted by the limitations of the data and by the compromises and adjustments made necessary by their quality. The acceptance of the possibility of generalization about social phenomena from specific instances opened up a further field, that of prediction. It was a major concern and expectation of the research unit to be able to foretell the effect of changing factors in the morale picture and to estimate trends in time.

Among the fundamental propositions of social science, two were considered of basic importance to the research. The first was the assumption that certain uniformities exist in the behavior of individuals and in the operation of social groups due to common human and social factors. Equally important, on the other hand, was the recognition that between different social and national groups there exist certain contrasts in belief and behavior which are culturally conditioned and which can be understood only in terms of the cultural context of the groups in question. The importance of this comparative point of view cannot be overestimated for the study of morale and social conditions in a culture so different from our own.

How the various aims and demands were met by the research unit is described in the remainder of this report.

ORGANIZATION

The FMAD operated as an OWI unit under a cooperative arrangement with MIS (Military Intelligence Service) of the War Department. From both agencies in varying degrees it drew personnel and equipment, and through both it had access to the military and civilian intelligence documents that were used as source material. As an analysis and information unit it served both OWI and MIS by means of reports and representation at conferences.

The research unit was established under OWI in the spring of 1944 and began working with the nuclear personnel of a chief and three analysts. From the beginning this staff worked in space provided by the War Department and with access to MIS intelligence sources. In these first months, attention was centered primarily on problems of military morale. During the fall of 1944, the staff was gradually enlarged to an over-all personnel of seventeen, with part housed in the War Department and the other part in OWI offices. With increased personnel and facilities it was possible to turn attention to social conditions and morale on the Japanese homefront while further developing and refining the study of military morale.

By the beginning of 1945, the OWI personnel consisted of the division chief and co-chief, ten analysts, two translators, and three secretaries. From time to time additional temporary personnel was made available from OWI for special tasks. (The author of this report has included Navy members with the OWI group. This is done because they were assigned by the Navy to OWI.) The permanent staff represented a wide range of experience and training in the social sciences and psychiatry. The division chief had directed a social research project in a Japanese Relocation Center, following the evacuation of West Coast Japanese and Americans of Japanese ancestry, and had brought with him from the project four analysts and a secretary, all of Japanese ancestry. Ten members of the total OWI staff of seventeen (plus two who were later contributed by the Army) were persons of Japanese ancestry with linguistic or other special qualifications for working with Japanese materials. Another of the senior analysts had also had experience as head of social research in a Japanese Relocation Center. In all, a large proportion of the staff had had first hand knowledge of Japanese culture either through personal or research experience or through both. In addition to these special qualifications the remainder of the top personnel had had training and wide research experience in sociology, social anthropology, and psychology.

As an OWI operation the research unit was known as the Foreign Morale Analysis Division. It had two sections — the group housed in the War Department engaged in analysis of intelligence material made available through military sources, and the staff in the OWI office working on translation and analysis of other material available through non-military sources. In the War Department office, emphasis was on analysis of military morale, but data on homefront conditions were also assembled. The work of the staff in the OWI office was concerned with translation of current materials from the Japanese, independent background research on Japanese cultural and psychological characteristics, and the coordination of activities of the research unit with OWI psychological warfare policies and operations. Needless to say, there was free interchange of materials between both of these sections; joint meetings were held; and the data accumulated by one was accessible to the other.

As a War Department operation the research unit worked in cooperation with the Sociological Branch of MIS, had access to MIS intelligence materials, was assigned space and personnel by it, and prepared reports for it on request. The cooperative arrangement with MIS went through several stages. Under the final arrangement, completed in the spring of 1945, the cooperative research unit was known as the Joint Morale Survey. The JMS was comprised of the FMAD staff and the following personnel assigned by MIS: a joint chief of the unit correlative with the OWI divi-

sion chief, three civilian and three military research analysts, plus occasional other professional workers and clerical assistants. The JMS was divided into two sections — the morale research unit and a propaganda section concerned primarily with analysis of Japanese radio propaganda. The latter section was mainly an Army operation distinct from the morale research unit except for the loan of one OWI analyst to it and the utilization of its radio material by the research unit.

The results of the research were presented to policy-making and operational units in OWI and to the War Department essentially through two media — formal reports and memoranda, and in formal and informal conferences. The series of reports issued by the research unit, on subjects ranging from over-all studies of military morale and effects of Allied propaganda to reports on special topics, were circulated to policy-making units in OWI and the War Department. These formal reports reached a relatively wide audience of military and civilian agencies, and proved to be particularly useful to certain offices in OSS, the State Department, the Navy, and a British liaison unit concerned with morale problems. In addition to the regularly circulated series of reports, special memoranda were prepared in response to specific requests from MIS or when it was felt necessary. Although the subjects of the reports were in general geared to the known interests of OWI and MIS, suggestions and impetus for following certain lines of investigation also came from the research unit and from leads provided independently by the data.

Probably quite as effective as a means of presenting the point of view and results of the research to persons in key positions were the formal and informal conferences carried on with members of OWI, MIS, and other agencies. Representatives of FMAD participated regularly in policy-making meetings of the Far Eastern Division of OWI. Early in the summer of 1945 the co-chief of FMAD left to become director of an OWI over-all planning and coordinating unit for psychological warfare to Japan and provided a strategic link between the research and planning programs. Communication with War Department policy-making officials was likewise maintained through participation in conferences, principally on the part of the Army chief of the unit.

Conferences and particularly informal contacts, not only in OWI and the War Department but also with key persons in other agencies, were of great importance in establishing the research point of view, in communicating the results and in indicating the usefulness of social science research methods in this context.

SOURCES

The source material upon which the research was based covered a wide range of intelligence documents, both civilian and military. Military intelligence materials included documents obtained through collection, translation, and interrogation agencies of the Allies, principally American, British, Australian, and Chinese. The military intelligence documents were, of course, the principal source materials for analysis of Japanese military morale, but they also provided data not elsewhere available on internal social conditions and civilian morale in the Japanese homeland. Of the military documents, the most useful were prisoner of war interrogation reports, and the methods devised for their systematic analysis will be discussed later in detail. In addition to POW interrogations a variety of other types of strictly military intelligence sources, such as captured diaries and enemy military publications and orders, also provided rich data for the study of morale.

Intelligence materials from non-military sources and containing data on homefront conditions and morale were made available through MIS and civilian war

agencies, principally the following: OWI outposts, for translation and summaries of Japanese publications (OWI outposts also furnished special POW interrogations on psychological warfare subjects); OSS, for background material and special translations and interrogations; IDC (Inter-Departmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications), for translations and summaries of newspapers and periodical articles; and FCC, for translations of Japanese radio broadcasts. Except for certain types of materials, such as Japanese newspaper and radio broadcasts, the sources of data on internal social conditions were less uniform and less susceptible to measurement and systematic analysis than those for military morale. However, the greater variety and wider range of topics in this civilian data opened up unexpected and interesting possibilities. These intelligence documents, both military and civilian, were received currently insofar as translation and transmission facilities permitted. In general, the military documents were forwarded to Washington headquarters from the field with higher priority and became available for analysis more quickly than did civilian documents. As a result, it was possible to keep the analysis of military morale more up to date than that of the civilian data.

One disadvantage in the use of all of these materials for FMAD's research purposes was the inability of the research unit to participate in the gathering of the data and its lack of control over the sources. The materials had originally been collected for a variety of purposes — military, technical, economic, political. In many cases the original observations and collection of data were not made for sociological, psychological, or morale purposes. Except to a very limited extent in some POW interrogations, the research unit was not able to determine or influence the range and quality of field observations or the methods of collection of morale data. It used the materials gathered by others, often with different ends in view, as they were presented to the unit. Despite this lack of control over its origin and collection, much of the material proved to be useful and rewarding for the research purposes. In the following description of specific types of documents utilized, more attention will be given to military than to civilian sources, since their nature and the possibilities for their use are presumably less well known.

POW Interrogations

Interrogation reports were the richest sources of information on Japanese military morale and the most susceptible to systematic analysis. In volume they formed about half of the intelligence documents that came to the unit. POW interrogations, although conducted primarily for military information of operational value, contained other kinds of data useful for morale analysis. Almost all interrogations, except some on specialized subjects, enumerated at least a minimum of personal background items about the prisoner, such as his age, rank, home residence, education, and occupation. Statistics on such background items were essential in describing the "total population" of Japanese POWS. The principal data on morale resulted from direct questioning on such subjects as the state of discipline and military spirit in the POW's unit, attitudes toward last-ditch resistance and suicide, or the effects of Allied propaganda. Much could be inferred about the morale pictures from less direct questions on such topics as circumstances of capture, health and food conditions in the unit, supplies and reinforcements, training and patriotic indoctrination. In several series of interrogation reports the POWS were routinely questioned about homefront conditions.

The extreme readiness of Japanese POWS to talk under interrogation and their willingness to cooperate with their captors have been matters for surprise on the

part of Allied observers. Such apparent reversal of loyalty becomes more understandable in the light of Japanese psychology and particularly in the light of the Japanese military attitude toward the taking of prisoners. Japanese military ideology did not acknowledge the possibility that a Japanese soldier would surrender, had not in the early part of the war provided security training for this eventuality, and had denied to a soldier once taken prisoner the possibility of his return to Japanese society. Thus cut off from his life as a Japanese, the POW saw himself starting a new life, and his behavior under interrogation made sense in terms of this new adjustment. The extraordinary cooperation of the Japanese POWs made available a quantity and kind of information that would not have been possible otherwise.

Several different kinds of interrogation reports were used. Their form and content differed according to the place and circumstances of interrogation, that is, whether it was conducted in frontline units immediately after capture or later at rear echelons. Reports differed also in respect to the kind of information sought, whether primarily operational for use in the immediate situation or, on the other hand, for long range military, economic, or morale purposes. Three fairly distinct types of reports were used: 1) brief frontline interrogations concentrating on tactical information but containing identifying background data about the POW and, usually, brief notes on morale and the effect of Allied propaganda; 2) more detailed interrogations at rear echelons on both technical and morale subjects; 3) specialized interrogations made in rear areas or at special interrogation centers, often including extended questioning on military morale or homefront conditions. Sometimes in the latter type, essays on subjects pertaining to Japanese ideology and morale and to prospective occupation problems were solicited from POWs or even volunteered by them.

Captured Military Documents

Of the large volume of Japanese documents captured in military operations several types contained data particularly useful for the research unit. Perhaps the most revealing information about the attitudes of Japanese soldiers under battle conditions came from captured diaries and personal notebooks. The Japanese soldier was apparently accustomed to record his intimate thoughts and feelings in a personal journal to a much greater extent than is usual among Western soldiers. Although sometimes these diaries had a flavor of being written for an audience and reflected ideal soldierly attitudes, they also revealed quite clearly the strains and discontents of the soldier's life. The lengthier diaries often showed a change of attitude as the soldier proceeded from rear areas or successful campaigns to defensive fighting with its cumulative hardships and strain, and diaries from the early part of the war reflected a different mood from those covering later periods. Occasionally, comparable information came from captured letters and personal correspondence.

Captured official documents provided data on indoctrination, training, and official efforts for maintenance of discipline and morale. Information of this kind came from combat operational orders, official communications between rear and frontline headquarters, and training manuals and instructions. Such documents revealed weak spots that were the subject of official concern at various levels of command and the measures by which it was sought to strengthen them.

Translations of captured documents were published by Allied Translation Centers in the various war theaters. Full translations were made of important documents, but in most cases only pertinent extracts or summaries were published. The volume of Japanese documents was greater than the translation centers could handle, and only those judged to be of particular importance for military or other reasons were published. Presumably a great deal of morale material, especially personal data that was of no operational importance, was lost because of this. In some cases, when the catalogue listing of untranslated documents indicated one of particular interest, the original document could be obtained. In general, however, this remained an untapped source because of unavoidable delay in obtaining such originals and the limited facilities of FMAD's own translation unit.

Miscellaneous Military Intelligence Documents

In addition to these first-hand Japanese sources, military intelligence channels gave access to secondary accounts by non-Japanese individuals and agencies. These included reports by Allied experts on certain aspects of Japanese morale or by non-Japanese who for some reason, such as long residence in Japan, were qualified to give special kinds of information. For knowledge of the military background and progress of campaigns the periodic intelligence reports of Allied units were available.

Japanese Civilian Publications

These were mainly newspapers and periodicals. Abstracts and translations of articles were received principally from the Inter-Departmental Committee, but also from OWI outposts and other military or civilian field agencies. In addition to translations, the original copies of newspapers and periodicals, or microfilms of them, were in many cases available to the FMAD's own translation unit. The supply of untranslated Japanese materials of this kind, however, was much larger than the resources for handling it. Miscellaneous Japanese civilian publications, mostly of government origin, were also used. It was not possible to keep this material as up to date as the military analysis because of delay in translation or in the transmission of documents.

All of these publications in a sense represented the official Japanese point of view regarding the war effort and homefront conditions. More personal material from "inside Japan" which diverged from this official view was obviously difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, it was possible to use the official material, with due regard to its propaganda bias. It provided a more or less dependable record of internal events and official pronouncements. It also gave a basis for estimating current Japanese attitudes and stresses. By watching the kind and frequency of criticisms of certain social groups — for example, farmers, students, intellectuals, or women — it was possible to judge what problems and what elements of the population were causing most official concern.

Radio Monitoring

This last qualification regarding the propaganda bias of Japanese publications holds even more strongly for radio material. But, again, with due regard to this bias, the radio was found invaluable for keeping track of current internal events and the official propaganda line directed by the Japanese toward their own people

and toward Greater East Asia. Translations of the daily monitoring of Japanese broadcasts to the homeland, to GEA, and to the Allies were provided by FCC, and were supplemented by monitoring reports from other Allied agencies in the Pacific. The monitored material was quoted extensively from current Japanese periodicals. These daily radio reports had the obvious advantage of being more up to date than any other source.

Other Publications

Throughout the research, historical and background sources were used in connection with the current intelligence materials. These were writings both by Japanese and by Western observers or "experts" about Japan. A special FMAD study by Dr. Ruth Benedict (FMAD Report No. 25, *Japanese Behavior Patterns*, 15 September 1945. Enlarged and expanded, this has since appeared as *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946) on Japanese behavior and psychology made use of such historical and literary sources, particularly by Japanese writers, as well as first-hand information obtained from intensive interviewing of Japanese who had been reared or had lived in Japan.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

. . . some of the general office operations and procedures as they were applied to all data used in the research will be described. In brief, the essential procedures consisted of taking notes and extracts of information relevant to the social and psychological interests of the research, and classifying and filing these notes under topical headings so that they would be readily and quickly available for analysis and report writing.

Topical Outlines

The topical outlines grew out of a combination of empirical and theoretical considerations. It was assumed that certain aspects of social organization would have importance for the research. Topics of this order had to do, for instance, with evidences of internal social divisions along class or factional lines, information about ideology and methods of patriotic indoctrination, information about political or military leadership and attitudes toward it, information about child rearing and education. Such topics, or their parallels, are familiar landmarks in any social analysis. The topical outline was organized against such a background of established theoretical interests. In addition, however, the choice of many of the specific topics was conditioned by the kind of data available in the documents. Subdivisions of larger topics were often made on this basis. The homefront sources were found to contain, for instance, a great deal of information about civilian reactions to bombings, about attitudes toward Allied propaganda and Allied military successes, and about various aspects of the civilian war effort. Military sources yielded sufficient data on certain crucial subjects, such as attitudes toward suicide, maintenance of discipline, or emotional attitudes toward the enemy, to warrant separate topical headings in the outline. Two separate topical outlines were divised in this manner, one for military or "fighting forces" material, the other for civilian or "homefront" material. [The *Fighting Forces* and *Homefront Topical Outlines* are given in Appendix I of Leighton's *Human Relations in a Changing World*, pp 328–36.] These topical outlines were used by the analysts as guides to the kind of material to be extracted or on which notes should be taken; they were also used in the organization and filing of the completed research notes.

Processing

Certain fundamental procedures were used in the processing of documents received by the research unit. These procedures were applied to all incoming material, although certain types of documents, namely POW interrogations, were in addition subjected to a more elaborate scheme of analysis. Incoming military documents were routed to the research unit before being sent to the MIS library. Documents received from other agencies could in some cases be retained in the files; in other cases they had to be processed and returned. All incoming documents were scanned, and if they contained relevant information, notes were taken, whether or not the document was to remain in the office files. Notes were made in the form of summaries or brief indication of content when the document was lengthy or would be easily accessible in the files or from the library. Direct quotations and more or less extended extracts were made from documents when the material was of crucial importance or when the original document would be difficult to regain. The large volume of incoming MIS documents and the time limit that they could be held for processing (72 hours in the case of important documents) put constant pressure upon the research unit to devise ways and means to expedite their handling. It also meant that compromises had to be made in the completeness with which notes could be taken.

A uniform system of note-taking was devised. All notes, whether summaries or extracts, were made on 5″ × 8″ sheets, easily manageable in the research files, and were made with sufficient carbon copies to allow the note to be filed under each of the topical headings to which it applied. Some series of brief OWI documents were received in multiple copies that could be cut up or filed in toto under the appropriate headings. The necessary bibliographical information was recorded on the note together with sufficient additional identification to indicate the context or source of the data. In the case of captured documents such identification would include a description of the document, the number of pages it contained, where and when it had been captured, etc. Bibliographical references to all documents processed were also kept on index cards, together with reference to where a complete copy of the notes had been filed, and thus provided a catalogue of all documents processed and a mechanical means for locating the notes taken from any given document.

Research Note Files

The research notes were organized under the headings of the topical outlines in the *Fighting Forces* and *Homefront* files. Any one note usually was pertinent to several topics in the outline. The mechanical means of marking and filing notes had gone through several revisions in the course of operations. The final and most satisfactory arrangement was to type across the top of the note at the time it was made all of the topics under which it was to be filed, at the same time ensuring that sufficient carbons of the note were made (or cross-references if this were impractical) to be filed under each topic. Each copy was designated for filing by underlining the appropriate topic. Notes were dated according to the time reference of the material contained in them, and in most cases they were filed chronologically under each heading.

In addition to the Fighting Forces and Homefront note files built up in this way, it was felt necessary to maintain a master *Area File*. One copy of all notes pertaining to a given area, exclusive of Japan proper, was filed chronologically under an appropriate area heading. Thus, at any time a survey of all notes taken on the

Philippines or Burma, for example, regardless of the topics dealt with, could be readily made. The Homefront File itself constituted the area file for Japan proper, and within it notes were filed chronologically under each topic heading. The chronological arrangement of notes in the Area and Homefront Files gave a rough time perspective even at this stage of the analysis and facilitated handling the data for estimating time trends.

Other files were maintained for special kinds of material. The files for notes from POW interrogations will be described later, together with the special methods for processing POW material. The amount of material from newspapers and periodicals was sufficient to warrant another master file, known as the *Current Opinion File*. One copy of all notes from newspapers and periodicals (or cross-references) were filed here chronologically by publication name. The Current Opinion File thus brought together in convenient form all notes on newspapers and periodicals that had been translated or processed by the research unit. Similarly a separate *Radio File* was kept for notes from FCC and other monitoring. The headings for the Radio File were a duplication of those of the Homefront File, but it was found advisable to keep notes from this special source separate from all other homefront notes.

The research files constituted the materials from which analyses could be made. At any one time they represented all of the materials processed to date. The notes in many cases contained the data in a form in which it could be used directly in preparing reports; in other cases they provided a means of reassembling the original sources. Once used, it was merely a mechanical operation to return the notes to their proper places in the files ready for future reference and reuse.

Research and report writing on particular topics were achieved through what the members of the Division came to call "task forces." After a subject had been selected, or after a request had come in from a policy maker, one of the senior analysts would become head of the work related to the project. He would draw together such staff as he needed from among the processors and the other analysts, but, since the processors had to keep up with their daily routine of handling incoming intelligence material, the "task force" usually operated as such only during half of each day. When the first draft of a report was finished, it would be examined by all the professional members of the Division and then discussed at a meeting. Following this it would be reworked by the "task force," with additional research if need be, and then submitted to the chief of the Division or the co-chief. As a rule the chief would pass it informally to a number of appropriate policy makers for their suggestions and then return it with their and his own comments for a final going over by the "task force." After this the report was given to the Division editor who prepared it for publication, checking when necessary with the head of the "task force." When all the research and report writing were completed, the "task force" disbanded. Its members, however, would before long be reassorted and reassembled in a new project of a similar character. Sometimes two or more such groups were in existence simultaneously.

This kind of organization was employed instead of a permanent division between processing and topical research for two reasons. First, it saved the processors from the deadly monotony of an entirely routine task and from the falling off in work quality that often comes as a result of boredom in such circumstances. Second, it kept the processors familiar with how the material they collected daily was actually used, and hence it sharpened their judgment and interest in selecting items and placing them in the best categories.

USIE KOREA — AN EXPERIMENT IN WARTIME OPERATIONS*

By Rolf Jacoby

An American Information Officer in Korea in 1950 describes some of his difficulties as he went about the task of implementing American information objectives in war-torn Korea.

After more than a year as a war operation, USIE Korea is still swirling up dust or churning mud along rutted paths taking word and picture to more than twenty million Koreans. As the first State Department information organization ever to operate in the thick of a red-hot war, USIE Korea and its travails are of more than passing interest at posts which have to face the threat of open Communist violence.

When the Communist armies struck on June 25, 1950, USIE Korea was a far-flung organization with experienced local personnel and equipment necessary for conducting a hard-hitting information and educational exchange program. By the third day of the war a large part of the American personnel had been evacuated to Japan. Several American and local staff members were immediately detailed to psychological warfare work in Tokyo. Other Americans, however, were flown back to South Korea to carry on in the rear areas.

Field operations were modified to emphasize war and morale news. Mobile teams, operating from information centers, covered a lot of real estate during the summer of 1950. One mobile motion picture unit, in hot pursuit of a potential audience, drove straight into enemy territory, with the American assistant radio officer at the wheel. Luckily, after small arms fire had pinned the team down for the rest of the day and part of the night, everybody returned, although a Korean interpreter was hit from behind by an enemy rifle bullet. The wound healed, but the mobile unit, recovered much later, is a useless, burned-out shell. Since then USIE has attempted to confine its ground operations to friendly territory.

Throughout the critical summer of 1950, when rumor and panic were the chief USIE targets, USIE news — disseminated by radio, public address sets, printed or mimeographed handouts, leaflets, bulletin boards, and motion pictures — achieved and maintained extremely high and deserved credibility. The most convincing evidence that people believed USIE occurred in August a year ago when the enemy was less than five miles from Taegu. When a misinterpreted military directive resulted in a ROK order to all civilians to evacuate the town, USIE was a lone, if loud, voice exhorting the people to stay. USIE promptly succeeded in stemming the panic, and Taegu remained the second largest functioning city in the Republic of Korea.

In October 1950, just a few days after the city was retaken, key operations were returned to Seoul. Here the new problems were how to operate in a bombed, shelled, and burned-out city. The weather turned inclement, and the going was hard. Several hundred pallid former local employees, left behind in the first evacuation, appeared again and had to be screened. Most of them could be re-employed. But there was a stark background of hunger, destruction, cold, and

* Extracted from USIE *Newsletter*, Aug 51, pp 1–4. Reprinted with permission of the author and the US Information Agency.

insecurity. Within four weeks, however, USIE again had a smooth-working operation, in spite of the fact that the information center had been completely destroyed and the rest of the buildings were badly damaged. By the middle of December the evacuation of all but a small key staff was begun again, and on the third of January the last USIE jeep rolled southward across the frozen Han River.

Back in the expanded perimenter USIE efforts were intensified. New, improved publications were created. Dictation-speed radio news scripts and a weekly pictorial news poster were inaugurated. Today the operation remains flexible, ready to move with the tide of battle and alert to ferret out and attack morale and informational problems.

USIE's effort to keep up an uninterrupted operation has been successful only because of a decentralized field organization. There were USIE centers in all key cities even before the war. By reorganizing them as the war and the capital of Korea moved back and forth, they were easily converted into operational headquarters. In addition to offering shelter, these centers had radio sets, mimeograph machines, typewriters, stencils, paper, generators, and a more or less experienced Korean staff. Thus, at all times there was continuity in the USIE effort in spite of evacuations, returns, and re-evacuations. If USIE's human and material resources had been centralized in the capital city, Seoul, everything except the American personnel would have been lost in the first two days of the war, and it would have been months before USIE could have gotten into action again.

Among the novel problems confronting USIE at war were relations with the US Army. USIE's early relations with the Army, most informal, were not without puzzlement. "Now exactly who are you?" was the usual opening Army gambit. While frequently an answer seemed at first to be unimpressive, the discovery that USIE had a pool of qualified writers and interpreters, had knowledge of the country and the people, and was willing and able to produce data, publications, and radio programs was gladly accepted and utilized by the Army. In one specific case the English text of an 8th Army airdrop leaflet came to USIE at 9:30 in the evening with the request for 100,000 leaflets in the Korean language, including a cut of General Walker's signature, by 7:00 a.m. The next morning, in the curfew-deadened town of Taegu, USIE met the deadline.

Over the months there has developed a working relationship between USIE and various UN Command agencies in Korea. These include the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, which performs G-5 functions through ROK channels, especially in forward areas; the Second Logistical Command, which is responsible for unloading ships in Pusan and transporting supplies forward; United Nations Civil Information and Education, which is responsible for tactical psychological operations against the enemy. USIE now regularly assists these units and is assisted by them. Now, the Army's opening gambit in an interview is usually, "We understand USIE can help us." Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in the first few months of the war, before these units were established in Korea, USIE provided the shock troops, and later the cadre, in the "hot" information effort. It was only shortly before the Inchon landing, after the greatest informational crises had passed, that the UN Command managed to get one psychological warfare officer to Korea.

During the early days of the war much time was also spent with American and foreign reporters on Korean background, and many a story was made possible only through the loan of a USIE interpreter. One American member of USIE was detailed permanently to the UN, where he was the only person with intensive pre-war knowledge of health and welfare conditions.

Besides the new work with the military and with reporters, the war situation required an increase in copy and photo production by USIE Korea for the use of the Department and USIE posts in Southeast Asia. This has been and is being done, although there is now only one American technician doing the motion picture and still-photo work that he and three other Americans did before the war. In this connection, it might be noted that the motion picture unit, described in the June USIE *Newsletter*, is again producing Korean newsreels and documentaries and is dubbing in the sound on IMP documentaries.

One major problem of wartime operation is a minor problem even in peacetime, but in a war situation it assumes a nightmarish aspect. "Three bids of which the lowest. . ." and "bills in quintuplicate" are possibly things of intrinsic beauty and under normal circumstances of necessity, but the circumstances were not normal except for the administrative rules. The final solution in a number of cases was that members of USIE paid for operations out of their own pocket. Having lost most of their property in the evacuation of Seoul anyway, this further contribution was not a novelty. Another matter was that of supplies. The cumbersome machinery involved in filling supply requisitions from 9,000 miles away is a time-consuming process in the best of circumstances. In a war operation it is even longer before the supplies can hit the pipeline. However, on the basis of literally begging, borrowing, and "stealing," USIE kept going and kept producing.

The most definite conclusion that can be drawn from the experience of USIE Korea is that the normal information program must be geared for swift changes if it is to function in a war situation. The fact that USIE Korea was flexible, motorized (with jeeps and trucks), and decentralized (with personnel, buildings, supplies, and equipment stockpiled in regional offices) enabled the operation to continue uninterrupted. USIE lived from its fat, which was largely acquired from the Army long before the war. Without scattered hoards, USIE would have had to close up shop. USIE Korea is still operating to a large extent on a "scrounging" basis, even in the matter of personal housing. The moral for other USIE operations threatened by Communist military attack would seem to be, "scrounge, hoard, motorize, and decentralize."

THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER*

By James J. Robbins

The Public Affairs Officer serves two major functions:
(1) *he is a specialist on cultural and information matters;*
(2) *he is a relatively high-ranking quasi-political general officer on the staff of the Ambassador or Minister.*

[The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is a post-World War II arrival in the US Foreign Service. Since there is not a long history to which one can defer to learn what a typical or ideal PAO does in line of duty it is not easy to describe with a high degree of accuracy what functions he actually performs. The account which follows was prepared by a former PAO and is based not alone on his own account of his activities, for he discussed his conclusions with persons engaged in similar work in other areas, and circulated the account which follows to several other Public Affairs Officers for comment and emendation.]

* Extracted from a Department of State Foreign Service Institute Training Document, prepared by Dr. Robbins, Professor of Political Science, American University, one time Public Affairs Officer, US Embassy, Stockholm Sweden, 1950.

[While this account may not cover the variety of actual situations at all posts, it is believed to give a fairly accurate general picture that may serve as a point of departure for analysis of the kind of training required for effective operations in the field.]

The Two Major Functions of the PAO

Usually the Public Affairs Officer may anticipate a two- or three-year assignment, the main aim of which is to disseminate essential information and to build up a program of cultural and educational exchange between the United States and the country to which he has been assigned. Once at the post, he is likely to find that he has two major functions: as a relatively high-ranking quasi-political *general officer* of the mission, and as a *specialist* on informational and cultural activities. These will be discussed in turn.

The General Functions of the PAO as Diplomat

The PAO is not likely to be confined by any means to carrying out only the work of his own section of the Embassy or Legation. As a senior officer of the mission, one of a number in the Ambassador's or Minister's official suite, he will be expected, as are all other officers of his rank, to carry out a good many assignments of a general diplomatic nature. Some of them will consume much time and energy.

For purposes of planning or executing the total work of the mission, he will be available at any time for meetings called by his chief or by the latter's executive officer. If the PAO is a person of particular skill and experience in the affairs of the country to which his mission is accredited, he is likely to be called upon for a great deal of advice of a broadly diplomatic, political, or economic character, as well as for coordination of the information and education programs with these other activities.

In his general capacity as diplomat, he is also likely to be expected to attend as a "working guest" at luncheons, dinners, and receptions given by his superiors. He has to be on hand to take care of any number of distinguished local personages and also to meet a variety of visiting firemen from home, such as Senators, Congressmen, and other VIP's.

Because of these responsibilities, and also in order to carry out his more specialized tasks in the public affairs field, he will find it indispensable to cultivate within the mission the friendly cooperation of fellow officers and employees. Although it is sometimes assumed that an American diplomat abroad ought to spend all his time socially with outsiders, the facts of life are otherwise. No senior officer can do his job well without frequently collaborating with these fellow officers, their wives, their families. All of them may be able to reach out into many circles in the community that he may not be able to tap himself. The PAO, like other officers, will naturally include among his cocktail and dinner guests some of these fellow officers and their wives. Foreign officials entertained in his home expect to meet a good sprinkling of Americans. And these other Americans provide extra sets of eyes and ears at social functions.

The Functions of the PAO as Chief of USIE

In his more specialized function in the field of public affairs, he will move into his section of the mission as the responsible program planner and supervisor of all the various activities of the USIE. He must coordinate and spark the work of

press officers, cultural attaches, librarians, the specialists on films, radio and music, and educational exchange officers. He has to see that a proper balance is maintained in the use of these several media, sometimes shifting the emphasis from one medium to another. In the use of media he will be guided first of all by the needs of the mission as a whole, by the general patterns of State Department policy as indicated by the flow of instructions, and by the changing character of opinion and policy in the area in which he is operating.

One of his biggest jobs will be to devise fairly accurate and speedy methods of assessing the effectiveness of the several media, and of reporting these evaluations to the Department. To do this, he will need to have a better-than-casual acquaintance with the more exact established techniques of measurement known to experts in the field of mass media and communication. And he will certainly find it increasingly necessary, within the next few years, to get into his staff the appropriately trained Program Evaluation Specialists for these exacting tasks. Reliable sampling of audience reactions to USIE activities is necessary not only as a guide to officers in the field and the Department in the economical planning of output through various media. It is also indispensable in the preparation of budget justifications, which ought to demonstrate quite clearly to Congressmen and other policy makers just what is being accomplished in relation to the main path of our foreign policy. Although the PAO, unlike certain other officers in the Mission, is expected to devote the major part of his time to *disseminational* rather than *reporting* work, he cannot avoid giving the most careful attention to these evaluative and measuring functions. Unless these functions are performed with a high degree of professional skill, his whole operation will run the danger of foundering aimlessly in a sea of indecision, or of allowing the USIE to be monopolized by the momentary enthusiasms of some especially energetic officer.

The Public Affairs Officer, as well as his chief assistants, will need to have a good working knowledge of the political and social structure of the country in which they are operating and an especially firm grasp of the avenues of communication that are used in influencing opinion. Ideally these officers would have had university training in the history, culture, politics, economics and language of their area, before leaving the US for their posts. The well-equipped USIE office will have readily available a kit of currently useful background materials on these for the instruction and orientation of newly arrived staff associates.

Another important responsibility of the PAO is to see that his USIE is properly equipped with analytic files of current data on principal personalities, organizations, mass and educational media, and social trends. He needs to have staff specialists trained in the analysis of the institutionalized patterns of communication, as in the organization of the press, the radio, educational and scientific institutions, the churches, the labor movements and so on, who will prepare systematic files of materials that will provide without delay the names of all the key leaders and groups in the country. Ideally, the PAO will have built up a card-index of the major organizations in such fields as press, education, science, the arts, etc., indicating the names, addresses and phone numbers, as well as the personal characteristics of the key people in these areas who have to be cultivated by social calls, letters, invitations, and insertion on mailing lists. Such a list is invaluable, not only for the use of the PAO and his staff, but also for use in advising the chief of mission, on request, as to invitations for major diplomatic functions and appro-

priate approaches to influential sectors of the population. Such files are also essential for orientation of new staff members, and especially for the PAO's successor when the latter first arrives at his post.

The PAO and his staff will be expected to keep themselves abreast of American affairs and especially American foreign policy as it develops day by day. Many hours each week will be spent by the PAO reading incoming cables, dispatches, reports and analyses, circular telegrams, and airgrams from the Department of State (and now the USIA). Also he will be expected to read selectively but voluminously from the American daily press and periodical literature, unless he is willing to run the risk of falling out of touch with the American scene. If he fails to keep this vital source of information flowing across his desk he may have embarrassing questions fired at him by editors and others (including fellow officers in the Embassy). These people are likely to expect the Public Affairs Section Officer to represent the United States in a very literal sense. To increase the chances of success, the USIE staff should have a good distribution of Americans by regional origin in the United States, and the PAO himself just before he goes abroad will be much better off if he gets some down-to-earth orientation on the American continent outside Washington and beyond his home state. He should take full advantage of drama, sports, scientific developments, religious life, labor conditions, politics, and education. At the post he needs to insure that he receives for his own use and for the use of his staff an adequate cross-section of reference materials on the US; and he needs to make sure that his staff knows how to use these.

To make sure that the informational and educational exchange work is really country-wide, the PAO must do a good deal of traveling outside the capital city. For this purpose, he may have to exercise no little ingenuity in controlling his daily schedule so as not to become desk-bound. He will also find it wise to plan his budget, so far as he is able to control it, so that there are sufficient funds for travel and per diem outside the capital city, not only for himself but also for the librarian, the press officer, the cultural attache, the film officer, and others. Above all he will have to fight heavy centripetal forces, special and administrative, which always seem to militate against any trip of more than a few miles or a few hours away from the chancery. The executive officers of some missions simply cannot understand that a PAO has a special kind of job to do that cannot be done if he binds himself to a 9 to 5 schedule in and about the chancery, where he is conveniently at the beck and call of everybody. But even in the capital city, the arrangement of his social calendar is a matter of major importance. He can easily allow himself to be snowed under by repetitious contact in the same circles. He has to make a systematic effort to diversify his contacts and to see that his staff members do the same.

He will encourage every staff member to keep antennae out to the key sectors of public opinion, and will see to it that they all build up complementary circles of acquaintance. Certain staff members will be spotted for their special talents and as new techniques are introduced, such as precision in opinion measurement and trend analysis, he will develop their special skills. When staff members wish to take advantage of educational and cultural opportunities relevant to their functions, such as participation in local cultural groups and attendance at local educational institutions, he will encourage them to do so and will free their time when possible.

Not the least important of a PAO's duties is the cultivation of press and cultural officers in other missions. Only by knowing them personally and well can he keep himself informed about what they are doing. Reciprocal courtesies can often lead to most useful information and to new uses for our own media.

Training of USIE Officers

It will be obvious from the above sketch of the manifold duties awaiting a PAO at his post that much is expected of him. He must know a lot before he gets there and he must keep learning all the time. Moreover, he must build up and maintain a certain *esprit de corps* in his staff based on their shared understanding of what the program means as a whole and as an integral part of American foreign policy. They must all keep up a high level of out-put through the available media and they have to be continuously on the job of evaluating the effectiveness of all the activity. The training required for these tasks cannot possibly be offered in major part at the post. It has to be given to people before they leave home soil. Just what training is necessary, in detail, remains a problem the solution of which will require much consultation between those experienced in the program and the skill-trainers in educational institutions.

Profiles of a Few Outstanding Propagandists

The editors of this volume believe that any discussion of psychological warfare and foreign information personnel should include biographical profiles of a few outstanding propagandists of our time. Thus, biographical sketches of seven were chosen for inclusion in this work. Only two of those selected are American citizens.

Of the seven chosen, two were propagandists for Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels and William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw"); one is a Russian, Ilya Ehrenburg; and two, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart and Richard Crossman, served British interests in the UN psychological warfare efforts of World War II. The two Americans were combat propagandists who were judged by their wartime colleagues to have been unusually effective in their propaganda operations against Nazi troops.

If an analysis of the training, skills, and personality traits possessed by the seven were attempted, a number of interesting observations might be made. First, as far as can be judged from the written record of their lives, all seven appear to possess or to have possessed strong tendencies toward extroversion. Second, all possessed education and travel experiences far above that of the average man of their age and cultural background. Third, all possessed what one writer has called "political awareness," i.e., an interest in and concern for the political events and trends of their time.

If Goebbels were eliminated from the list as one primarily concerned with the propagandizing of his own people, and Joyce because, as a British

renegade working for the Germans, he was not especially effective, it may be observed that the others all have other important attributes in common. All possess that quality that one of them, Crossman, has called "empathy." Ehrenburg, owing in large measure to extensive travel and residence in Western Europe, understood the mind of the West far better than most of those responsible for making political decisions in the USSR. He has lived most of his adult life outside Russia.

Bruce Lockhart came to be recognized among British leaders as one of the few who could successfully bridge the cultural gap between his own people and those of Eastern Europe, especially the Czechoslovaks and the Soviet Russians. Crossman understood the machinations and mental processes of the German Nazis as well as any Britisher of this generation. This knowledge he gained from years of study and travel in Hitler's homeland.

Benno Frank and Martin Herz, the two Americans, were also alike in several important respects, although different in others. Each was, however, equally well qualified for service in a psychological warfare effort directed at Nazi Germany. Herz, an American-born citizen, spent a number of years as a young boy in Vienna, Austria, a prewar center of German culture and arts. He went to school in Austria with young men who later served in the Nazi armies of World War II. His knowledge of the German language was as profound as his knowledge of English. Furthermore, he demonstrated that he understood and respected all that was good in the German culture while rejecting the insidious aspects of the training imposed on German youth by Nazism.

Benno Frank, on the other hand, is a naturalized American citizen, the son of a Polish diplomat. He received most of his higher education in Germany during the 1920's, during which time he lived in the home of an important German general. He came to understand and to appreciate the inherently good qualities of German civilization far better than most native-born Germans, while retaining the necessary objectivity that enabled him to be critical of Nazi excesses. He, along with the others, possessed an extremely keen imagination and that trait of character that showed a willingness to try or to improvise new tricks or devices by which the enemy might be successfully thrown off psychological balance.

Also, it should be noted that all those whose biographical profiles are included in this volume possessed an unusual and facile literary and oratorical ability. All were able to express themselves well in the language that served as the major means of communications with their respective target audiences. Benno Frank is an outstanding student and teacher of dramatic arts, and Ehrenburg, Lockhart, Crossman, and Herz have all demonstrated strong interests in literary and journalistic pursuits.

JOSEPH GOEBBELS

By M. J.

The Nazi Propaganda Strategist

Joseph Goebbels, Nazi propaganda minister throughout the Hitler regime in Germany, was born in the German industrial town of Rheydt in 1897. His father was a small manufacturer and most of his family seem to have been from the artisan or small-entrepreneur stratum of German society. His father and his mother (who survived her son) were devout members of the Catholic Church. The mother had hopes that young Joseph Goebbels would go into the priesthood, and she hoped that his early manifestations of literary skill might assist in his promotion in the clergy. Part of his early education was on a scholarship of the clerical Albertus Magnus Catholic Society, although the priest who interviewed him for this award is supposed to have discovered: "My young friend, you do not believe in God!" (p 5)[17] Goebbels possessed a limp, or a clubfoot, that was due to an attack of osteomyelitis at the age of seven and required an operation resulting in the shortening of one leg.

During World War I, great emphasis was put on military service in Germany, and this carried Goebbels along with it so that at the early age of seventeen he volunteered for army duty. He was found unfit for the army, and this is said to have caused him great chagrin and humiliation and even to have intensified his militaristic enthusiasm. Later as a propagandist it is alleged that he attempted to cultivate the belief that his infirmity was actually due to a war injury.

He spent the years of World War I as a student in German universities, receiving a doctor's degree from Heidelberg University in 1921. His student days were marked by extreme restlessness, even aimlessness. He attended eight different universities, and, as one biographer said, "It is a German custom to study at several universities, but to switch from one to the other every six months was most unusual even in Germany." (p 6)[17] His intellectual tendencies at this time were diverse and conflicting. The hero in a later Goebbels autobiographical novel says:

> "What exactly do I study? Everything and nothing. I'm too lazy and, I believe, too stupid for any particular science. I want to become a man. I want to become a great personality!" (p 7)[17]

He read Marxist literature under the influence of a communist friend, and yet he was also influenced by the romantic German writers and wrote his doctor's thesis on a German romantic dramatist.

Goebbels was never attracted to an academic or any other routine career, and the end of the war left him, like so many other German young men, at loose ends. At the same time, the economic position of his family, as in so many members of the small entrepreneurial groups, was suddenly worsened by the great postwar German inflation.

He began a career in journalism and wrote some novels. However, in 1922 he was attracted to National Socialism when he heard Hitler speak for the first time. He soon became an agitator in his native town for the Nazi party, rapidly becoming adept at manipulating a crowd by oratory and mass demonstrations. As an

orator he was recognized as second only to Hitler, among the Nazis, in his ability to hypnotize an audience.

He was more inclined than were Hitler and the Munich party leaders to emphasize the necessity of attracting the working classes to the Nazi movement through emulation of Communist and Socialist propaganda. Hitler soon brought him back into line by argument and careful cultivation of his friendship and admiration. Goebbels was, as far as any of his colleagues were able to tell, passionately devoted to Hitler and Hitler's personal success. He was one of the few Nazi leaders who remained loyal to Hitler to the end. Unlike so many others, he committed suicide after Hitler did, apparently believing his own *raison d'etre* to be coterminous with that of the Nazi leader's.

In 1926 he was appointed Nazi Gauleiter of Berlin and in that left-wing-inclined city became accustomed to making speeches before violently hostile audiences. Here, he became experienced in the simultaneous use of persuasion and violence. On one occasion he made a speech after a brawl with several wounded SA men left lying on stretchers before him for their potential effect on the audience. After Hitler became Chancellor, Goebbels was appointed minister of popular enlightenment, i.e., propaganda minister. This position gave him complete control over radio, press, cinema and theater, and later, all German art.

In 1931, he married a divorcee named Magda Quandt, by whom he was to have six children. His marital history was one of periodic rupture and reconciliation, for he was sexually promiscuous. Hitler took a personal interest in Goebbels' family life and at one time is supposed to have prevented a divorce between him and his wife.

On becoming Nazi propaganda minister in 1933 Goebbels placed his undeniably brilliant intelligence and his insight into mass psychology entirely at the service of his party. In staging mass meetings and parades he was unsurpassed in ability. Goebbels not only helped Hitler to gain power and aided him in consolidating his position, but also, by intrigue and manipulation of symbolic appeals he helped to popularize National Socialism abroad. He is said to have raised bald lying to the status of an art and to have employed every available facility and channel in spreading untruths. It is also said that he held no particular beliefs except that of self-justification of power.

During World War II his propaganda schemes were usually formulated in the light of the latest and the most secret intelligence. This was possible because of his close relations with Hitler, and a disregard of how he personally was thought of by his listeners and readers. He appears to have had little interest in personal popularity with the German people so long as he could contribute to maintaining, by his propaganda efforts, the myth of the Fuehrer's superhumanity. Indeed, he appears to have been aware that awe and respect for Hitler could exist in the German population while the masses disliked him [Goebbels] and held him in contempt for his activities. One writer has pointed out the fact that most propaganda ministers seem to be unfit for challenging the leadership of their chiefs of state.[18] In Goebbels' case, rivalry with Hitler was completely obviated, not only by his age, but also by his personal, possibly even deliberately cultivated, unpopularity. Goebbel's image of himself may have been that of a Fuehrer maker, and right-hand man, but he certainly never thought of himself as a potential successor to Hitler.

Goebbels' propaganda approach was extremely flexible. He became one of the most highly developed examples of the completely manipulative, amoral, propa-

gandist of modern times.* In his personal work habits, however, his office staff regarded him as eccentrically rigid in his passion for orderliness and excessive neatness. (p 139)[17] He was most concerned about his physical appearance, owned hundreds of suits of clothes, and cultivated an artificial sun-tan in winter. He liked to appear dressed entirely in white most of the summer. (p 141)[17]

As defeat in World War II became increasingly evident he appears to have been able to face the deteriorating military situation with considerable realism, and even occasionally used the encouragement of pessimism and self-deprivation as a domestic propaganda device. The climax of his career was his destruction of himself and his family in April 1945 as Berlin was falling to Russian troops. Apparently his determination that his six young children should die with him and his wife was conditioned by his view that the continued existence of his offspring after his own death would be a dishonor to himself and an abnegation of the belief that he had cultivated — that his existence was wholly dedicated to the greater glory of Hitler.

WILLIAM JOYCE

By M. J.

Propagandist of Treason

William Joyce — "Lord Haw-Haw" — the best-known English propagandist for the Germans in World War II, was not, legally speaking, an Englishman. By extraction he was Irish, both his father and his mother having been born in Ireland and having lived most of their lives there. Legally, however, he was probably an American citizen, since he himself was born in the US; his father had become a naturalized American, and neither had ever resumed or acquired British citizenship. The British court that convicted William Joyce for treason tried him as an alien owing allegiance to the British Crown since his British citizenship could not be established.

Joyce was born in New York in 1906, but he had been brought up in Ireland. The period of his childhood and adolescence were spent under the shadow of British armed suppression of the Irish rebellion. He showed an early indifference to the opinions of most of his contemporaries (who were then Irish nationalists) by participating as a volunteer in the British "Black and Tans." William Joyce's father and his brother (although all were Roman Catholics) shared these "loyalist" convictions, although the reason why they did so is not at all clear.

When the Irish independence movement finally succeeded in 1921, the Joyces lost the protection the British Crown had afforded them against the nationalists; as a consequence they moved to a London suburb, apparently for the sake of safety from their Irish countrymen. Michael Joyce, William's father, had been a fairly prosperous building contractor in Ireland and America. In England, however, he became a grocer and the Joyce family fortunes took a turn for the worse.

* For example, he made a legendary hero out of Horst Wessel, who died in a brawl with a rival over a prostitute who was the means of his livelihood. (pp 61–62)[17] The fact that the true information about the cause of Horst Wessel's death came out in a public trial "didn't bother him (Goebbels) in the least," according to his assistant in the propaganda ministry.

In 1922, William wrote a letter to the University of London in which he applied for admission to the army officers' training corps, passionately proclaiming his English patriotism, and professing his previous experience in the use of arms in Ireland on behalf of the British Crown as qualification. Despite his fervent protestations of patriotism, however, it can be surmised that he had been bitterly disappointed when the English withdrew from Ireland, rather than persevering in the suppression of Irish rebellion by the use of violence. Had the British been successful in this suppression the private fortunes of the Joyces, as loyalists, might not have taken a downward turn.

At the University of London, Joyce pursued a course of humanistic studies and graduated with distinction even though he did not get a regular academic appointment. One writer who watched him at his trial years later described him as "grotesque" and commented that it was out of the question that he should have been offered one:

> "He could never by any chance have been invited to join the staff of any school or college of conventional academic prestige, for in spite of all his studies there clung to everything he did or said a curious atmosphere of illiteracy." (p 72)[19]

While in the university he appears to have rid himself of his Irish brogue and to have acquired an English accent, without however, according to his biographer, acquiring a diction that would lead one to identify him as a member of the English upper classes.

While at the University of London, he joined the British Union of Fascist, led by Sir Oswald Mosley. Joyce for a time had been an active member of the Conservative Party, but it would seem that his "grotesqueness" of manner and appearance closed the doors of advancement in that organization:

> "It is inconceivable too that the Conservative Party, or, for that matter, the Liberal Party, or the Labour Party, should have admitted William Joyce to anywhere near the inner circle of operative power, even if that circle was drawn widely enough to dilute that power far below Cabinet strength. It was not only culture in the sense of book-learning which was inaccessible to him; it was also culture in the sense of the life of the people. A police officer who had known William Joyce for many years . . . said . . . that sometimes Joyce had reminded him . . . in the days before the war, of a real criminal . . . because he . . . 'did not seem to fit in anywhere.' " (p 72)[19]

As a Fascist, Joyce trained himself in oratorical agitation in which he acquired considerable skill. His voice was so arresting and memorable that in 1945 it led to his instant recognition by British officers when he was hiding out in a forest in Germany.

> "The famous voice was let loose. For a fraction of a second we heard its familiar quality. It was as we had heard it for six years; it reverberated with the desire for power. Never was there a more perfect voice for a demagogue, for its reverberations were so strong that they were certain to awaken echoes in every heart that was tumid with the same appetite." (p 6)[19]

His love of violence may have been gratified by the activities of the British Fascists who, in their early days, were allowed to wear uniforms and whose oratorical meetings were usually climaxed by semiarmed conflict. Joyce himself was

indicted with others for illegal violence at one of these meetings but was acquitted on the grounds that provocation from the victims had been its cause. He became the deputy leader of Mosley's party and its director of propaganda. This promotion appears to have been due less to his admitted skill in agitation and organization than to the fact that Mosely did not consider him a likely rival for the leadership of the party.

Although Mosley had originally modeled his party on the Italian fascist example, the rise of the National Socialists in Germany fascinated and attracted Joyce far more. On the one hand, Mosley proclaimed the national uniqueness of British Fascism, while on the other Joyce embraced the transnational aspirations of the Nazis toward German hegemony over the Western democracies. His relations with Mosley and the latter's upperclass English recruits were such that there developed a breach between them. He appears to have been snubbed socially by those who were quite willing to utilize his talents in the organization. (p 83)[19] In any event, after a visit to Germany, he left Mosley to found the British National Socialist Party. Since the group suffered from no apparent lack of funds, and yet had only a very small following, it would appear to have been largely financed by the German Nazis themselves.

During these years, Joyce married a dentist's daughter, a Protestant, and thereupon renounced Catholicism, the religion of his family. By this marriage he had two children. As he rose in Fascist circles, however, he neglected his family. Finally, he was divorced from his wife, only later to marry a daughter of a textile warehouse manager, a member of Mosley's party.

As Anglo-German tension increased during the 1930's, Joyce was careful to see that his British passport did not expire. In 1939 at the height of the Polish crisis he availed himself of it and went to Germany with his second wife. Only a few weeks after the declaration of war, in the autumn of 1939, his first broadcast under German auspices was heard in Britain. His broadcasts were characterized by a wry humor, which, together with his pseudo-cultured accents, earned him the name, Lord Haw-Haw.

His early appeals were directed at British class tension and whatever latent anti-Semitism existed in England. At this time he had a large audience (over 50 percent of the British listening public) but there is no evidence that he had any corresponding influence on British attitudes.[20] After the German conquest of France, his tactics changed to direct appeals to the British to surrender to the Nazis for their own good, and it is conjectured that if he had previously had any sort of indirect effect on his listeners, this change in strategy brought it to a virtual end. Joyce's propaganda "line" was always immersed in patriotic appeals. He professed that his love of England led him to advise English submission to the stronger Nazi power, just as he had in his early years encouraged Ireland to submit to British domination.

Although the Germans accepted Joyce's services, it was his fate that they did not accept him personally, any more than had Mosley's colleagues. Other British traitors received greater emoluments from the Germans than did Joyce. Goebbels is reported never to have had any enthusiasm for his employment and to have lost confidence in him entirely when the war and Joyce's propaganda line took a different turn in 1940. (pp 189–90)[17]

At the end of the war, when he and his wife were hidden with German identity cards in a forest near the Danish frontier, Joyce gave himself away to the British by speaking in English to a pair of officers who were looking for firewood.

ILYA EHRENBURG [21,22]

By M. J.

Propagandist of Soviet Nationalism

Ilya Gregoriyevitch Ehrenburg, one of the best-known Soviet propagandists during World War II, was born in 1891 in Moscow. He was brought up in a Moscow suburb where he apparently remembered particularly the "sour, stale odor of a brewery," but in spite of what this memory tends to suggest, his parents seem to have been fairly well-to-do. He was educated in a Moscow *gymnasium* and by private tutors, one of whom, it is reported, found him a "wicked" child and allegedly used to hypnotize him to make him manageable. At the age of thirteen he manifested a life-long tendency toward expatriation when he traveled alone to Berlin, without apparent reason or parental authorization. Later, however, he was again in Moscow, engaging in agitational activities at the Moscow *gymnasium*, organizing student strikes as early as the time of the rebellion of 1905. In 1908 he was arrested and imprisoned, but only for a brief time, since he was soon bailed out, presumably by his parents. In 1909 he traveled widely in Russia but shortly went, in the same year, to Paris where he became a poet. His poetry showed, according to Prince Mirsky, "an extraordinary adaptability to the taste of the times: his poems from 1911 to 1922 may be used as a text-book of the successive changes of poetical schools."[23] In Paris he came under the influence of a group of well-known mystical and Catholic writers, including the famous French poet, Paul Claudel. Ehrenburg so shared the spirit of these associates at this time that he considered joining the Benedictine Order.

During World War I he was sent as a reporter by the French government to the French and Macedonian fronts, and his experiences resulted in a series of fairly realistic articles on the war. When the Russian revolution began in 1917 he returned to his homeland and engaged in child supervisory activities and teaching in Kiev, Tiflis, and elsewhere. He was arrested and temporarily held as a White Russian agent, but he was soon released, and, after much vacillation, became a Bolshevik. For a time he lived in Moscow at a Bolshevik home for "proletarian writers," but, according to biographers, found the living conditions during the civil war so uncomfortable that he returned to France in 1921. Although it is possible that he returned to Western Europe on instructions from the Russian government, still it is certain that he never showed marked attachment to his native land. Mirsky describes him as one of the most westernized of Russian writers.[23] A friend of his reports that not only could he perceive "Italian elements" in the Kremlin, but that he manifested no interest in the industrial city of Kuibichev on visiting it for the first time: "I am sure," this observer writes, "that he regarded otherwise the cities of Bruges, Rouen, or Cologne."[24]

On his return to France in 1921, he was expelled for a time as a Bolshevik, and found refuge in Belgium. There he produced a number of novels, including *The Extraordinary Adventures of Julio Jurenito*, a picturesque story of a wandering Mexican who promotes the cause of revolution by support of reactionary movements. During his stay in Paris he escaped the internecine wars within the Russian Communist party, especially in the 1930s. While his novels suggest that he may have had "left deviationist," "Trotskyist," and even "prematurely anti-fascist" inclinations, he seems always to have had an attentive eye out for the "main chance."

After the fall of France in 1940 he returned to Russia where he was less generally well-known than in Paris, and not until the invasion of Russia by the Nazis did he become a major Soviet propagandist. He was then brought forward and throughout the war was one of the principal journalists working under the propaganda ministry. His articles appeared not only in *Pravda* and other leading Soviet journals but also as dispatches from the Eastern front in American and Allied Western newspapers. His typical article contained a glorification of a particular Soviet hero, a good deal of "human interest," and a political moral, such as a plea for a second front. He was a pioneer in the revival of Russian nationalist exhortation sponsored by the Bolsheviks during the war.

Ehrenburg's novels, which continued during the war, were based on patriotic themes in the same style as his articles, and can only be described as "hack" performances. Most of his works appeared in English translation during the war and, directly or indirectly, probably did much to provide material in the West for popularization of the Russian cause and drawing attention to the wartime deprivations of the Soviet Union. His contacts and reputation in the West explain in part why the Russian propaganda ministers chose him as their chief "foreign press agent."

Despite Ehrenburg's obvious efforts to act in conformity with the party line, as early as 1945 he was officially criticized as being too anti-German (when the official Soviet directives had begun to make attempts to conciliate the German population). He has since been repeatedly criticized for "deviationism" although, at the time of writing, he was still being produced for the benefit of Western visitors to Russia. None of these has ever detected any nonconformity in his utterances while he has been in their society.

It is noteworthy that one of the most outstanding glorifiers of the Russian national spirit during World War II should have been a writer who had himself preferred to live most of his adult life outside Russia. His literary opportunism made it possible for him to produce the whole range of effects required by Bolshevik propaganda aims, from cynicism to free sentimentality. At present it is impossible to foresee whether his "cosmopolitanism" and Western training will make it worth while for the Bolshevik leaders to perserve him for some possible future use.

SIR ROBERT H. BRUCE LOCKHART*

By M. J. and W. E. D.

World War II Director General
British Political Warfare Executive

Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart was born in Scotland in 1887. He was Scottish on both his father's and his mother's side and he once wrote, "There is no drop of English blood in my veins."[25] Although his family belonged to an ancient Scottish clan, some of whose members were extremely rich, Lockhart's father had relatively modest resources, and thus it was necessary that his four sons make their own careers.

* In the preparation of this profile sketch the writer has relied heavily for data on two accounts by Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart: his post-World War II memoirs, *Comes the Reckoning*;[14] and an account of an address that he delivered in London on 25 January 1950, later reprinted in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*.[26]

Lockhart's education was begun in an English public school, but he was sent abroad to Germany and France for his higher education. Here he acquired great facility in German and French, specializing during his academic career mainly in literature and linguistics. He was by inclination a wide and serious reader, yet he had no fixed ambitions along any lines. On his return to Scotland he was led by an uncle's tale of ready fortunes to become involved in Malayan rubber planting. A sojourn in Malaya took him through several fairly dangerous escapades, one of which finally led his uncle to believe he would be better off at home, and thus he soon returned to England. Aside from vague literary ambitions his only plans at this time appear to have been to place himself in the way of adventure. According to his own account, he found himself capable of severe stints of work for short periods of time, but not of long and sustained steady effort.

Through the advice and intervention of his father he was given the consular service examination on which he placed first, despite the earlier neglect of political economy in his education. He entered the Foreign Office at the age of 23 and was soon sent as vice-consul to Moscow (in 1912). He immediately applied himself to learning Russian, becoming rapidly proficient in this language. After his first year in Moscow, he married an Australian girl, daughter of a wealthy family whom he had met the previous year in Scotland. They were divorced many years later.

With the beginning of World War I, a major task of British Foreign Office personnel in Russia became that of giving encouragement to the Russian war effort. Lockhart's astute reports to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg relative to the Russian political situation resulted in his being appointed acting Consul General in Moscow. In 1916, at the age of 29 he opened a propaganda bureau in Moscow for which the British Government provided only £50 per month for operations.

The many contacts he had established with government officials and the intelligentsia and his facility in the Russian language made him a popular figure in Moscow. He was given access to important political information, and was found frequently speaking to Russian audiences extolling the joint British-Russian efforts against Imperial Germany. As Russian resistance at the front began to collapse and as the home folks became demoralized, Lockhart increased his propaganda efforts by making special efforts to maintain contacts with each wave of new leaders which came to the fore. He was intimate with Kerensky during the last days of the Kerensky regime, however, he was forced to leave Russia for sick leave in England during a crucial period of that ill-fated regime.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, Lockhart was one of the few British officials in London well-acquainted with the contemporary Russian situation and with the Russian language. Since the new regime was not officially recognized, it was impossible for the British government to carry on formal relations with its government and hence Lloyd George and the cabinet sent Lockhart back to Russia as a special agent accredited to the Bolshevik organization. His function was to do what he could to prolong Russian participation in the war, to look out for the interests of British nationals, and to keep the home government informed on the state of Russian affairs.

He succeeded in establishing contact with Lenin and Trotsky and was even taken into the confidence of the latter. However, he had little success in persuading the British government that the Bolsheviks were not merely agents of the German imperial government. After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed,

Lockhart advised against Allied intervention in Russia without Russian invitation, but he failed to influence British policy in this direction. When the British finally intervened with troops, Lockhart was thought by Trotsky and others to have been responsible and therefore he was put in jail. In time he was released and sent back to England, in exchange for Litvinov, the Bolshevik emissary in London. Shortly after the end of the war, he served for a short while as commercial secretary in Prague. He resigned from the Foreign Office a few years later and took up a brief career in central European banking and followed this by journalistic work. He wrote several books between the two wars and continued his adventures in Europe and the East. He was an enthusiastic advocate of Czechoslovak autonomy, intimate with Eduard Beneš and Jan Masaryk, and, in fact, he knew intimately most of the leading politicians of Europe.

Lockhart was one of the leading spokesmen of the group of individuals who vociferously opposed the appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain in 1938. In 1939, after the fall of the Beneš government in Czechoslovakia, the outbreak of the war in Europe, and the establishment of the Provisional Czech Government in London, Sir Robert was called out of retirement and assigned to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, where he was made head of a division concerned with Central Europe and the Balkans, with the exception of Germany and Austria. In this position he was to have an indirect association with the propaganda activities of the British.

Later on, in the autumn of 1939, Lockhart, owing to his longtime friendship for Beneš and Jan Masaryk, and his sympathy for the plight of the Czechs, was designated liaison officer with Dr. Beneš and the Czechoslovaks in Great Britain, in addition to his continuing duties as a member of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. In July 1941 he was appointed Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office and took a leading role in coordinating the activities of various British government agencies engaged in propaganda work. Early in 1942, following a reorganization of the British propaganda services he became Director General of the newly established Political Warfare Executive (PWE).

In many respects the British experience in organizing for propaganda warfare was similar to that of the US. The organizational setup did not remain static for long, and there were always those who pressed for changes, few ever being satisfied with the compromises that are inevitably a part of a democratically controlled coalition government. At the beginning of the war in Europe a Ministry of Information (MOI) dealt with all matters of publicity concerning not only Britain, but also neutral and allied countries. An entirely separate organization, a secret department of the Foreign Office (Department of Enemy Propaganda) was given the responsibility for disseminating propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries. To make for further difficulties the propaganda service of the Foreign Office was physically located in the country, 40 miles from London, far removed from the political and military departments with which it had to work closely, if it were to operate effectively.

Lockhart has reported (p 192)[26] that one of the most serious obstacles which faced the propaganda services of the Foreign Office was the separation from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Although the Department of Enemy Propaganda of the Foreign Office had vague authority over broadcasts in foreign languages, practical experience showed that control over broadcasting could not

be exercised efficiently unless the controlling body is near the microphone. The European Service of BBC resented any interference interposed by a department buried in the country.

In June 1941, Mr. Duff Cooper, the then Minister of Information, made a bid in the cabinet for single control over all British propaganda activities. He was defeated in his efforts by the service departments. They refused to give strategic secrets to a department mainly concerned with publicity. Following this, Lockhart was asked to submit a scheme for reorganizing the propaganda services. He proposed the establishment of a separate department under the Foreign Office, with close relations with the military services, with a special junior minister in charge. In making its decision the Cabinet was forced to compromise between ideal efficiency and political expediency. It decided that there was a vital distinction between information disseminated at home and abroad among friends and allies, and propaganda disseminated to enemy and enemy-occupied areas.

As a consequence, the Cabinet voted to give control of propaganda to a Committee of three Ministers: Dr. Hugh Dalton, Brendan Bracken, and Anthony Eden, chairman. In addition, it was decided to establish a committee of three to administer a Political Warfare Executive (PWE), charged with waging "political warfare," a term the British prefer to use rather than the term "psychological warfare." Lockhart was designated as chairman of PWE. PWE was to make weekly reports to the three ministers.

PWE, as originally organized, proved unworkable. Lockhart, the chairman, had offices in the Foreign Office; General Dallas Brooks, the head of the military wing of the Department for Enemy Propaganda was located in Lansdowne House; the European Services of BBC were situated in Bush House; the Ministry of Information was housed in Bloomsbury; and the bulk of the propaganda experts remained in the country in Bedfordshire. Physical separation made effective control and coordination impossible, chaos was inevitable; the separate organizations being constantly at loggerheads. Lockhart, in speaking of this arrangement, has written, "during this period there was more political warfare on the home front than against the enemy." (p 96)[14]

Lockhart attributes no small part of the difficulties of the British propagandists to the lack of interest of Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister.

> "Much of our teething trouble would have been modified if only the Prime Minister had been interested in political warfare. Unfortunately for us, this great man, himself our greatest war propagandist, attached at best a secondary importance to all forms of propaganda." (p 127)[14]

Although Lockhart's attempts to reorganize the British propaganda services was more than enough to occupy one man's time, this was only one of many activities that concerned him during the summer of 1941. He continued his liaison activities with the Czechs in London, consulting with Beneš regularly on propaganda matters relative to Central and Eastern Europe. He found Beneš a great source of strategic intelligence concerning Russia, which had been attacked by Nazi Germany on June 22. Lockhart has written:

> ". . . Czechs, who were neither Communists nor capitalists, had always made it their business to know both East and West. President Beneš was therefore well worth consulting on propaganda matters and on Russia." (p 130)[14]

Lockhart was quick to seek the advice and help of any who could assist in British propaganda operations. His wide acquaintance among European leaders and exiles was of great assistance. Among those with whom he consulted frequently during this period was M. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador to London. Concerning Maisky, Sir Robert has written:

> "A great reader with a fertile and subtle intellect and a genuine appreciation of the best in world literature, he was by far the shrewdest and most able of the Russian ambassadors whom the Kremlin has sent to this country. He gave me considerable help in my political warfare work, and his criticisms of our leaflets were always valuable. He did not believe in subtlety in propaganda and found our leaflets too long. A leaflet he said, was like a bullet. One argument was enough for one target. Figures and facts were the best propaganda; the best facts were victories and the best figures dead Germans." (p 141)[14]

In addition to administering an unwieldy propaganda organization, and planning, revising, and preparing propaganda content for current operations, Lockhart's advice on Russian matters was constantly being sought by Eden and others in the Foreign Office during the critical autumn days of 1941, when it looked as though Soviet Russia might be forced out of the war by the German armies fighting with undiminished determination.

It was only a matter of time before all British leaders knowledgeable on the subject became convinced that the propaganda setup had to be revised further. Again Lockhart, unsuccessfully, proposed single ministerial control over the propaganda agencies. It was not until May 1945, much too late to affect the fortunes of war, that full ministerial control, under Anthony Eden, was accomplished. What was accomplished in February 1942 may be termed "half-way measures," the result of inevitable compromise and expediency.

The PWE was reorganized and given a new charter, with two ministers: Eden for policy, and Bracken for administration. Lockhart was made Director General. Lockhart has characterized the revised setup as a great improvement over the previously existing organization, yet an untidy administrative arrangement. It is impossible to separate policy matters from administrative matters, he has written.

The mission undertaken by the reorganized PWE was a twofold one. First, to undermine, by overt and covert means, the morale of the enemy, and second, to sustain and foster the spirit of resistance of British friends in enemy-occupied countries. Before either of these tasks could be undertaken vigorously Lockhart had to accomplish a number of administrative changes. His success in meeting the challenge of the times has rightfully earned for him the title of outstanding administrator as well as extraordinary propagandist.

Administrative tasks successfully undertaken included bringing all PWE personnel into one building and in close proximity with other allied propaganda services. The Director General along with the military wing of PWE moved into Bush House in the same block with BBC. A new agreement was made with the BBC which gave PWE full policy control over foreign broadcasts. Bringing the propagandists back from the country was by far the most difficult problem to handle, but even this task was accomplished in the course of time.

To know something of the views of the man who presided over the cumbersome British propaganda service for most of World War II, the following quotations

are lifted from his postwar writings and speeches. These tell us much about his opinion and thoughts of how a nation's propaganda effort should be organized and coordinated with various services.

In defining or delimiting the field of psychological warfare (political warfare to the British) this is what he has written.

> ". . . political warfare is neither an exact science nor a separate art. As the handmaid of official policy and of military strategy, it is dependent on the calculations and errors of government . . . It has to take its directives not only from ministers and Chiefs of Staff, who are not always readily available but also from the incidence of time and events. (p 155)[14]
>
> "Political warfare . . . may be described as the application of propaganda to the needs of total warfare. It seeks by special knowledge to anticipate and forestall the intentions of the enemy, to commit him to military objectives which appeal to the enemy public but which his forces cannot fulfil, to disturb the morale of the enemy public by secret broadcasting stations allegedly operated by disaffected enemy subjects inside enemy territory, and, in general, to play its part in the various schemes of deception. Described bluntly, its main purpose is to soften the way and render easier the task of the armed forces." (p 195)[26]

Lockhart, in common with most British and American propagandists insists on the importance of objectivity and truth in propaganda warfare.

> "In open propaganda there is one fundamental truth which . . . is not always understood. The credit that the propagandist enjoys both with the enemy and in enemy-occupied territory is in direct proportion to the accuracy of his information. . .
>
> "We had of course no say in the compilation of official communiques but I should like to emphasize the importance to political warfare of their accuracy. . . . Inaccurate claims in official communiques are . . . a great handicap to the propagandists and not only encourage the enemy but have a depressing effect on pro-Ally elements in enemy occupied countries. This applies with added force to bombing where both enemy and enemy occupied populations can see the results for themeslves and are inclined to assume that all communiques are inaccurate. . ." (p 196)[26]

With respect to the relation of policy and propaganda Lockhart has said:

> ". . . political warfare is and always must be the handmaid of official policy. It is the duty and function of the propagandist to use his ingenuity, skill and special knowledge for the propaganda exploitation of official policy. It is equally his duty and function to keep his output of open propaganda within the framework of official policy and to ensure that he makes no divergence from it which may commit or embarrass the Government." (p 201)[26]

On questions of organization and personnel required for psychological warfare he has offered what appears to be equally sage advice.

> "It was one of the lessons of the war — any political warfare organization must work very closely with and be subordinate to the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. Today, I can merely express a heartfelt hope that it will have one boss and never again come under the control of divided authority or a committee, let alone three ministers and two committees. (p 202)[26]
>
> ". . . the Political Warfare Executive was not an easy team. Every good propagandist has and, I think, must have the qualities of a prima donna. The department was composed almost entirely of temporary personnel drawn from every walk of life. It had a strong *esprit d'corps* but considerably less knowledge of Whitehall under whose restraints it sometimes chafed. From my experience of two wars I think it fair to say that the temporary departments suffer from lack of experience and excess of zeal and perhaps the reverse is true of the permanent departments." (p 196)[26]

Any list of prominent and outstanding propagandists of the present and recent past must of virtual necessity include the name of Robert H. Bruce Lockhart. It is important therefore that attention be focused on those aspects of his training, experience, and aptitudes that have played a part in his mental and emotional makeup and that rightfully bring to him recognition as one of the leading political warriors of this generation.

First, note that his formal education was equal to, if it did not surpass, that acquired by most of those in the intellectual circles at the top of British society. At an early age he demonstrated literary skill and knowledge and won praise for his facility in foreign languages. To formal education he added travel, an experience that broadened his cultural horizons.

After entering the career service of the Foreign Office he demonstrated an interest in people to whom he was sent as a British government representative, administrative ability, and tact, as evidenced by the fact that he was promoted to acting Consul General in Moscow at an especially grave time, when only 27 years of age. He continued throughout his active career to demonstrate his ability as an executive. This stood him in good stead when he was offered the opportunity to bring order out of chaos in reorganizing the multiheaded British propaganda setup in World War II.

Equally important as his other attributes is the fact that Lockhart appeared to be equally sure of himself whether dealing with a foreign dignitary, a cabinet minister, a high ranking military officer or a subordinate. He is an "extrovert" within the full meaning of that term. He demonstrated a skill at making incisive decisions and an ability to get on with the work at hand, despite many frustrations, which few of his contemporaries have equaled. His predilection and skill in journalistic ventures may account for a part of this.

No aspect of his experience and training appears to have been employed more effectively in psychological warfare than his intimate knowledge of regions where he had lived, studied and worked with great effectiveness. He wrote, following World War II, "My personal view is that in propaganda an ounce of first-hand experience of a country is worth a ton of theoretical knowledge." (p 156)[14]

At the end of World War II, Lockhart again withdrew from the public service, as he had earlier during the years of the uneasy peace between the two world conflicts. For his services in World War II a grateful nation knighted him. Once more he sought to resume the pursuit of private literary and journalistic ventures, but not with complete success. With Russian expansionism and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, once more Sir Robert became involved in British psycho-

logical warfare. However, for reasons of health, he was forced to limit his involvement largely to the role of chief BBC spokesman to Czechoslovakia, with which country he has had long and intimate attachment and close association with democratic leaders of the past three decades. Thus, perhaps a still more interesting and effective chapter of Lockhart's life is only now being written by his current deeds and declarations.

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN

By W. E. D.

Scholar, a Politician, an Outstanding Allied Propagandist of World War II

A survey conducted among Americans who served either in a civilian or a military capacity in the World War II psychological warfare effort disclosed that respondents most often mentioned Dick Crossman as the propagandist on the UN side who most nearly embodied all the qualities of a "propaganda genius." What is the background of this man and what are the qualities of character, ability, and experience that impressed his associates and acquaintances so forcefully?

Dick Crossman is a Britisher, a former tutor and lecturer at Oxford University, and was at time of writing a representative of the British Labour Party, from Coventry, in the British House of Commons. During the last war, he served the UN cause with distinction, first as the Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ, Algiers, and later as Assistant Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Crossman was mainly interested in university teaching and local politics. Since the war his major concerns have been with the problems of national and international affairs, with a side interest in journalism. In recent years he has served as the Assistant Editor of the *New Statesman and Nation.*

Dick is the son of a judge. He followed the example of his father by going first to Winchester College and then to New College, Oxford. He won scholarships to both institutions. He obtained a double first at Oxford, i.e., first class in Greek and Latin philology and first class in ancient history and philosophy. He was elected a fellow of his College, even before he took his degree.

He finished his university training in 1929, at the age of 22. Since this was considered much too tender an age at which to start a teaching career, he was sent to Germany for a year to continue his studies of ancient Greek philosophy. While he was in Germany he first demonstrated an interest in political affairs. During 1929–1930 the Nazis won their first significant election victories, and Crossman then on the continent, exchanged his interest in poetry and ancient philosophy for one in politics, especially that pertaining to modern problems. His first active political contacts in Germany were with Communists, including a number of leading members of the party.

After a year in Germany, he returned to Oxford where he began a comparative study of the works of Plato and Marx. For 8 years he lectured on Plato's *Republic,* during which time he wrote his first book, *Plato Today.* In addition he became the first Oxford tutor to master Marx's early philosophical work. In teaching the

works of Plato, Crossman introduced a new trend in thought concerning this noted Greek philosopher. He treated Plato as more of a political failure, as one who, in the period of democratic decline in Athens, sought salvation in a totalitarian state. This was in contrast to the practice, previously followed in England, of treating him as the spiritual father of British democracy.

By 1934 Crossman found that his academic pursuits were not sufficient to absorb all his energies. Thus he became an elected member of the Labour Group on the Oxford City Council, on which body he served until 1940. He also continued to spend a part of each year in Germany making studies of National Socialism. These visits to the continent and the broadcasts that followed on the BBC brought him into close association with a small group of British Socialists, led by Bevin and Dalton, who were outspokenly opposed to the pacifism of the British Labour Party and who argued in behalf of British rearmament in order to save the League of Nations. Crossman thus became a member of the group dubbed by Sir Stafford Cripps as "reactionary right wingers."

During the winter of 1939–1940, in the period of the so-called "phoney war," Crossman enjoyed little, if any, status with the officials in the British Foreign Office, even though he was one of the Britishers most knowledgeable on current German affairs. When the Churchill coalition government came to power, Dr. Dalton was put in charge of all British psychological warfare directed against enemy and enemy-occupied countries. He in turn put Crossman in charge of the German department, much to the consternation of old-line Foreign Office officials, who raised all manner of numerous objections to this appointment. During 1942 he assumed a leading role in the reorganization of the BBC German-language broadcasts.

In the spring of 1943 Crossman was sent to Algiers as the senior British official in PWB/AFHQ. Throughout the rest of the war he served as the senior British officer in the major Allied psychological warfare effort in Europe, first, in the Mediterranean area, and later in Northwest Europe with PWD/SHAEF. At the end of the war he returned to East Coventry to campaign and win election to parliament as a Labour party member. He defeated a Conservative, a Liberal, and a Communist. As a member of Parliament he joined a small group, headed by Aneurin Bevan, to advocate the creation of a "third force," to counteract the more extreme demands made by pro-American and pro-Russian groups.

Although most Americans who knew Crossman during the war agree that he was one of the Allies outstanding propagandists, they do not agree among themselves in all respects concerning the traits of character that made him so successful. However, the following comments are typical of those made by American colleagues who knew him during World War II.

One civilian who worked with him said of Crossman:

> "I personally think our greatest propagandist was Dick Crossman because he has an insidious mind. . . . It was this type of extremely lovable and likeable, but extremely insidious, personality that made him tremendously effective for PW."

Daniel Lerner in speaking of Crossman's ability in psychological warfare has written as follows: (p 89)[15]

> "What mainly distinguished Crossman as a policymaker was his superior knowledge of German, Germany and the Germans in the context of con-

temporary European and world politics. This rich background of experience and knowledge enabled him to use his first-rate intelligence to project himself into the German mind and to 'sense the psychological moment' with respect to that audience."

Another civilian, in describing the qualifications of Crossman that impressed his American colleagues relative to his ability as a propagandist said this of him:

> ". . . he had the imagination to see the enemy from the inside, to know what would get under his skin and what would move him. Not from an idealistic point of view, but a practical point of view. . . . Now there were many people who knew Germany better, more about German culture, who could tell you all about German philosophy, who had probably taught German for many years at some of the best universities, who were not one-tenth as effective as this guy was; he was a born propagandist."

BENNO FRANK

By W. E. D.

An American propagandist

It was difficult to realize, as one sat talking to Benno Frank, that only a few years earlier he had been an active member of the American army. He was obviously many pounds overweight. Nature had so distributed the excess pounds that it made Benno appear much older than his actual years. Yet, notwithstanding his lack of military appearance, it did not take one long to realize that accounts that had described him as one of the ablest combat propagandists of World War II were not exaggerated. He possessed most of the qualifications deemed essential for an effective psychological warrior. As he talked he demonstrated that he possessed a keen imagination; that he was willing to try any stunt in psychological warfare that seemed feasible; that he had an extensive knowledge of German arts and culture; and that he possessed the ability to speak many languages with fluency.

Benno Frank left the military service in 1945 as a lieutenant, but he had spent the decisive war years as a sergeant with a psychological warfare team attached to the 12th Army Group. Today Benno is the director of a municipal theater group in Cleveland, Ohio.

Benno's background for work in psychological warfare is most impressive. Had one deliberately set out to train an individual for later work in psychological warfare operations against the Germans it is highly unlikely that he could have consciously done better than provide for the type of education and background to which Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Frank was subjected.

Benno is the son of a former diplomatic official of one of the countries of eastern Europe. His father was a strong believer in the virtues of the German culture and wanted for his son an intensive training in its heritage. Being of another country, and moving about periodically from one diplomatic post to another, he made arrangements to leave Benno in Germany for both his secondary and advanced education.

During the 1920's life was not pleasant for many of the former members of the German General Staff. Many of the generals who had once occupied high positions and prestige were impoverished by the post-World War I demilitarization and the inflationary tendencies of the period. As a result of this, many undertook to supplement their incomes by outside activities. Thus it was that Benno's father made arrangements for his son to live in a general's home during the early impressionistic years of his life.

Benno went to live in the home of General von Kleist so that he might be exposed to the best in German society and culture. Here he learned to speak and think like a German, and he came to know many among the top military ranks in Germany, especially the families of those who made social calls at the home of the General.

In the course of time, Benno completed his academic training in the German universities, taking a doctorate in the field of drama. He later became the director of a North German theater and when the opportunity presented itself he emigrated to the US, where he became a professor of German literature in an American university. He has been characterized by one of his World War II colleagues as "a spiritually rich and forceful man."

Benno possessed a great love and respect for everything good and eternal in German culture; he respected the virtues of German civilization, as only an outsider could do; but he detested, with adequate cause, the Nazi regime for the grief and destruction it had brought to the Germany he admired.

In addition to his deep knowledge of things German, his greatest strength for work in psychological warfare was his almost complete lack of orthodoxy. He had little time for the amenities of warfare that were prescribed by those who were tradition bound. If Clemenceau's famous remark may be paraphrased, Benno, judging from his observed behavior, must have thought "wars are much too important to be entrusted to the military mind." He was ever conscious of the importance of psychological warfare in the military arsenal of auxiliary weapons, and his boundless faith in his own ability as a manipulator of human behavior was such as to make of him a person to contend with, whether he was discussing a proposed psychological warfare plan with a general or a fellow noncom. It has been said that Benno could sell anyone anything.

Many interesting anecdotes are told of Benno's lack of orthodoxy. A few are worth repeating. It was Benno who sold G2 on the idea of letting the interrogators take prisoners of war out of the cages to cross-examine them under more relaxed conditions. When a young American lieutenant, fresh from the G2 training grounds at Camp Ritchie, tried to hold the men to Army procedure, by insisting that an American soldier should not walk ahead of his prisoner with his tommy gun dangling from his shoulder, Benno assured him it was all right because "the gun hasn't been cleaned since 1942, and won't go off anyway." He never wore his sergeant's stripes, and he referred to his own division commander by his first name.

Benno's training in the German theater stood him in good stead for his work in psychological warfare. Over the radio he knew when to shout, when to whisper. Occasionally he was carried away by his own enthusiasm, but, as he was prone to say to his colleagues, "it doesn't matter too much what I say, only the Germans are listening, SHAEF doesn't tune us in."

Benno was dynamically original in his whole approach to psychological warfare. He was willing to try anything that promised success, and when he ran into oppo-

sition in his own camp he turned his powers of persuasion on those who objected to his plans.

To the Germans, Benno was known as "Captain Angers," a soldier who had served in the German army but who later became a captain in the American army. Any American knew this was an impossibility, but it was credible to the Germans to whom the idea did not seem so strange.

The main theme Frank stressed in his "Captain Anger's" talks was:

> "It is an easy way out to die on the battlefield; it is far more difficult to live to go back to Germany to assist in its reconstruction, instead of leaving this task to the old men, women and children."

In his radio broadcasts Captain Angers spoke of everything near and dear to the heart of the German soldiers, of everything that concerned them. In his talks he attempted, with marked success, to acquaint the German soldier with the "Yank." He did this by commenting on the American way of life, the interesting but peculiar differences between German and American ways of doing things, and not the least, he stressed the wholesome quality of democratic processes of government.

As prisoners of war flowed into the prison cages, following Captain Anger's appeals, interrogations revealed that many associated the field radio station of the psychological warfare team almost entirely with the "Captain." Prisoners almost at once began to submit material useful to Angers for later broadcasts. They said that they believed this to be the proper thing to do for it might induce more soldiers in the besieged garrison at Lorient to surrender.

One day, knowing that he had not cleared his broadcast with his superiors, or the policy-makers, Benno's colleagues were amazed to hear him say in clear and unmistakable German.

> "Come over. If you don't like it here after a 30-hour trial period, you will be free to go back. On my honor, I will see to it that you are sent back! Ask for Captain Angers."

This was deemed to be a safe promise. Surely no one who would risk his life in order to escape a besieged garrison would ever dream of wanting to return to it. Not even Benno Frank, with his vivid imagination and intensive knowledge of German charactertistics, was prepared to believe there might come a day when someone would ask to have this promise fulfilled.

However, that day did come. One morning as regimental interrogators were interviewing a group of recently captured enemy soldiers, a master sergeant named Fridolin Hopt, an ardent Nazi who had been captured, asked to see Captain Angers and demanded that he be released in accordance with promises Angers had broadcast. Benno was on the spot and he realized it. Here was a Nazi demanding that he be released; he cited propaganda broadcasts as evidence of promises; but Sergeant Frank had not cleared with his superiors the content of the messages that promised release to any prisoner of war who might appear dissatisfied with his lot in allied hands. Could he get concurrence from higherups now, so that he might honor his pledge? Only time would tell.

Benno told his story to the G2, 6th Armored Division. The latter explained that it was bad policy to release enemy soldiers who had either surrendered or been captured. Benno thus was forced to direct the full weight of his powers of

persuasion against the G2. He explained that little harm and much potential good might result from the Nazi's release. In the end, Benno won the argument.*

Sergeant Hopt, the ardent Nazi, was called before the camp authorities. His pockets and field pack were filled with candy bars, cigarettes, gum, and canned food. He then was released to return to his unit. Later, after he had had time to reach the garrison, Captain Angers broadcast an account of the episode to the Lorient garrison, giving the name and organization of the Nazi master sergeant.

Sergeant Frank's success in psychological warfare is indisputable. There seems to be little doubt as to the factors that made this possible. His creative, well-trained, and imaginative mind was such that he could exploit every item of usable intelligence that came to his attention. In common with most successful propagandists he is a thorough-going extrovert. His lack of orthodoxy in military matters, although irritating to those with whom he was forced to come into contact, were turned into virtues when it came to exploiting the vulnerabilities in the enemy's mind. His career stands as a testimonial to the allegation that a propagandist can be made, but it suggests that the path in making one is neither a smooth nor a short one.

MARTIN F. HERZ

By W. E. D.

A Propagandist of World War II

Among Americans who served with operational units in World War II few if any were more universally respected for their ability in psychological warfare than Martin Herz. Daniel Lerner describes Herz's "long and continuous experience in Sykewar in World War II," as especially outstanding.

Herz, who emerged from the war as a major, is today a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State. During the war he served overseas, first, in the Mediterranean Theater as a member of a psychological warfare team attached to the Fifth US Army. With this command he was in charge of writing leaflets that were addressed to German troops. In addition to this he interrogated German prisoners of war for psychological warfare purposes. Later on, after the creation of PWD/SHAEF, he became the chief leaflet writer with that agency. In this position he traveled as widely as his duties would permit in order to keep abreast of the changing nature of psychological warfare requirements and the enemy situation. Since the war he has written a number of articles on various subjects related to his World War II experience and interests.†

An individual interested in psychological warfare once described the ideal propagandist as one "who has one foot firmly planted in the camp of the enemy, while still remaining a loyal member of his own political society or military group." When asked to describe more fully what he meant by this statement, the speaker,

* See "The Radio Siege of Lorient," in Chap. 6 for a more complete account of Frank's portrayal of the role of Captain Angers.

† See, "Mechanics of Surrender, Capture and Desertion," and "Ultimatums and Propaganda To Surrounded Units" in Chap. 6.

in effect, said that he would like to have a propagandist on whom he could rely upon as being 100 percent loyal to his own cause, yet who would be able to understand and sympathize with the plight of the enemy, or the target group addressed, so completely that there would be no lack of ability to project himself into the target group's frame of reference. Without using the term, this person described a quality that Richard Crossman has called "empathy," i.e., the imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being, which in the case of the effective propagandist would be a prototype of the target audience addressed.

Using this criterion in describing an "ideal" propagandist, no one would appear to have been better adapted for work in psychological warfare directed against the German people, and especially their troops, than was Martin Herz. However, it should be kept in mind that just because Herz was an outstanding German-language propagandist there is no reason for necessarily concluding that he would be just as effective in the future against a target group with a different cultural background, language, and tradition. As a matter of fact, Herz himself has stressed the fact that his effectiveness as a propagandist in World War II stems from conditions that are not likely to obtain in another conflict. Although there is probably much truth in what he says, there is little doubt but that his views are exaggerated, for he still would possess many qualifications one would seek in a propagandist.

It is wholly unlikely that Herz would fail as a propagandist for a cause he believed in strongly, for he possesses an enthusiastic interest in this type of activity. He believes that psychological warfare is effective as an auxiliary weapon in a combat zone, and he believes it to be a more humane combat weapon than others since its primary purpose is to save human lives that might otherwise be lost. He therefore advocates its more widespread employment.

In addition to the fact that he has expressed great interest in the expanded use of psychological warfare, he has intimate knowledge of more than one culture, and this would be of great assistance to him. Even if he were preparing propaganda for dissemination to people other than Germans or Americans, people with whom he is intimately acquainted, he is more likely to be aware than others who are the products of only a single culture that one cannot effectively address people of another culture as though they were faced with the same problems as one's own people. Thus, it is not likely, as Herz is modestly prone to suggest, that "in another war, unless we fight the Germans again" he would be of relatively little value as a propagandist for the American cause. However. there is little doubt but that it was his superior knowledge of the German language and the Germanic culture that made him a recognized propaganda genius in World War II.

Herz was born in New York City of German-speaking parents. He was brought up to be equally fluent in English and German. When he was 5 years of age he moved with his family to Vienna, Austria, where he remained for 14 years. His father, a businessman, made frequent trips between New York and Europe, and in this way he and his family, even though living abroad, were able to maintain contact with the land of his birth.

Herz received all his primary and secondary school education in Austria. He returned to the US in 1936, after completing 1 year of his university training. He spent the summer of 1935 in England as a student at Oxford University. In 1937 he received his BS degree from Columbia University. He returned to the university in the fall of 1939 for graduate work and remained until 1941.*

* Much of that which follows is based on an autobiographical sketch that Herz prepared after World War II, and published in *Sykewar*.[15]

Of his childhood, the following information seems pertinent in explaining what his qualifications were for later work in psychological warfare. Starting with a perceptible German language deficiency, Herz by the age of 13 had not only overcome this handicap but had moved to the head of his class. Owing to a gift of expression, he was eventually elected class president (*Klassensprecher*), a position he held during his last 3 years at the *Realgymnasium*, in Vienna.

Because he was a foreigner there were many local activities in which he could not readily participate. Thus he remained aloof from all purely local Austrian politics. Instead of joining the Pan-German or Socialist youth groups, which many of his classmates joined, he preferred to become active in the Austrian Boy Scout movement.

This period was vital to Herz's later career. These formative years in Austria (1922–1936) were for the country a particularly critical and exciting period. He experienced at first hand the emotional content of Pan-Germanism and German romanticism, as these were manifested in poetry, legends, and the Wagnerian operas. He enjoyed first-hand contact with the campfire romanticism of the Boy Scout movement, which although internationalist in outlook was nevertheless nationalistically and militaristically oriented. The scouts sang old German soldiers' songs and performed certain military rituals.

Herz experienced the essential conflict between pacifism and nationalism, then becoming increasingly evident in Austria. He gave student lectures on pacifist themes, which were coldly received, not alone by the Nazis in his class, but also by the anti-Nazi elements in Austrian political life. Most important of all during this period of his life was the first-hand experience he gained in observing Nazi subversive propaganda and political machinations, during and after the civil war of 1934.

On the side Herz studied journalism and collected exhibits of political propaganda, meanwhile expressing little interest in the merits of the political controversies that were raging in Austria. He was 19 when he returned to the US. He claims to have been quite immature politically at that time, and even to have been much more interested in Far Eastern than in European problems.

His attitude of aloofness from European politics at the time he left Austria in 1936 (2 years prior to the *Anschluss*) may have been an important factor enabling him to make what his wartime colleagues characterized as a "dispassionate analysis of intelligence bearing on Nazism and on the mentality of German soldiers." Unlike many intellectuals who came to America from Europe in the late 1930's, Herz was not a refugee. He harbored no rancor toward Europeans. Yet he was as linguistically qualified for service in psychological warfare and intelligence activities as the most articulate German. Also he was of the same age group as the majority of the German soldiers.

When the war broke out in Europe, Herz was engaged in business in New York. For 2 years, while continuing graduate studies, he had tried to establish himself in the literary field — however, without marked success. His ability as a German-language scholar qualified him outstandingly for translation and propaganda analysis work, for which he was employed on a part-time basis by NBC and CBS during 1939–1940. He was drafted into the Army in 1941 and, while still a private in Headquarter II Corps, wrote a brief study on the possibilities of "Tactical Psychological Warfare." This was one of the first studies of its kind written on this subject in America. Later, after he had won his commission as a second lieutenant, he was assigned to the War Department, Military Intelligence Service Division, primarily so that he could carry on work in the field of combat propaganda.

From the point of view of later work in psychological warfare, Herz found his own experiences during the early, confused and groping days of psychological warfare in the US as significant as any formal education he could have received. He was assigned to the Office of War Information in Washington as an Intelligence Officer on the Planning Staff. During his service with OWI he was impressed by:

(a) The problem of what should be told to a domestic audience as war information and what should be directed to a German language audience as propaganda. Many in OWI believed that what the American people were told about Germany should also be told to the German people.

(b) The importance of adequate intelligence for propaganda planning and operations, since what the enemy knows and believes *now*, not what he should know and believe, must form the point of departure for effective psychological warfare.

(c) The consistent over-emphasis on the strategic over the tactical aspects of propaganda activity, and the equally disadvantageous overemphasis on planning rather than on operational aspects of psychological warfare. He was especially impressed by the inability of some planners to recognize that *how* something is said in propaganda is equally as important *as what* is said in propaganda.

His wartime association with scholars who were experienced in public opinion research, and in a systematic approach to psychological warfare, proved of great value to Herz, for he was impressed that the *mot juste* in propaganda may be as important as the *idée juste*.

Herz's field experience in combat propaganda can be considered as covering three phases, the final one being his work in SHAEF, where his conclusions were applied on a large scale. The first phase of his field work may be characterized as an experimental one. This was during the Sicilian campaign. Herz went to Europe as a captain and as chief of the propaganda section of a large and over-ambitiously organized combat propaganda unit. This was the First Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. The company soon proved to be far too unwieldy for effective operations. Hence, the unit was broken up into small task forces. One of these task forces, part of a larger psychological warfare team, was attached to Headquarters, Seventh US Army. This unit wrote and disseminated the first American leaflets that were fired from artillery pieces. Members of the unit interrogated prisoners in an attempt to check on the effectiveness of the first propaganda appeals directed to the enemy urging him to surrender.

The second phase of Herz's combat propaganda experience was at Headquarters, Fifth US Army, in Italy, where he was placed in charge of leaflet writing and the interrogation of prisoners of war for psychological warfare purposes. During this phase of his career, the following significant progress was noted:

(a) A safe conduct pass was planned and printed, which went through many changes before becoming the accepted and official SHAEF Safe Conduct Pass. (The *Passierschein*)

(b) The practice of polling prisoners of war was begun, thus enabling the psychological warfare operators to chart trends in enemy thinking. This practice was continued with marked success in PWD/SHAEF.

(c) "Tactical contingency leaflets" were prepared and held in readiness by corps and division artillery units to be disseminated on the advice of corps psychological warfare liaison officers, when the tactical situation warranted.

(d) The first coordinated leaflet effort, carried out in close coordination with a military offensive (that of the British X Corps across the Garigliano River) was tried during this period.

During the third phase of his career in psychological warfare, that which covered his period of service at SHAEF, Herz wrote most of the leaflets addressed to German troops and a large proportion of the leaflets addressed to German civilians. During this period he worked in close association with Dick Crossman, a man who combined a live imagination, a scholarly mind, and an excellent insight into German psychology. The abilities and knowledge of these two men added much to the effectiveness of the effort made by the PWD/SHAEF Leaflet Section.

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CHAPTER 5

POLICY GOALS AND PLANNING IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Introduction

The attainment of effective results in psychological warfare is most likely to occur only as a result of careful and deliberate planning. Only rarely do spontaneous and improvised operations achieve outstanding results. To recognize the importance of a well-conceived plan for psychological warfare is not to deny the principle that it is impossible to devise a plan that will cover every conceivable eventuality. Thus in the implementation of psychological warfare plans it is essential that on-the-spot operators be given sufficient flexibility of action to enable them to meet changing situations. Also events may transpire that will suggest the wisdom of altering policy or changing psychological appeals in order to gain an important advantage over an adversary. In such a case the psychological warfare planner may have to bring to bear all his skill as a pleader for special causes to persuade policy makers to make necessary and desirable changes in emphasis on declared policy objectives.

Effective planning for psychological warfare necessitates a number of important steps: (1) a determination of policy objectives; (2) an analysis of the psychological strengths and weaknesses (i.e., vulnerabilities) of the target audience; and (3) the formulation of proper policy directives and guidances to direct and control psychological warfare output.

Seven case studies are presented in this chapter to illustrate the interrelation between national policy objectives and psychological warfare. A short account, "The Balfour Declaration of 1917," demonstrates how the British government, by a new expression of national policy in announcing support for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, achieved a propaganda coup such as elicited the envy of the German leaders, who openly declared that they wished they had first thought of such a pronouncement.

In addition to the account of the Balfour Declaration, four case studies involving the general topic of psychological warfare and policy objectives, two involving national policy coordination and control of propaganda

output, and a short editorial note on written directives are presented in this chapter. A discussion of the related problems of target analysis and intelligence research, with appropriate illustrative case studies and editorial comments, is reserved for treatment in Chap. 7.

Policy Objectives

"German Psychological Warfare against the Soviet Union 1941–1945" illustrates how broad national policy objectives limit the sphere in which psychological warfare may be effective. The Germans went into the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941 without a psychological warfare plan. The failure to anticipate accurately the predispositions of Soviet subjects and to gear their propaganda output and policy pronouncements in line with the real interests of both the German High Command and the Russian people led the German Nazis to miss what otherwise would have been a great opportunity to subjugate great parts of the Soviet Union. The case further illustrates the fact that many of the principles of psychological warfare usage are a mere extension of those applicable in diplomacy. Where propaganda campaigns are waged in behalf of national minority movements of liberation, negotiations must be conducted on the basis of mutual faith and trust and in an atmosphere considered genuine by the leaders of the liberation movement.

During World War II the Anglo-American psychological warfare effort against the Axis powers was greatly handicapped by the Roosevelt-Churchill pronouncements that the Allies would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender from the Germans and the Japanese. The case studies "Unconditional Surrender" and "Captain Zacharias's Broadcasts to Japan" illustrate that even though the Allied propagandists found it well-nigh impossible to make unconditional surrender appear attractive to the Nazis and the Japanese, there was "more room for maneuver than might have been expected." Psychological warfare personnel were unable to offer any promises, which probably would never have been believed. Thus, they were forced in their broadcasts and other propaganda releases to rely on more basic appeals such as the following. These probably turned out to be even more effective than promises would have been.

1. Allied victory is inevitable, therefore, why prolong a losing struggle.
2. The democratic world, in contrast to that of the Axis, is decent and just, and thus is to be trusted even by a vanquished foe.

"Captain Zacharias's Broadcasts to Japan" illustrates further that it is not always necessary or desirable that national objectives, either for peacetime or wartime, be spelled out in minute detail in propaganda releases. As circumstances change, and as new intelligence concerning the enemy target group becomes available to policy groups and propaganda planners, it is often desirable that emphasis in propaganda releases be altered. Such was the case in the summer of 1945. The accession of Mr. Truman to the presidency in April 1945, the discoveries of the strategic intelligence group relative to the rapidly deteriorating morale structure in wartime Japan,* and the continuing adverse military situation that confronted the Japanese throughout the early months of 1945 all led the American policy makers to the conclusion that it would be desirable to spell out in considerably greater detail the meaning of "unconditional surrender" and to address broadcasts concerning this problem primarily to the decision-making elite in the Japanese government.

The US chose an individual admirably well-qualified to serve as the official spokesman: Captain (later Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, US Navy. Captain Zacharias had lived in Japan on various occasions during the previous 25 years and therefore possessed the requisite linguistic skills and background of knowledge for the task. Captain Zacharias personally knew many of the Japanese leaders and thus he directed his remarks primarily to these men — the moderate elements in the ruling circles. He set out as his objective to convince the ruling High Command that there was an alternative to complete annihilation and enslavement, and that further resistance was therefore senseless.

It was the belief of those who planned and implemented the Zacharias broadcasts that the radio messages would be monitored and possibly transcribed, and that digests and summaries would be circulated among members of the ruling circles who might not actually hear the appeals themselves. It was the hope of the personnel who conceived the propaganda campaign that the views expressed in the broadcasts would be accepted as a creditable expression of the American government's position. It is believed that those who planned this propaganda action were fairly accurate in their forecasts.

"The Darlan Story" reveals the difficulty that is often encountered in integrating over-all political and military strategy with a sound and effective psychological warfare program. For one of the first times in modern military history, plans for the use of psychological warfare were carefully drawn in advance of an operation and integrated with the plans for the use of the more conventional military weapons. The advance planning was done with the most meticulous care. Psychological warfare personnel undertook the mission of describing the Allied landing in North Africa as the first step in the liberation of territory occupied by the Germans.

Political and military decisions made prior to the landings in North Africa did not contemplate the obstinacy displayed by General Henri

* See "Japanese Home Front Morale," Chap. 7, and "Personnel Utilization in Strategic Psychological Warfare Evaluation," Chap. 4.

Giraud, the French military commander chosen to lead liberated French forces in the area; the fact that the French population in North Africa would give Giraud such a cool reception; or the fact that a high-ranking Vichy leader, Admiral Darlan, would be in the area at the time of the Allied landings.

Owing to unforeseen difficulties, General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander, made a "local decision" that there would be cooperation between his forces and the Admiral. This decision, born out of the necessity of the hour, put the propaganda effort of the Allies on the defensive. British leaders were opposed to any collaboration with Vichy leaders. To these men the fact that Americans would undertake to do business with a personage such as Darlan was evidence that they were naive and wholly inexperienced in political and military affairs. The slowness in which the Darlan regime retracted the Nazi-inspired racist policies led to attacks on American leaders' judgments in the American press and made it difficult, if not impossible, for American psychological warfare personnel to picture the American military actions in North Africa as a movement of liberation. The resulting confusion as to how American propagandists should interpret events and American policy in North Africa was not resolved until 24 December, when Darlan was assassinated by a disgruntled French subject.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION OF 1917*

By Henry Wickham Steed

A new expression of national policy was made to serve effectively as a propaganda medium.

When, in November 1917, Mr. Balfour issued his famous declaration in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home, its effect upon Jewry was far-reaching. The Germans then described it as the greatest stroke of propaganda which Great Britain had struck against them, and wished they had thought of it first. A propagandist effect it certainly had, though it was not primarily conceived as propaganda. It was an act of war-policy designed to achieve definite results in two quarters. However much Mr. Balfour may have been moved by a semireligious sense of the fitness of assuring to the Jews a National Home in Palestine, he and the British War Cabinet were mainly influenced by arguments which the Zionist leaders, Dr. Chaim Weizmann and the late Dr. Nahum Sokolow, laid before them. These arguments bore directly upon the military position of the Allies at that moment, and held out prospects of preventing it from deteriorating in one direction and of improving it in another.

In April 1917, about a month after the first (Constitutional Democratic) revolution in Russia, the United States entered the war on the Allied side. But the war

* Extracted from *The Fifth Arm*, Constable & Co., London, 1940, pp 132–34. Reproduced with permission of Constable & Co., Ltd., copyright holder.

effort of the United States, in terms of positive military help, was not proceeding so quickly or so smoothly as the European Allies could desire. The bulk of American Jewry remained pro-German at heart. There was even room for suspicion that many American Jews were putting sand in the wheels of their adopted country's war machine. The Zionist leaders, who were whole-heartedly devoted to the Allied cause, had reason to believe that if a British declaration were issued in favour of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, the greater part of American Jewry would not only cease to hinder but would actively further the effort of the United States.

Simultaneously there were signs in Russia that the Provisional Government of Constitutional Democrats might not be able to hold its own against the influence of Lenin and other Bolsheviks, whom the Germans had deliberately sent back to Russia in order that they might undermine Russian resistance to the German army. On the side of the Bolsheviks the Jewish Social Democratic "Bund" was fomenting revolutionary disorganization. By themselves the Russian Zionist Jews could do little to counteract these disintegrating tendencies, or to keep the Russian front "in being" against Germany. But the Zionist leaders in Great Britain believed that by the Balfour Declaration the influence of the "Bund" in Russia would be neutralized sufficiently to enable the Russian army to hold together for another six months, and thus, to prevent the Germans from bringing back a million men to reinforce Ludendorff's impending offensive in the West.

In view of these two possibilities the Balfour Declaration was sanctioned by the British War Cabinet. It fulfilled its purpose in both respects. The American war effort gained in speed and efficiency. The Russian front did not collapse, even after the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, until the beginning of March 1918 — too late for German troops in the East to be brought back, in any large numbers, to the West. For these reasons I have always looked upon the Balfour Declaration as an act of policy undertaken, and a promise given, in respect of value to be received. When the value had been received the promise became binding upon the British War Cabinet and upon subsequent British Governments.

GERMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION 1941–1945*

By Paul Blackstock

An account of General Vlassov's army of liberation.

There is a striking contrast between the propaganda appeal of Wilson's Fourteen Points that was employed in World War I and the bleak slogan of "unconditional surrender," employed against Germany during World War II. The difference between the two appeals illustrates the axiom that the upper limits of psychological warfare are set by broad national policy objectives. These objectives may be determined and set forth as war aims prior to the outbreak of hostilities, or, as is usually the case, they may only gradually take on definite form and substance during the actual course of military operations. Propaganda may either publicize such policy objectives or attempt to conceal them, but sooner or later, as they

* An original report by a staff member of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, specially written for this study.

become clear to the enemy, they fix the framework within which psychological warfare operates and which determines its ultimate effectiveness. Until such time as enemy territory is occupied, credibility may be maintained in spite of a wide disparity between the appeals or themes used and actual policy objectives. The gulf between words and deeds may even be continued briefly during the period of dislocation attendant on the immediate military needs of an advancing army. But before long as enemy territory is occupied the paper money of propaganda promises must be redeemed by actual deeds if credibility, the irreducible basis of effective psychological warfare, is to be maintained.

Within the broad framework of German-Soviet relations, all these principles are dramatically illustrated by the history of Nazi policy objectives and of Nazi psychological warfare against the USSR during World War II.

German-Soviet Relations Prior to the Nazi Attack

The broad outlines of German-Soviet relations in the period between World War I and World War II were well known to both the German and the Soviet people. Following World War I the USSR and Germany, the two "outcasts of Versailles," reestablished relations in a series of agreements, the most important of which were the April 1922 Treaty of Rapallo, a series of trade agreements which were renewed regularly, and the Berlin Political Treaty of 1928. In addition, German tank, poison gas, and airplane factories were secretly set up on Soviet territory, and there was considerable friendly cooperation among high level military circles of the two countries. In spite of certain unfavorable incidents resulting from the activities of the Cominform, official relations may be described as excellent. By 1931 German exports to the USSR amounted to nearly 1 billion gold marks.

Despite the official collaboration of Soviet Russia and Germany in the interwar period, the Comintern did not desist from carrying on a continuous propaganda campaign against neighboring states and promoting or supporting uprisings, where feasible, such as the Spartacus uprising in Berlin and that of Bela Kun in Hungary in the early twenties. Such activities gave the Nazis and other extremist groups an excellent peg on which to formulate counter propaganda, etc.

As early as 1920 the National Socialist Party program called for the "union of all people of German race" and "the acquisition of further territory for the support of the people and the settlement of the surplus population." With the advent of Hitler this demand for *Lebensraum* was directed specifically toward "Russia and the border-states dependent on it."

After Hitler's rise to power official German-Soviet relations deteriorated rapidly. By mid-1934 the two countries abandoned all restraint in their propaganda campaigns against each other. Even trade relations were reduced to a minimum, and in 1937 the respective consulates of the two countries were closed. Tension reached a climax at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938. The subsequent easing of tensions, evidenced by the renewal for another year of the existing Soviet-German trade agreement on 19 December 1938, came as a surprise. About the same time the two states concluded a secret press agreement by which press attacks on each against the other were greatly reduced in the early months of 1939. This *detente*, which went virtually unnoticed in the rest of the world, paved the way for the sensational Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, by which Stalin touched off what he hoped would be a long drawn out war among the capitalist imperialist powers of the West. In addition to leaving the USSR with a military balance of power in Europe, such a war would pave the way for future Communist

expansion in the aftermath of political, economic, and social dislocation which a general war would entail.

Although most of the vitriol had already been drained from Soviet press attacks, Stalin's widely publicized speech to the Communist Party Congress in Moscow on 10 March 1939 caused wide comment among the Moscow diplomatic circles, and was interpreted by some observers, particularly the German Embassy, as one of the first bids for friendlier relations. In the speech Stalin said in part: "It looks as if the object of this suspicious fuss [over alleged German threats to the Soviet Ukraine] was to raise the ire of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible basis." This speech is important for it set the tone of Soviet propaganda up until the Nazi offensive began in June 1941, some 2 years later. While German troops were obviously concentrating for an offensive against the USSR, Soviet propaganda went to the extreme of explaining the situation with the absurd line that after the successful French campaign, Germany had to send the great masses of its troops *somewhere*, and that it was Germany's and only Germany's business where they were sent. All rumors concerning German troop concentrations were described as the machinations of well-known war mongers seeking to incite a Soviet-German conflict.

Thus, when the Nazi attack came in June 1941, the Soviet propaganda machine had, by having kept up a pretense of normal, friendly relations, left the Soviet people psychologically unprepared for such an about face. The undoubted confusion resulting from this lack of preparation may very well have added to the shock effect of the unexpectedly rapid Nazi advance, and thus helped to create a disturbed or ambivalent atmosphere favorable to the German psychological warfare campaign.

Policy and Planning for the Russian Campaign (Barbarossa)

Reduced to its simplest political terms Hitler's foreign policy had for years been one of divide and rule, with an added refinement that can best be expressed in the injunction, "set against each other and conquer." In previous conquests, Nazi techniques of indirect aggression, including the massive use of propaganda, had been highly successful in breaking up the social and political structure of the victimized country into a complex of mutually distrustful and antagonistic groups, until the fabric of society had more or less disintegrated before the actual onslaught (where required) of the Nazi war machine. The classic case study of such moral disintegration was France, which has still not entirely recovered from its effects.

It was only natural, therefore, that Nazi policy with respect to the USSR should seek to apply the same tactics. But compared with Western European countries, the Soviet Union had always been sealed off by an "iron curtain" that effectively prevented the large-scale infiltration, subversive, and propaganda operations that had been successful elsewhere. This was especially true after the advent of Hitler, the end of secret military collaboration, and the great purges of 1937–1938. Thus Hitler did not have the capability of softening up the internal structure of the Soviet Union from the outside before launching his attack.

However, in the case of the USSR Hitler did not believe that any softening-up period was necessary. In Nazi Germany it was simply accepted as axiomatic that the hated Bolshevist system would "burst like a soap bubble" within a matter of 2 or 3 months after the initial blows of an attack from outside the country. These sanguine hopes were based on stereotyped images of USSR as "a giant with feet of clay and no head." In planning for the Russian campaign, such stereotypes — the sort of self-evident truths that one culture-pattern accepts with reference to another

— were substituted for an analysis of the anticipated political or psychological situation on which psychological warfare should have been based. Such an estimate was never made, and the Russian campaign was thus to a large extent a political gamble, the terms of which were never seriously examined.

The period 1940–1941 was an age of great expectations for the Germans. Nazi overconfidence had been greatly inflated by the extraordinary success of German psychological and military warfare in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The propaganda annex to the war plans for the Russian campaign estimated that "the use of all types of psychological warfare against the Red Army promises to be even more successful than in previous operations. For that reason, propaganda will be used on a large scale." During the preparations for the campaign, Hitler, carried away by his own anti-Communist rhetoric, considered himself an expert on Soviet affairs and ignored the counsels of his Ambassador and Military Attaché in Russia, Schulenberg and Koestring, whom he described as "the two worst informed men on Russia." In the planning period and during the first weeks of easy victory and overconfidence, "the Russian question" seemed relatively unimportant.

However, by 31 July 1941 Hitler had decided on outright annexation of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic States. (A year later, the Crimea and the Caucasus were also added to the list.) The Slavic population was to serve as a cheap labor pool for economic exploitation of the conquered territories, the educated classes were to be liquidated and the population left to die out through lack of medical attention and sanitary measures. The vacuum was to be filled by German colonists — 10 million in the first 10 years, and 100 million eventually.

By contrast the plans of Alfred Rosenberg, whom Hitler put in charge of the administration of the occupied Russian territories, were much more moderate. He favored a German protectorate over the Baltic States and White Russia, the creation of an independent state in the Ukraine, and the establishment, under German supervision, of a federal state in the Caucasus. In both the Ukraine and the Caucasus native cultures were to be fostered and protected. However, whenever Rosenberg encountered determined opposition from influential Nazi personalities he retracted his views and sided with them. This led in practice to constant vacillations or even contradictions, although in the early stages of the war, Rosenberg frequently had the support of the propaganda ministry and Himmler's *Schutzstaffel* (SS).

Rosenberg advocated preferential treatment of the national minorities in his plan to turn them against the Great Russians and Moscow, and later protested, on humanitarian grounds, the brutal mistreatment of Russian civilian and military personnel. However, officials of his *Ostministerium* had previously arrived at the "hard decision" that 40 million Great Russians would have to be eliminated; thus Rosenberg's "humanitarianism" is somewhat suspect.

Nazi policy particularly as proclaimed by Hitler and Himmler was based on the racist premise that all Slavs, but especially the Great Russians, were *Untermenschen*, i.e., literally subhuman beings. The Russian people were regarded as the embodiment of everything murderous, barbarian, and "oriental" as opposed to the civilized, cultured, Aryan-led West of which the German *Herrenvolk* was the self-appointed saviour.[1,2] This messianic ideological crusade was thus directed against the Russian people itself, rather than against the Soviet regime, under the slogan: "The *Untermensch* has risen to conquer the world: Europe, defend yourself!" As

with all such crusades, once the die was cast it became impossible for Germany to fight a war of limited objectives. Victory or defeat had of necessity to be total. This in turn gave sanction to German colonization, the looting of Soviet prisoners of war, the drafting of forced labor, and the brutal mistreatment of the civilian population of the occupied territories.

The postwar flood of memoirs and apologia by German military leaders has left the impression that almost all of them were opposed to the Nazi policy with respect to the USSR; that most were forced to follow Hitler's policy blunders and mistakes. The historical record proves otherwise so far as the Russian campaign is concerned. However, it is true that German military councils were divided. The Armed Forces High Command (OKW), which was closest to Hitler and the policy-making process, was carried along in the hate-ridden, anti-Bolshevist "crusade" atmosphere of the inner Nazi councils. OKW planning papers actually disclose an effort to incite the German forces to atrocities against the Red Army,[3] and the opening paragraph of the OKW Regulations states flatly that the Russian soldier is not to be honorably treated in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention:

> "I. *Treatment of Soviet PW's in general — Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National Socialist Germany.* For the first time, the German soldier faces an enemy who has not merely been trained as a soldier but who has also undergone Bolshevist political training calculated to destroy nations. The fight against national socialism [sic] has become part of his nature. He carries out his fight with all the means at his disposal — sabotage, seditious propaganda, arson, and murder. For this reason, the Russian soldier loses all claims to treatment as an honorable soldier and according to the Geneva Convention."

On the other hand, in opposition to the High Command, field commanders protested vigorously against the brutal treatment of both Russian soldiers and civilians, especially when the disastrous effect on would-be defectors and on the local population became evident. Once again the doctrine of *Schrecklichkeit*, of unlimited violence and terror, failed to pay off, and in the historical postmortem period most German military leaders insist that they were *really* on the side of the angels all along. If so it would seem that many of them have found the courage of their convictions somewhat tardily.

A logical corollary of *Rosenbergschtina*, as the Russians called the Nazi policy of supporting national minority separatism, was the suppression of any Great Russian anti-Bolshevik forces. Two weeks before the Nazi attack in June 1941, Rosenberg had already taken this position in a letter to Hitler, who also opposed the genuine support of any Russian nationalist or anti-Soviet movement, because such forces would impede his plans for economic colonization and exploitation following victory. (p 9)[1] Accordingly, Rosenberg organized a number of non-Great Russian National Committees within his *Ostministerium*, the Ministry of Occupied Territories. These Committees represented such ethnic minority groups as the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians, Turkestanians, and Cossacks. The latter were particularly resentful of Great Russian rule. Representatives from these groups were trained in a propaganda school in Wustrau and heavily indoctrinated with anti-Great Russian propaganda. Later when the Great Russian, General Vlassov, emerged as the leader of an anti-Soviet movement, he was bitterly attacked by these national minority propagandists.

Insofar as the German dismemberment policy depended on Rosenberg, its application in practice was ineffectual, inept, and frustrated. Following the pattern already set in Poland, the SS usually took over. Local, high-handed administrative officials, such as Koch in the Ukraine, made their own policies on the scene, virtually ignoring the directives or pained remonstrances emanating from Rosenberg's *Ostministerium*. Even the principle of using the various national minority groups to aid in the dismemberment of the Soviet Empire was never seriously or systematically practiced. For example, in the first flush of early and easy victories, in the Baltic states, the Germans were so intent on exploiting the occupied Eastern territories that they were indifferent to the political handling of the populations in them and were openly hostile to any manifestation of national independence. The Baltic peoples welcomed the advancing Germans as liberators from the Soviet regimes which had been imposed on them and offered at once to form volunteer legions to help liberate their countries. These offers were, at first, rejected out of hand. Even later, when mainly under the aegis of the SS national units from the Baltic states were finally permitted, they were organized exclusively "for the fight against Bolshevism." Nationalist propaganda was not permitted and officers of Baltic nationalities were mistrusted. As a result, German intelligence reports (from both Abwehr and RSHA sources) show that by 1943, when the Germans were in serious need of additional manpower, new recruiting drives were regarded with suspicion. Many of the eligible males had already joined partisan bands which, as was frequently the case in the USSR proper, were as anti-German as they were anti-Soviet.

It is important to note that the so-called national committees were never treated seriously as the nuclei of future bona fide governments or even administrative units. The real German policy objectives in Russia precluded the use of such groups for other than temporary, divisive ends, or for general propaganda purposes. Sooner or later, had Hitler been serious in his use of such national minority groups, he would have had to enter into bona fide political negotiations with their leaders. Otherwise, once the Soviet regime itself had been overthrown, the national minorities would have turned against their new masters unless their separatist demands were satisfied. Not only were such issues *not* met by Rosenberg's *Ostministerium*, they were not even seriously considered during the first flush of Nazi victories. It was naive on the part of Nazi policy makers and propagandists to assume that the national minorities, although eager to overthrow the Soviet regime, would for long be satisfied with the empty slogan "Down With Bolshevism" in place of well-defined ideas as to what the future of Russia would look like following the anticipated German victory. This blind spot on the part of the Nazi propaganda experts later vitiated their appeals to the Great Russians as well.

Policy Split between the Party and the Army High Command

In direct contrast to Hitler's paranoid faith in unlimited military capabilities, which was implicit in his Russian policy, informed German military circles were much more sober and realistic in their outlook and estimates. They considered the Nazi objective, colonial exploitation of the USSR, as unrealistic. In contrast to a total crusade against Red Russia, their more modest aims were to overthrow the Soviet regime by driving a wedge between the government and the people — basically a "free Russia" approach — and the early establishment of a government friendly to Germany. They estimated these limited objectives to be within their capabilities, but from the start of the Russian campaign, when a manpower shortage quickly developed, they were in favor of using Russian prisoners, and anti-Soviet volunteers for rear-echelon services, antipartisan warfare, or even front-line combat duty, as might be required in any given situation. As early as November 1941 a report recommending the use of anti-Communist Russians in military units was submitted to Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, who approved it, adding the phrase (which later infuriated Himmler when used by General Vlassov), "Russia can only be beaten by Russians." Von Brauchitsch soon resigned over his differences with Hitler (on this as well as other issues) and was replaced by Hitler personally in February 1942, who finally approved the project. However, Hitler was so afraid of having to deal with *any* Great Russian movement to which he would be indebted, that he limited the organization of such units to battalion size, and forbade the use of any two battalions side by side in combat. This split between the Party and the Army (at field levels) on the use and treatment of Soviet prisoners and volunteers is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the blundering way in which Soviet defection, symbolized by the anti-Soviet movement of General Vlassov, was handled.

Mass Defection and Prisoners of War

The importance of the policy split between the Party and the Army at the beginning of the Russian campaign must be evaluated in terms of the mass disaffection evident in the USSR, the number of prisoners taken, and loss of anti-Soviet military potential due to Nazi policy blunders.

Four months after the invasion of Russia by Nazi Germany (21 June 1941) 3,900,000 Russian prisoners were in German hands. (Vol XI, p 187)[4] By the end of the winter 1941–1942 an unprecedented number of prisoners, at least 5 million had passed through German prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front. To them may be added an estimated 10 per cent who did not reach a camp because they were shot by their captors or succeeded in concealing themselves as civilians.[5] Groups of division size or larger surrendered in bodies. In some sectors, especially the Ukraine, the civilian population welcomed the Germans as liberators. Strong separatist sentiment existed. So alarmed was the Soviet government by this defection that Stalin issued an order (260) declaring that all Soviet prisoners of war would be considered traitors to their country. To lend force to the order the Soviets bombed at least two camps containing Russian prisoners of war — Orel and Novograd-Seversky, each containing about 40,000 prisoners, and afterwards dropped leaflets bearing these words — "So will it be with all those who betray the cause of Lenin and Stalin." Internally, within the Soviet Union, Marshall Lavrenty Pavlovitch Beriya, People's Commissar of People's Affairs (NKVD), issued an order calling for reprisals against the families of persons who allowed themselves to fall into enemy hands.

It was not until the Russians were subjected to brutal prisoner of war and occupation policies, and began to understand the Nazi war aims vis-à-vis Russia (partition and colonization), that their amity or indifference turned into fear and hate, and that they really began to defend themselves against the invader. Even strong separatist groups were later transformed into staunch anti-Germans; hence Stalingrad.

Thus the Germans found themselves in a historical situation without precedent during the winter of 1941–1942. They had at their disposal a military manpower potential of 5 million trained men languishing in prisoner of war camps, most of them disaffected, with many others already being used by military commanders in

the field (without the knowledge or permission of Hitler). But the situation was not only entirely unplanned for, it was also, given the Nazi war aims already described, one which German policy could not exploit. Nazi psychological warfare, via radio broadcasts and leaflets dropped over the Soviet lines, talked of liberating the Russian people from their oppressive regime, of fair treatment to prisoners of war and defectors, of abolishing the hated Kolkhoz system and of restoring private property and trade. But there was a wide gulf between the words and deeds, between what the Russian people heard or read, and what they saw in actual German behavior.

The German treatment of Soviet prisoners of war can only be described as large-scale genocide. The death rate among Russian prisoners during the first winter of the war was seventy-two per cent. (Vol XX, p 612)[4] For the entire period of the war the death rate was in the neighborhood of forty per cent. (p 146)[1] One of the top aides to the Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories wrote during the war:

> "The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several hundreds of thousands are still able to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died. . . . It can be said without exaggeration that the mistakes in the treatment of prisoners of war are to a great extent the cause of the stiffening power of resistance of the Red Army, and therefore, cause for the death of thousands of German soldiers." (p 15)[2]

Treatment of the civilian population was equally genocidal. Wholesale drafts of forced labor amounted to mass deportations. Occupation troops conducted wild requisitions which frequently degenerated into open plundering. The local population was disregarded except as a source of labor drafts. The following is a typical report on a police operation, "Cottbus," against guerilla bands, which took place in June 1943:

> "As generally in such operations, it is very hard to distinguish friend from foe. Nevertheless, it should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those who have been liquidated. To lock men, women and children into barns and to set fire to these, does not appear to be a suitable method of combatting bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. . . . The political effect of this large-scale operation upon the peaceful population is simply dreadful in view of the many shootings of women and children. In December, the town of Begomie was evacuated by the armed forces and the police. *At that time the population of Begomie was preponderantly on our side.*" (Vol VIII, pp 206–08)[6, *]

General Vlassov

In view of the record of Nazi policy and practice described above, it is now clear that the whole Vlassov movement was doomed to failure from the start.

The fatal policy split between the Party and the Army on the use of both prisoners of war and defectors is nowhere better illustrated than in the blundering manner in which General Vlassov and his Russian Army of Liberation was handled. Lieutenant General Andrei Andreyevitch Vlassov, an excellent commander with a

* A summary listing of Nazi atrocities in Soviet territory that gives some idea of their magnitude is given in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol I, pp 35–39.[6] The author has also interviewed survivors of the famous *Windhund* division that saw almost continuous action on the Russian front.

brilliant combat record in the defense of Moscow in 1941, came over to the Germans following the Volkhov encirclement near Leningrad during the winter of 1942. The first Vlassov action came through the OKW Propaganda Office as a psychological warfare move against the Red Army to bring over deserters. Vlassov made speeches at the front, in the prisoner of war camps and in Russian workers' camps urging his hearers to join the Russian Army of Liberation (ROA) in the fight against Bolshevism. He had considerable success among the Great Russians but not with the racial and cultural minorities of South Russia.

Vlassov's political program was first formulated in the "Smolensk Manifesto" of 27 December 1942, which was published in Russian newspapers in Germany. It can be described as a continuation of the Kerensky revolution of 1917 — democratic, socialistic and nationalistic, a united Russia with promises of autonomy for non-Russian elements of the population. Following the Smolensk Manifesto of December 1942, the Vlassov project was abandoned, for all practical purposes, until the summer of 1943. Finally a second important Vlassov appeal, known as "the Prague Manifesto" was made in Prague on 14 November 1944, when the original Great Russian organization was expanded to include representatives of various national minorities and renamed the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR). The Prague Manifesto called for "the return to the peoples of Russia of the rights which they won for themselves in the popular revolution of 1917." By labeling themselves thus as direct heirs of the February revolution, the Vlassovites sought to avoid being considered (1) monarchists, restorationists, or reactionaries, (2) Communists or Marxists of various types, or (3) Fascists. They regarded themselves as true democrats. Designing the Fourteen Points of the Prague Manifesto to include the social and political rights and freedoms which in their opinion were lacking under the Soviet regime, the men of the Vlassov Movement came out with a program which, if considered alone, can scarcely evoke disagreement from anyone who subscribes to the basic principles of western democracy. (pp 101–02)[1]

Although starvation was the strongest motivating force, it is significant that, even as late as 15 November 1944, the day following the radio broadcast of the Prague Manifesto, at a time when the Nazi cause was deemed almost hopeless, 62,000 Russian prisoners of war in camps near Berlin signified their desire to join the new ROA. The total number of applications for the ROA and the service of the Committee has been estimated at from 1.2 million to as high as 2 million. A very small percentage of the volunteers, however, ever found themselves wearing the ROA shoulder patch and carrying arms. For it is clear that in spite of its early promise the entire Vlassov Movement was opposed until almost the end of the war not only by Hitler and Rosenberg, but also by Himmler, who particularly resented Vlassov's statement to the effect that "it takes a Russian to lick the Russians." As noted above the Vlassov program was directly opposed to Nazi racist dogma, and the Nazis rightly feared the growth of a patriotic Russian nationalism which, in the event of victory, would be a serious hindrance to their plans for the colonization and exploitation of the USSR. At best the Vlassov Movement was thus "a marriage of convenience." For the Russian defectors it held out the only hope of overthrowing the hated Stalin regime and of mobilizing resistance forces within the USSR. For the Germans, it was a means of adding to their failing reserves of manpower, and, potentially, a powerful weapon of psychological warfare, although, because of the blunders noted above, they failed to realize this potential.

It was evident that a propaganda action alone was intended. Owing to lack of armament and equipment, but above all to a lack of understanding and interest in higher quarters, it was not until the beginning of April 1945 that one division (No. 650) was finally activated. On 13 April it was committed on the Oder line and assigned a limited objective. Its performance was entirely satisfactory. The second Vlassov division received the necessary men and officers, and Himmler as Commander of the Replacement Army authorized recruiting in the prisoner of war camps (20,000 volunteered). However, only about 10 per cent of the necessary weapons and equipment were made available to this unit. On 12 May 1945, the First Division, never having made contact with other ROA units, was dissolved in Schluesselburg, a Czech town which was about to be turned over to the Red Army by US military authorities. The Americans had refused to admit the ROA division as a unit into American-occupied areas. Many ROA soldiers fled southward into Bavaria, but thousands of others were either seized by the Soviet units or, as Vlassov himself, allowed to fall into Soviet hands. Such forced repatriation resulted in numerous suicides. General Vlassov was hanged in Moscow in 1946, according to a brief *Pravda* communique, "For betrayal of the motherland and for active espionage-sabotage and terrorist activity, as agents of German intelligence against the Soviet Union." The same charges were made against 11 other Soviet generals and colonels who had joined the ROA, and similar sentences were meted out to them.

Conclusion

So far this study has traced the broad outlines of German-Soviet relations prior to the Nazi attack, German policy and planning for the Russian Campaign, the policy split between the Party and the Army (and within the Army itself), mass defection, mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilians, and finally the mishandling of General Vlassov and the Russian Army of Liberation.

From this brief look at the historical record a few observations are pertinent. In the first place it should be noted that Soviet mass disaffection at the time of the Nazi attack presented the Germans with an unprecedentedly favorable situation for psychological warfare. Within a few months the Germans had at their disposal a military manpower potential of at least 3 million Soviet prisoners who, under the proper conditions, might have taken part with the Germans in a campaign of national liberation to free their country from the Soviet regime. But not only were "the proper conditions" lacking; Nazi policy had already taken such a course that they could not possibly be met. The backbone of any such a liberation movement could only have been the Great Russians, the largest single ethnic group (50 to 55%) in the USSR. Nazi racist policy under Hitler and Rosenberg not only attacked the Great Russians as Slav barbarians and *Untermenschen*, it also deliberately incited the national minorities of the USSR — the Ukrainians, Georgians, Cossacks, etc. — against the Russians, as part of the divide-and-conquer tactics successfully used by the Nazis elsewhere. The two policies, had the Germans decided to support a Russian liberation movement, would have been mutually exclusive. The Nazi war aim of colonizing the USSR in order to exploit ruthlessly the conquered territories precluded the use of a bona fide national liberation movement and the millions of Soviet prisoners who might have taken part in it. Once the war had begun, German blunders — the starving of millions of prisoners and the incredible brutalities in handling Russian civilians — merely made an impossible policy situation worse. Actually such ruthless practices followed logically and inevitably from the Nazi war aims.

In the second place, it should be abundantly clear that to have been effective Nazi psychological warfare in support of *either* the national minorities *or* the Great Russians would have required bona fide political negotiations with the leaders of these respective groups. This was neither done nor seriously contemplated by Rosenberg's *Ostministerium*, which supported the national minority groups. When after severe setbacks policy was ostensibly reversed, and it was decided to "support" General Vlassov's Army of Liberation, the same mistake was repeated. Negotiations with General Vlassov were a sham which eventually could not be concealed from either the liberation "army" itself or from the Russian people.

This leads to a final observation that is also clear from the record. The German policy framework, i.e., the *real* Nazi war aims toward Russia, was such that in the long run successful psychological war was impossible. Given the background of widespread disaffection with the Soviet regime, and the initial speed of the German advance, it would seem that psychological warfare directed at both the Soviet soldier and citizen could hardly have failed in its appeal. The unprecedented number of prisoners taken, and the large-scale defection of units of battalion size or larger were due in part at least to an effective exploitation of a highly favorable psychological situation. But empty slogans such as "Down with Bolshevism," and empty promises of fair treatment of prisoners and civilians, of land reform, of the restoration of private property and trade were not enough to retain the support of anti-Soviet elements who wanted to know definitely what sort of a future Russia they were to be asked to die for in fighting — without quarter — against the Red Army. When the brutal Nazi practices made it clear to all what the real Nazi war aims were, and that there was little to choose from between the Nazi and Soviet terrors, the Russian people as in the time of Napoleon, naturally rallied to the defense of their native land against the invader from the West. By their unexampled brutality and policy blunders, the Germans themselves thus gave Stalin the capability of converting what had at the outset been an unexpected and unpopular war into a bitter-end, patriotic struggle for the fatherland.

"UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"

By W. E. D.

How Anglo-American propagandists made a difficult policy work effectively in psychological warfare.

With the advantage of hindsight we now believe that the Anglo-American propagandists in World War II were placed at a great strategic disadvantage, first, by the lack of a crystal-clear well-defined policy of what it was that we expected of our major enemy nations, and second, by the complete absence of a "hope clause" in our policy once it was defined and publicized.

The policy of "unconditional surrender" may have been well conceived for bolstering home-front morale and for purposes of stiffening inter-Allied determination to fight the war through to a successful and decisive end, but it was not one calculated to lighten the burdens of the propagandists whose major responsibility it became to convince the enemy that it was to his advantage to lay down his arms short of complete or near annihilation.

In both England and the US the people were divided with respect to the question, how should Germany in defeat be treated? In England the so-called "Vansittart school" held views similar to the Morgenthau school in the US. Individuals in

these groups emphasized the desirability of imposing a "hard peace" on Germany, in opposition to what they called a "soft peace," advocated by others. For example, not only had the President proclaimed a policy of "unconditional surrender" for all our enemies (Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese) while in North Africa in January 1943, but during 1944, over the vigorous protests of his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, he accepted the recommendations of his Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, that Germany should be laid barren and thus rendered incapable of waging war again for generations to come.

Robert Sherwood, intimate adviser to President Roosevelt, and himself one of the leading propaganda administrators in World War II, has written as follows concerning Roosevelt's pronouncement on "unconditional surrender."

> "There were many propaganda experts, both British and Americans who believed that the utterance of these words ["unconditional surrender"] would put the iron of desperate resistance into the Germans, Japanese, and Italians and thereby needlessly prolong the war and increase its cost: there are some who still believe that it did so. These critics were not necessarily opposed to the principle of total defeat — but they considered it a disastrous mistake for the President to announce it publically." (p 695)[7]

With respect to the many disadvantages to the nation's propaganda effort of publically proclaiming a "Morgenthau Plan" for pastoralizing Germany, former Secretary of State Byrnes offers us this interesting comment:

> "In October 1944 . . . I was in Paris. At the Guest House, where I lived, there was a sergeant who spoke German. Each night he would interpret for me the Berlin broadcasts; these invariably included an appeal to the people of Germany not to consider the proposals of the Allies to surrender. Surrender, they warned, meant enforcement of the 'Morgenthau Plan' which would destroy all industry and turn Germany into an agricultural state. The plan was greatly exaggerated to inspire the Germans to fight and die rather than surrender." (p 181)[8]

The so-called "Morgenthau Plan" for Germany for a period of time became the accepted plan of the US relative to the defeated enemy, for the plan was embraced by President Roosevelt, only to be altered after his death by President Truman. However, even though President Roosevelt subscribed to the Morgenthau proposal, American opinion was far from united with respect to it. Differences of opinion in the President's Cabinet and among members of Congress were most pronounced. Former Secretary Byrnes in speaking of this states:

> "My mind went back to an occasion at the White House, in the latter part of August 1944, when President Roosevelt had discussed the kind of peace he proposed for Germany. He said that some well-meaning but misguided officials in the State Department were planning what he regarded as a 'soft' peace for Germany. That he said was not his plan. The German people should be taught their responsibility for the war and for a long time should have only soup for breakfast, soup for lunch and soup for dinner. . . .
>
> "There was a wide difference among the members of the cabinet committee. . . ." (pp 181–82)[8]

The memoirs and private papers of former Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Forrestal, and the late Senator Vandenberg, which have been published, all reveal that there was sharp disagreement among the inner circle with President Roosevelt and Secretary Morgenthau over the postwar policy for Germany. Sherwood suggests that in the last months of his life Roosevelt came to regret that he had initialed the "Morgenthau Plan" during the Quebec Conference, September 1944.

> "There is no doubt that Hopkins, as a member of the President's Special Cabinet Committee, joined with Hull and Stimson in opposition to the [Morgenthau] plan, and I can confirm from my personal knowledge Stimson's statement that Roosevelt subsequently made no secret of his regret that he had ever agreed to initial the proposal." (p 818)[7]

In England opinions with respect to postwar German policy were equally diverse. The Vansittart group represented the so-called "hard peace school," whereas among those interested in a less vindictive peace were Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, head of the Political Warfare Executive, and Commander King-Hall, who was the mainspring of a Parliamentary Propaganda Committee that reported directly to Ministers Eden and Bracken of the British Cabinet. Lockhart has written with respect to his views.

> "We propagandists favored the hope clause, but the difficulty was to win approval for a formula which would not conflict with the official policy of unconditional surrender. Many attempts were made both by the British and Americans but they came to nothing, and with the understandable object of preserving national unity at home the Government did their best — and in wartime it is a powerful best — to avoid public discussion of the problem." (pp 158–59)[9]

Regardless of how history will eventually treat the wisdom or lack of wisdom of Roosevelt in announcing an "unconditional surrender" policy at Casablanca, this much is clear, what he in effect said was — there will be no negotiated peace or compromises with our enemies who launched this war against us. There was to be no "escape clauses" provided by another Fourteen points. Roosevelt undoubtedly felt that the American, Russian, and Chinese people needed to be reassured that there would be no deals with a Goering in Germany, or a Matsuoka in Japan, such as was charged when Allied commanders in North Africa chose to deal with the Vichy leaders, Darlan and Peyrouton, as a matter of military and political expediency.

Nevertheless, even though there may have been justifiable reasons for the pronouncement of an "unconditional surrender" policy it was generally believed to have been a great handicap to the Allied propagandists who waged psychological warfare against Germany. Many attempts were made to get a clarification of it or an expression of a softer policy for use against Germany, but all to no avail. Lockhart, speaking of the situation in Britain, has emphasized the problems that arose from ignorance and skepticism concerning psychological warfare on the part of the top military echelons in Whitehall.

> "The Chiefs of Staff were always willing to help us to solve our problems, but to begin with at least, they erred on the side of over-simplification. When we explained to them our difficulties about the hope clause for

Germany, one of them, assuming that all propaganda was deception, provided an admirable solution. 'Why don't you take the King-Hall line in your propaganda and keep the Vansittart line for the peace terms?' " (p 159)[9]

Whether "unconditional surrender" was or was not a wise and proper policy to follow with respect to our World War II enemies is in fact a moot question, as is the question of whether the propagandists, believing it to be an improper policy, should have exercised greater vigor in opposing it or in getting it altered to better suit their needs.

James P. Warburg, a Deputy Director of OWI during the early years of World War II argued that the influence of a nation's top propagandists should properly reach into the counsel chambers where basic public policy is being formulated. In a bitter criticism of the OWI and its Director, Elmer Davis, Mr. Warburg charged that the 'timid indifference' of the Director led to 'serious consequences.' "

" . . . the Director of OWI showed that he considered his assignment an information or publicity job, pure and simple, and that he did not understand that he was being entrusted with the management of an important branch of modern warfare.

"By so doing, Mr. Davis in fact abdicated from the most important responsibility which the President had assigned to him and deprived the United States psychological warfare agency of having a voice in the shaping of foreign policy. The fatal consequences of this decision were to appear later."[10]

George Creel, the World War I Chairman of the American Committee on Public Information (CPI) is often credited with being among the top few talented propaganda administrators our country has produced. He was an intimate confidant of President Wilson, and the fact that he had free and easy access to the President to discuss matters of public policy is often cited as the reason for his great effectiveness as a propagandist. It is said that he did not wait for the policy makers to announce a policy decision, instead he helped them make it and to announce it at such times and in such phraseology that would most effectively aid his propaganda objective.

The weight of opinion among propaganda administrators and research writers today would appear to be largely on the other side of the contention. That is, the role of the propagandist is not one of making or assisting in making public policy, but rather that of talking about it. Both Hans Speier and Richard Crossman emphasize this viewpoint in their writings. Speier has written as follows:

" . . . propagandists do not make foreign policy: they talk about it. They inform the world about the policy of the country for which they speak. They interpret this policy. They translate its meaning into language that will be understood by people who are not experts on foreign policy. They point up its successes and conceal its failures. . . .

" . . . [the propagandist's] interpretations have to stay within narrow limits and are, as a matter of routine, subject to clearance by policy making agencies. . . .

" . . . Unlike experts in foreign, military and naval affairs, experts in propaganda are seldom among the participants in international conferences. In fact, the more important the parley, the less likely it is that there will be propagandists among the attending advisers."[11]

The memoirs of individuals who during World War II had to live with the problem of finding an acceptable way of conveying the meaning of "unconditional surrender" to Germany inform us that on at least two occasions — first in April 1944 and again in August of the same year — General Eisenhower, on the advice of both his psychological warfare and political staffs, sought to persuade the President and the Prime Minister to modify the harshness of "unconditional surrender." Captain Butcher, Naval Aide during the war years to General Eisenhower, in his diary entry for 14 April 1944, wrote as follows:

"There have been discussions with [Secretary of State Stettinius] as to the meaning of "unconditional surrender" as applied to Germany. Any military person knows that there are conditions to every surrender. There is a feeling that at Casablanca, the President or the Prime Minister, more likely the former, seized on Grant's famous term without realizing the full implications to the enemy. Goebbels has made great capital with it to strengthen the morale of the German Army and people. Our psychological experts believe we would be wiser if we created a mood for acceptance of surrender in the German Army which would make possible a collapse of resistance similar to that which took place in Tunisia. They think if a proper mood is created by the German General Staff, there might even be a German Badoglio. To accomplish the proper mood, there would need to be a new American-Anglo-Russian statement to define 'unconditional surrender.' Then we could tell the German people, by radio and pamphlet, the methods of demilitarization we propose; the fact that we propose to purge Nazis from the government machine; that we maintain the right to seize and try war criminals; that there will be orderly transfers of populations, and that there will be restoration of freedom of religion and for trade unions. After the three governments had agreed and announced such definitions our staff feels that the Supreme Commander should make a declaration after the landings to the German commander in the west, reciting in soldierly language, the principal points of surrender terms. It is believed this would shorten the war. General Ike strongly advocates this view and asked Ed Stettinius to transmit it to the President, which he did by cable."[12]

On 17 April, Stettinius, while still in London, received the President's reply. Roosevelt stated categorically that he wished that the subject be given no further consideration without his expressed approval. Despite this rebuff, a second attempt, looking toward a modified pronouncement, was made in August, but once again the President turned down the request.

Even though the policy of "unconditional surrender" was not to the liking of Anglo-American propagandists it was rigidly adhered to in all of the propaganda output. Lockhart has written with respect to this:

" . . . we [in PWE] were never allowed to make in our propaganda any commitment which the Government was not prepared to fulfill. If we approached even the borderline, I was certain to be rebuked. . . ." (p 160)[9]

Dick Crossman, the Deputy Director of PWD/SHAEF, gives an excellent illustration of how strictly this policy was adhered to in the propaganda disseminated.

" . . . in October 1944 . . . an offensive against the Saar was being planned, and SHAEF regarded it as vitally necessary to persuade the miners to remain at work after the withdrawal of the German armies. PWD was called

in to assist and, after discussion with those responsible for Military Government, we drafted an official announcement that all of those miners who 'stayed put' would continue to receive existing rates of pay and be permitted to organize Trade Unions. This announcement contained nothing more than the Military Government regulations which would be enforced immediately after the area was occupied. State Department and Foreign Office representatives, however, were so nervous about violating 'unconditional surrender' that they raised the objection that this draft announcement contained a promise to a section of the German people and so transgressed the bounds of high policy. When the issue could not be settled inside SHAEF, it was referred to Washington. The objection was sustained in Washington and the matter dropped." (p 331)[13]

Even though it is generally agreed that the policy of "unconditional surrender" delayed the end of the war by several months, a significant fact must not be forgotten: the propagandists were able to salvage something from the policy for effective use in propaganda warfare. With respect to this point Crossman has written:

"Surprisingly enough, [in the treating of "unconditional surrender"] we found more room for maneuver than might have been expected. The Germans had been deeply impregnated with skepticism about Anglo-Saxon promises, and Goebbels almost daily reminded them of the turpitude of the failure to fulfill the pledges implicit in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Long before the Normandy campaign, we had discovered while trying to 'sell' the Atlantic Charter, how effective this German propaganda had been. It is by no means certain, therefore, that our appeal to the German people would have been greatly strengthened if we had been able to make use of precise promises about the treatment to be accorded to Germany if Nazism were overthrown. On the other hand, the refusal to permit the Supreme Commander to state the terms and methods of military surrender certainly decreased the readiness of German commanders in the field to surrender, and so quite needlessly prolonged the war.

Because Psychological Warfare could promise nothing, it was compelled to rely exclusively on two themes:

"(a) the inevitability of Allied victory, and

"(b) the integrity and decency of the democratic world, in contrast with the corruption and untrustworthiness of Nazi leaders. The Germans were presented with the alternatives of unconditional surrender to Anglo-Saxon mercy and justice, or continued resistance. Partly because no promises were made, this contrast gained in persuasiveness, once it became clear that a German victory was impossible. A Germany impregnated with Nazism, paradoxically enough, was more inclined to trust an enemy who promised nothing and told the truth with a soldierly objectivity, than 'a Greek bearing gifts.' To this extent, the limitations imposed by high policy became a positive advantage." (p 331–32)[13]

But when we entered Germany, we found that, though Psychological Warfare had scrupulously fulfilled its policy directive it had nevertheless committed the Allies in one important respect. By telling the objective truth, and building an impression in the German mind of Anglo-Saxon honesty and integrity, it had

brought the enemy to expect a standard of behavior on the part of troops and officials which in practice it was very difficult to maintain. Millions of Germans had learned to know intimately the personalities who had spoken to them day by day over the radio, and the isolation of black listening had made the contact between the remote radio voice and the German audience extremely intimate. The promise of fair treatment and democratic decency had been implicit in all our propaganda output though on no occasion had any explicit promise been made; and the contrast between the unseen personalities of the BBC and the real behavior of the occupying forces made many friendly Germans believe that a pledge had been actually broken. The belief would have been far more widespread and justifiable if "unconditional surrender" had been modified.

CAPTAIN ZACHARIAS'S BROADCASTS TO JAPAN*

By M. J.

A US naval officer, trained in the use of the Japanese language during the 1920's, became an official spokesman of the US in 1945 broadcasts to the Japanese Empire.

Introduction

When the idea of a special series of American broadcasts to Japan was conceived in 1944, experts on Japanese affairs were aware that Japan was led by a group of military leaders, including General Tojo and General Koiso, who could have nothing to lose by continuing Japanese resistance to the bitter end. However, it was also known that there were other members of the Japanese political elite, close to the Emperor, who felt that prolongation of the war could lead only to greater catastrophe for Japan. It was believed that this group would be willing to surrender provided they could have assurance that the "sovereignty" of Japan would be spared by the Allies, i.e., that revenge would not be taken on the Japanese population as a whole, that the Japanese nation would be preserved, and that the status of the Emperor would be maintained. This group, diagnosed as "susceptible" to surrender appeals by some authorities on Japan, consisted mainly of Japanese naval leaders, long rivals of the military clique for the Emperor's attention.

Captain Ellis Zacharias, US Navy, had served tours of duty as a language officer in Japan for the Navy during the 1920's and 1930's. In this position he had acquired a personal familiarity with many Japanese leaders, especially those naval officers who were thought in 1944 to represent the "peace faction." He conceived the plan of a series of broadcasts to Japan that would appeal directly to this group to surrender. He proposed addressing to the "Navy faction" assurances of the outcome of surrender, which the US might probably have been unwilling to give were the group represented by Generals Koiso and Tojo to remain in power.

The feasibility of the proposed campaign seemed greatly increased when, in the spring of 1945, news of changes in the Japanese Cabinet reached the US.

"On April 8 the cabinet of General Koiso fell and was replaced, as predicted by our confidential agent in his December 1944 report, by a cabinet headed

* Adapted from *Secret Missions*, by Ellis M. Zacharias, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1946. Reproduced with permission of Admiral Zacharias, the copyright holder.

by Admiral Suzuki. It was evident that Japan was now ripe for a termination of the war and that we were reaching the eleventh hour insofar as our psychological warfare campaign was concerned. . . ." (p 346) [14]

The mission and the strategy of the campaign were outlined in the operational plan, as it was approved by the President:

"To make unnecessary an opposed landing in the Japanese main islands, by weakening the will of the High Command, by effecting cessation of hostilities, and by bringing about unconditional surrender with the least possible loss of life to us consistent with early termination of the war.

This is to be accomplished by providing valid and powerful arguments for those in high places who are actually or potentially desirous of an early peace, and by canalizing their views which are divergent only as to means:

"(Propaganda objectives)

(a) To convince highly placed leaders of the hopelessness of further resistance,
(b) To convince the High Command that there is an alternative to complete annihilation and enslavement,
(c) To explain the meaning of 'unconditional surrender,'
(d) To create dissension, confusion and opposition among those enemy leaders who remain adamant in their opposition to this plan . . . in order to impose our will upon the enemy. . . . (p 342)[14]

DECISION

"The United States will conduct an intensive psychological campaign against the Japanese High Command through an official spokesman of high rank in order to accelerate and effect the unconditional surrender of Japan without the necessity of an opposed landing in the Japanese main islands. . . .

"The official spokesman will:

"(a) Lay the groundwork for the implementation to follow by addressing personally individual naval, military, political and economic leaders in a factual, direct, intimate and suggestive type of speech which experience has shown always commands their attention. He will carefully discuss their accomplishments or failures in order to enhance the prestige of desirable individuals and discredit those who hold the reins of remaining power and are in favor of continuing the war.

"(b) Exploit the cliques and groups, formed and forming in the High Command, who feel that the war is irretrievably lost or disagree with present strategy. . . ." (p 344)[14]

The operational plan indicated four essential features in the strategy of the 14 Zacharias broadcasts to Japan that followed the fall of the Koiso Cabinet:

(1) The broadcasts were directed at a sector of the Japanese top leadership presumed to be susceptible to appeals for surrender.

(2) The broadcasts defined the unconditional surrender formula in such a way that certain of the Japanese leaders might see in them the modification of US peace terms.

(3) The broadcasts originated with the approval and guidance of top political and diplomatic leaders in the US and were represented as official to the Japanese target.

(4) The broadcasts were based on systematic target analysis and accurate current intelligence, the exploitation of which was enhanced by Captain Zacharias's own intimacy with the personnel and methods of the Japanese High Command.

Each of these elements of psychological warfare figured significantly in the actual broadcasts beamed to Japan in the spring and summer of 1945.

Japanese Top Leadership as a Psychological Warfare Target

The dilemma of those who propagandize totalitarian powers in order to bring about military surrender is that their success depends not primarily on the support of general enemy public opinion, but rather on the willingness and ability of factions within the enemy leadership to effect surrender of the country's fighting forces. The Zacharias broadcasts, therefore, were aimed primarily at this leadership group. Zacharias recalls in his memoirs:

". . . We know that every important American broadcast was printed in a daily monitoring digest which the Japanese Board of Information placed at the disposal of about five hundred carefully selected Japanese political, industrial, and military leaders, and trusted publicists. . . . It was a qualitative rather than a quantitative selection. Although their number seemed infinitesimal among the more than seventy million Japanese, it was this group of five hundred who held the power of decision. If they wanted to continue the war, compel us to invade Japan and fight it out on Japanese soil, they had the power to do so. If they wanted to discontinue resistance, to embark on peace talks, or to surrender unconditionally, they also had the power to carry out their decision. Although we hoped that the broadcasts were also reaching the Japanese people, we considered them helpless because of the ineffectiveness of Japanese public opinion.

"Copies of the monitoring report were supplied to the Imperial Palace. This was the manner by which we hoped, from the very outset, to reach the Emperor's own circle. . . ." (p 359)[14]

Since American hopes for Japanese capitulation rested on the estimate that the "Navy faction" was ready for peace, when Admiral Suzuki became Premier on 6 April 1945, Zacharias "felt that his appointment created the best possible political situation in Japan for us. . . ." (p 360)[14] Accordingly, the naval leaders were the primary target and the strategy of the campaign and the content of the broadcasts shaped on this assumption:

". . . It would have been easy to harp on the ineffective showing of the Japanese Navy. But this would have been a faulty technique and this theme was therefore barred from our talks. The Japanese Navy was, in the propaganda sense, fighting on our side. Any derision would necessarily have weakened its hand while automatically strengthening the hand of the war party, spearheaded by a clique within the Army and led by ex-Premier Hideki Tojo. . . ." (p 360)[14]

Not only was derision of the Navy avoided, but, while blame was heaped on the Army leaders, the admirals of the Navy got credit for having advocated more

sensible policies. The fourth broadcast, for instance, transmitted after the German surrender, laid the blame for the Nazi-Japanese alliance at the feet of the Army leaders and contrasted their policies with that of one of the leading admirals:

> "Admiral Yonai realized that Japan's interest would best be served by avoiding an entangling alliance which he felt would force Japan to depend upon German success in the war. Admiral Yonai was convinced that Germany would be defeated. How right events have proved him to be! . . ." (p 406)[14]

Interpretation of the Unconditional Surrender Formula

The operation plan sought to "convince the High Command that there was an alternative to complete annihilation and enslavement" and to explain the meaning of "unconditional surrender." In effect, this meant informing the Japanese what policies the Americans planned to adopt toward the Japanese people, and what leadership, should surrender make it unnecessary for the Allies to invade the Japanese mainland.

Until this time the policy of unconditional surrender had meant, for Germany as well as for Japan, that the Allies would not agree to making promises of concessions to the enemy in advance of the complete cessation of resistance. Toward the end of the war against Germany and Japan, however, it became Allied policy to announce some postwar intentions. Toward the Japanese this policy assumed important proportions and, moreover, it was stated that the carrying out of these intentions was contingent on Japanese capitulation before invasion. Zacharias's broadcasts became the main vehicle for the elaboration of these intentions. The first broadcast in the series included a statement from the President of the US to the Japanese, which contained the following message:

> ". . . The longer the war lasts, the greater will be the suffering and hardships which the people of Japan will undergo — all in vain. Our blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in *unconditional surrender*.
>
> "Just what does the unconditional surrender of the armed forces mean for the Japanese people?
>
> "It means the end of the war.
>
> "It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the present brink of disaster.
>
> "It means provision for the return of soldiers and sailors to their families, their farms, their jobs. . . .
>
> "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER DOES NOT MEAN THE EXTERMINATION OR ENSLAVEMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE." (p 401)[14]

Not only did the broadcast indicate US intention to make no reprisals against the Japanese population, but it also sought to convey the message that the only military leaders whose influence would be "terminated" were those who had been directly responsible for originating and prosecuting the war policy.

The remaining crucial obstacles to Japanese capitulation were highlighted through an analysis of a direct response to the Zacharias broadcasts by Premier Suzuki himself. From his response it appeared that the psychological warfare policy had to reassure the Japanese on the consequence of Allied surrender policy, for the status of the Emperor and the "national structure of Japan."

> "Admiral Suzuki, the new premier, was particularly concerned over this question of peculiar Japanese sovereignty. . . . What he called the 'national structure' of Japan meant the divinity and political prerogatives of the Emperor. This was his guiding principle, and now he was concentrating his efforts toward saving Japan by saving her national structure, i.e., the continuity of the ruling house said to be 'unbroken for ages.'
>
> "On the other hand, he was more than willing to heed the Emperor's desire to bring about peace — but his loyalty to the Emperor made him refrain from doing anything about it until he could ascertain what the Allies had in mind regarding the future fate of the imperial house. . . . What he really wanted was an assurance that Japan's sovereignty would be respected even if she had to pay for the privilege with her empire. . . . (p 367)[14]
>
> "Our problem now was the method by which we could reassure Suzuki on this score, and indicate that there was no decision to destroy what he ambiguously described as the national structure of Japan. . . ." (p 370)[14]

One of the forms these assurances took is expressed in the following sentence in a subsequent broadcast: ". . . I know that unconditional surrender is a term which refers to *the form in which hostilities are terminated.* On the other hand, you know that the exact conditions of the *peace* are something to be settled in the future." (p 417)[14]

In a still later broadcast Zacharias elaborated further on our peace intentions as follows: ". . . As I have said before, the Japanese leaders face two alternatives. One is the virtual destruction of Japan followed by a dictated peace. The other is unconditional surrender with its attendant benefits as laid down by the Atlantic Charter. . . ." (p 373)[14]

Zacharias believed that this element in the psychological warfare strategy, the elaboration of American peace intentions toward Japan, was the crucial factor in his campaign. According to him:

> "The Japanese answer was delivered . . . on July 24, by . . . Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye this time, who was introduced as Japan's outstanding authority on international relations. . . .
>
> "The message entrusted to Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye was of momentous importance. In effect, he was to indicate Japan's willingness to *surrender unconditionally,* if and when Japan was assured that the Atlantic Charter would apply to her. . . .
>
> ". . . In retrospect the Inouye broadcast of July 24 must be accepted as evidence of the Japanese decision to terminate the war then and there; to terminate it on the basis of the terms outlined in my series of previous broadcasts culminating in my twelfth talk. . . ." (pp 373–74)[14]

Addressing the Enemy Leadership as an "Official Spokesman"

In his appeal to peacemaking forces among the Japanese leadership, it was of first importance that Zacharias's broadcasts appear as authentic and authorized representations of Presidential policy, and not to be merely "another propaganda campaign." This was sought not only by repeated designation of Zacharias as an official spokesman but also by such devices as his making use of authorized quotations from Presidential messages devised especially for the series of broadcasts.

The fact that Zacharias's previous official status was well known to the Japanese leadership and that he was personally acquainted with some gave reassurance of his reliability and authority.

Target Analysis and the Utilization of Intelligence Reports in the Zacharias Campaign

The use of intelligence facilities figured importantly in this psychological warfare campaign. In the first place heavy emphasis was placed on the use of current intelligence reports on Japan in order to furnish content for the broadcasts themselves. Secondly, constant monitoring of Japanese responses to the propaganda campaign formed the basis for evaluation of the whole series of programs. Thirdly, the knowledge of the target that Captain Zacharias had gained years before while stationed in Tokyo was most useful in interpreting these responses and in formulating future strategy in the campaign.

A policy was made in the campaign of using secret intelligence for the purpose of formulating the content of the actual broadcasts. Zacharias reported:

> "Many secret intelligence reports were used as the basis of the broadcasts in an unprecedented exploitation of this classified material for the purposes of propagating the truth as an effective weapon of warfare. There is little use for this important data if it is filed and forgotten. In our scheme of things we made this dead material work for us and even used such top-secret information, suppressed in Japan, as the arrest in Tokyo of the son of General Eugen Ott, German ambassador to Japan, as an espionage suspect. . . ." (p 355)[14]

For example, interception of a secret message by a Japanese correspondent advising the Japanese Foreign Minister to make peace was promptly reported by the OSS to Zacharias and his staff:

> "It was on June 9, 1945, at 8:25 a.m., that I made my fifth broadcast, in which I incorporated the message sent from Switzerland by the prominent Japanese newspaperman, Jiro Taguchi, to Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo. A copy of this dispatch had been obtained through the superb efforts and espionage technique of the Swiss branch of the Office of Strategic Services and was a splendid example of their co-operation when they sent it to me as of possible value for inclusion in my campaign. . . ." (p 363)[14]

When the broadcasts of Zacharias elicited a direct response from the Japanese, the message had to be analyzed in the light of all the political information, as well as linguistic sophistication, at the disposal of Zacharias's office. This response was in the form of a radio talk by Dr. Isamu Inouye who was chosen for the task, Zacharias believed, "because he claimed to know me personally from the days when he edited a Japanese newspaper in Los Angeles. . . ." (p 358)[14] Zacharias describes the task of interpreting this message as follows:

> "When we received the full text of Inouye's cagily worded reply in my office, we analyzed it carefully to determine his real objective. It requires considerable experience to filter the true meaning from the typically Japanese indirect approach. . . . it was decided that we should have to examine the original text of Inouye's address. When both the original and the English translations were scrutinized, we concluded that Inouye's broadcast was designed . . . chiefly to obtain clarification of the unconditional surrender formula and, indeed, to bring about its amendment. . . . (p 358)[14]

> ". . . Inouye said in conclusion: 'We should like mutually to join hands in constructing an international machinery which strives toward world peace and the good of humanity.' This line we interpreted as *the* message of the whole broadcast, coming, as it did, at the end of a long talk, after much verbal shadowboxing. . . ." (p 358)[14]

Understanding of the full significance of the response depended on the interpretation of certain subtleties of language in Inouye's talk:

> "What made this answer particularly significant were the thirteen concluding words. Inouye expected an answer since he stated: 'I should like to know what Zacharias thinks of these words from Japan.' (p 358)[14]
>
> "The Japanese text of the Inouye broadcast revealed a significant and interesting side light which was lost in the English translation. In the last paragraph he addressed me as Zacharias-*Kun*. Previous references were to Zacharias-*Taisa* (captain), and ordinarily, when referring to 'Mr.,' the word *San* is used. The word *Kun* is one used only between close friends or intimates. Therefore its injection here was a significant gesture and appeal which carried the fullest of hidden meanings. Literally translated the implication was 'my good friend' Zacharias." (p 359)[14]

Assessment of Effectiveness

Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Zacharias campaign against Japan had to await the conclusion of the war and is still extremely difficult to make. Zacharias reported the basis for believing that the broadcasts not only reached their target, but also that they influenced the Japanese elite to agree to Allied surrender terms:

> "Subsequent investigations on the spot after Japan's surrender revealed that the Emperor was fully aware of our psychological warfare activities and had access to the monitoring service. He felt that we understood clearly the situation inside Japan and that at the end of June 1945 the time had come to seek peace.
>
> "Several Japanese in high positions who were in constant touch with the Emperor were thoroughly interrogated. One official of the Foreign Office said: 'The Zacharias broadcasts were influential, especially in government circles,' and added: 'The outstanding feature of the Zacharias broadcasts was the difference between unconditional surrender and dictated peace. The Japanese knew how Germany was being administered under such a peace. Zacharias promised that if Japan accepted unconditional surrender they would have the benefit of the Atlantic Charter. The people began to look with favor on such terms, claiming that it was not what the militarists had said. It seemed to the people that Zacharias' explanation of unconditional surrender offered a way out. . . .' (p 374)[14]
>
> "Another official of the Foreign Office stated: 'The broadcasts of Captain Zacharias were the object of unusual attention.' He felt that these talks were influential because (a) they claimed to represent the official views of the United States government; and (b) they reiterated the pledge of President Truman that the Japanese would not be enslaved.
>
> "The highest and latest official word on this subject was received in a letter from Mr. Dennis McEvoy. It was dated August 29, 1946, and was sent

just after McEvoy's return from Tokyo, where he had gone after V-J Day. . . .

"His letter reads:

> " 'Just before leaving Tokyo I had dinner with Prince and Princess Takamatsu, whom you knew and mentioned in your first broadcast. The Prince told me on this occasion that "the Captain Zacharias broadcasts provided the ammunition needed by the "peace party" to win out against those elements in the Japanese government who wished to continue the war to the bitter end" — and after looking over the fortifications the Japanese had prepared for us, I am convinced it would have been a very bitter end indeed. The Prince's statement was in exact accord with the estimate of the situation which you made before you began to talk to the Japanese on the radio. Other pre-war contacts of mine in Japan, both in and out of the government, who were in a position to observe the crucial political situation which terminated in Japan's surrender, confirmed Takamatsu's assertions. I believe that this is rather convincing evidence of the tremendous value of your work in helping bring the war to an early close, thereby saving countless lives.' "

"There was unanimity among Japanese newspapermen that our propaganda not only shortened the war, but made the bloodless occupation of Japan possible. This was the goal set forth in the 'decision' of my operation plan 1-45." (p 375)[14]

TEXT OF SELECTED ZACHARIAS BROADCASTS *

Number One, Released 8 May 1945 (pp 399–401)[14]

ANNOUNCER: "You are about to hear the first of a series of special broadcasts which we have announced previously. Near the end of this broadcast the official spokesman will read you a declaration by the President of the United States dealing with matters vitally concerned with the destiny of Japan.

"And now the official spokesman, Captain Zacharias, United States Navy.

CAPTAIN ZACHARIAS: "This is Captain Zacharias of the United States Navy speaking from Washington, D. C.

"I am beginning today a series of talks addressed to responsible and thinking Japanese. I propose to convey a message to you which is of the utmost importance to the whole future of Japan and to those who have the welfare of Japan at heart. And I am speaking to you at a time which your own generals and admirals have described as the most critical moment in the long history of your native land.

* The English-language texts of all 14 Japanese-language shortwave broadcasts delivered by Admiral Zacharias in the period 8 May 1945–4 August 1945 are reprinted in the Admiral's account. (p 399–424)[14]

"I have been recalled from the fighting command in the Pacific theater, to come to Washington at this crucial time, first because the collapse of Germany, which the world has now witnessed, spells Japans's inevitable military defeat. . . . I am sufficiently acquainted with your military situation and I am intimately familiar with our own military potentialities to be able to evaluate the military chances of Japan in a scientific and objective way. There is not the slightest doubt that Japan will be defeated definitely and decisively.

"Secondly, I was chosen as spokesman to interpret for you the true meaning of events now shaping up, because in twenty years of peace, in Japan as well as here in the city of Washington, I have always acted as a friend of the Japanese people and have done everything in my power to prevent the catastrophe which has already begun to envelop your homeland.

"Those among you who know me personally, and there are many in the highest places, will confirm this fact.

"Admiral Yonai will recall our many conversations after his return from Russia as a language officer.

"Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo will remember my frank discussions, both in Japan when Admiral Nagano often attended, and on his way to Washington to his last official assignment.

"Mr. Kurusu will know my regret in the loss of his son whom as a young boy I often patted on the head.

"Generals Matsumoto, Washizu, Teramoto, and Hirota will remember my frequent advice.

"Likewise Mr. Debuchi, Mr. Wakatsugi, Mr. Horinouchi, and the staff of late Ambassador Saito.

"Your Premier Admiral Baron Suzuki may remember our meetings when he was chief of the Naval General Staff. My impression of him was fully confirmed by his recent sympathetic statement regarding our loss in the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

"And finally, their Imperial Highnesses Prince and Princess Takamatsu will recall when, as their aide-de-camp, I accompanied them during their tour of two months in the US in 1931.

"In the present war, as a naval officer, I have fought against your armed forces. As long as you continue the war it is unavoidable that we remain on opposite sides. In spite of this I am inclined to believe that those of you who have known me personally will trust me. I cannot expect that all of you will have confidence in me or will *want* to believe me. But even those will have an opportunity to examine my facts. They will then not be able to deny that events have borne me out. My arguments, I am confident, will speak for themselves. My devotion to my military duties of today does not prevent me from thinking of the problems of tomorrow.

"Let us look at the situation in which you find yourselves today. Your empire in the Pacific has crumbled, the lands which your forces seized in the early days of the war have all been either recaptured or cut off from the homeland, and Japan itself is today under direct attack. Your navy has suffered losses which no navy can suffer and yet endure as an effective

fighting force. Your land armies have suffered losses in the hundreds of thousands in dead, wounded, and missing. And additional hundreds of thousands are waiting helplessly in the cut-off areas for a fate over which neither they, nor you, have any measure of control.

"The men who have brought this misfortune upon Japan are repeatedly asking the question: 'What will happen to Japan?' They know that everybody in Japan is also asking this question. What answer have they given you?

"They tell you that the situation is the most serious in Japan's long history. They say the only choice left the Japanese people is victory or extermination.

"I am in a position to guarantee with authority that the desperate phrase 'victory or extermination' is a deliberate misrepresentation of fact. You know that Japan's situation is the most serious in all her long history. And I can state categorically that Japan has no chance left for victory. But at the same time I deny most emphatically that your only alternative to victory is extermination.

"Now listen carefully, for I am going to read the official message which I have to convey to you.

'STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

'Nazi Germany has been defeated.

'The Japanese people have felt the weight of our land, air, and naval attacks. So long as their leaders and the armed forces continue the war, the striking power and intensity of our blows will steadily increase and will bring utter destruction to Japan's industrial production, to its shipping, and to everything that supports its military activity.

'The longer the war lasts, the greater will be the suffering and hardships which the people of Japan will undergo — all in vain. Our blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in *unconditional surrender*.'

("I am still reading from the statement of the President of the US regarding Japan. The President continues:)

'Just what does the unconditional surrender of the armed forces mean for the Japanese people?

'It means the end of the war.

'It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who have brought Japan to the present brink of disaster.

'It means provision for the return of soldiers and sailors to their families, their farms, their jobs.

'It means not prolonging the present agony and suffering of the Japanese in the vain hope of victory.

'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER DOES NOT MEAN THE EXTERMINATION OR ENSLAVEMENT OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE.'

("That concludes the text of the statement of the President of the United States regarding Japan.)

"You can understand from this forthright statement that your true alternatives are as follows:

"Either cessation of hostilities with unconditional surrender, and this is the only way left for the preservation of your families, your homes, your economy, and your country.

"Or a futile prolongation of resistance which will inevitably result in the needless desolation of your country and destruction surpassing in scale even that in Germany.

"Let me assure you again and again that my country is determined to fight this war to its predestined end and I cannot find any who think that our victory will be too hard and too costly to win.

"Therefore familiarize yourselves with this thought:

"Your future lies in your own hands. You can choose between a wasteful, unclean death for many of your forces, or a peace with honor."

ANNOUNCER: "You have just heard the first of a special series of broadcasts by a spokesman of the United States Government, Captain Zacharias.

"Please note that in all these broadcasts the English text is the official version. The Japanese is an unofficial translation."

Number Four, Released 26 May 1945 (pp 405–06)[14]

"It is difficult at this time to appraise the full impact which the collapse of Germany will have upon Japan. I have no doubt that it will become evident, in all its implications, as the war is intensified against Japan. But the collapse of Germany has rendered Japan one service. Now, for the first time, the Japanese people have the opportunity to evaluate fully for themselves the quality of the political leadership which maneuvered their country into their ill-fated alliance with Germany. The men who advised the highest authority to link the fate of Japan with that of Germany, who schemed to plunge Japan into a hopeless war against the most powerful nations on earth — these men now stand revealed as lacking in judgment and in statesmanship.

"Let me recall to your minds the names of some of these men: Field Marshals Hata, Sugiyama, and Terauchi: General Hiroshi Oshima, recently found hiding in southern Germany by the United States Army; Koki Hirota and Toshio Shiratori; Generals Tojo, Koiso, and others. Among these are some who worked secretly for Germany which now has surrendered unconditionally. In Berlin, General Oshima collaborated to bring about the signing of the Tripartite Pact, and made commitments on behalf of the Japanese nation, and, more particularly, although an army general, he made commitments on behalf of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

"I realize that this is a serious indictment against a Japanese army officer. But remember, I promised to give you the facts.

"As you know, there was a German invasion of Japan. Can it be called by any other name? This German invasion of Japan began with the signing of the pact of 1936. At this time, German military men, propagandists, and so-called professors began to arrive in large numbers. They were sponsored by the pro-Nazi group of Japanese leaders. By 1938, when a '*cultural*' agreement was signed, the pro-Nazi leaders of Japan had made it possible for German influence to be spread throughout most media of public opinion. The *Yomiuri* newspaper, for example, under the leadership of Mr. Shoriki Matsutaro, became completely dominated by the representative of the German propaganda ministry in Tokyo, Mr. Erich Wickert, who had his offices right in the German Embassy. Other newspapers similarly dominated were the *Hochi* and even the *Kokumin*, which, as you undoubtedly know, was close to the Imperial Army.

"But this was not enough to satisfy Japan's pro-Nazi leaders. German agents infiltrated Japan's industrial system. The now thoroughly discredited German generalship was represented in your own Imperial Staff meetings by Lieutenant General Eugen Ott, who was not a strategist, but is known to the entire world as one of the key men in the German intelligence service. He was permitted to attend the most secret conferences. Do you know that General Ott's own son was guilty of espionage in Japan, and was arrested in Tokyo? Remember, I promised to give you only the facts.

"And now more important still, the very councils where policy decisions concerning Japan's relations with other nations are prepared for the highest approval, became contaminated by Nazi influence.

"In July of 1940, as a result of pressure by pro-Nazi Japanese leaders, General Hata demanded of the then premier Admiral Yonai that Japan enter into an immediate military alliance with Germany and Italy. Can you visualize the embarrassment of Admiral Yonai, who, only a few weeks before, on April 25 to be exact, had assured the American Embassy that Japan would never be a party to the Tripartite military pact as long as he remained premier? That Admiral Yonai was sincere I know from my personal acquaintance with him.

"Admiral Yonai realized that Japan's interests would best be served by avoiding an entangling alliance which he felt would force Japan to depend upon German success in the war. Admiral Yonai was convinced that Germany would be defeated. How right events have proved him to be! He was apprehensive that Japan likewise could not possibly win were she to side with the Axis powers against the Allies. Aware of his responsibilities as premier of Japan, Admiral Yonai refused to yield to pressure. As you will recall, Hata resigned. The refusal of the pro-Nazi group, which controlled the Army's High Command, to designate a new war minister, resulted in the fall of the Yonai cabinet. The military alliance with Germany and Italy was concluded by the succeeding Konoe cabinet. Hata had won a personal victory. But for his personal victory the Japanese nation is still paying a heavy price.

"Now Nazi Germany no longer exists, and therefore men like Hata, Sugiyama, Terauchi, Koiso, and Tojo today stand as failures before the Japanese nation, and indeed, before the entire world. You yourselves

compelled the Tojo and Koiso cabinets to resign. Now Germany's collapse brings the bankruptcy also of the political leadership of the entire group into sharp focus. Although men like Hata, Sugiyama, and Terauchi are still in your midst, can one forget that these men, through their faulty advice and machinations, have brought Japan to the brink of disaster?

"Can leaders with an unbroken record of past failures be trusted to guide Japan's future destinies? Is it not time for the leaders who have the best interest of Japan at heart to repudiate these failures and embark on the only course which can save Japan?

"This course has been set forth for you in unmistakable language by President Truman in his now famous proclamation. The time is running out, but inspired leadership can still save Japan."

THE DARLAN STORY

By M. J. and W. E. D.

An account of American collaboration with a Vichy French leader and its psychological warfare implications.

Probably no part of US dealings with the Vichy French government has been subject to greater dispute than that of the relations with Admiral Darlan after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. The so-called "Darlan interlude" reveals the complexity of psychological warfare integration with over-all political and military strategy. The period of US cooperation with Darlan is one of the best examples from World War II where significant military requirements put propagandists in a temporarily disadvantageous position and created conflicts with long-run psychological warfare strategy.

During the period 1940–1942 the US government, through the Department of State and its agencies abroad, maintained diplomatic relations with the pro-Nazi Vichy French government, headed by Marshal Pétain. Anti-Nazi elements in the US and abroad vociferously and vigorously attacked this policy of maintaining relations with a government allied to an obvious enemy of the US. The protests were especially loud and numerous after Nazi Germany declared war on the US in December 1941. Objective observers privately and the Department of State publically later could only justify the maintenance of such diplomatic relations on military grounds. Through the presence of agents and observers in Vichy France the US was not cut off entirely from access to military intelligence regarding conditions in France and her overseas territory, including North Africa. As a military desideratum, it should be stated that the US policy of maintaining relations with Vichy had the approval of the British government, which did not itself maintain official contact with Vichy.

In addition, US policy toward Vichy was intended to have favorable psychological effects for the Allied cause. By promises and delivery of material aid to the French people given to Pétain on behalf of the US, by constant messages to French officials, and by all other possible diplomatic activities, the Department of State sought to strengthen the determination of Pétain and his ministers to resist increasing Nazi demands on them. It was hoped that the Nazis might be deterred from occupying the south of France, which by the terms of the armistice of 1940 was

to be free of German troops, and that Pétain would be strengthened in his determination to preserve the French fleet from Nazi control. These strategic objectives were to be implemented by diplomatic pressure applied to the French government itself. In evaluating the psychological warfare aspects of the 1940–1942 US policy toward Vichy, it must be remembered that the Nazis did not occupy the whole of France until after the invasion of French North Africa had actually taken place. The Nazis were never successful in gaining control of the French fleet, although the British were forced to engage a portion of it.

Despite the purposes behind it, this policy was uncongenial to many private groups in the US. Many Americans felt that such a policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy gave a tacit approval and open recognition to a government that was under the thumb of the Nazis:

> "The so-called Vichy policy drew more criticism of the Department of State than almost any other issue of foreign affairs during the war years. In the United States it generated no end of indignation and bitter feeling and led to charges that frequently went beyond the limits of decency and reason." (p 382)[15]

Both the State Department and the President refrained from making any significant attempts to explain publicly the rationale behind the Vichy policy. To have explained the policy to the American public would have jeopardized the policy itself, since it would have been tantamount to announcing to the Vichy leaders and to the Germans that our major purposes in maintaining relations with France were to gather vital military intelligence and to apply covert anti-Nazi pressure.

During the same historic period the British had taken under their protection Charles de Gaulle, outspoken leader of French resistance forces. The American government, meanwhile, refused to give any official approval to the Free French movement under de Gaulle's leadership. This was due partly to the conviction American leaders had of his political irresponsibility, to their mistrust of his political intentions for postwar France, and partly to the belief that he did not have (by the middle of 1942) any widespread following in the resistance movement of metropolitan France. With respect to the extent and intensity of de Gaulle's popularity in France itself, there were conflicting reports from US intelligence sources:

> "It was easy enough to say that de Gaulle represented the real sentiments of the French people and that he was our obvious ally in the campaign against the common enemy. But was that the fact? No one could say with certainty, for there was no way of sounding out French opinion. Our representatives in France did not believe it and neither did the Department of State." (p 257)[15]

On one question, however, intelligence sources were in substantial agreement. No matter what the size of de Gaulle's following among resistance forces in Metropolitan France, he had few followers and little support of any kind within the ranks of the French Army. General Eisenhower wrote concerning this problem:

> "During the course of our planning in London a constant stream of information came to us from consuls and other officials whom our State Department maintained in Africa throughout the war. All of this information

> was to the effect that in the regular officer corps of the French Army de Gaulle was, at that time, considered a disloyal soldier. His standing with the resistance elements of the civil population was vastly different. But at that moment resistance elements, particularly in Africa, were inarticulate and ineffective — and we had to win over the armed services as the first objective." (pp 83–84)[16]

Thus, the Allies in planning the invasion of the French North African coast agreed that de Gaulle would be of little, if any, use in inspiring the elements of the French there to cease resistance and to rally to the Allied side:

> ". . . Gaullist co-operation or participation . . . had been ruled out from the beginning by common consent of the President and the Prime Minister. The reasons for the decision were two. In the first place, the patriot leaders in Algiers were all men appointed by Vichy, men who, though violently anti-German, were conservative, authoritarian, or even royalist in their political views. . . . there can be no doubt that the use of Fighting French forces would have led to civil war." (pp 289–90)[15]

The importance of a "bloodless victory" in North Africa was described as follows by General Marshall:

> "If our occupation of North Africa could be carried out without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in that region, it would provide a setting for the reconstitution of the French army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland. The psychological effect of the conquest of North Africa would be tremendous." (p 287)[15]

In order to accomplish this bloodless victory, it was thought necessary to appeal to the Vichy-controlled area through a distinguished French leader whose military record rivaled that of Pétain. Henri Giraud, a hero of World War I and a German captive in both world conflicts, had only recently escaped from a German prison camp and returned to the south of France. In France, his record of heroism was thought to have made him the "man of the hour." He was therefore chosen by the Allies for the job of appealing to the French in North Africa to refrain from offering resistance to American forces landing there. American agents in French North Africa assured military commanders that Giraud's appeal to the French troops would be effective in eliminating French resistance to Allied moves.

Great care was taken in planning the psychological strategy for the attack. Not only was de Gaulle to be excluded from participating in the landing by design, but the British contribution was to be concealed from the public in the belief that Vichy French troops might resist the British forces whereas they probably would welcome Americans as "liberators." President Roosevelt cabled Churchill as follows:

> "I would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in Africa, whereas an initial American landing without British ground forces offers a real chance that there would be no French resistance or only a token resistance." (p 288)[15]

In the psychological warfare offensive, the invasion was to be described as the first step in the ultimate liberation of France; it was also to be presented as designed to forestall a planned German occupation of French North Africa.

Thus, for the first time in World War II, psychological warfare strategy was made an integral part of the Allied planning for an important military operation. Propaganda personnel of the American OWI and the British Political Warfare Executive were to land with the invading forces. Allied intelligence officers already in North Africa, under cover, were supposed to organize French resistance personnel to commit acts of sabotage so as to coincide with the invasion. General Mark Clark and a small staff had been dramatically smuggled ashore a short time before the invasion in order to "brief" French military resistance leaders on the plans to be followed when the invasion took place. Part of the psychological warfare strategy, designed to forestall or to bring to an end French resistance, involved an exaggeration of the size of the American forces being landed. The appeal by Giraud to the French North Africans to cease resistance was to be so timed as to coincide with the actual invasion.

When the invasion finally took place, on 8 November 1942, not one of these steps was executed in conformity with prior plans. The presentation of Giraud as a symbol around which the French were asked to rally proved to be impossible and made necessary a radical revision of the plans on the spot. This revision produced political repercussions among many and varied groups of Allied supporters.

Leaders in both London and Washington had earnestly believed that General Giraud could lead the French troops in North Africa into Allied hands. Thus Allied planners had begun negotiations in October, through American diplomatic agents, which resulted in the rescue of the General from virtual imprisonment in Vichy France. Prior to his rescue trusted intermediaries had kept him informed of developments. There was little reason, during this time, to believe that once he was rescued from Nazi surveillance he would prove to be difficult to deal with. General Eisenhower, in describing his meeting with Giraud on 7 November 1942. in Gibraltar, has recounted how mistaken Allied planners proved to be.

> "It was quickly apparent that he [Giraud] had come out of France laboring under the grave misapprehension that he was immediately to assume command of the whole Allied expedition. . . . I wanted him to proceed to Africa, as soon as we could guarantee his safety, and there take over command of such French forces as would voluntarily rally to him. . . .
>
> "General Giraud was adamant; he believed that the honor of himself and his country was involved and that he could not possibly accept any position in the venture lower than that of complete command . . . after many hours of conference [he] felt it necessary to decline to have any part in the scheme. . . . The conversation with General Giraud lasted . . . until after midnight. . . . His good-night statement was, 'Giraud will be a spectator in this affair.' " (pp 99–101)[16]

After a night's sleep General Giraud demonstrated a change of heart; he decided that he would participate on the basis of General Eisenhower's wishes. However, further talks revealed that he and the Allied staff were poles apart as to what should be done strategically. He saw little need for North Africa as a base from which to direct future operations and thus he desired to attack southern France immediately.

On the morning of 9 November, Giraud and General Mark Clark went by air to Algiers in order to carry out prior plans designed to end the fighting and to secure

French cooperation for future operations against the Germans. General Eisenhower has informed the world how disappointing General Giraud proved to be in this role.

> "General Giraud's cold reception by the French in Africa was a terrific blow to our expectations. He was completely ignored. He made a broadcast announcing assumption of leadership of French North Africa and directing French forces to cease fighting against the Allies, but his speech had no effect whatsoever. I was doubtful that it was heard by significant numbers. . . ." (p 104)[16]

Other problems added to the complications of the operation. The invading troops landed miles from planned debarkation points and thus arrived too late to support the seizure of Algiers by French resistance forces. Radio communications with Algiers were difficult to establish and nearly as difficult to maintain, but eventually a message came through that confirmed an earlier report that Admiral Darlan, the Vichy Minister of Marine, and Commander-in-Chief of French fighting forces, was in Algiers. There was little question but that his presence in North Africa was a mere coincidence, being occasioned by the critical illness of a son, to whom he was devoted.

Immediately the problem arose to plague the Allied commanders — should there be any traffic with Darlan? General Eisenhower reports that it would have been "a simple and easy answer . . . to jail him." But, would this have been a useful act? Churchill thought not, for he said:

> "If I could meet Darlan, much as I hate him, I would cheerfully crawl on my hands and knees for a mile if by doing so I could get him to bring that fleet of his into the circle of Allied forces." (p 105)[16]

There were other equally cogent reasons for dealing with Darlan. General Clark found it virtually useless to talk to Frenchmen, civilian or military, about capitulation to the Allies, unless the overriding influence of Marshal Pétain was recognized. The French military leaders in North Africa looked on Darlan as their legal commander and the direct and personal representative of Pétain. From him they would take orders, but from no other leader in North Africa. On 12 November, General Clark reported to Eisenhower that it appeared possible to achieve cooperation with Frenchmen in North Africa only by dealing directly with Darlan.

General Eisenhower concluded that the problem before the Allied Command, i.e., through what French channels it should deal, was one that required local and expeditious handling. He recalled that his basic orders called for his leading a military force into North Africa "in the attempt to win an ally — not kill Frenchmen." He says that he was well aware that by dealing with a Vichyite he would create revulsion among people in England and America. (p 107)[16] In this assessment he was not mistaken, even though it was Darlan who issued the orders for all French commanders in North Africa to cease resistance to the Allied forces.

In the US and throughout the British Commonwealth, Darlan was known as a collaborator with Nazis in France, a violent Anglophobe, and as one responsible in large measure for the Nazi-like policies put into effect against the civilian populations of France and North Africa. Disapproval of the policy of cooperation with Vichy leaders was outspoken in Britain, where it became a subject of debate

in Parliament and the basis of bitter criticism of the American "inexperience" in political and military enterprises. Such criticism was given added impetus because few Britishers understood or appreciated the reasons why de Gaulle was shunned by American leaders. Coupled with the planned strategy of omitting credit to the British for their part in the invasion (which, although represented as solely American to the French, was actually a joint undertaking), the Allied collaboration with the anti-British Darlan was especially unpalatable to the rank and file of the British public. Although Churchill supported the American decision there seems to have been widespread private misgivings in British government circles. Robert Sherwood remarked:

> "I think I am justified in expressing the opinion that the British Foreign Office derived a certain private satisfaction from the embarrassment of the US Government throughout the Darlan affair and its ridiculously protracted aftermath." (p 655)[7]

De Gaulle, too, did not hesitate to denounce the policy of collaboration with Darlan in his broadcasts to the European Continent.

Needless to say the disagreement among Americans and between American leaders and the British public provided a fine opportunity for enemy propagandists. Sherwood observed:

> "The whole Darlan deal, and the tremendous repercussions therefrom . . . inspired plenty of gleeful quips by Goebbels and his satellite broadcasters in Rome and Paris and throughout Europe. It seemed to confirm the impression that, while the Americans talked big about the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, they actually knew nothing about Europe and could be hoodwinked by any treacherous gangster who offered them collaboration." (p 655)[7]

Considered to be equally important, at the time, was the fact that the promises of liberation the Americans held out to French resisters in occupied France probably would have far less appeal to them when it became known that we had actively and unhesitatingly collaborated in North Africa with the archenemy of the resistance movement, Darlan himself. There was the ever-present danger that compromises with Vichy leaders in North Africa might cause our supporters in all occupied countries to lose faith in us as liberators. Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, the Director General of the British psychological warfare agency, Political Warfare Executive, recalled:

> "The resistance movements in all the occupied countries . . . were horrified by Allied collaboration with Frenchmen whom they regarded as little better than Quislings.
>
> "These conflicts of opinion affected PWE acutely and made our propaganda exceedingly difficult. How were we to explain Darlan and his regime to our friends in France and in the occupied countries?" (p 213)[9]

Wallace Carroll, the American OWI representative in London at the time, reported that a further source of concern to the Allied psychological warfare officers was the fact that the Americans in North Africa seemed unable or unwilling to bring effective pressure on Darlan and his followers to terminate the Nazi-like Vichy policies in the area placed under nominal American control. President Roosevelt had promised changes, in the following words:

> "I have requested the liberation of all persons in North Africa who have been imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate the world, and I have asked for the abrogation of all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi governments or Nazi ideologists. Reports indicate that the French of North Africa are subordinating all political questions to the formation of a common front against the common enemy." (pp 371–72)[15]

Carroll depicts the predicament of the Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters, in North Africa, which wished to depict the American offensive as a liberating movement:

> "So we who tried to defend America stood naked to the blast with only the words of the President to warm us. And when we had said these words a hundred times, they sounded thin and unreal and brought no comfort. Oh, for one little act to give meaning to those words! Just the name of one patriot released from jail, one honest man restored to his post, one Fascist put out of the way. Or just one photograph of a Jewish schoolboy returning to his classroom, or of a refugee eating the bread of the liberators." (pp 72–73)[17]

The American policy of working through Darlan led to frustration of initiative by psychological warfare officers in enlisting the support of the French North African population. To have made anti-Vichy appeals to the general public would have been tantamount to criticism of Darlan with whom the Americans were collaborating.

> "It was not long before some of the men of the Psychological Warfare Branch in Algiers began to form a sort of 'resistance movement' of their own, to wage psychological warfare against Darlan and the Americans who collaborated with him. They found allies among the men of the Algiers Underground who had risked their lives and careers to help the Americans on November 8 and who had been rewarded by being left to the mercy of the Darlan régime. These bitter and disillusioned men told the Americans about the Frenchmen who were being persecuted for having helped the Allies, about the Gaullist and other political prisoners who were still in concentration camps, about the Jews who continued to suffer the discriminations of the Vichy laws. The psychological warriors in turn passed this information on to American and British war correspondents who found ways of squeezing it through the military censorship. Much of this information was true, some of it was not. One of the strangest facts of the whole strange North African story is that some of the news dispatches that cast the greatest discredit on the United States were inspired by the Americans who had gone to North Africa to make propaganda capital for America." (p 62)[17]

President Roosevelt looked on the cooperation with Darlan as necessary to prevent widespread American casualties at the hands of French forces. Likewise he believed such a working arrangement necessary to avoid American-inflicted French casualties that might have had still worse political consequences later during the ultimate invasion of metropolitan France. However, as his critics in this instance had been more often in the past his articulate supporters, he was vulnerable to the uproar in the American press relative to the Darlan affair. The President therefore issued a statement designed to reassure the offended groups as to the temporary and purely expediential nature of the Darlan-US collaboration:

"I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in the United States and Great Britain and among all the other United Nations that in view of the history of the past two years no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan. . . .

"We are opposed to Frenchmen who support Hitler and the Axis. No one in our Army has any authority to discuss the future Government of France and the French Empire. . . .

"The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle." (p 371)[15]

Although his message had the effect of soothing disgruntled Allies, it had at the same time the negative effect of ruffling Darlan's feelings, who commented in a letter to General Mark Clark, "Information from various sources tends to substantiate the view that I am 'only a lemon which the Americans will drop after they have squeezed it dry.' " (p 373)[15]

The confusion as to what line American psychological warfare policy should take was "saved by the bell." Another unforeseen event, the assassination of Darlan, took place on 24 December 1942. The Americans were able to install Giraud in his place. In the meantime, at Casablanca, a meeting between Giraud and de Gaulle had been arranged, and a semblance of collaboration between the two was displayed to the public. The psychological warfare liability of the Darlan policy was thereby terminated.

Psychological warfare operations connected with the French North African invasion cannot be regarded as other than a valiant effort that failed to achieve the planned results. The campaign that was planned before the invasion could not have succeeded since it was based on faulty intelligence from French North Africa itself. Then as the military developments led to the negotiations with Darlan the whole propaganda line became unfeasible. As in the case of the earlier American representation at Vichy, a policy that had great military considerations to recommend it had few ideological ones. No other line of propaganda strategy then could have been successful. What skill was available had to be turned to moderating the damaging psychological warfare effects of the collaboration with Darlan.

Policy Coordination and Control

Individuals who have written on the subject are not in complete agreement as to how active the government foreign propagandist should be in the counsel chambers where foreign policy is formulated. Some argue that the role of the propagandist is to exploit foreign policy never to create it. Others argue that it is not only desirable but necessary that psychological warfare personel have direct access to those who make policy decisions and should exert definite influence in the policy-determining process.

Edward W. Barrett, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and before that Deputy Director of OWI in World War II, has declared:

"It should be standard government policy to have specialists in foreign opinion participate in decisions of international policy. Sound policy

should not be changed in order to win popularity, but it can at least be so formulated, announced, executed and explained as to win maximum good will."[18]

Hans Speier, a leading publicist in the field of propaganda and how to utilize it effectively, chief of the OWI German policy desk in World War II, has characterized the relation that should exist between the policymaker and the propagandist as follows:

"Because the propagandist depends on the policymaker, effective liaison between their agencies is of great importance in political warfare. But liaison between the statesmen and the top personnel responsible for propaganda is not institutionalized in any country. Unlike experts in foreign, military, and naval affairs, experts in propaganda are seldom among the participants at international conferences. In fact, the more important the parley, the less likely it is that there will be propagandists among the attending advisers."[11]

The enunciation of acceptable policy is only one of the problems facing a propaganda agency — equally important to its success is the machinery established to ensure effective liaison, thus to ensure proper coordination and control over psychological warfare output. Three articles are reproduced in the pages immediately following. Each is believed to illustrate some of the lessons of importance in a limited sphere of interest — liaison, coordination, and policy control.

"The 'Moronic Little King' Incident" suggests that had the OWI broadcast division maintained a closer liaison with the Department of State policy makers and the military authorities involved in political negotiations in Italy an embarrassing incident involving an overseas broadcast in 1943 might never have occurred. The scriptwriter in preparing broadcast material for OWI echoed the sentiments of a domestic commentator, which were at variance with American official policy. President Roosevelt is reported to have denounced the broadcast and to have rebuked OWI officials for propaganda releases inconsistent with American interests and policy.

"Policy Coordination in OWI" is an account of difficulties encountered by the US in coordinating policy and propaganda during World War II. The account was prepared by one of the senior staff members of the Social Science Division, RAND Corporation, and is based in part on an examination of some of the official guidances and directives issued during the war by the American propaganda agency. The author of the account concludes that the effectiveness of OWI suffered because high officials of the agency were not included in high-policy discussions.

"Announcing the Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea" — how three different broadcast outlets, subject to American jurisdiction, handled

the news stories of Chinese intervention in the war in Korea in November 1950 — suggests an almost total lack of central guidance, unified control, or operational coordination. The news accounts given in VOA shortwave broadcasts, originating in New York, but heard in Korea, and those disseminated by VUNC (the radio voice of General MacArthur's UN command) and the Broadcast Corporation of Japan (BCJ — then under the jurisdiction of General MacArthur's SCAP command), both originating in Tokyo, but also heard in Korea, differed in many significant ways such as would imply both the absence of effective guidance and the lack of administrative liaison and operational coordination. These deficiencies surely reduced the effectiveness of the American propaganda effort during this period.

THE "MORONIC LITTLE KING" INCIDENT*

By James P. Warburg

The lack of coordination between policy makers, domestic information personnel, and broadcasters to overseas areas led to embarrassment of all three.

All through the first half of 1943, rear echelon strategic propaganda — especially propaganda to enemy-occupied countries awaiting liberation — was seriously hampered by the uncertain course of Allied policy in North Africa. No sooner had the misgivings awakened by the Darlan deal died down somewhat, after Darlan was assassinated, than they were re-awakened by continued Allied dealings with Vichy officials, continued refusal to allow General de Gaulle to come to North Africa, and most of all, by the importation from Argentina of the notorious French Fascist, Peyrouton.

Nevertheless there was one country against which both tactical and long-range strategic propaganda remained extremely effective; namely, Italy. This was no doubt largely due to the fact that the Italian people, whose hearts had never been in the war, now felt themselves immediately threatened with invasion, and that the tension produced by this threat made them ripe for defeatist propaganda. As a matter of fact, the Italian people presented an interesting problem in psychology — half-way between the problem of Germany, the true enemy, and that of enemy-occupied France. In one sense the Italians were a people to be defeated; in another sense they were a people to be liberated. All through the winter and spring Allied propaganda hammered home the hopelessness of the Italian military position. It pointed out that the Germans always left Italian troops behind to protect their own retreat; that the Nazi High Command would make a battleground out of Italy for no other reason than for the defense of the Nazi homeland; that Mussolini had betrayed the Italian people, had sold them out to the barbarian Hitler, and was keeping them in a hopeless war merely to save his own skin; that the Fascists

* Extracted from *Unwritten Treaty*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1946, pp 106–11. Reproduced with permission of Mr. Warburg and Harcourt, Brace & Co., the copyright holder.

were corrupt profiteers; and that the Allied armies were coming to Italy not as conquerors but as liberators.

This barrage of subversive and defeatist propaganda was dinned into the Italian people day and night, not only from Allied transmitters in England and America, but from new powerful transmitters erected in North Africa, and operated there by PWB as the United Nations Radio. It was showered upon them in leaflets. It was whispered to them by secret agents. The high point of a long crescendo was timed to coincide with the Allied invasion of Sicily early in July, and lasted until the fall of Benito Mussolini on July 25, 1943.

This was the high-water mark of Allied psychological warfare in the European theater, at least so far as strategic over-all propaganda was concerned. In the days immediately following Mussolini's resignation, there occurred an incident which marked the turning point and the beginning of the decline. The incident, unimportant in itself except that it served to underscore what had happened, was as follows:

The news of Mussolini's resignation, the King's appointment of Marshal Badoglio as his successor, and Badoglio's statement reaffirming Italy's alliance with Nazi Germany was received in New York on the evening of Sunday July 25, 1943. In accordance with standing policy directives, the OWI in reporting these events to the world referred to Badoglio as a "high-ranking Fascist" and took the line that what had happened was merely a changing of the Fascist guard. Monitoring of BBC broadcasts showed that the British were throwing their hats in the air and saying, "Now that Mussolini has resigned, the Italian people and we have but one common enemy, Hitler." This seemed to the officials of OWI an extremely dangerous line to take. They therefore waited eagerly for some American personality to comment upon the events in a more realistic fashion. Since it was Sunday night, official comments were unobtainable, but Samuel Grafton delivered a broadcast on a domestic station which took precisely the desired attitude. The text was as follows:

> "Premier Mussolini of Italy resigned at five o'clock this afternoon, as you probably know by this time. The King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, has taken over command of the Italian armed forces. Marshal Badoglio has been made chief of state and prime minister of Italy in Mussolini's place.
>
> "The first word from Italy is that war will go on. Marshal Badoglio has made an announcement to that effect, and King Victor Emmanuel has called on Italians to stand firm at their battle stations and to continue fighting — and so, after twenty-one years as chief of state, one of the two Axis dictators has been knocked out. This man who led his criminal march on Rome, before many of the soldiers in the American army today were even born, is out of power.
>
> "We have knocked him out by remote control, as it were — we nudged him in Africa, and in Sicily, and he has gone down — and yet, I do not feel in any great sense that history has been made today. Five years ago, the resignation of Mussolini would have been a tremendous sensation.
>
> "I wonder if many of you do not feel as I do, that it is only today an incident in the war. Fascism is still in power in Italy. It has put on a new face, that's all. Italian Fascism has rouged its cheeks and its lips and is trying to see whether a smile will not do more for it than the famous frown by which it lived so long.

"The moronic little king who has stood behind Mussolini's shoulder for twenty-one years has moved forward one pace. This is a political minuet and not the revolution we have been waiting for.

"Badoglio himself is a kind of Goering-like character, who has been considered by pro-Fascists to be one of the best Fascists, whatever that is.

"Mussolini's epitaph today is not that his resignation is important, but that it is so hopelessly unimportant.

"It changes nothing, for nothing can change in Italy until democracy is restored.

"We who have learned to fight Fascism at last have learned not to judge by man, but by system, and so I cannot even gloat that the fat boy has been knocked over. I am keeping my hat in my hand and I'll throw it into the air when the first Italian casts his first free vote in Italy."

This commentary was rebroadcast by OWI in English only, as notice to the British that America did not share the excessive optimism of the early BBC broadcasts. It was not used in Italian or other foreign languages, because it contained one phrase — "the moronic little king" — which seemed in questionable taste.

On Tuesday morning, July 27, the New York *Times* printed on its front page a story by Arthur Krock making a big to-do over the fact that OWI had called the Italian king a moron and Badoglio a "high-ranking Fascist," and calling attention to a commentary by an "imaginary" commentator.

On Tuesday afternoon, at his press conference, President Roosevelt was quoted as having denounced "a shortwave American public opinion broadcast to Europe by OWI in which King Victor Emmanuel of Italy was styled 'the moronic little King' and the 'Fascist king' and Marshal Badoglio was called 'a high-ranking Fascist.' " According to the New York *Times*, which ran another front-page story the next morning, the President also repudiated by inference OWI's comment that "the essential nature of the Fascist regime in Italy has not been changed by the substitution of the Marshal for Benito Mussolini." The *Times* story went on to interpret the President's rebuke in such a way as to make it the basis for the questionable allegation that OWI was flouting the policy of the United States Government, and following a policy consistent with the personal ideologies of its own staff, which served the interests of the Communists and endangered the lives of American soldiers.

A full investigation by the proper authorities disclosed that OWI had not in any way violated policy directives and that the sensational accusations and insinuations of the New York *Times* were wholly untrue. Furthermore it came to light that this newspaper had newly instituted a twenty-four hour monitoring system in order to be able to listen to OWI's output — a matter which raised certain questions of security — and that the *Times* itself in an early edition of the same day (July 27) on which it had first denounced OWI had editorially referred to Victor Emmanuel as a "conniving puppet king."

As a matter of fact, a survey of editorial opinion showed that the comment quoted by OWI was mild in comparison to that of many newspapers. The New York *Sun* called Victor Emmanuel "a timorous little king"; the Washington *Post* said, "If Mussolini was the tool of Hitler, what was King Victor Emmanuel but the tool of Mussolini?" The New York *World-Telegram* spoke of "the craven king" and the "caricature king."

What, then, was all the shouting about? Was it merely a tempest in the political teapot, stirred up by a single Roosevelt-hating newspaper correspondent? Had the President been tricked into a position in which it was made to appear that he did not think either Victor Emmanuel or "the Butcher of Abyssinia" should be referred to as Fascists? In a radio broadcast immediately after the incident, the President went out of his way to make the statement, "We will have no truck with Fascism." Why, then, should Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio be treated with such tender consideration?

The answer was in one respect quite simple: there had been a sudden change in Allied policy on the highest level, but no new instructions had been issued to OWI.

The hue and cry over OWI's use of "imaginary" commentators and the storm of criticism which the incident evoked were evidence of a widespread feeling of distrust and resentment against OWI because it seemed to be secretive, tricky, and politically untrustworthy. This again was the old misapprehension about the very nature of psychological warfare. Some months earlier Senator Taft had actually moved in the Senate to make all United States foreign propaganda public. The setting up of a monitoring service by the New York *Times* was an expression of the same feeling — "the American public is entitled to know what OWI is saying to the world abroad."

POLICY COORDINATION IN OWI*

By W. Phillips Davison

The role of the propagandist in the policy-determining process.

The diplomatic negotiator attempts to further his country's interests by persuading the representatives of other nations to accept certain points of view, to sign certain documents, or to commit their nations to engage in various specific acts. His success in gaining his point depends partly on his skill as a negotiator, but depends even more on the authority he has brought with him that enables him to apply pressure, to make promises, and to exercise the power of the country he represents. No matter how clever he may be, the diplomat cannot make commitments that are at variance with the high policy of his government.

The diplomat's audience is composed usually of only a few men seated around a table, and his discussions often take place in secret. The strategic propagandist's audience may comprise groups totaling millions, and insofar as he is engaging in white propaganda his words are public. Nevertheless, both depend on national policy. Like the diplomat the specialist in white propaganda cannot rely on his skill alone. How much he can say is determined by the measures that his government is willing to take, and by the power of his country.

* Adapted from RAND Corporation classified study, written in 1949. The author in doing the study had access to the classified directives of OWI, then in the custody of the US Department of State. This portion of a larger study was declassified officially in 1956 to enable its inclusion in this volume. It is reprinted here with the permission of RAND, the author, and the Department of the Air Force.

High-policy discussions precede each diplomatic conference. How much is the negotiator's country able to offer? Is it willing to risk war? Will the population stand for more taxes? What should be done if another party to the discussion makes certain demands? Questions such as these are argued back and forth, and when the negotiator arrives at the scene of the discussion he usually has a fairly clear idea of the answers he can give. If he has not personally taken part in the preceding policy discussions, he has at least been represented by others who know the problems that he will face and who are familiar with the approach that other national representatives will probably take. The diplomat is bound by national policy, but the more important the issue the more likely it is that he or the agency he represents has had a hand in the formulation of that policy.

The propagandist is not so fortunate. Although he is bound by national policy as closely as is the diplomat, he usually has *not* had a hand in the formulation of that policy. Instead, he may receive an official statement already in final form and be told to make use of it as best he can. The effect that the policy may be expected to have on various audiences throughout the world has often been given only passing consideration. Furthermore it should be emphasized that almost every major policy has a propaganda effect, whether or not that effect is intended and whether or not that effect has been given prior consideration.

Exclusion of propagandists from policy-making councils has not always been the rule in the US. During World War I George Creel, who was in charge of the US propaganda effort, had ready access to President Wilson, and one of the greatest psychological successes that the US has ever achieved in world politics came about in part through this close liaison between the White House and Creel's Committee on Public Information. Creel relates that one of the factors behind Wilson's Fourteen Points was the following cable from Edgar Sisson, the Committee's representative in Russia:

> "If President will restate anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America, thousand words or less, short almost placard paragraphs, I can get it fed into Germany in great quantities in German translation, and can use Russian version potently in army and everywhere."[19]

Wilson's resulting statement of US war aims constituted a highly effective propaganda weapon.

During World War II, however, US propagandists in OWI found themselves in a less favorable position. They not only felt that they were not included in the process of policy formulation but also felt that the President and the Secretary of State did not understand exactly what OWI was trying to do. Wallace Carroll writes that President Roosevelt believed that the OWI had something to do with censorship, and that Cordell Hull also at times gave the impression of holding the same belief. (pp 6–7)[17] Elmer Davis, OWI's Director, is said to have received little cooperation from other high officials, and often had difficulty in finding out what US policy was.[20] As a result the propaganda potentialities of major US policies were rarely given thorough consideration during the process of policy formulation.

Former members of the OWI policy staff are in unanimous agreement that this lack of liaison between the chief US propaganda agency and the top political and military decision makers seriously curtailed the effectiveness of US foreign propaganda. Hans Speier, wartime chief of the OWI's German policy desk, has described this lack of coordination as giving rise to some of the most serious weaknesses in US psychological warfare in World War II. He goes on to say:

> "The most important news during the war was 'produced' in battle and by statesmen or their ghost writers. The propagandists had virtually no influence on these productions; they functioned as wholesale and retail agents in the news business. Consequently, their prestige within the government was low and their influence limited. . . . Major propaganda policies depended upon general policies that were oriented toward speedy military victory rather than toward a desirable distribution of political power after victory. . . . Take President Roosevelt's announcement of the war aim of unconditional surrender. Without doubting the political need for adopting this war aim, its psychological repercussions could be foreseen to be considerable, so considerable indeed that it would have been worthwhile exploring them in advance. The desirable effects on Soviet leaders and on the resistance elements in occupied Europe could have been maximized; the undesirable effects on the Germans could have been minimized without sacrifice of principle."[21]

Wallace Carroll, former Deputy Director of the Overseas Branch of OWI, has given numerous examples of occasions on which US propagandists were hampered by insufficiently defined policies. When the US was losing badly needed good will on the part of the French public because of its apparent intention to install military government in those areas of France liberated from the Nazis, to function until legitimate French civil authorities could take over, OWI representatives at General Eisenhower's headquarters pleaded for recognition of the French Committee for National Liberation, for an unequivocal American statement repudiating Vichy and Petain, and for another statement on Allied military government and its role. With regard to these requests, Carroll writes: "American recognition, which the President could easily have granted in July, was granted with many reservations on August 26." (p 110)[17] OWI's request for a statement on Vichy and Petain was ignored for 8 months, and nothing was ever said about alleged American intentions to install military government in liberated France. This author concludes: "The events which I witnessed in London convinced me that policy and persuasion are one, or that persuasion is simply an extension of foreign policy. . . . The policy-makers in Washington . . . like the diplomats who serve them in the field, must be men who are sensitive to trends of feeling and opinion out on the periphery." (p 193)[17] These examples emphasize, incidentally, that inaction (or the absence of a policy) may have propaganda effects fully as great as those of positive action (or a clearly formulated policy).

Examination of US propaganda directives also supports the thesis that political thinking often failed to take the requirements of political warfare into account. This can be inferred from such passages as the following:

> "Until we receive new instructions from the State Department, we should ignore both Vichy and the Free French in our broadcasts as much as possible. We should neither praise Vichy for resistance nor blame Vichy for weakness; in fact, we should not even let the French listener realize that we are aware of any special problem in the relations of Vichy with the Germans on the one hand and ourselves on the other."

A later directive shows strenuous attempts by OWI policy men to make the best of a situation in which US national aims had not yet been clearly defined:

> "To overcome our lack of a clear political attitude toward the problems of Europe and Asia: Continue to use all available statements by United Nations' leaders which indicate that such an attitude is in the making, and emphasize particularly such actions as demonstrate that we mean what we say. Give the greatest possible encouragement to all liberal anti-Fascist, anti-Nazi, and anti-Japanese militarist movements, and identify our interests with theirs to the extent permitted by our present policy. Keep alive the statements of United Nations' leaders promising the punishment of enemy war-criminals." (Basic Central Directive, 27 August–3 September 1943.)

During 1943, when US authorities were attempting to persuade the Italian government of Marshall Badoglio to proclaim an armistice, OWI was not informed of these negotiations. Consequently it made the blunder of attacking the Badoglio government bitterly in overseas broadcasts. When informed of the discussions in progress, it was forced to change its line abruptly — a procedure that not only tended to discredit the propagandists but also reflected on the country they represented.

The difficulties of the propagandist in adhering to policies that did not take the probable reactions of foreign audiences into account are further illustrated by the following passage from the Basic Central Directive:

> "If the title of Provisional Government of the Republic of France is officially adopted by the French Committee of National Liberation, we should continue to refer to it as a 'committee' and not as a 'Provisional Government.' We should paraphrase those portions of official statements or communiques which use the title Provisional Government." (Basic Central Directive, 23–30 May 1944.)

The failure of American policy makers to furnish adequate weapons to our propagandists was noted with satisfaction in Axis countries. On 25 January 1942, German Propaganda Minister Goebbels wrote in his diary:

> "Our adversaries lament the fact that they have no compelling peace slogan. Quite obviously they would like to use it to deceive the German people. I won't permit this theme to be discussed by our writers because I am convinced that so delicate a problem had best be put on ice and killed by silence. We can surely congratulate ourselves that our enemies have no Wilson Fourteen Points. Of course, if they had them, we wouldn't be duped by them as were the German people of 1917 and 1918."[22]

The unconditional-surrender formula did little to remove this lack, and the most powerful weapon that could have been given to white strategic propagandists consequently remained unused in World War II.

It is the thesis of the writer, therefore, that the effectiveness of OWI suffered because its Director or his representatives were not included in high-policy discussions, and it is his contention that any future war cabinet — or similar body —

should include as one member a representative of US propaganda agencies.* There are many who would oppose such a suggestion strongly, and it should be recognized that resistance to any arrangement of this type will be met, but it is beyond the scope of this memorandum to explore the reasons for this resistance and the factors on which it is based. One point, however, should be stressed in this connection. As far as the writer knows, no student of propaganda has ever suggested that national policy should be based on reasons of propaganda alone. The reactions of various elements throughout the world to US national policy is *one* factor that must be taken into consideration during the process of policy formulation, and this factor must be weighed against political, military, economic, and other considerations. It is not contended that the propagandist should always have his own way; he should only be entitled to a fair hearing.

It may be noted parenthetically that the chief of both the British and German wartime propaganda agencies had ready access to their respective Chiefs of State and other leading policy officials. Goebbels mentions in his diary frequent occasions on which he took a hand in the formation of military or political plans.[23] Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, chief of the British Political Warfare Executive, was on close personal terms with Foreign Minister Eden. Although he does not claim to have taken a hand in formulating basic British policy, it is clear that he was in a position to observe its growth from very early stages.[9]

If the contention that the propagandist should play a role in the process of policy formulation is accepted, then it is necessary to consider two additional questions: (1) What contributions can the propagandist make at the policy table? (2) What aspects of policy formulation most affect the propagandist's work? These questions have been touched on in the preceding discussion, but they are considered more systematically below.†

1. What contributions can the propagandist make?

a. His principal stock in trade is knowledge of foreign publics. He should be acquainted with the relative distribution of power and influence among various groups in the principal countries. He should be able to estimate with a fair chance of success the probable reactions of these groups to alternative policies and alternative ways of stating policies.

b. He should be aware of the various competing policies and competing communications of other nations to which his audiences are exposed.

c. He should have a thorough knowledge of the technical capacities and requirements of the communications media at his disposal.

* It is, of course, clear that the mere presence of a propaganda or political warfare specialist is not the chief issue. He must also have something to say. The basic contention is that the propaganda effect of policies should be carefully assessed during the process of policy formulation. The surest way of achieving such an assessment would seem to be the inclusion, as one of the partners in policy making, of an individual specifically charged with this duty.

† This discussion of the relation of the propagandist to policy making is oriented toward the national level. It should be clear, however, that essentially the same relation prevails at lower levels. The psychological warfare officer who participates in the staff conferences of his military unit is likely to perform far more effective work than one who does not.

d. He should have in his propaganda organization facilities for gathering and analyzing the types of information referred to in subparagraphs *a* to *c*. The propagandist will be able to make the greatest contribution at the policy table only when his research and intelligence personnel have foreseen, insofar as possible, the situations that will arise and have assembled and studied the data regarding principal audiences and technical communications capacities that are relevant to these situations. In this respect the propagandist does not differ from the political, military, or economic specialists — all of whom depend on the preparatory work of their staffs.

2. What aspects of policy formulation most affect the propagandist's work?

a. Most of all, of course, the propagandist is interested in the content of the policy under discussion. He may have reason to believe, for instance, that *limited* war aims may enable the US to overcome the resistance of the enemy far more easily than *total* war aims. Or he may know that using the atomic bomb on certain targets will arouse more resentment throughout the world than will its use on other targets. He should, in effect, represent the points of view of various foreign publics — both mass and elite.* He is interested in achieving a policy that will influence foreign publics to behave in such a way that US national aims can be more easily attained.

b. The propagandist also is interested in seeing that policy is projected as far as possible into the future. The diplomat or the military expert may be satisfied with a short-range plan that will solve his immediate problems. The propagandist, however, recognizes that the behavior of his audience *now* depends in part on their *expectations* regarding the future. It is therefore not so easy for him to cross his bridges when he comes to them. For instance, the US war policy of unconditional surrender left the future a blank as far as enemy and satellite nations were concerned, and in this blank space Goebbels painted a black picture of dismal slavery under an Allied yoke. The propagandist will therefore exert an influence, which might not otherwise be felt so strongly, toward lengthening policies in terms of time.

c. The sharpness of policy formulation is also a concern of the propagandist. Throughout the world he knows that people will be asking: "What does this American action mean to me?" Consequently, he will press for more concrete plans than may be necessary for the immediate purposes of the diplomat. To use the policy of unconditional surrender once more as an example, it is known that this phrase could be interpreted in various ways. Propagandists in both Europe and the Far East pressed for a clearer definition of the policy. What was its significance for the individual German, Italian, or Japanese? If an American policy contains aspects that will unavoidably have unfavorable repercussions for certain audiences, then the propagandist may wish to blur it in presentation. But this does not affect his need for a sharp formulation to begin with.

d. If a policy is one that is to be communicated to the public verbally or in writing, the propagandist is interested in its wording; this may have a considerable effect on foreign publics. Although wording is often a comparatively minor consideration, it may at times have significant implications. The decisions to call Allied military government in Italy AMGOT, and to designate the dropping of candy for German children during the Berlin airlift as operation SCHMOO both illustrate

* In this respect his function parallels that of the domestic political adviser who attempts to foresee the probable reactions of major groups in the US to tax increases, price-support programs, and other major moves.

the undesirable connotations that improperly chosen wording may have.* It is also advisable to consider in advance how important policy statements will sound in foreign translation, and whether certain symbols that have special emotional connotations for various audiences should be included or omitted.

e. Finally, the propagandist is greatly interested in the manner in which news regarding a policy decision is released, and the timing of the release. From the point of view of the effect on foreign audiences it may be advisable to have a statement made by a military rather than by a political figure. It may also be necessary to prepare various publics for a new policy, and for this reason to hold up the announcement for a period of time. For example, the sudden termination of lend-lease to Britain, before we had explained to the British the reasons for termination, caused considerable unnecessary bitterness against the US. (p 375)[17]

To summarize, the propagandist has a dual role in policy making. First, he functions as a staff adviser. Since every major policy — or absence of a policy — has a propaganda effect, the specialist in this field can help to assure that the impact on the opinions and actions of relevant publics of what the US does or does not do is such as to serve our national interests. Second, he functions as a communicator. Since national policy determines in the last analysis what he will talk about, he is interested in seeing that this policy provides a favorable basis for his propaganda operations.

ANNOUNCING THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA†

By William R. Young

Inadequate policy guidance and the lack of operational coordination reduced effectiveness of a propaganda effort.

In late October of 1950, the end of the Korean police action seemed to be in sight. The landing near Inchon on the west coast in mid-September had pinched off a large portion of the North Korean troops in central Korea, and the UN forces were pursuing northward the disorganized remnants of Kim Il Sung's army. The news reports broadcast by the Korean unit of Voice of America (VOA) in New York City and those of the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC), which used the Tokyo facilities of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, a Japanese government agency, disseminated the official and unofficial optimism that was then widespread. Their commentaries not unnaturally began to concentrate on "consolidation" themes, best summarized as peace, unity, and reconstruction. For a while, both VOA and VUNC maintained a complete silence about the reports, unconfirmed by any official source, that Chinese Communist troops were present in Korea.

However, on 2 November (1 November in New York) Korean audiences had their first opportunity to hear from a US medium of information that Chinese

* "AMGOT" turned out to be a term with sexual connotations in Turkish. "SCHMOO" as pronounced in English sounds exactly like a word in Berlin slang that means "sharp practices."

† Original text prepared for Operations Research Office in connection with this volume.

troops had been committed to action in Korea. In its first Korean newscast on that day directed to the Far East, VOA reported:

> ". . . The American Xth Corps announced that troops under its command were fighting a Chinese Communist regiment. The announcement said the Chinese Communists were encountered thirty miles north of the port city of Hungnam. The Xth Corps described the regiment as 'wholly Chinese.' "

VOA included in its second newscast of that day the following:

> "In Washington, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson . . . told his press conference that the United States is . . . concerned about the presence of Chinese Communists in the Korean fighting. Mr. Acheson said the United Nations Command is investigating the presence of Chinese Communist troops in Korea. A number of prisoners taken by UN forces have admitted belonging to Chinese units, the Secretary of State said. He added that the matter must be worked out by intelligence authorities and the United Nations."

On 3 November the preceding report was repeated on VOA's first news roundup of the day. The first newscast on 5 November (transcripts of VOA programs for 4 November are not available) reported this:

> ". . . In an interview with a *London Daily Mail* correspondent . . . General MacArthur said the Communists are apparently bringing into action 'a certain number of fresh troops' for the 'do or die attacks.' Earlier, General MacArthur's headquarters disclosed that Communist reinforcements and supplies are coming from what was termed 'protected territory' across the Yalu River."

The second VOA news on 5 November informed Korean listeners that:

> "At Eighth Army headquarters, an official statement confirmed earlier reports that some Chinese Communist troops are in action in Korea. The statement said: 'The Eighth Army confirms that Chinese Communist units are in sufficient numerical strength to be equivalent to at least two divisions.' "

The first newscast the following day repeated the substance of the Eighth Army report, and the second news show carried extensive excerpts from General MacArthur's communique acknowledging the presence in Korea of "alien" Communist forces from beyond the Yalu River. Thus VOA had announced clearly to its Korean language audience that the Chinese Communists had intervened, although its treatment was full of reserve.

During the same period 3 November–5 November, the Tokyo transmitter of the Broadcasting Company of Japan (BCJ), which was leased by VOA and VUNC for their transmissions to Korea, was broadcasting in Japanese as follows:

> "Red Chinese troops are gathering on the north bank of the Yalu River" [3 November]; "Britain has recognized intervention by Red China in Korea. . . . United States government officials received information of Red China forces in Korea. . . . United States armed forces have recognized intervention by Red China. . . . 300,000 troops may be gathering on the Sino-Korean border" [4 November]; "Great Britain pays attention to Red Chinese intervention in Korea. . . . Red China has declared support for North Korea. . . . Possibly 70,000 Chinese troops are participating with North Korean troops" [5 November].

During the 40 years of Japanese rule over Korea a very large proportion of the Korean people, notably those in the social groups most likely to possess the greatest number of radio receivers, had learned to understand and to speak the language of their rulers. The study of Japanese language was required throughout the Korean school system. Furthermore many observers have reported that BCJ programs during this period enjoyed a reputation among Koreans for reliable, complete, and up-to-the minute newscasts, and hence were widely popular in Korea.

VUNC treatment of the news of Chinese intervention differed greatly from that of BCJ and VOA. On 3 November the military news roundup contained two references to UN action against "reinforced" Communist forces, the military news report of 4 November spoke only of action against the enemy, and on 5 November the term "reinforced Communist troops" appeared once. The US X Corps announcement and Secretary Acheson's remarks of November 2 and an interview of General MacArthur by the British correspondent and the Eighth Army communique all went unreported. However, on November 6, VUNC gave prominent coverage to the UN Commander's communique that UN forces faced a "new and fresh army."

In the 5-day period 7 November–11 November, VUNC continued to refer to the Chinese as "alien" Communists. Statements of US or UN officials and the proceedings in the UN were reported in reference to the actions and designs of alien Communists (e.g., "The United States charged yesterday that alien Communists have recklessly thrown thousands of troops into the war in North Korea. . . . The United Nations Security Council thereupon called on the alien Communist government to send a delegation to answer the charges of General MacArthur. . . ."). VUNC in reporting military news continued for several days to refer to Chinese troops simply as Communist forces.

During this 5-day period VOA broadcasts from New York relayed to Korea by US-leased facilities in Japan were presenting detailed and explicit accounts, all based on the words of official spokesmen or the texts of official pronouncements, of what was occurring on the battlefield and elsewhere. These reports cited, for instance, General MacArthur's estimates of the number of Chinese troops thought to be in action and in reserve, their locations, and their unit designations. However, it was not until 12 November that VUNC for the first time referred explicitly to the Chinese Communist intervention. This was done when VUNC reported that "The government of Communist China has rejected the invitation to be present at the forthcoming debate by the United Nations Security Council on the presence of Communist Chinese troops in Korea. . . ."

Co-ordination of output of VOA, VUNC and other information agencies under US control was virtually nonexistent. Four days elapsed between VOA's first report of the official US X Corps communique of November 2 announcing Chinese intervention and VUNC's first extensive report on November 6 stating that "alien" forces had entered the fighting in Korea. During this same period of time, BCJ was openly reporting that Chinese Communists forces were in Korea. Ten days elapsed between the first announcement by VOA and the first explicit reference by VUNC to the presence of Chinese troops in Korea.

The psychological warfare problem implied in this situation is the difficult one of coordinating the output of various agencies engaged in a given propaganda campaign. Involved in such situations may be included activities of personnel over which the psychological warfare agency itself may have little if any control. Where a psychological warfare agency is operating in a military theater of operations, coordination with civilian-sponsored strategic media of communications is especially difficult. When and in what manner the Chinese intervention should have been announced to the Korean listening audience is an interesting question. But this is not the central issue involved in this discussion. What is immediately relevant is what lessons may be learned about psychological warfare coordination that may be applicable for the future.

From the point of media coordination, first there were the activities of the non-US medium, BCJ, which was at the time under the general supervision of a small number of personnel, representing the occupying authorities in Japan. There was no liaison between the US personnel at BCJ and VUNC other than that found necessary for technical operations. Furthermore, US personnel at BCJ did not exert any direct control over the content of the network's newscasts. This situation, of course, reflected the evolution of the US occupation that was steadily relaxing its control over the domestic affairs of Japan. Policy had developed to the point where "orientation" of the Japanese personnel was relied on as a safeguard against any errors or statements prejudicial to the occupation. Beyond that BCJ was a free agent.

However well-suited this mode of operation may have been to the progress of UN occupation in Japan, it is apparent that it had serious limitations for the US military forces engaged in operations in Korea, an area where BCJ had an important listening audience. VUNC came into existence on 28 June 1950 for the primary purpose of broadcasting to Korea; however, officers in charge of this operation failed to establish effective liaison for purpose of coordinating content of output with BCJ. As a result the broadcasts, particularly during the critical days in November 1950, were far less than maximally effective. Because liaison between the US staff at BCJ and VUNC was limited largely if not entirely to technical matters, the Japanese newscasters could not be expected to be acutely aware of the propaganda implications of their activities. And even if they were, they had no reason to suspect that their straightforward account of the Chinese invasion ran counter to the treatment afforded it by VUNC, for there was no regular channel through which the one agency could be informed of the content of the other's programs.

An additional dimension of coordination involves the extent of coordination between VOA, a Department of State operation, and VUNC, a military operation of the Far East Command. Such coordination as there was, was primarily at the policy-planning level and limited to Washington. Even in this respect a considerable degree of freedom of action was left to VUNC. There was no coordination on the operational level, i.e., between the VOA Korean unit in New York City and VUNC in Tokyo.

This meant that although the commentaries broadcast by the two groups were usually emphasizing the same themes in substantially the same way during any particular week (e.g., "the defeat of Kim Il Sung presages peace," and "Koreans must begin to shoulder the burdens of reconstruction"), neither was informed of what the other had said the day before or planned to say the following day. This was so in spite of the fact that the two programs were but a station break apart, for VOA was short-waved to Tokyo and rebroadcast over BCJ.

Furthermore, coordination at the policy level, where only the next week can be kept in sight, left relatively untouched the core of radio psychological warfare — the daily news program. Coordination at that level could not provide for the contingency of the fast-breaking big story, and so left wide open the possibility that such an event would be handled in divergent ways. This is precisely what occurred when the news broke about the most portentous story of the Korean war, the Chinese Communist intervention, in November 1950.

What was accomplished by oblique, mysterious reference to "alien" Communists it is difficult to determine, particularly when VOA was broadcasting explicit information originating in numerous official quarters, including the headquarters for which VUNC spoke. BCJ was doing the same, and even Radio Peiping had announced on 8 November that Chinese "volunteers" were fighting in Korea. On the negative side, if it had any effect it would have been to contribute to confusion and uncertainty and in undermining confidence in the reliability of VUNC as an objective source of news.

Both the VOA Korean unit and VUNC had failed to develop desk-to-desk coordination. Neither felt it necessary. In fact both seemed to have agreed that the mission of VOA was in the broad field of "propaganda" whereas that of VUNC had the narrower objective of "psychological warfare." In light of the record it does not seem unfair to conclude that whatever may have been the merits of this distinction, for other purposes, it does not commend itself as a handy guide in determining the degree of coordination that is required when two US agencies of information engaged in the common task of speaking by the same media to the same audience, over the same facilities, about the same topics, and but seconds apart.

Among the many difficulties inherent in the problem of coordination, the purely physical one is not the least. One can assume the closest of relations in other regards between two propaganda groups, whether responsible to the same agency or to separate departments. Yet how is it possible to ensure that their output, particularly in respect to news, will be in strict conformity? No central coordinating body can hope to oversee every aspect of two operations that are physically half a world apart. Mere multiplication of directives may not only seriously impede an operation but often results in more problems than it solves.

In many psychological warfare situations the key to coordination is simply the exchange of information. Had there been a method of exchanging information as quickly as possible on what was being said on both programs, the initial divergence would have been detected by the Tokyo group within a relatively short time. The next step would have involved a top-level decision. But such a policy decision would have been based on the consideration of more relevant facts than were otherwise available. A regular check of some sort on what BCJ newscasters were reporting would have served a similar purpose.

The method of coordination used by the VOA German unit in New York City and RIAS in Berlin is an illustration of effective desk-to-desk coordination. In the main the VOA-VUNC situation is identical with that of the VOA-RIAS. VOA programs are short-waved to RIAS and retransmitted by medium wave. In addition other programs are locally produced in Berlin. Whether the one produces "propaganda" and the other "psychological warfare" is immaterial. RIAS engages in more "tactical"-type maneuvers than does VOA. This fact has not obscured the importance of presenting a consistent face to the German audience.

The major RIAS news broadcast made during the late afternoon Berlin time (forenoon in New York City) is transmitted by short wave to VOA in New York

City. This informs VOA of how RIAS is treating the day's news. There then follows an exchange of messages in which RIAS, among other things, outlines its main commentary for the coming evening. The VOA German desk then has approximately 2 hours in which to complete its own program, which is transmitted from New York at 1 P.M. (7 P.M. German time). Such a system does not permit the preparation of written translations. It does depend in a very large measure on the availability of competent linguists, a commodity that was in short supply in both the VUNC and the VOA Korean units. However, it must be understood that only such detailed exchanges of information give real meaning to the phrase operational "coordination."

WRITTEN DIRECTIVES

By M. J.

No problem that faces top policy makers in a psychological warfare agency is more perplexing or, at times, more difficult to carry out effectively than that of successfully coordinating the agency's propaganda effort with that of other agencies, including those engaged primarily in implementing the nation's political, economic, and military policies. Propaganda output must be adjusted on a day-to-day basis to shifts in policy and to new situations as these arise in international relations. Within their respective organizations psychological warfare planning officers constantly seek for devices to enable a better coordination of the propaganda effort. It is at this point that written directives assume such an importance in the operations.

The propaganda directive may be viewed as a specific statement of policy designed to guide one over a multitude of steps that must be taken in psychological warfare campaigns. The main purpose of the written directive might appear to be that of ensuring compliance and adherence to an over-all propaganda line that faithfully expresses official policy. But this is only half its task. The directive must seek to encourage the operator to make full use of the resources at his command that are consistent with policy objectives. Extreme diversity of expression is required if the heavy hand of monotony in output is to be avoided. The propaganda directive should seek to encourage flexibility of expression in output while stressing that which is necessary to ensure adherence to an over-all line.

At the close of World War II the criticism was frequently encountered that Allied propaganda suffered in comparison with German propaganda because there was no single source from which directives emanated. The principle that psychological warfare requires careful coordination led many to the erroneous conclusion that coordination required complete centralization in the preparation of written directives. In retrospect a more objective evaluation of this knotty problem can now be made. No doubt, Allied propaganda warfare during World War II suffered from the complex propaganda organization and the fact that the authority of those who prepared written directives was not always clearly understood. But from this weakness came a peculiar strength appropriate for democracies at war. Allied propaganda never fell to the dead level of mechanical regularity that characterized a great part of the German output. Output that was as closely regulated as German propaganda tended to lose its vitality. By contrast the differences that arose in Allied propaganda output, the various shading peculiar to specific outlets,

served to increase audience interest. In the simplest terms, variety was more effective than uniformity, especially to audiences that had been long exposed to totalitarian propaganda.

The problem of directive writing is more basic to an operation than the mere avoidance of mechanical uniformity and monotony. Richard H. S. Crossman, top British propaganda adviser to General McClure in PWD/SHAEF during World War II, stated after the war with a bluntness typical of him that the bulk of written propaganda directives furnished to Anglo-American propagandists were not effective. Although his statement may be considered an extreme one, it nevertheless expresses a point of view, held by many of those whose task it was to implement the written directives in the past war.

"A propaganda directive is either so general as to be valueless, or so detailed that it is invalidated by events before it has been distributed." (p 338)[13] In short, control of a world-wide network of psychological warfare operations, especially during a period of rapid changes, required something more than written directives.

Again, an observation of Crossman's is important for the students of psychological warfare who are interested in understanding how a psychological warfare team actually operates. In his opinion the speeches of Roosevelt and Churchill were by far the best directives World War II operators received. These were not formal statements spelling out in detail what ought to be the next development in psychological warfare. Instead in essence they served to stimulate and to mobilize the propagandists to make efforts appropriate to the basic policies of the Allies. As Crossman states it, the speeches of Roosevelt and Churchill, however important they were, would have been soon forgotten if their central themes and their key sentences had not been repeated endlessly in every medium of propaganda.

The guidance that Roosevelt and Churchill supplied to the top-echelon propagandists through formal speech and personal contact was, of course, repeated in varying forms by lesser leaders to the large corps of operators in the Allied psychological warfare machine. Personal contact, staff conferences, and free two-way communications between planner and operator helped to develop doctrine and helped to ensure that output would be kept in line with policy objectives and still have the necessary vitality to be potentially effective.

Because of the limitation of written directives and because of the speed with which directives were often issued and changed, a cynical, but in some respects accurate, evaluation developed among the operators in World War II. To these operators the chief function served by the written directive was to provide a cover to ensure the operator from undue interference by the policy makers. Crossman stated the view of this group as follows: "The higher the official, the more he likes a directive, and the less he peers below it to study the actual output. But every now and then there is a complaint. The high official demands to see the full text (in an English translation!) of the offending leaflet or broadcast. It is then that the directive becomes invaluable to the operator. If skilfully drafted, it provides a justification for the man on the job which prevents interference by the policy makers, whose excessive caution on some occasions and wild stunting on others are inevitably a menace to serious and continuous work." (p 338)[13]

In this view the directive not only protects the operators when a complaint has been made, but the directive also serves as a useful device for watering down outside and irrelevant pressures to which both the psychological warfare operator and the propaganda policy maker are subject. Under the force of outside pressure,

one is likely to vacillate between extremes of caution and the wildest ideas that defy the most active imagination, both of which obstruct consistently effective operations. Adequately prepared directives serve to cushion the number and force of such disturbances.

Despite such observations and attitudes about directives, they obviously remain central devices in the management of psychological warfare campaigns. However, a realistic appraisal of their usefulness should prevent one from placing dogmatic reliance on directives for tasks they cannot possibly perform.

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CHAPTER 6

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The over-all objective of psychological warfare has been described as that of supporting the accomplishment of national policy aims and goals in times of peace and war and the supporting of military goals and objectives in times of armed hostility. Psychological warfare may be employed in support of either long-range or short-range goals, and it may be directed largely to the support of either political or military objectives.

Specific operational objectives for which psychological warfare may be employed may be classified in various ways. As a matter of convenience the editors of this volume have classified operational objectives under three major headings: those that may be termed as purely *political objectives;* those in which it is not possible to draw a clear line of demarcation as either being a *political* or a *military objective;* and those in which the *military objective* is paramount.

Political Objectives

Five case histories illustrating the use of psychological warfare in the support of what may be termed a "political objective" are reproduced in this chapter. The five cases may be further subdivided into four kinds of objectives: specific short-term objectives, general medium-term objectives, specific long-term objectives, and general long-term objectives.

"US Propaganda Efforts and the 1948 Italian Elections," and "UN Security Council Action and the Burma Parliament" are case studies illustrating the effective use of psychological warfare to support specific short-term political objectives. "The HICOG Exchange of Persons Program" illustrates a more general medium-term political objective. The employment of psychological warfare techniques in behalf of a specific long-term objective is illustrated by "Free Europe Committee and 'Operation Veto.' "

An objective quite different in character than others discussed above is found in "Operation Magic Carpet," an account of an airlift of Moslem pilgrims stranded in Beirut, Lebanon, in August 1952. The objective of the act described may be characterized as both general and long-range. This particular case is important also as illustrative of an act, as opposed

to mere verbal utterances employed as psychological warfare. In this instance the act — the airlifting of the stranded pilgrims to the Mecca Area — was important in creating favorable reactions for the US since first, the act itself created a favorable impression and second, it provided an event or series of events about which propagandists could make desirable references in both radio and printed propaganda broadcasts in programs in the days and months that followed.

US PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AND THE 1948 ITALIAN ELECTIONS

By M. J. and Elizabeth Marvick

The account of an American propaganda campaign in support of a specific short-term political objective.

The general elections in Italy in the spring of 1948 were among the most crucial of all those in postwar Western Europe. The Italian Communist Party was one of the strongest operating within the Western democracies. Moreover the Communists gave every indication of desiring to make a "test case" of the Italian election. They sought to gain control of the government by getting a plurality of the votes cast at the polls. Many Western observers feared that the Communists might be able to secure a majority or near majority of the total vote, a proportion almost unheard of in countries with a multiparty system. Such a victory would ensure the Communists representation in the cabinet and thus would pave the way for a coup by which they could seize control of the government. A correspondent of the *New York Times* in Italy at the time recapitulates the expectations, progress, and final outcome of this vital election campaign:

> "At the beginning of the campaign, few people thought that the Communist-led Popular Front would obtain less than 40 percent or so of the total vote, and the extreme left-wing parties were supremely confident that they would exceed that figure by a comfortable margin. Step by step as the anti-Communist parties developed their campaign, in which American propaganda played a not inconsiderable part, the Popular Front's stock sank readily. When all the votes were in it was found that the Popular Front's share was only about 31 percent." (p 198)[1]

Italy thus became, for about a month in 1948, the principal battleground in the cold war and the scene of a notable democratic victory. To support US political objectives in Italy in this election a comprehensive public information campaign was developed that demonstrated the ability of the Department of State to employ private individuals and voluntary associations effectively in the US and indigenous agencies as well as US government instrumentalities in Italy.

Against the Communist threat, the US had one outstanding and unequivocal argument, the Marshall Plan aid that was just beginning to arrive in Italy in large volume. This was the main argument made by the partisans of the US in Italy in support of the election of candidates of the Christian Democratic Party, led by Premier Alcide de Gasperi. US Ambassador James C. Dunn exerted all his powers of persuasion to influence the Italian electorate to reject the Communist appeals:

> "He delivered a total of about forty addresses after his arrival in Italy. Of particular importance were those he made at the arrival of the first, second, and hundredth relief ship, and of each hundredth thereafter. The 600th arrived just before the election. The speeches were, as a rule, purely factual and emphasized the greatness of the effort that the United States was making to help Italy and the sacrifice that it cost the American people. A few of them also contained indirect, but unmistakable, warnings that American aid would cease if Italy were to go Communist." (p 202)[1]

Later speeches by Ambassador Dunn included one given at the time he presented an American gift of streptomycin to an Italian Children's hospital. He promised more such aid in the future.[2] Two days prior to the election he announced in a public address that he was sending a favorable report on the Italian political situation to the US government.[3] Americans well-known in Italy, speaking from the US, made direct appeals to the Italian people. Senator Lehmann of New York, ex-Secretaries of State Stimson and Stettinius, Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court, and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt all sent cabled messages expressing support for Premier de Gasperi.[4] President of the New York City Council, Vincent Impellitteri, broadcast short-wave to Italy, as did Mayor William O'Dwyer, Arthur Bliss Lane, former Ambassador to Poland, Attorney General Tom Clark and AFL President William Green.[5] The Italian-American Labor Council sent financial aid and cables encouraging the anti-Communist movement to a leading anti-Communist politician.[6] The worship services of a New York church were broadcast short-wave to Italy. In this service prayers were offered in behalf of an election outcome favorable to the West.[7]

In Italy, itself, American officials distributed leaflets widely outlining the object of the Marshall Plan. Special exhibits, consisting of attractively presented photographs, statistical charts, and the like, were prepared for exhibition among low-income groups. USIS personnel in Rome and other large cities organized and showed exhibits called "The Worker in America." These were designed to illustrate how working-class families live in the US.

Films, both documentaries and full-length features, were employed effectively. The leading American distributors in Italy pooled their resources and cooperated with each other and with US government information personnel in giving the widest possible dissemination to selected American films on a nonprofit basis. Italian documentary companies produced three separate films on American aid to Italy. It was estimated that more than 5 million Italians each week saw American documentaries in the period immediately preceding the 1948 elections. This number is in addition to the estimated 8 million a week who viewed the Italian-made documentaries or those who saw films distributed through normal USIS channels. (p 200)[1]

One observer has expressed the opinion that American films were among the most effective media used in the preelection propaganda drive in Italy. Among the films distributed in Italy during this period, *Ninotchka*, a 1939 release of MGM, starring Greta Garbo and Melvyn Douglas, has been singled out as particularly effective. (p 200)[1] This film, which hilariously satirized life in Russia, tended to leave an audience with a feeling that if this is Russia please deliver us from such a society. Distributors provided double the usual number of copies of this film, and special arrangements were made so that the film would be shown immediately among the low-income-level population. As evidence of the effectiveness of

Ninotchka it is of interest to note that Italian Communists made several determined attempts to forestall the showing of the picture. After the election a pro-Communist Party worker declared that "What licked us was *Ninotchka*." (p 202)[1]

VOA broadcast a number of programs from New York aimed at convincing Italian voters that the American people were vitally interested in the outcome of the election, were sympathetic with their problems and aspirations, and thus were watching developments with great interest. "One of the few foreign programs carried by the Italian stations was a one-hour show from Hollywood put on the air as part of a drive to raise funds for the orphans of Italian pilots who fell in the war." (pp 200–01)[1]

Perhaps as important as these means were the specific developments in US foreign policy affecting Italy:

> "The American propaganda effort was accompanied by certain moves in the field of international politics that without any question won many votes for the anti-Communist side. Noteworthy among these were the tripartite step for the restitution of Trieste to Italy and the discussion at the United Nations of Italy's application for membership. Both helped to put Russia in a bad light." (p 199)[1]

Similarly significant was the announcement on 2 April 1948 that the US had made a payment of $4,300,000 to Italian prisoners of war who had worked while imprisoned in the US.

One of the most interesting and novel of all the propaganda devices used to influence the Italian elections, was the letter-writing campaign organized among Italian-Americans residing in the US. The plan was designed to stimulate the flow of personal letters from Americans of Italian extraction in the US, exhorting their friends and relatives in Italy to reject Communism at the polls. Generoso Pope, editor of an influential Italian newspaper in New York, was apparently the first person to urge Italian-Amercians to write to their friends and relatives in Italy. Mr. Pope explained the campaign as follows: "I started the campaign, realizing that the people of Italy would believe the truth when it was told by a brother, or a friend, or a blood relation. . . ." (p 112)[5]

Others joined with Generoso Pope in printing and circulating sample letters to be sent abroad by Italians in the US to their former compatriots. Victor Anfuso, one of the authors of these letters, describes the principal reason for this "form letter" approach:

> "I felt that a lot of people of Italian extraction wanted to write . . . but either did not have the time . . . or did not possess sufficient facts to frame a letter. With the letter already prepared, all that the sender had to do was to sign it and place it in an envelope and address it to a friend or relative on the other side. . . ." (p 113)[5]

The Catholic churches in New York and New Jersey took up the circulation of the form letters among their parishioners. Various Italo-American organizations also participated. For example, Anfuso himself, a New York attorney and Commander of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre, in collaboration with the Bishop Lithographing Corporation and the staff of *Divigando* Magazine distributed one-quarter million copies of his form letter in churches and precincts having large Italian populations. (p 113)[5]

The Committee to Aid Democracy in Italy distributed one-half million illustrated postcards to be mailed to Italy. Radio station WOV carried Italian-language broadcasts in New York and made recordings of the experiences of war brides from Italy to be sent to their friends and relatives at home. (p 113–14)[5] These steps were all designed to stir up interest among New York City Italians in the hopes that most of them would mail letters and cards to relatives and friends in Italy prior to the elections. Business corporations joined the campaign by offering to mail the letters to Italy without cost to the senders.[8]

As for the content of the form letters, the following extracts come from one of the most widely distributed ones.

> "It is Easter Sunday and the bells joyously ring forth. In this country where people of every race and creed live together we would like to celebrate this Holy Day singing hymns for the peace and prosperity of the people.
>
> "We are thinking especially of our beautiful and dear Italy, which after so much suffering, we finally want to see rebuilt and free from all tyranny and injustice. For this reason we anxiously look to you. On April 18th, by going to the polls you can decide not only your destiny but perhaps that of the whole world.
>
> "Therefore, it shouldn't surprise you, if we ask, if we implore you not to throw our beautiful Italy into the arms of that cruel despot Communism. America hasn't anything against Communism in Russia but why impose it on other people, other lands, in that way putting out the torch of liberty? Above all, Italy should be able to surmount the repulsive oppression and violence which are enemies of God and of the family. . . .
>
> "Have faith in America's proven friendship; don't repulse the aid that this nation wishes to continue sending; don't destroy in one day the stupendous work which you have already done in directing Italy towards its reconstruction. . . .
>
> "This is the prayer which all of us Americans of Italian origin direct to you on this Easter Day, in the hope that the Resurrection of Our Lord may always be celebrated in the land that is the center of Catholicism." (p 114)[5]

A second form letter displayed more aggressive tone. It was used widely in Jersey City, New Jersey.

> "The shout that springs spontaneously from the hearts of more than eight million Italo-Americans is that of saving Italy from the slavery and yoke of the Communists sold to the cause of Russia.
>
> "The shout of thousands of dead who fell in the battle fields in order to see our Fatherland free and independent of the enemy oppressor, they would damn you and your Fatherland and your children.
>
> "By voting for the Communists on April 18, you make yourselves slaves of Russia, which looks for the destruction of Religion, the Fatherland and the Family. . . .
>
> "The Pope would probably be constrained to leave Rome, and the Holy City — beacon of the whole world — would be reduced to a heap of ruins. . . .

"If you should vote for the Communists or the Left-wing Socialists you will become the slaves of Russia.

"Instead, vote for the parties of order, especially for the Christian Democratic Party of Premier Alcide de Gasperi, and you will assure your children of freedom, Democracy, and liberty. . . .

"Down with Communism! . . . long live religion, the Fatherland, and and democracy with the liberty of the Italian people!

"Read and make your friends read this letter with the hope of a great victory for the greatness and future of our holy religion and our dear Fatherland." (pp 115–17)[5]

The *New York Times* reported that J. J. Lamula, former New York Assemblyman, had ascertained from the State Department that voting for the Communists in Italy would constitute "affiliation with a totalitarian power" and hence would debar such persons from later immigration to the US. Mr. Lamula urged Italian-Americans to emphasize this fact in letters to Italy.[9]

The picture postcards distributed in the same manner as the form letters contrasted, by means of captions and cartoons, life under democracy with life under the Communists.

A content analysis of form letters and postcards mailed to Italy during the campaign reveals that the major themes emphasized were as follows:

One set of themes stressed the catastrophic effects to be expected if the Communists were not defeated . . . . Italy would then be threatened with Russian domination, loss of religion and Church, loss of family life, loss of home and land, an entirely destructive Red policy in Italy, and loss of future American aid.

A second set of themes stressed the beneficial effects that would follow a Communist defeat: future aid from the US and an independent and prosperous Italy, following its reconstruction.

A third set of themes pointed out the close ties between the US and Italy. Voters were asked to remember past American aid, and family ties between those in the US and those in Italy.

Finally, a fourth set of themes played on the patriotic sentiments of the voters. They were reminded of (a) Italy's past wars for unity and independence and (b) the role Italy could play in world events if she remained democratic. All these themes were presented in highly emotional language. The threats and promises were painted in bold colors and the punishments and rewards were pictured in specific terms. The personal tone of the letters plead with the recipient as one would with a close friend. Throughout the appeals, the reader was reminded of the close ties between himself and the writer, of the similarity of their interest in what is best for Italy. (pp 117–19)[5]

The difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of the letter-writing campaign lies in the fact that it was only one phase of an all-out attack with other anti-Communist propaganda devices. Moreover, the election preliminaries were not only marked by propaganda, but also by such events as the dramatic discovery and exposure of a ship bearing arms and munitions from Yugoslavia to the Italian Communists. The Italian anti-Communist press was thus able to headline: "HELP FOR ITALY FROM THE UNITED STATES, GRAIN AND COAL. FROM YUGOSLAVIA, ARMS AND MUNITIONS."[10] Probably of equal

significance to the anti-Communist cause, the Italian government countered threats of Communist violence by a large-scale parade in Rome exhibiting the strength of the expanded police force.[11]

However, despite the difficulty of estimating the effect of the propaganda campaign, or of one propaganda device alone, various "on-the-stage observers" thought the letter-writing campaign had a distinct influence in the ultimate anti-Communist success. For example, Arnaldo Cortesi, *New York Times* correspondent, called it a "powerful" technique, (p 199) and said:

> "Many understood from them [the letters] for the first time that the United States means what it says when it declares that American aid will cease if Italy votes Communist.
>
> "The deep impression caused by the American letters was confirmed by Don Luigi Sturzo, one of the big men behind the scenes in the Christian Democratic Party, who wrote in this morning's *Popolo*: 'Those who receive gift packages from uncles and cousins in the US have been warned that they will not get another dollar if Italy turns Communist. Such letters struck home in southern Italian and Sicilian villages with the force of lightning. . . .' " (p 120)[5]

In any event, two observations may be made with respect to the letter-writing campaign and its probable effect on the outcome of the Italian elections. Americans of Italian descent gave it their unqualified support and Communist party members in Italy objected strongly to it. (p 119)[5] They attacked the letter-writing campaign as "unwarranted interference" by foreigners in Italian affairs. (p 120)[5] However, since the Italian Communists themselves were openly receiving "foreign assistance" their counterattack may have been completely ineffective.*

The Communists went so far in their counteroffensive as to claim that with American letters and packages came "American Commandos."[12] They also felt called upon to deny that the Communists planned the extermination of the Church,[13] and by the end of the campaign the word "Communist" was practically eliminated from their posters and literature in favor of "Popular Front."[14] Such propaganda expedients were obviously defensive measures against all the facets of American propaganda. As such, these propaganda reactions cannot be cited as evidence of the effectiveness of any specific US appeal, propaganda technique, or media of dissemination.

In any case, in evaluating the letter and postcard campaign, the question arises whether all the messages sent were of equal effectiveness. The two most widely distributed form letters, quoted above, are so different in their appeal that it could be possible that a person who responded favorably to one of them (e.g., the one promising rewards for voting anti-Communist) would not respond equally favorably to the other (threatening deprivation for voting for Communists). This assumes that the audience perceived the messages in this term. Similiarily, the

* This assistance came not only in the form of arms from Yugoslavia. Cortesi suggests that since the cost of the Communist preelection campaign in Italy was estimated at $150 million, financial assistance also must have come from outside the country. (pp 203–04)[1]

question arises whether or not the form letter attenuated the personal appeal of the American letters.

Whatever the qualifications that may be introduced, the effectiveness of the letter-writing campaign as a propaganda device lay in its person-to-person character. It combined the possibility of reaching a mass audience with the possibility of approximating a face-to-face appeal. The "friendship trains," widely remembered in Italy at the time of the election, also reached a mass audience, and were aimed at making a personal appeal. But this device could not by its nature have the intimate significance of the appeal across the sea made by known relatives or friends who were formerly countrymen.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND THE BURMA PARLIAMENT*

By W. E. D.

An account of how the USIS staff and library aided the anti-Communist cause in Burma in 1950.

On 27 June 1950 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by the US that called on the members of the UN "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel armed attack." Although this action by the UN was a victory for American diplomacy, the victory was meaningful only to the extent that the member states of the UN adopted domestic legislation appropriate to the obligations the political representatives in the UN had undertaken. Thus in order for the UN Security Council's resolution to be as effective as possible it was desirable, if not necessary, that all member states endorse the Security Council's action.

As has been shown repeatedly throughout this volume the function of psychological warfare and international information is to support, through appropriate propaganda activity, the political, military, and economic policies of the nation. Thus, VOA and the other branches of the Department of State IIA undertook the task of informing the ruling elites in many of the member states, through publicity and news programs, about the Korean problem and the significance of the UN action to the cause of world peace and the independence of small states.

The domestic political situation in Burma, in 1950, was typical of that to be found in many sections of the world, especially in Southeast Asia. The people of Burma were divided politically between pro- and anti-Communists, and the pro-Communist elements were still further subdivided into two competing camps. The nation had won its political independence in the post-World War II era and the people were jealous of their newly acquired freedom. They were all anxious not to take any action that would compromise the status of the nation as an independent country.

Most of the people of Burma who were not already irretrievably committed to the Communist cause looked on the cold war struggle largely as a contest for power between two political giants, Soviet Russia and her satellites on the one side and the US and her friends on the other. To the leaders of Burma the correct policy

* Adapted from a USIS unpublished report.

for their country to follow, it seemed to them, was to steer a center course of "neutralism," i.e., to avoid taking any stand favorable or unfavorable to either the US or Soviet Russia. Clearly, such a policy ran counter to the hopes and aspirations of the US, which wanted a clear and unmistakable expression of condemnation of Soviet aggression.

In Burma, therefore, USIS personnel were faced with a difficult situation. The Burma government's announced policy was to declare its support of the Security Council's decision of 27 June 1950 with respect to North Korean aggression. However, there was every indication that the Parliament would not go along with the government's decision. USIS was thus faced with the problem of what to do, remembering that what is done within the field of another country's domestic affairs is always subject to unfortunate consequences if the action backfires.

Prior to the discussion of the Security Council's action in the Burma Parliament, the Rangoon Office of US Information Center published the pamphlet "The United Nations and Korea." This pamphlet was distributed to government officials and to the schools and was displayed in local libraries. The Office of the Attorney General requested 200 copies of the pamphlet for distribution to members of the Parliament so that they might study it before the motion to approve the governments endorsement of the UN action came up for discussion. In addition to this pamphlet, copies of another, "Enforcing the Peace in Korea," a UN reprint, was also disseminated to members of the legislative body.

After the discussion in the Parliament the members voted to sustain the Prime Minister in the action he had taken in agreeing to support the UN decision on Korea. The Assistant Attorney General personally expressed his thanks to USIS and he especially singled out USIS library for praise, saying it had been of "immense help" to the Attorney General in refuting the charges and statements made by certain members of the legislative body. He was sure, he said, that it was the work of the American information personnel that enabled the members to understand the issues involved. Thus, had it not been for them, the motion before the Parliament to sustain the government's action in supporting the Security Council's decision might have been lost.

THE HICOG EXCHANGE OF PERSONS PROGRAM*

Psychological warfare techniques are employed to support a general medium-term objective.

The HICOG Exchange of Persons Program between Germany and the US and other democratic nations is one of the primary vehicles for attaining the objectives of the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany. The over-all American mission in Germany is that of aiding Germany to become a stable democratic sovereign state, whose citizens are equipped and ready to work with other democratic peoples in the interests of freedom, peace, and, if necessary, in the common defense of the free world against totalitarian aggression; the role of the exchanges program is to assist the Germans to help themselves in developing a democratic way of life, in becoming members in the society of free peoples through their own

* Extracted from "8th Quarterly Report on Germany," Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 1 Jul–30 Sep 51, pp 59–64.

efforts, and, eventually, in bringing their country into equal partnership in the family of democratic nations. The exchanges program moves to realize this important and far-reaching goal of aiding the German people in its democratic self-development by sending selected Germans to visit and study in free nations, so that they may see democracy in action.

It is self-evident that the objective of the HICOG exchanges program, although it is now an integral part of the world-wide Information and Educational Exchange Program carried on with many countries by the US through the State Department, is critically different from that of the normal social and cultural exchanges of the world-wide program. This difference, as well as the total American mission in Germany, must be borne in mind in any appraisal of the effectiveness of the exchanges program.

Also, the background against which the program is carried out must be taken into consideration: The German people have undergone 13 years of Nazi rule, a destructive war, and, since the end of that war, an occupation by the four major powers responsible for the defeat of the Nazi German government. During the Nazi regime and the war it fostered, the German people in the main lost all contact with democratic ways of living; individual and social concepts regarding such basic considerations as respect for human dignity and the freedoms on which democratic societies are based were deliberately destroyed, particularly in the youth; and respect for the cultures of other peoples was, of course, largely smothered and replaced with an excessive development of nationalism. Following the defeat of the Nazi German government, the German people have seen the occupation of their country develop along the lines set by the contrast between the free world and that portion under Soviet dominion, with the Western Occupation Powers working toward the democratic reconstruction and rehabilitation of their former enemy and the Soviet Power carrying out a program of exploitation and oppression resembling that of the Hitler era.

Under these circumstances, then, the measurement of the HICOG exchanges program's effectiveness lies not so much on its record of having sent some 6000 persons on exchange visits to the US and more than 500 teachers and other professional persons to neighboring European democracies, but on how well it has implanted among the Germans those concepts which will further the developing democracy of their nation. It should not be forgotten that the exchanges program is not intended to "Americanize" the exchangees; nor is it intended primarily to improve technical or professional skills, as are exchanges made under the ECA Technical Assistance Plan.

Observations made by Americans managing the exchanges, by participating Germans, and those outside the program, and by US and European specialists called in as consultants indicate that thus far the exchanges program has had a solid impact reaching into nearly every aspect and level of German life. Demonstrably it has helped to democratize the thinking and standards of thousands of persons, modify deeply entrenched social attitudes and institutions, and release into German life forces for progress banned during the long years of Nazi government and war.

In the field of civic responsibility, men and women of all interests and professions have returned from American study tours as advocates of the value of group effort in Germany. Impressed by the American approach of group action to solve community problems — group action that relies on the expenditure of common effort rather than on large sums of money — the Germans have been quick to adapt the

idea to their own communities, which are universally short of funds but long on capable woman- and manpower. The exchanges have founded or helped found dozens of voluntary citizens groups that have educated both themselves and the general public on how to attack and solve community problems. They have been prime movers in establishing day nurseries for children of working mothers, city playgrounds, other recreational facilities, self-help projects for refugees and community aid for war veterans and the unemployed.

Illustrative of this adaptation to German needs and surroundings was a ceremony at Stuttgart on 19 July 1951, dedicating the "Anna Haag Haus," a unique social institution combining the functions of a home for working women and a community center. Frau Anna Haag, Stuttgart legislator and journalist for whom the house is named, had made a three-month exchanges program visit to the US, where she had studied the social and political aims, activities, and methods of American women's groups. Returning to Germany, Frau Haag set out to change, to some degree, the plight of homeless working women in her own city — a situation that had long distressed her. She initiated and led a civic fund-raising campaign that enlisted the aid of both German and American women's organizations in the Stuttgart area and drew support and assistance from US and German officials. "America gave me not only the idea but the courage to do this," Frau Haag has explained to those interested in the working women's home — the first of its kind in Germany.

About 1 month earlier, the effectiveness of the program for sending German officials on study tours was evidenced by the ceremonial opening on 14 June of Frankfurt's first reading room for children. Dr. Gertrud Gelderblom, chief of the Frankfurt Public Library and sponsor of the new room, told a dedication audience of leading citizens, officials, journalists, and radio broadcasters that this introduction into German state-supported libraries of the idea of a reading room for children was the result of her study of American library methods during an exchanges program visit. The reading room incorporated a number of innovations, such as the open-shelf system, which, except for the America Houses, is almost unknown in Germany.

Another instance of the returns from the exchange program is the fact that "exchangees" of all ages and interests have adopted the idea of the parent-teacher association, which only a short time ago was literally unknown in Germany. Returning to their home communities, many have plunged into organizing German parent-teacher societies — a long-standing goal of HICOG education officials and progressive German educators. Today there are scores of these parent-teacher associations in Western Germany. These associations have been instrumental in improving the curricula of German schools by advocating more social studies, citizen training, and democratic techniques in the classroom. Under the leadership of those who have participated in the exchange program, the parent-teacher groups have had a strong influence toward liberalizing an educational system in which the teacher has long been the absolute authority.

To date, some of the most decisive testimony regarding the effectiveness of the HICOG exchanges program comes from the US Resident Officers. Working at the grass-roots level, these American representatives are in a position to render definitive judgment on the force and extent of nearly all social and political influences in German community life. Most of the Resident Officers agree with one who said, "My personal opinion is that these exchangees are perhaps the most effective force in our whole program in bringing lasting democratic influence to bear on individu-

als." Many of the American field representatives have noted the influence of the returned exchangee on his neighbors. The average German is more inclined to believe his fellow citizen who has been "over there" and made personal studies and observations than if he is a foreign spokesman.

Thus, the US Resident Officer at Pforzheim reported the intense interest shown by the citizens of that city in an open forum he had sponsored. The forum, which drew more than 500 men and women into the city theater (which has a 400-seat capacity, necessitating the turning away of scores after all standing room had been filled), featured six Pforzheim citizens who had traveled for 3 months in the US as an exchanges program "citizen-team." These four men and two women of varied professions and cultural interests made individual first-hand reports on America, and then engaged in a lively question-and-answer session with members of an audience that remained intensely interested despite the overcrowding. Several of the speakers at this forum took the opportunity to set right misconceptions about the US and the American people voiced by members of the audience.

Supporting this natural tendency to believe the friend or neighbor who has "seen for himself" is the fact that about 3000 of the US visitors under the HICOG exchanges program have been men and women in leading positions in public or professional life. These include Federal, state, county, and local government officials; labor union functionaries; journalists; radio specialists; publishers; judges and lawyers; public health doctors and nurses; social workers; agricultural and home economic specialists; and leaders in the areas of youth, religious, and women's activities.

These leaders in German life have made it a practice to share their American experiences, sometimes engaging in energetic speaking and writing activities, as do the less firmly established professional men and women, university students, and "teen-agers" who make up the balance of the HICOG program.

The following are not unusual examples: A leading Regensburg publisher interpreted America to more than 3000 persons in 20 separate speeches. A professional youth worker sent to HICOG the summaries of 70 talks he had delivered to audiences totaling 5000 persons. Most of the returned Germans speak to several groups at the least; their talks are usually informal and followed by question-and-answer sessions. The importance of these talks cannot be overestimated in bringing to a wide circle of German people new ideas, methods, and encouragement toward the establishment of valid democratic practices in their way of life.

Public officials, as well as private citizens, have returned from study tours to conduct campaigns to liberalize or reform election and governing procedures. They have demanded better candidates and better officials, have made candidates declare their platforms, and have fostered more political representation and expression for minority elements of the population, such as refugees. A county official in Wuerttemberg-Baden was so impressed by open city council meetings in America that he stopped a practice that he had previously supported — the holding of closed sessions by the various town councils in his county. Until he saw on his US trip the effect of citizen interest on local government the county officer had not been convinced that the average citizen could or would contribute to governing his own town. The political activity and power of American women have been translated into German concepts by returning exchangees. Since women have traditionally been excluded from German political affairs, it is noteworthy that not only women leaders but men, public officials and leading professionals, have

assisted and encouraged German women to organize political campaigns and run for office.

In an effort to educate potential leaders and teachers, Germans returning from abroad have set up and organized seminars, forums, courses, and institutes in political and social sciences. At the *Seminar fuer Politik*, Frankfurt, more than 600 private citizens have studied government and civic responsibility with the aid of outstanding guest speakers and visits to representative government agencies and bodies. All services and facilities are donated so that students pay only a nominal fee. Development of the HICOG-supported Institute for Political Science (*Hochschule fuer Politische Wissenschaften*) at Munich has been strongly influenced by seven staff members who have participated in the exchanges program. To a great extent, they have based courses and lectures on their American experience and materials.

Another aspect of German life in which the effect of the exchanges program can be observed is the growth of an international spirit now breaking through the nationalism that has cloaked German thinking for many years. Exchangees are among the most active leaders of groups and movements promoting internationalism in Germany. A woman civic leader in Wuerttemberg-Baden returned from an exchange visit to England to initiate the founding of five chapters of "Europa Union." In Hesse several young exchangees made themselves the nucleus of a local group to study international affairs and to enlist the aid of the "Europa Union" organization in promoting the exchange of persons among neighboring European nations.

This broad interest in internationalism has made for a tremendous growth in privately sponsored exchanges. The returned Germans have worked to make the exchanges program a two-way street. For example, a "citizen-team" from Krefeld (British Zone) has announced a plan to invite a team of eight citizens of Kalamazoo, Mich., for a 6-week study visit to Germany. In like manner, a Karlsruhe group is raising funds to finance two American exchangees at the *Karlsruhe Technische Hochschule*.

The presentation of these activities of Germans who have benefited from the exchange program and of the success they have achieved in bringing new concepts or practices to bear in government, education, civic affairs and many other phases of German life, is not meant to convey a picture of unqualified success or absence of difficulty and opposition. On the contrary there is general recognition that the ultimate judgment cannot be made today on this program to aid the German people in their own efforts to readjust, reorganize, and redirect their own social and political institutions. American officials, European expert observers, and the German participants themselves are agreed that a decade or more will be required before the influence of the program and of those Germans sent abroad by it can be fairly assessed. Traditional attitudes and mores, especially in the social and political fields, are slow to change, and the exchange participants, although they are scattered throughout all levels of German society, are comparatively few in number, with almost half being students. Opposition, both open and covert, has been encountered, especially by the younger ones who have not yet established themselves in positions of influence.

In one case, a teacher recently returned from the US was dismissed from her post on the ground that, after her American study, she was "on a different pedagogical level" than our fellow teachers. In all fields, those returning from abroad

have of course encountered the conservatism, fear of new ideas and practices, indifference and opposition-to-all-things-new that faces any proposed change in social concept of custom. Frequently, exchangees have collided with the antagonism of Communists and neo-Nazis and their sympathizers. Sometimes younger persons returning from the US have hampered their own effectiveness in promoting German democracy by expressing the desire to emigrate immediately to America. The emigré attitude is diametrically opposed to the intent of the exchanges program, which is concerned with developing democratic Germans — not future Americans. It has, fortunately, never seriously hampered the young returning Germans, since most regain their enthusiasm for their homeland after a short period of readjustment.

In sum it can be said that the exchanges program has been and is a continuing force behind many of the changes now being made in German cultural, political, and social concepts. As such it has complemented and increased the effectiveness of the other components of the HICOG program for helping the Germans in their work of democratic reconstruction and preparation for national sovereignty and membership in the family of free nations.

FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE AND "OPERATION VETO"*

An account of how balloons and radio broadcasts were employed to support a specific long-term objective.

From the period 29 April to the early autumn 1954 more than one hundred thousand hydrogen-filled neoprene rubber and polyethylene-plastic-film balloons, over 4 feet in diameter, each capable of carrying a 3-pound cargo, fell on Czechoslovak soil, thereby disseminating to the Czech and Slovak peoples approximately fifty million anti-regime leaflets, stickers, manifestos, mock election ballots, posters, and newssheets.

While leaflets and other printed matter showered from balloons, Radio Free Europe transmitters, located in Munich, beamed explanatory broadcasts to the people of Czechoslovakia. These activities marked the beginning of "Operation Veto," the first sustained effort to reach the population of an Iron Curtain country by both printed and spoken word on a closely coordinated, saturation basis. This effort differed from similar previous ones in that this was to be a long-term campaign in which the message, rather than the ingenuity of the means, was paramount.

Organization

"To launch its 'drops,' the Free Europe Committee [FEC] (parent organization to Radio Free Europe, and to date the sole practitioner of coordinated balloon-broadcast psychological warfare) has built special housing and mess quarters at its West German border sites. It is also installing field communication and weather reading facilities, training technical

* Adapted from two sources: "Balloons for a Captive Audience," by George Clay in *The Reporter*, 9:28–31 (18 Nov 54) and "Czechoslovakia: RFE Launches 'Operation Veto,'" in *News Behind the Iron Curtain*, (Jul 54). Quoted portions of this account are from *The Reporter* and are reproduced with the permission of the Editor, *The Reporter* copyright holder.

personnel, and spending considerable sums to improve 'aim,' calculate areas of cargo 'scatter,' and develop an accurate method of tracking balloon fleets to their destinations.

"Having bought up all the available hydrogen in West Germany, FEC is now [1954] scouring France and Italy for additional supplies to fill the hundreds of thousands of balloons that will be required to drop future issues of its biweekly newspaper, *Free Europe*. This paper, printed in eight-page strips (two million of them per issue) which accordion down to the size of a pocket book, has been in the air, so to speak, since early June. (p 28)[15]

Leaflet Dissemination by Balloons

There is actually nothing new in the use of balloons to disseminate propaganda material. A century ago a Russian exile named Vladimir Engelson wrote to the French Minister of War on 23 May 1854 suggesting that balloons be used to disseminate messages inciting the Russian people against participation in the Crimean War. However, the balloon has been slow in proving itself an effective weapon of propaganda for the simple reason that there was little to be transmitted that could not better be disseminated by other means. In addition, during the present cold war between the Free West and the Russian and Satellite East, until about 1953 there was little the West could say in leaflets that could not be broadcast by radio to peoples behind the Iron Curtain more quickly and far more effectively. As long as the West rejected the idea of inciting unarmed and unassisted peoples to rise against their leaders, there was little to be said in leaflets except "Take courage — be patient — the West hasn't forgotten you."

"The Free Europe Committee said just that via balloon to the Czechs and Slovaks in August, 1951, and again in July, 1953. While it needed saying, particularly after the Czechoslovak and East German demonstrations, neither of these isolated balloon operations was backed by a long-term program.

"It wasn't until the full score was in on the June, 1953, outbreaks and concessions were being granted throughout the Soviet orbit that FEC adopted what Edmond Taylor called the 'Strategy of attacking Communism in terms of its own professed ideals and forcing the Communists to behave in an un-Communist way by seeming to take them at their word.'[16] The change was made possible by the fact that the Communist regimes had at last uttered words they could actually be taken up on — not only abstract ideals but specific promises to better the lot of workers, farmers, and housewives. The rocks the east Berliners had thrown at Soviet tanks proved the futility of our previous all-or-nothing resistance concept. But they also symbolized an unrest so widespread and effective that it allowed the formulation of a new concept of internal opposition to undermine the political and economic structures of the 'People's Democracies.' This, for the first time, was a long-term program that the spoken word could accomplish more effectively in conjunction with the printed word."

Analyzing the Target

"What FEC did was to sift out the principal sources of Czechoslovak resistance by analyzing the Communist regime's press and radio and talking to

thousands of escapees, then to incorporate these complaints in a ten-point 'People's Opposition' platform outlining concrete, attainable demands such as more housing, higher wages, lower norms, freedom to change jobs, and the right of farmers to leave collectives." (p 28)[15]

The first message sent into the country by balloon consisted of a series of posters, small enough to be concealed in the palm of the hand, dealing with the theme of the Ten Demands. They were followed by an eight-page leaflet with the actual text of the Ten Demands. A few days before the elections to the National Committees on May 15, the "Ballot of the People's Opposition," printed in twenty million copies, began to reach the country. This "ballot" listing the Ten Demands as the "people's candidates," stressed the fact that the ballot was not meant to contest the regime's rigged elections but to establish the positive program of the people's opposition:

"This ballot of Czechoslovak People's Opposition does not belong in the government ballot boxes. It belongs in the hands of citizens, who will use it — each according to his own possibilities — as a demonstration of the people's solidarity and as a first part of a step by step program against the regime. Securing these Ten Demands will constitute a historic milestone on the road toward a free Czechoslovakia in a free and United Europe.

THE TEN DEMANDS OF THE PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION

1. *Trade Unions for Trade Unionists* — Trade union functionaries are responsible only to those who elected them. They must not be dictated to or recalled by the Central Trade Union Council. Trade Union functionaries must bargain collectively on behalf of the workers; press for better wages, conditions, lower norms, and safety measures. They must prevent payroll deductions. When work slowdowns are the only means of achieving just demands, the State as employer must not persecute the workers.

2. *More Pay, Less Propaganda* — The purchasing power of workers' earnings is considerably below the pre-war level. Therefore, before the end of October of the current year, plants and central offices must increase wages and salaries: for employees earning less than 1,060 kcs. by 15 percent; for workers earning more than 1,600 kcs. but less than 1,500 kcs. by 12 percent.

3. *Workers Must Not Be Chained to Their Jobs* — Workers must have "freedom to quit" without management permission. Workers must not be compelled to accept State-imposed jobs. Youth must be free to select vocations of its own choosing.

4. *No State Regimentation of Free Time* — Plant management must not prolong work hours. Sunday and holiday work must be voluntary and compensated for by overtime pay. Overtime must be paid for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Vacations must not be curtailed under any pretext.

5. *No More Serfdom* — The farmer must be free to leave the collectives without persecution and to regain collectivized property rightfully his. The National Committees must ensure equal treatment for private farmers and collectives, equal credits and bulk-buying prices, larger garden plots, and establishment of a farmers' organization.

6. *No Quotas, or Smaller Ones* — Delivery quotas are a temporary evil. While they exist, the local National Committees must exert influence on the district National Committees to ensure just apportionment of quotas. Non-fulfillment of quotas reflects mistaken estimates by the State. The local National Committee must see to it that the farmer is not penalized by the errors of Communist planning.

7. *Autonomy for the Local National Committees* — The councils and employees of local National Committees must represent the interests of the local population, to whom they owe first allegiance. They must regain authority for the community and prevent the schools from becoming recruitment centers for child labor. In Slovakia, the National Committees must support Slovak autonomy, not Communist centralism.

8. *Goods for the People, Not for the Soviets* — The regime must be forced to keep its promises to produce more consumer goods, particularly household wares, textiles, etc. Foremen will cooperate with workers in slowing down all production which does not serve these needs, and, on the other hand, in speeding up the production of consumer goods.

9. *Back to Servicing the Customer* — To cut through the bureaucratic mess of central planning and inefficient wholesaling, retail store managers should apply directly to factories for needed parts and products. Local National Committees must gradually and unofficially turn over communal enterprises to private cooperatives of individual holders. This applies particularly to restaurants, bakeries, small craft enterprises, and personal and repair services.

10. *Housing for Families, Not for the State* — National Committees must press for larger housing budgets and see that housing sites are chosen according to popular need instead of State planning. Housing must be allocated justly, not on a political basis.

The list of what the people inside Czechoslovakia want is based on information from inside the country, developed from refugee reports and analysis of the Communists' own press and radio. The opposition platform is thus based on specific causes of dissatisfaction and is aimed at attainable goals. It seeks to organize and articulate those pressures which in the past have proven effective against the Communists and induced them to temper the oppression of their Satellite peoples.

Target Reaction

"According to refugees who escaped during May, June, and July, nearly everyone had either read or heard about the 'Ten Demands' and was discussing them openly. 'The first leaflet I saw was given me by a Communist,' said Karel Cihak, a pilot who escaped in a training plane on May 12, 'and while I was reading it, a Communist was reading it over my shoulder.' Others reported that people had begun to write the figure '10' on Communist election posters at night. Opposition stickers, small enough to fit in the palm of the hand, were being pasted on the doors and windows of party agitation centers. Mock ballots were found on factory steps at the beginning of the morning shift. Well-known Communists received opposition leaflets in the mails, and hundreds of them were spread at a regime election rally at which Minister of Culture Vaclav Kopecky spoke. (pp 28–29)[15]

"The Communists, officially silent for about a week, let fly seventy volleys at the end of May — first from Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky and his press and radio, then from Radio Moscow and *Pravda*, and finally from the other satellite regimes in unison. The prospect of combating a concrete action program had obviously disturbed party leaders. 'The authors of these leaflets,' the Prague government protested to the US Embassy in an aggrieved tone, '. . . feign an interest in the rights and social achievements of the Czechoslovak working people.' *Pravda* denounced the campaign in doctrinaire invective, but carefully withheld the exact content of the 'Ten Demands' from its readers. As the national committee elections drew near, Zapotocky reportedly brought up special police patrols and marshaled fresh speakers to score the 'traitorous *émigrés*' of Radio Free Europe." (p 29)[15]

Leaflets Supplement Attack by Radio

"The unexpected way in which the 'Ten Demands' seemed to have caught on and been adopted by the Czechoslovak people as spontaneous expressions of their own self-interest decided FEC to continue its balloon operations indefinitely through a biweekly newspaper — in effect, to establish an opposition press to supplement its opposition radio. According to the Committee, neither leaflets nor broadcasts alone could have put over the 'Ten Demands.' 'The physical link,' says Jan Stransky, head of the Czechoslovak desk at Free Europe Press, 'has a mystical power. You know that somehow the West managed to get this piece of paper to you, and quite aside from its message, it becomes a kind of talisman. As for the printed word, it has an important residual effect. Unlike the spoken word, you can save it and return to it or pass it on at leisure.'

"On the other hand, many escapees who brought news of the 'Ten Demands' hadn't seen a single balloon or leaflet themselves; they had heard the 'Demands' over RFE and memorized them because they knew, either through RFE or the grapevine, of intense excitement miles away where leaflets *had* been found.

"The leaflets had brought radio into more urgent contact with the people. And radio, with its wide and regular audience, had guaranteed unified impact for the balloon operation. To quote Samuel S. Walker, Jr., an FEC vice-president and the man primarily responsible for getting the printed word behind the Iron Curtain: 'It was a case of two plus two adding up to ten.' "

Estimating Results

"This enthusiasm for balloons is not shared universally. When Walker's equation was put to an official of the US Information Agency, he shook his head and smiled. 'How do we know it's two plus two?' he asked. 'How can we be sure it's not two plus point zero zero zero one?'

"The truth is that no one can be sure. Not yet. One can only tot up the number of farmers who actually do leave collective farms, watch work norms and wage scales to see whether they go up or down, analyze regime investment policies to see whether housing and consumer-goods budgets are on the increase, evaluate the results of this fall's shop-committee elections. FEC has already found complaints in the regime's press that labor-union officials are protecting soft norms and indulging shift skippers (Demand No. 1), failing to report job hoppers (Demand No. 3), and extending workers' free time and vacations (Demand No. 4). Even so, it is virtually impossible to judge how much of this sort of thing is due to the pressure of the 'People's Opposition,' much less to apportion credit for the success of the 'Ten Demands' between the printed word and the spoken word. (p 29)[15]

"But apart from short-term, measurable results, FEC hopes that its press-radio program will help to give disparate anti-regime elements a feeling of unity about their political targets by getting farmers, workers, and party small fry to work, each in ways of his own choosing, for the 'Demand' most important to him. Even if some of the 'Demands' are never achieved,

FEC reasons, Czechs and Slovaks will become accustomed to expressing themselves in terms of positive action. They will be preparing themselves for a time when inside and outside pressures might combine to bring about some really fundamental changes." (pp 29–30)[15]

OPERATION "MAGIC CARPET"*

By W. E. D.

US Air Force airlift of Moslems from Beirut to Mecca — summer 1952 — in support of general long-term objectives.

To thousands of devout Moslems who had saved their money for a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1952 it was an especially auspicious year. Every faithful Moslem's earthly goal is a *hadj*, or pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca at the time of the Festival of *Id Al Adha*. In 1952, in accordance with the lunar calendar, *Id Al Adha* fell on 29 August — a Friday, and therefore was seven times as holy as any other day. In previous years the Saudi Arabian government had collected a $100 head tax from each pilgrim making the journey, but in 1952 this tax was removed, largely because the revenues produced by the Arabian-American Oil Company's royalty payments had become so large as to make the levy on visiting pilgrims unnecessary. Thus additional hundreds in the Moslem world, many of whom traditionally live on a low economic plane, were encouraged to attempt the *hadj* in 1952.

For the pilgrimage to be a success it was necessary for the visitors to reach Mecca by Wednesday 27 August, for on that day the city gates were to be closed by Saudi Arabian authorities. However, less than a week prior to this date more than 9000 Moslems found themselves stranded in major air transfer points in the Middle East. More than 4000 were stranded in Beirut, Lebanon, 800 miles from the Holy City. All these pilgrims had tickets, which they had purchased in their home countries of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Senegal, and which entitled them to air transportation to Mecca. However, they lacked reservations — and the regular commercial airlines: Middle East Airlines, Saudi Arabian Airlines, and Air Lebanon — were unequal to the task of providing passage for more than a few hundred of those who had reached Beirut.

Most of the stranded pilgrims had come from distant lands; they were elderly, and for most of them the journey was possible only after a lifetime of saving. If they failed to reach Mecca before the gates were closed they would be forever deprived of realizing one of the chief goals of their earthly existence, the pilgrimage to Mecca. The *New York Times* correspondent in Beirut at the time described a typical pilgrim.

> "An 85-year-old Iranian pilgrim shabbily dressed and now penniless typified the plight of thousands. He explained that he had begun saving for the trip when he was ten years old and kept his hoard buried beneath the mud floor of his hut. Unless he is one of the lucky ones who take off

* Adapted from the *New York Times*, 26 Aug to 5 Sep 52; H. B. Ellis, "Air Lift to Mecca," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 Aug 52; Department of State, *Field Reporter*, 1: No. 3, 20–22 (1952); N. Russell, "The Bureaucrat of the Year," *This Week Magazine*, 7ff (18 Jan 53).

tomorrow [by air for Mecca] his life of sacrifice will have been in vain. In his carefully budgeted trip he had allowed for only a two day stay in Beirut. He has been here twelve days now. His money for food has run out and he is living on the charity of airline officials."[17]

A correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that approximately 80 per cent of the stranded pilgrims were from Turkey and almost none could speak the Arabic language of the Lebanon country to which the Turkish airline had brought them on the first leg of their journey. As the airlines were unable to move these people out of Beirut on schedule, pools of these simple peasant folk began to grow restive as 27 August approached. They gathered around airline offices in Beirut, overflowing into the streets, with their bundles, crudely tied with ropes, about them, while harassed clerks tried to explain why there were no planes to carry them to Mecca.

It was into the midst of this human calamity that officials of the American State Department and the US Air Force were projected. Through a combination of imagination, enterprise, and everlasting persistence, the American Minister in Lebanon, Harold B. Minor, was instrumental in bringing about the mass movement by air of the stranded Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda, Saudi Arabia, located only 40 miles from Mecca, the Holy City.

The airlift really began in Mr. Minor's Beirut office on the sweltering afternoon of 21 August. Minor, a 50-year-old career diplomat with nearly 20 years' experience in the Middle East, was visited on that Thursday afternoon by Saeb Salaan, a leading Lebanese politician, a member of the Lebanon Parliament, and President of the Middle East Airlines. Salaan told Minor that in the midst of the annual mass pilgrimage to Mecca about 1000 Moslems had suddenly been stranded on Beirut's Khaldi airport. They were suffering in the intense heat, unable to get adequate food or water.

Their plight was not their fault. They had been misled into believing that if they reached Beirut the local airlines could carry them to their destination. However, time was running out. These pilgrims had to be in Mecca by 27 August for the week-long ceremonies that mark the fulfillment of one of the five basic tenets of the Moslem faith. Otherwise, the opportunity of making the pilgrimage would be lost, for most of them forever.

"Could the United States Air Force possibly help out?" Salaan wanted to know.

Minor quickly saw the benefits to the US if the Air Force and the State Department could be persuaded to meet Salaan's plea. This humanitarian airlift would give our reputation a great boost in a part of the world where America had long been regarded with suspicion and hostility.

Cautiously, Minor promised he would find out what could be done, if anything. He dispatched a top-secret "NIACT" (night action) cable to the State Department pleading for the airlift. He said he realized that he was "asking the impossible."

Action in Washington

With the arrival of Minor's cable the wheels of governmental machinery began to move, at first with alarming slowness. The cable reached the State Department code room at 11:07 A.M. Washington time, Thursday, 21 August, but was not decoded and delivered to Henry A. Byroade, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, until 5 P.M.

When Byroade saw the cable he moved quickly. Within 2 hours he had obtained the cooperation of H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, and Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force. But there were still details to be worked out that might prevent the carrying out of the proposed action.

Before he went home that night, just before 8 P.M., Byroade drove back to his office from his meeting with Finletter in the Pentagon and cabled Minor. He said the Department was "looking into the possibility of moving some of the pilgrims by air."

He asked Minor to cable immediately replies to a number of technical questions involving the nationality of the stranded pilgrims; possibilities of finding other means of transportation (there were none); and whether the pilgrims possessed visas and health certificates for entrance into Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cautioned Minor not to indicate to Lebanese officials that there was much likelihood a solution could be worked out. Clearly, he was fearful of a last-minute hitch.

Minor's reply to the questions arrived at noon the next day, Friday, 22 August. He reported the situation was getting worse — there were now 1500 pilgrims stranded at the airport. And, apparently fearful that red tape might yet strangle his scheme, he warned that the Lebanese government was getting so worried that it was about to make a formal request to him for American assistance.

Meanwhile, Finletter had taken the problem to Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett in order to obtain his formal approval. Mr. Lovett insisted that one point be made clear: the Air Force would not accept payment from the pilgrims. Instead, he said the pilgrims should pay their fares into escrow for eventual donation to Moslem charities.

Byroade spent most of Friday afternoon at the Pentagon working with Air Force officers on details of the operation. At about 7 P.M., he cabled Minor that orders were going out to implement the plan. Overnight the Air Force went into action.

Orders were dispatched to Brig Gen Wentworth Goss, commanding officer of the 1602nd Air Transport Wing at Wiesbaden, Germany, to organize a "Mecca Airlift Task Force." General Goss received these orders at 6:10 A.M., Saturday, 23 August, and 17 hours and 34 minutes later, he landed at Khaldi Airport, Beirut, to take command.

Throughout Sunday General Goss's planes arrived — 14 in all — from Wiesbaden and Tripoli, Libya. Meanwhile, word of the airlift spread through Beirut, and hence more and more pilgrims congregated on the airfield.

As the airport became clogged with a moving mass of humanity, the streets of Beirut were slowly denuded of bewildered and bearded men, clutching prayer rugs and rope-bound luggage, a sight that had become so familiar, yet pathetic, during the previous week.

At the air terminal long lines of elderly men waited patiently hoping they might still reach Mecca before 27 August, the deadline. Here and there one would see groups of women, each individual with a black shawl drawn over her head, in Moslem fashion, sitting in silence. At prayertime, five times a day, pilgrims formed lines at the nearest outdoor water faucets where they went to wash themselves before kneeling in prayer.

At 8 A.M. Monday, 25 August, the actual airlift was launched. General Goss's C-54 bucket-seat transports began taking off, operating around the clock, each

plane taking off with 50 or more eager, grateful, solemn pilgrims. In 48 hours, 48 flights left Beirut for Jidda. It was impossible for the Air Force to land its planes nearer Mecca. Since the plane crews were infidels, the Americans could not, according to Islamic law, enter or approach the gates of Mecca.

An American reporter in Lebanon at the time described the scene at the Khaldi Airport as the pilgrims crowded about waiting and hoping for a summons to board a transport plane that would carry them to or near Mecca.

> "Some clutched a passport and an airline ticket — and thrust them at every Westerner who went by in the vain hope that that man might solve their problem. More than one approached me with a pleading look, though neither of us could understand one word the other spoke.
>
> "One night I walked past rows of sleeping pilgrims, while others wandered like shadows in the night, stumbling out of the way of a sudden taxi or an airline bus bringing a new load of pilgrims from crowded Beirut.
>
> "Suddenly overhead came the screech which is now familiar to Beirut residents but which was terrifying to these simple folk — the noise of a BOAC new jet Comet making a weekly landing at Beirut, a magic carpet far beyond the storied princes of these Arab lands.
>
> "Pilgrim No. 2157 brought a stir to the airport crowd — Ayatollah Kashani, now speaker of the Iranian Parliament, one of the most powerful men in Iran. Some pilgrims sought to throw themselves beneath the wheels of Kashani's car in some sort of desperate sacrifice.
>
> "Like other pilgrims Kashani flew in a MATS plane on the upholstered seat provided him and his principal aid, while other pilgrims sat on bucket seats or on the floor. . . .
>
> "It was uncertain whether all the pilgrims could be lifted to Arabia in time to participate in its feast of *Id Al Adha* . . . but overworked Major Charles A. Roberts, Acting Commanding Officer of the 41st Air Transport Squadron told me grimly 'We will go on until the planes can't fly or we can't fly them.' "[18]

While the Air Force officers were thus busily engaged in loading the planes, Dr. John H. Shope, executive secretary of the American Friends of the Middle East, who happened to be in Beirut, added an extra fillip of US good will. Learning that the stranded pilgrims had reached the end of their food resources, he and George Britt, a director of the organization, bought 7500 pounds of food and had it packed in box lunches for the hungry throng at the airport.

In spite of the fear that the Air Force planes had not been summoned in time, not a single pilgrim was left stranded in Beirut for the lack of air transportation. However, success in meeting the objective of airlifting all the stranded pilgrims was aided by an act of the Lebanese government. Seeing that it was impossible to lift all the late-comers who swarmed into the airport when they heard of the arrival of American planes, Lebanon authorities obtained from the Saudi Arabian government a 48-hour extension of the deadline for arrival in Jidda to 29 August. Finally, at 5:22 P.M., 29 August — 38 minutes before the final deadline — the seventy-fifth flight took off with the last of the 3763 stranded pilgrims. Minor cabled the State Department:

> "Gen Goss reports his mission accomplished . . . . airport is completely clear of all stranded pilgrims. This was an outstanding job well done." (p 24)[19]

The airlift was not a free ride for the pilgrims. Every passenger airlifted carried a round-trip ticket for a flight between Beirut and Jidda on one of the regularly established commercial airlines, whose planes continued to work overtime along with MATS in carrying the pilgrims to Jidda. Tickets to cover the first leg of the return flight were collected from all who were carried on US Air Force planes. The commercial airlines redeemed these tickets. The proceeds from these tickets went into a special fund, to be held in trust by the American Legation in Beirut, until authorities in Washington, or in the field could decide on how the fund was to be used for the advancement of some recognized Middle East charity.

Thus the American taxpayer shared with the pilgrims from the Moslem world the cost of this remarkable airlift. The immediate response proved to be an excellent investment.

> "Altogether, it added up to a brilliant propaganda coup, so successful that Moslems throughout Lebanon prayed for the Americans who organized and flew the airlift. Beirut newspapers, usually critical of the United States, particularly of its policy of support for Israel, published 1,538 column inches of news and comments, all favorable, on this 'miraculous . . . humanitarian gesture.' "(p 24)[19]

Al Massa, a Beirut newspaper, in its 25 August issue, commented editorially on the airlift as follows:

> "We are glad to acknowledge this humanitarian mission made possible through the American Government and its Air Force Headquarters. God, the Almighty, will certainly recompense this mission.
>
> "The Holy Koran says, 'good deeds efface bad ones,' American bad deeds are many but God will forgive them.
>
> "Is it not wonderful that American Air Force planes carry pilgrims to Mecca. Has America at last found God's way?"[20]

Mohammed Allaya, Grand Mufti of Lebanon, immediately called on the American Minister, Mr. Minor, to express the gratitude of "40,000,000 Moslems in the Arab speaking states. This act marks the turning point of American relations with the Moslem world," Allaya told Minor.[18]

The real meaning of the airlift to the Moslem world, however, was without doubt locked somewhere in the hearts and minds of the pilgrims, mostly elderly men and women. Many of the pilgrims had invested their life savings in the pilgrimage, only to find themselves stranded in a strange land because the civil airlines lacked the necessary planes to honor all the tickets the pilgrims had purchased. In returning to their respective homelands from Mecca the story the pilgrims had to tell surely did much to counteract Russian anti-American propaganda among the Moslems. In telling their story of the modern "Magic Carpet" they were able to say that it bore the label "made in the USA."

One American writer in commenting on the airlift nominated Minister Minor "The Bureaucrat-of-the-Year." "His action," the writer said, "is the past year's

to live as free men. . . . Americans, who fought the Civil War to liberate the slaves and who think they are fighting this war to free the enslaved people of the world, must find it painful to reflect upon the sad course over which their president is now taking the country." (11-9-43)

The Atlantic Charter is a "false front for Anglo-American imperialism." The vigor of the Japanese attack on the Charter and on Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" suggested a genuine fear that they might serve as articulate expressions of American war aims. Hence, there was a consistent effort to persuade us that our leaders were not sincere and that the ideals of the Charter would not and could not be achieved:

"The Charter says that people should have the right to choose their form of government. The leaders of India believed that and are now in jail. As Churchill said, he did not become prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire." (8-15-43)

We were constantly reminded that none of the colonial powers had made any promises to relinquish control of their colonies after the war and told that the colonial system was not in harmony with the Charter principles. Abandonment of those principles was likewise seen in the partition of Poland and in the "invasion" of North Africa. When Roosevelt revealed to newsmen that the Charter had not been a specific, signed document, Tokyo heralded this admission as —

" . . . conclusive proof of the fraudulent nature of the document and of the amazingly low level to which Anglo-American leaders descend to gain their evil ends." (12-4-44)

Japan's aims were represented as being truly in the American tradition:

"Japan is fighting for the things for which you think you entered the war, and you are fighting against the very things for which you believed you were fighting." (7-6-43)

"Japan is a crusader, fighting valiantly and unselfishly to accord to the Asiatic peoples the rights and privileges given them by God." (2-7-42)

"Japan's ideal is a living, working one. . . . Japan is bringing about independence and freedom for the peoples of Asia."

As evidence of her high purpose, Japan pointed to a series of achievements — relinquishment of extra-territoriality in China and the return to China of the Shanghai international settlement; the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and parts of Malaya and Indo-China; a new treaty recognizing full sovereignty for the Nanking government of China; the adoption of an impressive "charter of liberties" by the Greater East Asia Conference of November, 1943, and much alleged peace and prosperity in the "Co-prosperity Sphere."

The attack on Pearl Harbor was justified as defensive — an act forced upon Japan by the Allied leaders:

"There can be no question but that war was forced on Japan by an arrogant and dangerous enemy who has no hesitancy in resorting to any trick of propaganda to attain his sinister ends. . . . At least by November 26, (1941) the United States . . . had for all practical purposes launched upon a state tantamount to war against Japan." (11-26-42)

Finally, one use made of the numerous atrocity charges constantly made against American and British forces was to prove that our real behavior betrayed the falsity of our claims that we were champions of human rights and the Four Freedoms.

By these methods Tokyo sought to throw doubt on the justice of America's cause and the worthiness of our war aims, as well as to place the Japanese in the most favorable light possible — gallant, kind even to their enemies, defenders of freedom for the downtrodden peoples of Asia, and victims of the inhuman tactics of their enemies.

Validity of Assumptions. As to the major assumption that America lacked concrete, positive war aims, it seems to the writer that the Japanese, for a time at least, had a point. The American people were slow to accept the idea that they must again enter the European war; most of them hoped right up until the Pearl Harbor attack that war could be avoided in the Pacific. Public-opinion polls on American entry into war showed a consistent majority for neutrality even as late as October, 1941, when a *Fortune* survey showed only 37 per cent ready to call Japan to a halt, and in April of that year only 36 per cent were willing to send an American air force to Europe. This fact seems to suggest distrust of the idealistic war aims of the belligerents, perhaps a survival of the attitudes of disillusionment which developed after World War I.

The Pearl Harbor attack, of course, turned the trick, and any question of positive war aims was swept aside by the indignation of the moment. But even when statements of positive war aims and postwar plans were made, they remained for a long time in broad general terms. Even after the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt's statement of the Four Freedoms we were unable to apply their principles concretely to many of the peoples in Asia because the British, Dutch, and French had made no commitments regarding future colonial policy. Of inestimable aid to the Japanese propagandists was Churchill's forthright statement that he did not become prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire, and it was quoted and requoted many times by Japanese spokesmen. Neither could America make any application of the Charter principles to India. Aside, therefore, from the pledge to free the Philippines and to recognize the sovereignty of China and Thailand, America could talk only in generalities about war aims in the Pacific and Asia.

Tokyo perhaps rightly believed that this situation was somewhat less than satisfactory to those American idealists who looked upon the war as one for the literal achievement of the Four Freedoms, and the comments on this point in sections of the American press seemed to bear out the Japanese assumption.

Although one may grant some vulnerability in our position in regard to the long-run application of the Four Freedoms, this did not mean, as Tokyo may have assumed, that Americans could easily be persuaded to stop fighting. Japan greatly underestimated the depth and tenacity of the antagonism caused by the Pearl Harbor attack. It is doubtful if any but those strongly predisposed in Japan's favor ever accepted the Japanese explanation of that act, and for many throughout the war it was in itself a sufficient war aim.

Nor does it seem probable that Japan's benevolent aims in Greater East Asia or her complaints of martyrdom for a noble cause or charges of atrocities could be expected to arouse much American sympathy, for the Japanese invasion of China and other areas was too recent, and reports of Japanese atrocities were too frequent and too generally believed.

Thus, while Tokyo may have hit upon a point of dissatisfaction in the matter of long-run war aims, she was wholly unrealistic in supposing that this dissatisfaction could be turned to a positive identification with Japan's aims, a justification of the Pearl Harbor attack, and a demand for the cessation of the war.

American Decadence

The Assumptions. Japanese spokesmen made it plain that they considered the American people too materialistic and too much accustomed to luxuries to endure shortages and make the sacrifices necessary to carry through a long and costly war. They expected Americans to lose their enthusiasm as the sting of Pearl Harbor wore off, as their standard of living was cut, and as the cost of the war in men and materials became apparent to them. Then the lack of clear-cut war aims would be felt, and Americans would demand peace. . . .

The Propaganda. Proceeding on the above assumptions, Japan's propagandists set about to hasten the decline in America's will to fight by stressing American weakness, the strength and superiority of the Japanese, the tremendous sacrifices we were enduring, and the much worse ones yet to come.

Much of the propaganda that seems to fall under this head is of a standard sort. The weakness of the enemy, the strength and superiority of one's own troops, the one-sided results of military engagements, also attempts to capitalize on conditions on the enemy's home front and the suffering of loved ones are parts of all war propaganda. Of special interest here are the specific Japanese assumptions that American materialistic civilization and the high living standard which it made possible were productive of physical and moral softness and that Americans could be persuaded that Japanese "spiritual" strength rendered them capable of almost superhuman achievements which made them unbeatable. The acceptance of these two propositions would indeed be conducive to defeatism.

Said a regular commentator:

> "In your country you have a national case of pink-toothbrush on a large scale and in many forms. The American way of living made most comfortable and easy by advanced science is not all it is cracked up to be. Survival of the fittest, remember. The time and place for frittering away the nation's strength is not before the battle. After twenty years of soft living the American soldiers are no match for the Japanese." (2-11-43)

The fantastic exploits of the Japanese troops which were soberly reported as fact for American listeners are well illustrated by the following:

> "The dauntless activities of a Japanese scout unit on the New Guinea front are reported. . . . Corporal Takagi and nine other men . . . stealthily entered the enemy's camp on a moonlight night of October 15. . . . Locating the enemy soldiers, these ten fighting men immediately fell upon them, blasting two heavy artillery pieces, blowing up twenty-four (pieces of) enemy camp (equipment). The enemy soldiers, completely taken by surprise, flung whatever they could lay their hands on, but these ten Japanese scouts soon made short work of the four hundred American soldiers and wiped them out. Miraculously enough, these ten Japanese soldiers did not suffer any wounds and returned to their base after gleaning all the information." (11-30-43)

Such deeds of valor were attributed to the spiritual superiority of the Japanese:

> "The burning internal unity of the Japanese gives them a mental energy eternally beyond America's materialistic logic. This is worth all the money and factories in the world." (2-23-43)

By virtue of American decadence, Japanese spiritual strength, and the expected decline in American production, the war was sure to be long and costly if America persisted in her hopeless task:

> "Your troops landed in the Solomons a year ago. They are still there in the malaria-ridden jungles, a stone's throw from where they first landed. This despite an overwhelming numerical advantage in men and aircraft. Consider for a moment that the Japanese swept down the jungles and swamps of the Malay Peninsula, heavily fortified at strategic points, in seventy days. . . ." (8-25-43)

The American people were likewise thought to be unable to endure the thought of the suffering of their loved ones. Prisoner-of-war messages, a regular feature of Japanese programs, were a favorite vehicle for emotional appeals which preyed on this assumed weakness:

> "To you, mothers, sweethearts, sisters, relatives, and friends, in the name of the unknown soldier for whom you are weeping in cemeteries today, I ask: Why are you continuing to send your loved ones overseas to foreign countries to die for an unknown cause? . . . This war brings absolutely no profit to the American nation. . . . (It) positively brings misery and misfortune, to say nothing of the torture and death befalling innumerable American youths." (POW messages 5-30-43 and 7-6-44)

Likewise, the American people were thought to be unable to endure privations on the home front, and Tokyo made it a point to keep such privations constantly before us by telling us of our own troubles and of the greater ones to come:

> "Better stock up with fifty years' supply of clothes. It's going to be a long war, and money won't do you any good when there is nothing to buy." (6-4-43)

We were reminded constantly of dire shortages of food, of absenteeism in war plants, of increasing juvenile delinquency, of increasing taxes, of shortages in land and sea transport, of the dangers of a postwar depression, of the closing of race tracks — termed the hardest blow of all. Special stress was laid on the shortage of rubber, tin, oil, and quinine for which we had relied heavily on the areas we lost to Japan. Substitutes for these were declared impractical, and Japan's abundant supplies from the conquered areas were underlined.

Validity of Assumptions. It is an interesting assumption that the American people be led to doubt the value of their high living standards and the materialistic achievements of their civilization and to attribute their military reverses to the resultant decadence. These are part of the very ethos of American culture, and to doubt their worth would be to abandon some of our most deep-seated values. By contrast, Japan's concept of spiritual strength seemed like mumbo jumbo to most Americans.

It must be admitted, of course, that Japan's assumption that America would break rather than endure a long war was never put to the test. The American home front suffered infinitely less hardship on account of the war than that of any other major belligerent. It is not necessary to speculate on what the American reaction would have been to such conditions, for example, as the Japanese themselves suffered. It is perhaps sufficient to note that the Japanese greatly overestimated the shortages and the sacrifices Americans were making. In the absence of the conditions they assumed, their propaganda of defeatism was at best premature.

The conclusion of their American "expert" that our war production would decline after mid-1943 is a case in point. Recognizable errors of fact appearing in their broadcasts, even though perhaps not sufficiently serious to invalidate the argument logically, were sufficient to nullify the psychological effect of the propaganda upon the listener by convincing him that the commentator did not know what he was talking about.

The obvious gloating of the Japanese spokesmen over our loss of sources of quinine, rubber, tin, and other essential materials of the South Pacific and the inexhaustible supply of them now held by Japan was perhaps expected to create defeatism. But they underestimated both the absolute faith most Americans have that science can do anything and the ability of American scientists to fulfil that expectation. It is also characteristically American that the result of the many reminders of our losses and Japan's gains in the southern regions had the effect of increasing our determination not to let them get away with it rather than of creating the defeatism Tokyo hoped to produce.

On the military side there was somewhat more in Japan's favor, at least during the first year of the war. America had, indeed, underestimated Japanese strength, and some were inclined, when it was revealed to them, to swing to the opposite extreme and attribute to the Japanese almost uncanny and superhuman powers. But neither the early reverses nor the Japanese propaganda that capitalized on them ever convinced any considerable fraction of the American public that it was remotely possible for us to lose the war.

Exaggerated reports of American battle losses and stories of the superiority of Japanese troops and pilots were for the most part so clumsily done as to produce a laugh rather than to establish for the Japanese the reputation for invincibility which they sought to build up.

There is, perhaps, always a susceptibility to reports of actual sufferings of loved ones, and Japanese reminders of the malarial jungles, of shocked and broken battle casualties, of prisoners of war killed by our "blind bombing," may have been effective with persons whose husbands and sons were known to be directly affected. But the prisoner-of-war messages lost much of their potential value by being so obviously faked. And the assumption that the American people would be ready to sue for peace when they were told of battle casualties showed an exaggerated conception of American "decadence."

Internal Cleavages Exist in America

The Assumptions. Internal cleavages exist that can be exploited so as eventually to cause revolt against American leaders and against the war.

There was an evident hope that the American people could be turned against Roosevelt personally. The power of racial minorities, especially Negro and Mexican, to cause trouble must also have been assumed, to judge from the stress on that subject in broadcasts to America. And, finally, a class cleavage was evidently

thought to exist between the "war profiteers," or businessmen, and the workers, or American masses.

The Propaganda. One of the heaviest and most persistent of lines was the personal attacks on President Roosevelt. He was depicted as a tyrant, a dictator over the American people. He falsified the war news to deceive the people. The war guilt was placed squarely on his shoulders. He planned war on Japan long before Pearl Harbor. He was termed "A Don Quixote of the present century living in his dreams," a tyrant lusting for world hegemony, a politician who fooled the American people and led them into war for political reasons. Tokyo frequently became abusive and sarcastic. He was called "a paralytic cripple" with a "warped brain." One commentary was entitled "Is Roosevelt Sane?" and concluded in the negative. (8-27-42) His pre-war promise to keep America out of the war and not to send draftees to fight on foreign soil was constantly reiterated.

At times these personal attacks seem bitter enough to constitute nothing more than ill-tempered jibes at the man whom they recognized as perhaps the most effective leader among their enemies. . . . If they had any serious propaganda purpose, however, it could have been based only on the belief that Roosevelt had a potential opposition in America which could be aroused or encouraged by such methods.

Other Allied leaders were likewise attacked. MacArthur, for example, was accused of cowardice for fleeing the Philippines when the Japanese came in 1942. He was termed a "Braggart and Crybaby," a "would-be hero." Americans heard that when he fled Mindanao with his wife and son he had an American plane loaded with fresh pineapple for his own personal use. (5-9-44) He was accused of falsifying war results and of "concocting victory news." "A well-known New York daily states that MacArthur is such a seasoned general," Tokyo wisecracked "we say he is a pickled one." (10-21-43)

The racial identification of the Japanese with other colored peoples was given much emphasis. The American treatment of colored peoples was kept continually before us. Every discriminatory practice in the armed forces, in defense industries, in social and economic relations, was seized upon. Statements from American spokesmen or from the press on any phase of the racial question were repeated and interpreted for the American audience. Discriminatory laws against Negroes, Orientals, and Mexicans were repeatedly cited, as well as imperialistic practices of the Western powers throughout the world. In contrast with the Allies, Japan was pictured as champion of all colored races, fighting to free them from white domination and enslavement. At times the vehemence of the accusations seemed to suggest that the Japanese spokesmen were determined to convince us of our own wickedness, to make us hang our heads in shame.

Granting the possibility that the tone of some broadcasts may have been colored by the emotional reaction of the commentators, a theme pursued with such consistency must have been inspired by a more rational motive. This would appear to lie in the hope of arousing these minorities to oppose the war, to withhold support, or to embarrass the government by demands for equality of treatment at once.

Japanese attempts to create or widen cleavages along class lines in America were simple. There were frequent charges that business leaders had led us into war for the sake of profits and to re-establish their imperialistic hold on the resources of the Far East. Japan charged also that American war taxes favored the wealthy and bore unduly on the poor.

On the other hand, there were attempts to frighten the conservative element in America at the growing power of labor and the radical tendencies of the administration. Roosevelt was called the "Communist candidate for 1944." It was asserted that the Cripps appointment to the British cabinet proved England was turning communistic and that America's alliance with Russia and Britain, "two good Red friends," would surely nourish the seeds of communism and anarchy in the United States. (2-27-43) For the most part, however, Japanese propaganda made very limited use of the "Communist menace." This sharp contrast with German propaganda was perhaps due to the Japanese fear of giving offense to the Soviet Union, whose neutrality in the Far Eastern war she appeared to desire ardently.

Validity of Assumptions. The belief that America was disunited and that factions in it were ready with slight encouragement to fly at each other's throats is perhaps a natural result of the inability of outsiders to understand the nature of our national unity. To persons acclimated to totalitarian regimes, there was ample evidence of disunity. The vocal opposition to government policy on the part of various pressure groups; the bitter debates in Congress, on the domestic radio, and in the press; the uninhibited utterances of office-seekers in American political campaigns; and the open struggle for advantage between labor and employer — these things, had they happened in Germany or Japan, would indeed have been cause for alarm. That they are classifiable as "normal" in America was known, perhaps, but not thoroughly comprehended by the Japanese. To them America was a fertile field for the sowing of seeds of dissension and revolt.

Thus, the vehement attacks on President Roosevelt personally may have been encouraged by the very vocal opposition to him and his New Deal during the pre-war years and by the criticism of his policy of aid to Britain in the early years of the war in Europe.

Tokyo was astute enough to draw upon American sources for many of her criticisms; and, of course, the American press with its editorial license, its Peglers, and its Hearsts, not to mention Congress with its Bilbos and Rankins, furnished Tokyo with ample material with which to attack the administration and the conduct of the war.

The same principle seems to apply to Tokyo's appeal to America's racial minorities. The existence of a considerable Negro population, which was denied many of the advantages of which democracy boasts, vocal in demands for equality, and supported in these demands by a considerable faction of the white population, appeared to be a natural point of attack for racial propaganda. The advocates of "white supremacy," in Congress and out, did yeoman service for the Japanese cause, perhaps more useful in convincing Asiatics of our racial intolerance than in fomenting revolt on the part of American minorities who are accustomed to them.

But if Tokyo hoped to produce open revolt or organized opposition to the war by racial minorities, she failed to reckon with the degree of accommodation which minority groups have achieved in American life. Moreover, the belief that their desire for fuller participation in American democracy and economic well-being could be turned into espousal of the Japanese cause seems to border on the fantastic.

The Tokyo charges that American capitalists led us into war for profits appealed to a long-standing popular distrust of big business running throughout our history at least since the "trust-busting" days of Theodore Roosevelt, and Tokyo was correct in recognizing an open struggle for power between organized labor and

organized employers. But here, again, the ability of a democratic society to accomodate itself to many inter stresses was probably not appreciated by the Japanese propagandists. They therefore appear to have greatly over-estimated the possibility of fomenting effective disunity within America.

Americans Are Suspicious of Their Allies

The Assumptions. Tokyo propagandists recognized the existence of considerable isolationist sentiment in America, the longstanding anti-British feeling in some quarters, and anti-Russian attitudes. In propaganda to America she sought to take advantage of these American biases to create disunity among the Allies and lessen thereby our ability to cooperate in the prosecution of the war. This propaganda to produce suspicion and disunity was likewise used, of course, to the other countries, and for the same purpose.

The Propaganda. The chief point of attack on the American beam was American-British cooperation. Britain and America were represented as fighting each for his own national interests rather than for the high ideals of the Atlantic Charter. Britain's aims were essentially to save the Empire and reestablish her control of her Asiatic colonies, but a future clash was seen with American interests in British plans to seize as much as possible of the postwar trade. Tokyo likewise told Americans that Britain was cleverly scheming to make America, as well as her other allies and colonials, bear the brunt of the war and turn all to her own advantage:

> "Britain is proving that Americans are the world's prize suckers. American troops are in England, India, Australia, Africa, and New Guinea. They're there to save the British Empire . . . . When the majority of the Americans finally realize how they are made suckers of by the British and the Soviet Union, they will decide that the time has come to stop pulling someone else's chestnuts out of the fire. . . ." (1-19-44)

Attempts to discredit the British in the eyes of American listeners also took the form of playing up charges of British atrocities, British imperialism and colonial policy, British racial discrimination, and reports of friction between American troops and those of Britain or her dominions.

Attempts to discredit the Chunking regime took the form, for the most part, of reports of its weakness, its internal chaos, and impending collapse. Chiang Kai-shek was represented as willing to fight "to the last American dollar" and as ungrateful and dissatisfied with the aid he had received.

Though Japan made very limited use of the "Russian menace" in her war propaganda, presumably for fear of provoking a Russian attack, America was told on a number of occasions of the dangers inherent in her Russian alliance and reminded of the friction arising between Russia and the other Allies:

> "When President Roosevelt says there have never been any economic disagreements or danger of war with Russia, he is a hypocrite and doesn't believe his own propaganda." (2-9-43)

The alliance between Britain and America and Russia was pictured as a marriage of convenience which could not last:

> "With the European war over (said Tokyo shortly after V-E Day), a greater source of headaches for the Anglo-Americans is the advance of the Soviet Union. . . . (The) war will still continue in Europe, the war of seizing what is left in Europe." (5-7-45)

By methods such as these Tokyo sought to capitalize on American distrust of her allies and to convince us that they were imperialistic, selfish, and seeking to use America as a tool to achieve their own ends and that they were against many of the ideals for which we were told the war was being fought. On the other hand, there were said to be many advantages to collaboration with Japan:

> "The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere does not mean closed doors. . . . This sphere is not to be a small, narrow group surrounded by high walls, but a family which is willing to work with the rest of the world. . . ." (5-28-43)
>
> "It is time not only to think seriously of but to talk peace. . . . America will do well to ponder a peace, co-operation with your neighbors . . . prosperity for your own people . . . the chance to save millions of lives. . . ." (6-29-43)

Validity of Assumptions. There seems little doubt in the writer's mind that the assumptions of Allied disunity and suspicion were the most accurate of those made by the Japanese and their propaganda of disunity potentially the most dangerous. A certain suspicion or dislike of Britain among rank-and-file Americans is deep-seated and of long standing. Perhaps equally general, and in some quarters much more acute, was the fear and distrust of Russia. That to preserve unity and to make effective co-operation possible was one of the major problems of the Allies seems to have been recognized by Tokyo.

Americans were predisposed to be critical of British colonial policy, British "imperialism," and schemes to monopolize world trade, for of these aims most Americans consider themselves innocent. As to charges of atrocities, racial discrimination, and the like — these were likewise leveled against us, and with no less justification, but this fact was perhaps no bar to our developing a righteous indignation against our allies over their acts.

The relatively greater accuracy of the Japanese assumptions regarding America's international attitudes does not in the writer's opinion invalidate the thesis of this study, for their assumptions on this point rested less on knowledge of American culture and internal conditions than on observation of international relations in which Japan, too, had been a participant.

The failure of this propaganda, and the identical German line, to achieve an actual rupture among the Allied powers was not because it was inappropriate but because of the effectiveness of our countermeasures, the obvious advantages of wartime collaboration, and the depth of the American antagonism toward Japan which made her proffered peace terms so generally unacceptable.

Conclusions

The above analysis shows just how difficult is the problem of the war propagandist in adapting his appeals to his enemy audience. It is evident that the Japanese assumptions were in some respects correct but in many others were wide of the mark, either through ignorance of necessary facts or through faulty analysis of American attitudes and the workings of the American social system. That American broadcasts to Japan would show up any better from the Japanese point of view is perhaps doubtful, though the straitened circumstances on the home front, the long series of military reverses which could not forever be concealed from the people, and the bombing which brought the reality of the war to the

civilian population perhaps combined to create a situation more favorable to the growth of defeatism in Japan than ever existed in America.

The war propagandist in dealing with enemy peoples must attempt to modify the behavior of a hostile audience which he but imperfectly understands and the current condition of which he can judge only from incomplete and inadequate sources. Moreover, he is generally working against a system of domestic propaganda or "information" whose perpetrators have every one of the advantages he lacks. It therefore seems to be a safe hypothesis that he is powerless to achieve his objectives until or unless continued military defeats, severe domestic privations, or other circumstances generally beyond his control undermine the enemy's morale, destroy confidence in enemy leadership, and thus create a receptive atmosphere for his suggestions. Under such favorable circumstances he may intensify doubts and discouragement, and he may, once credibility and a degree of leadership have been established, suggest modes of action. But those conditions under which he can be effective cannot be created by him; nor is he in a position to know precisely when the conditions obtain.

THE FRENCH TARGET AUDIENCE IN 1944*

By John W. Riley

How a team of social scientists identified and analyzed the privations and frustrations of a friendly people in time of armed conflict.

Public opinion research, as a sociological tool, demonstrated its practical value in emergency situations during the liberation of France. Conflicting reports from Normandy shortly after D-day as carried in the British press read:

> "Allied Beachhead, June 13. At least 7 out of 10 Frenchmen resent the arrival of Allied troops. Several incidents of sniping have been reported.
>
> "Bayeux Sector, June 13. Upon the entry of advanced units into the Bayeux area, the French civilian population went wild with joy. Flowers were strewn in the path of the tanks and glasses of cider were eagerly held out for the soldiers as they passed."

The military significance of this confused picture loomed large. If the French civilian population was going to be antagonistic the army needed to know it — and in some detail in order to be able to plan accordingly.

Within two weeks a team of Survey officers attached to the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF were enroute via jeep and trailer to Southhampton. Armed with orders from Brig. Gen. Robert McClure, their mission was to make a definitive report for military and propaganda purposes of the reactions of the Normans to the landings and to the presence of Allied troops.

This was the start of operations for the Surveys Unit, Intelligence Section of PWD, SHAEF. Activated in April, staffed by British and American personnel, both civilian and military, the unit had spent three months in England, planning, train-

* From *American Sociological Review*, XII:698–703 (1947), originally published under the title "Opinion Research in Liberated Normandy." Reprinted with the permission of the American Sociological Society, copyright holder, and the author.

ing, being trained, working out tables of organization and equipment, and generally engaged in what was popularly known, during those tense and sometimes frustrating days, as "dry runs." Several of the original members of the unit had early been detached to FUSAG (First US Army Group) and from there assigned to the First and Third Armies. They formed the nuclei of combat survey teams and were originally scheduled to leave on D-day plus one. Since embarkation schedules, however, had been generally unhinged by adverse weather conditions, it was not until the first of July, four days after the fall of Cherbourg, that operations on any scale were begun in the field.

Such was the beginning of a unique experience in the annals of public opinion research. As the vanguard jeep drove off the LST onto the sandy Omaha beachhead, its trailer was loaded with paper, pencils, rubber bands, maps, slide rules, a hand-operated gelatin duplicator, some standard statistical reference tables. It would have presented a strange contrast to the light tank unit into which it had been automatically absorbed for the strictly military purpose of getting across the Channel had it not been for the tarpaulin which mercifully covered these unwarlike implements.

After two days of detours and travelling only on "mines cleared to hedges" roads, headquarters were established in Cherbourg. A building which ten days previously had housed the central German "propaganda shop" for the Department was requisitioned and for four weeks became our combined working and living quarters. From that point of view it was convenient, but little else could be said for it as a research center. One had to choose, for example, between a shell hole through an inside wall and a broken door frame, in getting from one part of the "office" to the next. But such details were minor. Real problems faced us and we were in a hurry.

Many problems, of course, had been anticipated and worked out in London. Official French cooperation, through General Koenig, had been obtained. The immediate objectives of the first survey were already part of our orders. But by and large, most of the problems — translation of questions into local idiom, pretesting, sampling, hiring and training of native interviewers, clearance prodecures, etc. — had to be settled on the spot.

GENERAL PROCEDURES

The policy throughout was to use local French civilians as interviewers. This policy was adopted primarily to insure unbiased interviews and frankness on matters of Allied relations with the populace, and because the Norman is traditionally inclined to regard even the French from another department as "outlanders." It was necessary, therefore, to recruit and train all investigators on the spot. Furthermore, all personnel had to be cleared with the Counter Intelligence Corps, French Civil Police, the French Civilian Authorities of the Prefecture, and finally with the head of the French Resistance, to make sure that all possible parties were satisfied with the bona fide character of the interviewers. Each of these groups separately and independently cleared the interviewers. After a few rejections in training on the grounds of unsuitability, ten young men and women were chosen to work on this special survey.

Interviewers, accompanied by a Survey Officer, were taken daily by jeep to places chosen and plotted in advance to assure representative sampling. The Survey Officer in charge of the team determined the immediate sampling procedures. He was also able to observe the reliability and work habits of the interviewers, and to examine completed questionnaires at various times during the day so that faults could be immediately dealt with.

It was inevitable that a survey of opinion of this sort, instituted within 30 days of D-day and two weeks after the last German in Cherbourg had surrendered, should have been attended by some suspicion. There were naturally instances of interviewers being picked up by local authorities even after those authorities had been briefed on the operation. But in the entire total of over 1,000 personal interviews, they were very few untoward incidents of any kind, and instances of suspicion of this sort are by no means unknown in survey work in other countries. Furthermore, in more than 1,000 attempted interviews, there were fewer than 3% who refused to be interviewed. This percentage is below the expected refusal rate for a questionnaire of this sort in the United States — a country accustomed to survey technique.

The Sample

The survey covered the Contentin Peninsula, north of a line drawn from Port Bail on the west coast to Carentan on the east. This took in much of the zone occupied by American troops at the time. The size of this area is roughly one-third of the Departement de la Manche, and its total population on a pre-war basis is approximately 150,000. The southern boundary line was in most cases within 15 miles of the Front, because since French nationals were employed as interviewers, it was considered unwise, on security grounds to take them any closer than this to the Front line. This fact also limited the scope of operations in the beachhead areas.

The operational sampling problems met with were probably unique in the history of scientific social research. Population statistics which normally establish the controls for research of this sort were virtually nonexistent. In Cherbourg, the base of operations, no vital statistics beyond the simplest of figures detailing the size of various communes in la Manche were found. French officials at the Mairie were of the opinion that statistics on occupational groups, income, home ownership, etc. *might* be obtained in Paris, but it hardly seemed wise at that point in the war to send a special mission into the occupied French capital!

But even if vital statistics had been available, the enormous displacement of people caused by the war would have rendered them practically valueless. Not only were there the absent prisoners-of-war and forced labor battalions which had been formed for Germany, but the pre-war population figures were further affected by the various evacuation waves, both before and after D-day. Cherbourg, normally a city of 39,000, was down to an estimated six or seven thousand when the Americans fought their way in. By the conclusion of interviewing on this study, city officials estimated that considerably less than half the population had returned to their homes. Here again, however, no actual figures were available.

The heavy bombings of towns such as Valognes, Montebourg, created a further sampling problem. Since a casualty in the family or the destruction of a person's home might well be a vital factor influencing his attitude toward the Allies, this point had to be taken into consideration.

To meet these various difficulties, the population in the area to be surveyed was divided according to size of commune and extent of war damage and quotas were constructed to guarantee a proper coverage.

In all 53 sample points were used. In each commune interviewers were instructed to call at every Nth house, depending on the number of the interviews needed to

represent this area. This insured a geographic spread of interviews which included respondents from all walks of life. Interviewing was done at different times of day and night to insure representation of employed and non-employed persons. There still remained the problem of choosing individuals to interview within each household. If an interviewer always interviewed the person who answered the door, the sample might have been overloaded with housewives and lacking in men and younger people. Lacking vital statistics on which to base age and sex quotas, a census of each household visited was collected. By tabulating these data from geographically scattered households, it was possible to assess roughly the total age and sex distribution of the population of the area and to distribute the interviews accordingly.

In short, every effort was made to obtain an adequate sample of the *existing* population. Obviously no attention could have been given at this time to evacuees who left the area either before or during the invasion.

Beyond its demographic characteristics, the sample gives an objective picture of what total war does to a population. Sociologically, many implications could be drawn. Thirty-four per cent had been evacuated from their own homes and 57 per cent were then living in homes visibly damaged; 16 per cent lived in areas that had suffered heavy damage and 65 per cent in areas with slight or medium damage, and 19 per cent in undamaged areas; 45 per cent had immediate members of the family in German prisoner-of-war camps; 11 per cent reported casualties in their families from Allied bombings, and so on.

The findings of this first survey reveal the behavior of a civilian population under total war. They show the basic failure of years of enemy propaganda. They describe the impact of liberating armies upon the occupied peoples. Although they afford a sociological laboratory too complex to be catalogued here, a few typical findings will indicate the nature of the data.

Reaction to Allied Landings

It was naturally difficult for the Normans, some four to six weeks after D-day, to recapture the precise feelings which they entertained upon hearing the news of the Allied landings. Some of them doubtless had conflicting emotions, mixtures of surging hope and haunting fear. The horrible possibility of failure of the landings, coupled with the naturally undemonstrative Norman nature, may well have caused some of them to act with a reserve which, to press reporters, seemed like hostility.

Doubtless, too, the momentous happenings intervening between D-day and the time when SHAEF interviewers talked with them had, to some extent, dulled their recollection of first impressions. They did, however, appear to have definite remembrances of their feelings on that all-important day in their lives. And their initial thoughts on hearing of the Allied landings formed an important part of the background of the inquiry. The respondents were asked:

> "When you knew for certain that the Allies had landed, what did you think?"

To this: 75 per cent reacted with pleasure and joy at the landings, optimism and confidence in the outcome of the battle, and a sense of relief at seeing the last of the Germans. Their comments leave no doubt on this point:

> "We were happy, we wanted victory, and how much joy we felt after waiting so long.

> "We were very happy because we could be free of the Germans.
>
> "I was greatly relieved because I was confident of success.
>
> "It was about time, life will get better now.
>
> "It was time they came because the Germans were beginning to get us down."

Seventeen per cent expressed doubts, anxieties and reservations:

> "Everyone was happy, but I was afraid that it might only be a Commando raid.
>
> "I hope they'll hold on.
>
> "We had been waiting for them for four years, we were afraid that the Allies might not succeed.
>
> "The war has been going on so long, and now France is once more a battlefield.
>
> "I thought of my parents and, above all, of my wife and son who are at St. Lô.
>
> "There would certainly be casualties.
>
> "I was afraid."

Five per cent gave miscellaneous comments, and 3 per cent had no opinion.

To the public opinion analyst studying the Contentin Peninsula one month after D-day, talking with its people, observing their reactions to the liberating forces around them, the most striking thing was the homogeneity of their feelings. Young and old, rich and poor, farmer and city dweller, appeared, by and large, to share the same sense of relief, the same fundamental gratitude toward the liberating forces.

Contact with Allied Troops

Into the restricted peninsula area the war brought tens of thousands of Allied troops, most of whom had never been in France before, knew little of its people or customs. The question asked on this point was:

> "What contacts have you had with Allied troops?"

Less than 10 per cent reported that they had had no contact with the troops, the overwhelming majority mentioning agreeable contacts of one kind or another.

To some it had simply been the contact of welcome: "We threw flowers and welcomed them with open arms." Others gave a more practical turn to their emotions: "I gave them butter, bread and ham to eat, and something to drink." There were cases of the troops being given information and so helped in their military duties: "I pointed out the site of German munition dumps." "I informed an American officer where the booby traps were." And others were even more active and self-sacrificing in their aid: "We took food to three American air force men hidden in Montaigu wood for twelve days." "My husband hid five parachutists in the woods." Others underlined their friendly relations by stressing how the troops helped the civilian population or shared their rations with them. "They helped me clear away the debris." "They threw sweets and chocolates to the children." Some emphasized that these friendly contacts continued beyond the first meetings: "There are some Americans who live next door and we frequently talk about what to do with the Germans." "They come to learn French from me."

Criticism of Allied Troops

To the majority of Normans the conduct of these troops was satisfactory. They offered considerable unsolicited praise of the American soldiers, and the stories of their contacts with the troops are replete with accounts of agreeable and friendly relations for the most part.

On the other hand, the presence of so many foreign troops could not help but bring problems of public relations. Specific questions were put as to the conduct of the troops. One in five of the Normans had specific complaints to register. Their most frequent criticism of the Americans as a whole was that they drank too much, hence their discipline was slack. This emphasis on discipline was a point which would naturally come to mind in view of the widespread recognition of the strict discipline of the German army. And the importance of this point was further emphasized when they were asked to make suggestions to improve relations between the troops and the civil population. The majority of these concerned disciplinary matters.

Interestingly enough, even those respondents who had suffered personally or directly from the Allied landings did not prove to be any more critical than the rest.

Post-D-Day Civilian Problems

The war brought numerous and very real problems to the non-combatant civilian in the Contentin Peninsula. Houses were necessarily ruined, cattle were unavoidably killed, transportation and communication facilities were inevitably disrupted. The Normans spoke of these problems, some of which were of the sort that might, in time, produce a souring effect on Allied-French relations if continued beyond the point where the people considered them natural concomitants of the war of liberation. The question asked was:

"Since the invasion, what has been your greatest problem?"

A. Being traditionally materialistic in outlook, the Normans' feelings toward the liberators would, in some degree at least, be colored by his material well-being following the invasion. His greatest complaint on this score, as revealed by the survey, was lack of bread. This complaint was not only a specific one of bread shortage, but was also probably a comment on the quality of their bread which was, at that time, black, heavy, doughy.

Bread is, of course, a natural anxiety focus for a peasant people. But the lack of it in this instance was sufficiently important for 15 per cent of the population to declare that the food situation had deteriorated since the Allies arrived in Normandy. They properly evaluated this situation as being due to lack of transport facilities. And while about half of this 15 per cent *blamed the Allies* for the worsened food situation, most of these again attributed war-related interruption of transportation as the cause.

B. On the other hand, 37 per cent believed that the food situation had improved, either because there was less exportation of food from Normandy, because the Germans were not there to requisition food, or because the Allies had brought about a reduction of the black market.

C. Anxiety over friends and relations in evacuated areas, shortages of supplies such as clothes, shoes, soap, the absence of public utility service — these were other Norman worries. Many of these complaints were attributed to the effects of war. To the people, these appeared inevitable and, for the moment, insoluble. Furthermore, the basic attitude behind this acceptance of the situation was the recognized necessity to give priority to war materials.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the findings of this first survey may be stated by quoting several paragraphs from the original report of August 1944. In retrospect these paragraphs take an added significance. Copies of the detailed report were sent by SHAEF to all field commanders and also placed in the hands of all policy makers within the Psychological Warfare Division. How well the Allied mission was completed in France it is perhaps even today too early to assess. Here is the situation as it was reported before the breakthrough at St. Lô — while Normandy still contained the battle front:

> "1. In Normandy the Allies, up to late July, were living in a honeymoon period. To put it another way, they had credit in their favor at the bank. The Allied landings were long expected and the uppermost emotional feeling was a sense of relief and optimism over the Allied successes and joy at the thought of coming freedom. Nor have the Normans been fundamentally disappointed in this matter since the landings. By D + 45, the great majority of them in the Contentin Peninsula were still looking at the Allies through rose-tinted glasses. But our future policy and conduct will determine how inexhaustible the bank balance is.
>
> "2. The old story of the 'brutal and licentious soldiery' is a point to be watched in this connection.
>
> "3. So far as food is concerned, much will depend on our future methods in dealing with the black market and the effectiveness of the rationing system, for food is a problem uppermost in the Norman's consciousness. At present the Allies have been helped by the impossibility of exporting the expendable goods in Normandy.
>
> "4. At all costs the Allies must avoid being likened to the Germans in their requisitioning procedures. This appears to be an important field for future propaganda directives."

Thus, essentially, the attitude of the Normans was a realistic one based on an appreciation of the war needs of the Allied armies in the field. It was not based on any dream fantasy of the Allies as a fairy godmother loaded down with food and equipped with a magic wand to remove all cares and difficulties.

OBSERVATIONS ON RUSSIAN SOVIET CHARACTER

By W. E. D.

A skilled linguist-psychiatrist reports his observations on Soviet character gained from interviewing 29 defectors from the Soviet Union and correlating the findings with a panel of experts on Soviet social and political affairs.

Dr. Henry V. Dicks (lieutenant colonel in the British Royal Medical Corps), in peacetime a psychiatrist associated with the famed Tavistock Clinic of London, was a senior intelligence officer of the British Directorate of Army Psychiatry during World War II. In this capacity he became involved in the joint Anglo-American psychological warfare effort directed against Nazi Germany. His major contribution in this work was the development of a technique for the scientific study of national character for understanding a foreign society.

As early as 1942 Colonel Dicks was stationed in a British transient camp for recently captured German prisoners of war where he began his studies of Nazi followers. He brought to this work of interrogator-analyst an excellent background of experience and training — a knowledge of clinical techniques, an excellent command of the German language, an extensive prior knowledge of the Germans as a people, and a wide acquaintance with social psychological and anthropological literature.

Through his interrogations he was able to construct his "Psychological Foundations of the Wehrmacht." These were found useful in training intelligence personnel preparing for service on the Continent and in providing new insights into German character that could be used in preparing propaganda output to Germany.

In the prison camps Dr. Dicks did not disclose his status as a psychiatrist. He was introduced to the respondents as a welfare officer interested in their problems as a prisoner. He interrogated large numbers utilizing a carefully prepared schedule of questions, carried on informal and friendly interviews with many, and kept carefully recorded notes of mass observations. The facts thus gathered were analyzed against the background of such other knowledge available to him concerning the Germans.

His wartime studies have come to be recognized as landmarks for those who desire to know how best to approach the study of an alien culture through the use of scientifically objective and valid techniques.[1, 2] His work on German and Nazi behavior patterns was so favorably received in American academic circles that he was commissioned by private research foundations to make a study of the Soviet character. This study was completed in 1951.

Dr. Dicks did not find this new field of endeavor an entirely strange one. He had had as he states an "early familiarity with the Russian tongue and culture area." However, the pilot study in the field of Russian culture and personality was not accomplished without its share of difficulties, not the least of which were the limited number of subjects available for interview or interrogation.

UNDERLYING HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY

Dr. Dicks reports in his study "Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior"[3] that "the assumptions with which the gathering of interview data was approached were similar to those outlined in . . . [his] . . . paper on personality in relation to National Socialist ideology." He states that clinical and anthropological evidence suggests that members of a given culture area share certain broad tendencies or regularities in their whole life style. He further stresses that in order to adequately describe the functioning of a given society it would be necessary not only to study the personalities of a proper sample of members but to place the data in a meaningful context. This he says is most important in the case of a group that has undergone social and technological revolutionary change in recent decades.

RESEARCH METHODS EMPLOYED

Interview Setting and Procedure. Unlike his studies of German prisoners the interview of Russians followed no structured schedule. This was in part due to the lack of prior ideas on what one was likely to discover. The opening interview session as a general rule took place in some room of modest comfort, not infrequently in the home of the respondent. Quite often a meal was taken together on the occasion of the first visit. Respondents were always told the purpose and identity of the interviewer. They were assured that the questioner was an academic person and not an agent of any government service. After the establishment

of some degree of rapport the subjects were asked to talk of their life experiences. Questions or comments were injected by the interviewer only insofar as these were necessary to stimulate further discussion. With many of the respondents the interviewer fruitfully invested five or six periods of approximately 3 hours each.

Recording and Data Analysis. Recording was done mostly after an interview session. Note-taking was kept at an absolute minimum and discarded at the first manifestation or hint of discomfiture of the subject. The gist of the interviews was later dictated onto soundscriber disks and transcribed. These records were then carefully scrutinized for common recurring features in content. After these were tabulated or abstracted in usable form the study director discussed his tentative findings with a panel of American experts knowledgeable on Soviet social and political affairs. The final paper emerged after long and careful deliberation on the meaning to be attached to the significant findings.

THE SAMPLE

Unlike the sample available for the study of Nazi ideology the number of Russian respondents was quite limited. Periods of armed conflict often provide a much better opportunity to secure access to a larger panel of respondents, thus assuring a better opportunity to approach the requirement for an adequate sample.

Only 29 subjects were included in the study. All had left the Soviet Union in the recent past and only a few had had any personal contact with others. The sample may be further described in terms of the social data they individually supplied:

Age. The majority fell in the age group of 35 and under; a number actually were less than 25. Only five men in the sample were 45 or over.

Ethnic Group. Twenty were Great Russians; two, White Russians; six, Ukrainians; and one, Armenian.

Education and Occupation. Four were university graduates, and most had received an education beyond the primary level. Both city-skilled labor and collective-farm peasants were included.

Class Origin. Three of the four university graduates were sons of professional, former upper-middle-class parents. A few described their parents as "rural intelligensia." The majority, however, claimed to be sons of city workers or peasants. In five cases they were believed to be of the poorest type.

Party Status. Approximately one-half admitted to Communist Party or Komsomol adherence.

Other Characteristics. As members of the displaced person's community all had demonstrated their break with the Soviet Union. The motivating force for their defection ran a whole gamut of reasons: love of a German woman; disillusionment with the Bolsheviks; preference for living conditions in the West; and rejection of their regime (but not of their people) on grounds of reasoned principles. With few exceptions they had been members of the armed forces of the USSR during the war, some even claiming decorations for gallantry in action.

THE REPORT

The excerpts that follow are taken from the published report[3] and are reproduced with the permission of Dr. Dicks and the Tavistock Publications, Ltd., of London.* The reader should be cautioned on two grounds. First, only a portion

* Dr. Dicks in granting permission to reproduce these excerpts from his published report has asked that the editors emphasize that this study was not undertaken as part of psychological warfare, but rather as an independent piece of socio-psychological research.

of the original report is reproduced below. Although every attempt has been made to refrain from any distortion, this effort may have met with limited success. Dr. Dicks's account is so tightly written that some distortion is inevitable in lifting excerpts out of the original report. Second, Dr. Dicks would be among the first to caution the reader to accept his findings with care. The sample was limited in size and the data were gathered in an era that increasing passage of time may make less applicable to the present situation. Stalin has passed from the Russian scene and as of this time no one single leader has emerged to usurp the place he occupied in the Soviet social and political order. Yet, with all of these deficiencies the account that follows was deemed worthy of inclusion in this volume. It is at least suggestive of what one may expect relative to Russian attitudinal and behavior patterns and it provides a point of departure on which to build new and enlarged studies when and if such are ever deemed to be desirable.*

"In this . . . paper certain general statements will be made concerning recurring regularities of Russian Soviet behavior and motivations abstracted from the interviews. If all the relevant evidence in the shape of raw data were to be included, it would require a book which the preliminary status of this study does not warrant. . . ."

GOAL ORIENTATIONS

"Goal orientations or values to be striven for have always seemed to the writer a relatively neglected aspect of personality descriptions. We may think of them here as determinants of long-term striving of individuals, culture groups, or societies, in which there may be distinguished goals or values which are ends and those which are related to choice of means. . . ."

Official Value Orientations

". . . the goals and values of the Communist party line of the Soviet Union are unequivocably defined . . . there need be no description here of official Stalinist doctrine and philosophy in regard to its aims and hopes. The model of the 'new Soviet man' is, however, worth outlining, because it is the official norm or 'Ego-ideal,' against which individuals, especially Party members may be rated by their leaders and toward which they are expected to strive.

"On the values level the Party aims to create whole-hearted accepters of the goals and values of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This involves the acceptance of the 'ideals' of self-discipline, Soviet patriotism, self-surrender to the cause, and so forth. On the cognitive level the goal of the Soviet people is mastery of Marxist–Leninist–Stalinist dogma and practice, as well as becoming models of knowledge and skill in their chosen profession, regarded as a 'sector' of a battle front, quick to distinguish right from wrong applications of Marxist reasoning and deviations in themselves and others even in the performance of their technical jobs.

". . . Model citizens are supposed to 'leave Father and Mother' and 'follow' Stalin who is portrayed as the model for all.

* The reader interested in further accounts, including methodology used in the study of national culture patterns, is referred to the suggested reading list appearing at the end of this chapter.

"On the level of action this freedom from conflict is supposed to make Soviet people able to show active, tireless energy, ruthless but humane consistency and efficiency, wholehearted commitment, resolution, optimism, perseverance, power to make correct insightful decisions, hence to display qualities of leadership, initiative and improvisation. Their combination of the knowledge of the doctrine and of devotion to the cause would also make them alert to their own and other people's errors and weaknesses, and ready both to inflict and to suffer criticism or punishment in an objective and loyal spirit. To the good Bolshevik there are 'no limits' to what the State or the Party may expect of him by way of expenditure of energy and time, and he has therefore no excuse for failure. 'To the Soviet man all things are possible. . . .' "

Unofficial Orientations

"While the foregoing appears to represent something like a consolidated and universally valid official behavior model, there was found in this study a considerable range of variation in private behavior norms both in the subjects and their description of other Russians. The amount and the intensity of identification with Party goals and values were not easy to ascertain. They are probably higher in the post-war generation, such as in the sons of Party and Government 'high-ups' and in the products of Suvorov Military schools and the like, than among the generation of age 30 and over. Some such were met. It is likely to be least (a) among veterans below senior Cadre officers' rank, who were exposed to prolonged impact of Germany and other 'Western' countries; (b) peasants who recall private ownership of land and the NEP days; (c) certain victims of the regime and their relations. It would appear that this disillusionment cuts across Party/non-Party boundaries. But even among the most disaffected of the sample the attitude was at best ambivalent, by no means wholly hostile or renegade.

"Secondly, the degree of apolitical goal orientation is probably high. Many Russians long for a peaceful, untroubled world and value freedom from pressure by the ceaseless bombardment of propaganda devices, such as enthusiasm drives, appeals, and mass demonstrations. At the same time they value the idea of the greatness, integrity, and development of their country; they would like to see it prosperous, and themselves well-fed and well-supplied with consumer goods. The impression is that they value Soviet military strength and the 'power' of the Government. (In case it be argued that this impression was gathered from a sample in which men of a 'military' type of status predominated, the present or former members of the Armed Forces were with few exceptions conscripts or war-time soldiers, and essentially civilians.)

"As far as can be gathered, the Russian notions of freedom consists of the wish to be 'left in peace,' not being morally or physically coerced into higher tempos of work, into constant contributions to loans, high rates of agricultural delivery to the State, or the showing of enthusiasm to order. Peasants also associate with 'freedom' a positive 'private profit' motive ('to farm in their own way and sell the products freely'). Certain more educated persons yearn for unfettered thoughts and their expression, in

the absence of which they are oriented toward achieving the 'inner emigration,' a secret private life of an apolitical sort, seeking out careers in the areas not invaded by ubiquitous political theory — medicine, certain sorts of technology, and so forth. This sort of freedom seems to them compatible with a socialist economy and something resembling their present constitution. What is resented is not the Communist ideal but the rigid, relentless, bureaucratic machinery of its implementation. Their orientations towards justice, fraternity and equality seem best served by a socialist order minus the 'policing' and pressure, felt to be an indignity because implying lack of trust and respect for their good intentions, intelligence, and maturity. . . .

"No desires for a return of the monarchy, for large scale private enterprise, and so forth, were noted [in the sample interviewed]. The wish for continued freedom from interference by foreigners was prominent. Foreigners must only come to Russia as 'friends and helpers.' Rumors of wars are much resented, and there appears to be no expansionist power-urge in the unofficial avowed goals of Russia."

Deeper Trends

". . . Every now and again we get glimpses of the persistence of old, deep beliefs and aspirations regarding the 'special mission' of the Russian people to supercede the morbid, over-sophisticated civilization of the West; a belief in the superiority of the Russian strength, capacity to endure hardship, cunning and inventiveness, and virtuous contempt for the enfeebling timidity that springs from attachment to physical possessions. Coupled with this there is, nevertheless, also envy of the Westerner for his technology and his standard of life and culture. . . . Another aspect of Russian phantasy, with a quasi-goal oriented flavor, and possibly derived from long centuries of subservience of the masses, is the tendency to favor the tripping up of a powerful person and to gloat over his fall, at least secretly. At other times, one feels, the Russian is himself a sleepy, lazy giant who will wake up one day and just stretch . . . and then there will be fun and 'hell to pay.' "

Comparisons between Official and Unofficial Goals

". . . It is in the sphere of internal and especially political and economic pressure on the individual occasioned by the pursuit of the Party goal, that the chief tensions appear to occur between the official and the private goal orientations of a proportion of Russians. In general, many citizens of the Soviet Union seem to say, 'What do I care about international communism?' The ruthless pursuit of the long-term Party goals and the consequent disregard of individual short-term satisfactions conflict with many domestic and private aims of the Russian. He sees consumer goods and food being shipped to the satellite countries while his people are going 'hungry and naked,' as he puts it. He had looked for a softening and a humanizing of the tempo and temper of the demands made on him by his Government after his heroic acquittal in the Second World War. He saw an earnest of this in the reinstatement during the War of many traditional Russian values: in unashamed love of country; in the relative permissiveness in the spheres of religion and private marketing; in the rehabilitation

of officer status. In these and many other signs he felt a lessening of disapproval by the rulers of the common people who were for once praised, honored with medals, and made to feel that 'their' government loved and trusted them and that its purposes were also theirs. When, however, these relaxations were felt by many people to be but war-time expedients, and when the government was seen to resume its interrupted policy of rapid industrialization, of tightening up labor discipline and Party control, there seem to have been widespread anti-Kremlin sentiments. . . .

"The unofficial goal of a fraternal and egalitarian society with freedom from constant pressure and scarcity was sadly disappointed and once again indefinitely postponed. This disillusionment seems to have been especially acute in those many Soviet citizens who in the course of military duty contacted Western countries at first hand and saw their own official policy had in thirty years produced no living standards comparable to those seen personally in the allegedly starving bankrupt capitalist world. This produced not only doubt in the worth-whileness of Soviet official goal orientation but a concurrent profound distrust of the veracity and good faith of the Soviet rulers. . . ."

RELATION TO AUTHORITY

. . . . .

Official Attitudes to Leaders and Followers

". . . Barrington Moore[4] . . . has shown on published Soviet material what I have also gathered from these interviews: namely, that there is a great deal of swing in the official expectation of leader behavior, between the egalitarian democratic (in the Western sense) pole and pole of authoritarian leadership. On the whole the prescribed behavior of the new *elite* is tending to harden towards the latter. This is what we would expect if it were true that revolutions take their coloring from the regime they displace. Psychologically, the peasants and workers who have so quickly traversed the gamut of social status and find themselves in exalted *elite* roles, have had to find their models on the basis of the remembered behavior of the old-time *'nachal'nik'* (Superior or Boss) or officer. Even the Party intelligentsia has, as Moore also points out, always been ambivalent toward the 'masses.' On the one hand, there was a *vox populi*, essentially Western feeling toward freedom and democratic equality to be achieved; on the other hand, the frequently stressed conviction that only the Communist elite knew the truth and the way and that even the bulk of Soviet aristocrats — namely, the industrial workers — had to be led by centralized, stern control towards their goal.

"My material shows the widening gulf between the *nachal'nik* (some of our subjects had been themselves, or had been close to higher officials of the State) and the subordinates. A Chief in Industry or in the Forces is required to be stern, demanding, and hard driving; always putting the general cause before consideration of the individual. Yet he is also expected to be accessible, ready to inspire and to listen to grievances. The picture painted is much more that of shepherds or stern educators than one of servants of the people who are just doing an administrative job. The most striking feature is the explicit responsibility of the appointed

chief for the misdeeds or failings of his subordinates. Each power-holder is aware that his own chief is in the same position and is therefore watching him for slips or failings, which would rebound on his own head. There is an elaborate system of inspection, verification, and control at all levels.

"Among the failings of a leader which are visited by sanctions is laxity toward discipline. Another expected trait is the preservation of due distance between the chief and his subordinates, all attempts to show favoritism or ingratiating familiarity being severely frowned upon.

"To the successful and unswervingly loyal Party-man who has ambitions, the State offers privileges and status which place him high above his theoretical 'comrades.' But these perquisites of power last only so long as he is acceptable to those still higher, and he may be stripped of all overnight and disappear into the unknown when he has transgressed.

"In brief then, the official image of the Soviet leader is that of a ruthless puritan who has to control all sentimentality, self-importance, and self-indulgence in his task of forcing the pace of development of a new pattern of behavior in a new social structure, and who is responsible for the welfare and doctrinal 'salvation' of his subordinates.

"Turning now to what could be learnt about the official role-expectation of all those whose position require subordination, we need add little to the already mentioned demands of unflagging zeal, energy, and enthusiasm in serving the Soviet fatherland, which increasingly become centered in the prescribed adulation of the all-wise Father and Leader, Stalin, Teacher of all the peoples. The rewarded behavior of a citizen is a blend of cleverness and ambition in technical and educational achievement with a conformist attitude in politics. Official doctrine encourages initiative, but also invites 'criticism' of slackness and vigilance over the doings of one's neighbors. In practice criticism appears now to be permitted to the many only in the very narrowly defined areas at lowest levels and restricted — it would seem increasingly — to certain kinds of individuals, mostly party members. The sham of 'free discussion' at local level has already been mentioned.

"Great stress is laid on the virtues of sobriety, punctuality, and discipline, avoidance of waste, and on cheerfulness. Most of these traits are demanded of party members and aspirants than of the non-Party citizen. The impression of the official aim is the production of a sort of industrious model-boy who must run to the teacher and tell about his companions' misdeeds; the picture of a prig with no personal idiosyncrasies. . . . "

Private Images of Authority

"Remembering again the smallness of our sample, the first thing which strikes one is the great self-contradictoriness of Russians' attitudes to authority. Authority is something one has to submit to absolutely, but also to resist inwardly. To this extent it seems markedly more external to their personality than it is in Western people. . . . Certain exceptions to this will appear below. Anticipating points in later discussion, there seems to be in the Russians a felt need for the strengthening or containment by external agency of an ego felt to be weak and ill-defined, and thus in need of a coercive 'moral corset' without which it would lose its boundaries,

which, nevertheless, it also wants to lose. Authority, besides being seen as something external, is also very distant, and a great gulf is fixed between the self in its role of subordinate, and 'Them.' To a young peasant who had served as a private in the Red Army, even a corporal was such a being from the great, vague world of 'They' who had power to coerce. There was no distinction in his mind between an NCO and any intermediate hierarchical levels up to Stalin himself.

"This brings us to the second point: the absence in Russian thinking about authority of the category of hierarchical classification. There is Stalin at the very top, then an undifferentiated blur of 'authorities' or *nachal'niki* until the face-to-face boss is reached. Though authorities dwell on another plane of existence, they are also felt in an intensely personal way. Their acts which we, as Westerners would probably interpret as 'official' acts 'in line of duty' would carry positive or negative emotional significance to the Russian subordinate in accordance with the tone and manner of the act, and its impact on the person who experienced the act.

"In another sense there is only one authority — Stalin himself, with an entourage whose names are almost less known in Russia than in the West, vaguely called the '*verkhushka*' (top or summit). To this summit everybody else is subject and submissive. Qualities attributed to and expected of Stalin and all authority seem to have remained largely unchanged since before the Revolution. In virtual unanimity the informants talked of Authority as hard, deprivational and arbitrary or capricious — unpredictable. This is how a '*vlast*' ' (authority, power) always behaves. If the *vlast'* were weak nobody would obey it, and governments have always to deprive you — tax you, make demands of goods or services, care nothing about your welfare, arrest you and push you around at their whim. It is part of the admired strength of the *vlast'* to be clever, sly, and scheming in subtle unseen ways — *i.e.*, to be inscrutable to the subordinate. It is all-seeing and knows all about each man. The secret police and the informer system is just an accepted part of this cleverness by which the *vlast'* can suddenly swoop and confront a man with evidence of inside knowledge about his doings which confounds him and while terrifying also makes him marvel at the omnipotence of his authorities. Those who know Russian history will recognize the linear descent of the present secret police system from those of Ivan the Terrible's *Opritchniki* and of the late Tsar's *Okhrana*. Against such an authority, the Russian feels, it is impossible to assert oneself. It exists, it is as it is, there is only outward submission and inner dissociation.

"Despite this apparently negative picture, there is evidence that the feeling of being held under duress is not one which the culture-conditioned Russian experiences as wholly negative.

". . . among the older of our informants, who recalled the early years of the Revolution, there was at least the remnant of the feeling that the new *vlast'* comes from the people. This notion, of course, is officially encouraged by constantly stressing the link between rulers and the people. Though there is little conscious identification with authority, what there is springs from this source. . . . To the younger subjects *vlast'* was just '*They*' — the privileged and powerful.

"Another factor favoring acceptance of an authority, sterner than any that Western people could readily conceive, is that authority-holders at intermediate levels are frequently and publically degraded and punished. This introduces a sort of egalitarian justice, making people feel that there is really only one supreme power which is capable of visiting sanctions on great and small alike, hence that all the people are really helpless children together before that mighty inscrutable power, and none may presume on his privileges or be proud without getting into trouble. The hierarchy of functional authority, already blurred to Russian eyes, loses all meaning when even a highly-placed official can suddenly be struck down. Thus, even Ministers are thought of as essentially only in more exposed positions but otherwise subject to the same compulsion to submit to lesser men, holding their privileges precariously and at the Tyrant's will and pleasure. The pleasurable sense of identification with supreme power is heightened when some incompetent or obnoxious immediate authority figure is punished. . . .

". . . the good qualities looked for and loved in leaders are those of a (Russian) good, strict father. . . . The type of superior or chief who was described as good, invariably had attributed to him the following constellation of traits: He is warm hearted though strict — that is, his human reactions of rage or loving kindness, of punishing and rewarding, must be obvious, straightforward and intelligible to his subordinates. He may storm, shout, abuse you, even strike you. That is understandable, and is therefore forgiven, for it is accepted that a *nachal'nik* has many worries and is expected to be 'nervous' which means irascible, capricious. . . . A rough tongue and the gruff, horatory or appealing tone of an exasperated father are positive qualities in a superior, part of his strength. They are valued far above those of a smooth, over-conciliatory man who does not exert his authority but tries to ingratiate himself. Such a weak leader has no influence, and is derided and despised. But an authority figure is valued highly also if he brings to his job not only a sense of humanity but also a calm, decisive competence and can give clear simple directions.

"Among other positively evaluated qualities in leader figures are fairness and concern. Fairness or justice to the Russian consists in softening the harshness of authority by imposing equal burdens on all and in sharing them with the subordinates; *i.e.*, the absence of favoritism and of feathering one's own nest. Concern or compassion consists of respect for subordinates, shown by recognizing the limits of deprivation to be imposed on them, by some degree of personal interest, and by being able, without surrendering authority, to come down to the human level 'off duty' and providing an informal relaxation of severity, such as sharing a drink, helping with a personal problem. A superior is further valued if he shows trust in his underlings and gives them some degree of autonomy in 'getting on with the job.'

"These, it will be said, are universal, rather than Russian, valuations applicable to leaders everywhere. They have been dwelt on here partly to report faithfully how close in some respects Russian expectations are to our own, but partly to point out that these are not qualities encouraged or often encountered in present practice in the Soviet world. The experience, to men in my sample, of this type of good authority was pathetically like a gleam of sunlight in a leaden sky and for this reason cherished. . . .

"A bad authority figure . . . is one who not only lacks the above-mentioned 'good' characteristics but who shows certain other traits. These may be listed as dryness, bureaucracy, and arrogance; all interrelated. Russians are accustomed to hardship and a low standard of life. They feel resentment most when their frugal life is administered in an impersonal, unconcerned, wooden bureaucratic spirit, to them the opposite of paternalism or brotherly equality of sacrifice. Thus the distant, 'correct' official person is felt to be inhuman, because he *hides* his feeling, and is presumed to have none for the little man whom he has at his mercy. He is dangerous because incalculable. 'Dryness' (sukhoi narod) — a quality also attributed to Western people, like the Germans and the British — has the same connotation of absence of emotional warmth, a sort of 'unnatural' control over one's feelings.

"It may be mentioned in passing that much of this fear and distrust of bureaucratic 'dryness' may be due to the rapidity of social change. The gap between the friendly informal authority structure of the village and the complex organization of an industrial society with its demands for routine administrative role-playing seems to the overwhelming majority of Russians both enormous and alien. Business-like dispatch already carries this 'inhuman' quality for them. . . ."

The Actuality of Authority-Relations

". . . all of our informants were agreed that the type of person most frequently encountered in positions of authority in State and Party was the kind who was trying to measure up to the role model of the official norm. To translate his profile into our terms, he would in behavior approximate to a Western ambitious technocrat or compulsive 'managerial personality.' Such a person the Russians unofficially dub a careerist (*vydvizhenets*), sometimes also ironically a 'patriot.' He has, in addition to the familiar compulsive drive and need to dominate and 'organize,' a sense of militant righteousness and arrogant doctrinaire censoriousness of other people's views and behavior, while prying into all their affairs and motivations in part of his official duties as an 'educator' and leader. The less objected-to variety of this personality-type is felt to be just, as severe and demanding towards himself as to others, earnest and sincere like a puritan, and usually competent and hard-working. If he is in addition concerned for the common people, really attempts to remedy abuses and to redress genuine grievances, he may be respected as a worthy leader, though feared. . . . The more objectionable type of this new sort of Communist leader, according to our informants, is a man solely concerned with his advancement. His personality impact on his subordinates approaches very closely to that of the former Nazi '*Parteibonze*' (Party big-wig), who, because he is essentially self-oriented and hence insecure, has to over-protest his conformity, is strident and ultrajingoistic in his utterances of Party slogans always reflecting today's *Pravda;* praises the Great Leader with every breath; seeks the favor of his superiors by feverish driving and harassing of his subordinates. He is distant, arrogant, a collector of merit awards,

highly preoccupied with his status and demanding a great show of deference. This is the type of *elite* personality which was stated to be on the ascendant. . . .

"The good sort of Bolshevik, it was stated, behaved in public not unlike the official pattern: severe, demanding, on the lookout for dangerous thoughts or slackness. Yet he was felt to be kindly underneath, precisely of that gruff paternal stuff so admired and responded to by Russians. . . . It was one of the quarrels with the USSR of many of the interviewed subjects that this fine type of Bolshevik 'of the good old stuff,' stern but sterling, close to his people and knowing their minds, was fast being superseded by the cold, careerist zealot, promoted for his mastery of dialectic from the academies of Communism, a 'fine gentleman' who only aped ritually what was once felt to be genuine revolutionary inspiration. Naturally, those among the informants who had held posts of some authority, identified themselves with the 'old Bolshevik' point of view and disliked the young 'aristocrats' now taking over. . . .

"Apart from cases of failure [political or production] with its serious consequences, there seem to be two ways in which the Soviet administrator, in common with many fellow citizens, tries to cope with intolerable demands. The first is ceaseless, compulsive, painstaking toil, entailing the sacrifice of all leisure and private life. Such behavior is, in any case, highly regarded. The top leaders are stated to be at work 'day and night,' so lesser men hope to show themselves worthy by copying them.

"The other way is more in line with the culture-pattern. It consists in giving the appearance of just that concentrated toil, with much sound and fury, but behind it there is a reinsurance by a system of unofficial, friendly relations called '*blat*.' We are told this is not graft or nepotism. It is in part the 'old boy' system plus the offer of favors, with an occasional hint of mutual agreement not to disclose disagreeable things about each other to interested official parties. Drinking companionship seals this 'old boy' relationship, which may be based on territorial ties (*Zemlyak*), personal liking, or old friendship of the 'he was in my battery at Stalingrad' sort. This may be the reason why political officers (the former commissars) and security officers are expected to keep distance, mix chiefly among themselves . . . tend to be recruited from among puritan prigs and political zealots. The graft aspect of *blat* varies from mutually favorable barter of industrial components, and so forth, between factory directors, to 'tokens of respect and tasty something' for the *nachal'nik's* lady, presented on the occasion of a name-day celebration. . . . This network, coupled with the kind of paternalism already described, and always used with caution by the circumspect, would seem to grease the wheels and make tolerable a social system which, it appears, even the Russians find hard to bear. . . .

". . . many officials welcome the elaborate hierarchy of inspections. Provided they can get cleared by these many visiting commissions, they feel safer if they have a 'document' to show their virtue, and have passed the onus to someone higher, at least for a time.

"It seems to be possible for the intelligent man to 'get by' with verbal conformity and official certification of his 'unobjectionableness.' . . ."

CONTROLS AND TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM*

Known and suspected tensions produced by the totalitarian communistic system of control are so significant as to render Soviet subjects extremely vulnerable to carefully worded appeals.

Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin requested in 1951 from the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress a study of the tensions within the Soviet Union. The result of his request was a report prepared by Dr. Sergius Yakobson, senior specialist in international relations, who disclosed certain facts that counteract the Soviet propaganda claim that everyone within Russia is "loyal and fearless . . . ready to support the regime through thick and thin."

It was Senator Wiley's purpose to make available to the American public such information that would reveal Soviet realities within areas of tension — the lack of enthusiasm of the Soviet youth for the present regime, the conflict between the government and free-thinking scholars, the subservience of the press, the persecution of various religious groups, the discrimination of minorities within industry, education, local administration groups, and the Politburo, and the exploitation of the worker. There were many other signs of discord pointed out in the report, but the important question was: how would we, as potential allies of the oppressed Russian masses, communicate with them and make them aware of our method of living? If we peace-loving anti-Communist Americans could penetrate into the Russian mind, probe into the aspirations of the people, and find and offer solutions to them "in the language of . . . their grievances," it might be possible to widen the cleavage that exists between Stalin's government and the people of Russia.

Merle Fainsod,* of Harvard University, outlines the results of a carefully conducted interview of a small segment of the new Soviet emigration. This new Soviet emigration

> ". . . consists of about a quarter of a million former Soviet citizens who are now chiefly concentrated in western Germany and Austria, but who are beginning to scatter all over the non-Soviet world — the United States, Canada, Australia, North Africa, South America, etc. They include in their number representatives of every stratum of Soviet society — except the top ruling group. The great bulk of these 'living witnesses' consists of former Soviet citizens who refused to return to their homeland at the end of the War. Some are more recent defectors from the Soviet Occupation Armies and Military Governments in Germany and Austria. They have been arriving, and are still arriving, in the western zones in not inconsiderable number. They provide a living reservoir of fresh data on the Soviet Union and its problems for which there is no parallel in the world today."

Fainsod directed his questions at approximately 100 former Soviet citizens who were then living in western Germany and Austria, from which 64 fairly extensive life histories were obtained. This group of *émigrés* could not be described as a

* The quoted parts of this study are reproduced from "Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System," *American Political Science Review*, 44:266–82 (1950), with the permission of the American Political Science Association, copyright holder, and Dr. Merle Fainsod, the author.

TABLE 1

FORMER SOVIET CITIZENS INTERVIEWED[a]

Information Category	Persons
Nationality	
Great Russian	51
Ukrainian	7
Don Cossack	3
White Russian	1
Kalmyk Republic	1
Daghestan	1
Political background	
Non-Party intelligentsia	32
Acknowledged former Party members	6
Army officers	2
Engineer	1
High-level bureaucrat	1
Former NKVD employees	2
Former members of Komsomol	11
Arrests and penalties	
Served prison or forced labor terms	24
Had close relatives arrested	18
Had trouble and lost job or status	17
Had escaped arrest or disciplinary penalty	15
Family background	
Did not supply family information	3
Worker parentage	2
Worker-peasant background	2
Peasant families	16
Land-owner families	6
Professional intelligentsia	4
Scientific-technical intelligentsia	10
Civil servant and salaried manager background	6
Czarist officer families	8
Merchant and industrialist family	5
Orthodox priest parentage	2

Information Category	Persons
Military records	
Some form of military service	34
Privates	14
Noncommissioned officers	2
Army doctor	1
Lieutenants	7
Captains	3
Lieutenant colonels	3
Colonels	4
Occupations	
Factory workers	7
Office workers	4
Collective farmers	6
Collective-farm office worker	1
Skilled worker of a motor-tractor station	1
Advanced graduate students	2
School teachers	5
University professor	1
Engineers	10
Economist planners	3
Scientists	3
Doctors	2
Lawyer	1
Actors and directors in entertainment field	4
Journalist	1
Low-level government administrator	1
High-level government administrators	2
Cadre (professional) officers	7
Former NKVD officers	2
Forced laborer	1

[a] The median age of the 59 men and 5 women whose interviews were completed was between 41 and 42; 50 of them were under 50 years of age: 38 had some form of higher education in a technical institute or university.

cross section of the population of the USSR, but it did provide Fainsod an insight into a part of the one remaining "relatively untapped source" from which material could be drawn concerning behind-the-Iron-Curtain activities. Possibly Senator Wiley had this type of interview in mind when he said: "it is imperative for us to get better acquainted with the everyday life and mental climate of the Soviet Union . . ." and "to learn more about the social composition of the Soviet society."

Fainsod did not use a formal schedule of questions during the interrogations. Each interview lasted the length of time it took a person to tell his life story — some required only an hour, others up to 2 days. All information was cross-checked with official sources and the testimony of other informants, and, on the whole, the material obtained was considered to be reliable in fact. Table 1 relates the findings of Fainsod in connection with the social stratification of the 64 out of 100 persons whose life stories were complete.

> "In conducting the interviews, answers were sought to three basic questions: (1) What were the motivations which inspired the Soviet non-returners not to return and the defectors from the Soviet Army and Military Government to flee? What factors deterred efforts to escape? (2) What were the sources of tension and dissatisfaction in the Soviet system and how were these distributed in different groups in Soviet society? (3) What was the basic pattern of controls in the Soviet system? . . ."

I. Motivations of Non-Returners and Defectors — Factors Deterring Escape

> "A discriminating analysis of the motivations which led the new Soviet emigration to sever its ties with the Soviet Union must differentiate the non-returners (those who left the Soviet Union during the War) from the defectors who have been escaping since.
>
> "To put the problem of the non-returners in some perspective, it needs to be remembered that the great majority of the approximately five million Soviet citizens who found themselves in Germany and Austria at the end of the War returned home. How many returned voluntarily and how many under compulsion are questions which cannot be satisfactorily answered on the basis of the evidence now available. . . . It is . . . clear [however] that many returned unwillingly despite Soviet statements designed to reassure them about the future. . . .
>
> "The non-returners who managed to escape repatriation were a heterogeneous group. Some were ex-Soviet prisoners-of-war; some were former *Ostarbeiter*, Soviet citizens who were sent to Germany on forced labor; some were collaborators who had worked with the Nazis in military government or in other capacities; still others were Soviet citizens living in areas occupied by the Germans, who retreated with the Germans in order to escape from Soviet rule.
>
> "The motives which inspired their decision not to return varied. Some obviously had a first priority position on Soviet lists of proscribed persons. . . . For this group, return to the Soviet Union was a form of quick suicide. For others, the motivations were equally direct. Many had been victims of repression in the Soviet Union and had served terms in forced labor camps or Soviet prisons. Still others had families and relatives who had been imprisoned or killed by the Soviet authorities. They were filled with hatred of the Soviet regime. For them, the German invasion was the

equivalent of a jail break. There were also many among the non-returners who belonged to or were descended from social groups which had been persecuted by the Soviet authorities — gentry, merchants, priests, White Guard or Czarist officers, and kulaks. Some, even though not arrested, had suffered various indignities or disciplinary measures in the Soviet Union, had lost jobs or status or had been denied opportunities to advance as the result of what they regarded as arbitrary action by the regime. . . . There were also many ordinary workers and peasants among the non-returners who had not been victims of repression in the Soviet Union, but who still preferred not to return. As *Ostarbeiter* or prisoners-of-war they had had a view of the West, and they wanted to enjoy bourgeois comforts in preference to Soviet-planned austerity. . . . Uncertainty about the fate which might await them on their return to the Soviet Union and the lure of western luxuries combined to produce the decision not to return.

"The motivations of recent defectors have perhaps greater current and continuing significance. Ten case studies of escape since 1945 may serve to throw some light on the reasons for flight.

"Number 1 was a 25 year old private of peasant background with no history of repression in the family. He had been an *Ostarbeiter* in Germany between 1942 and 1945 and was inducted into the Red Army in 1945. He served as a private until 1948. Why did he flee? First, he reported that he was impressed by the contrast in living conditions between the Soviet Union and the West. He had had a taste of the West and liked it. Second, he said that the MGB (secret police) had kept him in confinement for two days until he agreed to spy on his army comrades. He found this distasteful and decided to try to escape from the MGB clutches. Third, one of his friends managed to escape, and this gave him the courage to make a similar attempt. . . .

"Number 5 was a 36 year old former lieutenant-colonel in the army who left in 1945. His father had been a carpenter. There was no history of family repression. Number 5 was brought up as a loyal Soviet citizen. He joined the Komsomol and was a party member. He became an engineer and later a journalist. He served with the Red Army from 1941 to 1945 and was promoted from junior officer to lieutenant-colonel. He fled in the confusion of the VE Day celebration in 1945. He reported that he had become disillusioned with Communism in the course of his work as an engineer, that many of his friends and associates had been arrested during the 1936–1938 purge (the *Yezhovschina*), and that, although he was passed over, he lived in constant fear that he too would be apprehended. The dominating reason for his flight, he reported, was his desire to be free of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which surrounded him in the Soviet Union. . . .

"Number 7 was a 34 year old lieutenant-colonel on occupation duty in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. His father had been a Czarist officer. Number 7 was arrested during the *Yezhovschina* as a Polish spy because his father had Polish connections. He was sentenced to ten years of forced labor, but escaped during the War, hid out, and finally, with the help of false papers which concealed his identity, obtained a job

as an electro-technician. He was sent to Germany in 1945 to work on a reparations assignment and escaped in 1947. He reported that he lived in constant fear that the MGB would discover his true identity. He would have fled earlier but was not sure until 1947 that the Americans would give him a friendly reception.

"Number 8 was a 33 year old captain, a former employee of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. He escaped in early 1949. His father had been a small tradesman who was arrested at the end of the NEP and sentenced to ten years of forced labor. Number 8 had lived with false papers which concealed this fact. He was not personally repressed until early in the War when his unit was cut off by the Germans. On his return, he was treated as a potential spy, beaten and jailed for 30 days. After prolonged interrogations, he was finally released. He explained his determination to flee as due to his family background, his false papers, his experience when he was arrested early in the War, and the fact that he fell in love with a German girl. He did not want to leave her and they escaped together. . . .

"Number 10 was a 41 year old former cadre officer, a captain who was on temporary duty with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. He fled in 1948, also leaving a wife and two children behind. He was terribly worried about them. He said that the decision to escape was a painfully hard one for him because of his family. He had no personal material reason for fleeing. He lived reasonably well. But he always felt that he was living in a prison. Every movement had to be accounted for, every gesture watched, every intonation controlled. Life had become so unendurably disciplined that he decided that he had to break away. He preferred to take his chances as an ordinary laborer in Germany.

"He described his life as without incentive and without perspective. He recalled the year 1937 when many of his comrades were arrested and shot in the wake of the Tukhachevsky affair. He himself lived with the constant fear of arrest and sat night after night waiting for the knock on the door. Most of his comrades were arrested without reason, and he feared that he too would be taken on the same basis. He was not arrested, but he felt no sense of stability or security in the Soviet Union. One might have an important job today and be in a forced labor camp tomorrow. He decided that he simply had to try to escape while there was still an opportunity.

"These ten cases constitute a tiny fraction of a much larger number of recent escapes. But even this small sample suggests the range of motivation which inspires flight: the superior material attractions of the West, the grimness of life in the Soviet Union, and the desire to escape the discipline, the regimentation, and the oppressive atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and secret police. . . .

"If the reports of the defectors are to be believed, they represent a small segment of a much larger disaffected group in the Soviet Army of Occupation and Military Administration. They claim that disaffection reaches back quite deeply into the Soviet population itself. They also assert that

a substantial percentage of those who make the break for freedom are caught before they reach safety.

"Recent escapees report that there has been a tremendous tightening in the Soviet control machinery since 1947. . . . The Soviet Occupation Army leads what amounts to a concentration camp existence. When soldiers are not on duty, they are confined to barracks and clubs. Absence without leave is subject to the most severe penalties. Arms are issued only when essential for assigned duty. At the first sign of disaffection, the soldier is arrested and sent home. New recruits are a carefully screened and thoroughly propagandized group. They are not ordinarily sent on occupation duty if there is a record of repression in the family or any indication of anti-Soviet attitudes. Screening obviously does not work perfectly (witness the continuing escapes), but it is much more careful than earlier.

"Another powerful factor in discouraging defection is the fear of retribution against family and relatives. The hostage system presently in vogue in the Soviet Union operates with considerable effectiveness to prevent many who contemplate escape from making the attempt."

II. Tensions and Dissatisfactions in the Soviet System

"The new Soviet emigration provides a particularly rich source for an analysis of the elements of tension and dissatisfaction in the Soviet system. The size and diversity of the emigration open up possibilities for a careful analysis of the grievances of particular groups — peasants, factory workers, members of the armed forces, bureaucrats, intellectuals and scientists, nationality groups, youth, and party members. What is offered here is a preliminary effort at such an analysis based on a very small sample. It does not purport to present generalizations valid for the whole of Soviet society. It is a record of how some former Soviet citizens in diverse walks of life reacted to and appraised their environment.

"In summarizing the reports of peasants or collective farmers, the complaints of former kulaks whose property was expropriated and who were consigned to forced labor will be passed over. Their bitter enmity to the regime can be taken for granted. More significant were the reactions of the collective farmers who were not kulaks. There seemed to be general agreement among the former kolkhozniks that the kolkhoz was a device by which the regime exploited the peasants for its own interests. They said that the party made fine promises of how much better life would be after collectivization, but that the promises were not kept. The kolkhozes, they asserted, were run chiefly by outsiders, chairmen sent in from the *raikom*, or district committee of the party. The party members on the kolkhoz monopolized the best administrative jobs; they credited themselves with work days to which they were not entitled; and they had first call on all new supplies arriving in the village stores. The former kolkhozniks complained that organization of work in the kolkhoz broke up family life, that husband and wife rarely had the same free days. They were loud in the denunciations of the NKVD or MGB informers who made it impossible for anyone to speak his mind. Since the end of the War, the complaints centered on the slowness of reconstruction — the shortage of

tractors and draft animals. Except for a few returned war invalids, the villages have been emptied of manpower in the prime of life. Women have to do the heavy work. There are many illegitimate children because of the shortage of males. Life is grim and hard.

"The workers interviewed complained generally of inadequate pay, food shortages, and bad housing conditions. There was grumbling about the number of compulsory deductions from pay — the obligatory state loans, trade union dues, the special subscriptions to this organization or that. There was resentment expressed against the inflation of administrative staffs in the factories, the supernumeraries who held down soft office jobs. Complaints were reiterated about the Stakhanovite movement. It was described as a form of speed-up, a device for raising norms and extracting extra work for the same pay. Workers, it was said, had no real freedom to express their grievances. MGB informers were everywhere. The trade unions, which should have expressed the interests of the workers, were the creatures of the party and the factory managements. They did not help the worker to improve his position. There were complaints about discipline and the excessively severe penalties for tardiness and absence from work. Those interviewed asserted that they were practically chained to their job. It was almost impossible to shift or transfer.

"Among the ordinary rank and file soldiers, the chief grievances focused on poor food, and (in the case of the occupation army) on the enforced isolation from the local population, on stringent discipline, and on the special privileges of the officer group. With the officers, complaints took a different turn. Among the cadre, or professional officers (particularly the non-party ones), there were repeated expressions of resentment against the encroachment of the *Zampolit*, or Assistant Commander for Political Affairs (the former political commissar), on command responsibilities. The officers complained that they . . . were not trusted, and that they had to function in a milieu of constant insecurity and fear.

"Insecurity and fear were also the chief grievances of the bureaucrats. They asserted that they dared not exercise any initiative; the penalties of failure were too drastic. Like the army officers, they felt themselves under constant surveillance, and even more than the army officers, they reflected a feeling that the privileges of today might evaporate into the deprivations of a forced labor camp tomorrow.

"The same sense of insecurity and fear was also strongly expressed by the intellectuals and scientists. It was less strongly marked among the doctors and engineers than among the school teachers, college professors, journalists, and those engaged in artistic and cultural pursuits. But in greater or lesser degree, it was present everywhere. One of the younger scientists spoke with great poignancy about what he called the 'inner migration' among the young intellectuals — the effort to transfer one's activity from more politically dangerous to less politically dangerous fields. He himself had abandoned literary interests for microbiology. But, as he ruefully observed, with the Lysenko controversy, even microbiology became politically infected. There was no escape from the long arm of totalitarian ideological control. It is with the intellectuals especially that one senses the tensions generated by enforced conformity and the stifling of the desire for self-expression.

"The nationality representatives interviewed displayed an interesting ambivalence in their attitude toward the Soviet Union. On the positive side, they pointed to very real achievements in the direction of racial equality and increased educational opportunities. To that extent they gave support to those students of the Soviet system who contend that the Soviet nationality policy constitutes one of the great strengths of the regime. But they also emphasized a darker side of Soviet nationality policy which has been less frequently commented on abroad. One of the most serious points of tension in Soviet nationality policy involves the position of the new Soviet-trained native intelligentsia. Once they have been educated for administrative and other responsibilities, they aspire to real as well as formal authority, and they become increasingly restive under the rigid external control to which they are exposed from Moscow. When they express their restiveness, they are charged with nationalist or bourgeois deviations, removed from office, and subject to the most drastic punishment. The decimation of the native intelligentsia in the Great Purge of 1936–1938 was explained by some of the interviewees in these terms. This phenomenon of internal Titoism has been little noted, yet it would appear to be of considerable significance, and it constitutes an interesting counterpart to the problems encountered by western colonial powers dealing with the native intelligentsia in their colonies.

"Testimony as to tensions among Soviet youth was particularly challenging. There is a widespread assumption in the non-Soviet world that, since the Soviet regime controls all the instruments of indoctrination which shape the minds of youth, its hold on their loyalty is practically complete. Conversations with young ex-Soviet citizens, school teachers, and others who have had extensive contact with young people in Russia cast some doubt on that assumption. One school teacher who had taught for nearly 25 years in Soviet schools said that the attraction of Communist ideology for Soviet youth is greatly exaggerated in the West. She pointed out that there was a great difference between a revolutionary ideology which appealed to youth's idealistic and utopian instincts, and an official ideology which insisted on conformity. Communism in its present state had become such an official ideology. It was dinned into the children day after day. But, she asserted, a number, instead of becoming imbued with it, became bored with it, and turned with relief and enjoyment toward literary, cultural, sport, and technical interests where they could find some relief. Another very intelligent escapee, himself a former Komsomol who had worked professionally with youth groups for many years, insisted that it would be a mistake to assume that all Soviet children came off the Pioneer and Komsomol assembly lines as unthinking and unquestioning tools of the regime. He added that even very young children began to pose embarrassing questions which raised doubts about the official propaganda. Crowded conditions at home, food shortages, low living standards, the arrests of friends and relatives, the difficulty of obtaining a higher education when no stipends were available, compulsory labor service — these and other elements of life in the Soviet Union planted doubts which this informant said proved embarrassingly difficult to handle when youngsters in their early teens came to him to discuss their problems.

"This informant also pointed out that it was important to distinguish between the attitudes of two different generations of Soviet youth: (1) those who came of age in the period of the first Five Year Plan and collectivization, and (2) those who came of age in the middle and late thirties. In the first group, he stated, the imagination of many was caught by the grandiose sweep of the Five Year Plan and the Agricultural Revolution. The Komsomols of that generation started with a vision of a vast constructive effort, and genuine idealistic motivation could not be discounted. The youth crusade to build Komsomolsk was an example of their fervor. But the fervor abated. The agony of collectivization lost the support of many rural young people whose families suffered and starved in the famine of 1932–1933. The drop in the standard of living was strongly felt in industrial centers, and many young workers dropped by the wayside. The purges of the thirties deeply affected the Komsomol organization itself, and the enforced conformity which came afterwards alienated many of the more independent-minded young. To be sure, many of them made their careers on the heels of industrialization, collectivization, and the purges, but much of the initial enthusiasm and ideological momentum was lost in the process.

"The new generation which came of age in the mid- and late thirties, according to this informant, never really captured the crusading spirit and idealistic vision of the earlier group. . . . They were disciplined to repeat the fashionable party slogans of the moment, but they repeated them as gestures of conformity rather than out of any inner conviction. The more independent-minded of them resented the regimentation, but they had no opportunity to make their resentment effective. The less well-situated rebelled against the growing evidences of inequality in the Soviet Union, but they too were in no position to register any effective protest. Their low state of morale was revealed by the mass surrenders to the Nazis in the early days of the War. It was only when the Nazis resorted to mass slaughter of prisoners and other atrocities that patriotic fervor was aroused and resistance stiffened. Even so, this informant claimed, the bulk of Soviet youth fought for their country and against Hitler — and not out of any deep loyalty or devotion to Communism as such.

"The interviews verified the common assumption that the party organization is one of the strongholds of the regime. But, within the party, distinctions must be made between the Party *Apparat*, or apparatus — the full-time party functionaries and leadership group who constitute the inner core of the party — and the party rank and file whose regular major occupations are elsewhere. The Party *Apparat*, of course, is peculiarly bound up with and dependent upon the regime; in a sense, it is the regime. It too has its anxieties and worries, not the least of which is the fear that one may be toppled from the heights to the depths with dizzying swiftness. This came out strikingly in an interview with a functionary in a high party school which was attended by regional party secretaries and other party officials of similar rank. This informant remarked that the party secretaries who had been ordered to the school were perpetually worried about what was happening back home in their regions; they were afraid that their authority would be undermined in their absence. They spent much

of their spare time telephoning back and forth to their offices to keep a firm hand on local developments.

"So far as the party rank and file were concerned, there seemed to be general agreement among those interviewed that many joined the party, not out of deep inner conviction, but primarily for careerist reasons — because party membership opened the door to a job which they coveted, because it accelerated the rate of promotion, and because it was the gateway to the perquisites of privilege and high position. But even these careerist Communists had their problems. They found themselves surrounded by the same aura of fear and insecurity which enveloped the non-party intelligentsia. Enlarged responsibilities brought privileges and perquisites — but they also brought burdens and hazards with swift retribution for the first misstep. The interviews with former party members emphasized that the tensions generated by these hazards were a gnawing maggot from which there was no escape.

"What conclusions can be drawn from the materials gathered in these interviews? If accepted as an index of conditions generally prevalent in the Soviet Union, they seem to give a picture of the Soviet people as a seething mass of anxieties, frustrations, and discontent. But before concluding that this is an accurate portrait of Soviet society in all its diversity, it is important to strike a note of caution and to re-emphasize that the people interviewed constituted a relatively small and select group. While a wide diversity of occupational interests was represented among them, on the whole they were a group who suffered particularly severely under the Soviet regime, and their testimony could be expected to emphasize all the darker sides of Soviet life. This does not mean, however, that their evidence is only of marginal significance for an understanding of Soviet realities. While their testimony did not emphasize and probably did not do justice to such positive sources of support as the Communist regime may still have among the Soviet populace, it did point to the existence of considerable dissatisfactions, frustrations, and tensions which extend through important strata of Soviet society.

"At the same time, it is important to emphasize that most of the persons interviewed discounted the possibility or probability of any organized or spontaneous effort to unseat the Communist regime in the near future. There seemed to be general agreement among them that the power of the secret police was too all-pervasive, and that the opportunity for an effective organization of a revolutionary movement inside the Soviet Union at the present time was *de minimis*. Nor did most of them think that the death of Stalin would make any substantial difference. They were prepared to concede the possibility of a bitter intra-party struggle for the succession, but they did not think that that struggle would go deep enough to open the way to a revolutionary movement which would dislodge the Communist regime itself."

III. The Pattern of Controls

"Given the existence of considerable disaffection, what is it that holds the system together? What is the pattern of controls by which the regime maintains its power?

"The Soviet regime, like other dictatorships before it, exists in a state of permanent crisis and emergency. Circumstances as well as doctrine have contributed to perpetuate this sense of crisis over the whole life of the regime, and, given the continuation of present trends, they promise to project it into the indefinite future. Within this framework of crisis, the regime naturally seeks to stabilize its own position. In doing so, it relies both on repression and indoctrination. It uses force and intimidation to deal with its opponents; it installs its supporters in key positions of control; and it depends on indoctrination to widen its basis of mass support.

"In its first phase of development, while its control mechanisms still remained to be developed and consolidated, the Communist regime drew heavily on the utopian aspects of its ideology to broaden its mass appeal. It presented the less attractive features of the dictatorship of the proletariat as transitory phenomena; it emphasized mass welfare objectives and egalitarian and leveling notions as the basis of the organization of Soviet society; it stressed mass participation and intra-party democracy in appealing for popular support. It even sought to placate peasant hostility by the turn to the NEP. There is little doubt that it won considerable popular support in the process.

"As the regime turned in its search for stability toward building up its power through an intense program of heavy industry expansion and the collectivization of agriculture, the utopian aspects of Communist ideology were subjected to severe strain. Mass welfare objectives had to be subordinated to the demands of a program of heavy capital investment. The unrest which developed had to be chastened and disciplined and diverted away from the regime. The disciplinary process reflected itself in a growth in the repressive machinery of the regime — the NKVD, the purges, and the forced labor camps, in the emergence of the monolithic party, the liquidation of the opposition, the apotheosis of Stalin, and the concentration of authority in the hands of the leader and his henchmen. The diversionary operation involved finding both domestic and external scapegoats upon which the masses could be induced to pour out their anger for the sacrifices which they were being required to endure. At the same time, every effort was made to assure the masses that their sacrifices were temporary, that they would eventually reap a rich reward in a greatly improved standard of living. But the better life to come — too long delayed — invited disillusionment. Ideological slogans offered as substitutes wore thin with reiteration.

"One of the strongest impressions derived from the interviews is of a decline in the ideological *élan* of Communism inside the Soviet Union — a growth in rank and file apathy and indifference, and a loss of faith in Communist professions as such. This appears to be even partly true of the party itself. Within the party, the proportion of time servers and careerists is larger than before; the zealous devotees are less in evidence.

"The testimony of the non-returners and defectors suggests that the heroic age of Soviet Communism is over, that long-postponed economic improvements have eroded belief, that a series of events such as forced collectivization, the Great Hunger of 1932–1933, the Purge of 1936–1938, and the continuing austerities of the postwar period have left a trail of disillusionment behind them.

"This does not mean that the regime is without ideological resources. Nationalism is still a powerful cementing factor. To the extent that the regime leans on it, as it did during the War, it evokes its strongest support. The vigorous attempts since the end of the War to identify Communism with nationalism through the new hybrid of Soviet patriotism demonstrate a realization on the part of the regime of the continuing importance of the nationalist appeal, even though strenuous attempts have been made to give it a Soviet content.

"The tremendous revival of indoctrination since the end of the War represents an effort to neutralize and overcome apathy and to stir up positive belief. But the effectiveness of the effort is open to serious question. The young recent escapees from the Red Army were unanimously of the view, for example, that the anti-American propaganda campaign was encountering great resistance among the veteran rank and file of the occupation army. This, however, was less true of the fresh recruits who had just begun their exposure to the West.

"The weakness of the ideological appeal of Communism within the Soviet Union and the tensions and dissatisfactions generated by Soviet realities make it all the more necessary for the regime to turn for its basic supports and controls in non-ideological directions. This effort takes three main forms:

"(1) The regime leans heavily on the support of what might be called the administrative and managerial élite — those who occupy the key managerial and administrative positions — the higher level bureaucrats, the plant directors, managers, engineers, and technicians, the collective farm chairmen, and the worker aristocracy of foremen, brigadiers, and Stakhanovite workers. In order to consolidate the support of these groups, who play key roles in the administrative structure, the party seeks to incorporate them in its hierarchical structure of privileges and rewards. It treats them as a privileged category and pays them well. It seeks to draw them into the party itself and to identify them actively with the party leadership.

"(2) A second basic institutional support of the regime is, of course, the party organization itself, and, more especially, the hard inner core of the party — the *Apparat*, or party functionaries for whom party work is a full-time job. The party operates as an instrument of indoctrination, of leadership, and of control.

"(3) The third support of the regime is its repressive element, the Secret Police — the MGB and its supporting formations in the MVD, whose authority extends into every corner of Soviet society and for whom terror itself becomes a system of power.

"It is through these three main channels of authority — the administrative-technical, the party, and the secret police — that the regime has worked out its basic pattern of control. The operation of this system of control can best be illustrated by taking three examples: (1) a collective farm, (2) a factory, and (3) the armed forces.

"Each collective farm has its chairman (almost always a party member). Formally, he is elected by the members of the kolkhoz. In fact, the kolkhoz merely approves a designee who has been selected in advance by

the *raikom*, or district committee of the party. In most cases, this designee is not even a member of the kolkhoz, but is sent in by the *raikom* from some other area as its agent. The actual administration of the kolkhoz is in the hands of the chairman, his deputy or deputies, the brigadiers, who lead the work in the field, and the office staff of bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, etc. It is this group that usually constitutes the core of the party and Komsomol organization in the kolkhoz and through which the party projects its control over the kolkhoz. In every *rayon*, or district, there is also an office of the MGB with its own independent lines of authority. It is the job of this office to direct a network of spies, or informers, who penetrate every kolkhoz in the area. Through the reports and denunciations of these informers, the MGB office keeps informed about disaffection in the kolkhoz and takes the necessary action to stamp it out.

"The pattern of control in the factory is, in its essential lines, not very different. In administrative-technical charge of the factory there is a director, now invariably a party man, and usually technically trained for his job. He operates in the ministerial or administrative chain of command, though, if the factory is important, his appointment must be approved not only by the Cadres Section of his ministry, but also by the Cadres Section of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party. The party organization in the factory is presided over by a secretary. If the factory is of any size, the secretary is a full-time official ordinarily designated either by the *raikom* or district committee, or the *obkom*, or regional committee of the party. The job of the party secretary is not only to direct propaganda and educational work in the factory, but to detect deficiencies in its work, to report on them through his separate channel of command, and to help to correct them. Each factory of any size also has its so-called Special Section, a branch of the MGB, again with its own independent channel of command. The MGB Special Section controls both party and non-party personnel in the factory; it maintains a dossier on every employee, and has its network of informers scattered through the factory. Its major task is to discover and root out disaffection wherever it finds it.

"Control in the armed forces conforms to the same basic pattern, although there are differences of detail. Corresponding to the administrative-technical line of control is the regular military command, with the usual hierarchy of officers found in all armies. The higher one ascends in the officer bureaucracy, the greater the percentage of party membership. The party has a particularly strong representation in the officer cadres in the newer services such as aviation and tanks.

"In the armed forces, it is necessary to distinguish between the work of the party organizers who concentrate on party personnel and the organization of political work in the broader sense of including both party and non-party personnel. Each small unit of the army has its party and Komsomol organizations, each one led by a *partorg* or *Komsorg* (party or Komsomol organizer or secretary). Up to the regiment, the *partorg* or party secretary is not a full-time official. He performs his party duties in addition to his regular military duties. In the regiment and higher, the party secretary has a full-time job. He is part of the party apparatus and assigned to his duties by higher party authorities. He directs the work of the party

organization in his unit, has responsibility for party education, for party meetings, for executing the party lines in the army, and for enforcing party discipline in his political unit.

"The political education of the armed forces as a whole (non-party as well as party) is the responsibility of the Political Administration — so-called — which has its special representatives in every unit down to and through the battalion. This representative is called the *Zampolit*, or Assistant Commander for Political Affairs. He was formerly called the Political Commissar. He has responsibility for the political education and political health of the army as a whole. The *kinos*, the army clubs, the educational circles, the army libraries, the army newspapers, and all varieties of propaganda directed to the army rank and file come under his jurisdiction. He also has responsibility for reporting on the political mood and morale of each unit in the army, officers as well as men. The problem of demarcating his responsibilities from the command responsibilities of the officers in military charge of units presents a particularly troublesome issue in Soviet army organization. The difficulty is that the *Zampolit* and the commander have separate chains of command — the one leading up in the military hierarchy and the other in the party hierarchy.

"In addition, there is still another chain of command independent of the other two, that exercised by the MGB, or Secret Police in the army. Divisions, corps, and armies — each has its Special Section representing the MGB; below the level of the division down to the regiment and even occasionally the battalion, there is a specially empowered emissary of the Special Section. As is usual, this emissary has his dossier on everyone in the unit, and the regular network of informers to keep him posted on what is happening in the unit.

"This triple-lined system of control — administrative, party, and secret police — is reproduced in essentials in every Soviet institution of any consequence. Among the people interviewed, there seemed to be general agreement that the MGB was not only the most feared, but that it appeared to operate with the greatest degree of independence at the local level, and that its power seemed to be on the increase.

"This is the pattern of controls as it has crystallized in the Soviet system. Is there any immediate prospect that it will be modified in the direction of providing greater freedom and a higher level of welfare for the Soviet populace? The prospects do not appear too bright. For the postwar period, the vista held out to the Soviet citizenry is one of primary emphasis on heavy industry construction with only secondary attention to improvements in the standard of living. While there have been undoubted improvements in living standards compared with the war low points, the major energies of reconstruction have been concentrated on capital replacement and expansion, and welfare objectives have necessarily had to be sacrificed in the process. The justification for these sacrifices still runs, as it has run in the past, in terms of the dangers of capitalist encirclement and the necessity of strengthening the fortress of Communism against the threat of attack from the imperialist aggressors.

"But continuing sacrifices breed continuing dissatisfactions. The existence of widespread dissatisfactions drives the regime in the direction of

strengthening its repressive machinery. The secret police follows its own laws of growth — increasing in importance and power by the amount of distrust it sows and the discord it discovers or invents. The top leadership, to some extent at least, becomes a prisoner of the Frankenstein's monster which it has created — of the intelligence which it provides and of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which it generates. The products are such measures as the efforts to seal off the Soviet population from all contact with the West, to mute dissatisfactions by arousing the most primal instincts of obscurantist nationalism, while at the same time invoking the apocalyptic vision of the inevitable triumph of world Communism to rally the party faithful. These measures in turn invite their own response, a hardening in the attitude of the non-Soviet world toward the Soviet Union. The vicious circle is completed as the Soviet regime finds in such developments both the occasion and the justification for putting even greater emphasis on its program of capital expansion and for tightening the controls to deal with the dissatisfactions which a high rate of capital investment generates.

"It is difficult to see how the Soviet regime can break out of this circle, even assuming some desire to do so. It is possible to envisage a theoretical escape in the collapse of the western world, either through disintegration within or military defeat in which Soviet arms win a cheap and easy victory. But this contingency appears highly remote, given continuing economic and military strength in the West. It is also theoretically conceivable that the circle can be broken by a broad settlement of differences between East and West. The existing state of international tension and the long-term doctrinal outlook of Communism do not promise a hopeful prospect for such an agreement. The vista ahead is an uneasy truce, neither peace nor war, a shadowy no man's land in which danger lurks on all sides.

"Given this setting, the Soviet regime seems doomed to continue to feed on crisis and emergency, to emphasize the industrial development which builds up its military potential, to sacrifice mass welfare objectives in the interest of power, and to rely on its bureaucratic apparatus and its totalitarian controls to keep popular discontent in check. This is the moving equilibrium in which the Soviet leadership seeks to stabilize its position. It rests on the premise that while the regime cannot trust substantial segments of its own population, it can still control them. It is a premise for which history has still to provide an ultimate test."

Intelligence Concerning Activities of Competing Communist Propaganda Agencies

No psychological warfare operator can realistically expect to enjoy a propaganda monopoly in the drive to secure and hold the attention of a foreign audience, be it a peacetime audience to a strategic information program, or a wartime military unit locked in combat and simultaneously subjected to a propaganda attack by friendly military psychological war-

fare personnel. There are usually many competing propagandas and one may assume with respect to an audience in a totalitarian state that it will always be subjected to a continuous and intensive propaganda barrage from domestic sources.

If the military propagandist of the future finds himself charged with the responsibility of waging psychological warfare in time of actual armed conflict against either Soviet Russian or Chinese Communist troops, it is desirable that he have an understanding of the counterforces that are likely to be at work establishing and reinforcing attitudes, concepts, and other habits of thought among such forces.

Two articles are reproduced on the following pages showing in some detail conditions and practices that have prevailed in the Chinese and the Russian armies, and there is at least the presumption that such practices will continue to prevail in any future struggle. The first case is "Soviet Indoctrination of Red Army Troops," which is a translation from a Russian language journal. The title of the article in the original Russian version is "Political Work on the Offensive: From the Experience of the Warsaw–Lodz–Posnan Operation." The author of the journal article is Lt Gen M. Pronin, at the time of writing one of the top three men in the Kremlin's organization for propaganda and Communist Party work. The article is believed to be an authoritative expression of Soviet policy and practice.

"Indoctrination within the Chinese Communist Army" is extracted from a book by Lt Col Robert B. Rigg[5] In the portions of the book reproduced in this chapter the author vividly describes the means utilized by Chinese Communist military leaders to instill in the minds of the Chinese soldiers, drawn from the peasant masses, hatred and fear of the enemy and loyalty to the Communist regime in power.

SOVIET INDOCTRINATION OF RED ARMY TROOPS*

By Lt Gen M. Pronin

A case study of Soviet methods of troop indoctrination and propaganda within Red Army ranks.

[It is important that the psychological warfare officer, who may be called on to wage a propaganda campaign against Soviet front-line troops, understand that he will in all probability face considerable competition from Soviet propaganda agents in reaching the consciousness of the individual Soviet target. The following account includes excerpts from a translation of an article, "Political Work on the Offensive: From the Experience of the Warsaw–Lodz–Poznan Operation." The author of the article is Lt Gen M. Pronin, one of the three top men in the Kremlin's organization for propaganda and Communist Party work in the Soviet armed forces. The article, as originally written, in Russian, was addressed to the professional propagandists of the Soviet Union and appeared in a sophisticated technical journal as an illustrative case history for the edification and future guidance of political workers in the Soviet armed forces.]

[This article is believed to be significant to Americans for the following reasons. (1) It is an authoritative, representative statement of a leading Soviet officer's views on the role of the Party and propaganda in a front-line situation. (2) It illustrates, from recent past history, what was done within the Soviet armed forces by Party workers and professional agitators to keep the Russian soldiers' fighting pitch at a high level. (3) Such an outline of activity as given in detail in the article gives some indication of what one may expect to occur within the Red Army of the future. This points toward some of the difficulties that the propagandists of an opposing force will face in trying to reach the consciousness of the individual Soviet soldier. In all likelihood, a psychological warfare officer from the outside will have to compete against Communist Party workers and propagandists within the Red Army who will be striving to maintain a monopolistic hold on communications to their own troops, and the outsider will face an enemy whose enthusiasm for fighting will be increased, by means of internal propaganda, to a higher level of efficiency than might otherwise be the case. This article then suggests some of the aspects of target analysis relative to the Russian Army.]

At the beginning of the Warsaw–Lodz–Poznan Operation, conditions at the front provided a very favorable situation for the commanders and the political organs to prepare the troops for the coming offensive. The troops were eager to smash the Fascist beast in its own lair as quickly as possible and to raise the banner of victory over Berlin. With this in mind, special political indoctrination of the troops was provided. Let us look at several forms which this work took.

Assignment of Party Forces and Strengthening of Party and Komsomol Organizations

A most important aspect of the work of the political organs in the period when the army was preparing for the offensive, was the assignment of Party and Komsomol cadres [to the lower echelon] and the strengthening of the existing organizations and the creation of new Party and Komsomol organizations at the company and battery level. The political organs gave their primary attention to the infantry companies in the front lines, to which Communists from other units were sent. Thus, by the time the fighting began, new full-blooded Party and Komsomol organizations had been created.

Many young [Communist] Party organizers were sent to aid in setting up the company organizations. In order to prepare the organizers for their tasks, the political sections conducted seminars for them. At these seminars such practical questions as the following were discussed: "The company Party organization — support and aid to the commander," "Structure of the Party organization in the Red Army," "Tasks to be assigned to Communists during battle," "How to prepare documents for those entering the Party," and "Methods of accounting for Communists during battle," etc.

In order to create within the regiments a reserve of Party organizers for the company organizations, the political administration [responsible for political work

* From the article in Russian, "Political Work on the Offensive: From the Experience of the Warsaw-Lodz-Poznan Operation," *Voennyi Vestnik*, Nos 5–6, 40–44 (1946). Translated by Dr. Louis Nemzer for use in this volume.

in the entire operation] conducted study conferences which were attended by Communist Party members of non-commissioned and enlisted ranks. Here were selected [for the company political organization] the most steadfast, literate and battle-worthy of these Communists. In addition to the study of questions on how the Party functions in the lower echelons, the participants in the study-conferences were given special military training. By strengthening the Party and Komsomol organizations within the front line companies it became possible to allocate the available forces so that in the first line of attack there always would be an adequate number of Communists and Komsomol members.

Work with New Reinforcements

Into the regimental units came reinforcements, called primarily from the areas of Byelo-Russia and the areas of the Ukraine, liberated from the Germans. These people had long been separated from their Soviet homeland, and they knew little about the actual course of the war and the potentialities of our Red Army. Of course, the soldiers [from these sectors] required the political workers' greater attention. It was the task of the political organization, and particularly of the agitators and propagandists, to explain skillfully to these soldiers the objectives and character of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, to tell them about the power and might of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and to show them our military materiel, and to prove to them our superiority over the Germans.

Experienced soldiers and war veterans were used in the military education of the new reinforcements. These men told the young soldiers about their own part in the battles before Stalingrad, on the Dneiper and in Byelo-Russia. The work conducted with the reinforcements was not in vain. Many of the replacements were awarded orders and medals of the USSR for bravery and courage in battle.

Nourishment of Love for the Homeland and of Hatred for the Foe

High moral-military qualities among the personnel are the result of the nourishment in them of love for the Homeland and hatred for the German-Fascist aggressors.

In the work of nourishing a sense of hatred for the enemy, the political organs and Party organizations were following the instructions of Comrade Stalin that "you cannot defeat the enemy if you have not learned to hate him with all the forces of your soul." The basis of the nourishment of hatred was Comrade Stalin's book, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,* in which are discussed with sharp clarity not only the beastly face of fascism, its vileness and moral degeneration, but also the degree of danger which fascism has brought to our country and to all freedom-loving humanity.

In nourishing in our warriors this hatred of the enemy, the political workers have taken into account the social as well as the personal interests of our soldiers. This has made our agitation sharper and more effective.

The Germans had killed the mother and father of Red Army man Shpanov, and his sister had been driven into slavery in Germany. Red Army man Demchuk's mother and four children had been shot by the Fascists. These facts were set forth in a special leaflet issued by the political section of their division. Thousands of our soldiers learned about the personal tragedy of Shpanov and Demchuk and they swore to seek merciless revenge on the German murderers. The political section of one division questioned seven hundred warriors and established the fact that

of those questioned, close relatives — father, mother, wife, or children — of six hundred and eighty-six soldiers had been killed by the Hitlerites. The Fascists had burned the homes of one hundred and three warriors, and had taken their cattle. The political section issued a leaflet in which the warriors were called upon to remember these figures and to take revenge on the Fascist villains. In several units, excursions to Maidanek were organized. Warriors who had been to the Fascist death camps conducted talks with the soldiers, describing what they had seen.

The Political Administration operating at the front issued newspapers in the Uzbek, Kazakh, Tartar, and Moldavian languages. All appeals to the soldiers by means of leaflets and brochures were translated into these languages. On the eve of the offensive wide use was made of meetings between the soldiers of non-Russian nationalities and their fellow countrymen who were Heroes of the Soviet Union. At these meetings the heroes passed along their own experiences to the soldiers and taught them the art of conquering the enemy.

Political Support for Cooperative Action in Battle between Service Arms

The most successful and most easily justified forms of such (indoctrination) work were the meetings arranged between infantrymen, mortar-artillerymen, tankmen, and aviators. Talks were also given by experienced commanders to the soldiers about the military friendship of the different units.

On January 12, or two days before the offensive, the Party and Komsomol organizers of some batteries and several officers from a mortar-artillery regiment went to the trenches of the infantrymen and shared with them their experiences in combined action which brought about a break-through in the enemy's defense line. On the following day, soldiers of several rifle companies went to the firing positions of some mortar-artillery units. The latter fired their mortars and showed the accuracy and effectiveness of their fire. In friendly talks, the infantrymen told about the military traditions of their own units, and passed along some ideas about the techniques of combined action. These meetings of infantrymen with the artillerymen had a good effect. The artillery units sent their most proficient officers, sergeants and enlisted men to the rifle companies, where they told about their fire power, and shared with the infantry an account of their experiences in combined operations. During these talks, suggestions were offered on how infantry observations and fire correction reports could aid the artillerymen.

The meeting of some aviators with the cavalrymen of Lieutenant General Kruzov was interesting. The cavalrymen were shown the mechanism and equipment of the airplane "Il-2." Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel Panfilov, demonstrated with his airplane, diving, hedge hopping, and firing with various types of arms. On the second flight, made with Red Army men of cavalry units, he demonstrated how the flyer is assisted by rocket flares shot by ground units as a means of communication. Following this, the cavalrymen held a meeting at which the flyers were present, and here there was a discussion of various defects, for example, the poor timing of ground to air communications and the failure of the air units to recognize their own troops on the ground, etc.

The great work conducted in these preparatory days prior to the operation paid off in dividends during the battles that followed. In the period of the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, and during the pursuit that followed, all the services synchronized their actions better and gave timely aid to each other.

Maintenance of Camouflage Discipline among Troops Concentrating for the Offensive

In order that the enemy be kept unaware of the movement of our columns a high level of organization and discipline was demanded while tremendous quantities of troops and equipment were being concentrated for the breakthrough. Therefore the political organs and the Party organizations were given, as a high priority function, the task of strengthening military discipline and order among troops on the march, and the intensification of vigilance and the maintenance of the strictest military security during this entire period. Before the march, Party and Komsomol meetings were conducted. Battalion and divisional commanders outlined the duties of Communists and Komsomol members on the march. Following these, separate conferences were held for the sergeants and the rank-and-file enlisted personnel at which the regimental commanders discussed assignments for the coming operations.

In one of the infantry regiments, checks revealed that in the area of build-up there were violations of the rules of camouflage (during rest periods fires were lit, there were stragglers, etc.). At the end of the first day, the Communists and Komsomol members discussed at their meetings the results observed during the first day of marching, and the measures that were planned for the removal of (the observed) deficiencies. Then the Communists conducted talks with the soldiers, reminding them about each soldier's responsibility for concealment in the unit's movement forward.

The great concentration of troops not far from the enemy — our units were in defensive positions there — made necessary the establishment of new positions of concealment, including new dugouts and trenches. It was necessary to conceal this construction work as it was going on, so that it would not be seen by the Germans. The commanders demanded that the work proceed quietly and be well masked. Utilizing short talks with the soldiers and by exploiting the personal examples of the Communists, the Party organizations mobilized the personnel for the immediate fulfillment of these requirements.

Political Work on the Eve of the Offensive

On the evening of January 13, it became known that the troops on our flanks had gone on to the offensive and were successfully advancing. The commanders and political workers [in our ranks] immediately transmitted this news to the entire personnel. The success achieved by the adjacent units raised still higher the confidence of our troops that the German defenses to our front could be broken just as successfully and in a fashion equally as devastating.

In the evening, the units received their operations orders about going over to the offensive. By that time, the entire Party-political apparatus had been assigned to various military commands and lower echelons. Where the situation permitted, short Party and Komsomol meetings were held three to five hours prior to the commencement of battle. Each Communist and Komsomol member was reminded that by his conduct he was to set a personal example in battle. Some of the political officers were assigned the task of conducting talks in their platoon, others were to issue "militant leaflets," with descriptions of heroic deeds, a third group was to gather and transmit to the rear, reports of soldiers distinguishing themselves in battle as well as disseminating in abbreviated forms the communiques of the Soviet Information Bureau. A fourth group was assigned the task of raising red flags on the military objective stormed and captured.

During the period from two to three hours prior to the beginning of an attack, meetings were held within the companies, and where it was not possible to assemble the soldiers of the company, talks were conducted on a platoon or squad scale. *The Order of the Military Council of the Front* brought forth in the troops a mighty wave of patriotic enthusiasm, and this was one of the decisive conditions for a high offensive impulse in the personnel of the units.

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The task of political work in the offensive was to promote a growing enthusiasm for combat among the troops during the battle. This demanded special forms of agitational work as well as great flexibility and initiative on the part of the political workers.

During the course of battle the following operational activities were successfully carried out: slogans were proclaimed; demonstrations of organized firing were conducted; reports were sent to higher echelons about warriors distinguishing themselves in action; "lightning-flash" pamphlets and "militant leaflets," with descriptions of the exploits of heroes were issued; Soviet Information Bureau reports and the contents of orders from Comrade Stalin were disseminated; and, letters and notes of greeting to commanders of regiments and companies and declarations of gratitude for military successes were transmitted through channels. During the offensive itself political workers dispatched letters to relatives of heroes [telling of their exploits].

The short "lightning-flash leaflets" were particularly popular with the troops. The content of these leaflets was extremely varied. The following is illustrative of a type of leaflet disseminated to a Guard regiment:

WOUNDED GUARDSMEN DO NOT LEAVE
THE FIELD OF BATTLE

"Guardsman Red Army man, comrade Tarchinin, of the third rifle company, was wounded in the hand, but did not leave the field of battle. Instead, he took upon himself the command of his squad and continued to fight. Machine-gunner guardsman, Private First Class Banuzin, wounded in the leg, stayed in the battle until his unit had completed its task.

"Glory to the courageous!"

Leaflets were disseminated which reported successes among adjacent units, in which models of proper conduct in battle were cited. For example, one of the rifle units, engaged in fighting the enemy, needed a point the enemy occupied but they could not take it. The regiment then executed a wide flanking movement, hit the Hitlerites in the rear unexpectedly, occupied the point attacked and thus cut off the path of retreat for the Germans. The division commander, in a special leaflet, announced his gratitude to the personnel of this regiment. In the leaflet, he commended the officers and men of the regiment for their tenaciousness and high moral bearing.

A great upsurge of enthusiasm was stimulated by the delivery to the soldiers of a unit commendation, from Comrade Stalin for meritorious performance of military duties. "This is a very high reward," exclaimed the soldiers who received the document. The wounded were given similar documents at the hospital stations.

Particular attention, by way of awards, was given to those who had distinguished themselves during battle. Political workers not only announced the names of comrades who received awards, they also assisted commanders in making nomina-

tions for awards. Then, when the soldiers were given awards, the political workers made certain that the citations were made known to the entire personnel of the unit.

The Front Line Role of Communists and Komsomol Members during Battles

The entire Warsaw–Lodz–Poznan operation was characterized by numerous instances of heroic action on the part of Communists and Komsomol members. They were permeated with a high consciousness of their duty to the Party and showed with their fearlessness how one must defend the beloved Homeland and the great cause of Lenin-Stalin.

The intimate feelings of the Bolshevik was expressed by a brave Communist, Red Army man Valentinov, who fell in battle. In a letter which was found with his Party card, he wrote: "To my dear Party, I'm going into battle and I wish to say that I have been your loyal son, and so I shall remain until my last breath. If I should meet death, I shall meet it as befits a Communist. The cause of Lenin–Stalin is stronger than death."

And here is another note which was found with the Komsomol card of fallen Red Army man Dmitriev: "As I go into battle, I swear that I shall fight as our hero-Communists are fighting. I give my word to our people that I shall fight until that time when my eyes shall cease to see the enemy, and my hands shall cease to hold my gun."

The moral force of the Communist and Komsomol members was exceptionally great. Following the traditions of the Bolshevik Party, they were the first to throw themselves into battle, and the last to leave it. They demonstrated through their action self-denying heroism. Their influence and organizing ability was felt at every stage of the battle.

Before and during battles, at the resting places, and during the march, the agitators assigned to the regiments and the division political sections spoke to the soldiers. Agitation was particularly effective because it was conducted not only before the battle, but also during the battle, and because it was conducted not only by Party political workers, but also by many commanders, including those senior in rank.

Growth of the Party Organizations

The company Party organizations were greatly strengthened by drawing into the Party new members and candidates chosen from among those warriors who had distinguished themselves in battle. The self-sacrificing conduct of the Communists during battle raised the authority of the Party in the eyes of the non-Party men, and thus, thousands expressed a desire to enter the Bolshevik ranks. During the combat phase of the operation, the Party organizations on the Byelo-Russian Front accepted as members or candidates more than 20,000 men.

It was important that worthy comrades be accepted into the ranks of the CPSU without delay, in order that the Party organizations continue growth without interruption. [Even though there was great need for increased membership in the Party] the principle of personal approach to those selected was still maintained. When the political workers gave the necessary attention to this, the company Party organizations systematically grew in size, power and vigor.

However, during the first week of the offensive, many political organs, and particularly some divisional Party commissions, were unable to adapt themselves to the conditions of the swift forward displacement of the troops. They were not able to secure in the time provided the necessary review of the accepted applications for admission to the Party. These defects were soon removed by the Party

commissions with the aid of workers from the army political sections and the Front Political Administration.

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It is necessary to dwell on several special features of Party political work in the battles for the city of Poznan. These battles continued for a month and ended with the destruction of the surrounded German groups. The situation in the battles for Poznan required the creation of special assault detachments, of reinforced rifle battalion strength. In this order [creating special assault detachments] the "buro" of the Party organization of the battalion was transformed into a "buro" of the Party organization of the assault detachment, which now exerted its influence through the Party organizations and the Communists not only of rifle companies, but also in the added supporting units, artillery, tank, etcetera.

Every evening, when the fighting had subsided, the Party organizer brought together the members of the "buro" and the Party organizers of the companies and the new support units, and he discussed with them the results of the recent battle, exposed defects in Party work, and set forth the tasks to be performed the next day. At these short conferences, the company Party organizers discussed their work experiences in the street fighting.

The assault detachments were divided into assault groups, and these groups were often further divided into sub-groups. The party organizations made certain that there were Communists in each of these sub-groups, and in each, these Communists were commissioned to induce high military activity from all soldier personnel. One such sub-group, under the guidance of Communist guardsman Sergeant Kirichek, was assigned the mission of capturing a strongly fortified building. In addition to Comrade Kirichek, Communists Shilov and Zhukov were also in this sub-group. The military mission was successfully accomplished by the sub-group. At night on the wall of the occupied building was written: "Communists Shilov, Kirichek, and Zhukov were the first to break into this house."

In the street fighting in Poznan, great significance was attached to the practice of raising red flags on important objectives, as these were taken by assault groups and detachments. This proved to be an effective means of influencing the participants in the battle. As a rule, the appearance of a red flag on a captured objective called forth new militant enthusiasm among the assaulting troops.

Along with the staffs of the various service units, the political administration worked out and issued a series of guide booklets for gun crews and groups, generalizing the best experience of those who had been directing the street battles. This played a significant role in the battles for the city of Poznan.

In agitational work during these days fixed trench loudspeakers were also utilized within each division. These were employed to transmit the orders of Supreme Commander Comrade Stalin, summaries prepared by the Soviet Information Bureau, and appeals of the military councils of the Front and the armies.

Before the assault on the Poznan citadel, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General Chuikov came before the microphone of a loudspeaker broadcast station. He called on the heroes of Stalingrad to make a determined assault on the Poznan fortress. The talk of the commander was heard by all warriors who were assembled at the jumping-off line. It was instructive to see the thoroughness with which the troops, sergeants, and officers, dealt with the enemy in the Poznan fortress. By this great service, the Party-political workers and Party organizations aided the high command to secure the victory over the enemy in the street battles.

INDOCTRINATION WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY*

By Lt Col Robert B. Rigg

The Chinese Communists place great emphasis on the indoctrination of the peasant soldier — instilling in him both hatred and fear of the enemy and loyalty to the Chinese regime in power.

Propaganda Pays Off

There is a lot of paper work in the PLA [Peoples Liberation (Chinese Communist) Army], but it is not the administrative type. Posters, handbills, books, magazines, broadcasts — and always the proclamations, written and verbal. The army does a lot of bragging. Propaganda is paying off in two ways in the conduct of the soldiers. To us it may seem silly that the Communists keep harping on the fact that the PLA "never takes so much as a thread or a needle from the people without returning it." But this scheme has helped establish the general concept among the Chinese people that this army is their friend. The second way this propaganda is paying off is that the soldiers are coming to believe in themselves as superior to all other generations of Chinese soldiery. This point is drummed home incessantly. The result is — pride in self-restraint, in little matters, which makes for bigger "face." The soldier is given more respect by the people, and this heightens his morale. He treats the people well, except when under orders to raid or shoot, and the people, therefore, treat the soldiers well, as individuals. These are little chain reactions that build up soldier spirit into unit *esprit de corps*.

However, this army is not made up of docile peasants who always reek with politeness and concern for other human beings. Their own lives are held so cheaply that they regard others' the same way. Although they may have learned to treat their own people with a measure of respect, new for Chinese soldiers, they have lost none of the brutality that typifies so many elements of Asia. The men are like trained dogs. Point out an enemy and they will attack and viciously tear him apart. Call these soldiers back and show them the people who are not their enemies and they will be friendly. The Chinese Red soldier has now undergone several years of violent anti-American indoctrination. This vicious hate campaign has taken effect among a large number. Its effect among those who do believe it, is such as to sweep the remainder (who do not believe, or are in doubt) along with the current. When it comes to fighting us, there have been no polls taken; the soldiers simply have obeyed orders. When first shot at, they know they must shoot back. When they have been shot at often and hard, they recall the hatred in which they have been schooled, and react with added vigor and resistance. Red China's soldiers make excellent troops with which to slaughter Americans. The soldier may not know the issues at stake, but once in combat he sees tangibles like shells coming at him; men of white skin and no slant eyes. The enemy is from a distant land, while he, the Chinese, is close to home. But always there rings in his ears: "The officers and commissars have said the Americans would attack us, and now they have. I must shoot them."

* Reprinted from Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1951, pp 135–38 and 165–70, with permission of author and publisher, copyright holder.

These soldiers have little education; they believe most of what they are told. As prisoners, they will come over to believing our side, if they are indoctrinated; but do not make the mistake of crediting the Chinese soldier with —

(1) Any education that will permit him accurately to judge international issues; or,

(2) Any martyr-like resistance against the military leaders already entrenched in power.

The thing that makes the Chinese soldier outstanding is his enduring obedience to orders. One could take 60 percent of the PLA today and, with new leaders, reorganize it under an entirely different political and military system, then commit it to battle in Korea and get practically the same results as the Reds have achieved.

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The Chinese Communist Cultivation of "Beets" and "Radishes"

"The PLA [Peoples Liberation Army] is one of the toughest and most highly politically-indoctrinated forces the world has ever seen. There have probably been few forces in history in which the officers have been in closer relationship with their men, or have tried harder to look out for their interests and really lead them in battle." This is the evaluation of an army officer who has lived most of his professional life in China and who has spent long periods with the Chinese Reds. Colonel David D. Barrett is one of the United States' few real experts on China and Chinese militarism. I value his analysis highly and believe that he gets at the factual core of the matter.

The big question about China's Red Army has been, and is, "How does it manufacture the automatons that march so willingly to mass slaughter?" The Communist answer is "political indoctrination and discipline"; the Western answers to the question are many. We seem unwilling to believe that political indoctrination is so strong and so effective. On that point we must change our minds. Recent history and present events are set neatly before us. The conclusion that political indoctrination has effective impact — is inescapable. But, like radiation, political indoctrination will stick to some objects longer than to others and will also dissipate itself unless additional doses are administered. The Communists don't give their troops a single indoctrination lecture and then march them off, with the naive assumption that this does the trick. No, they pound home the political and ideological themes until many of the troops know the Communist line by heart. Indoctrination and political training are daily measures in the PLA, no matter how simple or repetitious the message. Repeat and repeat — by rhyme, rhythm, and redundancy — the Marxist-Maoist line. Military training time often is sacrificed to non-military labor, but political training periods are rarely ever sacrificed to other jobs or interests. The early morning and late evening hours are periods for the daily ritual of indoctrination. The first morning hours in the army are "sacred" to the commissars and other political preachers, who consistently lead their flocks before the Red altars with their ever-present pictures of Mao and Stalin.

Formally, in large halls where these faces stare down at the troops, or informally, where the smaller photographs appear in a book held by one who can read out loud, the troops get their daily dosage of indoctrination. Soldier minds may wander on some days, but because of the regularity of the training, the soldiers cannot long escape a good measure of "Why we fight," "Who our enemies are," "What we are doing," "What we will do," and so forth.

Like so much that the leaders do, this training is conducted along simple lines and the political pills are sugar-coated with such devices as group singing and plays. When he gets up in the morning, the soldier knows he will have to do something. To sit and listen to someone read a dull political book still is more comfortable than the labor of the later hours. So they gather in little or large groups, squatting on the earth, smoking, breaking twigs, drawing in the sand. The monotone of an uncultivated voice makes some men doze, but some one else jabs them to alertness. No officer or commissar stands by just to plant his boots in some soldier's ribs. It is a gathering in which all may not *want* to take part, but one in which all are made to *feel* a part. The chronic wool-gatherers are watched by their NCOs and officers. The kitchen smells remind all that "after this is over there is food" — and those who demonstrate no interest in the lecture are reminded by the kitchen odors that the cooks are always in need of details. So the laggards pay the measure of attention that befits those who want to keep out of trouble.

Not all of the sessions are boring. There is fresh news and the Chinese, like others in the world, are interested in news. As in all Communist newspapers, few individuals, but many organizations are cited, for one reason or another. The soldier never expects that *his* name will appear, but he wonders if his army or its leaders will be mentioned. He begins to feel a part of something bigger than just himself — an organization. If he were a coolie he would be just a particle in an unnamed mass, but here he *belongs — to something formal and organized!*

The propaganda varies in theme. It is not all abstract. The Communists cleverly build up cases which play on the emotions. Someone is to be hated; some nation is to be pictured as a threatening power, so that the soldiers and the people will not question why there is so large an army. Spies, guerrillas, the "wily, blood-sucking rich, the brutal landlords" — the soldier is made to feel that he protects himself and his family from many threats. Always threats! People are plotting; nations are plotting! "We must watch," says the commissar, "our nation must be prepared. We have been enslaved — now we are free." And so it goes like rain on a roof, dulling their simple minds to all but the rain. "The roof is leaking — the storm threatens to grow worse — we must protect ourselves — we, in uniform, protect the people!"

This ceaseless drumming is so studied and regular that it diverts the mind while clouding the truth. It is like the prisoner who is allowed but one newspaper a day. Does he read it? Or does he turn it down for a document he really wants? No, after a time he will read it for reading's sake. Poor or inaccurate news is better than no news at all. He may even come to believe parts of it. After all, is he in a position to verify on the real facts?

But do the Chinese soldiers believe all they are taught? No, they do not, but they become convinced by many of the slanted sides of one argument, simply because they haven't heard the truthful rebuttal.

Do they seek the truth? Do they question the wisdom of their Communist warlords? They would *like* to know the answers to many questions, but to *seek* the truth actively is physically dangerous. The Red system has them enmeshed to the point where any question challenging the propaganda stories is regarded as heresy. It is simply easier and safer to obey. After all, the soldiers of China have served brutal masters before. The fatalist philosophy of *Mei-yo-fatze* runs deep.

The Red leaders have been militarily successful; the Nationalists were not. The Red side won with nothing; therefore many soldiers take the view that the leaders have *something* that is different enough to be followed — for a while at least. The bottom could be knocked out of much Communist propaganda if it were not for the fact that the Reds won a war — the China Civil War. The fact of victory does lend so much support to the concealed lies in other issues, that many Chinese soldiers are convinced that the whole Red propaganda fabric is pure.

What does the Chinese soldier believe regarding Korea? There is much indoctrination on Korea. This propaganda I have seen in Chinese documents of various sorts. It boils down to the clever breeding of one thing — hatred. It is well supported by photographs of bleeding, bandaged, and dead Manchurian farmers, purportedly the human victims of air strafing by UN planes. This propaganda is exhaustive in its details of time, place, and even in the number of cows, pigs, and chickens that were "casualties." These cases are cleverly treated to relate blood and suffering to the matters most dear to any human — the family, the home, possessions, and property. These cases are described as so numerous, and are given such high case numbers, that there is indication that the Communists have used fake photos and false facts, and have multiplied and magnified a few farm yards into many acres of reported mass suffering.

This is where the propaganda campaign in Korea jumps off with a violent start, to stir the emotions of the masses. Just as the presses are bringing one death to play on the sympathy of millions, the Red propaganda campaign, pulled taut by the arm of the Red hierarchy, has now released from its bowstring the mighty arrow of "attack on our soil." The Communists say "We told you so; there was threat when you did not believe it. Now march to your duty — there is the enemy threatening our borders!"

The Chinese soldier does not know the tricks of photography, the fact that an entire motion picture can be shot on a few acres of ground and yet seem to encompass miles of terrain! He sees the "slick" magazines he can't read or write, but those who make the magazines and speeches can read and write; therefore, by his low educational background the limited knowledge *they* must know more about the issues than he does. Yes, he believes; he believes on little evidence because he is not educated, and if he is educated he is being schooled to view things by present rules — his thinking processes dulled and channelized. But, while beliefs can be deep, they can also be temporary. They can be changed overnight by exposure to facts, especially facts resulting from action, not words.

Kneeling and weeping, crying out and holding their clasped hands aloft, Chinese soldiers have met capture by UN troops *believing* they would be massacred to the man, upon surrender. We know this fact, which is the direct result of Red indoctrination designed to deter them from easy surrender. But minutes, hours, perhaps a few days, have destroyed for good that belief in the minds of those captured.

Intelligence for Psychological Warfare Output

Intelligence is required in psychological warfare operations not only to provide planners with realistic estimates of the situation but also to enable output personnel to "flesh out" appeals and arguments advanced in radio broadcasts and printed messages. The article "Intelligence for Output"

describes some of the sources of intelligence that were found useful for output purposes in World War II operations. High on the list of fruitful sources for such data are monitored enemy radio broadcasts and interrogation reports of recently captured prisoners of war.

"Political Report on Aachen" is taken from Saul Padover's postwar book *Experiment in Germany*. In the account concerning Aachen the author describes how the improvised, hastily arranged fact-gathering mission to the first large German city to be captured by American troops provided data useful in satisfying output requirements in psychological warfare.

"Commander Norden and the German Admirals" describes how the US Navy intelligence sources learned through routine analysis of German news sources that German naval officers were being advanced to flag rank much faster than the Germans could launch craft for them to command. The intelligence collected and assessed by naval officers was declassified and given to the Navy German-speaking radio spokesman for broadcast to Germany. When the Nazis stopped the previous practice of publishing the names of officers advanced to the rank of admiral this was accepted as prima-facie evidence that the American broadcasts on this subject had touched a vulnerable spot in the German psychological armor.

INTELLIGENCE FOR OUTPUT

By M. J. and W. E. D.

Monitored radio intercepts, interrogation of refugees and prisoners of war, and analyses by research scholars have all proved to be excellent sources of intelligence usable in output broadcast to enemy target groups.

Intelligence and research personnel perform functions that are required for two basic phases of psychological warfare activity. Through basic research and the collection and careful analysis of current intelligence it is possible to draft psychological warfare plans that are realistic, i.e., capable of such implementation that they may achieve a high degree of effectiveness. A number of questions may be cited for which propaganda planners of the distant or recent past have had to seek correct answers. In the war against Japan, what were the assumptions on which the propagandists based their plan of action? It was through the processes of research and analysis of pertinent data that answers were derived. These, then, were reflected in the psychological warfare plans. For example, was it reasonable to infer that the Japanese nation would fight on to the destruction to the last man? If not, under what conditions was it likely that Japanese leaders would choose to surrender?

Other types of questions for which planners seek to find answers by means of research and intelligence involve circumstances comparable to the following. In directing propaganda to areas like the Middle East, where the politically articulate elite comprise only a small percentage of the total population, what media is better

suited for reaching this audience — shortwave radio broadcasts or printed media? In drafting plans for use against Iron Curtain and satellite areas, to what extent may we assume that defectors are "representative" of the population of the countries from which they have come? If intelligence and research personnel can discover, with some degree of certainty, the answer to questions such as these, their findings may be used in the drafting of basic psychological warfare plans.

Of importance equal to the need for intelligence for psychological warfare planning is the need for material that has been called intelligence for "output." Once the limits of policy have been delineated and a plan of propaganda action drafted, there is always the further problem of translating output into terms that are meaningful to the particular target audience addressed i.e., in terms that will cause it to act in the manner desired. If ideas are the chief ingredients of plans, these can only be "fleshed-out" as active appeals through the use of words and symbols.

Examples from World War II experience show how intelligence for output was collected and later utilized. An effective linguistic device employed against all our adversaries was that of monitoring the enemy's propaganda broadcasts and newspapers in order to get his own words and phrases for use later in broadcasts — however, in the context we chose to employ. Goering's messages of reassurance to the German people, early in the war, were monitored systematically and appropriate transcriptions were made. During the later stages of the conflict, at frequent intervals, the very words he had used, in speaking to his own countrymen, were employed effectively in reminding the German people of what he had said and how little confidence they should place in his type of leadership.

During the war in Europe there was considerable evidence that some Germans were amused, bewildered, and sometimes even frightened by the rapidity with which Allied radio retold anti-Nazi jokes as they became current in various parts of the country. For this sort of operation, psychological warfare required special intelligence reports that could be utilized immediately. Further examples of intelligence utilized for output relate to cold war broadcasts to Czechoslovakia where the operators have need for a great quantity of carefully evaluated data on the standard of living within that country. Script writers need this information not merely for background data but also to supply content for the actual broadcasts on economic matters.

Professional intelligence officers and academically trained specialists think of intelligence and research as the bits and pieces of information required to make accurate estimates of the situation. On the other hand, the propaganda operator needs the same type of material for inspiration and for grist for his output mill. Every intelligence and research operation, from the interrogation of refugees to the content analysis of enemy newspapers and propaganda broadcasts, can be useful in determining policy questions and in supplying information that may be included in propaganda output.

A highly successful script writer, who was assigned to a combat unit during the last war, reports somewhat colorfully, but meaningfully, about his reliance on prisoners of war as sources of intelligence for output.

> "Our existence as a functioning tactical weapon depended on our intelligence from prisoners. We ate, slept, and drank with prisoners. Many nights I was awakened by members of our crews dragging in deserters, who sat on my bedroll, dripping the waters of the river Scorff as they told the latest Winchell dope on what went on inside the fortress."[6]

Likewise, operational content analysis — or propaganda analysis — provides intelligence for output. For the policy planner, an analysis of the press and radio of the target nation is a source that may throw light on opinion, attitudes, and intentions. But for the operational staff, content analysis provides another service, for by digesting enemy output and by unmasking the main themes of his broadcasts, his day-to-day tactics are disclosed. Furthermore, content analysis supplies the quotable quote, the basis for a new script or a counter to an argument, either direct or indirect.

Because of the difference between "policy" and "output" intelligence, it is seldom that intelligence and research personnel are not subject to conflicting pressures. Friction may result at times over the use to which a piece of research or an intelligence item is to be put. The operations section often needs material in a hurry and from areas where psychological warfare intelligence personnel may not be. Therefore the task of collecting intelligence for output is often hurriedly carried out by the personnel in the operations staff of a psychological warfare agency. Incidentally, such individuals frequently consider themselves better equipped for the task than intelligence people. Under such conditions intelligence and research personnel are likely to complain about the character or inadequacy of the product.

Such difficulties as have arisen in the past between intelligence and research personnel on the one hand, and propaganda operations personnel on the other, have frequently stemmed from differences in the character of the training and experience each has had. As a result, there is a tendency on the part of each to fail to appreciate the degree of competence possessed by the other and to fail to understand the essential differences in the character of their respective tasks.

During World War II, a joint OWI-MID (Military Intelligence Division) research operation directed toward the determination of the status of Japanese morale was carried on in Washington, under the leadership of Lt Cmdr Alexander H. Leighton, USN. This research organization was one of the first to prophesy that Japan would capitulate prior to an actual invasion of the home islands. A great deal of usable intelligence was brought to light through the work of this Foreign Morale Analysis Division, yet, friction developed between the personnel in it and the operations personnel in OWI. One officer, a member of the operations staff of OWI, described this as due largely to a tendency on the part of intelligence personnel to want to dominate operational activity.

FMAD personnel started out to find the answers to certain relevant questions. As the information that was collected and analyzed tended more and more to fall into a particular pattern of response, or as the conclusions pointed in a definite and clearly discernible direction, the enthusiasm of the research workers was frequently such that they understandably, yet improperly, attempted to dictate to the operators how the data should be used. Such a practice as this is fraught with at least two dangers. First, if intelligence and research personnel become involved in planning, or in operations activity, they may neglect to perform the essential intelligence and research functions which are their reasons for existence. Second, no matter how well informed they may become concerning a particular target audience, they may not have at their disposal all the data necessary for a given propaganda campaign. In other words, intelligence concerning a target audience's vulnerabilities constitutes only one side of the coin. The operator must take into account many other problems that may escape the attention of the most vigilant intelligence officer. Factors that may be overlooked include such things as policy

objectives, concurrent coordinate or parallel operations by the same or by allied agencies, and political guidances, about which all personnel in a particular agency may not have been fully informed.

Intelligence and research staffs serving psychological warfare agencies all too frequently look on the policy planners as the prime users of their product, and thus there is a tendency for them to overlook the necessity for gathering well-documented carefully evaluated data useful for output. When the necessary background data are not produced by the intelligence staff, operations personnel often undertake to supply their own needs. Such personnel usually operate under pressure and tend to look for the dramatic rather than the normal behavior of enemy groups. Past experience has indicated that operations personnel, owing to the pressure of events and the desire to exploit the dramatic, have at times misinterpreted the significance of intelligence data supplied by intelligence and research, and thus they have emphasized atypical incidents as though they were commonplace. Where this happens, intelligence officers may be prone to try to police the whole operation. It is unwise for intelligence and research personnel to develop such an outlook. Actually it would appear to be unrealistic to ask intelligence and research to assume formal responsibility for seeing that operations personnel use intelligence data properly. Their responsibility is to furnish the maximum amount of carefully analyzed current intelligence about the target addressed, which is consistent with the time and resources available to them. Fully analyzed current intelligence should contain the necessary cautions about the representativeness and accuracy of the information, which the operators ought to keep in mind. Moreover, if cordial relations exist between operators and intelligence personnel, operators will feel obliged continually to check doubtful material.

In reality the work of intelligence personnel, like that of mothers, is never done. Although it would be illogical to permit intelligence personnel to make demands on operators there is nothing inconsistent with the view that operations people may make constant demands on intelligence and research for data relevant to output. Such demands actually have a beneficial effect on intelligence and research personnel for they tend to sensitize such individuals to the realities and requirements of effective propaganda.

It is vitally important that intelligence and research personnel be indoctrinated in the dual function of their work. Where the size of an operation warrants it, it would seem desirable that psychological warfare intelligence recognize the dual function it must perform by designating different individuals to be responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence for planning and for evaluating effectiveness, as opposed to intelligence for output. In World War II, SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division, as well as subordinate units in the psychological warfare effort, sought to develop distinct personnel for this purpose.

One final point needs to be emphasized. If intelligence and research is to serve output needs the knotty problem of security requires constant attention. There is an ever-present tendency for the results of intelligence and research to be classified higher than actually necessary to protect the nation's security, and therefore such research findings are often not made available in usable form for output. Paul Linebarger has suggested at least two rules to expedite the flow of materials to output personnel and to prevent needless domination of psychological warfare operations by security officers.

> "Classification should be kept at an absolute minimum. No information should be classified unless there are genuinely strong reasons for sup-

posing that it would benefit the enemy. Classification and declassification should be the responsibility of designated officers trained for the task. . . .

"Security should not be applied for editorial purposes. Censorship is a separate function. Improper security procedures, vesting arbitrary powers in stated officers, may tempt the security officer to express his personal literary, artistic, or political preferences under the guise of maintaining security. The inevitable consequence is the breakdown of both security and of procedure. . . . Review and estimate of radio and leaflet output is another function." (p 54)[7]

POLITICAL REPORT ON AACHEN*

By Saul K. Padover

A social science survey team sponsored by PWD/SHAEF *found the elite structure of a recently liberated area to be quite different than one might have anticipated. Only research groups operating in or near a target area can effectively carry out such research investigations.*

The first day of the year 1945 found us in Brussels. At PWD headquarters of 21 Army Group, where we stopped to report, we were told to hurry back to Luxembourg for special orders. In Luxembourg, Colonel Powell (Chief Psywar Officer of 12th A. G.) suggested that we undertake a new mission. It had to do with Aachen. A number of people at Headquarters had long smelled something there. Psychological Warfare was interested in finding out what was going on in the city because there were redolent rumors that affected public opinion. First Army had not encouraged any investigation, but during the Rundstedt offensive Aachen was taken over by the Ninth Army which had no objections to an inquiry. On the contrary, it welcomed one. Wherefore, Col. Powell and Major Pat Dolan (PW Operations Officer 12th A. G.) asked me to go there and make a thorough survey. Two colleagues, Sweet and Gittler, accompanied me.

Aachen, the first big city occupied by the American Army in Germany, was the first major experiment in Military Government. The lessons of Aachen, its failures and successes, were of prime importance, especially for us in Psychological Warfare who were waging a war for German public opinion. Other headquarters, too, notably G-5 (Military Government), could learn something from an objective analysis of the situation. Our job was to investigate Military Government, its men and policies, the civil administration and its program, and the public reaction.

We arrived in Aachen when a heavy snow covered the mounds of rubble and softened the harsh ugliness of the ruins. Our immediate objective was to find lodging and board. MG, to which we were temporarily attached, had no room for us. Moreover, we preferred to live independently so as not to be influenced in our work. Aachen was without facilities, and had it not been for a company of MP's that guarded the city, we would have had to starve or live on cold rations. The MP's had a mess in a ruined and tenebrous house which was reached through a yard where the mud was never more than calf-deep, and they generously permitted us to partake of their chow. Living quarters presented a greater difficulty. We

* From *Experiment in Germany*, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., New York, pp 218–25. Reprinted with the permission of Mr. Padover, copyright holder.

managed to find a house that had walls, floors, ceilings, and a roof. It had no gas, no electricity, and no running water; the toilets were not working, and the whole murky place was enveloped in odoriferousness.

It was better than a foxhole in the winter, and for the first few days we bore it with varying degrees of stoicism. Then came a frost. "Unusual," the people said, as people always do — and arctic winds blew through the cracked house. We had a small stove but one had practically to wrap oneself around it to obtain a pittance of warmth. Nights became a misery. Darkness fell around five o'clock and we had only a dim lamp by which to read or work. To stay inside meant shivering in the gloom; to go out involved endangering one's life. After five thirty o'clock, which was curfew time for the German population, the blacked-out city lay in sepulchral stillness. MP's, finger on trigger, challenged anything that moved and, being so near the front, they frequently fired without waiting for an answer. It was, therefore, unwise to venture out of doors, assuming there was some place to go, which there was not. From five thirty o'clock in the evening until eight o'clock next morning, we felt ourselves entombed.

When life became intolerable, we piled our duffel bags and bedding rolls into the trailer and set out in a snowstorm to find billets in nearby Belgium or Holland. "Any port in a storm," Joe said; I do not know whether he meant to be original or not. At Vaals, a small Dutch town on the German border, we went in to see the Buergermeister and told him our troubles. He was a stocky Dutchman wearing a black cape, and he listened sympathetically. Finally he said, "For the American gentlemen I will do my best"; and he went out with us along the main street and stopped in front of the biggest house and rang the door bell. Another comfortable-looking Dutchman came out and the two exchanged some incomprehensible words. Then we were invited in and offered a whole floor — a bedroom for each one of us and a kitchen. It was wonderfully warm inside, and, of course, spotlessly clean. The beds had white sheets and the mattresses were supple and the rooms were electrically lighted. Only one thing marred this Elysium, and that was the toilet. For some inscrutable reason, it had a glass door of immaculate transparency. We tried not to think of that, and expressed our enthusiasm and gratitude. The Buergermeister beamed. "For the American gentlemen," he repeated, "nothing is too good."

And so we settled down for the winter a few miles outside of Aachen and commuted to Germany every day. It was a short trip, but on the way back in the night, when there was a fog and the windshield froze thick, it had its elements of recurrent unpleasantness.

The responsible MG officers in Aachen put no obstacles in our way. Major Jones, the MGO, and Major Bradford, his deputy, were friendly and helpful. Major Jones had inherited the German civil administration from two of his MG predecessors, and he felt that, whatever the situation, his hands were clean. He welcomed our investigation which, he hoped, would help make necessary dismissals and decisions. We were supplied with official passes authorizing us "to circulate anywhere at any hour and to interrogate civilians."

We spent five weeks in Aachen, interrogating, interviewing, investigating. We talked to the leading civil officials, to the chief Military Government officers, to workers, policemen, clerks, businessmen, *Hausfrauen*, men on the street, boys and girls. Our final report, when it reached the various headquarters, caused a storm, both of resentment and of approval. It had far-reaching effects. Here, told for the first time, is the full saga of MG in Aachen.

It was a city of paradoxes. The most important man in Aachen, we found, was not the American Military Governor, but his appointee, the German Oberbuergermeister. The most influential individual in the administration was one who held no political office at all — the Bishop. The most powerful men in the community were not the American conquerors, but the group of Germans who belonged to a Nazi armaments clique. The dominant official ideology was not democracy, but authoritarian fascism. Military Government officers, only one of whom knew the German language, had only the muddiest notions of what was going on. Clearly, Aachen was an interesting city and one that rewarded looking into. All winter hundreds of news-hungry correspondents were sitting in the press camps at Spa and Maastricht, practically next door to Aachen, and missed this, one of the striking stories of the war. Many of the correspondents came to Aachen, sniffed around a bit and went away as wise as they came. An exception was Max Lerner of *PM*, whose intellectual curiosity remained undiminished as a war correspondent. . . . Our report began:

> "In the last three months a new elite has emerged in Aachen, an elite made up of technicians, lawyers, engineers, businessmen, manufacturers, and churchmen. This elite is shrewd, strong-willed, and aggressive. It occupies every important job in the administration. Its leader is Oberbuergermeister Oppenhoff. Almost all the Buergermeister and key functionaries were chosen by him and most of them think his way. Behind Oppenhoff is the Bishop of Aachen, a powerful figure with a subtlety of his own and a program of the Church. Nearly all of these men have known each other for a long time. Three of the Buergermeister live together in one house, two in another house. Oppenhoff had been, among other things, the lawyer for the Bishop and the diocese. His collaborators are Faust and Op de Hipt, both of them executives in the Veltrup (armaments) works. Buergermeister Hirtz and Schefer are old school-mates. All of these men managed to stay out of the Nazi Party; most of them were directly connected with the city's leading war industries, those of Veltrup and Talbot.
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> "Their strong point, especially in dealing with Americans, is that they are 'anti-Nazi' or 'non-Nazi.' Their proof is that they never joined the Party. How and why did they escape Party membership? Oppenhoff says his circle did not depend on the Party because they were in the *freie Berufe* (free professions) or were closely connected with the Church and thus 'could not join.' Schefer, now Chief of Police, was protected from Party membership by working as an assessor for the Wehrmacht High Command in Berlin. Buergermeister Mies was manager of a big war industry whose contribution to the Nazi war effort was important enough to earn him the *Kriegsverdienstkreuz* (War Service Cross) in 1943. Buergermeister Hirtz was not eligible for Nazi Party membership because he says he had a Jewish mother (he admitted he would have joined otherwise). Buergermeister Breuer could not join because he was a Papal Legate.
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> "These leading officials kept out of the Wehrmacht because they volunteered their services to the war industry. Some of them, notably Oberbuergermeister Oppenhoff and his chief assistants Faust and Op de Hipt, sought 'refuge' in Aachen's leading war plant, the Veltrup works. Veltrup was under the jurisdiction of the German High Command's *Wehrkreiskommando*, and since the Wehrmacht was primarily interested in war production, Veltrup was not ordered to force his group of experts to join the Party.
>
> "A striking fact about this new Aachen elite is its comparative youth. Their ages run from thirty-three to fifty. They all represent the upper-middle class; their earnings in the last ten years under Hitler have been high, ranging from seven thousand to two hundred thousand marks yearly, with the average about thirty thousand marks. None of them ever suffered under the Nazi regime — or ever, by word or deed, opposed it. The record shows that they prospered under Hitler.
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> "These men around Oberbuergermeister Oppenhoff are not democratic-minded. They profess a marked distaste for the Weimar Republic, an abhorrence of party government, a dread of labor, and a fearful suspicion of liberal movements. In varying degrees and tones, one or the other repeats the slogans and clichés of the Nazis and the 'eternal Germans' . . . that Germany was 'dishonored' by the Versailles Treaty, that the latter was too harsh, that France is the permanent hereditary enemy, that Germany was betrayed when the Fourteen Points were not kept, that the 'poor' Reich is a 'land without space' and must expand. They attribute the outbreak of the war to these 'evils' and charge the working class with being the main support of Hitler."

The leading men in this group had spent their working life and grew prosperous under the Nazi system and they knew little else. They had an anti-democratic conception of government and a "leadership" view of business. Buergermeister Faust, an engineer in his middle thirties, told us that at a recent semi-public conference an articulate worker dared challenge his words. "I was so shocked and embarrassed that I looked down at my shoes. In all my experience I never saw anything like it. Such things had never happened in the (Nazi) Labor Front."

Oberbuergermeister Oppenhoff and his select circle in the Aachen administration had a long-range political-economic plan. This plan, about which MG knew little and cared less, was a significant index to what one may expect from similar business groups in Germany. It aimed at setting up an authoritarian corporate state, à la Dollfuss, with a paternalistic small-scale industry based upon handicrafts and a hierarchical, unfree labor system. Politically the Oppenhoff idea called for small-state clericalism and a fundamental decentralization of the Reich. There was no objection to a separation of the whole Rhineland, provided it were attached to Belgium, France, Holland, or Britain, and thereby made economically viable. Economically the Oppenhoff group visualized a tightly-knit community of owners and managers of small enterprises, supported by a limited "labor aristocracy" of foremen, artisans, *Meister*, and *Obermeister*. Oppenhoff and his friends expressed themselves as violently opposed to popular elections, political parties, and trade unions. They considered "pride in one's work" and the approval of a benevolent employer as the solution of the competition of parties and the conflict of classes. They had contempt for politically alert workers. "Give the worker a glass of beer and a loaf of bread," one Buergermeister told us sarcastically, "and he is contented." Another said that German workers "think comically." A third called Social Democrats "un-German." In short, under the nose of MG, the Oppenhoff administration was setting up the framework of an authoritarian, hierarchical, bureaucratic, corporate fascism . . . a type of *Staendestaat* that even the Nazis had rejected.

This group entrenched itself in power with nine Buergermeister, sixty-seven different Bureaus, and seven hundred and fifty city employees. One out of every fifteen people in the community was on the city payroll. There was one Nazi Party member among the Buergermeister. Of the other leading men, we found one was a notorious Gestapo informer, twenty-two out of seventy-two in "key positions" (so defined by the Oberbuergermeister) were Nazis, and all were fascists. When this was pointed out to MG, the latter defensively quoted Oppenhoff that they were "indispensable."

COMMANDER NORDEN AND THE GERMAN ADMIRALS

By W. E. D.

The US Navy downgraded and released significant intelligence data for use in propaganda output.

Intelligence for psychological warfare differs from that required for other forms of warfare in that intelligence is a requisite for actual operations in propaganda campaigns. The activities of a supersecret World War II branch (OP-16-W or Special Warfare Branch) of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) illustrates how intelligence concerning the enemy was collected, analyzed, and used in operations.

Early in the war the British established a unit called NID 17-Zed in their Naval Intelligence Service to wage psychological warfare by means of radio broadcasts, dissemination of leaflets, etc., against the German Navy. NID 17-Zed struck particularly hard and effectively against the submarine branch of the German Navy. By radio German sailors were advised how to avoid the hardship of submarine duty by contracting certain diseases.

17-Zed came into existence only shortly before the German Admiralty launched a recruiting campaign to obtain additional men for Admiral Doenitz's U-boat service, then undergoing considerable expansion. Thousands of young Germans were needed to man the scores of submarines then coming off the ways. Admiral Doenitz preferred volunteers for he believed such personnel exhibited much higher morale.

The British agency NID 17-Zed launched its propaganda program by means of both radio broadcasts and cleverly designed leaflets, which were dropped over those German towns where the Navy traditionally appealed for submariners. The British emphasized the hardships of life on a U-boat, painting it as anything but a romantic experience. The hazards of submarine life and the short life expectation of a U-boat man were pictured. When the effectiveness of the campaign was tested by various means it was found that the recruiting campaign was hardly the success Doenitz had anticipated.

British Naval success in the use of this unorthodox weapon was brought to the attention of the US Naval Attaché in London and Admiral Stark, Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces in Europe. This led to these officers recommending that the Navy Department in Washington organize a group comparable to NID 17-Zed to cooperate with the British in a common psychological warfare attack on the enemy. About the same time an American intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Ralph G. Albrecht, USNR, was in London conferring on prisoner-of-war interrogations. He was well qualified for work with the Germans from long experience as an international lawyer. His command of the German language was nearly perfect. While in London, Albrecht was asked by 17-Zed to make two radio broadcasts to the German Navy.

On his return to the US, Commander Albrecht reported on his experiences in London and the desire of the British that the US Navy organize a similar group to cooperate with them. The enthusiasm with which these recommendations were received in Washington led to the establishment of the previously mentioned Special Warfare Branch (OP-16-W).

If one were to judge the place of OP-16-W in wartime Washington by the size of its staff, it would hardly bear any mention in any volume on wartime psychological warfare operations. However, what it may have lacked in number of personnel was more than compensated for by the quality and intensity of the contribution it made to the common national wartime propaganda effort.

OP-16-W worked out the closest and most harmonious relation with the OWI. It assisted the latter office in the preparation of propaganda directives, especially with any and all details relating to naval warfare. It did not attempt to build up its own competing system of outlets for its propaganda releases but contented itself with preparing broadcast recordings and carefully documented intelligence information suitable for release to enemy forces through OWI or related channels.

It was in the field of intelligence support for psychological warfare operations that the Navy Special Warfare Branch provided an especially significant contribution. A program called "Prisoner-of-War Mail" was prepared and turned over to OWI radio desks. Letters were solicited from German and Italian prisoners of war held in the US with the knowledge that the messages would be broadcast to their homelands. All manner of detailed information collected by the ONI was assembled, assessed and downgraded for use in propaganda releases.

OP-16-W collected all manner of odd bits of intelligence data. Items referring to friction in the German Navy, little and major scandals, and innumerable bits of information that might be termed nothing better than petty gossip was collected and filed for ready use. The names and locations of sweethearts of high-ranking German officers in France were ascertained in as much detail as possible. Accounts of how one admiral refused to permit one of his officers to marry a young lady of simple circumstances were prepared for release. Throughout the effort the attempt was made to picture the Americans as all-seeing and all-knowing — as possessors of information that not even the German people were aware of.

Because of his unexcelled linguistic and area knowledge background for propaganda work and his unbridled enthusiasm, Albrecht was chosen to become the spokesman for the US Navy in broadcasts to German seamen. To mask his civilian background as a prominent international lawyer it was decided to provide him a pseudonym, "Commander Robert Lee Norden, USN," or, in German, "*Fregattenkapitän* Robert Lee Norden *der Amerikanischen Kriegsmarine.*" To lend credibility to the existence of Norden and his great knowledge of German naval affairs, even highly classified intelligence data was downgraded for use in his broadcasts. The attempt was made to make him appear even more knowledgeable than the Germans on any matter relating to their navy.

Between 8 January 1943, when the first broadcast went on the air, and V-J Day "Norden" delivered 309 radio broadcasts. Broadcast 22 in the series, delivered in March 1943, illustrates the manner in which intelligence was collected, downgraded, and employed in the propaganda effort against the Germans.

It was learned that the Germans had only recently promoted a relatively large number of officers to flag rank. It was apparent that reasons other than normal wartime requirements had prompted a large number of these promotions.

"Norden" began Broadcast 22 in this manner. "I have just heard that 16 new admirals of the German Navy have been appointed. . . . That makes a total now of two grand admirals, five general admirals, more than 150 admirals!"

He went on to suggest that the German admirals constituted an exception to the general rule that unemployment in Germany had been eliminated. "Just what do your admirals do? . . . Are they aboard warships? Well, hardly — because there aren't enough warships for that." Since "there are only 30 German warships of more than 1000 registered tons . . . five admirals would have to divide one flagship between them. You certainly could say in this case that you can't see your fleet for admirals." In a mildly sarcastic voice he continued, "I don't want to be unjust. In this war there are two cases in which German admirals can definitely be proved to have boarded a ship." He then proceeded to describe these occasions in detail.

In July 1943 in Broadcast 68 he emphasized the same theme in referring to operations in the Mediterranean. He pointed out that VAdm Lange became the thirteenth flag officer in the German Mediterranean fleet at "precisely the time it lost its flagship."

In Broadcast 90, in September 1943, he further implemented the point by reading the list of promotions to flag rank that had been made in February and April of that year. There were 20 names on the April list. "Norden" commented with reference to this list. "In April there were actually more admirals launched than U-boats."

Much of the information for this campaign was obtained from German newspapers. News accounts from time to time listed the names of officers promoted to flag rank. These bits and scraps of information were carefully collected and preserved for later study, analysis, and use. When these accounts showed promotions per month ranging from 10 to 20 it became obvious the number appointed to the admiral class was well out of all relation to any possible expansion of the German Navy.

In May 1944, "Norden" in Broadcast 193 stated in part:

> "It is . . . not without interest that precisely since September 1943 the promotion of German naval officers to admiral rank has not been announced publicly. For in September 1943, on these broadcasts, I stated that 'at the end of the last war, when Germany had the second greatest fleet in the world, there were in the whole German Navy only 88 admirals. Today the German Navy can scarcely be said to have more ships, but it is able to boast 235 admirals.' "

"Norden" repeated his earlier charge that more admirals than U-boats had been launched in April 1943 and added that *Admiralinflation* (a coined word meaning "admiral inflation" that would be readily understood by a German audience) continues so that now (i.e., May 1944) Germany "possesses about ten times as many admirals as torpedo boats, destroyers and cruisers combined; and 300 times more admirals than battleships."

The following October "Norden" implemented the *Admiralinflation* theme by reporting that Admiral Schultz, naval commander in the Crimean theater "evacuated Sebastapol . . . in a speedboat in which he flew his admiral's flag from the

mast of the radio antenna," and by quoting figures showing that under Doenitz the German Navy itself had shrunk in size, the number of naval officers below the rank of captain had decreased about 10 percent, but "the number of German admirals increased by exactly 75 percent."

Although it is never possible to ascertain with any high degree of finality the success any propaganda effort may have attained there are several indications that "Commander Norden's" campaign on *Admiralinflation* may have hit the mark. This is suggested by the fact that in September 1943, after the campaign had been launched, the Germans discontinued publishing lists of promotions to flag rank. German prisoners of war were familiar with the *Admiralinflation* campaign and "Norden's" broadcasts in reference to it. At least one prisoner reported that "Norden's" quip that more admirals had been launched than submarines was often quoted by German naval personnel.

Sources and Methods of Psychological Warfare Intelligence

Sources of psychological warfare intelligence are as diverse and as varied as the interests and objectives of the personnel planning and implementing a psychological warfare effort. In strictly military tactical propaganda operations the sources of intelligence are not greatly different from those for conventional military operations. However, there is increasing dependence on higher echelons to provide useful data obtained from strategic interrogation of prisoners of war, propaganda analyses of monitored enemy broadcasts, and order of battle data obtained through both covert means and the careful analysis of captured enemy documents and newspapers obtained through neutral channels.

During World War II it was only in the European theater that officers were specifically detailed to intelligence duties and special channels established to forward data from front line areas to the rear echelons for processing and use in propaganda planning and output. The official report of PWD/SHAEF's operation in Europe[8] states that the principal sources of intelligence gathered by PWD were:

(a) G2 material on the enemy's strength, capabilities, and intentions.
(b) G3 material on the state of the battle and our potentialities.
(c) Interrogation of prisoners of war with special emphasis on psychological warfare matters.
(d) Captured enemy documents.
(e) Civilian interrogation.
(f) Material obtained from other staff sections of each echelon and from civilian agencies.

Captured enemy documents proved to be one of the richest sources of intelligence data useful to psychological warfare. In order that such documents should not become "lost" in the normal G2 channels, and thus be unavailable to propaganda personnel, PWD assigned a liaison officer to

the G2 Documents Section, SHAEF, to screen material useful for psychological warfare operations and to arrange for its declassification and transmittal for possible use by PWD.

In the war in the Pacific against the Japanese, captured documents provided a highly useful source of intelligence data for propaganda operations. The Japanese left all manner of official and private documents lying about when falling back from a given line of resistance. These data included order of battle information, even for areas far removed from the immediate battleground, and virtually every Japanese soldier carried a diary in which he recorded his most intimate thoughts concerning the war, his anxieties for the future, and his longings for the homeland.

Front-line military units forwarded captured documents and prisoners of war to rear echelons, where large intelligence establishments were set up to process translated material and interrogate the prisoners. The Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General MacArthur's South West Pacific Command and the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA), of Admiral Nimitz's Central Pacific Command, produced a vast quantity of data useful for combat and strategic propaganda operations.

Far more significant in the development of psychological warfare intelligence methods however, than the creation of these translator and interpreter sections were the advances made in the assessment and analysis of data as background for propaganda operations. The US Navy in 1944–1945, through a branch of Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), undertook an ambitious project to study how the Japanese people had in the past reacted to national defeat. This was all undertaken as preparation for a psychological warfare campaign conducted later under the leadership of then Captain Ellis M. Zacharias.

The Navy analysts, from their study of Japanese history, were able to show that, contrary to the stereotyped view of Japanese behavior held by a wide segment of the American people, the defeated elements in Japanese military strifes of the past had never resisted to the last man. Thus it would be counter to Japanese traditions if the military forces and the nation did not surrender rather than die at their posts. History also revealed conditions and formalities that had accompanied Japanese surrenders in the past. This data supplied useful background information that was incorporated in the Zacharias operational plan.

At approximately the same time a joint OWI-MID (Military Intelligence Division) group was established in Washington under the formal title Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD). Individuals recruited and assigned to this unit included uniformed personnel, both officers and enlisted men, of the Army and the Navy and civilian specialists of OWI.

The analysts employed in the project included representatives from the following academic disciplines: history; political science; sociology; anthropology; psychology; psychiatry; psychoanalysis; journalism; and statistics; and individuals described as representating more specific academic interests such as Japanese language and culture, community analysis, and public opinion surveys.

For their studies the FMAD depended on other agencies to supply much of the raw data. The Army and Navy forwarded reports of interrogations of prisoners of war and translations of captured documents; the Department of State sent reports of Foriegn Service officers stationed in so-called neutral countries; the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the FCC, forwarded transcripts of monitored enemy radio broadcasts; and OSS from time to time transmitted reports gathered from covert agents and scholarly studies prepared by Washington agents of that office.

The field of interest and the type of analyses undertaken by FMAD can best be described by quoting from the writings of one of the co-directors of the group.

> "The Divison's field of interest encompassed all the psychological and social factors pertinent to the Japanese capacity to put forth their best effort in the war. The work consisted in sifting, classifying, and interpreting current intelligence data. These included: prisoner of war interrogation reports; captured diaries, letters, and official documents; reports from neutral observers in Japan; Japanese newspapers and periodicals; and radio broadcasts. In addition, background descriptions and analyses were prepared from prewar sources such as novels, histories, travel and anthropological books, movies, and interviews with Japanese living in the United States.
>
> "The essential characteristics of the research were two: a conceptual frame of reference and a method of continuous operation. In regard to the first, all analysis was based on a limited number of assumptions concerning the nature of man derived chiefly from psychiatry, psychology, and cultural anthropology. With reference to the second, there went forward in accordance with the assumptions a continuous "processing" of the intelligence data as it arrived daily. The processing was analogous to the constant sifting, classifying, and recording of observations that take place in a weather bureau where reports are received from many stations. The files thus assembled constituted the basic material utilized in further analyses and published conclusions on particular topics." (pp 44–45)[9]

Two of the case studies that follow in this chapter relate to the work and product of the FMAD. "Japanese Home Front Morale" describes some of the findings of the group. Along with the wartime conclusions, Dr. Leighton has added excerpts from the postwar report of the USSBS of Japan, which suggests that the wartime findings came remarkably close to describing actual conditions among Japanese civilians.

Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn's account, "Anthropologists Contribute to the Defeat of Japan," adds further light on how the research tools and skills of one academic discipline were used as a part of the FMAD team to prepare analyses of probable Japanese behavior under varying conditions.

"Research and Analysis: the Chief Components of Usable Intelligence" points out the importance of careful filing and cross referencing of data and the fact that often the most useful intelligence data may be compiled from open sources. Farago, in the account reproduced, describes how one author using virtually nothing more than German newspapers, was able to describe in great detail the New Nazi Army. Hitler became enraged when he learned so much was known about German military affairs, yet he had permitted the news releases from which the data in the book had been painstakingly compiled. Up-to-date information of the type published in the book that incurred Hitler's wrath is of inestimable value for propaganda operations.

One of the principal sources of information concerning target groups that are inaccessible to the propagandists, such as are represented today by the peoples behind the iron and bamboo curtains and in wartime by the enemy forces across the line, is the interview and interrogation of defectors, refugees, and captured prisoners. Two case studies are reproduced in order to shed further light on the usefulness of this source and how best to profit from any opportunities that may occur to interrogate Soviet Russian defectors.

"The Intensive Interview as a Means for Highlighting Target Vulnerabilities," in very abbreviated form, lists some of the major findings disclosed from interrogation of a Russian Ukrainian defector. The second study, "A Guide for Interviewing Soviet Escapees," is a synthesis of the opinions and conclusions of interrogators recently engaged in interviewing defectors from the Soviet orbit, on how to achieve the best results and how one should prepare himself for such work if he is to gain optimum results.

No case studies involving sources, methods of analysis or utilization of intelligence for strategic peacetime information operations have been included. However, it may be said the methods and sources utilized for this highly important activity do not vary greatly from those developed and used during World War II. Sources used for intelligence vary in accordance with the ease or difficulty of establishing direct relations with elements or segments of the population to be addressed.

If the need for psychological warfare intelligence concerns a population not within the Soviet or satellite orbit it may be possible to utilize public opinion polling devices to gather data. However, when the target lies

behind the iron or bamboo curtain different techniques of data gathering and analysis will be required.

The analysis of foreign propaganda, particularly that emanating from either an enemy or potential enemy source, may produce intelligence useful in planning psychological warfare. Through propaganda analysis the analyst attempts to discern the major sources of strength in enemy morale and weaknesses in his psychological armor. Both may turn out to be profitable targets for friendly propaganda attacks. Often analysts are able to uncover the disguised plans of an enemy through an analysis of his propaganda output.

By quantitative and qualitative analysis of enemy propaganda it may be possible to reconstruct the enemy's psychological warfare plan. This may have a direct bearing on the response to be given and the objectives to be sought in a countereffort.

Strategic information programs also depend on the collection, assessment, and utilization of a great mass of information concerning potential targets, which for lack of a better term is called "area knowledge." Much of this is the product of ordinary scholarly research. The psychological warfare operator or foreign information specialist is particularly interested in the following topics relating to a target people: historical and political backgrounds; present-day economic, political, and social structure; sentiments concerning minority groups, foreign peoples, and institutions; ethnic and religious structure of the country; literary traditions and linguistic patterns; military traditions and policies; systems of mass communications and popular education; and biographic information concerning important personages of the past and leading figures in the arts, sciences, and politics of the present. Much of this information can be brought together only through use of the time-consuming techniques of academic research.

American diplomatic officers stationed in foreign countries, including military, naval, air, economic, labor, cultural, and scientific attachés have proved to be valuable adjuncts to the intelligence collection system. There is no category of data normally collected by such officials relating to a given target group that is not potentially useful in psychological warfare. Since the material is usually gathered for other purposes it is necessary that it be combed and studied with great care.

Official reports originating with these sources when combined with the normal products of American scholarship involving foreign people and reports of interviews with returning American travelers and defectors from totalitarian-dominated lands provide much of the raw data that must be exploited if our intelligence concerning foreign lands and people is to be kept current.

JAPANESE HOME FRONT MORALE*

By Alexander H. Leighton

The FMAD *of* OWI-MID *came remarkably close to accurately charting the deteriorating civilian morale structure in Japan in 1944–1945.*

The central questions about Japanese home-front morale were much the same as those . . . for the military. Similarly, among our policymakers, the opinion prevailed that this morale was for all practical purposes indestructible.

There was, however, one difference: the opinion was more uniform. . . . Regarding the psychology of Japanese soldiers, there were some voices on each side. In the case of the civilian morale, almost none of the policy makers or experts with whom the Division [Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Office of War Information] had contact believed that the Japanese might have difficulty in keeping up their fighting spirit. The accepted picture was the stereotype of fanatical and suicidal resistance and it hung like a spectre over planning and discussion. The policy directives for psychological warfare were all based on the assumption that the Japanese population and leading groups were suffering no significant decline in their will to fight.

Without losing sight of the capacity of some Japanese for extraordinary valor, the Division early felt that such high morale was probably not characteristic of all Japanese under all circumstances. During the latter part of 1944 analyses showed increasing evidence that Japanese home-front morale, while still formidable, was nevertheless deteriorating in a number of important respects.

By January 5, 1945, the indications were strong enough to warrant presentation at an OWI meeting for preparing the weekly directive. The Division reported at this time that the Japanese home front seemed to be "full of tensions and dissatisfactions" and that it was likely that "something was going to happen," either "a blowup of some kind," or else "a decline into a state of chronic inefficiency." The specific points made were:

The Japanese are being worn down by severe physical discomforts and privations, by bad war news, and by the upheavals from evacuations;

Some types of people (such as students, factory workers and Christians) are being treated as scapegoats and blamed for falling down in the war effort;

Campaigns are being carried out to whip up spirit, using such devices as claiming fictitious victories and pointing to the Germans as examples of what the Japanese should be able to do;

In the political scene, there is widening of cleavage lines and an increased turnover in men occupying important posts.

This report had little effect except to anger some of those responsible for planning the OWI directives and arguments were advanced to show that the political turnovers were without significance. Nevertheless, in succeeding months, the indicators of progressive decline in Japanese civilian morale continued to increase. By the end of March [1945] it seemed very likely that the OWI (and other) policy makers were working in terms of a largely false picture of the home front.

* From *Human Relations in a Changing World*, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1949, pp 58–75. Reprinted with the permission of Dr. Leighton, the copyright holder, and through the courtesy of E. P. Dutton & Co., the publisher.

The principal conclusions of the Division were:

1. A significant number of Japanese think that the Allies will win and consequently they are disposed to pay attention to what we tell them — an attitude quite different from people who still believe in their own victory and one that gives special opportunities in psychological warfare.
2. There is widespread apathy toward the war effort;
3. But there is a very great fear of what the Americans will do when they land. It is therefore important to reassure the Japanese and try to prevent them fighting vigorously from terror.

None of this, of course, implied an opportunity for slackening in our war effort. It concerned only opportunities for psychological warfare.

Throughout the spring of 1945 there were many discussions with policy makers on these and related points and by May a report had been prepared. Since much of this seems merely common sense now in the light of hindsight, it is worth noting that at the time the OWI Japan Section in the office of the Deputy Director for the Far East held up the report's publication and required that it be toned down.

The report on home-front morale was finally brought out as of June 1, 1945. A condensation follows, matched with appropriate excerpts from a report by the US Strategic Bombing Survey[10] based on information secured in Japan after the war. . . .

It should be said that since the Survey report was not prepared with the idea of checking the Division, it is organized differently. As a result there is a certain amount of awkwardness in comparing the two. The general sense, however, is clear and, due to the danger of distortion, it has been thought best not to extensively reword either report for the sake of matching. Some condensation has, however, been carried out.

Report of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

The Japanese people are suffering markedly from:

STRESS RELATED TO SUBSISTENCE, WORK AND SHELTER

"Food is deficient in quantity and quality.

"Work is characterized by long hours and few days of rest.

"Salaries and wages are consumed by inflation, forced savings and high taxes.

"Migration to industrial centers has caused overcrowding and related housing problems. These difficulties have been intensified by bombings which have not only destroyed buildings directly, but have also made it necessary to tear down structures to create firebreaks, to evacuate people from urban centers and to decentralize industry."

STRESS RELATED TO HEALTH

"The general health of the Japanese people is deteriorating. There is malnutrition and lack of medical personnel and facilities."

Post-War Report

"As the war continued, the supplies of fish and rice fell seriously and almost uncontrolled inflation permitted inequities to develop in the distribution of the limited amounts that were available.

"The net result of this situation, the mass of evidence shows, was widespread undernourishment, nutritional disease, social conflict, and depression of the will to resist. . . ."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

STRESS RELATED TO WAR NEWS

"The Japanese know that their army is losing; that their navy has not been able to keep the supply lines open, nor United States task forces away from Japan; that their country is being severely bombed; that they lack a strong air force; that invasion is imminent; and that the West is superior to Japan in material strength and technical knowledge."

Post-War Report

". . . As Japanese defeats began to accumulate in the latter months of 1943 . . . and still more in the early months of 1944 . . . the bad news became impossible to suppress . . . the facts filtered through to the homeland and were reflected in public attitudes.

"Some Japanese knew from the beginning of the war of the tremendous superiority of the United States in physical resources, industrial plant, and skilled man power. As the war continued many more came to realize or at least suspect the fact."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"In response to these various types of stress, the following conditions prevail:

"While there is no evidence that any significant number of Japanese have lost confidence in the purpose and rightness of the war, many have doubts about victory and a considerable number already feel that Japan cannot win."

Post-War Report

"Analysis of an important component of morale, confidence in victory, indicates that once the decline set in, in the latter part of 1944, morale cracked at an ever-increasing rate.

" . . . while Saipan was a shock to the home front, really widespread depression and apprehension came after the Philippine Campaign.

"On 10 July, 1945, the 'Thought Police' issued a secret report, the result of a survey of public reactions . . . on the loss of Okinawa on 25 June. The major conclusion seems to be that, 'the publication of Okinawa's fate has apparently given rise to no special trend in public thought.' The reason for this, according to the report, was that morale was so low anyway, and Okinawa's loss only added to the defeatist feelings.

"A cross-section sample of the population was asked by the Bombing Survey, as one of the items in the questionnaire:

" 'As the war went along, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?' If the answer were 'Yes,' then the respondent was asked, 'When was that?'

"Using these answers it was possible to chart the [decline in the] total percentage of Japanese who said they had doubts about victory at successive stages of the war. The results showed . . . a similar curve for the question, 'When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?' "

The Bombing Survey sums up its conclusion by saying:

"Obviously, what happened to a critical component of Japanese morale was not a sag, nor a decline; it has something of the characteristics of a crack-up."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"In the event of defeat, most Japanese expect to be enslaved, starved and physically mutilated."

Post-War Report

"Probably most important . . . at least as the war went on, was fear of the consequences of defeat. The propagandists, throughout the war, instilled in the Japanese a fear of the dire consequences of an American victory, until the overwhelming mass of them expected anything from enslavement to annihilation. . . . To the question, 'During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family if Japan lost the war?' almost three-fourths of the responses were in this vein. As a woman munitions worker in Hagi said:

" ' . . . I thought that it was better to be dead than to be captured. I hated to die suffering. I thought that it would be better if we died together happily.' "

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"There has been no weakening of attitudes toward the Emperor and the Imperial Institution, but for all other leaders, from the Cabinet down to neighborhood air-raid protection units, there are both satisfactions and dissatisfactions, with the latter mounting."

Post-War Report

"Parallel to [this] . . . faith in spiritual resources was the Japanese obedience to and faith in the Emperor. While 37 per cent of the Japanese were definitely critical of their leaders' conduct of the war, and 60 per cent criticized home-front leadership, the Emperor remained practically immune from criticism; he was above and beyond any schism between people and leaders.

"A well-informed community leader in Kyoto observed: 'Throughout the whole war, the attitude of the people toward the Emperor did not change,

for they regarded him as the father of the people and symbol of all that is good and great in Japan. Toward their other leaders from the prime minister down, the attitude of the people changed greatly. At first the people were proud of and greatly trusted their leaders, but as news of the war reverses began to leak through, and as cabinet changes took place, the confidence of the people in their leadership was rudely shaken and finally utterly shattered . . . the people themselves were not fully united in the latter part of the war.' "

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"The trend toward social disorganization and hence disorganization of the war effort is seen in:

"Hostility between urban and rural people, the city dwellers feeling that the peasants are hoarding and falling down on production, while the farmers feel that those who live in the big towns are the cause of heavy taxes, lack of fertilizer and low prices for country produce. There is also an influx of city people into the country as a result of evacuation, and these are a strain on rural housing and subsistence facilities."

Post-War Report

"Evacuees had a most unsettling effect upon the communities in which they sought refuge. They went everywhere, spreading news of disaster and eating into the meager resources of their hosts.

"Their leaving (home) resulted in disorganization of family life, and the abandonment of passive defense against bombs in the communities from which they came.

"In nearly all the communities which received evacuees, the commonest complaint of the people was the increased black-market activities and the consequent rise in the price of commodities. The people blamed the black market upon evacuees who, they charged being rich, were willing to pay high prices to obtain goods otherwise unavailable.

"Even had organizational efficiency remained at a high level, this vast migration would have been a calamity. But the very scope of the evacuation dissolved organization, already under heavy strain from the physical results of bombing. The combination was disastrous.

"Evacuation, then, was bad for the morale of the evacuees, bad for the morale of their hosts, and bad for the morale of those whom they left behind. It materially disorganized the economy and the social life of the entire country."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"The Koreans, who have been imported for labor, are feared and suspected of plotting against the Japanese."

Post-War Report

"Rumors and recrimination regarding a scapegoat minority such as the Koreans rose especially sharply."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"In politics, cleavages between different factions are becoming more evident. These political moves indicate not only scheming and counter-scheming but also dissolution of solidarity, hostility between cliques, lack of clarity as to aims and methods and, above all, a roughened sea of rising public fear, hostility and confusion."

Post-War Report

"Soon after Tojo's fall in July, 1944, the IRAA (the single political party that replaced all the previous political parties when they were officially abolished) was beginning to deteriorate. . . . The basic trouble had, of course, been the lack of truly popular support. . . . There was, furthermore, a good deal of internal conflict. The factions and feuds among the old parties which the IRAA was supposed to eliminate, reappeared in its midst. There was, for instance, bitter rivalry between the IRAPS and the Youth Corps."

Report of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"There are a small number of radical secret societies operating below the surface who would like to see the Allies win because it would discredit the ruling groups and give themselves a chance to develop political power."

Post-War Report

"There are indications of the existence throughout the war of a fairly coherent organization, at least among party Communists. . . ."

Report of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"The Government and the public generally blame each other for the war situation. The people accuse the Government of bungling, interfering, red tape, lack of trust in the people, concealing information and economic muddling so that the food situation is desperate and the black markets are uncontrolled."

Post-War Report

"Despite vigorous control measures, the incidence of both overt subversion and rumor-mongering showed a distinct increase after March, 1945. According to one Special High Police report of July, 1945:

" 'Recent rumors, scribblings and (other) manifestations are numerically increasing. . . . They say that the Japanese war leaders, or the leading circles, are responsible for the decisive battle against Japan proper, for intensified air raids, shortage of food stuffs, acute inflation, etc. . . . This indignation against the ruling class was shown in criticisms of military strategy and misrepresentation of the attitude of military circles. Others speak ill of government measures and government communiques. They explicitly assume a hostile attitute toward the government circles. Some others dare to speak of class antagonism.'

"A report on Japan's fighting capabilities as of early June, prepared by Suzuki's chief cabinet secretary, Hisatsune Sakomizu, arrayed the grim

complex of forces which were recognized by a goodly part of the ruling group and which were forcing them to sue for peace. . . . Sakomizu's report, called 'A Survey of National Resources as of 1 to 10 June, 1945,' stated in part:

" 'The ominous turn of the war, coupled with the increasing tempo of the air raids, is bringing about great disruption of land and sea communications and essential war production. The food situation has worsened. It has become increasingly difficult to meet the requirements of total war. Moreover, it has become necessary to pay careful attention to the trends in public sentiment. . . .

" 'Morale is high, but there is dissatisfaction with the present regime. Criticism of the government and the military is increasing. The people are losing confidence in their leaders and the gloomy omen of deterioration in public morale is present. The spirit of public sacrifice is lagging and among leading intellectuals there are some who advocate peace negotiations as a way out.'

"This statement is typical of official Japanese statements on morale. . . . No one would dare to admit openly and generally that things were as bad as they were. However, in the detail of reports, the intended impression would be conveyed. Sakomizu's own testimony to Morale Division interrogators was that he took a dim view indeed of public morale."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"Emotionally, five trends can be distinguished:

"a. Some people are inspired to greater effort by the difficulties.

"b. Some people show variable activity in which they seek by trial and error some escape from their stresses but stick at no one thing for long.

"c. Some people are angry and aggressive toward others in Japan and blame various individuals and groups for the predicament the nation is in.

"d. Some people are panicky and prone to hysterical outbursts, flying from one extreme to another.

"e. Some people have become apathetic, slowed down, imbued with defeatism and concerned only with their own personal needs.

"It is difficult to say which trend is the most prevalent at present, but there is some reason to infer that it is apathy."

Post-War Report

"Such practices as labor hoarding and 'pirating' by companies, paying 'black-market' wages to entice workers, absenteeism among workers and production 'blocking' by disgruntled workers prevailed. Labor-management disputes were never eliminated. Intraplant conflicts between conscriptees and old workers existed, and many war workers resented being forcibly removed from trade and service occupations or light consumer-industry jobs. Furthermore, in most instances wages were inadequate to meet the real cost of living in a black-market economy.

"A national security report, dated August, 1945, makes this statement concerning the trend of labor morale:

" ' . . . after the big raids (from March on) the . . . majority of workers in (the bombed) areas disengaged themselves from production and became very interested in their own self-preservation. This behavior . . . is gradually deepening the tendency toward defeatism and the trend is following a course which warrants attention to the preservation of peace.'

"While the drastic reduction in the food supply helped to undermine confidence in leadership and intensified the cleavage between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' among Japanese civilians, the consequent competition for the necessities of life, together with heightened nervous tensions and mounting difficulties brought on by air raids struck at the nerves of individuals. As the war progressed, people began to distrust each other more; they became ruder, more selfish, more short-tempered and more inclined to pick fights. In answer to the question, 'Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?' almost half the responses indicated growing tension among the civilians.

"A middle-class housewife of Ogaki expressed herself this way:

" 'Yes, definitely — everyone became inconsiderate. Stores didn't extend services; riding trains and streetcars was a mad commotion. I think the people became irritable due to lack of food. They are always hungry and dissatisfied and naturally they try to blame their suffering on someone.' "

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"Looking to the future (as of May, 1945) it seems that:

"There will long remain many energetic and determined Japanese in all walks of life, particularly among the military, who will wage a desperate last-stand fight. This will be countered by a determined effort on the part of other people to save Japan from devastation by ending the war. The people who do this will be those who see more advantage in an integrated, if defeated Japan, than in a crushed and disorganized Japan. They will be made up of political realists from the court, of the less extreme militarists (especially in the Navy), of bureaucrats and of men with industrial and business interests. They will not for the most part be liberals. They will seize as much power inside Japan as they can grasp and will try to drive a hard bargain with the Allies. On the other hand, they will strive to control the last-ditch fanatics and will evolve formulae in terms of recognized Japanese values that will permit the ending of the war."

Post-War Report

"As a political force, morale found its opportunity for expression in the existence of factions within the controlling group . . . fissures . . . gradually widened as reverses occurred. A faction emerged which had more to lose by continuing the war than by surrender.

"In mid-April, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki had been named Premier, and had been given definite instructions to 'bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible.'

"The important thing to note about this group of peacemakers is that there was nothing essentially democratic about their behavior. . . . Their

efforts were definitively and literally conservative. They represented a privileged class of the population who saw in the continuation of hostilities a threat of destruction to their status and privileges. In the first place, because of the military situation, they feared that carrying on to the point of invasion and the final battles would result in the disintegration and disappearance of the system through which they profited."

Report by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division

"The downward trend in Japanese morale may take a long or a short time before it reaches a point that makes possible the termination of the war. The military pressure brought to bear will be the principal controlling factor. Assuming that the military pressure is sustained, the psychological and social tensions now handicapping the Japanese will continue to mount in severity until they actively cripple the Japanese war effort. This may take the form of extreme social chaos, but it is more likely that those leaders who wish to stop the war will be able to secure control, most probably through the Emperor."

Post-War Report

"By the early spring of 1945 the peace group had considerably broadened its influence. Further elements of the naval top command had been won over, the closest advisers of the Emperor had been influenced and access gained to the Emperor himself. Secrecy was still important, however, as the army radicals and the lower echelons of the Navy were still strong in their refusal to admit the bankruptcy of their policies. . . .

"It is not appropriate in this place to detail the complicated maneuvers involved in the denouement. It is sufficient to state through Premier Suzuki, that

" 'When the Emperor took his active role in politics at the end of the war, it was because the Premier . . . had been able to lead the Government up to a point where it could be left to the Emperor to make the decision.'

In general summary, the post-war report states:

"After the loss of Saipan, their morale began to disintegrate. The process was one in which an accumulation of prolonged war weariness, social unrest, increasing consumer shortages (especially food) and a succession of military reverses weakened the will to resist. Then air attacks brought direct and immediate pressure on large segments of the population and morale abruptly went into a decline. The striking characteristic of Japanese morale during the war with the United States, therefore, was not so much its steadfastness, but rather its extremely steep climb during the period of initial victories and its precipitate fall at the end.

"Since there is a widespread belief in the United States that the atomic bomb was *the* cause of Japanese surrender, it might also be supposed that this event produced deterioration in Japanese morale. It is of interest therefore to report the findings of the Strategic Bombing Survey in this connection:

'The level of confidence was quite low in Japan well before the time of the atomic bombing. Under these circumstances, the announcement of a new and devastating weapon was merely added to the already eloquent evidence of national weakness. In Japan, as a whole, military losses and failures . . . were cited twice as frequently as the atomic bomb in inducing certainty of defeat. The general air attack was nearly three times as important in this respect. Consumer deprivations, such as food shortages, were also more important.

'The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of Government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside the target cities. It cannot even be said that it was the atomic bomb which convinced the leaders who effected the peace that surrender was necessary. The decision . . . had been taken in May, 1945. . . .'

"Nor can it be said that the atomic bomb persuaded the top leaders of the group opposing surrender to change their opinions. After the bomb was dropped, voting in the Supreme War Guidance Council still remained divided as it had been before, with the War Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. However, as the Bombing Survey says:

'There seems little doubt . . . that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to take strong measures against the peace group. . . . The atomic bombs hastened surrender, but did not themselves provide the major motive.'

"The report of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division ended with a series of recommendations for psychological warfare based on its findings. . . . [App A][9] They are omitted here because they are not of central importance in this presentation, because they are lengthy, and because they are difficult to check for validity.

"As noted earlier, the Division's report fell short in expressing the Division's conclusions, due to modifications that were imposed. Actually, by June, although nothing was known of the atomic bomb, it was expected that the Japanese would very soon make real overtures for peace and this was expressed in verbal statements to policy makers and others. A number of the members of the Division together with some other workers in the same field when participating in a panel discussion under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services estimated that the war would be finished some time between July and the end of September if no major change occurred in our military activity or State Department policy.

The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded:

'From its studies of Japanese resources, military position, and ruling politics, the Survey estimates that the Government would have surrendered prior to November 1, 1945, and certainly before the end of the year. . . .

'. . . Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.' "

ANTHROPOLOGISTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN*

By Clyde Kluckhohn

The role of anthropology in psychological warfare research.

During the recent war [World War II] applied anthropology blossomed . . . the anthropologist knows that in any given culture the majority of individuals will respond much more readily to some appeals than to others. . . . It is not sufficient to inform the governments of other states in the conventional legal and rational documents of statecraft. For there are now few nations in which policy is not influenced by public opinion. The background of United States policies must be kept in the foreground of peoples' minds. This can only be done if we present our basic goals and the reasons for them in terms that take account of the situation and the sentiment patterns of the various peoples we wish to influence. . . .

In analyzing enemy propaganda and in advising on the construction of our own psychological warfare, in predicting how the enemy would react under given circumstances, in making plans for building morale in our own nation, anthropologists had an opportunity for drawing upon the widest informational and theoretical stores of their science. . . . The greatest service of the anthropologist was in preventing his colleagues from casting both enemies and allies in the American image and in forever reminding intellectuals of the significance of the nonrational. Certain professors and literary men wanted to use our broadcasts to discuss democracy with the Japanese on a high intellectual plane. But you can't reason men out of irrationality. . . .

Two illustrations will show the contrast between the anthropological point of view and the culture-bound point of view in dealing with our enemies. Controversy raged in Washington over our propaganda treatment of the imperial institution in Japan. The liberal intellectuals in general urged that we should attack this as the prop of a fascist state. They maintained that it was dishonest and a betrayal of the deepest American ideals to allow the Japanese to assume from our silence that we would tolerate the monarchy after our victory. The anthropologists opposed this policy. They had the general objection that the solution to conflicts between the United States and other peoples can never rest on a cultural imperialism that insists upon the substitution of our institutions for theirs. But they had more immediately practical objectives. They pointed out, first, that if one examined historically the place of the imperial institution in Japanese culture it was clear that there was no inevitable linkage with the contemporary political attitudes and practices that we were bound to destroy. Second, since the imperial institution was the nucleus of the Japanese sentiment system, to attack it openly was to intensify and prolong enormously Japanese resistance, to give freely to the Japanese militarists the best possible rallying cry for morale. Third, the only hope for a unified Japanese surrender of all of the forces scattered over Pacific Islands and on the continent of Asia was through the sole symbol that was universally respected.

* From *Mirror For Man*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, pp 170–78. Copyright 1949 by McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. Reprinted with permission of the copyright holder and Dr. Kluckhohn, the author.

Anthropologists showed that it is almost always more effective in the long run to preserve some continuity in the existing social organization and to work at reorganization from the established base. This had been established by the British anthropologists when they created the principle of "indirect rule." If the United States and its allies wished to abolish the monarchy it could be abolished eventually by the Japanese themselves if we handled the situation adroitly and adopted an astute educational program. When an institution is destroyed by force from without, there usually follows a compensatory and often destructive reaction from within. If a culture pattern collapses as a result of internal developments, the change is more likely to last.

The second illustration is that of the attitude towards psychological warfare directed at the Japanese armed forces. Most of our top military men reasoned this way: We know that the Nazis are fanatics, but the Japanese have proved themselves still more fanatical. How can leaflets and broadcasts possibly affect soldiers who will go readily into a *Banzai* charge or fight under hopeless conditions in a cave, finally blowing themselves to pieces with a hand grenade? Why should the lives of our men be risked in attempting to secure more prisoners when it is obvious that Japanese prisoners will not provide us with intelligence information?

The generals and admirals who argued in this fashion were highly intelligent men. In common sense terms their picture was perfectly sound. Common sense was not enough, for it assumed that all human beings would picture the same situation to themselves in identical terms. An American prisoner of war still felt himself to be an American and looked forward to resuming his normal place in American society after the war. A Japanese prisoner, however, conceived of himself as socially dead. He regarded his relations with his family, his friends, and his country as finished. But since he was physically alive he wished to affiliate himself with a new society. To the astonishment of their American captors, many Japanese prisoners wished to join the American Army and were, in their turn, astonished when they were told this was impossible. They willingly wrote propaganda for us, spoke over loudspeakers urging their own troops to surrender, gave detailed information on artillery emplacements and the military situation in general. In the last six months of the war some Japanese prisoners flew in American planes within forty-eight hours after their capture, spotting Japanese positions. Some were allowed to return within the Japanese lines and brought back indispensable information.

From the American point of view there was something fantastic about all this. The behavior before and after capture was utterly incongruous. The incongruity, however, rests on a cultural point. The Judaic–Christian tradition is that of absolute morality — the same code is, at least in theory, demanded in all situations. To anthropologists who had steeped themselves in Japanese literature it was clear that Japanese morality was a situational one. As long as one was in situation A, one publicly observed the rules of the game with a fervor that impressed Americans as "fanaticism." Yet, the minute one was in situation B, the rules of situation A no longer applied.

The majority of American policy makers were taken in by a cultural stereotype of the Japanese which was interpreted in terms of motives and images projected from the American scene. The anthropologist was useful in making the cultural transition. Moreover, he had grounds in established principles of social science for challenging the assumption that the morale of any people was or could be absolutely impregnable. Morale might be relatively high under certain conditions but

it could not be a constant under all conditions. The problem was to find the right means for widening the cracks and fissures that would inevitably open up with local and general defeats, the pressures of starvation and isolation. The official Japanese line was that no Japanese was taken prisoner unless he was unconscious or so badly wounded he could not move. We swallowed this for a long time. Days or weeks after capture an interrogator behind the lines would ask a prisoner how he happened to be taken. He would give the standard reply, "I was unconscious." This would be entered in the tabulations. Eventually, however, skeptics began to check the reports made at the time of the incident. It was found that Private Watanabe who had been listed as taken while unconscious was actually captured while swimming. The difference between behavior and cultural stereotype is important.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: THE CHIEF COMPONENTS OF USABLE INTELLIGENCE*

By Ladislas Farago

There is no substitute for a keen imagination and painstaking labor in the intelligence process.

An outstanding example of the effectiveness of research and analysis was supplied by a German journalist and military expert whose remarkable intelligence case became celebrated throughout the world. On March 20, 1935, this man, an author named Berthold Jacob, was kidnaped by agents of the German secret service from Switzerland. Jacob had written extensively about the German army that was then in its initial stages of rearmament. He had published a little book which spelled out virtually every detail of the revived General Staff, the army group commands, the various military districts, even the rifle platoons attached to the most recently formed Panzer divisions. It listed the names of the 168 commanding generals of the army and supplied their biographical sketches.

When Hitler was shown the book, he flew into a rage. He summoned Colonel Walther Nicolai, then his adviser in intelligence matters, and asked, "How was it possible for one man to find out so much about the Wehrmacht?" Nicolai decided to find out the answer to this question from Jacob himself. An agent named Hans Wesemann was assigned to contact Jacob and lure him into a trap. Wesemann set up shop in Basel, in Switzerland near the German border, in the guise of a literary agent. He masqueraded as a refugee and struck up friendships with several exiles from Nazi Germany. Then he got in touch with Jacob in London and invited him to come to Switzerland to discuss a literary deal.

Jacob went to Basel with his wife and was received by Wesemann. They deposited Mrs. Jacob at a hotel, then went to a fashionable restaurant to lunch. At one point during this merry meeting, Jacob had to excuse himself to go to the men's

* From *War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence,* Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, 1954, pp 55–58. Copyright 1954 by Funk & Wagnalls Co. Reprinted with permission of the copyright holder.

room. His absence permitted Wesemann to slip a sedative into his drink. The unsuspecting writer returned in high mood and lifted his doctored glass for another toast.

Wesemann sat back in his chair and watched Jacob doze under the impact of the Mickey Finn. He then apologized to the waiter for his inebriated companion and asked him to help carry Jacob to a waiting car. A moment later Jacob was on his way to Germany.

Berthold Jacob arrived in Berlin shortly before midnight, acutely aware of his predicament. He was driven straight to Gestapo headquarters in Prinz Albrecht Strasse and taken to a room on the second floor where a commission of officers and civilians awaited him. At their head was Colonel Walther Nicolai.

The moment Jacob was pushed into the room, Nicolai pounced upon him with the question: "Tell us, Herr Jacob! Where did you get the data for your confounded book?"

There followed an explanation that sounded like an exposition of brilliant intelligence work. "Everything in my book came from reports published in the German press, Herr Oberst," Jacob said. "When I stated that Major General Haase was commanding officer of the 17th Division and located in Nuremberg, I received my information from an obituary notice in a Nuremberg newspaper. The item in the paper stated that General Haase, who had just come to Nuremberg in command of the recently transferred 17th Division, had attended a funeral.

"In an Ulm newspaper," Jacob went on, "I found an item on the society page about a happier event, the wedding of a Colonel Vierow's daughter to a Major Stemmermann. Vierow was described in the item as the commanding officer of the 36th Regiment of the 25th Division. Major Stemmermann was identified as the Division's signal officer. Also present at the wedding was Major General Schaller, described in the story as commander of the division who had come the paper said, from Stuttgart where his division had its headquarters."

This virtually ended the interrogation. Fortunately for Jacob, Nicolai respected good intelligence work. His admiration for the job Jacob had done secured for the writer humane treatment, in addition to which Jacob's wife left no stone unturned to secure her husband's release. The Jacob case became a diplomatic incident. Switzerland demanded that Germany release Jacob at once. The German Foreign Office was embarrassed and made a search for Jacob. He was discovered in the Gestapo jail. Some months later Jacob was returned to Switzerland where he related to me the details of his adventure.

Nicolai reported to Hitler on his findings. "This Jacob had no accomplice, my Fuehrer, except our own military journals and the daily press," he said. "He prepared his remarkable Order of Battle from scraps of information he discovered in obituary notices, wedding announcements, and so forth." He then added in a low voice in which there was suppressed a distant trace of admiration, "This Jacob is the greatest intelligence genius I have ever encountered in my thirty-five years in the service."

The case that at first looked as if it would explode into the greatest espionage scandal ever to rock the German Army was resolved. There was not a spy in it as far as the eye could see. It was a scoop scored by an outstanding civilian whose tools were a pair of scissors, a pot of glue, a file of index cards — and the mind of an intelligence officer.

THE INTENSIVE INTERVIEW AS A MEANS FOR HIGHLIGHTING TARGET VULNERABILITIES*

Report of an interview with a Ukrainian defector.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

The source stated that he was born in a little village of Ukrainian SSR. His mother and father, both of Polish and Ukrainian extraction, worked as farmers and were members of the Catholic church. The source joined the Catholic church at an early age. He described his life as a youth during the thirties as one of misery and suffering. During the famine of 1933 and the subsequent years of his early schooling, he and his fellow pupils suffered intensely from malnutrition, cold and general poverty. The collectivization of the farms, which began in 1933 in the region, and his father's refusal to participate therein added additional burdens to the source's family. Despite extreme hardships, he managed to complete seven years of elementary and grammar school prior to the German occupation.

From 1941 to 1943, under the German occupation, the source worked on a collective farm. He was one of the able-bodied men of the village sent to Germany in 1943 as forced labor. He worked in the coal mines until his liberation by American forces. He stated that he was treated harshly by the Germans, given 300 grams of bread and compelled to work twelve hours daily, even after he fell sick and could hardly move. This experience, however, revealed to him that the Germans lived on a considerably higher level than the Russians.

In 1945, he volunteered for repatriation to the Soviet Union and was inducted into the Soviet Army. The cold reception accorded him as a repatriate was disillusioning to the source, who expected a friendly welcome, and this fact had a bearing on his eventual defection.

He served in the Soviet army first as a private, then as a master sergeant, after completing a four-months' training course at a medical school in Germany. This experience, depicted as one of futility and drudgery, may be interesting as an example of the life of the average soldier. In 1946 he made his last trip to the Soviet Union as a guard convoying demobilized soldiers back to the USSR. The intense suffering and poverty of the Russian and Ukrainian people, worse even than during the pre-war years, made a deep impression on him.

MOTIVES AND CONDITIONS OF DEFECTION

While on a purchasing mission, the source defected. Although extremely dissatisfied with living conditions during his early life, and antagonistic to Soviet rule, both of which factors had a bearing on his final decision to defect, the idea of desertion came to him only after he had joined the Soviet Army in 1945 and had come in contact with the higher standard of living in the West. The following are a number of factors and incidents, related in great detail, all of which contributed to the source's decision to leave the Soviet Union.

He stated that his principal reason for returning to the Soviet Union was to see his mother again. He believed that peace in the world had come to stay and that life under the Soviets would greatly improve; more specifically, that police methods

* Extracted from Interview Report 4, "The Soviet Union as Reported By Former Soviet Citizens," distributed by External Research Staff, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), US Dept of State, 1951.

would be greatly relaxed. He entertained the idea that repatriates would be well received by the Russian authorities. He knew of no reason why this would not be the case.

The recollection of his early childhood in the Ukraine brought bitter memories of suffering, poverty, cold and hunger which influenced him not to return home. The famine and the collectivization of the farms, which began in the region in 1933, were particular horrors which remained vivid in his memory. His father refused to join with the other farmers in the collectivization program and fled to a nearby village where he was able to find work. As a result of the father's action, the police broke the windows of their home, stripped the house of furniture and effects and seized the meager stocks of food supplies. His mother agreed to throw their piece of land into the collectivization scheme and to work under the new order; and the police persecution stopped, although none of the seized food and furniture was returned. The family was saved from starvation by the unexpected receipt of 100 rubles from a relative in Vladivostok. The source claimed his father was a man of strong conviction and would not accede to the new order under any conditions. Finally in 1935, his father was picked up and given a four-year prison sentence. He became ill in jail and was permitted to return home in 1937; shortly after his return he died. During these years, the source's mother had to work on a collective farm as well as bring up four children.

Following his liberation by the Americans the source was removed to a British camp in the British zone. Both the Americans and the British treated him extremely well and supplied him with good food and quarters in marked contrast to those provided by the Germans. He was part of a group of more than one thousand men and women (Russian civilians who had worked in Germany as forced labor) who, in accordance with their wishes, departed for the Soviet sector of Germany. Accompanied by several British soldiers and officers they crossed Germany, taking four days because of bombed out bridges and disrupted tracks.

They were met in the Soviet Zone by two Soviet officers. A kitchen was set up by the tracks and the Russians were fed soup, bread and potatoes. The group was divided into two sections; those from 18 to 30 years and those under 18 and over 30 years of age. The latter group, which included many children, was marched away and the source never heard of them again. Following this, a meeting of the first group was called by the Soviet colonel and they were told in part the following: "You are now again Soviets — all is forgotten. Have no fears about your future. All of you will enter the Soviet Army." He then said that a long march lay ahead and that "it would be better to leave your effects behind." The source never saw his effects again. Accompanied by about fifteen officers and men, the Russians marched from 10:00 P.M. at night to 8:00 A.M. the following morning, a distance of 40 kilometers, until they reached ——. They were completely exhausted and were permitted to lie down in a field where they slept four to five hours. Following this a meal was prepared. Soon after they left for the camp a short distance away; where the source received two and one-half months of basic training. He was then inducted into the Soviet Army.

There were other groups of Russian repatriates in the camp, the total numbering five thousand or more. The camp, according to the source, was built by the Soviets. The barracks were crudely constructed and the men were crowded together in small rooms. There were no mattresses or straw. Food consisted of 500 grams of black bread, one-half liter of soup and 200 grams of kasha or potatoes

daily. Meat was rarely served and no cigarettes were distributed while he was in the camp. Water was available once daily in a large container which was emptied in a short time by the camp inmates. Sometimes they were without water for several days. The source did not know who directed the camp but said the repatriates were under the supervision of a Soviet lieutenant colonel. This man had no authority other than directing the welfare of the Russians who were taking their basic training. Their training was similar to that given a Russian peasant in his native village prior to induction into the Army, although their training period was longer, probably for the purpose of observing the political reliability of the trainees.

The source was questioned only once during basic training by a person he described as an "MGB spy." He was asked "Why did you go to Germany; were you a member of Vlasov's Army (he has since heard that there are soldiers from Vlasov's Army in the Soviet Army today); who liberated you; did you serve in the German Army or in the police; what contact have you had with Germans?" The "MGB interrogator" seemed satisfied with the source's answers. He was questioned along these lines when he entered the two brigades in which he served, and also the medical school. During his three years service with the Army he was constantly made aware of the fact that he was a repatriate. His medical chief in the Brigade, a doctor who was a devout Communist, constantly picked on him, and the source believed that this could be traced to the fact that he had been in Germany during the war. The doctor had said to the source on one occasion, "I would put you in prison if given the opportunity." From a patient he learned that the doctor had specifically ordered a subordinate of the source to watch him, "because he had worked in Germany during the war."

The source heard from one of the attendants at . . . the basic training camp that just prior to their arrival, an echelon of Russian repatriates (over age for the Army) had been ordered to set out from the camp on foot for the Soviet Union. It was rumored that all available train and freight space was being employed in transporting official and personal war "booty" and there was no train space for this group. According to the story, some died from exhaustion while others escaped.

In 1945 an incident involving his elder brother revealed the treatment that was being accorded to repatriates. The brother, who was working away from home, returned home to —— in the late summer for one month's leave. The source received a letter from his brother asking him to request home leave so that they could be together. The request was turned down because he was a repatriate. The brother stayed over an additional month waiting for the source to join him. In late 1945, the source received a letter from his cousin stating that the brother, on returning to his job from the Ukraine, was brought before a court and sentenced to be shot (source believes this letter was missed by the censor). His brother's wife, through a friend who was in contact with the judge, managed to arrange a new trial by the payment of 16,000 rubles to the judge. From a later letter, which was partially censored, he learned that his brother had been set free and a fine of 25% of his wages for six months had been imposed in place of the death sentence. The source stated he received a letter from his brother which said that he had been in court but no further details were given. He believes his brother was charged on two counts, one overstaying his leave one month, and two, writing to his brother, a repatriate, asking him to come home. As a repatriate the source was already a suspect.

In his position with the —— Brigade, the source was sent out of the camp on special errands in connection with his duties, and was able to observe the standard of living of the Germans. He visited German stores and made several acquaintances. (Prior to his flight he told one German male friend of his intention — none of his buddies in the Brigade knew of his plan.) He saw machines and equipment of German make in far greater quantities than he had seen before. In one small factory, there were ten electric motors while in a comparable factory in the Soviet Union there would be only one. More and more the falsity of Soviet propaganda, particularly the Russian claim that living conditions in the Soviet Union were better than anywhere else in the world, was brought home to him. He recalled that while in Germany from 1943 to 1945 he had noticed the better life of the Germans. The source asked himself this question, "Are we, the Russians, better off than the rest of the world?" He said, "It gradually dawned on me that life might be better in the West."

According to the source, his trip to the Soviet Union as a convoy guard in 1946 was another factor which influenced his decision to desert. The misery and suffering of the war invalids, the lack of care given them, the poverty of the masses which was worse than anything he had seen prior to and during the war, made a deep impression. He felt that nothing was being done for the soldier or peasant who had given his health for the war effort. Likewise, in the —— Brigade, the soldier received little medical care. Medical supplies were short and soldiers suffered from malnutrition. He realized that his mother in the Ukraine was also hungry and knew he could not help her by serving in the Army in Germany.

In 1948, he learned from soldiers arriving from the Soviet Union that the repatriates, on their return, were being watched carefully by the police, principally because it was feared they would contaminate others with their admiration for the standard of living in Germany. The source was told that the repatriates from Germany were gradually being picked up and sent to Siberia. He said, "This greatly influenced my decision not to return to Russia again."

Various incidents which occurred while he was serving in the —— Brigade were contributing factors in his defection. One evening, a cook escaped from the camp and spent the night in a nearby town. Returning drunk the following morning, he was put in the guardhouse, and for no known reason died that night. The case was publicized in the camp as an example of what might happen to a soldier who goes into town and drinks bad liquor. During the course of several months in 1948, six men in his Brigade committed suicide, three by jumping from a second story window and three by shooting themselves. The source stated that they were victims of mental depression brought on by the rigid and futile life to which a Soviet soldier is subjected. He himself considered suicide. He also thought of going to Poland, but German friends advised him that this would be difficult and that he would eventually be picked up by the police.

The source had no idea of the reception he would receive. In any case he was willing to take the chance, all the more so after a soldier who joined the Brigade told him that his reception as a repatriate in the Soviet Union would not be pleasant.

With reference to the Kasenkina case, only one paper, *Sovetskoe Slovo*, available to his Brigade (published in Germany) contained a report of the event. The source stated the story posed the question how it was possible, according to international law, for the Americans to take Mrs. Kasenkina forcibly from the grounds of the

Soviet Consulate. It surprised him to hear that she, a Soviet citizen, jumped from the Soviet Consulate. The soldiers were greatly interested in this event. Doubtless, for this reason, further issues of Soviet papers reporting the case were withheld from the reading room.

Asked why Barsov returned, the respondent said he was either out of his mind or a Soviet agent. If he was the latter, he would be treated well by the Soviets on his return, unless he failed to produce valuable information. Referring to himself and his fellow escapees he said they feel that if they were to change their minds now and go back to the Soviet Union, they would with 100 per cent certainty be shot or put in prison for life. If their parents were not already in prison, they too would land there.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

Communist Party

The —— Brigade (smaller than the usual Soviet Brigade) was composed of. . . almost 600 men of whom . . . 100 were officers. Approximately 60 per cent of the officers and 1 per cent of the soldiers were Communists. A party organizer directed the work of the party in the Brigade and good officers were urged to join the Communist Party. Many of them resisted as long as possible because they realized that as a member of the Party they would be in a precarious position. The consequences of even one slip are usually serious for Party members particularly in the Army. The source realized that as a repatriate he could never join the Party, although he became a Komsomol in 1947. His reason for joining was to make it a "little easier" to advance his career. Also it was a prerequisite for entering the medical school. He said that practically all soldiers in the —— Brigade who were worth anything at all and who were not repatriates were invited to join. He believes that he was one of the very few repatriates taken into the ranks of the Komsomol, probably because of his technical ability. As a Komsomol he was required to attend meetings, study the Communist line and endeavor to persuade other soldiers to follow his example. About 5% of the soldiers from the —— Brigade were Komsomols.

The respondent has been told that despite the great difference in the population, approximately the same number of workers are members of the Communist Party in Germany today as in the Soviet Union.

In —— which was typical of most villages in the Western Ukraine, Communists generally held the following positions: chairman of the collective farm; chairman of the village Soviet; and director of the local school. An MGB agent came in his car (the only car other than a truck which was seen in . . . the village) once or twice a week to check with the Communist leaders on political activities in the village. The MGB agent's principal responsibilities were to supervise and to issue certain directives to the Communist chiefs.

Police

A captain and a lieutenant directed the work of the MGB in . . . his Brigade. Their job was to keep a record of the positive and negative attitudes of the soldiers and officers. These men were known to most of the personnel in the unit. The two men, as far as their police work was concerned, were subordinate only to the chief of the MGB office in the division headquarters. In other matters, chiefly administrative, they came under the jurisdiction of ——, Commander of the Brigade. The source believed that the MGB section was separate from the political section.

A penalty battalion was formed under the auspices of the MGB in Germany in 1945 to which soldiers were sent for minor infringements, such as stealing, not saluting an officer, etc. Crimes were principally non-political and offenders served from one month to a year depending upon the degree of the offense. Physical punishment was inflicted on the men and they were compelled to work long hours and perform heavy and dangerous work. It was reported to be "a terrifying experience." The source does not know whether the penalty battalion is in existence today.

While in this Brigade, he heard reports that certain Moscow residents had found microphones in their apartments. In this connection the following expression was occasionally heard, "Man is afraid of the wall." The source stated that political crimes are the most serious for the Ukrainians. Prior to the war and at the present time the general practice for political offenses is to sentence a man to twenty-five years or life imprisonment in Siberia, or to death (the source was aware that the death penalty has been officially abolished). If a man is sent to Siberia for political reasons he has no chance of returning unless he escapes. The state considers a political offender the "most important enemy." For murder, the death penalty is rarely imposed unless the murder is for political reasons. The source recalled an instance of a murder in his native village in 1941. The murderer was sentenced to prison for five years.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

Despite the misery and hardship endured by the source in his early life in the Ukraine, a situation which he, his family, and the villagers blamed on the Soviet regime, he, unlike his parents and the older people in general, accepted the Soviet line that life in the Soviet Union was better than anywhere else in the world, that his country was building a new and better life for the peasant. He was told in school that the people in the West were suffering from hunger and unemployment and there was much talk on the subject of the American Negro, and his "miserable living and working conditions." The United States, at that time, was a far distant land and not a part of the world to which he belonged. In connection with the signing of the Russo-German Pact of August 22, 1939, a lecture was given early in September, 1939, by the head of the school. He said, "Our ally is Germany. It is the only country in the West which is enjoying political and economic success. Our friendship with Germany will be everlasting and we will assist them in case of a conflict with the British or the French Imperialists." This line was constantly reiterated in the school from 1939 to 1941. The source said that he was impressed by the praise of Germany and looked to that country as a friend of the Soviet Union. He said that in the early days of the war the Ukrainians continued to send wheat, eggs, etc., to Germany.

Most Western Ukrainians shared his disappointment over the treatment accorded them by the Germans. The nationalist-minded Ukrainians had welcomed the Germans with open arms and bouquets of flowers, believing that the opportunity had come to break away from the "Bolsheviks." As a result of German brutality, the youth in particular returned their allegiance to the Soviets even though Soviet propaganda had been mistaken in its praise of the Germans as allies. The source received his first jolt from the outside world when he was sent to Germany in 1943 as a forced laborer. He was immediately struck by the living standard of the Germans, which was much higher than that of the Russians. For years Soviet

propaganda had been telling him otherwise. His service in the Soviet Army in Germany from 1945 to 1948, during which time he saw at close range the Germans at work and in their homes, confirmed his earlier impression. The distortions and misrepresentations of Soviet propaganda, revealed by his experience with the Germans, convinced the source that life anywhere else in the world would be better. In July 1945 at ——, where the source took his basic training, the agitators' line of attack was directed against Germany and not the West. At that time British and American films were shown to the Russians. In the fall the attack shifted to the United States and the West.

For dissemination of propaganda, the —— Brigade had a well-organized political section. He defined this section, "as an organ designed to carry out political agitation among the masses." At the apex was a Lieutenant Colonel . . . who was chief of the political section. The chief agitator was a . . . major. A captain held the post of Party organizer. The Komsomol organizer directed a reading club and the activities of the Komsomol members. A *zampolit*, with the rank of major, directed political work in each battalion (there were three in the —— Brigade). A soldier, with the rank of sergeant, assumed the role of agitator in the battalions. The battalion Party organizer was a senior lieutenant and a corporal or private handled Komsomol affairs in the battalion. The Lieutenant Colonel . . . reported to the chief of the division, who in turn took orders from the chief of the political section of the Army Corps (four to five divisions), and the latter reported directly to Moscow. However, other than in specific political work, the above mentioned political chief were under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet troops in the Eastern Zone of Germany.

The office of political information played an important role in the disseminating of propaganda. Latest newspapers, including *Pravda, Izvestya, Sovetskoe Slovo,* and *Sovetskaya Armya* (the last two published in Germany in the Russian language) were available here, as well as the latest speeches of Soviet leaders. The soldiers were required to make morning visits to this office. The source said that he and his buddies usually read only the foreign page as only foreign information was of interest. He described a typical scene in this office as follows: "Some were leaning on their elbows dozing; others drawing pictures or gazing into space." There were nine batteries in the —— Brigade and each one contained a small Lenin library in which soldiers were required to spend part of their leisure time. A register was kept of the readers. Party literature, including the history of the Party, was available in these libraries. A Brigade library was also maintained in which could be found books by the classical authors Gorki, Lev and Alexei Tolstoy, Pushkin, Krylov, and a number of modern authors. Books by American authors were also available, but the attendant made a special note of the name of anyone who took out an American title.

One hour political courses were held twice a week for all soldiers of the —— Brigade in groups of 25 to 50 men: According to the source, these courses were given priority over all other activities. The source studied the biographies of Stalin and Lenin, the mineral wealth of the Soviet Union, and the history of the Communist Party. Occasionally, they would study the international survey from *Pravda* or *Izvestya* or a speech by Molotov, Malenkov or Bulganin on foreign affairs or on some other subject. Lectures were regularly given by the agitator on the decay of the capitalistic system or the Negro question in the United States. Political meetings, embracing the whole Brigade, were held on holidays and other important occasions. Examinations were held twice a year at which the soldiers were tested

orally on their course of study. The only acceptable excuse for not knowing the answers was that a soldier could neither read nor write, and he would be ordered to "bone up."

Referring to the Negro question, the source said that one agitator told them that the Negro would not support the United States in case of war. However, the source stated, this could hardly be believed by Soviet soldiers, a number of whom have seen American Negroes in Germany and have heard of their life and treatment there. He said that they could not help but realize that the lowest Negro in the United States lives better than the average worker in the Soviet Union. The source was surprised to learn that Negroes associated with German girls, which to him was another indication that the Negro is not badly treated by the American authorities.

"The agitator in the army speaks as if he is talking in the name of the people, according to the will of the people." Actually he speaks for the "*Shaika*" (gang), namely the Politburo. The Soviet soldiers in Germany are constantly reminded of the contradiction between propaganda and reality. They are told that life is best in the Soviet Union, that unemployment is rampant in the United States and Western Germany and then in their daily lives in the camp they see Germans better dressed than the Soviets. Some are able to get outside of the camp either on official business or by climbing the camp fence at night and they are immediately struck by the comparatively well-dressed German on the street, the stores with larger stocks than one sees in the Soviet Union, the well-built homes, offices, and superior German equipment and machines.

The source remembered one new arrival in the —— Brigade in 1947. He had just seen the effects of the famine of 1946 in the Ukraine, during which time bread was practically non-existent. He had come through Poland, thence through part of Germany and had been amazed to see people there dressed better than at home. "He quickly awakened to the better life abroad." The source said that soldiers in the —— Brigade had a negative reaction to politics. They often fell asleep or drew pictures during a lecture or study period except when a talk was given on international affairs. "Soviet propaganda goes in one ear and out the other of the Soviet soldier in Germany."

With reference to elections in the Soviet Union, the average Soviet citizen is completely indifferent to them, but realizes that it is obligatory to vote. About 2 to 3 weeks prior to elections (to the Supreme Soviet), special lectures were given twice a week by the chief agitator before the entire Brigade. The biography of the candidate was given in detail, his character was extolled and his war record praised. Finally it was declared that he had earned the right to serve the people as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, short daily pep talks were given to the men in their respective batteries. Elections are held to show the world that the Soviet system is democratic. The source believes that Soviet leaders are confident this practice is successful in strengthening the cause of Communism throughout the world.

The source voted the first time for Marshal Zhukov as Deputy to the Supreme Soviet in 1946. Zhukov's was the only name on the ballot, and it was officially announced that he had received 100% of the vote. He said that he put no mark by Zhukov's name and he talked with a close friend, whom he trusted, who claimed he crossed out Zhukov's name. The source voted again for a Lieutenant Colonel in 1947, who was likewise elected unanimously as Deputy to the Supreme Soviet. A special room was set up within the camp for the voting. As ballots were handed

out, names were entered by a registrar. There were five to six secret voting booths in which pencils were provided. Although he is not sure, he believes there were two other names on the ballot in the 1947 election. The source then folded his ballot and dropped it through a slit in the box. Answering the interviewer's question as to whether the authorities have any way of checking how each person voted, he answered categorically "no."

INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES

The source in his youth vaguely accepted the Soviet line toward the West, but he had no conception or understanding of what a country beyond the continent of Europe would be like. The United States was very far distant and not a part of the life to which he belonged. . . .

The Russian people know of American aid during the war and have not forgotten that it contributed greatly to the support of and to raising the morale of both the soldiers and the people. They saw American food. American tins were on workers' ration cards in Moscow during the war. Studebaker trucks were the mainstay of the Russian army and Studebaker chassis carried Soviet artillery, American jeeps are still being used and have been an effective advertisement for the United States. The source stated that the United States should have concentrated on sending food instead of trucks and machines, as the latter are used widely today and similar patterns are already in production in the Soviet Union. He knew of no Ukrainian during the war who had received a gift from an American.

With reference to strikes in the United States, the source was amazed that the police protect the strikers. According to Soviet propaganda, workers in the United States receive poor pay and work long hours, and "they strike to improve these conditions." The agitators told the soldiers in the army in 1948 that the Russian worker lives better and is more capable than the average Western worker and "there is no necessity to strike."

The Soviet soldier who has served abroad and the Russian generation which is now 50 years of age or older does not think that the United States wants war or is "aggressive." The reason for this, according to the source, is that the constant harping of Soviet propaganda on the American war mongers is having quite the opposite effect from the one intended. Again the source referred to youth in the Soviet Union today who knows nothing of life abroad, does not believe its parents and accepts the Soviet propaganda.

The source said that now is the time to go to war against the Soviet Union. The Russian people are exhausted and its morale is low. Technically the country is far behind the West. "The Soviet Union is a rotten, putrid, regime." Also, the Germans are weak at present and will offer no threat to anyone.

He first heard of the atomic bomb when the Americans dropped it on Hiroshima. The Soviets who were taking basic training with the source at —— were greatly impressed by its terrific force, and frightened by what it might do to them and to the Russian people if it were ever used against them. If the Russians have the bomb, they will use it as soon as war breaks out and will not consider the moral problem involved.

When the Soviets entered the war with Japan on August 9, 1945, a meeting was held of all basic trainees. They were asked if they would agree to fight against Japan, to which they all said "yes." The source said the war with Japan ended September 3, 1945. He had never heard that the Americans and British had previously come to terms with the Japanese.

LIFE IN THE SOVIET ARMY

The source characterized his experience in the Soviet Army as one of futility and hopelessness, that of a virtual prisoner. Little consideration or care was ever shown for his welfare and there were no pleasures in his life. He compared his life to that of a fly.

Entering the Soviet Army in Germany in 1945, the source took an oath which, in part, included the following: "To the last drop of blood I will serve my country . . . if I violate my oath, let the hatred and scorn of the Russian people fall upon me."

In 1948, he served as a . . . first sergeant in the —— Brigade. His job called for five subordinates but the source had only two assistants and a chauffeur. His work consisted of treating sick men for all types of diseases imaginable. "Every soldier had an ailment." They included heart trouble, malaria, tuberculosis, angina, grippe, stomach troubles (ulcers, chronic gastritis). The most common ailment was trench foot, an infection of the feet resulting from mud and dirt accumulated in boots, and it was extremely contagious. The infection would often embrace the entire foot and the victim suffered intensely. Occasionally it was even necessary to amputate the foot. He said that in the spring of 1948, 30% of the entire Brigade was afflicted with this infection. There is no specific cure for it and only symptoms can be treated. Venereal disease was rare in the unit because enlisted men were not permitted to leave the camp unless they were under special orders. Ten to fifteen men came to sick call daily, some crying or complaining bitterly of the lack of proper treatment. Medical supplies were short and modern medicines unknown, and the source felt that little effort was made by the doctor to acquire adequate medical supplies to treat the men.

The source emphasized that there was a sharp distinction, both socially and materially, between the officers and enlisted men. "Officers did not have a friendly attitude toward the men and walked around with their noses in the air." During their basic training they had been instructed to maintain this attitude. The officers, both married and single, had limited ration cards which entitled them to purchase milk, butter, sugar, meat, candy, fruit, clothes, shoes, cigarettes, and vodka at a store set up within the camp for officers only. In reply to the interviewer's question as to whether an officer ever gives a drink to an enlisted man, he answered "never." The source recalled observing wives of officers procuring the best meat and fat, leaving the bones and grist to the enlisted men. The store for enlisted men contained pencils, paper, tooth powder, and mirrors. The soldiers could not bring their wives nor, under any circumstances, were they to associate with German girls. It was difficult, in fact practically impossible, to get home leave even if a mother or father had died. Movies were shown to officers and enlisted men jointly but the social club was for officers only. Officers could enter and leave the camp freely and some of them were quartered inside.

The talk of the Soviet soldier was principally concerned with food and living problems and his daily routine. The soldiers were afraid of one another, not knowing who was an agent of the MGB, and therefore never offered criticism except that relating to their personal problems. He said, "If you said anything good about the Germans and an agent learned of this, your name would be placed on a black list. After two or three such offenses you were sent to Siberia." At the day's end the soldier would say to himself, "Thank God I have finished another day." New arrivals to the Brigade in 1948 from the Soviet Union used to say, "You are lucky to be here in Germany where you are certain to get something to eat."

The dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with the regime is reflected in the attitude of the average Soviet soldier. He does not want to fight again. If he does, it would be only for his family. The Soviet soldier at the end of 1948 was not hostile toward the Americans and believed that a conflict with the United States would be futile in view of American technical achievement. The source stated that "the soldiers understood that if the Soviets suffered an early defeat in World War III, this would mean a breakdown in the Army's morale and the general collapse of the Soviet fighting forces." Soldiers who have served abroad, particularly in Germany, are disillusioned on their return to the Soviet Union, where it is difficult to find a job which pays enough to eat. The man who has fought five years at the front has received no special consideration. Pensions are granted to wounded but are not adequate for a minimum subsistence.

It was the responsibility of both the commandant and the chief of the Political Section in the —— Brigade to maintain and bolster the morale of the soldiers so that, according to the words of the commandant, "They would be prepared for a new war." Under conditions of mistrust and suspicion among the soldiers and their general dissatisfaction with conditions, such a task becomes difficult. Sport competitions were arranged to stimulate the interest of the soldiers. Medals of merit were awarded to the soldiers. These they readily accepted, but with a grain of salt, according to the source. The majority of the soldiers were aware of the insincerity behind these methods of inciting the soldiers to perform greater tasks. Many of the men in the —— Brigade had served at the front, and a number of them constantly talked of their valorous exploits and showed resentment toward the source because he was a repatriate. Everyone knew of the source's service in Germany during the war.

The source reported the following as an example of the treatment accorded a soldier. While on the trip to the Soviet Union in 1946 as a convoy guard, referred to earlier, he slept for eight days on the floor of the Belorussian and Kursk stations in Moscow. He said, "Nothing is done for the consideration or comfort of the Soviet soldier." When the source was liberated by the Americans in 1945 he was amazed to find that the American soldier had so much leisure time and seemed so happy.

EDUCATION

In 1941, the source had completed seven years of elementary and low middle school. He studied the Ukrainian language from the first grade, the Russian from the third and German from the fifth. He took courses in geometry, geography, zoology, botany, algebra, Ukrainian literature, Russian literature, ancient, medieval and Soviet history, and physical culture; and studied singing and dancing. In the 7th grade, a special course was given on the Stalin Constitution of 1936. He recalled the political slant of the literature and history courses although at that time he had no idea that ancient history or the history of the middle ages could be slanted. His deepest impression was that everything Soviet was the best. He was convinced of the fact that the West was suffering from hunger and unemployment and that the Negroes lived a poor, miserable and persecuted life. Occasionally political lectures were substituted in place of the Ukrainian and Russian literature courses, and he remembered one on the Russo-German Pact of 1938. He was much impressed with the emphasis placed on Germany, on which subject there were many lectures in the period following the signing of the pact and up to the outbreak

of war in June 1941. Only Ukrainian was spoken among the population and in the school, and no one in the village could actually speak Russian in 1943.

With reference to the Communist Party, he said that approximately 50% of the teachers in his school, including the director, were members of the Party. The following were the political groups: Oktyabrata, first and second graders 40 to 50% of the class; Pioneers, ages 9 to 14 — 45% of each class; Komsomols, 14 years and up — 10 to 15% of each class. Meetings were arranged by Komsomol leaders at which the pupils were told to study harder, to follow the great leaders of the Soviet Union and not to be trouble makers. The source said it was dangerous to criticize the regime, in this way reflecting the attitude of the parents. He remembered that when he was very young, his mother had said, "Never talk outside about what we say at home." This contradiction of thought made it difficult for the pupil.

After 1939, those in the 8th through the 10th class had to pay 150 rubles a year, in addition to the price of the text books, which they also purchased in the early grades. Because of this extra expense he could not possibly have afforded to study further. There were never enough text books to go around among the students. In 1940 the source knew of no plan for the placing of students in jobs following completion of school. Whether they continued in school and attended a higher middle school depended entirely upon the wishes of the pupil and family.

POLITICAL CONCEPTS

The source defined the following concepts:

"Capitalism — A system under which a worker can strike;
Imperialism — The highest stage of capitalism;
Communism — It doesn't exist in the Soviet Union."

The Soviet leaders are only operating under the mask of Communism. When you read the doctrine of Communism and compare its theory with the practice in the Soviet Union today, you find little similarity. The source had no idea of the meaning of "Wall Street."

A GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWING SOVIET ESCAPEES*

Even the most violently anti-Communist members of a defector group have unwittingly accepted important tenets of communism. This and many other equally important factors must be considered in interrogating individuals of Soviet origin.

In 1950 the US Air Force undertook by means of a contract with the Harvard University Russian Research Center a study of the Soviet Social System. In the course of the major study more than 3000 Russian escapees and displaced persons were interviewed. By mid 1952, when it became possible to examine completed interview records and to discuss these with the individuals who had done the interviewing, a project officer suggested the desirability of putting down in writing the

* This account is based in very large measure on a report by Alice H. Bauer, "A Guide For Interviewing Soviet Escapees," Research Study 3, Air Research and Development Command, Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Aug 53. Only those portions that are quoted in this study come directly from the report, which is much longer than this condensation.

interview experiences and lessons learned. The report from which this case was taken was thus produced in accordance with this suggestion as a by-product of the basic study.

In reading this case it is important for the reader to bear in mind that all Soviet personnel who were questioned *volunteered* to answer the questions, that all interviews were conducted by Harvard University Russian Research Center personnel, and that with only a few exceptions the individuals interviewed were not under military control or in military custody.

Ninety-three percent of those interviewed were of Slavic origin (Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians). All those interviewed were either wartime displaced persons or members of the Soviet occupation forces who had left the Soviet sectors of Germany and Austria after World War II. Although the term "defector" is the most accurate description for persons who deliberately chose to leave the USSR or territory under its control, it was found desirable to eliminate the concept of "defector" from the interviewer's vocabulary because of its potentially bad effect on the respondent. The term carries a distinctly negative connotation, suggesting disloyalty and desertion not only of a political system but also of one's country.

RUSSIANS AS RESPONDENTS

"Three orders of events affect the relation of a Russian refugee to the interviewer:

(1) a residue of traditional Russian character and culture; (2) his experience under the Soviet regime; and (3) his status as a displaced person or defector. Although it is possible to identify the effects of each of these factors, in many instances they work against each other.

"Russians are basically warm, emotional people. This underlying desire for friendly human relationships has been frustrated in the Soviet Union and intensified by the situation of deprivation and uncertainty in which they find themselves as displaced persons, defectors or refugees. The interviewer will find that the combination —

(1) the desire for warm, friendly relationships and

(2) the feeling of uncertainty and fear or rejection

produces a complicated phenomenon which can help or hinder his task. If the interviewer recognizes and responds favorably to this frustrated need for friendly human relations, it can be a tremendous asset in obtaining rapport and in the conduct of the interview. The relatively cold, correct, formal manner with which an American can normally be interviewed *may prove a barrier* in dealing with Russian respondents."

Added to these considerations is the further

" . . . fact that most refugees have had unfortunate experiences with authorities: Soviet, German, or Allied. Starting with their Soviet experience, they have become, as a matter of survival, masters in the art of lying. The interviewer must learn to accept this as a matter of fact. To the extent that he can create an interview situation as far removed as possible from the situation of fear in which Russians learn to lie, he will enable and encourage them to tell the truth. However, since complete success cannot be hoped for, the interviewer will have to put up with a certain amount of concealment.

"The Soviet refugee is beset by a wide variety of fears which a project member who interviewed many Russians summarized as follows:

"*Fear* of the interviewer as a secret agent (for any power) or as a rash journalist;

"*Fear* of being overheard during the interview (for this reason I was often unable to get valuable information while interviewing in the camps);

"*Fear* of disclosing a pro-Communist past (as a black spot on immigration security);

"*Fear* of disclosing anti-Communist activity (which sometimes had, or was given, a fascist-traitor tinge);

"*Fear* of authority as such (one informant even dodged German policemen on the street, and all Americans represent authority);

"*Fear* of motor vehicles stopping outside the house (memories of the repatriation 'black crows');

"*Fear* of the end of the world (Stalin as anti-Christ);

"*Fear* of a Communist seizure of Germany and the consequences for the Russian DP's (particularly if they've informed to an American);

"*Fear* of retaliation on relatives still in Russia (particularly if the interviewer learns their names);

"*Fear* of a new repatriation agreement (the first one completely disillusioned many; they feel themselves helpless under manipulations of the big powers);

"*Fear* of the German Communists (who often pull the jobs for the MGB)*;

"*Fear* of the Allied Intelligence (which has many agents among the DP's);

"*Fear* of other DP groups (as agents for the Communists).

"In addition to these fears, the Soviet refugee has feelings of deep-seated guilt:

"*Guilt* for having deserted his motherland;

"*Guilt* for having left his relatives behind — perhaps to suffer for his flight; and, paradoxically,

"*Guilt* for having escaped from the continued suffering of his fellow Russians under the Soviet regime.

" . . . Most refugees and defectors are thoroughly anti-Soviet even though almost all of them bear, to some extent, the stamp of the regime from which they have fled. Most Russians accept unwittingly certain aspects of Soviet propaganda. While anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, they are often simultaneously anti-capitalist and pro-welfare state. In part this is due to sincere conviction and to the acceptance of certain social and political values whereby Europeans as a whole are distinguished from Americans. In part it is also due to ignorance of the capitalist West.

* MGB stands for the *Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti*, which translated is the Ministry of State Control or Ministry of State Security. This ministry operated a secret police system, which was merged into the MVD according to *Pravda*, 16 March 1953.

"Those aspects of Soviet propaganda which have been most thoroughly rejected are those which pertain to life in the Soviet Union. Refugees have had the opportunity to check such propaganda statements against their daily lives. Only after they leave the Soviet Union, however, do they have even a limited chance to check by experience the Bolshevik statements concerning the West. The interviewer will find that Soviet refugees and defectors retain with good faith a discouraging proportion of the Soviet contentions about the West. . . ."

AMERICANS AS INTERVIEWERS OF RUSSIANS

"By and large, Americans are unaccustomed to the direct and spontaneous expression of emotion to which Russians are likely to give vent easily. Therefore, American interviewers may well be embarrassed or at a loss as to how to handle such situations. Furthermore, the American is likely to find himself in the position of a powerful figure who can give and withhold favors. He finds that a large proportion of the Russians whom he meets will attempt to establish relationships of both physical and emotional dependency. The American must learn both to accept this pressure and to handle it gracefully without becoming too personally involved and upset. While he may run into a considerable number of 'phonies,' he also encounters a very great number of persons who have experienced profound personal tragedies. Even though he finds much to disapprove in the behavior of each of these persons, he is, in most cases, extremely sympathetic to their plight and finds himself constantly inclined to become personally upset over the stories they have to tell and the situations in which they find themselves.

"The way in which the American interviewer tends to become disturbed by the situation of the Russian refugee respondent enters into a curious interplay with another aspect of the interview situation: the extent to which the American disapproves of much of the behavior and attitudes of the person whom he is interviewing. As previously noted, the refugees are, to a surprising extent, products of the Soviet system even when they reject it. It is not enough that the interviewer be rationally aware of this; emotionally he finds himself torn between the temptation either to accept or reject these people completely. Any interviewer, particularly one with very sensitive personal emotions, may suddenly find himself dismissing the entire group of Soviet *émigrés* with such a judgment as 'They're nothing but a bunch of Communists who couldn't make good in the system.' Any other opinion would do as well. What is pertinent is not the truth or falsity of the judgment, but the fact that the American interviewer tends to invoke it as a protection against the disturbance which he feels from being placed in direct contact with these people. If he gives in to his impulse, his effectiveness as an interviewer is jeopardized."

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW

In establishing rapport between Soviet refugee respondents and American interviewers it is important that a number of factors be taken into account.

Personality Factors

"A warm, personal relationship with a good deal of give-and-take between interviewer and respondent is essential for Soviet refugees. . . . The Soviet *émigré* not only insists that the interviewer be friendly and pleasant but demands more of a two-way exchange of conversation. Among other things, he wants to know something about the interviewer. He often asks personal questions and expects an answer. One of the clinical psychologists on the Harvard Project with years of experience in research and therapeutic interviewing had never been asked by a respondent why she was not married. The Soviet refugees not only asked, but made her feel that she had to answer sincerely and that she could not parry with an evasive response.

"It is not sufficient to say that the interviewer should conduct the interview in a friendly fashion. To the extent that it is possible, interviewers should be selected who have 'warm' personalities. An interviewer who appears to be stiff and formal is at a distinct disadvantage. . . . A cold, formal personality seems to place a barrier between interviewer and respondent which disturbs most Russians and inhibits rapport. While this may be true in general of all peoples, it seems that this is a trait which, in its degree of importance, distinguishes Russians from members of other national groups. . . .

"For an American, an interview is usually a neutral, sometimes a pleasant, but seldom a threatening situation. Soviet refugees, however, have been interviewed in the USSR predominantly under circumstances in which their welfare, their security, in fact their lives have been at stake, and by persons whose manners ranged from impersonal to completely hostile. Even interviews for job and school applications were fraught with an atmosphere of tension. Implicit in the attitude of the authority conducting the interview was the suspicion that the respondent was probably lying, and the conviction that it was the interviewer's responsibility to *uncover* the truth. In situations such as these, refugees have become past masters at the art of lying and covering up. In addition, many of them have had fairly unpleasant interview experiences with Allied agencies.

"They have learned to lie under cold, impersonal interviewing or interrogation. In a friendly atmosphere the cues for lying are reduced and the respondent tends to drop his guard. While one cannot guarantee that a respondent will necessarily tell the truth in a friendly, open situation, he will certainly be less frightened, and thus more inclined to drop his habit of prevarication than in a situation where he is confronted with a barrage of cold, impersonal questions which are reminiscent of unpleasant experiences in the Soviet Union.

" . . . Although there is always a risk that the refugee will lie or distort even under the best circumstances, it may be anticipated that this tendency will be reduced to the extent that it is possible to create an interview atmosphere that is as different as possible from the circumstances under which he has learned the habits of deception and falsification; and, in this situation, even his lies will be more revealing.

"Another difference between Russian and American respondents is the variation in the quality of rapport between the first and subsequent interviews. Regardless of its nature, the first interview with American respondents is often the best; succeeding interviews often degenerate because the respondent is embarrassed by having been too confidential. With Soviet refugees the reverse is true. There are exceptions on both sides, but as an overstatement in the right direction one might say that a Soviet refugee is not embarrassed by revealing personal matters to a person whom he regards as a friend, and will reveal them more freely as he gets to know the person better."

Rank and Status

"In spite of the need for friendly relationships, the Russians are extremely rank and status conscious. By and large, they are surprised at, and occasionally even contemptuous of, what seem to them to be informal relationships between personnel of different ranks in our military services. Status in Soviet civilian relationships is reminiscent of imperial German society, all propaganda about the 'classless society' notwithstanding. . . . Ideally, such a person should be interviewed by someone of equal or higher rank. When the interviewer is in uniform his own rank is obvious, and the respondent will feel that his status is being given due consideration. If the interviewer is a civilian, it would be well to call him 'doctor' or 'professor,' or to establish his importance in some other way. This is not the place for subtlety and the interviewer should be introduced by an intermediary who will make it amply clear that the interviewer is a person of importance.

"Persons of high status want an interviewer of high status as a token of prestige and of the fact that their own importance is appreciated. (A colonel has enough status to interview a general, even though the status difference between these two ranks is greater than in the American services.) If it is impossible to supply an interviewer of appropriate rank, the situation can be manipulated by pointing out that the interviewer is the right-hand man of someone of high rank. In such a case, it would be well for the high ranking person to have a drink with the respondent before the interview, carrying on the amenities through an interpreter.

"Respondents of medium and low status should, when possible, be interviewed by someone of at least their own status. There is no reason why the interviewer cannot be of considerably higher status. . . .

"At all levels, Russians seem to have an almost touching need to be taken seriously. Several respondents were very disturbed when they learned that they would not be interviewed by the director of the project. . . . All in all, it is preferable for the middle and lower classes of people to be interviewed by persons of similar status. Their need to be taken seriously can be handled by the interviewer himself. If the interviewer does respect the respondent and assures him that what he has to say is valuable and will be used, this will compensate for an initial disappointment that the respondent did not get a high ranking interviewer."

OTHER FACTORS

Knowledge about the Soviet Union

"It is essential that the interviewer be fairly well informed about the Soviet Union for this, too, affects rapport. The refugees feel that Americans are extremely naive about the USSR and should be told everything in order to be put straight. . . .

"Even minor indications of knowledge are very helpful, as in the case where the interviewer used the word *blat** in asking a question. The respondent laughed loudly and said that he had not thought that foreigners knew the Soviet jargon. The respondent had not been uncooperative prior to this but rapport improved noticeably at this point."

Ethnic Conflicts

"The Soviet Union has been unsuccessful in wiping out conflicts among the national minorities. Indeed, in some instances nationality conflicts may have been intensified. Anti-semitism is widespread and numbers of various groups, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, etc., are sometimes extremely nationalistic. If the parental background of an American, interviewing a member of another group, is either Russian or that of one of the minority groups, this may present problems. One of the Harvard Project interviewers, who was of mixed Ukrainian and Russian origin and had a German name, said that if he had to do it over again he would take advantage of his German surname and not let it be known that he had a Slavic background.

". . . If the interviewers do not have a Slavic background there should not be much difficulty. Most Ukrainians will speak Russian to a non-Russian, but many will not to a Russian. A few cannot speak Russian, and a few will not speak Russian under any circumstances without a real loss of rapport. Hence, since any large scale interviewing may involve Ukrainians, the presence of someone who speaks Ukrainian and who does not have a Russian name would be valuable. If the interviewers have Slavic names it would be well to be careful to assign them refugees of similar or non-conflicting national origins for interviewing.

"Although many of the respondents expressed distinctly anti-semitic sentiments, two of the Harvard Project's most successful interviewers were Jewish. It is difficult to assess the importance of anti-semitism as a factor affecting interview success. However, in the light of the admitted anti-semitism of the refugees, it would probably be wise to avoid a predominantly Jewish interviewing staff. . . .

"In addition, the Soviet refugee lives in constant fear of denunciation to or by a Soviet agent. Even Americans interviewing for an American university were occasionally accused of being Soviet agents. If the interviewers were themselves refugees this fear would be — with some justifica-

* *Blat* means "pull" as might be exerted by an "operator" to obtain supplies, materials, products, etc. through "connections."

tion — intensified. Finally, if it becomes necessary to use refugee interviewers they should be screened for personality types, and those who tend to exhibit the 'Soviet personality' in contrast to the 'Russian personality' should not be used. The refugee who shows any of the characteristics of the present day Soviet bureaucrat is too reminiscent of unpleasant experiences with the NKVD."*

Areas of Sensitivity

"The following areas of sensitivity may destroy rapport if improperly handled:

"Even the most anti-Soviet of the refugees have a good deal of national pride. Love for Mother Russia is extremely deep. They talk about it more than do the people of the West and they seem to be much more emotional about it;

"Many of them are proud of Soviet accomplishments in industry, medicine, and education, although they are critical of some of the aspects of these same institutions;

"They are generally reluctant to discuss questions of personal morals;

"They are rather sensitive about their relationship (i.e., as defectors, displaced persons) to the Soviet Union and to the West;

"They are extremely sensitive to even minor humiliations;

"They are critical of American policy toward DP's as a group and of American policy toward the Soviet Union and Soviet refugees."

Interview Setting

"There is no doubt that the attitude and personality of the interviewer are more important than the physical surroundings, but a desirable setting helps set the mood and facilitates establishing rapport. *Privacy is essential.* Lack of privacy is probably the only physical handicap which cannot be overcome by a skilled interviewer. . . .

"It is desirable to have a pleasant room which is not too formal and business-like. An office which is practically barren may be reminiscent of NKVD interviewing quarters. A room with draperies, a rug, a desk, and a comfortable armchair for the respondent, creates an atmosphere which is at once relaxing and yet sufficiently business-like to indicate more than a purely social hour. If the respondent's chair is placed beside the desk instead of directly in front of it, it helps create an air of friendly informality. . . . Besides being pleasant, the room should be large enough for the respondent to pace up and down in it if he wants to. Russians tend to be quite active at times in interviews and occasionally act out incidents they are relating.

"Cigarettes are a necessity. Russians are very fond of American cigarettes and seem to expect them. They not only facilitate relaxation, but they are among the few things which can be offered the respondent without

* NKVD or *Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* was the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs; when all commissariats were changed to ministries in 1946, the secret policy functions of the NKVD were assumed by the MVD and MGB.

humiliating him. Tea falls into this same category. Russians not only enjoy tea for its own sake (much more than Americans do), but also appreciate highly the warm, friendly atmosphere which it helps create. . . ."

In conducting the interview, the interviewer must grant the Russian refugee respondent a period in which to "let off steam," since almost every one has his own particular story that he wants to tell and that he will insist on telling eventually. To refuse him this privilege not only interferes with rapport but will probably always result in time wasted in attempts to fight off the inevitable.

Soviet interviewees suffer from two major fears: of being discriminated against by Americans if they reveal something in their personal history that Americans may regard with disfavor (such as Communist Party membership); of having friends and relatives suffer if the information they give gets back to the USSR. As a result, they are likely to falsify three types of information: (1) personal history; (2) specific information about the Soviet Union for fear that its use may bring harm to friends or relatives (such as the bombing of an industrial installation in their home town); and (3) they may distort their answers in order to tell Americans what they think Americans want to hear.

The interviewer should be prepared to cope with such problems, taking them in stride as they arise. Such falsification should be regarded as a natural reaction, and more or less, as an indication of the informant's sincerity. The refugee who should put the interviewer on guard is not the one with whom he has difficulties, or who may express occasional anti-American feelings, but the one who comes with an air-tight story and appears to be completely and unequivocally sympathetic to the Western point of view. The latter is, in general, an unnatural point of view and may point to the informant's being an agent.

Research in Support of Psychological Warfare

There is need on a continuing basis for both basic and applied research in support of current and future psychological warfare operations. Following World War II and especially during the period of combat operations in Korea an increased emphasis was placed on the requirement for general social science research. However, there is anything but complete agreement as to how useful the research undertaken has been to psychological warfare operations. Two eminent American sociologists, John W. Riley, Jr., and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., both at times members of *ad hoc* and standing government committees to assess and program government-sponsored research, offer some thought-provoking comments in an article, "Research for Psychological Warfare," reproduced below.

In this account the authors discuss the uneven development of psychological warfare research and suggest that the deficiencies in the postwar research effort may be in part attributed to too much preoccupation with questions on either a very simple level of operation or an extremely complex level dealing with basic problems in human motivation and interaction. Riley and Cottrell suggest the feasibility of providing a more realistically conceived research program designed to fall somewhere between these two

extremes. They express the strong conviction that unless the major research effort is reoriented to provide theoretical formulations and implementing methodologies capable of dealing with the many problems facing operators, social science research will not be able to make its proper contribution to the solution of relevant problems in the field of psychological warfare operations.

RESEARCH FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By John W. Riley, Jr. and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.

Although past research in psychological warfare has not led to a theory of communication, it makes possible the formulation of several rather firm propositions about target audiences, message content, and message effect. It also suggests some specific avenues of research that might prove rewarding.

Shortly after D-day, in June 1944, the first rounds of leaflet shell were fired from artillery positions on the still insecure Normandy beachhead. Within a few hours, six German soldiers, each carrying a surrender leaflet, crossed the fluid battle line to surrender to the American forces. With the interrogation of these first German POW's in France there began one of the little known but highly useful research operations of World War II.

The typical research design followed in these operations called for data which would permit the correlation of leaflets with number of prisoners, and provided information on prisoner comments concerning the leaflets themselves. Here was an operational research problem in its simplest form. Here was one way to cope with the query of the hard-bitten field commander who asked: "Can you come up with some real evidence that these paper shell of yours can do anything but clutter up the landscape?"

Here, however, is illustrated one of the great dilemmas of psychological warfare research. On the one hand, it is highly necessary to develop readily applicable research techniques which will provide some immediate answers to the commander's problems as he understands them. On the other hand, it is equally important that the research not be left at such a superficial level. Sooner or later the commander needs to know why and under what conditions psychological warfare produces actual surrenders. The simple inference of causation, whenever leaflets are found on prisoners, is no substitute for such insights as those of the British psychiatrist, Colonel H. V. Dicks, who, later in the war, on the basis of systematic analysis of POW interrogations, identified the "hard-core" Nazi as "idealistic zealots" who lived on unrealistic and metaphysical arguments; or as "party toughs" who were held in line by "a sense of comradeship in guilt, excitement and adventure"; or as "concealed fanatics" whose "private fantasy world (and) the Nazi ideology and practice of brutality fit as a perfect expression of a . . . distorted mentality."[11]

Nor is the evidence of consistently favorable prisoner comment on leaflets any substitute for the more sophisticated research approaches which, during the Korean

* From *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21:147–58 (1957). Reprinted with the permission of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the two authors.

War, began to yield conceptualizations of surrender as a much more complex process than appears on the surface. As Linebarger has put it, "surrendering does not depend upon the disposition of the individual enemy soldier to say yes or no to the war as a whole. . . . The actual physical process of surrender is an elaborate one. . . ." (p 288)[7]

Another illustration also begins on the Normandy beachhead. Air strikes against German posts in various French villages had been ordered as part of the softening-up process just after D-day; and while general warning leaflets, designed to protect French civilians, had been dropped prior to each attack, it was soon evident that the message on the leaflet was frequently not heeded. A small research team was consequently detached to find a quick answer. The project didn't take long. French civilians, even while seeking kin and possessions in the smoking rubble, were asked if they had noticed any leaflets prior to the bombing. The answer was invariably in the affirmative. They were then shown a copy of the actual warning leaflet which had been dropped and asked if they had happened to see this particular one. The answers continued in the affirmative. Next they were asked to give the sense of the message and, in most cases, their answers showed that its meaning was comprehended. They were finally asked why they had not acted on the message and moved out of the village, and their answers were quite straightforward. They simply had not supposed the leaflets were meant for them. They thought that possibly the wind had carried them from some other battle area.

While the research came up with a perfectly satisfactory operational answer to the immediate problem, — that it was impossible to communicate with French civilians in villages which were about to be bombed unless the actual target was clearly indicated on the leaflet — it did not throw much light on the more basic question of why the French perceived the leaflets as they did.

Later in the war, there were several cases of more elaborate research findings demonstrating, among other things, that the acceptance, rejection, or distortion of any communicated message depends in no small measure upon the nature of the group relationships of the recipients of the message. One interesting example of this was the Shils-Janowitz analysis of the disintegration of the German *Wehrmacht*, in which it was pointed out that the most receptive targets for Allied messages "were groups where solidarity and ability to function as a unit were largely destroyed."[12]

During World War II, and later in Korea, research in support of psychological warfare operations played a significant role. Yet no systematic account of this effort, comparable to the story of research on soldier reaction to training and combat described in *The American Soldier* will probably ever be written, despite the fact that the research problems put to the Psychological Warfare Division were no less significant for military effectiveness than those which were put to the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division.*

Perhaps the absence of such a systematic summary of psychological warfare research may be explained partly in terms of widely varying types of problems

* Several excellent accounts have of course appeared, notably; Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar;*[13] Thomson, *Overseas Information Services of the United States Government;*[14] Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish.*[15] Interested readers will also look forward to a forthcoming work on this subject by Murray Dyer, which, incidentally, has been helpful in the preparation of this essay. An overview of the literature as a whole is given by the new bibliography prepared by Bruce L. Smith and Chitra M. Smith, *International Communication and Political Opinion.*[16]

which were posed for research. At one extreme were the simple operational problems of the nose-counting variety: "What proportion of prisoners carried leaflets?" "Were the French civilians warned to move?" Such questions as these could usually be dealt with successfully, since appropriate research techniques were at hand. At the other extreme, global and far-reaching questions of psychological warfare strategy were asked. These questions led directly to the bases of human motivation, communication, and social structure. Not only were the research techniques inadequate; the necessary theory was lacking as well. Research on these broad questions, with a few exceptions such as the projects of Dicks, or Shils and Janowitz, did not thrive.

The Need for Middle-Range Research

One might well inquire why research has tended to fluctuate between these two extremes and disregard the important middle-range problems. It is our contention that this is in part reflective of the varying moral and financial support accorded to psychological warfare research. Whenever, at the simple level, a few projects have succeeded in finding reasonably satisfactory answers, an atmosphere favorable to research was created. The increased research activity, however, has invariably led to the raising of basic questions and, at this point, disillusionment has quickly followed. The hard-headed user of research has little patience with the defining of abstract types, or with mathematical models of interaction, despite the researcher's need of all such tools before he is ready to come up with solutions applicable to complex problems. What seems to be required, therefore, is a realistic research program on a level which is intermediate between the simple and the complex. Answers at the simple level are not enough. Answers at the complex level await the development of requisite techniques and an appropriate body of theory.

Conventionally, propagandists tend to think in terms of the formula: *Who* says *what* to *whom*, and with *what effect*. Thus, a basis is provided not only for a division of labor in an operational sense, e.g., leaflet or script writers who produce the communicated "what," the research personnel who report on the "what effect," and so on; but also implicit in the scheme are the elements of a theory of communication. This is not to say, however, that any unified theory of communication is actually at hand. It is, rather, to point out that most of the work has centered in a somewhat disjointed fashion upon one or more of these elements:

1. The audience (the *whom* element), i.e., classificatory or descriptive analyses of target audiences.
2. The message content (the *what* element), i.e., content analyses and policy considerations as to what is communicated.
3. Response and evaluation (the *effect* element), i.e., research on the extent to which the message has produced the desired effect.

The fourth element — the communicator or the information source — has received very little attention in the development of research for psychological warfare, despite its obvious importance. Results of basic research on this element, such as that being conducted by Carl Hovland and his associates at Yale,[17] remains to be codified for psychological warfare purposes. Ultimately, any full-fledged theory of communication must deal with both communicator and audience as participants in an interactive process.

For the present, this essay follows the three-fold outline mentioned above, mainly because this provides a convenient scheme for listing some operating guides

which might well serve as starting points in planning a realistic psychological warfare research program. These points, scattered as they are and not entirely cognate with one another, have grown out of research experience at the operational level. Our review will consist of statements of some of these points, discussions of the contexts from which they emerge, and consideration from a sociological point of view of some of the possibilities for research. In the effort to redress the balance of certain earlier emphases, our emphasis is essentially sociological, with the main focus on the relationship between communications and group structures. No claim is made that what we propose constitutes all or even the most important problems. However, our suggestions are realistic both from the point of view of the practical needs of the field and as a move toward a more adequate research program.

We shall necessarily be limited in the scope and number of our examples. . . . in our opinion the field of research in psychological warfare would greatly benefit from a more adequate theoretical structuring and practical implementation. Our present discussion will be concerned with psychological warfare in the restricted military sense of utilizing propaganda and other communicative acts against an enemy. We view psychological warfare as a relatively limited aspect of the broader area of political communication.*

The Target Audience

On the problem of audience definition, two points are of special interest:

1. For purposes of propaganda the internal differences in the target audience cannot be disregarded.

To be sure, this is the exact opposite of the thesis announced by R. B. Lockhart, who, as director of the English Political Warfare Executive, had a good deal to say about Allied propaganda policy during World War II in Europe. The dictum was, at least as far as strategic propaganda was concerned, "it should be addressed to the masses;[19, 20] the implication being clear that it was hardly worthwhile for a large scale effort to seek out special target audiences. Lerner, in *Sykewar*, gives a supporting judgment:

> " . . . strategic propaganda concerns itself with the longer-term causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. With such an approach the interests of larger and more varied publics could be reached, and the lines of political differences among Germans could be crossed by *Sykewar*." (p 148)[13]

This view is, however, not without its critics. Among them, Hans Speier is perhaps the most articulate. In his essay "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" he suggests two types of fallacies. On the one hand, it is fallacious to think of the individual as being greatly involved personally in the weighty issues of the state, and on the other hand, it is equally fallacious to assume that individuals are equally powerful in the influence which they can bring to bear.

> "Since in modern societies the mass of the population cannot overthrow, or actively influence the policies of despotic regimes . . . the population at large is no rewarding target of conversion propaganda from abroad. Any notion to the contrary may be called the democratic fallacy. . . "[21]

* This distinction has been suggested in a paper by Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.[18]

Similarly, our own view is that, while much communication will of necessity be beamed to an undifferentiated mass audience, all possible research should be conducted on ways and means of identifying and reaching crucial subgroups and categories of individuals within a total population. In this connection, a number of lines of inquiry might well be pursued.

In the first place, the studies of voting in the United States[22] have, for example, suggested that individuals under "cross-pressures," those whose loyalties are divided between groups with conflicting norms, are those most ready to shift their political views. The possible implications for psychological warfare of such a finding might well be investigated further.

Second, the disaffected segments of an enemy population certainly represent a critical target. These include the openly rebellious, as well as those ambivalent persons who fear to admit their rebellion, even to themselves, and who cling compulsively to the established ways. Research is needed on the conditions under which such ambivalent persons can be won away from loyalty to the enemy.

Third, the long-run objective of psychological warfare is sometimes not merely to win over segments of a population, but to change certain values within a given society. Here, too, the propagandist must work with one segment at a time. Each segment or sub-group may play a different role in the re-formulation of group opinion, and techniques are needed to identify and analyze such interaction processes. What can be learned through research about which population elements are crucial in bringing about such changes?

If psychological warfare, following such lines as these, is to take account of the internal differences in its audiences, this will require a shift in the basic conceptual model on which much media research has been conducted in the past. Earlier studies "have, on the whole, tended to conceive of the audience as a series of discrete individuals. . . . But this conception is oversimplified (since) any given person in the audience reacts not merely as an isolated personality but also as a member of the various groups to which he belongs. . . ."[23] This may involve changes in sampling and other research procedures, so as to take into account the structural aspects of the society. Beyond this, mass media techniques themselves may well require various extensions and changes, if sub-groups within the audience are to be given special treatment. [An account of utilization of this kind of information by the Communists in Korea is given by Riley and Schramm.][24]

2. *The most promising method of distinguishing critical "special audiences" within the target audience is in terms of objective criteria.*

During World War II, some of the special problems posed for psychological warfare before the collapse of Germany centered around the possibilities presented by readily recognizable groups within the total target area. For example, the inmates of concentration camps or the members of involuntary labor units were considered to be audiences deserving special psychological warfare attention. As contrasted with such relatively obvious targets, many less obvious but important specific targets may require highly sophisticated and detailed psychological warfare intelligence for their identification. Research is needed to determine what objective criteria are correlated with important variables of the social structuring of the audience.

The Message Content

It is, of course, basic to any theory of the communication process that content cannot, save for descriptive purposes, be separated from either the audience or its

response. But to pursue the conventional distinctions, the following suggestions refer mainly to the operational problem of what goes into a psychological warfare message.

3. *Varying interpretations will be placed upon psychological warfare messages regardless of the objective truth of such messages.*

One of the keenest arguments within psychological warfare circles during World War II had to do with the so-called strategy of truth, although this was consistently the central element of the official policies of the United States.[25] Crossman, one of the major World War II psychological warfare policy makers, saw this strategy as demanding an extremely high degree of empathy on the part of the sender of psychological warfare messages.

> "In enemy-occupied territory we had two audiences, motivated by precisely opposite emotions — our friends, whose hopes made them intensely credulous of good news; and our enemies, ready to dismiss as 'enemy propaganda,' even the most sober statement of an Allied success. Whether on the radio or in leaflet form, the same news had to be selected and presented so as to appear objective to both these audiences, the credulous friend and the skeptical enemy." (p 336)[13]

Stated in its simplest terms, the import of this point is that even if we want to tell only the objective truth, we must have some basis for predicting how and to what extent it may be distorted. This view is not unlike that which W. I. Thomas prescribed for social science in general. Thomas insisted that the relationship between an objective situation and any behavior could never be regarded as a simple cause and effect relationship. Rather it is always mediated by the subjects' definition of the situation. Thus in his famous "Methodological Note" we find this statement:

> " . . . the effect of a social phenomenon depends in addition (to its empirical content) on the subjective standpoint taken by the individual or the group toward this phenomenon and can be calculated only if we know, not only the objective content of the assumed cause, but also the meaning which it has at the given moment for the given conscious beings."[26]

This is tantamount to saying that there are two kinds of reality: objective reality; and that which a person "sees," i.e., his subjective reality. Obviously, if the latter serves to *interpret*, to *select* from, or to *distort* the former, the two may frequently, and usually do, fail to coincide. It is this proposition which research for psychological warfare operations must take fully into account.

What constitutes this subjective reality undoubtedly varies from one segment of the enemy population to another. This is the sort of thing which Speier apparently had in mind when he pointed out that psychological warfare objectives cannot be conceived simply in terms of reducing the enemy's "will to fight," for actually there are many "wills." In short, we are led to believe that strategic messages, regardless of their generality, will carry quite different meanings to different segments of the audience, depending upon their reference systems and relationships. In order to throw further light upon the specific workings of this hypothesis, research might be conducted in various settings to test such propositions as:

1. In respect to media behavior, any member of the audience will react not merely as an individual, but also as a member of the various groups to which he belongs (or aspires) and with which he communicates.

2. The values of the media messages will be accepted, rejected, or distorted in line with the values of the significant reference groups to which the recipient belongs, or to which he aspires.[27]

The dynamics of this relationship between group membership and perception of the message rests upon the ease or difficulty with which the communicated norms or values can be harmonized with the relevant group norms or values characteristic of the target group.

4. *The more salient the content of a message is to an audience, the greater the probability of its effect.*

This operating guide is included here simply because so much of the actual psychological warfare effort of the last war failed to heed it. The typical conception (at least in the case of Germany) was that strategic propaganda which attacked the doctrinal basis of Nazism would eventually defeat the enemy. Shils and Janowitz, however, have pointed out that "propaganda attacks on Nazi ideology seems to have been of little avail." They go on to conclude that: " . . . attempts to modify behavior by means of symbols referring to events or values outside the focus of attention and concern would be given indifferent response by the vast majority of the German soldiers."[12]

Further research is obviously needed here. Much experimental work remains to be done by way of greater development of the appropriate instruments for testing hypotheses in this area. We need, for example, to know more about the relationship between the status of recipients and the salience of content. This leads to the next point, which is larger than, and subsumes, this matter of salience from the point of view of the receiver of the message.

5. *Psychological warfare messages must be cast within the frame of reference of the intended recipients.*

This statement is almost tautological, since there can be no communication without shared meanings. It is included in this listing because the self-evidence of such an assertion is often overlooked in psychological warfare practice. While the words may be accurately translated into the recipient's native tongue, the importance of his native symbols and values is often forgotten. Indeed, there is frequently a strong temptation for the psychological warrior simply to play games with his counterpart in the enemy camp, to outwit a mock opponent without regard to the impact of his message upon the real target audience.

In one of the better essays[28] on the theory of propaganda, it is shown that the essential nature of all propaganda involves a set of relevant values. Talcott Parsons, following W. I. Thomas, says, "a selection is made of those aspects which are functionally related to the particular orientations, values . . . of the person." In the design of research, therefore, the exhortation of Paul Linebarger and others must be constantly kept in mind that "the propagandist must tell the enemy those things the enemy will heed."*

Yet, in times of great stress, the relevant values of the recipient are often difficult to uncover. Even if the receivers of the message are right at hand where they can

* See his *Psychological Warfare*[7] for a full discussion of this point.

be readily studied, they may be unaware of their own values and unable to report them. A case in point arose in connection with a periodic study of general magazine audiences which was conducted during the past war.[29] Readers from the general public repeatedly told interviewers, "We are sick of the war. Therefore, we don't read or listen to anything which reminds us of it." Observations of actual reading behavior, however, when analyzed so as to focus analysis on the specific symbols which either encouraged or discouraged decisions to read particular articles or stories demonstrated overwhelmingly that no subject matter was acceptable which was not explicitly couched in wartime terms and surrounded by symbols of a military culture.

Far more complex is the problem of ascertaining the values of an enemy population in wartime, particularly those of its disaffected members. Of crucial significance may be those who are under strain, ambivalent, at once torn between loyalty to patriotic values and to the new values being offered by the communicator. Such a segment may be a critically important target, and it is necessary to understand the nature of its ambivalence and the implications for psychological warfare possibilities. While such a segment is drawn to the new values, its allegiance to the old is made more compulsive by guilt feeling evoked by its attraction to the new. Among such a population we should expect strong ritualistic conformity which would serve to deny evidences of hospitality to the alien values. Beneath this ritualism, however, we should also expect to find the repressed side of the ambivalence, the side which represents a disposition to espouse the new values.

Research is now needed on the readiness of individuals under strain to accept communications which represent both the expressed and the repressed sides of their ambivalence. It has been suggested that such individuals will reject any overt statement of the repressed side; but that they may pay attention if the repressed value is expressed in fictional form, so that it may be received on the level of fantasy, thus protecting the receiver from the need to decide whether or not he believes, or is willing to accept, such a conflicting value. It is our belief that research along such lines as these would have far reaching operational usefulness for psychological warfare.

The Effect of the Message

While in practical terms communication is frequently conceived simply as a transfer of information from one person (or source) to another, the more intriguing, and at the same time the most perplexing, aspect of the problem is properly seen in terms of effect. The ultimate purpose of any communicated message is to influence human conduct.[30] Certainly any operation in psychological warfare has, in the long run, to be designed to influence behavior, yet it is precisely the attempt to evaluate the influence which has yielded so little solid and convincing information. For this reason, therefore, it seems worth noting in the present context several suggestions which may be valuable in providing additional perspective on this problem.

6. *The degree of effectiveness of psychological warfare messages is measured by the degree of change in the values of the recipients brought about by the messages.*

This point simply means that, short of observations of the behavior actually resulting from a communication, the effectiveness problem should center upon the study of values and their changes. As Lasswell expresses it: "The most fundamental way to examine any response is in terms of values — does it modify or conserve values?[31]

What seems to be needed at this juncture is the development of techniques for measuring value changes, for indicating both consensus and cleavage in values within groups and subcultures, and, equally important, for determining which values are perceived and selected out of media messages. The general approach to these problems has been to work with relatively small groups and by successive approximation to obtain measures which will replicate and produce internally consistent results in the hope that such measures may ultimately be applicable to psychological warfare problems.

7. *The closer a psychological warfare message comes to meeting an existing predisposition or need in the target audience, the more effective the message.*

This point emphasizes the reinforcement aspect of learning theory as it applies to communications.[17] On the other hand, it is a proposition of great practical significance for psychological warfare, since, assuming first-rate intelligence reports, some workable rules could be derived from the theory. Lerner, in writing of the conditions necessary for effective propaganda, lists four points: (1) Secure the attention of the audience; (2) Secure the credence of the audience; (3) Work within the predispositions of the audience; and (4) Don't expect the audience to do the impossible (the environment should make the proposed action feasible). He goes on to say: "What we wish to emphasize here is that . . . predispositions define the limits within which audiences can be effectively persuaded to modify their expectations . . . ."[32]

This statement comes very close to the type of research which would seem to be most productive. Attention must be paid to the function of the messages for the recipient. One important set of needs is assumed to derive from the recipient's group relationships and it might be hypothesized that those could be classed as of two kinds: (1) The need to reinforce group identification, i.e., what meaning does the message have for the recipient's acceptance by group members or loyalties to group members, and (2) the need to escape from group frustration, i.e., what answers are provided by the message for the recipient to adjust to strains deriving from his group relations.

In Summary

This paper has suggested that the uneven development of research for psychological warfare is in part a reflection of the tendency for research questions to be posed either at the very simple level of operations, or as extremely complex and basic problems in the broad areas of human motivation and interaction. A consideration, in the light of current sociological knowledge, of some of the important operational guides to emerge from psychological warfare research experience during World War II has convinced us of the feasibility of a realistically conceived program somewhere between these two extremes. More particularly, it is our belief that human actors both give and receive communications stimuli not as discrete individuals but as individuals who are identified with, and are in personal relationship with, other individuals in groups. Moreover, the individual's participation and integration in larger, more complex social systems is accomplished and made meaningful largely through his membership in smaller groups. Finally, we maintain that interactional models must replace the conventional stimulus-response concepts if we wish to understand communication phenomena and to use this understanding

in psychological warfare. If social science research is to make its proper contribution to the solution of problems of psychological warfare, or any other type of communication effort, it must move promptly to theoretical formulations and implementing methodologies which are capable of dealing with the dimensions of the field we have indicated.

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CHAPTER 8

MEDIA, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Selection and Use of Media

After a determination that there are feasible objectives that may be sought through the use of psychological warfare and after intelligence and news sources have provided the necessary data to include in the output, it then becomes necessary to decide what media of communciation will be utilized in the propaganda effort. The decision as to which media will be employed will depend on an interplay of several factors, such as the availability of the necessary facilities and the ability of the intended audience to receive and comprehend the message as delivered by the various media.

The tastes, habits, and customs of the groups to be addressed and the time available for the accomplishment of a particular mission are other factors that should be taken into account in the selection of media in psychological warfare operations.

No attempt will be made in this chapter or in this volume to discuss every possible medium that could be employed. Another publication of the Operations Research Office[1] has attempted this far more exhaustively than the editors of the present work can possibly hope to do.

The case studies and journal articles that were selected for inclusion in this chapter were chosen as representative examples of both ordinary and unusual media. They illustrate both tactical and strategic employment of psychological warfare, in both peacetime and wartime operations. Official military records, professional military and popular journals, Department of State publications, personal memoirs, and interviews with personnel formerly or currently engaged in foreign information and psychological warfare work were all utilized in the selection of the case studies which follow.

SHORT-WAVE NEWSCASTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By W. E. D.

A discussion of some important do's and don'ts in international short-wave propaganda operations.

Newscasts like all international short-wave broadcasts are a means of waging psychological warfare. They differ from the domestic reporting of news events in that their purposes embrace more than a mere full, accurate, and dispassionate record of events.

What we say and how we say it in international short-wave newscasts is determined within the framework of truth by psychological considerations which take into account both the objectives of the sender and the cultural peculiarities of the target audience.

Psychological warfare defined very simply means playing with words — playing on people's minds and emotions in such a way as to produce reactions with them that are favorable to the cause espoused. Successful psychological warfare (call it "propaganda" if you desire) therefore depends for effectiveness on:

(a) A clear definition of aims — a precise agreement on the reactions one seeks to produce.

(b) An informed and sympathetic understanding of the listening audience (a trait called "empathy"), i.e., a knowledge of the audience's circumstances, his state of mind, his hopes and fears, his loves and hates.

(c) The skillful use of language and ideas with which to enlist and to hold the listener's interest and confidence.

Objectives of Newscasts

In terms of radio short-wave newscasts what does this imply? With respect to aims it simply means this; it is our ever-present desire:

(a) To provide that full coverage of news to which the listener, without the broadcasts, may not have access.

(b) To convince listeners of the truth and accuracy of our news releases.

(c) To interpret the news, within the limits of the truth, in ways that *illustrate* and *reinforce* the basic propaganda themes employed.

(d) To discredit the enemy as a source of news.

Understanding the Listener

The selection of news items for treatment, emphasis, or disregard takes on real meaning only when one projects himself into the listener's situation. What is selected for emphasis is, or should be, determined in very large measure by one's knowledge (or estimate) of the listener's circumstances and state of mind. As soon as one thinks of newscasts in these terms of reference the essential difference between domestic and "propaganda" newscasts is clarified.

* Based on an outline of an undated, anonymous, unclassified manuscript prepared by the San Francisco office, Overseas Branch of OWI during World War II (probably in the latter half of 1943).

There were three principal audience groups to which Area III (Pacific) of the Overseas Branch of OWI directed its short-wave radio programs during World War II: listeners in enemy-occupied areas; listeners in unoccupied Allied areas; and listeners in Japan and among Japanese residing or stationed in occupied areas.

Listeners in Enemy-Occupied Areas

The OWI found itself woefully short on accurate up-to-date information with respect to the listening audience in both Japanese-occupied areas and the Japanese homeland. The following suggestions were prepared specifically as "directives" to guide the preparation of newscasts to enemy-occupied areas. With obvious modification these suggestions were thought also to be applicable to listeners in areas not occupied by the Japanese enemy. Japan as a target area was considered as a case apart and thus is not specifically covered by these notes or suggestions.

Although recognizing that the paucity of information concerning the size and nature of the radio short-wave listening audience in Japanese-occupied areas made it dangerous to generalize, planners expressed the belief that it was possible to operate on the basis of a working hypothesis. The following were cited as facts to be reckoned with in estimating the listeners' circumstances and state of mind.

1. *Listening to radio short-wave broadcasting* in totalitarian countries, or in countries occupied by military forces of totalitarian powers, *is dangerous and therefore in all likelihood is carried on only in a highly irregular manner.* As a consequence it was thought desirable that newscasts be brief; that only essential news be stressed and that important news be repeated often. It is very important, so stressed the wartime guidance, that listeners' attention not be diverted to trivial matters of little or no consequence in their lives. The desirability of repeating important news items was based on the supposition that listening was not regular and that recapitulation of news events, wherein the significance of occurrences were interpreted for the listening audience, served the useful purpose of sustaining interest in the news until still bigger news was available for reporting.

2. *Short-wave reception* under the most favorable circumstances *is often poor and transmitted messages are always subject to being jammed* by unfriendly groups. Therefore to overcome these natural and man-made obstacles it is essential that phrasing and diction be clear; that the speaker's pace be deliberate and markedly slower than that used in domestic news reporting; and that, in areas where grapevine repetition is to be encouraged, at least one news bulletin daily be provided at dictation speed.

3. *The listener is in and of the Orient, not in and of America.* Thus it is suggested that the order of presentation of the news should correspond to the likely order of the listener's preoccupation. It is to be assumed the listener in enemy-occupied territory is interested in news relating to his own familiar environment and personal fortunes; news about the enemy, particularly any bad news about him; news of other peoples in the East (and to a lesser extent in the West) subject to privations and hardships like his own; and evidence of growing strength among the forces resisting the enemy.

In broadcasting to people who are living under the heel of the enemy it is necessary to remember that "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." A victory of Allied forces in distant places must be editorially linked to the listeners' fortunes if it is to have great impact. It is therefore necessary that the scriptwriter and the news-

caster avoid at all cost, in the order and emphasis he gives the news, a projection of his own sense of values and priorities of interest.

It is equally imperative that newscasts not be overloaded with news concerning unfamiliar place names. It is desirable that newscasts substitute wherever possible tangible symbols such as the number of miles advanced, the number of prisoners taken, the number of enemy killed. One should economize on the use of place names in order to provide for the powerful associative effect of a few names that can be easily remembered.

In addressing an Oriental audience it is especially important that one avoid overdoing the names of people. The average person may be expected to react as intended to only about six names in a culture alien to their own. Names that may be associated with significant place names or events, such as MacArthur and Bataan or Churchill and British resistance are precious capital for use in newscasts. This does not rule out the use of an occasional name in describing particular acts of heroism or infamy, especially in those instances where the use of the name adds a personal note of interest to the story.

News items of a world conflict should be so grouped as to illustrate and to emphasize the global aspects of the struggle. News should also be covered in such a way as to contrast the practices and purposes of the enemy and the US. For example, news concerning the exploitation by the enemy of occupied territory may be placed into juxtaposition with news of humanitarian acts of Allied groups in such a way as to point up the contrast of two differing modes of behavior.

Slogans and captions that have meaning largely only to the culture of the society producing foreign newscasts must be clothed with practical significance. They need to be rephrased, or supplemented, in terms that create for listeners a concrete picture of an abstract idea. Repeated use of slogans and captions that constitute a play on words helps to dramatize and to emphasize both encouraging and discouraging news, depending on the mood one wishes to elicit in the target audience.

Captions and slogans are worth thinking up and using in association with news and commentaries. However, the phrasing and frequency of using such slogans demands an intimate knowledge of the particular target area in which it is to be used.

The tone of voice, the pace, and the phrasing of a spoken newscast is an important ingredient of psychological warfare. The basic requirements for an announcer addressing a Far East audience appear to be clarity of expression and a voice suggesting authority. To the Easterner the events of war are not emotionally equivalent to the progress of a football game, they need sober recitation, thus the tone and the high-pitched diction often used in domestic news reporting is thought ill suited for use in broadcasting to Oriental target groups.

Clichés such as are frequently to be found in domestic newscasts are to be avoided at all costs in overseas broadcasts. Such phrases as "Press accounts report," or "Moscow's Monday morning communique says," are not only redundant but waste precious space and time and lead to awkward sentence structure. News sources need not be reported except in those rare instances where attribution enhances credibility and authenticity.

Notes on Editorializing

Elmer Davis, the World War II Director of the OWI, by a directive dated 7 May 1943, differentiated between the mission of the Overseas Branch of OWI and that

of the Domestic Branch. He said, in part, "The Overseas Operation is essentially a propaganda operation — that is, it wields a weapon which must contribute to the winning of the war and the saving of the lives of American soldiers by shortening the war."

By a central directive dated 28 May 1943, Davis added further words of caution and advice to the overseas propagandist. "When important news is scarce there is a tendency to blow up minor events out of proportion to their actual significance. This is bad propaganda. . . . Far better cut news reporting down and use space or the time saved for interpretation."

The World War II directive to the Far East desk of the OWI Overseas Branch went on to say, "Truth is an equivocal term. For our purpose the strategy of truth is best paraphrased as the *reporting* of significant facts." News was further described as any fact that one perceives to be true. News editing involves the ordering and selection of news events, facts, and statements in ways that give it significance. Thus selection, juxtaposition, and order are editorial devices involving a deliberate association of ideas in the listener's mind and should be fully exploited. It is truthful, but also naive, to distribute news items throughout a bulletin which, if set alongside one another, would create a useful association of ideas in the listener's mind.

In newscasts it is legitimate and worth while to give explanatory or illuminating comments. However, in quoting an adversary's communique it is necessary to keep in mind that one ought not to provide gratuitous publicity to his statements. But the same statement might be coupled with a warning comment as an oblique indication of the enemy's real designs. It is an effective act of psychological warfare when one can:

(a) Educate (or support) his listeners in a true interpretation of the enemy's designs, create distrust of the enemy, and diminish their prestige.

(b) Strengthen the listener's feeling that the broadcaster's group is not remote and out of touch with him but rather is informed and concerned about his welfare. The listener's sense or feeling of isolation must be continually borne in mind and catered to.

Source Material for Newscasts

The two major sources for news in propaganda broadcasts, during World War II were the processed news file and propaganda analysis. The latter source proved to be a mine in which newscasters could profitably dig deep and long, particularly for material with which to discredit the enemy as a source of news. The enemy target audience is usually within easy reach of many media of communications under enemy control. A major objective of any psychological warfare effort is to discredit this source of information.

During World War II, OWI Overseas Branch published a daily set of *Notes on News* to provide scriptwriters with a key on how best to use material in Processed News and Propaganda Analysis sections — in terms of the order, selection, and effective juxtaposition, as well as editorial slant and emphasis to be given in day-to-day operations. These *Notes on News* proved useful to section heads and newscasters alike in ensuring the most fruitful use of day-to-day news in psychological warfare operations.

NEWS SHEETS AS WEAPONS OF WAR*

The combat newspaper became one of the principal media used in psychological warfare in World War II. The Frontpost, Feldpost, *and* Mitteilungen *were the principal ones published by American personnel in Europe.*

The first issue of the 12th Army Group newspaper for German troops, *Frontpost*, appeared under the date, 14 August 1944, and carried the headline: "100,000 Prisoners in France." Publication was suspended with the first May issue, 1945, after official announcement of the German surrender.

The Nazi policy of suppressing or distorting news for its own people, including of course the troops, gave Allied propaganda the opportunity of filling the gap and playing up to the news-hunger of the *Landser*, the ordinary German soldier. From innumerable statements of prisoners of war we know that tens of thousands of German soldiers, with the passing of time, came to rely on Allied sources for their information on what was going on in the world and on their own front.

Supplying German troops with well-edited, well-written and attractively made up publications was not, of course, a gratuitous service. Every printed line was calculated, no matter how indirectly, to contribute to the basic aim of all Allied propaganda; weakening the enemy's will to resist, emphasizing the hopelessness of his position, undermining his faith in his own cause and leaders, bringing about a mental attitude conducive to surrender. These factors, in turn, were calculated to save the lives of Allied soldiers and hasten the end of the war.

With their sights on these targets, the propagandists of the Psychological Warfare Detachment of 12th Army Group went to work with news as their ammunition and a newspaper in German as their weapon. The first issue of the *Frontpost* (the name means the same in German as in English) was written and edited in the operations tent in a field near St. Sauveur in Normandy. The news, the raw material out of which the final product was fashioned, at that time was supplied by a field monitoring unit operating in a truck.

There being no adequate printing facilities in the vicinity of the camp, it was necessary to print the first issue of *Frontpost* at Rennes, in Brittany. The content and make-up of the paper was determined at St. Sauveur, two men were dispatched with the copy, headlines, art work and layout to Rennes, where they turned the material over to the printers, proofread, made up the paper, and watched it through the printing and off the presses. Last minute news was written at Rennes from the monitoring reports of the French (owned) paper printed at the same plant. The printed issues were then loaded on jeep trailers or trucks and brought back to the camp for packing into leaflet bombs.

The first issue of *Frontpost* was a single sheet, 35.5 by 25 centimeters, printed on both sides. Under the title of the paper was a line which was retained for all subsequent issues: "News for the German soldier, Publisher: The American Troops in France" (later "The American Troops in Western Europe"). The *Frontpost* was made up and written like a newspaper, not a leaflet. It contained news, a map of the western front, features, a news picture, a column, a bit of German sport news, a riddle — but no propaganda harangues, no editorializing, no overt preaching. The

* From *History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare, 12th Army Group*, Jan 43–Aug 45, pp 116–26.

first issue also contained a feature which continued in every subsequent copy and later was transferred with success to the radio: a column called *Der Yankee Spricht* — "The Yankee Speaks." This was designed to be the voice of an ordinary American soldier talking to the ordinary German soldier across the lines. The tone was informal and chatty, but not friendly. The column provided an opportunity for man-to-man appeal on a more informal and intimate level than most of our propaganda media allowed for. Later, when the radio phase began, the "Yankee" column always concluded with a joke. But here, too, the idea was not merely to amuse the German soldier, but to make a propaganda point in the most palatable and readily acceptable form possible. The joke, in other words, was as funny as it could be made, but it invariably contained a political point, a jab at the Nazi leadership, a comical comment on the plight in which the German soldier found himself.

The "Yankee" column is indicative of the whole method employed in publishing the *Frontpost* and, later, the *Feldpost*. It was felt by the editorial staff that a publication containing nothing but news which, from the viewpoint of the German soldier, was depressing, discouraging and hard to take would soon arouse a feeling of hostility and revulsion. Every effort was made, therefore, to produce a paper which, while directed as a whole at the objectives above, would be eminently *readable*. To this end all the devices learned through journalistic experience on two continents were employed. These devices ranged through the sober, factual presentation of major news stories in the manner of the *New York Times* through the eye-catching tricks and human interest appeals of the Hearst press and the boulevard papers in Europe. It was felt that any and all of these devices, so long as the basic rule of truth was not violated, were justified as being methods by which propaganda shafts would easily and certainly find their targets.

It may be of interest to list some of the journalistic devices used. In the first place, there was the elementary newspaper device of fashioning layouts which caught the eye and were as newsy and interesting as possible. With that went the routine business of writing provocative and telling headlines, and clear, concise stories unencumbered by useless details and extraneous comment. In addition, the *Frontpost* printed significant items from inside Germany itself to give the *Landser* an idea of what was happening behind his back. Secret documents, supplied by the 12th Army Group Psychological Warfare Intelligence Section were played up for the purpose of showing (1) inefficiency, inadequacy and general desperation in high *Wehrmacht* circles, and (2) corruption, ruthlessness and bungling in the Nazi leadership. These secret documents were sometimes printed under a standing heading *Geheim!* — "Secret" — to give the German soldier the feeling that he was getting a peek into matters not intended for his eyes, as in fact was the case. Such documents were always printed with exact dates, names, place and designation numbers so as to overcome any feeling that we had perhaps invented them. Many of them were of such a sensational nature that this suspicion could readily arise.

Since the publications were distributed to German troops directly opposing units of 12th Army Group, every effort was made to accentuate tactical material. Psychological Warfare intelligence was combed daily to ferret out every possible tactical item which could be used. These items were usually printed in regular columns entitled either: *Aus der Kompanie* (Company Items) or *Streiflichter aus der Wehrmacht* (Sidelights on the *Wehrmacht*). These items were regarded by the Editorial Section as among the most useful and effective material used. Their appeal and effect were based on the following factors: they had a pure gossip-scandal appeal, since they dealt with personalities and situations of the sort which interest fighting

troops and which are repeated and discussed; it was known from interrogations that these items aroused surprise and often dismay at the intimate knowledge of what went on inside the German Army; some of the items were merely amusing, but the vast majority indicated inefficiency, desperation, inadequacy of supplies and leadership, and all of them accentuated the usual soldier's dissatisfaction with his lot and, in the case of a losing Army, the friction between officers and men.

With the advance through France, it became necessary to change the publication site of the 12th Army Group publications. In addition to the thrice-weekly *Frontpost,* which was regarded as the 12th Army Group publication, leaflets were also written and produced by the Editorial Section as the tactical situation required. Much of this work was done at the Rennes plants.

The next publication site was Paris. The paper announcing the fall of Paris was, of course, printed in Rennes, but soon after the first Allied troops had entered the city, a Paris newspaper plant was working on a *Frontpost* under two members of the Editorial Section. The 12th Army Group [*Frontpost*] editorial men were in the city before the first tank columns had made their entry.

The first Paris issue was the sixth *Frontpost,* and it appeared under the date of 31 August, 1944. Due to the printing situation at the new plant, the Paris issues were somewhat smaller in size than the Rennes issues, but the make-up, style and content followed the pattern which had been set. Nine issues were printed in Paris.

The 15th issue was printed at the plant of the *Luxemburger Wort* in the city of Luxembourg, which the Editorial Section also entered on the heels of the liberating troops. The 15th issue, dated 22 September, 1944 (headline: "Brest Surrenders — 40,000 Prisoners in the Fortress") began a long and active publication period in Luxembourg where a schedule of four radio programs a day was also undertaken by the Editorial Section.

In November it was decided to switch the *Frontpost* schedule over to publication once weekly, but in four pages. The first four-page issue was No. 33, dated 13 November, 1944. (Headline: "Roosevelt Re-elected").

The four-page format gave the editorial staff greater play in the matter of feature and picture presentation. The news pages were not altered; they continued to be presented as spot news, hot off the wires, and there was no change over to the "weekly" style of presentation. But inside, several features intended to add to reader interest were used. Cartoons appeared more frequently; quotations of undelivered letters from and to the front were used, together with long lists of addresses of such letters; Page 3 of almost every issue contained a special report or feature, complete with appropriate photographs — a layout of captured photographs of the wives and children of German soldiers, designed to stimulate nostalgia; a story based on the last letters written by German soldiers from a Metz fort before its fall; the story of the failure of the Heydt paratroop mission; the reunion of a prisoner of war with his wife and family, made possible through American military authorities; layout and story on how sick and injured prisoners of war are treated in American hospitals, and so on.

Since *Frontpost* was being dropped inside Germany, it began to publish material which, while primarily intended for the German soldier, also had its appeal for the civilian population. Stories and pictures were used on life in occupied zones, showing how order and normal life were being resumed in areas which surrendered or had been captured. *Was Wird aus Deutschland?* ("What's to Become of Germany?") became a regular feature. It contained news stories about reconstruction in the occupied areas and about Military Government, with the intention of answering one of the German soldier's most pressing questions, i.e., "If we give up, what will happen to Germany?" This was continued all through the SHAEF "don't evacuate" campaign, and was dropped when the policy was altered.

The editorial staff continually studied interrogation reports to ascertain the attitudes of the German soldier: What was keeping him going: What kept him from giving up? What could we tell him that would lower his morale and make him more susceptible to the idea of surrender? The *Frontpost* in its news and features offered material based on the answers to these questions, as far as they could be ascertained by the editorial staff. Concurrently, the *Frontpost* and the other 12th Army Group publications endeavored to offset the main German propaganda lines to the *Landser* without appearing to argue with Nazi propaganda. Another incessant theme was the overwhelming Allied superiority, contrasted to German supply weaknesses; this, of course, was one of our major contributions toward arousing in the German soldier the feeling, "What the hell is the use?" Another constantly repeated stunt was the phonetic English lesson for the German soldier, with unbroken emphasis on the two words *Ei Sorrender.* This phrase was hand-lettered, made into a cliché and scattered as many as ten times through a single issue.

Up until December, 1944, the *Frontpost* had no difficulty living up to the motto printed in the upper right hand corner of the first page of every issue: "The Strong Need Not Fear the Truth." Since the inception of the paper, the news had been uniformly good from the Allied viewpoint, and under such circumstances it was of course no hardship to print the truth. With the outbreak of the German counter-offensive, however, the *Frontpost* faced its first test in the handling of news unfavorable to the Allies and encouraging to the Germans. This problem was met by simply printing the facts. The issue of 25 December, 1944, carried across all four columns the headline: "German Counter-Offensive." The lead story said: "The *Wehrmacht* has gone over to the offensive on a 100-kilometer front in the West. Strong German armored and infantry units are advancing in the area extending from South of Monschau to the German-Luxemburg border. The attacks are being supported by the *Luftwaffe* and in several places have gained considerable ground."

This headline and news story can fairly be characterized as frank, factual reporting of an event which the *Frontpost* would rather not have been forced to print. Subsequent issues continued in this vein: "Armored Spearheads in Belgium," was the next headline. The progress of the battle up to the liquidation of the bulge was reported the same way. However, the *Frontpost* never lost sight of the fact that they were propagandists first and journalists afterwards. In other words, they did not regard it as their function merely to supply the German troops with news, but to score propaganda points through the printing of the news. Thus, along with the facts of the counter-offensive, the German soldiers read in *Frontpost* certain other facts which were intended to backfire when the counter-offensive was smashed. The stories emphasized that the counter-offensive was powerful, but that it was a last desperate effort. Von Rundstedt's Order of the Day which said that "everything was at stake" was used over and over again. This idea was built up so that when the counter-offensive collapsed, the German soldier would feel a profound discouragement and a conviction that the offensive was, indeed, the last convulsive

effort of the *Wehrmacht*, and that beyond lay little or no hope. Many interrogations support the assertion that this line corresponded to what many German soldiers actually did feel after the counter-offensive had been beaten back.

That the news treatment of the counter-offensive actually had the effect which it was intended to have is also indicated by the Intelligence Summary of 21st Army Group, Psychological Warfare, 6 February, 1945, which says in reporting prisoner of war reaction to Allied propaganda: "Enthusiasm for the (Rundstedt) offensive disappeared when the troops saw in Allied newspapers that no great progress had actually been made."

In this connection, the *Frontpost* practice begun with the first issue, of printing accurate, sober maps of the fronts was especially effective, as interrogations revealed. The maps have frequently been the subject of comment by prisoners.

Early in November it was decided that the air-drop of *Frontpost* did not entirely fill the demand for getting news to the German troops facing us, since areas where a newspaper might be effective were sometimes not being reached by the air drop. To remedy this situation, it was decided to produce a leaflet-sized newspaper to be fired from artillery shells. The first issue of this leaflet-newspaper, called *Feldpost*, (*Field Post*) appeared under the date of 5 November, 1944. It was first issued once a week, and later twice a week.

Feldpost employed the same methods and had the same objectives as its bigger brother *Frontpost*. Many of the same features were included, but in condensed, stripped-down form. Even within the greatly restricted space of the leaflet size, it was found possible to pack in all the elements of a newspaper — the essential news in journalistic style, maps, news photos, columns, cartoons, English lessons, etc. Varying the layout from issue to issue within the restricted space proved to be a problem in ingenuity which was satisfactorily worked out, so that no two issues looked the same. The *Feldpost* found increasing favor with the Armies, and its editors were gratified to learn that in the storming of the Rhine thousands of copies of *Feldpost* made the crossing in an assault boat, for firing on the east bank.

From the first, an exact English duplicate of *Feldpost* was printed in English. This was done for distribution among the gunners and other Army personnel involved in the distribution of the paper. It was felt that these men were entitled to know what they were shooting at the enemy, and that they would perform their jobs with more enthusiasm and understanding if they themselves could read the paper they were helping to get to the enemy.

An exact duplicate of *Frontpost*, though its need was long felt, could not be undertaken for some time because of the pressure of work and the shortage of manpower. Finally, however, a four-page English *Frontpost* was printed for distribution to the pilots and airforce personnel which delivered the paper to the Germans.

Up until the end of November [1944], all publications produced by the Psychological Warfare Detachment of 12th Army Group were strictly combat propaganda, aimed exclusively at German troops confronting us and intended to lower their morale, weaken resistance, and induce surrender. As more and more German territory came under 12th Army Group control, however, a new publications task presented itself. It was decided that the time had come to publish a newspaper for the civilian population behind our lines. Thus, the Editorial Section, while continuing its combat propaganda, moved into the field of consolidation [activities]. But even the new publication was to perform an essential military function — that of contributing order and normalcy in areas immediately behind the front.

The first issue of the civilian newspaper appeared under the date of 27 November, 1944 (headline: "Strassburg Has Been Liberated"). The first issue was called *Die Neue Zeitung* (*The New News*) but the second and all subsequent numbers carried the title *Die Mitteilungen*, which can be roughly translated as *Information*.

Mitteilungen was of standard newspaper size, a single sheet printed on both sides. Here again, in appearance and content, the publication was strictly a newspaper and not a propaganda sheet and the news was written in a clear, straightforward way without comment. But the paper, like the combat publications, was not a gratuitous news service to the Germans but was intended to fulfill its military and later its purely occupational function.

One of the main tasks of *Mitteilungen* was to publish the proclamations, statements and orders of the Supreme Allied Commander and the rules and regulations of Military Government. This it did from the first issue, which contained General Eisenhower's Proclamation No. 1 in the first column. In this field the paper covered all phases of life in occupied Germany from the most exalted, high-policy manifestoes to such items as warning the people of Cologne to boil water before drinking it.

The first issue of *Mitteilungen* featured a biography of General Eisenhower, and subsequent issues published stories on General Bradley, the commanders of 12th Army Group Armies, and other Allied military leaders. The front page was ordinarily given over to extended stories of what was occurring on the battle fronts, east and west, shorter stories on the latest news from all over the world, and an Eisenhower proclamation. The second page was devoted, normally, to a feature with pictures on some phase of reconstruction in occupied Germany together with items from all over the occupied area throwing light on how normal life was being resumed, how problems were being met, judgments of Military Government courts, etc. On this page, too, appeared items from Nazi-held Germany, extracts from the speeches of United Nations leaders, news stories of lesser significance from all over the world, listings of radio programs, and a feature called "Kept Secret Up to Now." This feature was based on the idea that during recent years events of world importance had deliberately been withheld from the German people or presented to them in distorted form; "Kept Secret" made a start on the enormous problem of giving the Germans an accurate picture of what went on in the world, and in their own country, during the time when German propaganda was deliberately concealing and distorting every event of significance.

The necessity for such a publication as *Mitteilungen* was clearly demonstrated during the German counter-offensive. The German population in the occupied areas was profoundly disturbed by the offensive. People who had worked with us were in terror of their lives if the Germans returned; others did not know what would happen next, and the field was wide open to rumor mongers. In this situation the *Mitteilungen* with its sober, frank accounts of the situation and with its accurate maps was more eagerly read than ever, and the very appearance of the paper, on schedule and as well put together as before, had a definite effect. Basing its comment on G-5 [Military Government] reports, Psychological Warfare Detachment SHAEF called the production of *Mitteilungen* during this period "a gallant effort to discourage rumors and the spread of unrest" behind our lines.

The reception of *Mitteilungen* by the German population was from the start extremely favorable. Numerous letters were received from readers, and men in charge of distribution testified to the eagerness with which each new issue was received.

As German territory under 12th Army Group control began to expand with the breakthrough to the Rhine and beyond, it became obvious that *Mitteilungen* alone could not serve the entire area. The first 12th Army Group local newspaper was put into production, and the *Koelnischer Kurier* (the *Cologne Courier*) appeared under the date of 2 April, 1945. Here again print shop requirements made it necessary to print in a smaller format than that of the *Mitteilungen*, but the paper appeared in four pages. Its style and content was the same as that of the parent *Mitteilungen*, with emphasis of course on Cologne and its problems. The *Cologne Courier* was the first of what became a chain of newspapers produced by 12th Army Group in the American-controlled region of Germany after hostilities ceased.

In addition to producing the *Mitteilungen* on a weekly basis, the Editorial Section also turned out a four-page "standing" issue. This standing issue, containing no spot news but covering all essential proclamations ordinances, rules and announcements of Military Government, was distributed as soon as Military Government teams took over an occupied town. The paper was of standard size, ran to four pages with news headlines, pictures, and feature stories. The importance that the Army attached to this publication was indicated by the fact that a glider load of the "standing" *Mitteilungen* crossed the Rhine with the air-borne troops.

With combat propaganda to German soldiers obviously in its final phases, publications for civilians in the occupied areas assumed increasing importance. The issuance of such papers was perhaps one of the most important tasks of its kind ever assigned to an Army unit. Plans for discharging this task were drawn and these plans, in their initial phases, were already being carried out when the enemy surrendered.

THE COMBAT LEAFLET: WEAPON OF PERSUASION*

By Martin F. Herz

Whatever medium is employed in combat operations the leaflet is certain to remain an important channel of communications in combat psychological warfare operations.

Fired from guns, scattered by planes, and distributed surreptitiously by agents behind enemy lines, the combat leaflet is an important catalyst in the cauldron of total war. Frequently, its persuasive appeal has helped to precipitate those psychological reactions that spell the difference between surrender and unnecessarily prolonged resistance.

The effectiveness of combat leaflets cannot be judged solely by the number of deserters they produce. There are situations when a thoroughly demoralized enemy in an untenable tactical position will give up *en masse* in response to a leaflet appeal, but such situations are extremely rare. World War II experience demonstrated that those of the enemy who are already demoralized are in any event benefited by leaflets, regardless of whether or not those leaflets speak of desertion.

The plain fact is that most prisoners have to be taken by the infantry. While psychological warfare can help predispose the enemy in favor of giving up, the actual decision to surrender is an enormously difficult one for any soldier to make.

* From *Army Information Digest*, 5:37–43 (Jun 1950).

Personal and national loyalties, group pressures and especially fear of the unknown are powerful deterrents.

One of the most important accomplishments of our combat leaflets in the European Theater in World War II was to persuade the enemy that, contrary to the allegations of Nazi propaganda, he would be well treated if captured by the United States Army. In this, we benefited from our excellent reputation dating back to World War I. Prisoner mail from German soldiers captured earlier in the war in North Africa and Italy was also an important factor. Often, combat leaflets made the difference between surrender and continued resistance.

To the victorious American soldier who has not thought much about the possibility of surrendering to the enemy, there may not appear to be much difference between *surrender* and *capture*, since obviously a soldier may surrender and "be captured" at the same time. To the enemy soldier in battle, however, unless he was very politically minded and already disaffected, there was a world of difference between surrender as a voluntary act, and "submitting to capture" as something that "happened" to him. Interrogation of German prisoners showed that most of them, regardless of the circumstances, preferred to think of themselves as having been "captured" rather than as having "surrendered." In our leaflets, therefore, we preferred to speak of "situations when one cannot avoid capture," or to picture surrender as a military necessity rather than as a voluntary act.

It is not safe — unless there is reliable, conclusive evidence — ever to assume that enemy troops confronting us are disaffected and desertion-minded. There are cases on record when combat leaflets backfired badly because they were based on evidence obtained through the interrogation of deserters who were in no way typical of their comrades in arms. In most cases, however, it is also quite unnecessary to use themes which appeal only to disaffected enemy personnel. Even a perfectly loyal soldier may surrender if he believes that the tactical situation is hopeless, that his resistance will benefit no one or that there is no military merit in continuation of the war, and that he will be well treated upon surrender.

As far as combat leaflets are concerned, there is in most cases no need for sophisticated political propaganda appeals. The soldier in battle has a closely restricted horizon. When high explosive shells are bursting around him and he hears our tanks moving up, ideological considerations take a distinctly secondary place in his mind.

In Europe, leaflets that spoke plain soldier-to-soldier language were the most effective. We know from interrogations that enemy soldiers, in spite of rigid prohibitions, studied our safe-conduct leaflets very carefully, long before they had made up their minds to surrender. To be sure, it could be proved only in few instances that this reading matter had actually persuaded soldiers against firing another clip of ammunition before surrendering. The inference seems reasonable, however, that enemy soldiers who had leaflets on their persons when captured — in spite of the strict Nazi injunctions against picking up, let alone keeping leaflets — presumably were somehow influenced by them in their behavior. Toward the end of the war in the West, about 77 per cent of the German prisoners had Allied leaflets on their persons.

Much can be learned from the mistakes of the Germans and Russians in their combat propaganda in World War II. The Nazis, for instance, often foolishly belabored President Roosevelt in their combat leaflets and attempted — completely without success — to spread anti-semitism among American soldiers. The Russians, on the other hand, in their early leaflets addressed to German troops, assailed

the Nazi leadership and spoke of "fascism," "imperialism" and other verbal concepts strange to the Nazi mind, and even exhorted German soldiers to "overthrow Hitler" in order to end the war. This exhortation would have been patently absurd even if the Germans had not been winning at the time. For the soldier in battle is usually incapable of political action. Mutiny is not a reasonable objective of combat propaganda.

On the Eastern front, because both the Germans and the Russians were unable or failed in some instances to provide food for prisoners, their propaganda had much need to emphasize good prisoner treatment. Also, for the same reason, their propaganda was much less successful than ours, although the Germans occasionally achieved spectacular successes by very simple techniques. According to one captured German psychological warfare officer, a Nazi leaflet that produced excellent effects on the Russians was one addressed to a surrounded body of troops who were furiously defending themselves against their assailants. The German leaflet merely read: "When you give up, be sure to bring a fork and spoon with you — you'll need them." Allegedly, this leaflet resulted in an onrush of simple Russians who, by slow logical deduction, had figured out that an enemy who asked them to bring their eating utensils could not be planning to starve them if they surrendered.

Our own propaganda was not always proof against the fallacy of attempting to export domestic propaganda. Since to our people the war in Europe was pictured principally as a fight against Hitler, there was occasional pressure to present the battle in the same terms to the German soldier. The acid test of any such propaganda, however, must be whether it lessens the enemy's will to fight. If it is designed to *reeducate* the enemy, then it is postwar propaganda and has no place in combat propaganda. It may have been desirable for the Russians, as it was and is desirable for us, to undermine German belief in Hitler and destroy the Hitler-legend, but all such purposes must be subordinate to the overriding purpose of winning the war, winning it quickly and at the smallest possible cost. Therefore, when political propaganda involving an attack against enemy symbols slows the advance of our fighting arms, such propaganda is harmful. Any political theme that stiffens the enemy's will to resist is bad.

Combat leaflet writing is a specialized craft which calls, among other things, for a gift of projecting oneself into the mind of the enemy soldier. That this requires not only adaptability and language background, but also copious intelligence of a special kind, goes without saying. Excessive sophistication and attempts at being "devilishly clever" have, on the other hand, often harmed our own combat propaganda in the recent war.

An enemy leaflet, addressed to our 45th Infantry Division after the Battle of the Bulge, demonstrates by its mistakes some positive points about leaflet writing.

G.I.s of the 45th Division!

Many thanks for your nice leaflets! So you think that we deserve some rest and an occasional leave, do you? Well, what about the blisters at *your* feet? We don't mind not getting any leave just now. You don't get any leave either. All that matters to us is that

You Won't Get to Berlin.

You have been told the war would end in autumn. Your division, well known to us since the days of Sicily and the Anzio-Beachhead, did not achieve anything spectacular so far. Quite a number of your fellows, however, have kicked the bucket. Pretty tough for the replacements who never dreamt of having to cross the pond, isn't it? Your pals told us how much they "enjoyed" fighting. No wonder

They had no idea what they were fighting for!

One of them said that he had been FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM
He didn't seem to be one of the brightest boys.

You left freedom behind

with your folks at home, your parents, wives, children, girl-friends of whom you keep such a lot of photos.
Slugging it out in the mud *you have a good chance to be killed or maimed for the sake of war-mongers and profiteers who once more contrived to stay at home.*
Your buddies are glad to be out of the mud. They are sure to return home safe and sound. *They* have taken the short-cut. *You* still have a long way to go. Keep alive, if you can. For remember

You are still wanted . . . for JAPAN!

The first principle evident is that it is not psychologically profitable to "answer back" in combat propaganda. Usually the persons whom the leaflet reaches know very little about the propaganda that has been addressed to their enemy. Secondly, it should be recognized that taunts and jibes are more likely to arouse increased hostility than a desire to surrender. In the case of the 45th Division, for example, the German leaflet's claim that it had "achieved nothing spectacular so far" actually made some readers fighting mad. Moreover, ridiculing what prisoners have said will assuredly make captivity seem less inviting. Most important, however, is the unintended effect of a sly approach to the prisoner theme. The German leaflet, by implying that the captured Americans "took the short-cut," appeals for a treasonable act of surrender. As we have seen, this is not only unwise but also entirely unnecessary even in the case of disaffected personnel.

On the positive side, a representative American leaflet demonstrates a few practical, positive points.

BATTLE OF
MATERIAL!
RULES OF CONDUCT

When the Americans attack, they usually do so on the largest scale. They waste shells in order to save lives. They can afford that, for they have the means — they have more than enough in artillery, planes, flame-throwers, tanks, tankdozers and rocket weapons, in order to break any resistance. That is a fact.

When the Attack reaches you

you can try to stop it — with insufficient weapons, insufficient ammunition, insufficient equipment. Whether or not you try this is up to you. Millions have died in this manner.

Or else you can save yourself by staying in your position and showing clearly to the American infantry that you give up. Whether you surrender, is likewise up to you. Millions have saved themselves in this manner and know for sure that they will see their homes again after the war.

The instructions to German soldiers, which appear on the reverse side, are known to the American infantry. If you are captured, show this leaflet.*

* A Note about this Leaflet: This general attack leaflet was written to conform to battle conditions in winter when experience showed that the German defense tended toward the villages. This version was used in American sectors only.

In its approach, the leaflet accommodated a known alibi of the enemy — which may in fact have been a truth — that he was not being outfought but overwhelmed by our superiority of materiel. Since this acknowledgment cost us nothing and salved the enemy's military honor, it was a point that was made frequently in our combat propaganda in Europe. Registering initial agreement on one subject is in fact always extremely desirable from the psychological point of view, for it can never be taken for granted that the enemy will entirely identify himself with our cause. Once such an initial point of agreement has been found, the psychological manipulation of the enemy can proceed with profit. There need be absolutely no dishonesty inherent in such agreement. Only bigots and fools — and cowards — find it dangerous or dishonorable even to agree with the enemy that 2 and 2 make 4.

On its reverse side, this particular United States leaflet gave concrete instructions on how to stay alive in specific combat situations, such as fighting in cellars, retreat by daylight, or defense with light weapons against tanks. Each of these situations was described in highly unattractive terms, but only from the military point of view, and the conclusion was ostensibly left to the reader, even though he was also reminded not to wait too long before surrendering lest he find it too late.

Although the foregoing technique proved useful with German soldiers, there is no evidence that the same approach would be equally successful with enemies of another nationality. Only psychological combat intelligence and experimentation with various techniques can show which line has promise. Prolonged interviews with cooperative prisoners, detailed descriptions of typical surrender situations by prisoners as well as by friendly troops, captured enemy documents relating to our propaganda, memory tests conducted with sample groups of prisoners, analysis of counterpropaganda and finally a count of leaflets found on prisoners — all these and other techniques are required to test the effectiveness of any new approach in combat propaganda.

An entirely different problem is posed by propaganda addressed to an enemy civilian population. If the enemy is a totalitarian state and the civilian population is not in the combat zone, individual action to effect surrender is of course entirely out of the question. In such a case, particular care must be exercised to avoid frustrating the civilian reader. Registering agreement with the enemy civilian's plight may merely have the effect of prompting him to say: "I agree, but what can I do?" When he finds that there is really nothing he can do about it, he cannot very well be blamed for persisting doggedly in his course of action.

In the combat zone, it is of course an easy matter to give the enemy civilian specific instructions on what to do in his own interest, in such matters as evacuation or staying behind, persuading soldiers to surrender, sheltering deserters, hiding foodstuffs, and the like. When it comes to giving reasonable advice to the civilian deep in an enemy totalitarian country, however, the propagandist is usually confronted with an extremely difficult problem. Great honors await the person who, in the event of a new conflict, can hit upon a realistic mode of instruction to enemy civilians *which will help them and us at the same time.* For surely this is the essence and the beauty also of combat propaganda: that it can afford to be truthful, and that it contains objectively good advice by which everybody profits — except the enemy command. Not only are many Americans alive today who might have died but for our combat propaganda; but many a former enemy soldier would have died, too, if he had not allowed himself to be convinced by our message.

THE "PROPAGANDA" TANK*

By Arthur T. Hadley

Mounting loudspeaker systems on tanks during World War II enabled psychological warfare personnel to accompany the spearhead elements in any offensive action.

[During World War II a great deal of experimentation and improvisation took place with respect to the mounting and use of loudspeakers on tracked vehicles. Captain Arthur T. Hadley a psychological warfare officer with XIX Corps, participated in the development of the tank-mounted loudspeaker and pioneered the tactical employment of the weapon. The abridged account that follows was written by Capt Hadley.]

Every armored soldier knows that one of the essential characteristics of all tank action is shock. Shock, that strikes at the enemy's mind, increases his anxiety and paralyzes his ability to fight. Psychological warfare is that branch of the Army whose primary concern is lessening the enemy's ability to fight through action on his mind. One would think because of this similarity that Psychological Warfare and Armor would be constantly working together. Yet, probably because of the woefully limited use made of battle propaganda during World War II, the two have not trained together during this uneasy peace.

Properly used combat propaganda exploits the speed, violence and surprise inherent in every well planned armored attack to tremendously increase the shock effect. The effect of this shock causes the enemy such anxiety that he can no longer fight effectively and may even surrender. This saves American lives and gets the commander on the objective that much more quickly.

Because so little is known about the operations of tank mounted loudspeakers a glance at a World War II operation is instructive. The tank mounted loudspeaker was operating with an advance column of the 2d Armored Division. Arriving before a fortified town the column deployed. Some fire was received from the town. The loudspeaking tank informed the garrison of the town that a large armored task force stood on the outskirts. The broadcast also informed the people that the commander didn't want to destroy the town. The garrison was then informed that American artillery was ranged on them.

Over the tank communications system, word was sent back to the artillery. Six leaflet shells, containing surrender instructions for towns, burst over the village. The occupants of the town were then informed that American fighter-bombers were overhead. The Forward Air Controller called down a P-47, that laid a leaflet bomb squarely over the center of the town. The tanks then moved forward without firing, while the loudspeaker continued to call on the town to surrender. As the tanks brushed through a light curtain of fire, the firing stopped and white flags appeared. A garrison of some 800 men with antitank weapons surrendered.

Admittedly, this was an ideal operation. Usually the results achieved are not so spectacular nor is the coordination so perfect. However, several important aspects of battle propaganda can be gathered from this operation. Most important

* Reproduced from *Armor*, 60:32–33 (1951), with the permission of the US Armor Association, publisher and copyright holder.

of these is the realization that no one is surrendering to the propaganda. What they are surrendering to is the military force, the tank attack. However, that force has been exploited by the battle propagandist for its fullest psychological effect. Nothing could be more wrong than the idea, unfortunately prevalent in many quarters, that psychological warfare is a wonder weapon operating by itself to achieve spectacular results. It is merely another supporting weapon, though of overlooked power, and like any supporting weapon its fullest results are only achieved through cooperation. In this particular instance the tanks and supporting infantry never returned the hostile fire. This is a customary battle propaganda device that exploits the shock action of tanks to the fullest. Once the fire fight has been joined the enemy gets some relief from his anxiety in action and it becomes harder to get the maximum psychological result. This points up the need for peacetime training in this field. It takes a well disciplined unit to hold their fire. During World War II it would take on the average of ten to fifteen loudspeaker missions before troops learned to make the adaptations necessary for psychological warfare to be a success. Some outfits that had bad initial experiences with loudspeakers never learned. The intricacies of tank-infantry-loudspeaker cooperation should be forged now in training.

The individual tanker and armored infantryman also has to be trained to think in terms of psychological warfare. At the time the enemy first starts to surrender, any single soldier can change the outcome of a battle by shooting down the surrendering soldiers. This makes the enemy feel betrayed and he settles down to really fight. Also the belief that it is "sissy" to take prisoners must be eradicated. It is a far more soldierly course to get on the objective quickly with few casualties through taking prisoners, than to reach the objective after a hard battle in which no prisoners were taken, so heavily hurt yourself that you cannot exploit your gains. After all, Armor is the arm of speed and violence and taking prisoners often will increase your speed a hundred fold.

There are a host of other questions that should be ironed out in training. What is the best position for the loudspeaking tank to take in an attack? How should its radio set be hooked up? Who should command it? Through what chain of command? Then there are the technical questions of the best form of power supply, the best position for the loudspeaker on the tank, the exact distances the speaker can be heard in different terrain and weather?

There are also to be investigated the numerous supplemental benefits that derive from the presence of a loudspeaker tank. The most striking of these is the use of the loudspeaker in the control of infantry during an attack. The loudspeaker can reach every infantryman at once without having to go through the radio net. For example, after the tanks have finished putting fire on a strongpoint, the infantry can be informed of this over the loudspeaker. This way they can attack the strongpoint immediately without that lag that lets the enemy reorganize. The 2d Armored used this method with great success, particularly in towns where control was always difficult.

The question of how many loudspeaker tanks there should be and the command channel should also be gone into. The combat arms have a vital interest in this question, yet few armored experts have given the problem more than passing attention. At the risk of sounding like that famed loser of future wars "the old expert," I believe the following to be the proper ratio of loudspeakers.

There should be one organic loudspeaker tank with every tank battalion in the armored division. There should be two such tanks with the separate armored

mechanized reconnaissance regiments that operate out of Corps. There should be a PW officer in Division HQ responsible for training the crews in PW techniques and leading the key loudspeaker unit in combat. The loudspeakers must be organic. World War II proved that you cannot attach them to a division for an operation any more than you could attach a tank battalion to an infantry division on the eve of an operation and expect real results.

Looking briefly into the future, loudspeakers are due to play a tremendously important part in airborne armor units. In the air head, which is shock action at its highest, the mobile loudspeakers will range 'round the perimeter. Everywhere confusion is found they will exploit it, calling on the enemy to surrender, enhancing his fears with battle noises, increasing the confusions through phony orders to his troops.

To further its mission Armor needs the tank mounted loudspeaker and the techniques of battle propaganda. To be effective, battle propaganda must work with Armor and the other mobile combat forces. The lateness of the hour almost demands that the marriage take place soon.

THE OWI LIBRARY IN SPAIN 1942–1945*

By Frances I. Foltz

The American Reference Library and librarian became important instruments in the conduct of American foreign policy in Spain during the war years.

When Ambassador Hayes asked me in September 1942 if I would organize and direct a library in Madrid for the Office of War Information I had been out of library work for eight years. In 1935 I had left The New York Public Library to accompany my husband, a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press assigned to Paris. After Paris, we went to Bern and then, in 1941, to Madrid, by this time with a five-year-old son. Ambassador Hayes explained that the library might be slow in starting so that I should arrange and act as hostess at any social functions which OWI might consider it wise to give in non-belligerent Spain. That almost stopped me for I hate large gatherings, but there was a war on and the work had to be done.

The library was to share a large house whose maintenance had been neglected for ten years. The four-story mansion with guest house and garden was cluttered with a superb, but uncomfortable, collection of Spanish antiques left there by its late owners, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Byne. Emmet Hughes, who inaugurated the OWI outpost in Madrid, and I selected from this collector's dream such furniture as we guessed might be useful in the work to come. Mr. Hughes then went to work organizing personnel, administration and writing and producing news bulletins, while I went to work with the neighborhood carpenters, stone masons, electricians, plumbers, glaziers, painters and chimney sweeps to recondition the house. By November all was fresh and in order, and we named the house "Casa Americana, Annex of the Embassy of the United States of America."

* From "The Better to Understand Each Other: The OWI Library in Spain 1942–1945," *Library Journal*, 71:1497–1502 (1946). Reproduced with the permission of the Editor, *Library Journal*, copyright holder.

With a sigh of relief I set to work on the library. My material consisted of about 200 books left in the house by the Byne Estate lawyer. It was a weird collection, but fortunately contained a few useful reference books. Ambassador Hayes donated a fine collection of fifty American historical works. From my apartment I brought the few books we could spare from our meager library. We begged and confiscated a few others from members of the American colony. This, less than 300 volumes in all, formed the nucleus and, alas, almost all our library for many months. We lived on rumors that 5,000 books were on their way. It was two years later that we heard that Congress had scotched that plan, but by then the library was a going concern.

Anyone who has lived in Spain can imagine the difficulties in having stationers and carpenters make proper cards, blanks, trays, shelf-list and catalog cases. They all thought it mad that a woman should be doing any of the things I had to do in my work. Besides there were the wartime shortages. We had five different qualities of catalog cards in our files when I left Spain, through necessity. While waiting for the equipment, I began accessioning, classifying and cataloging our books. I had never typed but learned on shelf-list and catalog cards. For the previous seven years I had carried with me my New York Public Library *Style Manual* and samples, but had left them behind on a brief trip home in 1941. We then expected shortly to be in a concentration camp, or fleeing on a destroyer, so traveled lightly. My memories of spacing and indentation were a bit vague since training days in 1929, but with much experimenting I set forms and wrote a brief style manual for myself and the assistants I might have in the future.

I had hardly well begun when I lost my office workroom for three months in an excellent cause. In the recent North African invasion a young American aviator had come down off the coast of Spanish Morocco and worked his way up to Madrid. He was hidden away in my office until he could be taken out of Spain. My work was transferred to a tiny, former sewing-room. In spite of everything, I opened the library modestly as a reading room for the general public on January 23, 1943. We did lend some books, too, although the printers had not yet made our application blanks and borrowers' cards, and we had so pathetically little to lend. Unfriendly Spanish police often screened visitors to the house and made occasional arrests at our doors on trumped-up charges. But readers came, slowly at first, gradually with more courage and real eagerness to learn as much as they could about our country and its achievements.

They Escaped — to the Library

The library occupied a room, approximately 50 by 17 feet, on the third floor of the busy OWI headquarters. My small office adjoined. A long seventeenth-century table with six rush-bottomed chairs around it stood in the center of the big room. There we kept our few OWI pamphlets and aged American magazines. Later, when a few more magazines began to trickle through the Falange censorship, I had magazine racks built and placed on each side of the fireplace at the far end of the room. On a long, narrow table along the inside wall we kept the book-review sections passed on to us from the Ambassador's subscriptions to the New York newspapers. Across the room the atlas, a one-volume "set," stood on a small table beneath a casement window. The librarian's seventeenth-century desk stood before the other window, facing the entry door. Supplies were kept in an antique highboy. A small alcove in the inside wall housed our books for more than a year. But if OWI wanted a library, then a library I intended to produce, though short of books through no fault of mine. My requests for the tools of my trade and the long lists

of books I sent in seemed to become invisible once they left Madrid. My request in November 1942 and subsequent cables for a Dewey Decimal classification guide was finally answered in February 1944! Meantime I had borrowed a 1927 Dewey from a Spanish librarian.

By opening day I was flanked with two eager assistants, both of whom received their first library experience then and there. One was Mrs. Helen Lemly de Fernandez de Liencres, a former American schoolteacher married to a Spaniard. Her Spanish in-laws thought her really eccentric to work, considering her social and financial status. She weathered it out and was soon doing far more than her agreed four hours daily at the desk by book-hunting in the secondhand stalls, organizing and giving lectures and taking Americans on tours of the art centers of Madrid to teach them something of the country in which they were living and working. The other assistant was frail and charming Señorita Caridad Castellano, Spanish, and a former teacher in American colleges. She "kept" the desk the four morning hours and taught Spanish on her own in the afternoons to Americans of the Embassy. Her perfect English and French were invaluable to us.

Our library was designed for Spaniards who were interested to learn the "American way," above all the technical. Their civil war and World War II had dried up informational sources except from Germany, Italy and France. We kept Spanish hours for them. The library was open all weekdays and most holidays from 10 A.M. to 1:30 P.M. and from 4 P.M. to 8 P.M. The first year we also kept open on Sunday afternoons.

When the printers finished our application blanks and borrowers' cards in March 1943 we became a lending library in the free, American tradition. We asked no fees, but required for lending books a Spanish reference and a recommendation from a resident American or other United Nations citizen. Nothing was required of readers and visitors save the courage to come in.

Refugees became a problem. From 1943 to early 1945 about 15 per cent of our visitors were men who had escaped from Hitler's Europe across the Pyrenees. Most had also done their stint in Spanish concentration camps and were on their way to join the Allied armies somewhere. No other libraries were freely available to them, so they came to ours early and stayed late. For their benefit we accepted gifts of books in Spanish, French and German, although our intention had been to keep only books in English or translations therefrom. As it soon became evident that these refugees must be identified in some way, I telephoned all the Allied consulates that we would grant special temporary borrowers' cards to those refugees who bore the consular stamp on the back of our application blanks. Only magazines of which there were duplicates and paper-backed reprints were allowed to be withdrawn with these cards, for the refugees usually had to quit Madrid swiftly, and we could not afford to let any of our few precious books go with them. It was very difficult to refuse eager, cultured youths permission to take out "real" books "just overnight, please," but I learned through sad experience to be adamant. Some of them had been living by their wits for years and would sell our books in the second-hand stalls for a few pesetas to help them on their way. Nevertheless, we lost only forty-four books from our opening day to October 1945, and most of these were the paper-backed reprints.

My double duties were soon overwhelming, so I was grateful in late 1943 to get the part-time assistance of a secretary, Mrs. Isabel de Lafuente. She was helping in three other departments but took to library work rapidly and was soon typing the shelf-list and catalog cards in half the time I spent with my hunt-and-peck

system. She also helped me address and write tens of thousands of invitations and keep up the guest-list file.

Guests? Oh, yes, that was the social side of my job. In addition to teaching my library assistants and secretary, answering reference questions, writing all library letters, classifying and cataloging all books, magazines and pamphlets, making all decisions on library policy, overseeing the porter's wife and her three assistants who cleaned the whole house, buying household supplies and library supplies, seeing to current repairs for house, guest-house and garden, I had to tend to the chance visitors and invited guests. These were myriad. There were the telephone visitors asking all sorts of information. There were visitors who came in person to tell at great length what they thought was vital information about ammunition plants in the Black Forest (some callers like that did have valuable information which I passed on to other sections). Some of them wanted me to help them organize a baseball team (which I did!), or get a visa, or an American copyright, or a telephone, or an American technical book or magazine, or a job, or just an invitation to one of the film shows or lectures we might be giving.

The social functions were a full-time job in themselves. We gave the first OWI reception at the inauguration of the Casa Americana in November 1942. From that grew exhibitions, a series of lectures in Spanish and English, and film shows of newsreels, documentaries and feature films which thousands of Spaniards saw. Only in the Casa Americana and the British Press Office could the Spaniards see, during the first years of the war, Allied newsreels and documentaries. Later when Spanish censorship permitted some public showings we still gave, with the British, the only complete and uncensored showings. Suffice it to say that issuing invitations, managing and acting as hostess at these affairs, on top of my library work, kept me on duty from 9 A.M. to 9 P.M., with two hours off for lunch, and many nights the film shows kept me at work until 1 A.M. Evening movies begin only at 10:30 P.M. in Spain. Naturally, my home, husband, child and personal life were sadly neglected.

Where Friends Meet

Meantime, the library somehow grew apace. We gradually gave up hope of much help from home. But neither did we get criticism nor comment, so we kept on begging from the natives and buying almost anything available in English from the meager supplies of the second-hand markets. In July 1944, when our Embassy leased the building of the International Institute of Boston, about 2,000 books from the Institute library were brought, with their shelves, to be housed temporarily in the Casa Americana Library. With the books came their librarian, Señorita Enriqueta Martin, from whom I had borrowed the Dewey Decimal. She left her books in my care, but also transferred her free Library Science classes conducted under the auspices of the International Institute to the Casa Americana. We used her books and she used our library for demonstration purposes to her classes. Miss Martin is an island of hope in Spain where many national libraries still classify their books only by the size of the volume!

It was in December 1944 that we got our first substantial supplies from OWI. Then arrived a superb collection of 1,018 books sent for exhibition in the International Samples Fair at Barcelona in July that year. Two fine, small information libraries assembled by the London OWI and shipped by them in November 1944

arrived in Madrid in July 1945. One of these we forwarded to Barcelona, which we had supplied with all our duplicates, hoping eventually to establish a branch library there. Our only sorrow about all these books was that there were over 150 duplicates, triplicates and even quadruplicates of books in our library when we sorely needed other wide gaps filled in.

Magazines were a constant headache. We received only two magazines with any sort of regularity and these were ones which so often carried bitter criticisms of Franco and his regime that we were prohibited from displaying many copies. These were easily bought in Lisbon and cleverly used by the German Press Office to make counter propaganda against us among the Spaniards. Few Spaniards could have private subscriptions to American magazines and many of these were seized by the Spanish censorship, though they frequently appeared on the black market, selling for twenty times their newstand price. Our periodicals trickled in fitfully, months late and with many issues missing. In late 1944 we gave a highly successful exhibition of the tattered remnants of magazines sent months before for the Barcelona Fair. I had the tedious job of looking through every publication and blocking out violent attacks on Franco wherever they appeared, because we were an annex of the Embassy accredited to his government and therefore could display no insults to the Chief of State.

In October 1944 I requested my replacement since my husband was awaiting a long overdue transfer. Almost a year later the transfer orders came, but Miss Leslie Frost, my successor as director of the library, had arrived in April 1945. Then I had time to assemble a final report on work accomplished. When I resigned at the end of August 1945 the library owned 2,797 volumes fully classified and cataloged. Of these 1,033 had been donated in Madrid, 91 had been bought where we could find them in Madrid and Lisbon with money collected for overdue fines, and 100 were magazines, mainly medical, bound into books. On August 31, 1945 we had circulated 21,892 items in Madrid, not including the mail order business we did throughout Spain mostly through the consulates. Until mid-1945 borrowers had been limited to withdrawing two items each visit. During the wicked heat of August 1943, 1944 and half of August 1945 we had closed the library to the nearly non-existent public and caught up with our clerical work, while the Madrileños enjoyed the cooling mountain or sea breezes far away. Miss Frost and I then together got out our first printed catalog in book form.

Exactly 20,464 visitors to our library had signed the registration book in those twenty-eight months of active organization under conditions which were hardly ideal. Only about 10 per cent of these were Americans. Many had come, read and gone without signing, for there were Spaniards who did not want their names on view for any of the regime's agents, some of whom visited us poorly disguised as readers. We had 1,243 members with borrowers' cards.

I left Spain after making certain recommendations with which Miss Frost was in agreement. They were approximately as follows:

(1) That the library be maintained and expanded as long as the United States maintains diplomatic relations with Spain. Those Spaniards who came to our library were, in great part, ones who desired to be our friends and learn about our way of life. Their courage is a challenge to us.

(2) That the library continue to be modeled as closely as possible on the free, American lending library. Nothing like it exists in the Spain of today. Other

foreign libraries there were far less liberal about admittance and lending than our Casa Americana Library. Spanish libraries admit only "approved" borrowers.

(3) That the OWI collection of recordings, music, pamphlets, films and exhibits be incorporated into the library.

(4) That the library be provided with adequate space, including a stack room, a children's room, a study room, a room for listening to American recordings, space for exhibits and a periodical room. The library could easily utilize the whole of the Casa Americana to good purpose.

(5) That adequate, trained personnel for supervising the library be provided. My entire staff consisted of myself, two half-time, untrained assistants and a part-time secretary. Even I had too many outside duties to devote the proper time to the library. An untrained helper who "read" the shelves, replaced books to their shelves and did the "overdue" work for three months was the first person in the whole outpost to be dismissed when OWI began reducing its personnel prior to absorption into the State Department.

(6) That exhibits of books, pamphlets and photographs be sent to supplement such lecturers who could reach Madrid to tell the United States story. Dr. Van Horne, our cultural attaché, 1944–45, arranged some lectures on American subjects and gave a number himself. The response warranted an expanded program.

(7) That the gaps in the book collection be filled in and the whole kept up to date.

I believe that no American librarian could watch the courage and eagerness of those Spaniards, who braved arrest during the times when our armies were not yet winning the war and when the Spanish government was openly unfriendly, without a burning desire to see the knowledge and truth they sought provided to them. The better we peoples of the earth know and understand each other the better are our chances for peace. Living in other countries we best learn to understand their psychology and citizens. Lacking that possibility, books provide us the next best picture. Libraries can advance world peace. Well, I think so, anyhow.

THE AMERICAN FILMS' PROGRAM IN OCCUPIED GERMANY*

By Gladwin Hill

An account of some of the problems, failures and successes.

As one who spent three and a half years reporting various aspects of the war in Europe, I have been invited to make some observations on our film operations. These observations can be summarized quite simply. Intermittently over that three and a half years I saw many individuals, most of them intelligent, earnest, and energetic, coping with the problems of wartime film distribution; and ultimately I saw a lot of films being exhibited. But the details are a matter of record more comprehensive than I can supply from my notes. The main question is, What does all this activity add up to?

* Extracted from "Our Film Program in Germany," *Hollywood Quarterly*, 2:131–37 (1947). Reprinted with the permission of Mr. Hill, the author, the Managing Editor, *The Quarterly of Film, Radio, and Television* (successor to *Hollywood Quarterly*), and the Regents of the University of California, copyright holder.

I think that so far the work has been a sad, although not irretrievable, failure. There is still time, I believe, to recover; but to do so, we must examine what is wrong and why.

I base this judgment on the simple process of comparing what we accomplished with what we set out to do.

What was our aim?

To purge German movies of Nazism?

To show the Germans American films?

To revive distribution of American commercial film in Germany?

The answer to all these questions is an emphatic No.

The aim of the whole conquest and occupation of Germany, it should hardly be necessary to recall, was to re-educate the German people into ways of thinking and living that would make them a world asset rather than a world liability. Along with other modes of expression such as politics, schools, literature, music, the press, and radio, motion pictures were considered a likely instrument toward this end.

The motion picture segment of our campaign involved many agencies, notably the Army, the State Department, and OWI. They operated not just as a team, pulling generally in the same direction, but more like an Oriental acrobatic troupe, with the various members complicatedly intertwined. The State Department laid down policies that affected both the Army and OWI; the Army was responsible for both physical facilities and some sub-policies that governed OWI; and the OWI people had a hand in both the formation of over-all policies and the planning of physical facilities. . . .

One of the top officers in our psychological warfare organization in Europe admitted to me that in his whole Army career he could recall only two hours of formal tutelage in the field of public relations. Item: when the Army took the radical step after V-E Day of reversing its nonfraternization policy in Germany, the officer in charge of our propaganda in Germany was not notified so that he could alter his program to conform with and complement the Army's rather momentous announcement.

With respect to motion pictures in particular, the Army's comprehension leaves a lot to be desired. Two wars have not managed to pry Army motion picture production loose from that anomalous and possessive catch-all, the Signal Corps, where it no more belongs than the Air Force did.

In London, in the fall of 1942, Major Hal Roach, a man of some reputation in the movie field, recounted to me how, in the 1920's, he had been called to Washington to go over hundreds of thousands of feet of World War I service film, and found it so unorganized and incoherent as to be virtually worthless. He trusted, he said, that this had taught the Army a lesson and that we would do better this time.

To too great an extent we made the same mistakes again, and wound up looking rather shabby alongside of our supposed cinematic stepchildren, the British. I am referring now to historical film, not to the training reels, in which I understand that, thanks to Hollywood, an admirable record was made.

At one time in England there were at least three overlapping and conflicting US Army motion picture agencies working around the Air Force alone. The Clark Gable unit arrived and worked for months. I asked John Lee Mahin, Gable's right-hand man, if they were making a recruiting film, a training film, a documentary, a propaganda film, or a feature picture. He could not tell me; I doubt that the Army had told him. Is it any wonder their work ended up on the shelf?

Army film-making is not our topic in this discussion, but I am trying to describe the rarefied atmosphere of understanding upon which, because of organizational dovetailing, our film program for Germany was to a considerable degree dependent.

It is a matter of record that the OWI itself was not free from confusion and even overt schisms. Item: Robert Sherwood, after much exhortation, persuaded Mark Hanna to leave his lucrative New York agency to fill a supposedly key position in our film program in England. After months of investigation in London, Hanna concluded that under the existing setup (about which nobody apparently had bothered to advise Mr. Sherwood) the only function he could possibly fill was to escort reels in a taxi from Grosvenor Square to the Ministry of Information.

Despite such shortcomings, we nevertheless recognized that the film had a logical part in the rehabilitation of Germany and in our interim campaigns, and went to work.

We invaded North Africa. Here we were confronted with our first film distribution problem — a motley potential audience of Europeans and Africans, some of whom were helping us, some of whom had been conniving with the Nazis and some of whom were indifferent. Our main objective was to make them happy, entertain them, solidify their support. We took in a portfolio of some thirty films, innocuous but undistinguished items like *I Married a Witch* which seemed fairly well selected for the purpose.

Nearly a year later, we invaded France. The war was a year older, we were winning, the people were not a motley Casablanca crew but our old ally which had been suffering for our cause. What did we pull out in the film line? The same repertoire of pictures we had chosen to edify the Arabs a year before.

Our next step was the conquest of Germany. What were the governmental film agencies doing, meanwhile? They were reviving film distribution in France in order to turn it back to private agencies. They were distributing American documentaries, and working with the British and the French on Allied Newsreels. This work was quite meritorious. It represented an untold amount of effort and produced worthwhile results. But it did not represent much tangible progress toward our goal of helping rehabilitate the Germans; fruition was yet to come.

So far as this specific goal was concerned, there was ample reason for the film program to sag. Our whole occupation program sagged badly.

Today we are still vague about our occupation policies; we were even more uncertain then. Among those holding the reins, there were two conflicting approaches to the problem. One school of thought — broadly, the Morgenthau school — had in the back of its mind the old war-making Germany, and was preoccupied with suppressing any revival of it. The other was concerned with the wrecked, prostrate Germany that we had on our hands, and was preoccupied with getting it on a working basis. One group wanted to blow up nitrogen plants because nitrogen can be used in explosives. The other group wanted to revive nitrogen plants to make desperately needed fertilizer.

This tug of war brought our occupation program at times nearly to a standstill, and our "information" or propaganda program, including its film component, was hampered along with everything else. An aggravating factor was our general slowness, once we were confronted with the fact of a defeated Germany, to revise some of the facile notions conceived many months before and thousands of miles away.

The SHAEF Information Control section, a joint Anglo-American organization, was originally planned to suppress all ordinary motion picture exhibition in Germany for a long period and gradually to introduce a new era of cleansed, non-Nazi films of both foreign and German origin. But within two months after V-E Day the German people were getting so restless, virtually confined to their homes, that Marshal Montgomery became worried about keeping order in the British zone. He abruptly pulled out of the joint program — with an embarrassing lack of notice to the American section — and reopened the German theaters with any available pictures that seemed harmless.

On the American side, the whole information program, along with confronting intangible uncertainties, was struggling with a mountain of technical difficulties — things like these: . . .

The big Munich movie studios, whose facilities we needed urgently, stood idle for more than a month because they were inadvertently placed under the jurisdiction of the Air Force: a friend of mine had the key.

Our film distribution work itself was hampered for some time when a single courier plane would have helped greatly — while thousands of American and British planes and pilots were standing idle all over northwest Europe.

I cite all these circumstances not in proof of my assertion that our film program fell short, but as possible indications of why it did.

On proof, I will let the facts speak for themselves. A year after Germany surrendered, our principal film accomplishment, by all the accounts I have seen, was the exhibition throughout the American zone of some thirty American feature films. In general it was the same repertoire that we had shown successively to the burnoosed and fezzed citizens of North Africa and the French. I think some of the titles have been changed, but essentially it was the same portfolio: inconclusive items like *I Married a Witch* and *It Started With Eve.*

As a group of films originally selected for being noncommittal, what changes were they expected to work with the considerably less than receptive Germans? That they have been of less than no value is now affirmed by some of the men most closely connected with their distribution. The *New York Times* reported from Frankfurt, July 22: "The thirty-five American films shown to Germans since the end of the war have, with only a few exceptions, had no observable effect in the political and psychological re-education of the Germans and have, on the contrary, reduced American cultural prestige and probably damaged the future market for American films in Germany, *according to a group of Information Control Officers.*" This was formally corroborated in a Military Government report of November 17, which said the film program had served little in the re-education of the Germans, had held Americans up to public ridicule, and had hurt the reputation of the American film industry in Germany.

How does this look alongside of our original objective of helping, through films, to rehabilitate the German people? Under these circumstances does not the squabble about what has been done to revive American *commercial* film distribution in Germany smack somewhat of fiddling while Rome burns?

To be sure, feature pictures were only one part of our program. There were also documentaries — which had not stirred a ripple among the German people up to the time I left Germany last February (1946).

And there were Anglo-American newsreels. The ones I saw made the standard American bathing-beauty-and-dog-show nonsense look like Academy winners by comparison. Some typical sequences through which I watched a German audience sit in forbearing, bewildered silence were:

A British Army track meet in Holland.

Washington welcoming Admiral Nimitz (replete with men marching, tanks rolling, and all the military pomp we deplored when Goebbels presented it).

Military Government lieutenants applauding a Military Government captain's speech at the reopening of the Frankfurt stock exchange.

A London dog track.

Tattered German refugees swarming into Berlin from the East.

A Norwegian square-rigger sailing from Florida.

A Swedish fashion show using puppet models because of cloth shortage (indicating, propaganda-wise, either that it pays to be neutral because you end up with fashion shows, or that it doesn't pay to be neutral because you end up with insufficient cloth).

When I reproached an OWI newsreel official with this tripe, he acknowledged it was pretty poor but said that transportation troubles left them little choice of clips.

Since my last observation, Military Government reports indicate that the repertoire of documentaries has increased to fifty and has been well received and that the newsreels have improved. This is heartening, but it still comes a long way from alleviating the general vacuity of the program.

Let us give the OWI the complete benefit of the doubt, and say that these deficiencies were not their fault. Regardless of whose fault they were, is that the best that two great nations can do in the realization of the vast campaign into which they had marshaled millions of men and billions of dollars? Obviously not. Obviously more or better was not done simply because people in key positions did not think it was important enough.

Since I have returned to Hollywood, I have found it widely taken for granted that the motion picture industry refrained from wholeheartedly assisting the occupation film program lest it jeopardize commercial distribution. This certainly is consistent with the feeble showing so far and with the complaints about governmental delay in reviving commercial distribution, although I would hesitate to charge any group with such shocking stupidity and shortsightedness. But the cause is less important than the result. Even if the movie industry had matchless intentions, the result is still poor.

What should have been done? What can be done?

My personal feeling is that in the whole re-education program, as in several other important phases of the war, we sadly underestimated the "enemy," underestimated how much there was to do, how much effort we would have to apply.

The German people had been living in a factual vacuum, or worse, for a dozen years. To my mind, the inescapable first step for us was to fill this vacuum, establish a sound knowledge of the true facts of the contemporary world, historical, sociological, and otherwise, as a foundation for any political indoctrination we hoped to do.

We all know that the Germans' minds are still twisted, that they are still addicted to shockingly distorted ideas. But the fact remains that with all this there exists among them a tremendous appetite for straight objective information about the modern world, about the United States, about our government.

The Germans may still accept false rationalizations of their plight; nevertheless, they are conscious that for a dozen years they have been hoodwinked about just what was going on, and they have a Pandora-like yearning toward . . . the truth; they would like to taste it. That inclination is, in my opinion, our main chance of moving them back onto a constructive path.

Their quest for information is so great that ever since V-E Day there has been an active "black market" in tattered soldiers' copies of American magazines — everything from *Time* and *News Week* to *Cosmopolitan* and *Business Week* — even though these magazines are in no way banned to the Germans. Thanks to our "information" program, they are just — scarce.

In the motion picture field, I think this situation indicates an education program for the seventy million German people at least five times as extensive as the one we organized to help educate a fighting force of fifteen million in the various techniques of war. That is a large order. But it is very small alongside what we have sunk into the war effort with very uncertain returns so far as Germany's rehabilitation is concerned.

It is, I think, an order that manifestly cannot be filled by any amount of juggling of a film crop designed, not to re-educate the Germans or anyone else, but to ring the bell at the box office in Wilkes-Barre and Omaha. Military Government partially recognized this, recommending in its November report the use of films of "genuinely fine quality" only, more documentaries (on which Pare Lorentz's new project is a start), and improved newsreels. But here again I see the inclination to oversimplify, to underestimate. How many films of "genuinely fine quality" does Hollywood turn out? A dozen a year? Hardly enough, in any case, to stock some seven hundred theaters the year round.

And this still seems like an effort to alchemize ice cream for the good citizens of Wilkes-Barre into medicine for the social invalids of Frankfurt. Even if Walter Huston, Ingrid Bergman, Bette Davis have within their artistry the power of political and social education, serving them up as a nostrum to seventy million Germans — who, every man jack of them, through depravity, ignorance, apathy or timidity *sponsored* the concentration camps — is like talking semantics to a reform-school boy who doesn't know his ABC's.

Before the Germans are fit to ruminate over the nuances of evil in *The Little Foxes*, they must be reoriented on *what evil is*, if they have to be shown the life of Christ, book by book. Those who think Germans can be reformed by a diet of Oscars have not seen starving German ex-prisoners of war turned away from *German* doorsteps because they were members of the defeated Wehrmacht. Academy award winners are rarefied fare for people who don't understand the story of the Good Samaritan.

I have no delusion that you can take seventy million foreign civilians and cram a long series of educational animated cartoons and shorts into their heads, as was done with the armed forces. But there is no getting away from the fact that the Germans present a crying demand for education. And we are always boasting of the film's great educational potentialities.

Some very special and ingenious program is called for. Not having the collective knowledge of film leaders and craftsmen who met the challenge of mass education for our armed forces, I cannot suggest a detailed answer. The problem is unprecedented, and it calls for an unprecedented solution — something more radical in concept, certainly, than the elementary notion of giving the Germans some second-hand features; something transcending and superseding more efforts to peddle Betty Grable in Göttingen.

This is bad news for the budget balancers. But would they rather forego the money for a few years, or pay it a thousandfold repairing a second abortion of German stability? . . .

MUSIC — A MEDIUM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By Cedric Larson

The role of music in America's International Information Program.

During the past five or six years, music in its various forms has come to be almost Uncle Sam's No. 1 ambassador of good will over the airwaves to the world-wide audience of the Voice of America.

Its increased use in broadcasts year by year in response to popular demand from the four corners of the earth is a tribute at once both to the growing esteem with which the world at large has come to regard American music, and recognition of the generally high performance standards which the musicians and artists themselves possess.

Sufficient time has now passed by so that we can honestly take stock of what has been accomplished in this sector of our international efforts to win friends and influence people on a global scale.

The experience of the past five years has shown again and again that the planned and extensive use of music in our international programs has demonstrated that music, the universal language, which is above politics and international strains, has a healing power for a disturbed world. It brings friends closer together and succeeds where force cannot succeed in composing differences.

The primary purpose of Voice of America (VOA), of course, is the dissemination of news and comment. The officials who oversee its operation, and watch over its welfare and output must emphasize that basic function. But hardly any audience would listen forever to news and comment.

So here is where music enters the picture, and in the "aural show-window" of the VOA it is the only genuine American product which can be given the listeners first hand. Speeches, news, anecdotes, dramas, and cultural activities must all be talked about, passed through the personality of the script-writers, actors and announcers. But the story of musical life in America goes to them first hand.

What kind of musical fare does the VOA provide for its overseas listeners? The Music Section has found over the years from practical experience that the best bet is to give its overseas audiences a balanced diet. The world must learn that America has something besides popular music in order to disprove the accusation, so often made by our enemies, that our music is ephemeral and frenzied. So the Voice has been more than anxious to record all the contemporary serious American compositions that it could possibly get.

For years the Voice has had a series of "American Composer" transcriptions, mostly of orchestral works gleaned from broadcasts, which is often supplemented by soloists and chamber music organizations. Short-wave listeners are hospitable to American works. However, direct short-wave broadcasts of symphonic music via the Voice transmitters are frequently plagued with distortion and fading due to inherent atmospheric transmission factors, so this type of American music is usually recorded, and the recordings flown direct to the foreign radio stations throughout the globe.

* Extracted from "Music: America's Global Ambassador of Good Will," *Etude*, 70:16–17, 50, 57 (1952). Reprinted with the permission of the author and Theodore Presser Company, publisher of *Etude*, copyright holder.

The VOA does virtually all of its musical work at its studios on West 57th Street near Broadway, right in the heart of New York's music area.* Any staff member will tell you that owing to budgetry considerations, they could not begin to do the sizable job they are turning in today without the hearty cooperation of the entire American music industry. This includes individual musicians, musical organizations and unions, facilities of the existing radio networks, commercial sponsors, managers of boards and agencies, recording services, publishers, and composers, who control performance rights and copyrights. Without all this assistance, the Voice of America actually could not carry a tune. So if the normal outlay for such musical programs as are broadcast daily were required, there would just not be enough funds for the large scale musical programs now offered to the world at large.

One big job of the Music Section is to stockpile a variety of musical programs. In their 57th Street studios they constantly receive and record a large number of standard radio programs, music of all types — since there are listeners of all tastes. In a four-week period the music staff may thus accumulate from 100 to 200 hours of music. At the same time they may also record by direct wire or tape-recorder a dozen non-broadcast concerts, in Town Hall, Carnegie Hall or anywhere else. Staff specialists listen to these things, and write reports indicating where in the over-all broadcasting scheme of things they could be most efficiently used.

The major avenues in which the musical broadcasts appear, are, first, short wave; and second, transcriptions for overseas distribution. How much of the total VOA output is music? The percentage varies from country to country, or we might say, from target area to target area. The demand for American music in some countries is high, as from Latin America, where it may range up to 30% of all broadcasting time. In other portions of the globe it may run 10% to 15%. No music is beamed behind the Iron Curtain (with the possible exception of Christmas or Easter) for the very good reason that VOA doesn't want to imperil listeners in Iron Curtain lands by having American music come out of their loudspeakers and thus identify the source of the broadcast.

The music staff supplies the music to introduce or accompany some little drama of American life. Appropriate selections from records must be meticulously chosen to underscore the dramatic value in the program. There are also brief musical programs, such as a new work by a composer currently in the public eye, or interviews with artists concerning a new composition. If a prominent composer should pass away, a memorial program comprising selections of his best known works is frequently given.

The VOA constantly strives to reach the widest possible audience at all economic and educational levels. That means they must attract and hold the interest of the unsophisticated listener of musical entertainment, as well as the discriminating listener. While no precise formula has ever been arrived at, broadly speaking, one-third of the output of the VOA is serious music, another third is that vast catch-all category called "semi-classical," and the remainder to popular music. What they insist is that the quality in each of these categories be first class.

For the entertainment shows they utilize the best talent in the popular field: Bing Crosby, Jo Stafford, and such big name bands as Benny Goodman, Guy Lombardo, Tommy Dorsey and many others. Jo Stafford's weekly music show has had unparalleled success. It features among other things questions and answers about America on every conceivable topic, including music and show

* [In 1954 the VOA studios were moved to Washington, D. C.]

business. Sometimes a contest is run, such as an essay among the listeners on a certain topic, with an album of Jo Stafford's records for the best letter from each country. This has had an almost fabulous success. Jo Stafford has become an international favorite judging from the huge amount of mail from young people all over the world.

Another form of program is the informational and entertainment type of show. Paul Whiteman is the narrator on the program. He is doing a history of popular music in America from the early colonial days to the present time, against the background of the customs and culture of our country, and national and world events. In a program of this type as you trace events through the years, there is much room for presenting the ideals as well as benefits of democratic society.

A new series which has just been started is called the "Musical Theatre." It presents condensed versions of musical comedies and operas, and describes the history of this type of entertainment in the United States. Mimi Benzell, former Metropolitan opera star, is featured as hostess and narrator on the program, and she also sings. Quite a bit of American cultural history is woven into this series.

Then for variation in this series the VOA will take something from Metropolitan auditions of the year as originally broadcasted over the network. This represents a fine opportunity to show the rest of the world our best aspiring American singers. This particular program is translated into a number of languages, and besides being fine entertainment, is an excellent show-case for American talent.

As might be suspected, broadcasting music into a country like Arabia or India, each with its own esoteric music, is beset with many problems. To solve this problem field surveys on the spot are conducted to ascertain the actual musical tastes of the audiences in these countries, and then music is selected which meets these tastes as nearly as possible together with a certain amount of Western music. Recordings of their own native musicians are also secured for broadcast purposes with good results. During the past decade American occupation forces have been stationed all over the world and many countries have thus been introduced to American music which have never been able to hear it before, and a popular demand for it arises. An outstanding example of this is in Japan, where symphonic music became very popular during the occupation years. Not so long ago, the Japanese of their own volition were asking for operatic programs, and the Japanese radio put on an entire symphony series conducted by Toscanini. Japan became so engrossed in the Metropolitan opera that this country sent several radio men to New York expressly to arrange for Metropolitan operatic broadcasts on the Japanese radio network.

Last year two men who escaped from a Russian slave labor camp (which the Soviets deny exist) arrived at these shores, and found their way into the VOA offices in New York. They recorded songs sung by the slave laborers and by their very nature listeners know these songs were genuine. They mentioned names and places, and the songs had a sad lyricism of music and text that could not have been "hoked up." The music was recorded as it was heard from their lips. Then the leader of a choral group of Russian refugees was called in and the songs were recorded — there were six of the slave labor camp songs. They were then broadcast in every language, telling to the peoples of the world the sad story of the slave labor camps. The effect was tremendous.

The Music Section always keep in mind that we must get across to the people of the world that American music is not alone big name orchestras, symphony orchestras of the greatest cities, or Broadway and Tin Pan Alley productions. They try

to show how the love of music permeates even the smallest community of our outlying areas. They show how American youngsters are receiving a musical education in our schools, all the way through high school, by means of instruction on instruments, voice lessons, playing in bands and orchestras, singing in various choral groups, and classes in theory and music appreciation.

In our overseas programs, the role of music in our colleges and universities is also discussed, and the influence of the great music conservatories. They tell of the rich folk music inheritance that we enjoy in this country because so many nationalities have come here to live the democratic way of life.

Overseas listeners are shown, for example, how the Pennsylvania Dutch communities still sing the folk songs that their ancestors brought over here two and three centuries ago. These songs are a treasured memory and now a part of American culture. In Wisconsin and Minnesota you find Scandinavian folk music, and in Louisiana the French tradition still exists. Then there is the Mexican influence near the border; the Indian influence in such states as New Mexico and Arizona; and the Spanish influence in Southern California. They all contribute toward the growth of native American folk music.

We send out over the air-lanes of the world a whole list of songs which reflect American life, customs, and culture — songs which tell of the happiness of the American farmer at his work, the sad songs of the miner, or the rousing songs of the lumber jack or the riverboatmen. We send forth today cowboy songs from out of the West, usually plaintive and sad; the robust songs of the railroad men and the sea chanties of the early American sailors. It becomes obvious to our foreign audience that all this musical activity is the result of free thinking, inspiration, and incentive present under a democratic way of life.

Another point that is projected by the VOA is the little known fact abroad that American life abounds with a wealth of professional musicians, orchestras and musical organizations of high quality at the "grass roots level." Europeans and Latin Americans are of course all familiar with the Metropolitan opera of New York, the New York Philharmonic, or the Philadelphia or Boston Symphony Orchestra.

What is not known by our foreign audiences is that we have close to 400 symphony orchestras in this country, of which at least 150 are outstanding, while 25 can be said to compare favorably with the best orchestras in any part of the world. Every effort is made to record and send abroad programs from these fine orchestras from every part of America.

One method of bringing these programs to the close scrutiny of foreign audiences which was accomplished with great effectiveness during the orchestral season 1951–52 was through a series of so-called "musical salutes" between an American city and a foreign city of comparable size. Under this plan, a city such as Houston, Texas, gets in touch through its mayor with the head of a city such as Ankara, Turkey. A trans-oceanic salute is arranged wherein the respective cities exchange orchestral messages. The Houston Symphony Orchestra gave a concert Feb 29, 1952, with appropriate ceremonies, in what was called "Turkish Night." A tape-recording was made of the program, and the tape flown to Ankara for rebroadcast over the Turkish Radio network. Later the process was reversed.

This plan of "musical public relations" between key cities was carried on with signal success last winter, not only in the case of Houston and Ankara, but also in the parallel exchanges involving Minneapolis and Florence, Rochester and Iran, Kansas City and Strasbourg, Denver and Copenhagen, and Buffalo and Luxem-

bourg. Some of these musical salutes reached estimated audiences of twenty or thirty million persons. Newspapers of the respective cities gave a big play to these events which involved their mayors and musical leaders. Programs frequently highlighted the work of some composers born in the city or country of the overseas metropolis being saluted.

We will always stress that these scores of truly excellent orchestras in America are not creations of the government or the state, but that the American spirit provides for the sponsorship. It is for the most part people of the local communities who sponsor and contribute to the orchestras maintenance, and in so doing have an active voice in the size of the orchestra they want, in the calibre of the musicians employed, and in the type of music programmed. The net result, as is pointed out to foreign listeners, is an intense interest in all things musical at the grass roots level all across the country, a movement which is still growing rapidly. This is not an argument against the government sponsored cultural programs of other nations, but rather an indication of what can be accomplished without such control.

The VOA ships recorded music of all types out to the four corners of the world. Each city is given the kind of musical fare that it requests. Some Paris stations seem to prefer *le jazz hot,* Stockholm might ask for recordings of the Metropolitan Opera; Rome requests some American sacred recordings; while Pakistan likes brass bands or a stirring Sousa March. So the Music Section has to cater to the diverse demands of a heterogeneous international audience.

The VOA keeps an immense stockpile of thousands of musical recordings so that any sudden demand may be anticipated if possible. They make up dance band programs, folk song programs, band concerts, choral concerts and musical varieties. Original transcriptions are relieved of their commercials, material is rearranged in programs, and put on special discs to be sent to the ends of the earth. These are reproduced in quantity, with special instructions in the various languages, and shipped in monthly batches to the 250 embassies, consulates and other outposts of the State Department.

Thus Radio Turkey at Ankara may offer its listeners a program of the Boston Symphony, or perhaps Guy Lombardo and his quite different Royal Canadians. Or the mountain villages of the Andes will be regaled with a Bing Crosby-Dinah Shore musical menu for a quarter hour every Wednesday evening, and a half-hour of Symphonic music on Saturday nights all "by courtesy of the Voice of America."

This, then, is the way music tells the American story in the way we would like it told to our friends and our foes, and "neutrals" overseas. The musical broadcasts and recordings say quite plainly, "This is what audiences in the USA listen to on their radios and in their concert halls."

The foreign audiences learn that we have no form of artistic censorship; that we listen to Shostakovich in Carnegie Hall without fear of the FBI. Our broadcasts and records also illustrate our musical independence and vigor. We show them that American music is a plant of robust growth and much promise.

Our concerts show each year that America offers hospitality, and artistic and financial success as well to foreign musicians. Concerts featuring such men as Stravinsky, Bruno Walter, Hindemith, Rachmaninoff, Schoenberg, Casadesus, and Kurt Weill, are still excellent and honest advertising for democracy.

In the realm of music, it can rightly be said that the VOA is contributing to our world-wide "campaign of truth" by illustrating the vigorous musical culture that

can flourish in a democratic society. In terms of psychological warfare we have in this important phase of our information program an ideological weapon in the arsenal of democracy of the greatest effectiveness. This "weapon" at once helps to put across democracy, and at the same time keeps America's best musical foot forward.

THE EXCHANGE OF PERSONS PROGRAM*

By Jack Yeaman Bryan

Government-sponsored exchange of scholars, elite leaders, and technicians between countries has become an important means of furthering foreign information objectives.

Although the military effort to contain communism makes headline news, the battle to keep the minds of free men free and to liberate those that are not free receives relatively little public notice. One of the most effective weapons being used in this battle is international exchange of leaders, teachers, and scholars.

The beneficial effect of such exchanges is evident wherever they have been carried on for any length of time. To illustrate with conspicuous examples, in Latin America these exchanges consistently support our good neighbor policy; in China, during the establishment of the Republic, they created among Nationalist leaders a degree of sympathy with American aims which notably influenced China's constitution and her school system; and in the Philippines, they encouraged a strong sense of kinship with the United States while helping that nation to develop in the democratic pattern.

Educational Exchange with the Philippines

During the 48 years preparatory to granting independence, the United States vigorously promoted education in the Philippines. After the Spanish-American War in 1898, American soldiers, while still in uniform, began opening schools. These became the nucleus from which a public school system was started in 1901, when nearly a thousand teachers arrived from the United States. Combining zeal for their task with faith in the liberating power of knowledge, these pioneer educators and their successors helped to make education phenomenally popular throughout the archipelago. As years passed, pupils who showed unusual qualities of leadership were awarded grants to complete their studies in the United States. This program of assistance from American teachers, supplemented by awards for study in the United States, is regarded by most Philippine educators and leaders as a principal source of the intense interest their countrymen have shown in developing the Philippines in the democratic pattern.

A Philippine school superintendent commented upon receiving a "leader grant" to study in this country:

> "All my life I have heard about the United States and studied about it, but was afraid I would never be able to go there. Because we loved our American teachers, we learned to love Mother America. The propaganda

* From US Dept of State, *Field Reporter*, 1:23–26 (Sep–Oct 1952).

of the Japanese during the war could not change that. When they were hunting for Americans who escaped, we would hide them near our homes during the day, then pass them onward at night to relatives farther away and so help them reach the mountains. We knew, if we were caught, the Japanese would kill us, but we helped anyway because we remembered our teachers. They had made us feel that we and the Americans were brothers."

The Current Program

Throughout the free world the International Information Administration (IIA) of the Department of State is conducting exchange programs somewhat like the one started in the Philippines half a century ago. In doing so, IIA works closely with several other Federal agencies. Among these, one of the most active in providing exchange grants is the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).

The MSA and IIA exchange programs complement each other, but with important differences resulting from differences in objective. The objective of MSA is primarily economic. It seeks to assist other countries directly in economic stabilization and reconstruction, in strengthening government administration and public services, in securing increased output of goods, and in laying the foundation for future economic development. In arranging exchanges MSA therefore emphasizes (1) vocational and technical training, and (2) basic education as a fundamental to economic progress.

The primary objectives of the program of the IIA, on the other hand, are concerned with attitudes. IIA's immediate goal abroad is to create a climate of opinion favoring evolutionary change in the democratic pattern. In contrast to the Communists' efforts to convince peoples that only through armed revolution can they hope to gain the things they lack, IIA provides informational materials and educational opportunities which show how to effect progressive change under democratic law.

The IIA, at relatively small expense, is reaching great numbers of people with measurable effect through the media of press, publications, films, and US information libraries. But the use of these media alone cannot be expected to hold back the spread of communism. Large areas of the world have been so saturated with totalitarian propaganda during the last 15 years that many people hesitate to believe anything presented solely in print or on the screen.

Facts set forth through such media are much more persuasive when they are confirmed by trusted observers from the nation in which they are presented. People everywhere tend to believe first-hand accounts from outstanding representatives of their own nation who have visited the United States and see with their own eyes.

For example, a Brazilian leader who had visited the United States under the IIA exchange program was greatly in demand as a speaker. In describing the reactions of his countrymen to his talks, he stated: "From a modest professional, I became a 'full professor' about the United States." He wrote that he was so enthusiastic about America that some were suspicious about his reports and opinions, but "on the whole, I am heard with respect about the United States, and all who have been there are believed. Although my brother (a well-known Brazilian sociologist) knows more about American culture through books, I am heard with more respect than he is on the subject."

On returning to their homelands, most grantees retain a strong attachment to the American institutions they attended and to the friends they made in the United States. The influence of their visits is widened, in many countries, through formation of alumni associations in which activity related to first-hand knowledge of the United States is the principal link of fellowship. Also, in major cities, binational associations provide returned exchangees with an opportunity to meet regularly with visiting Americans.

Types of Grantees Selected

To make the case for freedom known through educational exchange, the IIA program emphasizes the awarding of grants to molders of public opinion, particularly to leaders in communications, public education, government, civic enterprise, labor organization, and community welfare services. In the selection process, care is used to rate candidates according to their actual or potential effectiveness in improving social and political conditions, whether they are teachers, newsmen, radio and motion picture writers, labor leaders, government administrators, or other professionals. At the university level the studies most encouraged include the social sciences, the humanities, the teaching of English, and certain of the natural sciences.

Last year, under this program, 6,291 outstanding representatives of 72 countries came to the United States. Meanwhile, 1,528 Americans were sent abroad. The foreign nationals brought to this country included 2,025 top leaders and 920 educators who came under grants that permitted extensive observation of the American scene. A total of 2,685 junior leaders, educators, and students came for studies at US institutions, while an additional 661 received special training in the United States outside the standard academic curriculum. The Americans awarded grants to go abroad last year included 237 specialists in various fields, 570 educators, and 721 graduate students.

Exchange Programs Contribute to Defense

The cost of this program was less than that of a squadron of B-36 bombers. It was approximately one-eighth as much as for a new battleship, roughly the same as for two submarines, and slightly more than for one destroyer.

Yet, with this relatively low cost, the program is contributing importantly to defense by giving the people of other nations a clearer understanding of the meaning of freedom. It has given representatives of 72 nations an opportunity to discover for themselves that the interests of the rest of the free world coincide with the interests of the United States. When these articulate observers return home, they are able to give their countrymen persuasive reasons for believing that the United States can help them resist the spread of tyranny.

A member of parliament in a country in Southeast Asia, summarizing what he had gained through a leader grant, reported:

> "I wanted to learn about American life because it was only possible in the United States for me to see the difference between democracy and communism. I have definitely accomplished this."

Another grantee, a Japanese legislator, commented:

> "I realized from this trip that the essential difference and fundamental disagreement between Communist Russia and the United States is that the former represents a way of life by compulsion and the latter represents a way of life which is based on and derives its strength from voluntary processes. The American way is just and proper for human society."

A leader from the Ryukyus wrote:

> "I cannot possibly describe the effects of this visit in a manner that does justice to the stimulation achieved and the great faith I have found in Americans as a people and in their democratic institutions. . . . Time and again, I found myself wishing and hoping that all the other leaders in the Ryukyus could see and study the same things. Anyone who sees the strength, the health, and intelligent life, and experiences the good will, integrity, and character of the American people as we did cannot fail to gain or reaffirm faith in democracy. . . ."

Another important phase of the IIA program is the aid given to American schools in Latin America. Two hundred such schools, with a total enrollment of about 60,000 students, receive assistance which helps them maintain academic standards and encourages progressive growth.

IIA also facilitates many exchanges of persons financed by private US organizations. During 1951 the Department of State assisted in the exchange programs of 464 such organizations, including educational institutions, business concerns, and associations of college-trained people.

Project Planning

Experience has shown the advantage of grouping exchanges in projects designed to achieve certain objectives. These projects frequently involve arranging for exchanges of grantees in different fields. An example is one being carried out in the Philippines. To stimulate a keener interest in the responsibilities of a free press in a free nation, an American newspaperman was assigned to lecture at the University of the Philippines while conducting a series of seminars in Manila for working newsmen. The project also included sending to the United States three young Philippine journalists on student grants and three men on leader grants — one the editor of the foremost vernacular newspaper, another the manager of the Government radio station, the third a motion-picture writer and director. In a new nation which has acquired a free system of communications without having to go through a long course of trial and error, this project can be expected to produce favorable results at a relatively low cost.

Under another project, jointly sponsored by the Department of State and certain American newspapers, 25 journalists from 14 countries will come to this country for periods of from 3 to 6 months during 1952 and 1953 to serve as working members of the staff of the sponsoring newspapers.

The same sort of planning to achieve certain objectives is done in connection with exchange projects in a variety of fields, including the applied social sciences, labor-management relations, welfare service, development of democratic thought, American civilization, and methods of teaching English.

THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE MAGAZINE "AMERIKA"*

An account of difficulties in attempting to reach a Soviet target audience.

Toward the end of World War II the Department of State, in an effort to improve Russo-American understanding, made an unprecedented proposal to the Soviet Government. It proposed that an official US Government magazine be circulated in the Soviet Union. Five months of negotiations in 1943–44 finally resulted in approval of the magazine *Amerika* by the Soviet Government. The USSR agreed to handle circulation of 10,000 copies through its own distributing agency, Soyuzpechat.

Amerika, as a magazine telling of American life, never attacked or even discussed Soviet institutions or policy. However, it soon became evident that the Soviet Government was disturbed at the existence of a publication permitting its citizens easy and frequent comparison between life in the United States and in the USSR. The Kremlin's efforts to curtail effectiveness of *Amerika* by restricting its circulation became increasingly drastic.

The story falls into three phases: (1) Early flourishing: tolerance by the Soviet Government (1945–47); (2) indirect attack by intimidation of readers: the mounting anti-American campaign (1947–52); and (3) direct attack by cutting distribution (1950–52).

After 7 years and 53 issues of publication, the Department of State has reluctantly decided that mounting Soviet obstructions to *Amerika's* distribution has made its continued publication undesirable.

Tolerance by the Soviet Government (1945–47)

The first issue of *Amerika* appeared in January 1945. Its size and format were similar to that of *Life* magazine. Since it was designed with a "people to people" approach — to bring the United States as close as possible to Russians who could never go there — it contained many pictures, including color photographs on the cover and inside. Paper and printing typified the best American typographical standards. On first seeing the magazine, a professional Soviet writer commented enthusiastically:

> "The paper must come from the United States, because there is nothing like it in the Soviet Union. In fact, we cannot match this magazine at all. We have *Ogonyek* (*Ogonyek* ["Little Flame"] is the largest and most elaborate picture-and-text magazine in the USSR), but it is nothing compared to *Amerika*."

The Moscow correspondent of the New York *Times*, catching the flavor of *Amerika's* early days in Moscow, reported on October 25, 1945:

> "Sudden quivers of excitement shot through American offices in Moscow yesterday. Succession of visitors opened doors and made anxious inquiries. Telephones kept buzzing. What had happened was very simple. Word had leaked out that advance copies were being distributed of the third

* Reprinted from *The Department of State Bulletin*, 27:127–32 (1952).

issue of *Amerika*. . . . Naturally, everyone wanted a copy at once. . . . No advertising and no editorials. Just information about America. . . . When *Amerika* appears it is a great day in Moscow. . . ."

And the correspondent of *Time* magazine cabled (issue of March 4, 1946):

"*Amerika* was hot stuff. Russians liked its eye-filling pictures of Arizona deserts, TVA dams, the white steeples of a Connecticut town, Radio City, the Bluegrass country, the Senate in session, Manhattan's garment district."

Evidences of Popularity

In content, *Amerika's* only "formula" was to present the truth about life in the United States as vividly as possible. It featured profiles of average Americans — an Iowa farmer; a steel-worker in Gary, Ind.; a white-collar girl in Chicago; an Oklahoma oil worker; a country doctor in Colorado. Advances in American industry, science, and medicine were described for the increasingly important professional groups in the USSR. Art, music, theater, and movies were treated regularly for culture-conscious Soviet readers. The operation of the American Government, its labor unions, its schools and colleges were explained. No direct comment on the Soviet system was ever made.

Signs of *Amerika's* popularity soon appeared. Newsstands sold out their copies a few hours after it went on sale. Would-be readers unable to obtain the magazine telephoned the American Embassy for copies. Second-hand copies began to be privately sold on the street above the original price of 10 rubles; sometimes single pages entered the market. The magazine even came to be used as a medium of exchange. On one occasion, the promise of a copy was the only lure by which an American official could persuade a reluctant Soviet plumber to fix his bathtub. A woman reader stated that a doctor refused to treat her unless she could supply him with a new issue of the magazine.

Despite the general restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government on contacts between Russians and Americans, many comments from readers were gathered by Russian-speaking members of the American Embassy staff in the course of conversations with Russians on trains, in parks, between acts at the theater, and in other public places. For example, an article on commercial transoceanic flying elicited approval of a Soviet Air Force lieutenant colonel, who particularly commented on safety factors. A surgeon was fascinated by the pictures of operations in an article on anesthesia and was amazed by the equipment shown. An engineer was "astounded" at the "impossible" things being done with plywood in America, as reported in an article on wood products. A university professor, when asked which picture of the United States Russians believe — that presented by the Soviet press or as portrayed in *Amerika* — replied that they distrust their own press and believe *Amerika*.

Reports from Americans on the Embassy staff also contained these observations on the magazine's circulation:

"I was passing the newsstand on the corner of Gertzen and Nikitski Streets in downtown Moscow as issue No. 19 went on sale. In the course of 15 minutes, almost every person who passed the stand commented, 'Ah, *Amerika* est' (*Amerika* has come). All copies were bought.

"Sunday afternoon, at the newsstand near the Maly Theater, there was a

line of 15 people waiting to buy the magazine.

"A spectator at a football match between the Dynamo and Spartak teams read a copy of *Amerika* between the halves. His neighbors craned their necks to look over his shoulder.

"A conversation was overheard in a post office between the clerk and a man who was mailing a copy of *Amerika* to his brother in Alma Ata (Soviet Central Asia). The man impressed on the clerk that this was a copy of *Amerika* which he had wrapped carefully, and he asked that she give it special handling.

"A tour through the center of the city the day No. 27 went on sale showed that many persons were buying copies and that some were reading it on streets and in restaurants.

"A Russian was seen near a second-hand book shop offering several old issues for sale."

Increase from 10,000 to 50,000 Copies

On the basis of the broad popularity which *Amerika* quickly achieved with Soviet readers, it was obvious that the circulation of 10,000 copies allowed by the Soviet Government under the original 1944 agreement was far short of satisfying the demand. Therefore, in 1946, an authorization to increase circulation to 50,000 copies was requested from the Soviet Government.

After the sending of three notes and an oral request by Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, authorization was granted in a note, dated April 23, 1946, from S. A. Lozovski, then Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Smith. The note stated that the distributing agency could "undertake the distribution of 50,000 copies of *Amerika*, starting June 1, 1946."

After this increase to 50,000 copies, distribution of the magazine was, until 1949, reasonably satisfactory. Although the Soviet Government never complied with the Embassy's requests for a nationwide breakdown of circulation figures, there was evidence that *Amerika* was distributed outside Moscow. The Embassy received reports in 1947 and 1948 that the magazine was being sold in over 20 cities and towns, including Leningrad (northern Russia); Tiflis and Baku (Caucasus); Kharkov (Ukraine); and Saratov and Stalingrad (Volga River).

The situation in 1947 was summed up by Neal Stanford, correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, as follows:

"Each month fifty thousand copies are put on sale at Soviet newsstands for 10 rubles. . . . They are said to disappear, however, quicker than such scarce commodities as butter and bananas during the war. If the Kremlin would permit the United States to ship more copies into Russia it could sell five or ten times the present number. The scarcity puts a real premium on them, so that second-, third-, fourth-, and even fifth-hand copies sell on the 'black market' at several times the original price."

Intimidation of Readers (1947–52)

During the spring of 1947, Soviet propaganda launched a virulent attack on all things American, which has continued ever since with mounting intensity. *Amerika's* popularity with Soviet readers was obviously hampering this attack.

The first step taken to combat its effect was a series of bitter criticisms in the press, aimed at deterring Soviet citizens from buying or reading the magazine. The first of these appeared on August 10, 1947, in the journal *Culture and Life*. The article, "A Catalog of Noisy Advertisement" set the pace for tactics used throughout the campaign. The article stridently and contemptuously dismissed *Amerika* as vulgar, false, and wicked; it admitted to no virtues in the magazine.

It is significant that the Embassy received several anonymous telephone calls after publication of this first *Culture and Life* article. The callers expressed the hope that the article would not be accepted as reflecting "general opinion" of *Amerika*.

Since that time, over 35 separate press attacks have appeared, in the guise of "reviews" of single articles or diatribes against the magazine as a whole. The usual line was that the magazine was "lying," "decadent," and "rotten bourgeois journalism."

The technique was to use an *Amerika* article as a springboard for a polemic against some phase of American life, rather than to make any specific refutation of the article in question. For example, *Pravda* of June 4, 1951, attacked an *Amerika* article entitled "Wages and Prices in the United States," which, by pointing out that the average living standard in the United States had improved 40 percent since 1940, directly contradicted Soviet propaganda about inevitable depressions and poverty-stricken workers. The *Pravda* article stated flatly: "Almost three-quarters of the population of the US constitute indigent masses who are starving or under threat of starvation." Accusing the magazine of giving Soviet readers "America in saccharine syrup," the author, David Zaslovsky, leading Soviet "critic," accused *Amerika* of "telling fairy tales on wages and prices" to the Soviet people, who, he said, "know no poverty or unemployment, but only grandiose peaceful construction."

There was evidence that the Soviet Government feared *Amerika's* competition in relation to Soviet magazines. In 1948 the Central Committee of the Communist Party gave a severe dressing-down to *Ogonyek*, *Amerika's* nearest counterpart in the Soviet Union, charging it with publishing "second-rate articles," saying that it "suffered from monotony and lack of imagination," and contained "too many small photographs and few colored photographs." *Ogonyek* was ordered to "drastically improve its production," especially in printing more and better color pictures.

In addition to attempts at intimidation through the press, direct pressure was applied to readers. Cases were reported of purchasers of *Amerika* being questioned by the police and having their copies confiscated. Readers who had formerly called at the *Amerika* office, located in a building separate from the Embassy to obtain copies, now ceased to do so since a policeman was stationed at the door. In 1949 telephone inquiries about the magazine, formerly averaging 10 or 20 a week, abruptly dropped off to 1 or 2 a month. Russians to whom copies were offered on trains read avidly as in the past but were more careful about being seen and refused to carry the copies home with them.

On the whole, however, the intimidation campaign was a failure. For one thing, the planners of the press attacks failed to realize that this press attention helped to publicize the magazine and increased demand for it. When they realized this, the frequency of the attacks diminished. Basically, however, intimidation failed because there were too many enthusiastic readers willing to take some risk to obtain *Amerika*. These "regulars" had come to depend upon the magazine.

Although the press attacks and other methods of attempted intimidation continued, stronger measures were needed to cut off *Amerika* at the source.

Distribution Cut (1950–52)

In December 1949 the Soviet distributing agency abruptly informed the Embassy that "unsold copies" of *Amerika* would henceforth be returned. This was the first intimation of any sort from the Soviet Government that the magazine had been anything other than a complete sell-out; during the previous 5 years, every issue had been paid for in full. The Embassy, therefore, replied by asking the distributor to supply details as to national distribution and number of copies sold, citing extreme inadequacies in distribution which had developed outside of Moscow, specifically in the city of Vladivostok, where officials of the American consulate (since closed, but then the only center of US personnel in the USSR outside of Moscow) had never been able to observe the magazine on sale. The distributor's answer, dated February 11, 1950, stated that *Amerika* was sold in "70 cities of the Soviet Union, including all the largest centers," and that "in every one of these cities *Amerika* magazine is on sale at from 3 to 50 newsstands depending on the size of the city." No information was given as to which cities were involved, or how many copies went to each.

Regarding the number of copies sold, the distributor cited figures purporting to show a progressive decline in circulation during the year 1949 of almost 50 percent. Throughout this period, when sales were alleged to have "declined," the distributor had continued to pay in full for each issue.

Such a sudden "drop in sales" of a magazine which had an established readership and popularity over a 5-year period seemed quite implausible to Embassy officials, especially since they continued to receive enthusiastic comments from readers; vendors were still to be observed selling second-hand copies on the streets of Moscow, and during 1949 the Soviet authorities issued nine separate attacks on the magazine in their press and radio.

Embassy Protests to Foreign Ministry

In a note to the Foreign Ministry dated March 21, 1950, Ambassador Alan Kirk said that the distributor's reply was unsatisfactory, that distribution methods were inadequate, and that "all information at the Embassy's disposal indicates that well over 50,000 copies could be sold in the Soviet Union if distribution were made in a satisfactory manner." The note also referred to the absence of copies at Vladivostok, and reminded the Ministry that the Soviet Government was "distributing freely in the United States an official publication of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and other information media."

The Ministry's reply, dated March 31, 1950, repeated the distributor's statement that *Amerika* was distributed in 70 cities but named only Vladivostok; denied that any deterioration of distribution had occurred; referred to a "fall in demand" for the magazine; and stated that "the Ministry cannot have influence for increasing demand on the part of Soviet citizens for the magazine *Amerika*." Allegations were also made that the distribution of the Soviet Embassy's *Information Bulletin* was not free and that "US officials systematically put obstacles in the path of distribution of the *Information Bulletin*." (This latter charge may have been based on the fact that certain schools and libraries in the United States, entirely of their own volition, had removed the *Soviet Bulletin* from their shelves and asked that their names be stricken from the distribution list.)

In its reply, dated May 26, 1950, the US Government expressed regret that the Soviet Government appeared unwilling to continue to carry out the 1946 arrange-

ment to distribute 50,000 copies. It stated that it was "impossible to accept" the Ministry's statements on lack of reader interest in *Amerika*. This Government also announced a price cut from 10 to 5 rubles as a measure to give the magazine maximum availability. Ambassador Kirk's note summed up the situation, as follows:

> "My government, which in the present instance as in the past, desires to make every possible effort to develop and increase exchange of ideas between our countries, sincerely hopes that the Soviet government will show itself more cooperative regarding this magazine than it has with regard to other suggestions for cultural exchange in recent years."

A reply from the Foreign Ministry on June 20, 1950, denied that an agreement ever existed to distribute 50,000 copies. It stated that questions regarding the magazine's circulation were matters "having a commercial character" and hence were not in the province of the Ministry but should be taken up with the distributor. The note closed with the statement that "on the part of the Soviet government there has not been and is no prohibition or limitation whatever of the free sale of the magazine *Amerika* in the USSR."

The US reply, dated August 25, 1950, stated that the US Government could not agree that there had never been any prohibition or limitation on free sale of *Amerika* in the past but expressed the hope that Moscow would speedily validate its claim to that effect. Furthermore, in view of the statement that questions of circulation were in the province of the distributor, the Ministry was informed that the Embassy "is presenting a series of suggestions for improving and extending the distribution of the magazine *Amerika*." The note concluded:

> "My government understands that, in the light of the statement that there is no limitation on the free sale of *Amerika*, the Soviet government will place no obstacles in the path of this further American attempt to increase understanding and the exchange of ideas between the American people and the peoples of the USSR."

Negotiations with Distributor

On August 2, 1950, a series of proposals for better distribution of the magazine was made to the distributing agent, Soyuzpechat. These included:

1. Distribution at more than the 20 newsstands in Moscow then being supplied and increasing the distribution outside of Moscow.
2. Advertising the magazine both in *Amerika* itself and in the Soviet press.
3. Use of posters and placards at newsstands.
4. Institution of subscriptions in addition to newsstand sale.

In a conversation during which a memorandum containing these proposals was submitted, the head of Soyuzpechat requested that the Embassy report details of unsatisfactory distribution as they arose. On September 29, 1950, and February 17, 1951, the Embassy gave detailed reports to Soyuzpechat of declining distribution both in and outside of Moscow. The reports showed that over a period of more than a year the magazine had been offered at fewer and fewer Moscow newsstands, dropping from 20 to an average of 3 or 4; travelers saw none in other cities.

On April 17, 1951, the Embassy summarized the evidence:

> "The Embassy can only conclude that the distributor has deliberately embarked on a campaign of dilatoriness in handling the magazine, and of limiting its distribution. The Embassy would welcome your assurances that you are prepared to distribute the magazine properly for sale in the Soviet Union."

On May 15, 1951, the Embassy received a belated reply from the distributor to its three letters. The letter read in full:

> "I received your letter of April 17. Measures have been taken by Soyuzpechat to remove existing technical defects in the distribution of the magazine through our retail network."

This brief and somewhat vague reply was, notwithstanding, the first admission that the maldistribution charged by the Embassy existed.

On June 14, 1951, the Embassy protested to Soyuzpechat that issue 46 of *Amerika*, which contained the article on "Wages and Prices in the United States," attacked in *Pravda*, had been removed from circulation by the Soviets shortly after the attack appeared.

On July 10, 1951, the Embassy protested the delay in reporting on sales. Reports on the last six issues had been delayed from 100 to 300 days after receipt of the issue by Soyuzpechat. Normally they should have been available the following month. On July 18, Soyuzpechat reported on sales of five of the six issues in the following letter:

> "Figures were not reported to you previously, since this question is connected with the receipt of reports from local agencies; i.e., from 70 cities in which the magazine is distributed."

On August 3, 1951, the Embassy again requested an answer to its proposals for improving distribution, submitted almost a year before. In an attempt to elicit some sort of answer from Soyuzpechat on national distribution more explicit than the oft-repeated "70 cities," Soyuzpechat was asked to supply details on distribution in the following 15 cities, including the largest centers in the USSR: Moscow, Leningrad, Gorki, Rostov, Stalingrad, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, and Erivan.

A reply to this letter was received on August 17. Soyuzpechat again offered its standard reply: "The magazine *Amerika* is distributed in more than 70 *cities* in the USSR. . . ." No further details were given. However, after a year's delay, the letter gave replies to the Embassy's proposals for improvement of distribution. These were as follows:

On subscriptions: "Distribution by subscription was not agreed on." (This was interpreted to mean: "Since there was no mention of subscriptions in the original agreement, we can never discuss the question.")

On advertising: "In regard to the hundreds of magazines published in Moscow, the practice of advertising them does not exist." This statement simply is not true. Advertisements of forthcoming publications are frequently carried in Soviet periodicals and newspapers.

On November 20, 1951, the Embassy made a last attempt to obtain information on *Amerika's* distribution. Soyuzpechat was reminded that it had ignored the Embassy's request of August 3 for a breakdown of circulation for 15 of the major cities of the USSR, and the request was repeated.

In Soyuzpechat's reply dated December 6, 1951, this query again was ignored completely.

Further "Decline in Sales"

While the above-described negotiations were going on, sales figures, as belatedly reported by Soyuzpechat, had been steadily declining. From 27,000 in December 1949, alleged "sales" decreased to a low of 14,000 as of March 1952 and 13,000 in June 1952. During the same period, unofficial reports received by the Embassy showed that not a single copy was on sale in cities other than Moscow. Thus, it appeared questionable whether even 13,000 copies were being distributed by Soyuzpechat as claimed in statements to the Embassy.

Meanwhile, the "unsold" copies returned by the Soviets have been used in countries outside the USSR to reach *émigrés* and escapees from the Soviet Union and satellites. During the first negotiations with the Soviets in the Spring of 1950, a world-wide survey was made to determine the most useful outlets for returned copies. This disclosed a potential audience of at least 200,000 Russian and other Slavic peoples who could read Russian. Returned copies, ranging from 25,000 to 35,000 an issue, have been distributed to these groups in such countries as Germany, Iran, Israel, Brazil, Greece, Sweden, and Argentina.

Censorship

As an absolute condition to the admission of any such publication from America, the Kremlin had insisted that all copy for *Amerika* be subject to precensorship in Moscow. Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained that this censorship was "purely a wartime emergency measure." For 6 years, however, censorship was not a problem, since the censor's cuts were rare and consisted of only a sentence or two at a time. In 1951, however, the censor started on a new policy of rejecting entire articles. One of these, "The World's Conscience," consisted of the full text of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Another was a comparison of the operation of public opinion in democracy and dictatorship, using Nazi Germany as the example of the latter. The third was a biographical article on William Saroyan.

The method of rejection used by the censor was simply failure to return the texts of these articles. When the Embassy requested their return with written notation of rejection the censor refused. When the Embassy repeatedly telephoned to ask him the reason for rejection, he refused to come to the telephone and callers were referred to a clerk. The clerk finally stated, still over the telephone and not in writing, that the articles were rejected because they were "not objective."

Conclusion

Despite the Soviet Government's reports of declining circulation over the past 6 months, Department of State officials believed that it might still be reaching some Russians and were reluctant to suspend publication. However, the mounting restrictions placed on distribution and the lack of evidence that it was reaching any Russian readers led to the decision that suspension would be in the best interests of the United States at this time. The Department is ready to resume publication as soon as the Soviet Government is prepared to permit free circulation in the USSR.

*Revival of Publication**

[In July 1956 the Russian-language magazine *Amerika* reappeared on the newsstands of Russia while simultaneously the Soviet Union information service placed an English-language journal of comparable length, composition, and format on sale in the US. Although the publication of *Amerika* is a revival project, the printing and dissemination within the US of *USSR* is a completely new venture for the Soviet Union. The publication and distribution of the two journals were undertaken by virtue of a reciprocal agreement between the governments in Washington and Moscow.]

[*Amerika* is printed in West Berlin and flown into the Soviet Union for distribution, whereas *USSR* is printed in the US. The first issue of the revived *Amerika* and the original issue of *USSR* appeared to shun overt political propaganda. Both followed a similar picture-magazine format and made generous use of color and eye-catching layouts. The contents of each was obviously slanted to acquaint readers with the picture of life in the originating country it was desired the reader should acquire.]

* This is not a part of the original account.

GULAG — SLAVERY, INC.: THE USE OF AN ILLUSTRATED MAP IN PRINTED PROPAGANDA*

By William R. Young

The AFL prepared an elaborately detailed map giving the location of Russian slave labor camps. These maps were in great demand due in part to the heavy play given to them by VOA in broadcasts to such areas as Latin America.

During one of the sessions of the San Francisco conference to sign the Japanese peace treaty in September 1951, Representative O. K. Armstrong handed Andrei Gromyko a map of the Soviet Union. The Soviet diplomat is reported to have smiled benignly but on closer inspection of this representation of his homeland, Gromyko found that in addition to cities, rivers, and rail lines, it contained additional cartographic symbols. He passed the map to an aide who hurriedly threw it on the floor. "No comment," said the frowning Gromyko.

Besides topographic features, the map contained a detailed picture of the locations of forced-labor colonies and concentration camps in the Soviet Union. Crossed hammers and sickles, each representing a concentration camp, and dozens of large red-shaded areas, each blot depicting the area of administration of grouped penal colonies, stood out in sharp relief.

Centered in the upper border of the map is the title: "GULAG — Slavery, Inc. The Documented Map of Forced Labor Camps in Soviet Russia." At the bottom of the map is a semi-circle framed in red and divided into three sections like slices of pie. Within each is a photograph of an emaciated child, wearing a crucifix, victim of the GULAG system. The upper and lower borders of the map are in part composed of twelve photostatic copies of GULAG "passports." These are release certificates given to the fortunate ones who survive their imprisonment. Between the bottom six certificates is the following text:

> "GULAG — the Soviet Slave Labor Trust — is an abbreviation of *Glavnoye Upravlenye Lagerei*, or Department of Penal Labor Camps, a division of the MVD, the Ministry of the Interior (formerly known as the NKVD — Russian equivalent of the Gestapo).
>
> "There are over 14,000,000 forced laborers in GULAG, scattered through scores of penal colonies, each a Devil's Island at its worst. This state monopoly in expendable human flesh is a chief source of revenue for the Soviet regime. Incontrovertible proof of the existence of GULAG and its vast ramifications is presented here. Nearly 14,000 affidavits, assembled

* Original text prepared for this volume.

by the High Command of the Polish Army during the last war, served as the basis of this map, supplemented by recent data supplied by the New York Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps and by the American Federation of Labor Consultants to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

"Photostats of 'passports' issued by the various GULAG administrations, with the seals and signatures of camp commanders, are reproduced here. A typical 'passport' in the center of the upper left section is of the Sorokski Administration, adjoining northern Finland. It reads: 'USSR — People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) — Administration of Railroad Construction and Sorokski Correctional Labor Camp — December 15, 1951 — number 4/58024/16 — City of Belomorsk.' The seals and signatures of the commanders, Kliuchkov and Georgeyev, are appended.

"It has been established that the average mortality rate in GULAG exceeds 12% a year, i.e., every eight years its total population perishes and is constantly replenished with prison manpower. All the territory controlled by GULAG, if consolidated, would make a submerged empire the size of Western Europe.

"The 175 penal colonies and concentration camps shown here do not exhaust all the divisions of GULAG known to exist in the Soviet Union Today. Nor is it possible to denote every type of industry operated by GULAG. We do know that forced labor is employed in the construction and maintenance of roads, railways, and canals; in coal, iron, gold, and other mines; in the building of airfields and underground installations; in the timber and pulp industries; in brickworks, quarries, fisheries, canneries, tanneries, and the manufacture of wood products; and in the construction of fortifications, harbor works, and other military projects.

"Beneath the title of the map is a notation of its source — the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor. And at the lower edge, beneath the text, is the following challenge: 'A reward of $1,000 will be paid by the Free Trade Union Committee for evidence disproving the authenticity of the Soviet documents here reproduced.' "

The story of the GULAG map, which was published in 1951, began back in 1947. A brief review of its history highlights some of the major considerations involved in the construction and dissemination of an effective propaganda message which found its origin in the activities of a voluntary association — the AFL.

In November 1947 the AFL requested the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to place on its agenda a consideration of forced labor, and it specifically asked the Council to request the International Labor Office to undertake a survey of forced labor in all UN member nations and to suggest positive measures for the elimination of such labor.

When ECOSOC met again at Santiago, Chile, early in 1949, Miss Toni Sender, Assistant to the AFL Consultants to ECOSOC of the UN, made the official presentation of the Union's case against the slave-labor system of the USSR. The following quotation is an extract from that address:

"The American Federation of Labor has received testimony from persons who have succeeced in escaping from the hell of slave labor camps; testimony which contains accusations of such a nature that no one can read these statements without the deepest feeling of horror and pity. They must arouse the decision that those who enjoy the benefits of freedom and human decency do everything in their power to come to the assistance of those who are suffering helplessly and are being sacrificed.

"The reliability of the statements mentioned is demonstrated in the fact that all these persons, although unknown to each other, describe the cruel circumstances in similar terms. In great detail they describe the use of political opponents, of stateless persons, and of prisoners of war for forced labor. These people are kept in concentration camps after having harsh, often cruel, treatment, hunger being a normal condition of life; millions suffering from a life of human indignity.

"Some of these labor camps are reported to be grouped together in huge clusters, with hundreds of thousands of inmates. In the biggest of such groups about a million persons are said to be interned.

"The internal police of the camp is reported to have at its disposal special punitive camps where prisoners have to endure still harsher and more cruel treatment.

"Many of these persons, victims of forced labor camps who have survived the ordeal, have looked to the American Federation of Labor and asked for our assistance in saving the lives of those still interned. Their testimony as given to the American Federation of Labor is at the disposal of the Economic and Social Council."

In March 1949, ECOSOC adopted a resolution inviting the International Labor Office (ILO) "to give further consideration to the problem of forced labor and its nature and extent in the light of all possible information." Later that same year the AFL published *Slave Labor in Russia: The Case Presented by the American Federation of Labor to the United Nations.* Among the documents included in this book were articles and editorials written by American labor leaders and printed in labor publications; texts of addresses delivered prior to the debate by ECOSOC of the forced-labor issue; thirteen representative affidavits by former inmates of Soviet penal labor camps (these included testimony from a Zionist scholar, a former Red Army officer, and a Byelorussian peasant); reports on slave labor in Soviet satellite states; official minutes of the ECOSOC debate (including an attack on US prison labor and Negro chain gangs by the Soviet representative and the Polish delegate); the text of the final resolution asking for an ILO investigation; and an appendix containing the "Corrective Labor Codex of the Russian Federated Socialist Republic," a document made public by the British government in July 1949 and obtained from published Soviet sources.

There the matter rested for many months. In the US, at least, the debate had attracted a fair amount of attention while in progress. The book was widely distributed among scholars and researchers. But no report came from the ILO, and there is still none at this writing. In brief, at this level, the question of Soviet concentration camps and slave labor was if not a dead issue at least a moribund one. In fact, it had never been a burning issue among the great mass of people of the world outside the Soviet Union.

The debate in Chile had been a far-off event. It was another of the interminable wrangles between the free nations and the totalitarian states. Its level of discourse was general, its aim was mainly to secure further investigation by a UN agency,

and its impact almost as transient as the debate itself. The book, while permanent and valuable, was acceptable to only a limited audience, a document read by a few and most probably already convinced. There was no bridge between the documented indictment of Soviet slave labor and the laboring man who is a primary victim of such a system and who is the target of much Communist propaganda. Such a man is frequently organizationally in many lands under the influence or control of pro-Communist leaders.

Additionally, it is undoubtedly true also that the very scope of the Soviet slave-labor system serves paradoxically to protect and conceal it. The printed word can hardly offer a complete substitute for experience, and knowledge gained through the written word never carries the impact of information gained through other more direct means. For example, recall the exposes of the Nazi concentration camps, the stories of Dachau, Belsen, Buchenwald. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the average person to comprehend the depth of degradation, depravity, and inhumanity, the extent of suffering and slaughter. The afflictions or death of an individual has meaning; it can be grasped. Indignities heaped on millions and death meted out to hundreds of thousands is beyond the imaginative substitution of knowledge for experience that enables us to place ourselves in the situation of another. It is for this reason that a photograph of a pile of shoes, taken from the victims before they entered a Nazi crematory, which contained several pairs of children's shoes probably created a greater impact on the average person than testimony at the war crimes trials or an estimate of the total number who died in such a manner.

In an effort to create a message capable of disseminating the impact of the Russian slave-labor system to larger audiences, the American Federation of Labor prepared the GULAG map. The map, although of course still limited in many ways, nevertheless possesses many ingredients that bring the viewer closer to the subject than a book. First, any map will almost always excite interest and in and of itself carries a ring of authenticity. In consequence the map has a simple makeup and use of color — the USSR is white in contrast to the gray-shaded neighboring areas, there is a minimum of detail, the red-colored areas stand out from all else, the title is in large, bold, plain lettering. As a result, the viewer's eyes are immediately attracted to the title and the symbols of the concentration camps covering the landscape. The immediate feeling is of their all-pervasiveness, spreading through the USSR, making a single concentration camp of an entire nation. Its message, without reading the text, can be understood in a moment. The crossed hammers and sickles have been appropriated and given new meaning. The Communist banner is used in this context not as a symbol of good and freedom, but as a representation of evil and slavery.

The photostatic copies of the release certificates bring an additional appearance of authenticity to the document even before an examination of the text reveals their nature and content. And the photographs of the children — always evocative of sympathy — seen together with the title and the map proper, need no additional explanation, although for authenticity's sake a note beneath the photos explains where and when they were taken and gives the children's names and ages. Authenticity is added too by the offer of a reward if the documents can be proved false. Such an offer might compel even a stalwart Communist to examine the text and otherwise arouse his interest where he might have elected to simply turn his back in the absence of such a base "capitalistic" appeal.

As an information vehicle, probably most important in this case was the sponsorship. Coming from a trade-union organization, the authority is one that does more than enhance respect on the basis of the history and objectives of the organization. In this case, the authority of the AFL in many ways would probably outweigh the name of the US government, should it have attached its name to the document. It might then have been shrugged off as just another round in the propaganda battle between two governments. But here is a free trade union, the recognized spokesman for millions of American workingmen and associated internationally with many foreign labor organizations, presenting the laboring man's case against the nation that presents itself as the sole international champion of labor.

It is in this context the reader would come to read the text. He would learn precisely what that mysterious word "GULAG" meant. The text provides a literal and associational meaning for him, in the latter case equating GULAG and the Soviet system with the Gestapo and Devil's Island. The figure of 14,000,000 forced laborers in GULAG can be associated with the huge blots defacing the map of Russia. The listing of industries and services in which GULAG labor is employed may have an immediate associational impact for many of the laborers who are employed in similar industries. The text contains no vigorous and generalized indictment, no direct call for righteous indignation, no appeal to forswear communism or close one's ears to the siren call of the Soviet. Instead, it is largely almost placidly informative. The reader may draw his own conclusions as to whether he is for or against such a system. Thus it is not surprising that the GULAG map has been one of the most widely circulated pieces of anti-Communist literature to date.

The map was first distributed in the US on a request basis, and then shipped around the world for distribution through labor unions and other contacts possessed by the AFL. It has had such dramatic uses as the presentation to Mr. Gromyko and its extensive posting in West Berlin where it could be seen by persons near or crossing the zonal boundary during the Communist youth festival (1950). After the widely publicized Gromyko incident, unsolicited requests for more than 150,000 copies came from throughout the free world. Its total circulation is impossible to estimate because reproduction rights were granted to many organizations abroad, where it has been translated and distributed through unions, schools, and other key groups. In Vienna, Austria, a printer in the Soviet zone was seized by the Russians for reproducing the map and the copies already printed were expropriated. But the consequence of this action was that the free-zone press voluntarily reproduced the map in their regular editions, with the result that it reached a much larger audience than it would otherwise have secured. Too, attempts have been made to circulate it in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, the results of course being largely unknown.

VOA offered the map to its listeners in Latin America, and the response was so immediate and heavy that VOA was at first unable to meet the demand. There were 400 air-mail requests received in the 24-hour period following the first offer, an unprecedented response from the Latin American area, and that number more than doubled in each of the next few days. Steps were then taken to have the Government Printing Office print thousands of additional copies in Spanish for a later offer and for distribution through local USIS offices. Plans were soon made for similar radio offers of the map in other countries. This aspect of the GULAG story is an interesting sidelight on the use of one propaganda medium to promote the acceptance and circulation of another.

A sampling of the letters received by VOA shows that the requests for maps come, for the most part, not just from curious or privately interested individuals, but, as was the case in the AFL's experience, from a crucially important group, local opinion leaders or others prepared to act in that role on at least this issue. These are often persons whose position lends additional authority to the map and whose function and personal drive is such as to increase the interest of their auditors in the subject and to help direct their thinking into the proper channel.

Here are some excerpts from letters to VOA that will illustrate the preceding remarks:

From Tocopilla, Chile, a miner wrote, "Please send me the map you offered so that I may show it to many of my co-workers, who, unfortunately, are influenced by the poison of Communism."

A letter from Caracas, Venezuela, explained, "Any maps you can send me shall be given to organizations or schools where they can do some good."

A student in Valle, Colombia, said he wished a copy, "to use against some youths at my school who are affirmed Communists."

From LaGuayra, Venezuela, a worker asked for a map, "as soon as possible, as I want to study it and get something from it with which to combat the leaders where I work."

And a letter from Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba, containing a request for several maps explained that, "one map is for me; the other copies are for distribution in several labor organizations."

The GULAG map, in conclusion, has been an effective bridge between the detailed results of voluminous research and the fundamental requirement for meaningful mass propaganda to carry a specific and easily comprehended message combining reason and emotion-provoking content. It also represents the effective use of a private organization in voluntary association with US governmental agencies in support of official information objectives.

THE USA GOES TO THE FAIR*

By J. D. Ratcliff

US exhibits at trade fairs around the world help in telling the democratic story and in fostering two-way trade.

In Bangkok, Thailand, a 2000-seat theater was jammed day after day with people who came to see the wonders of Cinerama. In Bari, Italy, farmers listened fascinated while a six-foot wooden chicken, with egg-producing organs exposed, gave a tape-recorded lecture on modern poultry practice. In Bogota, Colombia, throngs jostled around a stand offering free ice cream made from surplus powdered milk from Wisconsin. The United States was going to the fairs — the world trade fairs — and registering a smash success.

Each year there are something like 130 large fairs, ranging from the giant International Trade Fair in Paris, with nearly four million visitors, to the agricultural fair at Verona, Italy, which attracts about 130,000. Totally unlike US state and county fairs, the trade fairs are market places where new goods are displayed, where businessmen go to buy and sell.

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Although US businessmen long ago saw the wisdom of buying space and displaying goods, the US Government stood aloof until 1954, when President Eisenhower reviewed some disturbing facts. Since the war, Russia and her satellites had participated with spectacular exhibits in 133 fairs. Personable young Chinese sipped tea with German businessmen; Russians talked the virtues of Soviet tractors; Czechs demonstrated heavy machinery and spoke of booming production. The impression was left that the United States was too busy preparing for war to take part in such peaceful pursuits.

President Eisenhower decided to correct this. He earmarked $2,250,000 from an emergency fund to be spent at trade fairs to "put the United States in the best possible light overseas."

The Departments of Commerce and State and the US Information Agency drew the planning job. There were two main objectives: to sell the idea that this nation's vast industrial production is the result of a free-enterprise system, and to stress trade as a two-way affair.

To direct the program, the Commerce Department borrowed Roy F. Williams, New England industrialist and executive vice-president of Associated Industries of Massachusetts, who recruited a team of architects, designers, idea men. With only three months to design and build an exhibit for the fair at Bangkok, where a year earlier Russia had taken first prize with a costly and elaborate pavilion, Williams chose *Fruits of Freedom* as the US theme. The exhibit would emphasize ways and means by which US industrial techniques could help lift living standards in the East. Cinerama was an added eye-catcher.

Russia had 242 crates of murals on the Bangkok fairgrounds — heroic representations of Soviet industrial might. Getting wind of US plans, the Russians didn't bother to unpack them. They withdrew from the fair.

A similar situation arose in Paris last May. When it became clear that the lively US exhibit was almost sure to be the hit of the fair, the Russians packed up and went home. Altogether, the Soviets have withdrawn from five fairs rather than face US competition.

The US exhibit, *America at Home*, was the outstanding success at Paris, drawing as many as 70,000 people a day. It included a five-room house through whose open windows visitors could look while "Mother" prepared meals in a model kitchen equipped with freezer, garbage-disposal unit, dishwasher, mixers and other gadgetry. "Father" puttered with the car in the carport, worked with power tools in the home shop, broiled steaks on the terrace. But the real delight was the playroom, where children of US soldiers stationed in France concentrated on toys, oblivious of the crowds.

A similar display at the Vienna fair in September caused a newspaper to comment: "The Americans stole the show. They show us how we could live if we had plenty of money. But they do it in a way that makes us forget we do not have it."

When possible, exhibits are related to local problems. Italian farmers are keenly interested in US agricultural methods. Hence, at the agricultural fair in Verona the US exhibit included a small field of hybrid corn in which farm machinery was demonstrated. A model cow, cut away to expose internal organs, lectured on cow diets that increase milk production.

Spain has always had export difficulties with her valuable citrus crop. Fruit is often poorly sized and packed. Losses due to spoilage are high. For display at the Valencia fair the US imported a citrus-packing plant from Lakeland, Fla. In a continuous, automatic operation the plant cleaned, sized and waxed oranges.

(Waxing retains juice and cuts spoilage.) Another exhibit suggested a new market for the Spanish and a new market for US machinery: it showed how orange juice is extracted, concentrated and frozen — all new to Europe.

Lately Pakistan, the world's largest producer of jute, has worried about the growing competition of other fibers. Jute is used mainly for burlap and coarse sacking. The US exhibit at the Karachi fair included ingenious new machinery which converts coarse jute into a soft fiber — suitable for dress and other fabrics. Knitting machines, poultry-raising equipment, TV and a fashion show rounded out the lively display.

The Communists spread the story that the US is planning to hydrogen-bomb the world. *Atoms for Peace,* which tells of our peacetime atomic projects, has been a key US exhibit in a number of fairs. Including a 30-foot model reactor, mechanical hands to handle "hot" atomic materials, and other eye-catching displays, it presents the atom as a friend of man, the producer of medically useful isotopes, the source of curative radiations, a future producer of commercial power.

At the fair at Jakarta, Indonesia, last summer the US exhibit included a glass-walled TV studio broadcasting to 24 receiving sets spaced around the fairgrounds — the first TV the country had seen. A model train built by Lionel, puffing and whistling its way through a maze of tracks, gave Indonesians an idea of what a modern transportation system looks like.

At the Berlin fair, hordes of people swarmed over from Soviet-controlled East Berlin to see the Western world on display. Two US labor unions — the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union — provided a stirring rebuttal to the Communist story that the American worker is the slave of a capitalist economy. Pictures showed union health centers, camps, clubs; explanatory material told about the wage scales, pension plans and arbitration procedures.

In state-controlled stores in Communist East Berlin shoddy clothing brings sky-high prices. On living models at the Berlin fair a large US clothing chain displayed a complete winter wardrobe for a family — mother, father, two children. A large tag carried the price of each garment. Total cost of outfitting a family: about three weeks' pay for an American carpenter. To East Berliners this was an impressive demonstration of the fruits of free enterprise.

The key part of every US exhibit is a trade mission — a six-member panel (usually), drawn half from the Department of Commerce, half from industry. These men answer questions about buying goods from the United States and about exporting to the US market. In eight fairs last spring such panels handled a total of 26,000 queries.

In Hanover, Germany, the woman owner of a linen shop seeks and gets information about importing the bath towels displayed in the model US home. In Salonika a dealer wants the agency for a small tractor. He is put in touch with several makers. At Cologne a grocer wants floor plans of American supermarkets. Several US firms can supply them.

Such advice often bears immediate fruit, advantageous to all concerned. At Milan an Italian was interested in exporting ceramics. Two Americans interested in *importing* ceramics happened to be present. They got together on the spot.

This American readiness to do business *now* has been impressive. At the International Trade Fair at Lyon, France, Red China had a lavish display of motorcycles, saxophones, heavy machinery — much of it clearly handmade. When asked about prices and delivery dates, the Chinese were noncommittal. It became

apparent that the goods displayed were pure propaganda, not for sale. Meanwhile, the US trade panel was doing a land-office business — a fact duly observed in the French press.

Trade panels occasionally get hecklers. A man with clear Communist leanings denounced the group in Hanover: the United States was interested only in war, he said, not in helping people. Panel members questioned the man about his interests. He was an out-of-work salesman of household appliances. It was arranged for him to get the agency for a US refrigerator. The line went well, he prospered, and has altered his political outlook.

By next July 1, the United States will have been represented in 34 fairs. No one will hazard a guess as to how much trade has directly resulted, but Roy Williams is sure that the small investment has been repaid many times over. The business world apparently agrees. The year before official US participation at Bangkok there were 47 American industrial exhibitors. This year there were 140. At Hanover the number increased from 13 to 47; at the giant Milan fair from 571 to 700.

Thirty million people are expected to see our exhibits this fiscal year. "They will all go away," says Williams, "with a new realization of what free enterprise in a democracy really means."

AIRCRAFT AS A MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By W. E. D.

Deeds and acts are important elements in psychological warfare communications as is illustrated by three separate descriptions of how aircraft were utilized in the recent past to convey definite messages.

In World War II one of the most important states that was able to remain neutral throughout the struggle was Turkey; however, it was wooed by both the United Nations military entente and the Axis powers. It was the declared intention of Nazi Germany to force Turkey into the war on the Axis side. To accomplish this objective the Nazis sent one of their most able politicians, von Papen, to Ankara as ambassador. Both Germany and the US expended relatively large amounts of money to induce Turkey to follow a course of action suitable to their respective objectives, i.e., to join as a partner in a military alliance designed to defeat the enemy. If this was not considered feasible, then it was at least the hope that Turkey might continue to maintain its neutrality, thus avoiding the giving of assistance to the other side.

One of the propaganda advantages that Nazi Germany enjoyed over the members of the UN, relative to inducing Turkey to join in the war effort, was the fact that Nazi troops and military weapons were to be found only a short distance away, just across the Straits in nearby Bulgaria and Rumania. It was thus possible for many Turks to see, and many more to hear, by exaggerated rumors, accounts of how effective and how far advanced, German technology had become, compared to other nations. Naturally the Turks, acting out of national self-interest could not be expected to do less than keep from committing themselves from joining the losing side in the world struggle.

The Americans naturally hoped that Turkey might be induced to join the mounting list of states that had declared war on the Axis, but realistically inclined states-

men realized it would be folly to expect to accomplish this objective in view of mounting German pressures. For most Americans it would have been considered a happy day if they could have been assured of the continuance of effective neutrality on the part of the Turks.

During 1942 and 1943, American information personnel, stationed in Turkey, became increasingly pessimistic for the future as they observed how the Turks had become deeply impressed with the increasing war-making potential of Germany. The Turks were able to observe German aircraft and other vehicles of blitzkrieg at relatively close range, and they knew and were constantly reminded that these were greatly improved over prewar models. On the other hand the ordinary Turkish citizen knew little about American aircraft, tank production, and military might.

In reaching and impressing the Turks with the story of American military might, our psychological warfare personnel operated at a decided disadvantage. It was not possible for the Turkish people to see with their own eyes, or to hear the story of American military potential from their own people. Then one day, the tables were turned. Through a probable accident, it became possible to convince the Turks that the Americans were not really lagging behind the Germans in the air race, and thus, at an extremely crucial period, the Turkish government was induced to remain neutral in the belief that what our propagandists were saying verbally about US war-making potential was actually not exaggerated.

There is no reason for assuming that the event that turned the tide in Turkey was an act of psychological warfare, i.e., that it was a deliberately planned act, but the effect was no different than it would have been had a psychological warfare officer called the turn of events. It is easy to see that, although the event that turned the tide was not a staged event, it could easily have been one so designed as to accomplish a psychological result.

One day, long after the first US heavy bomber had fallen into enemy hands, an American bomber crew became lost after bombing the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania. Instead of returning to an Allied air base, the bomber and crew landed on a Turkish airfield, where all were promptly interned. Immediately it became common knowledge in Turkey that a US bomber had landed on Turkish soil and that its equipment was far from being inferior to German equipment as previously believed on a wide scale.

The loss of this one plane and the internment of the crew was immediately turned to our psychological advantage. The incident, although not an act of planned psychological warfare, carried important propaganda consequences. The message the plane had to convey to the Turkish people was many times as effective as might have been that conveyed through word of mouth and picture, as transmitted through conventional media of communications, at a comparable cost. Following this event, so it is said, there was never any doubt but that the Turks would be able to withstand Nazi pressures, and thus Turkey would continue its policies of neutrality.

In the summer of 1951 an airshow was under way at Orly Air Field, outside Paris, France. An announcer, in French, spoke over the public address system, calling attention to the time of day and announced that American planes were at that very moment taking off from the decks of American Mediterranean-based aircraft carriers. It is said that the average Frenchman present, thinking of the slower shorter-range propeller-driven craft, shrugged his shoulders and said in effect, "so what?" However, exactly 56 minutes later a flight of American jets

roared in from the south. These were the same planes that had been on a carrier deck in the Mediterranean Sea, several hundred miles away, only 1 hour previously. The flight of these planes told a significant story to the Frenchmen who were in attendance at the air show, and one can imagine the story was repeated many times in discussions that followed.

A less spectacular account of how aircraft were employed in behalf of psychological warfare objectives involved an event that occurred in Austria at Whitsuntide, in 1951. At that season of the year the Austrian Communist Party staged all manner of exhibitions, parades, and ceremonies designed to attract the attention of the country's youth. The USIS officer on the spot became concerned about the big play the Communists were making to attract public attention. He was especially disturbed by their apparent success in winning the youths' admiration for Communist-sponsored events. He therefore set about deliberately to plan counter-attractions that would aid prodemocratically oriented Austrians to compete successfully with Communist-sponsored spectacles. He was aware that the Austrians were not familiar with helicopters, and hence he arranged to have one flown down from Germany, to be shown and flown at local fairs. The fanfare that accompanied this first flight of a helicopter in Austria attracted much comment favorable to Americans but served mainly to take the play away from the Communists and thus to deny to them attention they might otherwise have received from the Austrian people.

Themes and Preparation of Messages

Daniel Lerner in writing about the experiences of Americans engaged in psychological warfare operations in Europe during World War II has written "the formulation of themes was possibly the most critical step in the whole Sykewar process." Themes are topics or subjects of discussion whose employment in propaganda output should support the achievement of the psychological warfare objectives or goals undertaken.

Themes used in any one campaign should not be large in number but they should be carefully selected, timely, and appropriate to the objectives sought and to the target audience or audiences addressed, and should be suitable for conveyance by the media of dissemination available.

The selection of appropriate themes depends on a number of factors: psychological warfare objectives, policy directives, and available intelligence. To be effective in accomplishing the mission undertaken, themes should be reasonable, timely, logical, and in accord with existing conditions. Messages to be disseminated over various psychological warfare media should be expressed in the proper idiom, language, and accent in order to elicit the most widespread sympathetic hearing.

Likewise, messages must appear to be credible to the group addressed, and graphic presentations on leaflets, posters, and other printed matter must be presented in a manner consistent with the target audience's cultural background and understanding. Another important principle that script-writers and other output personnel should keep in mind and observe in their work is that the "kiss of death" treatment for potentially useful

individuals in enemy-held territories should be avoided at all costs. All output, prior to release, should be checked against the possibility that it may produce "boomerang" or backfire effects of an undesirable character, and wherever possible propaganda messages should be so worded and delivered as to appear as little as possible as if it were in fact propaganda.

Idiom and Accent. It is not an essential requirement that spoken propaganda messages be delivered in grammatically and idiomatically correct language of the target, but in written communications it would appear desirable that the message be as grammatically perfect as it is possible to make it. However, whenever a speaker is attempting to use a language where it is known he possesses a noticeable accent he should make no effort to conceal this deficiency. In "Language Idiom and Accent in Psychological Warfare" two illustrations are given of how Americans turned what appeared on the surface to have been deficiencies for propaganda purposes into actual assets.

Credibility. The establishment of credibility for propaganda output is certainly one of the first requirements in making it effective. The establishment of credibility is usually accomplished through truthfully factual reporting, but it must ever be kept in mind that the mere reporting of factually truthful accounts is not enough to ensure that messages received by any one target group will be accepted as truth. The account "Truth vs Credibility" describes how a leaflet employed in Korea against Chinese Communist troops proved to be less than maximally effective even though every statement on it was true. One reason for its lack of effectiveness was that an important statement printed as a caption to a photograph was not credible to the Chinese.

Graphic Illustrations. Graphic illustrations included on posters, leaflets, and other printed matter can be rendered virtually useless if not damaging to one's cause if sufficient attention is not given to the artistic preferences and tastes of the target group and if the content or make-up of the illustration used reveals the artist has little comprehension of the habits, customs, and usages of the people addressed.

In Chap. 9 two accounts, "Problems Involved in Pretesting Leaflets" and "Credibility in Leaflet and Poster Illustrations," describe how UN psychological warfare personnel in the Far East Command in 1951 produced leaflets for dissemination to Chinese troops that at best should be described as of questionable utility and by some standards of evaluation as being completely meaningless as media of propaganda.

Avoidance of Kiss of Death Treatment in Propaganda Output. There may be occasions when one may desire to embarrass a particular individual or group in an enemy target area. This can often be done

through praise for them disseminated widely through various propaganda media. The remarks that follow are not intended to infer that this is not a proper objective. What is intended and is illustrated in "Dr. Kagawa and the 'Kiss of Death' " is that one should never condemn or destroy a friend or potentially useful individual in an enemy country by praise and glorification. American praise of Dr. Kagawa, the Christian leader of Japan, in OWI radio broadcasts during the war, although not permanently impairing his usefulness to our cause, did seriously embarrass and inconvenience him in his work, and thereby the propagandists hindered him without in any way helping the cause they espoused.

Checking Messages for Possible Boomerang Effects. The case "Uncle Jackass" illustrates an important principle in psychological warfare. One should never needlessly give added publicity to what his opponent is doing or saying, and above all one should check his output for any evidence that propaganda claims might backfire. The Communists and extreme nationalists in Iran tried to discredit, through ridicule, the activities of American Point Four personnel at work in their country. One newspaper stated editorially the US "had better keep their jackasses and chickens and leave us alone." This was stated in reference to the shipment of animals and chickens imported into Iran for breeding purposes. This ridicule defeated the purposes the writers had intended, with the result that the American aid program became even better known throughout the country.

Avoiding the Curse of Propaganda Label on Psychological Warfare Output. Ladislas Farago in his book *War of Wits*[2] states that propaganda "must be carefully camouflaged so as not to appear as propaganda. Conducted in the name of propaganda it is bound to fail." Ralph White in the article "Resistance to International Propaganda" emphasizes the same point. He also writes that our propaganda is most effective when our actions are in line with our words and when what we say is spoken in a modest, reasonable, and discriminating manner that is sensitive to the kinds of skepticism existing in the minds of any particular audience.

LANGUAGE IDIOM AND ACCENT IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By M. J.

In written communication messages should normally be conveyed in grammatically and idiomatically correct language. In spoken messages greater latitude may be had depending on circumstances.

As American troops launched the first assault landings in North Africa, a personal message was broadcast from President Roosevelt to the French people. In the following 24 hours, continuous rebroadcasting brought his simple but powerful message to the French-speaking population, not only of Metropolitan France but

throughout the entire French Empire. He spoke of ultimate victory and expressed sympathetic understanding for their present plight and future hardships. Because of his insight as a propagandist and political leader, he did not turn the text of his message over to a professional broadcaster. The professional broadcaster with flawless accent and idiom would have assured the maximum comprehensibility of the message. Instead, in an accent which was unmistakably American and without the proper intonations and rhythmical enunciation associated with most newscasters, his message was recorded and broadcast.

Regardless of the idiom and accent in which the broadcast was made, the message of Roosevelt would obviously have had a wide audience for the French people who were waiting impatiently for the turning of the tide. But this message was designed as more than a mere proclamation. In fact, Rooseveltian French conveyed a message to those among the French population who risked listening that had an emotional impact rarely achieved by international radio. The speech had no specific aim; it was not a call to action in support of the landing. It had instead the grand objective of seeking to unify the French people with their Allies and to restore self-confidence to their wounded pride. In retrospect, it emerges as a bold gesture.

It stands, moreover, in direct opposition to an ever-increasingly emphasized approach in psychological warfare. As psychological warfare becomes "professionalized" and as psychological warfare draws its inspiration from commercial advertising, there has been a growing and strong concern about the "correctness" and precision of language and form. The content of propaganda messages must be produced, therefore, as closely as possible to the idiom and mode of expression current in the target audience. This emphasis has great merit; especially if it is designed to avoid the "refugee" intonation which may be deeply obnoxious to the target addressed. Roosevelt's speech indicated how the opposite principle may be employed effectively. Under certain conditions, effectiveness may be increased by using an idiom or a mode of expression that identifies (and even stresses) the source of the message as originating outside the target area.

During World War I, when President Wilson's propaganda mission to Italy arrived in Rome, Professor Charles Merriam, head of the mission, faced an Italian public that had grown restless under military reverses. The involvement of the US in the war was in their minds still remote and remained so as the bulk of the US military effort moved into France. It was the mission's task to keep the Italian public's interest in the war at the highest possible level.

Merriam had been trained in the propaganda of practical politics, and he was especially adept at public speaking and in appearing before mass meetings. Although his mission made use of all available forms of mass communications, heavy emphasis was placed on public speaking. The speakers included Italian-Americans who returned to Italy to spread hope and information about American intervention. Merriam and others on his staff, who had no expertness in the Italian language, but who were learning to speak Italian on the scene, turned out to be extremely effective. Merriam spoke English to audiences which understood not a word of the language but which literally wept when he broke into Italian phrases and sentences wherever his vocabulary permitted. He recounts that repeatedly when he got stuck for a word or phrase the audience would break out in wild enthusiasm as they supplied him with the help which enabled him to complete his sentence. The progress of his Italian rhetoric was a powerful piece of propaganda of the deed designed to demonstrate his interest, conviction, and sincerity.

It might be argued that this approach is only relevant for propaganda to friendly powers and allies; hostile groups need the "perfect" language approach. Special broadcasts to the Germans during World War II demonstrated how to make a successful exception.

One such example was a regular feature of Radio Luxembourg, a broadcast called "Corporal Tom Jones." Tom Jones was represented as a typical American GI, friendly and easy-going by nature, with a keen sense of fair play and a deep-rooted feeling of justice. Because he grew up in the Green Bay area of Wisconsin among a large German population, it was explained, Tom had learned to speak German in his youth. Richard F. Hanser, who played the role of Tom Jones, has described the characterization:

> "The originality lay in creating a simple, homey character talking to the enemy as man to man — not as merely a disembodied voice representing the United States Army or the United States government. 'Tom' was designed to create a recognizable personality to which listeners could respond with some warmth and interest, and in this we evidently succeeded. Tom spoke with an atrocious American accent, which was all to the good; there was no suspicion that he was a German-born turncoat. He told human interest anecdotes in a simple and even naive way, which left him free of the taint of cleverness, sharp dealing or underhanded needling."[3]

Language idiom, like other aspects of psychological warfare output, must be tailored to the mission to be performed. The belief that the language idiom and accent must be correct and identical with that current in the target audience is not an invariable formula.

TRUTH VS CREDIBILITY

By W. E. D.

The credibility of a leaflet message should be tested, not assumed.

The Chinese Communist forces had been taking a terrific pounding from UN artillery and airpower, and yet they continued to pour forth toward the UN lines, in what their leaders chose to call "human sea waves." General Ridgway, then Eighth Army Commander, was at a loss how to cope with this situation in a manner most appropriate to his desire to save human lives. He had ordered that an all-out psychological attack be made on the enemy's morale and combat efficiency, and his enthusiasm and interest in psychological warfare were such that he frequently passed his personal suggestions along to the Army's PWD for consideration and implementation. This is a case history of a leaflet prepared in response to one of his suggestions.

General Ridgway suggested that he would like to see greater use made of pictures and graphics on leaflets, especially those portraying to the enemy the ugly views of death on the battlefield. He implied that he wanted PWD to emphasize more of the gruesome aspects of the enemy's death in battle, when facing the awesome might of UN armor. Acting on the assumption that the General's wish was in reality a command, the planning group in PWD immediately set to work to implement the suggestion.

The discussion that followed the receipt of the General's request revealed that there was considerable difference of opinion among the members of the leaflet section as to the advisability of using leaflets such as the General proposed. There

were some who saw no reason why the General's request should not be filled just as he expressed it. The attitude of this group could be best summarized, "If the Old Man wants a leaflet with blood on it, let's give it to him."

On the other extreme, there were those who emphasized caution. Believing that a gruesome type of illustration on a leaflet to be dropped on the enemy might produce reactions contrary to those desired, they argued that it was better to be less emphatic in proclaiming our intentions. A number of writers had expressed the belief that "Atrocity propaganda begets atrocity." "If this be so," it was argued, "would not a leaflet depicting broken and mangled bodies result in the charge that 'the UN forces are engaging in inhumane conduct, and here is evidence reproduced by them that will prove the point.' "

While the two extremes of viewpoint on how best to implement the General's request were being debated, the graphics men on the small staff set to work to find suitable photos or to produce black-and-white drawings that might be appropriate for illustrating the leaflet. A large number of technically excellent pictures of the battlefield, taken before the enemy dead were picked up, were secured from the Army Signal Corps photo section, but for psychological warfare purposes most of these were of little value. Since they had been taken with a view of reproduction and dissemination to the American public most of them contained features that made them objectionable for dissemination to an enemy target. For example, a large percentage were taken with GIs occupying a prominent spot in the scene. All too often a broad smile was clearly evident on the face of the American posing amongst the enemy dead. These pictures were cast aside as of questionable utility for psychological warfare purposes.

At last, a picture was uncovered that had been taken on a rocky Korean hillside to show a relatively large number of enemy dead just as they had fallen. It was clearly evident from the picture that the bodies shown were Chinese and that they had fallen in battle. However, the bodies had not been mutilated to the extent frequently noted after a heavy artillery-air assault. This picture seemed to be less gruesome than others. However, the factor that clinched the decision to use this one, in implementing the General's suggestion, was the caption printed on the reverse side by the Signal Corps: "Battlefield scene, showing Chinese Communist dead on Korean hill 262, after successful assault by Turkish RCT, February 21, 1951."

At that time there were 12 or 13 members of the UN with combat forces in Korea. Besides the US the following nations had forces in Korea: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, The Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. However, even though the number of nations dispatching troops to the fighting front was steadily increasing, interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war revealed that few realized there were any troops under the UN Command except those of the Republic of Korea and the US. Thus it was suggested that by using the picture showing a number of Chinese dead on the field of battle, after the Turkish assault, it would be possible to stress two themes, both based on a strategy of truth: first, the fearfulness of UN weapons and the inevitability of death to any enemy front-line soldier who continued to oppose the UN artillery-air might, and, second, that nations other than the US and the Republic of Korea have troops in Korea.

A message, appropriate to the objective sought, was drafted in Chinese and printed on one side of the leaflet. On the reverse side the photo chosen from among those provided by the Signal Corps was reproduced along with a caption in Chinese,

"These Chinese needlessly met death resisting UN Turkish forces." The leaflet, as thus planned, was approved, printed, and later disseminated along the front occupied by the Chinese (Fig. 4).

Approximately 4 weeks later a Chinese prisoner-of-war panel was established to discuss propaganda themes, pretest messages, and estimate probable Chinese reactions. Among the first leaflets discussed with the panel was this one. The prisoner-of-war panel was asked to (1) discuss the probable effectiveness of the textual material, including the ease with which it could be read; (2) the appropriateness of the picture to implement the major theme by Chinese of low educational achievement; and (3) the probable impact of the leaflet on the Chinese, considering the leaflet in its entirety.

The prisoners on the panel, seven or eight meeting in one group, discussed the merits of the leaflet. All agreed that the text was written in clear, direct, and simple Chinese. Likewise, they all agreed that the text was appealing, i.e., that it conveyed a message that experience would have taught front-line soldiers was accurate. All agreed that the picture illustration was effective, that it depicted a scene common to the average front-line soldier's experience. When asked how a Chinese would interpret the picture, the consensus was that the picture would cause a reader to ask himself, "Have I not witnessed this scene many times and won't death also come to me if I persist in fighting the UN forces?"

After all had agreed that the illustration and the text were not only acceptable but first rate in their psychological appeal, one of the prisoners turned to the interviewer-interpreter and asked, "But, why did you spoil a good leaflet by telling a lie?" The interviewer carefully refrained from indicating whether there had been or had not been an untruth included in any part of the leaflet message. The question was then asked of the prisoner: "What lie do you refer to?" Back came the answer — "This one here — the leaflet says, 'These Chinese lost their lives needlessly resisting the UN Turkish forces.' This couldn't be." "How did you know this was a lie?" the interviewer asked. "Oh, that's easy," said the prisoner, "the Turks couldn't have killed those men. There are no Turks alive in Korea. We killed all of the Turks last November (1950) north of Pyongyang." All the others on the panel agreed this was so.

Despite the fact that the leaflet in every detail contained only truthful statements, it so happened that the Chinese, who were representative of the target audience addressed, did not consider the leaflet caption truthful. On 25–26 November 1950 the Chinese hit the Turkish Regimental Combat Team with its full might, killing many. However, most of the Turks were scattered by the weight of the attack, and it was many days before the combat team was reconstituted as an effective fighting force. UN accredited correspondents publicized stories of heavy, near complete, losses among the Turkish forces. The Chinese in propaganda to their own troops spread these stories, so that they all apparently became convinced that no Turks were left in Korea as late as February 1951, and therefore that the Chinese shown on the leaflet could not have been killed by the Turks. The leaflet lacked credibility even though it contained nothing but truthful statements.

The failure to pretest this leaflet was a mistake; how serious, it would be difficult to say. There is little doubt that the psychological impact of the leaflet was greatly lowered by the caption. Had the caption read, "These were killed by the UN French Forces," which would have been an untruth, the leaflet might have been credible to a much larger number and, thus, far more effective in its appeal.



Fig. 4—Factual Leaflet Incredible to Communists

Dropped on Chinese Communist troops in Korea in March 1951. Caption in Chinese reads, "These men died needlessly resisting UN Turkish forces."

DR. KAGAWA AND THE "KISS OF DEATH"

By W. E. D.

Individuals potentially useful to one's cause should not be singled out for favorable mention in propaganda releases except under the most exceptional circumstances.

It would appear to be an elementary principle in psychological warfare that one should not needlessly, thoughtlessly, or carelessly embarrass or expose to either ridicule or the suspicion of disloyalty any friend or potentially useful individual living within the enemy zone of operations. Notwithstanding the importance of observing this rule, it has not always been observed as strictly in past operations as might be desired.

During 1944, at the height of the US military struggle against Japan, an American OWI radio commentator in a propaganda broadcast to the Japanese people hinted rather strongly that the US would be willing to negotiate a peace agreement with Japanese leaders who were acceptable to the US government. Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa, the noted Christian leader of Japan, was cited as representative of the class of leaders with whom we might negotiate on terms more favorable than unconditional surrender.

Surely it was not the intention of the script-writer or the radio commentator to embarrass Dr. Kagawa or to cause him needless inconvenience. However, the results of the propaganda action were surely as decisive in this direction as they would have been had the action been planned to achieve this effect.

Dr. Kagawa was well-known in the US. As one of the most widely known Christian leaders of Japan it was well recognized in the US that he was completely out of sympathy with the goals set by Japanese militarists. However, there was little that he could do, given the temper of the times, to frustrate the ambitions of Japan's military clique and thus to advance American interests. The most he could do, under existing circumstances, was to lie low and bide his time.

It is not known whether Dr. Kagawa heard either the original or a rebroadcast of the OWI message but its dissemination in Japan led to immediate added difficulties for him, with no apparent compensating advantages to the US. Before the broadcast was heard in Japan, he was already under suspicion by the ultraconservative elements of the country. Afterward an hour-by-hour surveillance was sure to be imposed. The Japanese militarists would be sure to raise the question, "Could it be that he had been in touch with American agents?"

Counterpropagandists and counterespionage agents called on Dr. Kagawa from whom clarifying statements were elicited, which when produced in print carried the obviously distorted meaning that "Kagawa reaffirms his faith in Japanese leaders and Japan's war aims."

Dr. Kagawa surely must have had some feeling of relief that the Japanese officials were not then desirous of giving him rougher treatment. He realized, however, that he was a doubly marked man: first, because of his firm allegiance to Christianity and, second, by the fact that some thoughtless American commentator had singled him out for special mention in a short-wave radio broadcast. He thus concluded that it would be well to go into "voluntary exile" until the incident was forgotten by the people of his homeland.

It was under these circumstances that Dr. Kagawa traveled to North China, then under Japanese military domination, and took up secret residence in the home of a

Japanese YMCA official, then living in the American Methodist Mission Compound in Peking. Dr. Kagawa remained in Peking until near the end of hostilities.

What happened to Dr. Kagawa, in World War II, as a result of an American radio broadcast is illustrative of the harm that can come to anyone about whom words of praise are spoken by the enemy. Certainly no one responsible for the script in question foresaw the difficulties that would follow the broadcast. Certainly no one meant to embarrass or to injure Dr. Kagawa, but the results were the same as though the intentions had been there. In speaking of individuals in the enemy camp, it is always well to bear in mind that one should not plant "the kiss of death" on those he would like to utilize later. This prohibition should extend not only to those who have been friendly or useful in the past, but equally to those who may be of value to one's cause in the future. If individuals in the enemy camp are to be singled out for praise, or friendly comment, as a general rule it might be better that one concentrate attention on those who show little or no promise of being potentially useful in the future.

"UNCLE JACKASS"*

By Jonathan B. Bingham

An account of how Communist ridicule of American Point 4 aid to Iran backfired.

In November, 1951, a live American dynamo named William Warne resigned as Assistant Secretary of Interior to take over the job of TCA director in Iran, which was then already suffering from the effects of the oil dispute. Within a few weeks Warne had launched, in cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, a project which made Point 4 known across the face of Iran. He arranged to have seventy-five thousand sturdy baby chicks flown from the United States, some to be distributed to farmers and some to be kept in brood flocks, to strengthen and improve the stunted local breeds. In addition, superior goats and sheep, Brown Swiss bulls, and big Cyprus jackasses were brought in for breeding purposes. At this point Iran's communists and extreme nationalists, who had been attacking Point 4 as an imperialist plot from the start, switched their line: no longer able to say that the United States was doing nothing constructive, they seized upon the chickens and the jackasses as a way of ridiculing the program. For example, one newspaper said editorially: "Why does the United States Government that plans to incite the Middle East against the Soviets send us chickens? They had better keep their jackasses and chickens and leave us alone."

This sort of propaganda backfired; it only advertised the program. Typically, one farmer rode 250 miles to the livestock station at Hyderabad to trade some scrub hens for the new American stock. (The trade-in procedure was followed in order to avoid any implications of charity; the old chickens received were sold in the market.) From a remote province, a tribal chief sent a courier with the message: "I offer you the salutations of my people and beg you to assign two of these fine donkeys to Firooz Abad."

* From *Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 In Action*, The John Day Company, New York, 1954, pp 53–54. Reproduced with the permission of Mr. Bingham, the author and copyright holder.

Ironically enough, a sizable section of the American press, always inclined to be hostile to Point 4, played up the jackass story as an example of bureaucratic bungling. Cartoons appeared showing Uncle Sam in the guise of a donkey, an object of ridicule. The real significance of the story was missed completely.

RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA*

By Ralph K. White

An analysis of the major problems of communicating with friends and allies without having communication rejected as "just propaganda."

The world is more and more tired of "propaganda." This is the fundamental, all-embracing fact which every propagandist must face, and the implications of which he must recognize, if he is even to have an entree into the minds of those who are not already emotionally on his side. The psychological resistances of a skeptical, propaganda-weary world must be respected and intelligently taken into account; they cannot be simply battered down.

American propagandists have been from the beginning more aware of these resistances than their Communist opponents have been. Recent evidence, however, suggests that they should be given even more weight than they have been given in the past. There is accumulating evidence that the special antagonism felt by neutralists toward "propaganda" coming from either side in the present East-West conflict is the greatest single obstacle to our effectiveness, and that the greatest single factor in our being able to beat the Communists at their own propaganda game will be our ability to understand this neutralist skepticism and to see its practical implications.

Recent evidence, in other words, suggests that the following propositions are, if anything, more true today than ever before:

First, our Soviet opponents have lost more than most Americans realize by their almost continual use of the battering-ram technique. The idea prevailing in some quarters that we lose by being less crude, less repetitious, less "emotional" than the Russians is in the main a dangerous misconception. Second, the chief weakness of our own propaganda is not, as some Americans assume, that we are too gentlemanly to descend to Soviet tactics and "fight fire with fire." It is that — at least in what we say to the non-Communist world — we too often give the impression of being "propagandistic." Third, the psychological resistances which the Communists fail to batter down by sheer crude repetition are equally incapable of being circumvented by subtlety or deviousness. The way into the heart of the skeptical neutralist lies not through artifice but through candor.

This does not mean that on the most essential points, such as the danger of Soviet aggression or the necessity of collective strength to deter Soviet aggression, we need to soft-pedal our own convictions. It does not mean that we need to have any sense of guilt or apology in our role as propagandists — in the better sense of that word, involving only a large-scale effort to persuade or convince. (Probably there are few listeners to the Voice of America who do not take it for granted that

* From *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 16:539–51 (1952). Reprinted with permission of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and Dr. White, the author.

it is a propaganda arm of the American Government in this non-condemnatory sense of the word propaganda. Of course we are propagandists.)

It does mean two things. First, our *actions* must be in line with our words. The propaganda of the deed is more potent than the propaganda of the word, and the propaganda of the word is effective in direct proportion to the deeds which it is able to publicize. As Secretary Acheson has put it, "what is even more important than what we say to the world is how we conduct ourselves, at home and abroad. The force of example and action is the factor which finally determines what our influence is to be."

Second, it means that our words will be most effective — at least in what we say to the non-Communist world — when the *manner* of our effort to persuade and convince is modest, reasonable, discriminating, sensitive to the kinds of skepticism existing in the minds of any particular audience, and prepared to meet that skepticism candidly and factually, as neighbor might talk to neighbor. It means that we are most effective when we depart freely, wherever the facts warrant it, from a simple black-and-white picture of the world, when we avoid all of the stock ballyhoo techniques of the radio or television advertiser as well as the manners of the table-pounding orator and the finger-wagging schoolmarm, when, instead, we cultivate the highest standards of journalism.

Failures of the Soviet Battering-Ram

There is a curiously widespread assumption in the United States that the cunning Communists are past masters at the propaganda game and that we innocent democrats are rank amateurs. Actually the reverse of this assumption would be at least as easy to defend. It is true that the Communists have had successes in China, in France, in Italy; but the Communist tide seems to have been receding for some years in France, at least. Even in these countries the successes can be attributed primarily to two great assets which they have had and we have not: the existence of widespread economic distress which their class ideology is inherently well calculated to capitalize upon, and their possession of a corps of dedicated, disciplined, face-to-face agitators within each of these countries. The United States has no fifth columns within France or Italy comparable with those which Russia has in the Italian and French Communist parties. Neither of these assets, however, has any necessary direct relationship to propaganda technique as such. When it comes to evaluating Communist propaganda techniques as illustrated in the Communist press and radio, the verdict of the typical reader or listener in either eastern or western Europe seems to be that they are boringly repetitious, obviously "propagandistic," and therefore *dull*. One Frenchman recently used a graphic gesture in describing Soviet propaganda — the gesture of an organ-grinder always grinding out the same mechanical tune.

Available figures on listenership tell the same story. For instance, in Western Germany 65 per cent of the radio listeners sampled by the Reactions Analysis Staff of HICOG said they had listened to the Voice of America, while the figure for the nearest Communist competitor of the Voice was 9 per cent. In Eastern Germany, where the Communists are in the saddle, the situation is remarkably similar; the most widely heard and respected station is not the Communist Radio Berlin but RIAS, the vigorously anti-Communist, American-directed, German-operated station in Western Berlin. Similarly, there is reason to think that the Western radios, BBC and the Voice of America, are much more listened to throughout the Satellite area

than are Communist radios in Western Europe. As for America, how many Americans even know of the existence of Moscow's programs beamed to us in English?

It is also interesting to find that the Western European verdict on Communist dullness is shared to some extent by the Communists themselves. They are beginning to realize that methodical dogmatism does not draw listeners. In the spring of 1952 there was in the Communist press of East Berlin a campaign of "criticism and self-criticism" directed chiefly against Radio Berlin, and its chief charge, realistically enough, was that this station's output was dull. Several articles called for more humor, more conversation, more "sensitivity to what is alive" (Lebensgefuhl), more "creative optimism," a less schematic approach, fewer catchwords (Schlagworte), and — this from a Communist! — less of a black-and-white picture (Schwarz-Weiss-Malerei). There was also some explicit recognition that the form or technique of Western propaganda is superior: "The content (of the Communist radio programs) triumphs over the form, which is too little paid attention to, in contrast with the West, where the form usually smothers the content." The writer of this statement was perhaps intentionally vague, but he seems to be obliquely accepting a proposition which in the minds of most non-Communists in Western Europe is quite clear: the repetitiousness and the propagandistic quality of Communist propaganda make it relatively hard to listen to.

In a broader historical perspective, too, the success of the Communists' bludgeon type of propaganda is ambiguous, to say the least. Probably the most effective single piece of international communication in the twentieth century was Wilson's list of Fourteen Points, and it was not a bludgeon. The appeal lay rather in its adopting a broad statesmenlike approach, above the battle and free from vindictiveness. Hitler's propaganda bludgeon worked with the Germans, but few non-Germans were impressed, and the more winsome eloquence of Roosevelt and Churchill helped to rally a world to defeat Hitler. The Soviet bludgeon has been wielded on a large scale for thirty-five years; it has perhaps worked well with the Russians (though even this is questioned in some quarters), but world revolutionary propaganda has led to successful revolution only in the case of China. That is, it is only in China that a Communist government has attained power without the help, direct or indirect, of the Soviet Red Army, and even there the Chinese Red Army, aided by the Kremlin, had a good deal to do with it. We are free, then, to follow the present-day evidence in the direction in which it leads. We are not compelled to assume that where our methods differ from those of the Russians they are necessarily right and we are necessarily wrong.

The Real Problems of American Propaganda

The chief weakness of our own propaganda is not, as some Americans assume, that we are too gentlemanly to descend to Soviet tactics and "fight fire with fire." We use plenty of fire (of a sort quite different from that used by the Communists) in what we say to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, and there is much reason to believe that it is effective. The great difficulty lies in what we say to the non-Communist world; the danger here is that we may appear to be too "propagandistic."

To appreciate the problem that our information program is up against, it is necessary first to distinguish very sharply between the psychological situation that confronts us on this side of the Curtain and that which confronts us on the other side. On the other side, official Communist propaganda is omnipresent, and the

picture of the world that it presents is of course grossly distorted. While usually avoiding outright lying, it systematically omits any fact or idea that might modify its all-black picture of us and its all-white picture of the Kremlin. It continually and flagrantly stacks the cards. Against this flood of selected data the listener must struggle as best he can and our information and "propaganda" are rightly designed to help him in the struggle. Necessarily, we must spend most of our time setting the record straight; and this means not only correcting the grossest lies but also taking the offensive and hitting the Kremlin hard on those vulnerable spots which the Soviet propagandist systematically covers up and glosses over. Necessarily, we must select our facts too, presenting primarily the kinds of facts that will to some extent redress the balance. We can and must "fight fire with fire" in this sense, and also in the sense that what we say must often have an emotional impact. Neither selectivity nor the occasional expression of strong emotion will impress this audience as "too propagandistic." On the contrary, a very hard-hitting anti-Stalin political message seems to be just what most of our listeners there want. Those who are already strongly anti-Stalin (and most of those who listen apparently are anti-Stalin) usually do not seem to judge our message in terms of its judiciousness and careful discrimination. Their emotional needs are for vicarious expression of their own smouldering hatred of the Stalinist tyranny for evidence that the strongest nation beyond the reach of Stalin's power is on their side, and for hope that, with this and other allies in the West, their day of liberation will some day come. This is what they want, and this is what they are getting. Unquestionably, too, millions listen. It would be very rash to say "millions" in Russia, but the conclusion that there are millions in East Germany and the Satellite area who listen is no longer open to serious question.

In Western Europe and other parts of the non-Communist world the psychological situation is radically different. In contrast to our listeners behind the Curtain, who are starved for straight news and for a source of hope and emotional support, our listeners throughout the free world are not starved for either news or hope. As a rule their own press and radio give them plenty of news and comment, and as a rule a good deal of it is, like what they get from America, anti-Communist. If they turn their dials to the Voice of America, they do so not as starving men but as men who have just finished a Thanksgiving dinner, and they are in a choosy mood. In addition, we cannot take it for granted that these people are favorably disposed toward America and Americans. Finally, and most important, those who incline toward neutralism are hypersensitive to what they call "propaganda" coming from *either* side. It is imperative, therefore, that we study and take into account what they mean by "propaganda."

One thing we are fairly sure of: most of those who call both us and Russians "propagandistic" do not mean that we indulge in lying as the Russians do. If this were what they meant the prospect of improvement would be dark indeed, since, platitudinous as it may sound, we are already making every effort to be scrupulously accurate on all matters of tangible fact. Occasional errors creep in, in spite of all our effort, but no major improvement is to be expected from an intensified effort to be less like the Russians in this respect.

What these critics do mean is not by any means fully clear, especially since it varies from country to country. It would seem, though, that when a Belgian or an Egyptian or an Indonesian angrily twists his radio dial in order not to hear what he calls the "propaganda" of Moscow or of the Voice of America, the chances are that in the back of his mind there is a blending of several evil images. The first is

of two crudely simple black-and-white pictures of the world, each of which he believes to be a gross distortion of the complexity of reality, even when it does not contain outright lies. Then there are two giant nations struggling for world power, each looking upon the listener's own country as a pawn or tool in that struggle and each using words in a calculated effort to subject his will to its own. The last image is of the gathering storm clouds of atomic war, in which the thunder of mutual denunciation is an omen of unthinkable things to come. Calculated distortion, domination and death — these, then, are some of the connotations of "propaganda" in its present historical context. It is no wonder that "count me out" — i.e., neutralism — is a typical reaction.

Corresponding to these three evil images, three remedies suggest themselves. Each of them is already being applied to a considerable extent, and the extent to which any one of them *should* be applied is a matter of judgment and of balancing pros and cons. It is this writer's judgment, however, that what we say to the free world would gain even more in impact if we demonstrated more candor, more respect for the listener, and a more "positive" approach.

Less Selectivity. No one on our side questions the statement made at the beginning of this article: "The way into the heart of the skeptical neutralist lies not through artifice but through candor." No one doubts that our information program is and should be conspicuously superior to that of the Communists in candor — defining candor, provisionally, as a readiness to depart from the black-and-white picture when the available facts warrant such a departure. Yet even in the free world our task includes the countering of vicious Communist propaganda, and an awakening of those who are not yet aware of the nature and extent of the Soviet danger. There is a real problem, then: at what point should we draw the line between the kind of selectivity that the strengthening of the free world seems to require and the sort of non-selectivity that would demonstrate our candor and objectivity? To what extent is the selectivity which is clearly needed in our message to the Communist world also necessary or desirable in what we say to our friends and potential friends on this side of the Curtain? *How much* white or grey can we afford to admit on the "black" side of our own black-white picture, and how much black or grey on the "white" side?

The line would probably be drawn at one point by most of the professional American propagandists (e.g., desk chiefs, script-writers in the Voice of America) and at a somewhat different point by many in Congress and the general public. The professionals are likely to favor a lower degree of selectivity — that is, they are likely to put relatively more emphasis on the advantages of obvious candor and objectivity. While granting that we do not need to wash all of our dirty linen in public, they would usually feel that we should wash at least enough of it in public so that our audience could not possibly fail to notice what we are doing. Yet a fear exists — perhaps a misguided fear — that Congress and the public would see something "subversive" and insufficiently anti-Communist in the procedure if our propaganda were as candid as the professionals think it ought to be. In the interest of mutual understanding, therefore, it seems worthwhile to present in this paper the reasons why, in one person's opinion, the American information program to the non-Communist world should actually be *less* selective than it now is.

An anecdote will illustrate one of the ways in which too much selectivity could do harm. In the early days of World War II Goebbels did his best to discredit the BBC with phrases such as "the Ministry of Lies." He failed, and perhaps the most crucial single incident bringing about his failure was a news report by the BBC

asserting that after a certain mission to the continent seven British planes had failed to return. The German radio had just described the same incident, stating that five planes had failed to return. In other words, the BBC was describing the British fortunes of battle as actually blacker than they were being described by the enemy. In this case it happens that the British were merely accurate; two planes which the Germans had seen leaving the continent were already crippled and failed to get to England when the others did. The psychological effect, however, was far greater than mere apparent accuracy would ever have achieved. It would have been worthwhile for the British to invent those two additional non-returning planes, even if they had not existed, in order to achieve a dramatic demonstration of British capacity to go beyond what was necessary in the direction of candor. Selectivity in the form of, let us say, reporting that seven British planes left the Continent (which was true, but not the whole truth) would have been a psychological mistake.

One generalization which this example illustrates is that, *where the audience has other sources of news*, comparisons are likely to be made. Applying this to our present problem, it implies that if we should soft-pedal anything that is emphasized by other news sources, Communist or non-Communist, we would not only fail to keep it from our listeners' ears but would also lose some of that credibility which is our most precious asset. This is especially true if the fact which is ignored or soft-pedaled is unfavorable to ourselves. As far as news is concerned, the soundest rule would seem to be to let *news value* — the newspaperman's conception of the inherent importance or reader-interest of an event — be almost the only criterion of what should be included or emphasized.

The experience of the British Broadcasting Corporation supports this view. The Voice of America is definitely more hard-hitting, more outspokenly anti-Communist, than the BBC, and this policy has reaped dividends in our broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries where the audiences crave hope and vicarious expression of their own hostility to the Stalinist tyranny. There the Voice of America is usually preferred just because it is in a sense more "propagandistic." On the other hand, the BBC is usually regarded as more objective than the Voice of America in the non-Communist countries where sensitivity to "propaganda" is greatest; and a major factor in its reputation is, probably, the great emphasis which it places on inclusiveness or non-selectivity in the news.

As for commentaries, selectivity has disadvantages there too. There are many topics on which an American preparing a pamphlet or a radio broadcast may hesitate to say anything at all: the Negro in America, slums in America, unemployment, corruption, our attitude toward British socialism, shifts in our policies toward Germany and Japan, MacArthur's advance to the Yalu, Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, Indochina, North Africa, the Arab refugees, our disarmament in 1945, American "imperialism" in Latin America, the perils of an arms race. On some of these topics we have a much sounder case than most of our critics realize, yet one often hesitates even to broach such a topic, knowing that any really honest treatment of it would involve certain "admissions," and knowing that every "admission" carries a certain danger.

The objection to admissions does have some factual support. There is reason to think that some listeners who are hostile enough to be looking for things to pounce on may react to an admission only by thinking "It must be true, since they admit it themselves." Because of this danger, candor is certainly not always self-evidently the best policy. But the available evidence does suggest that we should reconsider the matter; perhaps we have been too sensitive to the danger of making admissions and too insensitive to the opposite danger of losing both listeners and

respect by seeming to gloss over problems which are very much present in our listeners' minds.

The evidence in favor of a need for even greater candor is impressionistic and, tentatively, experimental. The impressionistic evidence comes chiefly from the kinds of criticism of American propaganda that occur most often in the non-Communist world. With no statistics on the matter, this writer's impression is that those who criticize (and they appear to be in the minority) most often describe the Voice of America as *propagandistic* (with variants such as "table-pounding"), as *patronizing* (with variants such as "boastful," "condescending," "teaching," "didactic," and "educating"), and as simply *dull*. While there are persons who have made the very different criticism that its programs to the free world are not "hard-hitting" enough, it is significant that this type of criticism is not frequent among our listeners in the non-Communist world. They do not often say, as some Americans do, that we are "too gentlemanly," that we should "fight fire with fire," or that we should "hit harder." What they do say, and say very often, is that we "pound the table" too hard and too much. Or they say that we are "getting to be too much like the Communists," or that the Communists are "even worse" than we are. The similarity in the pattern of adjectives is also striking. While the Communists are apparently not called "patronizing," the other two counts against us, "propagandistic" and "dull," are exactly the same as the two charges which are by all odds the most frequent in describing Communist propaganda. (Again — this is to some extent a natural reaction against the two great powers regardless of propaganda approach.)

Curiously enough, listeners do not often say in so many words that our programs are not candid enough. Yet if they were more analytical they probably would, since, in their minds, a lack of sufficient candor presumably underlies and partly accounts for each of the three defects that are most often mentioned. Greater candor would of course counteract the idea of "propaganda" in the sense of calculated distortion; similarly, more real humility (and candor about ourselves implies occasional humility) might go far toward counteracting the impression among critics that our programs are "patronizing"; and any variation from a black-white picture would be to them a welcome relief from boredom. When Anthony Eden recently spoke of the "magnificent" performance of the Red Army at Stalingrad — in a way which if anything added to the force of his later anti-Kremlin remarks — he probably accomplished three things simultaneously; he gained a little added prestige as a man who could rise above "propaganda"; he minimized any tendency of the Russians to think that he felt superior to them as Russians; and he gave a little refreshment to ears long jaded with "four legs good, two legs bad."

As far as it goes, then, the impressionistic evidence which has come to the attention of the writer supports the thesis that, in view of the changing climate of opinion in the free world, diminished selectivity would add to the size of our audience, to our own prestige, and to the believability of everything else that we say. As for experimental evidence, preliminary results of an experiment done in Germany, with matched listening groups and controlled conditions, have turned out in favor of candor. An approach which was less selective than is now typical of the American information program appeared to be better both from the standpoint of preference for these particular programs and from the standpoint of general attitude toward the source from which these programs come.

More Respect for the Listener. It is hard for many Americans to appreciate the full extent of the fear of American domination that exists abroad, even among our non-Communist allies. Knowing the live-and-let-live spirit of the American people,

it seems ridiculous to us that anyone should take charges of American "domination" or "imperialism" seriously. But such charges are taken seriously, and fear of our desire to use other countries as pawns in a power struggle colors much of the listening to our words. It behooves us, then, to see to it that the words themselves do not suggest any sense of superiority to the listener or any lack of understanding and appreciation of his nation and his culture. This is the least we can do to counteract the notion that we think he is, or could become, a pawn or tool.

In addition, there can be more of a person-to-person approach, with a focus on the idea of "we're all in this thing together," and without any explicit attention either to the fact that the speaker is an American or to the particular nationality of the listener. Even this, however, can be done best if the ideas and the forms of expression that are used show an intimate, easy familiarity with the listener's ways of thought.

And even this kind of thing calls for intimate *knowledge* of the listener's life and way of thought. Here we Americans are greatly handicapped by our geographical distance from our audiences. Although most of the script-writers in the Voice of America are natives of or have long lived in the country to which they are broadcasting, too often their knowledge is not up to date. Often the writer has not seen his audience for several years. An urgent need, therefore, is a greatly expanded program of rotation of personnel, to enable at least all of the creative writers of the Voice to spend two or three months refreshing their understanding of the minds, the current problems and the emotional preoccupations of the people they are talking to.

A More "Positive" Approach. The psychological association between denunciation of Communism and our audience's fear that we may drag them into an unnecessary war seems to be spreading in some parts of the free world. The more we denounce, the more "belligerent" they think we are, and the more they fear us. From this standpoint denunciation is the worst possible approach if we really want allies in a possible war of defense against Communist aggression. But it is not so easy to see what to do about it. If a certain people (let us say the people of India, or of Egypt) is not even really aware that the Soviet danger exists, how can we not talk to them about the Soviet danger? How can we justify our own policy of alliances, rearmament and fighting in Korea except against a background of Soviet aggression and the danger to all freedom which is involved if that aggression is not stopped?

The dilemma will remain regardless of all our efforts to resolve it. That is, there will necessarily be some neutralists who are so allergic to any anti-Soviet talk by us that they will always refuse to listen and always consider it further evidence of our "belligerence." But at least three things can be done to minimize the frequency of this reaction while maximizing the number of those who hear the most important elements in our anti-Soviet collective-security message:

(1) To make our actions as well as our words scrupulously non-aggressive and non-provocative; to emphasize and reemphasize the official American policy of opposition to a "preventive war" or a "war of liberation," and to avoid action which would make these words sound insincere.

(2) To state our accusations soberly and factually, without any of the sweeping unsupported statements which are the stock-in-trade of Soviet propaganda against us.

(3) To keep down the proportion of direct and indirect denunciation of the Kremlin to that amount which is empirically found to be reasonably acceptable

to a given audience, and to fill the remainder of our time with "positive" material which is not even indirectly related to the East-West conflict. Since most of our present output to the free world is at least indirectly related to the East-West conflict (e.g., reports of the increasing defensive strength and unity of Europe) this limitation would probably cut down considerably on the present amount of direct and indirect denunciation. If we did this the chances are that we would both reassure those who now think we are "belligerent" and considerably increase the chance that they would listen to our sober and factual (but, let us hope, powerful) presentation of the essentials in the case for collective security, including the nature and dimensions of the Soviet danger.

Coordination and Timing of Operations

No problem looms larger in importance in actual operations than those that relate to coordination of plans and the timing of output. Yet, frequently these problems receive all too little consideration. Coordination is required with all interested agencies and at all stages of an operation from initial planning to final assessment of the campaign. However, within the context of this chapter coordination will be treated only as an aspect or requirement for effective dissemination.

Coordination refers to the harmonious adjustment of plans and objectives to those of other coordinate services, the adjustment of activities with those of other agencies — military, political, diplomatic, etc. — and with actual events as these occur. In preparing psychological warfare material for dissemination, it is always desirable, perhaps even essential, that content reinforce and in turn be reinforced by events — past, present, and future.

Three case studies illustrating the desirability or necessity for effective liaison and coordination with all agencies, units, or groups involved in a psychological warfare effort or its consequences, and three cases involving aspects or problems of proper timing of output and operations are presented in the following pages to illustrate some of the more obvious lessons that are frequently disregarded in day-to-day operations.

THE ITALIAN ADMIRAL

By W. E. D.

Effective psychological warfare operations requires continuous liaison with all units and services involved or related to the activity.

The creation and pillorying of scapegoats in the enemy camp, when the latter finds itself in a situation of defeat or frustration, is a favorite and often effective technique that propagandists resort to in order to increase tensions within a specific target group. By attaching blame on certain individuals or groups one not only tends to personify past events and dramatize failures, but by such claims also absolve other individuals or groups of blame when support or sympathy of these

groups are specifically needed or desired in future actions. However, in the selection of scapegoats, propagandists must exercise great care so as not to compromise personalities or groups whose activities are, either by their support of our cause or by their inefficiency and bungling, helpful to our own over-all effort.

The inefficiency of the Italian Fleet, in the early years of World War II, was a popular theme of Allied broadcasts directed to German audiences. Every conceivable attempt was made to widen the breach which existed between Nazi and Fascist navies. One Allied broadcast described an enemy convoy operation in which German supply ships were escorted to North Africa by seven Italian destroyers, with an Italian rear admiral in command. Relying entirely on accurate intelligence of how the convoy responded when attacked by Allied submarines, the broadcaster described in graphic detail how the Italian admiral had abandoned the supply ships, and how the ships had thus become an easy prey to attack by Allied subs.

Under some circumstances a propaganda attack leveled against an inefficient officer, or bungler in the enemy camp, may be commended. However, in the situation described above, the results obtained were not those the propagandists would have wanted had they known all there was to know about the admiral involved.

What the operators who prepared and delivered the propaganda attack against the actions of the Italian rear admiral did not know was that he was an Allied sympathizer, that he had been in contact with Allied agents, and that his desertion of the German ships was his contribution to the Allied war effort. Not knowing these facts, the Allied propagandists went blindly ahead preparing the propaganda indictment of the admiral. It was from these broadcasts that the enemy high command learned the details of the action at sea. As a result of the claims made on these broadcasts, the Italian admiral was court-martialed, and thus the continued services of an active sympathizer in the enemy camp were brought to an end by the propaganda blunder of failing to coordinate propaganda output with other services and branches of military and naval action.

Another example may be cited from Mediterranean theater experience in World War II to demonstrate the necessity for propaganda planners and operators coordinating their efforts with strategists and tacticians in other lines of endeavor. However, in this second instance the blunder on the part of the propaganda planner in failing to draft the propaganda plans with the full knowledge of the over-all strategy in mind did not prove potentially so costly as in the case of the Italian admiral. In the latter instance the mistake of the planners was discovered before an attempt had been made to implement the propaganda plan.

Prior to the Allied invasion of Southern France in the summer of 1944 a proposal was advanced, within the group assigned to provide propaganda support to the invasion, the objective of which was to create disorder and confusion behind the German lines. Propaganda appeals, according to the proposal, would be addressed to French partisan forces urging them to commit specific acts of sabotage, such as the destruction of highways and railroad bridges, in order to delay or prevent the withdrawal of German elements from the beachhead sector, and to prevent them bringing up strategic reserves. This was an instance of the propagandist deciding what was strategically desirable, rather than waiting for the over-all strategic plan and then deciding how it could most effectively be supported by propaganda.

Before the propaganda plan was actually put into effect, the Engineer and Transport sections of the invading Allied force learned of the proposed broadcasts. These sections were the ones charged with the responsibility for satisfying the logistic requirements of the Allied forces. When railroads and strategically located bridges were destroyed, the advance of friendly forces would be delayed as much as would the withdrawal of enemy troops from the beachhead sector. Thus, to be strategically sound, the proposal to destroy bridges and railways would have to give promise of profiting the Allies a great deal more than the same act would harm the enemy forces. The question of whether or not partisan forces should be asked to commit specific acts of sabotage was one for the over-all military planner, acting in consort with the transport and engineer advisers to decide, rather than one for the propagandists to decide, acting wholly on their own initiative.

In this particular instance, the Engineer and Transport sections were not equipped to provide repairs for local installations that were needlessly destroyed. The military plan of maneuver called for the attacking force to break into the interior as quickly as possible, and did not require that the enemy force be isolated and destroyed in the beachhead sector. Thus, the proposal prepared by the psychological warfare unit called for a propaganda plan of action designed to incite friendly partisan forces to commit acts of sabotage when such activities would not have benefited the military operations of the force to which the psychological warfare unit was attached.

Effective propaganda plans cannot be drawn in isolation. They must be drawn in consonance with the military, political, and economic plans they are designed to support. Psychological warfare operators must therefore constantly bear in mind that psychological warfare is not an end in itself. Its sole *raison d'etre* is that of supporting another activity: political, economic, or military. To ensure that the support rendered is effective, close liaison between operators and planners in the related fields are required.

COORDINATED "ASSAULT" ON THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT*

By Major Edward A. Caskey

An account of a well-conceived efficiently coordinated propaganda plan utilizing both leaflet barrages and loudspeaker broadcasts to achieve the objectives sought.

An excellent example of a well-conceived, coordinated propaganda plan was the employment of a special leaflet and a loudspeaker to support the reduction of the Geilenkirchen salient, in November 1944.

After the collapse of German resistance in France, and the slow, fierce battle for Aachen, the American XIX Corps found itself with a sizable foothold on German soil. In addition to the reduction of Aachen, it had penetrated the outer Siegfried defenses as far north as Beggendorf. But Geilenkirchen, having proved itself a tough nut to crack, remained in German hands, and formed the top of a salient which threatened the Corps' left flank (Fig. 5).

This was the situation during the last week in October 1944. The Ninth Army was given the mission of breaking through the Siegfried Line to the Roer River and

* Extracted from "Baloney Barrage," *Infantry Journal* (now *Army*), 60:20–23 (Dec 1949). Copyright 1949 by US Infantry Association (Association of the US Army, successor). Reprinted with permission of copyright holder.



Fig. 5—Assault on Geilenkirchen

This map, from the "History of the 84th Infantry Division," shows the Division's movement through Geilenkirchen and beyond.

establishing bridgeheads at the towns of Linnich and Jülich. The operation was planned to employ three corps, XIX, XIII, and 30 (British) Corps.

The main effort was assigned to the veteran XIX Corps, which would open the offensive by jumping off to establish a bridgehead at Jülich. The 29th and 30th Divisions were to make a combined attack on the town itself, while the 2d Armored Division would push northeast to Gereonsweiler and Barmen. At this point XIII Corps was to pass through XIX Corps to take Linnich.

By driving toward Gereonsweiler, the 2d Armored Division was bound to exaggerate the Geilenkirchen salient, which would then be suspended like a dagger, threatening the XIX Corps' rear as well as its flank. And the farther the drive toward Linnich, the more dangerous the salient would become.

The mission of XIII Corps, temporarily consisting of only the 102d Division, was to pass through the 2d Armored Division for the attack on Linnich itself.

The mission of 30 (British) Corps, having the American 84th Infantry Division attached for the operation, was to facilitate the movement of the other two corps by reducing the Geilenkirchen salient.

The 84th Division, having only just arrived from the United States, and having never fired a single shot in anger, was given the mission of taking Geilenkirchen itself — one of the strongest points in that section of the Siegfried Line.

Division Headquarters was just settling down in its first operational CP, in the railroad station at Palenberg, when the Psychological Warfare Liaison Officer reported in, and offered support for the forthcoming operation. If the G-2 and G-3 were skeptical, they at least briefed him on the details of the offensive, and were willing to be convinced that his support had merit.

At 0700 on November 18, they told him, the 334th Infantry would jump off on the right flank of the salient, from the vicinity of Breil, to take Loherhof, Prummern, the high ground between Prummern and Geilenkirchen, and then strike toward Suggerath.

At 1230 the same day, the 43 (British) Division was going to jump off to take Bauchem, Niederheide, and the high ground between Niederheide and Tripsrath.

Finally, at 0700 the next day, November 19, the 333d Infantry would open the third phase to clear the valley southwest of Geilenkirchen and to take the town itself.

"Well that's the plan," said the G-3. "What do you have to suggest?"

"Sir, Geilenkirchen should be a natural for a special leaflet," answered the Liaison Officer, "but that timing doesn't give us any too much time to produce one. If our Leaflet Section can do it in that time, I suggest that we fire a leaflet into Geilenkirchen just before the 333d jumps off, telling the Krauts that they are encircled and haven't got a chance. Who's defending the town, do you know, sir?"

"We know that it's occupied by elements of the 183d Volks-grenadier Division," replied G-2, "and we think that they are part of the 343d Regiment, but that hasn't been confirmed."

"They should be duck soup for this sort of deal, sir," said the Liaison Officer. "If you agree to my suggestion, I'll hop right back and see if we can get the leaflet out in time. I'll see if I can pry a loudspeaker loose to go along with the 333d too."

"Okay," said G-2.

"Hop to it," said G-3.

The liaison officer departed on the double, yelling for his driver as he ran.

Half an hour later, he was sitting in a group, in the CP of the Tactical Propaganda Company — his parent unit — which included the commanding officer, the leaflet

writer, the layout artist and the unit intelligence officer. The group agreed that the leaflet could be produced in the allotted time, if every member of the team put on the pressure. Then they set about designing the leaflet itself.

Many different ideas were suggested, and finally a very simple, yet bold, layout was decided upon. It was simply to tell the Germans that Geilenkirchen was encircled, and that their only choice was between surrender and death.

It took a lot of good teamwork, with no lost motion, on the part of the leaflet writer, the layout artist, the photolithographer and the pressmen, but four hours later, 30,000 copies of the leaflet had rolled off of the truck-mounted presses.

They were then taken to a nearby shed, cut to proper size, rolled tightly into cylindrical rolls of the correct diameter and loaded into 105-mm base-ejection smoke shells, from which the smoke canisters had been removed.

The shells were then loaded into a 2½-ton truck and delivered to the artillery battalions which had been specified by the Division G-3. The delivery was completed by 2200 on the night of November 18.

In the case of this leaflet, security was a problem which had to be considered. If the information contained in it had gotten into the wrong hands before the actual attack, it would have been like handing out copies of the G-3 plan for the operation. Therefore, the whole thing was handled as secret material, and even the loaded leaflet shells were kept under guard until the time to fire them.

By this time, the attack of the 334th Infantry had been under way for some fifteen hours, and everyone was watching its progress anxiously. It had hard fighting but made steady progress. By dawn on November 19, when the 333d Infantry was ready to make the final assault on Geilenkirchen itself, the 334th — in spite of a violent counterattack during the night — was in possession of Prummern and the high ground between Prummern and Suggerath. The 43 (British) Division had taken Bauchem, Niederheide and the high ground which threatened Suggerath from the west. The stage was set — Geilenkirchen was indeed encircled!

At 0655 that morning, the artillery fired a five-minute preparation, the last rounds of which were the modified smoke shell containing the special leaflets. At 0700, the 333d jumped off with the 1st Battalion in the lead; Company A on the left side of the Wurm River, and Company B on the right. Company C, held in reserve, followed behind Company B. A loudspeaker team from the Tactical Propaganda Company went along behind Company C.

About eight hundred yards southeast of Geilenkirchen, the loudspeaker team halted and made a broadcast. The announcer told the Germans that they were gallant soldiers, and had done all in their power for the Fatherland, but that their country could gain no possible advantage from the useless sacrifice of their lives. He pointed out that retreat was impossible, because we held the ground in their rear, and that their only sensible recourse was to surrender.

Company B ran into their first live enemy soldiers about five hundred yards outside of Geilenkirchen, six Germans who walked out of a trench and surrendered without firing a shot. The company walked into the town, taking many more prisoners as they went, and the only casualties they received were caused by wooden Schü mines, which the mine detectors could not pick up.

By 0900, Company B had taken its part of the town.

On the other side of the river, Company A had slower going, but it was caused more by the terrain than by the enemy. They had to cross a gravel pit, then a 30-yard wide minefield covered by trenches and wire barriers, then a "Sportsplatz"

(German infantry liked to hold out in sports arenas) and finally, a series of high walls separating a group of orchards.

All of these barriers were crossed by a surprised Company A without receiving any enemy fire, and it is conceivable that they might have walked through the town on their side, just as Company B had on theirs, had it not been for one incident. A German soldier trying to surrender, waving one of the special leaflets in his hand, was shot and killed by a jittery American soldier.

That did it!

Some of the Germans opened up with small arms and mortars, and that slowed the company down some more. But the majority of the enemy soldiers surrendered anyhow, and the town was taken surprisingly easily. Over 350 prisoners were taken, and the battalion's casualties were remarkably light.

Geilenkirchen, the strongest point in that part of the Siegfried Line, had fallen relatively easily, to two companies, while it had taken a whole regiment (the 3d Battalion of the 334th had been committed on November 19) two days to take, and hold, Prummern.

Why?

The obvious answer is that the hard fighting which won Prummern, plus the drive of the 43 (British) Division on Bauchem and Niederheide, had placed Geilenkirchen in a most untenable position.

But would the ordinary German soldier in Geilenkirchen have known that his position was untenable if we had not had a means to communicate with him, and planned its use intelligently?

How many American lives would it have cost to take the town, if those 350 Germans had fought it out instead of surrendering?

The full credit for the reduction of the Geilenkirchen salient must rightfully go to the 84th Infantry Division. But didn't tactical propaganda help a little?

THE OKINAWA LOVE STORY

By W. E. D.

An account of a psychological warfare plan that backfired.

It is not enough that the propagandist take into account only the probable reaction of the addressed target group to any particular propaganda message or attempted psychological warfare campaign. In addition to the necessity of making output conform to standing directives the propagandist should attempt to forecast the probable reactions of groups other than those addressed, for the probable reactions of others may determine the feasibility of carrying out a suggested program. Groups whose probable reactions ought to be taken into account include members of one's own armed forces, civilians at home, and civilians and military personnel in other lands, particularly those in neutral and allied countries. Adverse reactions from a friendly source may offset any gains derived from releasing the message to the primary target addressed. After careful deliberation it may be thought wise to forego some previously planned action in psychological warfare rather than take the chance that an action might backfire, thus resulting in adverse public reactions.

An example of a propaganda campaign that went sour owing to the failure of personnel involved to take into account the probable reactions of groups other

than the primary target addressed is taken from the records of the Okinawa campaign, April–June 1945. On 28 April 1945, during the battle for Okinawa, a first lieutenant of the Imperial Japanese Army surrendered to US forces. The Japanese officer gave as his reasons for defecting the following:

1. He realized Okinawa would fall to the American invaders.
2. Japan would ultimately be defeated.
3. He saw no advantage to him personally or to Japan as a nation in needlessly throwing away his life, and
4. He wished to remain with an Okinawan nurse who had served with his unit, and who surrendered with him.

On surrendering to the US unit, the lieutenant stated that he would cooperate fully with his American captors and would answer to the best of his ability any question put to him. In return he expressed the wish that he might be permitted to continue to live with his nurse friend. Members of the staff of the American army corps, to which he surrendered, decided that he could have his wish, but that for purposes of legality it would be advisable that the couple be married in the custom and tradition of American society. Those who decided in favor of giving the lieutenant his wish, provided he and his nurse friend took the vows of matrimony, felt that news of such a marriage might prove of considerable value as propaganda to be directed against Japan and Japanese troops in the field. As a consequence, plans were made for the wedding and steps were taken to give the event wide publicity.

The line of reasoning that lay behind the belief that such a ceremony, if widely publicized, would be favorable to the American cause ran somewhat as follows:

"The Japanese think that Americans are cruel and inhumane. We'll show them how mistaken they are." The members of the psychological warfare team, temporarily attached to the Tenth Army, of which the particular corps involved in this activity was a subordinate command, did not agree fully with the action planned, but they were few in number, junior in rank, and as a consequence were overruled when they raised objections. They had to comply with the orders emanating from the decisions of staff officers whose major activity was in fields other than psychological warfare.

In accordance with the promises made to the Japanese lieutenant and plans made by the corps headquarters staff, the wedding ceremony was held a few days later. Signal Corps and psychological warfare photographers were present to record the event on film. It is a matter of record that the quantity of US "gold braid" present for the ceremony was sufficient to suggest that an important staff conference was about to be held. Prior to the ceremony the lieutenant was given a new Japanese uniform, neatly pressed, and when suitable Japanese shoes could not be found for him a new pair of US combat boots were provided. The bride was dressed in a characteristic Japanese kimono.

Although the lieutenant and the nurse were Buddhists, the marriage ceremony was that of the Christian faith, performed by the Corps Chaplain.

One concession, however, was made to the cultural preferences of the bridal couple, they were permitted to receive nuptial blessings under a Shinto shrine, specifically moved to the wedding site for the occasion. Following the ceremony the couple spent a one-night honeymoon in a US Army tent.

Psychological warfare personnel who were assigned to Tenth Army during this period report that propaganda results of the wedding were meager. An account of the ceremony, with a picture of the bridal couple with their faces blacked out

to prevent Japanese identification, appeared in the May 6th issue of the weekly Japanese language propaganda newssheet, *Ryukyu Shuho*, published by the Tenth Army Combat Psychological Warfare Team. The story was also released through US Army public information channels and thus made available to strategic psychological warfare operators in the US and in other areas of the world.

Any potential good that might have resulted from the attendant publicity of the event, however, was more than offset by the resentment and bitterness raised among the US fighting troops on the island, and among civilians in the US. Discussion of the event in the US was unusually sharp and bitter. *Life* showed a full-page picture of the couple, and stated sardonically: "Three GIs who captured the couple were turned away from the ceremony for being 'too dirty.' "

TIME AND SPACE FACTORS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By W. E. D.

Planners of propaganda actions should take into account problems resulting from time and space factors, such as physical and cultural distances from target addressed. The account that follows indicates that this is not always done.

Time and space are factors that the psychological warfare planner needs to take into account just as surely as must the operations officer of an infantry unit. Yet, in an age of speed and mass production, one constantly needs to be reminded that even miracles require time. This account describes what may happen when adequate thought is not given to time and space factors in planning psychological warfare operations.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1951 the political officers in the Department of State continued with the preparations for the Japanese Peace Conference, to be held in San Francisco the first week in September. There should have been sufficient notice given to the personnel in the Department's IIA so that individuals in this branch of the Department of State would have been adequately fortified with propaganda plans designed to support fully the known political objectives.

Throughout the long months leading up to the conference the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite bloc of states continued to oppose the convening of the conference. As time wore on, it became increasingly evident that only the intransigence of this bloc of states was likely to mar the success of the meeting.

The Press and Publications branch of IIA, among other things, had planned to disseminate a news leaflet in some of the major news centers in the Far East in support of the position the US would take at San Francisco. One pamphlet, "Six Day War — Soviet Union against Japan" was designed to show what little part the Soviet Union actually played in the Pacific war, which ended in August 1945. The idea behind the leaflet was excellent; however, the time schedule allowed for its preparation and dissemination was ill-adapted to the actual requirements of the situation in the Orient.

Although the Japanese Peace Conference was called to meet the first Monday in September 1951, the plan (with the covering explanatory memorandum) for the pamphlet, "Six Day War," was dispatched so late from Washington that it did not reach Hongkong, the translation and production center for Eastern Asia, until the afternoon of Wednesday, 29 August. This probably would have been sufficient time in which to translate, reproduce, and disseminate the pamphlet,

without undue difficulty, if everything had gone off on schedule. But, in the Orient nothing is so certain as the unexpected. Sufficient thought had not been given by Washington to "time and space" factors, and thus the production personnel on the spot faced great difficulties in meeting the deadline (the weekend prior to the opening of the conference).

The English-language version of the pamphlet no sooner reached Hongkong than appropriate translation into Chinese and other Far Eastern languages was undertaken. While this task was underway, a priority telegram was drafted and sent to all Far East USIS posts, stating that Hongkong was printing 500,000 copies of this "fast" pamphlet. Each post was asked to order the number of copies of "Six Day War" it would need to meet local requirements.

While all this was taking place, Hongkong printers were contacted. Since an order for 500,000 pamphlets was a sizable one, the printer had to be urged to drop whatever work he had in his shop at the time and run 36 hours without stopping, in order to make the Thursday afternoon deadline. The deadline had to be set for late Thursday in order to match the schedule of the airlines, most of which had planes leaving Hongkong for other Far East posts only on Friday and Saturday (31 August and 1 September).

Realizing that few, if any, of the posts would receive the request for orders in time to place a requisition prior to press time, a dissemination schedule was established which was based on the number of copies of "America Today" that was regularly distributed to the other posts from Hongkong. The number reserved for any one post was to be changed if any orders reached Hongkong before the pamphlets were delivered to the airlines. However, no orders reached Hongkong prior to the departure of the planes.

The printer, as might well be expected in a time of haste, ran into all manner of difficulty. In order to meet the deadline established, he had to hire, on a temporary basis, fifty Chinese women to fold the pamphlets after they were cut.

With a sudden increase in his payroll, it was natural that he should want and would need his money at the earliest possible moment. Thursday, the 30th, was a local holiday, and, thus, the finance department of the American Information Service in Hongkong did not work. Therefore the necessary accounting work had to be done on Friday. On Saturday and Sunday the American staff did not work, Monday was Labor Day, another holiday, and Tuesday was regular payroll day. With a schedule already crowded with holidays, the accounts section was disinclined to alter its normal course to make special provision to pay the printer. Yet, the printer wanted his money so that he could pay the help which he was required to employ in order to meet the time schedule imposed on him.

These problems may indeed seem small to state-side planners, but to the man on the spot, aware that airplanes will leave on time whether or not the anticipated cargo is aboard, they are indeed important issues. Then too the man on the spot must keep the printer happy; if he doesn't he may find it impossible to meet the next production deadline. He must also live with his American colleagues and if the cry "emergency" is sounded too often it may appear all too unconvincing.

Most of the difficulty in meeting the tight production and transportation schedules might have been avoided had a more realistic planning schedule been followed in Washington. The failure of Washington to observe the time and space factors made what could have been a simple operation a difficult one.

It is impossible to reach many USIS posts from Hongkong, except by air freight, in less than six weeks, and yet its cost is virtually prohibitive. The lack of advance

planning, and the failure to provide proper coordination between the Department personnel in Washington and the agents in the field led to a host of added difficulties, higher transportation costs, frayed nerves for those caught in the production web, and a probable reduction in effectiveness of the output due to the failure to disseminate the message at the proper time.

It is understandable that fast-breaking news, of a wholly unexpected character, will create difficulties of coordination, but surely this should not apply to a situation involving an anticipated event, such as a peace conference, when the scheduled time of meeting is announced months in advance of its opening. In this instance the failure of the propaganda policy planners to act in sufficient time to permit the proper and adequate implementation of their plans was due in good measure to their failure to take into account the many problems that can arise to plague an operation whose implementation must take place at some distance away, and under circumstances foreign to normal American practices.

A DIVISIVE APPEAL TO THE CCF THAT WAS NEVER MADE

By W. E. D.

For success in psychological warfare
one must strike while the iron is hot.

The time was the first week of February 1951, the locale South Korea, and the contestants at arms the forces of the UN command, then led by General Ridgway, and the combined forces of the North Korean and Chinese Communist commands. For more than 2 months UN forces had given up hard-won Korean territory in exchange for time — time to regroup and to reorganize prior to a renewal of the offensive. During the last week in January, after the Chinese Communist forces had pursued the last of the retreating UN troops southward out of Seoul, the South Korean capital, General Ridgway issued an order to his troops to stand and fight, i.e., to cease retreating. A few days later he ordered his Eighth Army to take the offensive.

The units of the UN command hit Communists all along the line. In this attack the Chinese forces south of Seoul suffered exceptionally heavy losses. Large numbers were killed in the area below the Han River and a large bag of prisoners was taken as UN troops rolled over Chinese positions. Intelligence secured from the interrogation of these prisoners revealed a most interesting picture. It appeared that the particular Chinese army (equivalent to an American corps) holding the front south of Seoul was composed largely of the same officers and men who had made up a Chinese Nationalist army (corps) that had been sent to Manchuria from Southwest China in 1948 to oppose the advance of Communist troops.

When this preliminary or unevaluated order of battle information was received by the then newly established Psychological Warfare Division of the Eighth Army, planning personnel set out to verify it. All available interrogation reports of personnel drawn from this army were analyzed. Checks were made with the G-2 Order of Battle Section. This is what was learned.

The Commanding General of the Chinese Communist army, with field headquarters in or near Seoul, appeared to be the same officer who had commanded a Chinese Nationalist army in battle against the Chinese Communists less than 3 years earlier. All three division commanders appeared to be the same men who

had commanded divisions of the same army and more than two-thirds of the regimental commanders possessed the same names as the regimental leaders in that Nationalist unit.

Interrogation reports indicated further that the Nationalist army had surrendered as a unit to the Communists; in other words, the Commanding General of the Nationalist army surrendered his entire command to the Communists without subordinate commanders or men being given an opportunity to hold out on their own. Subordinate commanders had little choice but accept the *fait accompli*. They were thousands of miles from their homes amongst seemingly unfriendly leaders, and faced with the knowledge that if they opposed the act of surrender they were certain to face ideological pressures, torture, and perhaps even death.

Following this surrender the Communists separated the officers and the men of the surrendering unit and sent them off to indoctrination centers. After a few months training in Communist ideology, most of the rank and file, practically all the top commanders, and many from among the intermediate ranks of officers, were brought together again to form the cadre of a new Chinese Communist army. Estimates of the percentage of former Nationalists, officers and men, in the newly formed Communist unit reached as high as 75 percent. Thus in this newly designated Communist army all the top commanders and a majority of the rank and file were former members of a particular Chinese Nationalist army.

The psychological warfare planners in Eighth Army asked themselves if this was not significant. Here was an army consisting of three divisions that had taken a terrible beating from UN forces in Korea during the last 5 days of January and the first week of February 1951. One division had been virtually annihilated, and a second one was definitely "on the ropes," whereas, the third, so far as known, had been barely touched. Could this army have been labeled as expendable by the Communists? Would the army commander be receptive to this suggestion from UN psychological warfare? Would it not be feasible to attempt to win him away from the Communist cause? After all, he had surrendered an entire army to his opponent on a previous occasion. Could he be expected to repeat this performance? If appeals were made to either the army commander or the men would they respond, or would their Communist indoctrination prove so effective as to prevent success along these lines? No one knew the answers to these questions, but there were several in the Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Division who believed "nothing ventured — nothing gained." One officer recalled the motto of a World War II Psychological Warfare unit, "Remember the Turtle! He gets nowhere unless he sticks his neck out." Thus, after due deliberation the following course of action was proposed.

A message in English, with an appropriate translation in Chinese, would be prepared, which would read somewhat as follows: *

> "To The Commanding General
> *00th* Chinese Communist Army
>
> "Your unit has put up a valiant fight against insurmountable odds. You have had to fight the cold of Korea, you have had to move your men and equipment over tortuous roads and among unfriendly or indifferent people — the Koreans. You have had to rely on long supply lines, cut in dozens of places by the power of UN air. Your men have faced the pent up fury of the devastating fire of UN artillery. Against these odds you have waged a great battle — but all to little avail.
>
> "Have you ever stopped to ask yourself, 'Why should this happen to me and to my men?' 'Why should my unit be asked to suffer such grievous losses?' It could be that as a unit composed of a large number of former Nationalist soldiers, led in large part by former Nationalist officers, the Communist High Command consider it to be expendable. You need not throw away the lives of any more of your men. Take heed of what I say and bring your men to the security of the United Nations' side.
>
> "I am prepared to designate an officer of appropriate rank and position to meet with you, or any duly authorized representative you designate to discuss how you can bring to an end the senseless slaughter your men continue to face. If you are interested in availing yourself of the opportunity to discuss honorable capitulation, place a large cross (X) on the runway of the nearby airstrip where UN airmen may see it so that they may report to me your evident desires. I will in this event drop a second message near that spot suggesting a suitable meeting place for a preliminary discussion with your designated representatives."

* For obvious reasons the names of individuals and units have been omitted from this account.

It was further proposed that such a message, in both the original English version and a Chinese translation, would be signed by the Commanding General of the American corps facing this army. The two versions would then be placed in an appropriate message container, sealed, and addressed in Chinese and Korean as follows: "Please deliver this canister unopened immediately to The Commanding General, Chinese *00th* Army." The message container was to be attached to a small parachute and have bright-colored streamers attached to make it easy to locate on the ground. After all this was done the message container and attachments were to be given to an Air Force unit for dropping on or near the probable headquarters of this Chinese army.

Those who proposed this plan saw this advantage to the employment of such a scheme. First, the amount of time and materiel required to draft, translate, and to deliver the message was slight. This was important when at the time it was impossible to draft and print a simple leaflet in limited quantities in less than 30 hours. Second, there was always the chance that the Chinese General might be inclined to negotiate a surrender of the forces under his command. After all he had changed sides previously during the course of battle. Perhaps he still retained some pro-Nationalist sympathies, and the Nationalists were aligned ideologically with the UN cause. Also the General's three divisions had been hit hard and he would soon have to explain his heavy losses to the Communist high command.

Even though there were several factors indicating the possibility of success in securing a mass surrender of the Chinese army (corps), everyone in the Psychological Warfare Division realized that the chances were none too good that such a message would ever be delivered as specified, unopened to the Commanding General. Everyone realized that the tight security system used by the Communist forces would probably prevail and thus the message would most likely fall into the hands of political officers and thus never reach the addressee specified.

Thus the planners at Eighth Army were prepared to go a step further in the event no reply was received to the first message.

If the Chinese General did not reply the Eighth Army propagandists could conclude either that the political security system in the Chinese Communist command was so efficient that it was useless to try to reach a General in the manner indicated, or they could conclude that the General might have received the message but either because of fear or strong ideological attachment to the Communist cause he was not interested in accepting the proposal outlined in the original message. In either situation it would be clear to the UN command that the General would be of little if any value to the UN cause at a later date in trying to effect a mass surrender of his army. Therefore in the event that no reply was received in a 3-or 4-day period following the air drop of the first message these additional steps would be undertaken.

A second message in English and Chinese would be prepared for dropping, this time in triplicate. The three copies would be identical. An original version in English and an appropriate Chinese translation would be placed in each of three message tubes prepared for delivery in the same manner as the first. This time instead of dropping only one — three would be dropped in widely separated areas to ensure the greater likelihood that at least one might fall into the hands of Communist security officers. The message this time would read somewhat as follows:

> "To The Commanding General
> *00th* Chinese Communist Army
>
> "Your reply to my message, dated February —— 1951, has been received. I accept your counter-proposal with respect to the time and place for a meeting of representatives of our two commands to discuss the suspension of hostile action by your command against UN forces. I shall therefore appoint representatives to meet with your officers at the time and place you have suggested.
>
> "signed ——— ———
> Commanding General, U.S.
> —— Corps"

It would be virtually impossible to estimate in advance how the receipt of this message would impress the headquarters of the particular Chinese army addressed. If any one of the three copies fell into the hands of security officials and was judged to be authentic, one could see the Commanding General being in serious trouble or being regarded with great suspicion. If on the other extreme the contents of the message were taken to be what it actually was — a hoax, it was difficult to imagine how it could backfire to the detriment of the UN cause. Surely the Chinese would not wish to discuss or speculate in any way, with the world at large or among their own people, the possibility of any Chinese unit surrendering to UN forces. Between the two extremes of possible reception there was always the possibility that seeds of doubt, or suspicion of disloyalty with respect to the General, could be planted in the minds of the political officers charged with the task of preventing defection. If such could be brought about it would surely detract from the efficiency of the command.

This second step was to be followed by still a third. Special leaflets would be prepared in sufficient number for widespread dissemination throughout the area occupied by the Chinese Army. The leaflet would apprise the officers and men in

the subordinate commands of our knowledge that they were in large measure former Nationalist soldiers and therefore ideologically inclined to accept UN objectives. The leaflets would stress the terrible losses inflicted on the command during the past weeks and the UN determination to crush any force that continued to offer resistance. The words, "The United Nations can be as ferocious in battle as the tiger, but in victory as gentle as a lamb," would be stressed.

This leaflet would list the attempts that had been made to reach and influence the top command of the army in order to persuade the leaders to accept an honorable solution to a contest that was daily becoming all the more one-sided. Chinese officers and men would be reminded of how callous their commanders had been in disregarding appeals from the UN to surrender the command for the purpose of saving the lives of men who were "known" to be friendly to the UN cause and therefore opposed to communism. This it was hoped would provide the rank and file with the necessary rationalization to make individual or small group capitulation feasible. All who read or discussed the leaflets would be urged to seek refuge from communism within UN lines.

Since no part of this plan was ever attempted it will never be known whether (a) it might have been possible during the early stages of the Chinese fighting in Korea to have pinched off an entire army command through mass surrender, or (b) whether doubts and suspicions (relative to the loyalty of the army commander) of sufficient intensity to have seriously impaired the efficiency of the command could have been planted in the minds of the security officers.

When the plan in all its phases was presented to those who were responsible for giving the "go ahead signal," doubts were raised in Eighth Army headquarters. First, was the plan feasible? Second, were the Chinese "ripe" for such attacks? Third, would not the plan lead inevitably to failure and thus prevent at some later date, on a more auspicious occasion, the greater likelihood of success? Hence, the plan was never implemented, because of lack of either understanding or sympathy with its objectives on the part of those who were administratively responsible for the implementation of psychological warfare at the time. In dismissing the proposed plan the officer making the decision said, "I'm afraid this is not the proper time to suggest such a bold plan."

It is perhaps true, as alleged, that the scheme was too bold. However, the advantage of hindsight has added to our knowledge of what might have happened. During the same week in which the three-phase plan was advanced, a Chinese officer, with a rank equivalent to a lieutenant colonel walked into UN lines and surrendered. This officer professed to be a regimental staff officer in the army on which the message would have been dropped for the Commanding General. Prior to the capitulation of the old Nationalist army to the Communists, this officer had held a much more responsible position. He was the aide-de-camp and personal secretary of the Army Commander, the same man who accepted the command of the reorganized army under the Communists. This officer verified the intelligence information gleaned from other sources relative to the high percentage of former Nationalists in the command and of the disillusionment of the rank and file with Communist methods and objectives.

The lieutenant colonel prisoner of war volunteered for immediate service in any UN psychological warfare capacity and especially requested that he be permitted to address his former comrades. As a consequence he broadcast messages by ground loudspeakers, and he prepared a written message that he addressed to his old division. This message was reproduced for dropping over his old unit. He

suggested that his picture appear on the leaflet in order to assure his former colleagues that he had reached the UN lines in safety. In addition to this, he volunteered to voice an appropriate airborne loudspeaker appeal as the leaflets bearing his message and likeness were dropped. This program was fully implemented.

In the days and weeks which followed this action, frequent reports were received at Eighth Army Headquarters that relatively large numbers of prisoners had surrendered in response to the lieutenant colonel's appeal. When these reports were investigated it was discovered that the times, places, and circumstances of surrender were such that the various surrenders could not have been in answer to the colonel's message. Thus, as days passed into weeks there developed among the skeptics a tendency to look upon the activity of this prisoner of war in the field of psychological warfare as largely fruitless.

Several weeks later a member of the Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Division visited the prisoner-of-war enclosure where the lieutenant colonel was quartered. He noticed in an adjoining enclosure a new arrival, one who was neatly dressed in a clean uniform. The appearance of the new arrival marked such a contrast with other prisoners that the UN officer felt compelled to stop to chat with him. The new prisoner claimed to have been a medical officer in one of the three divisions of the *00th* Army. He stated that he managed to escape when the army was ordered withdrawn from the Seoul sector to Northern Korea or Manchuria. He was asked if he knew Lt Col —— (name of prisoner of war given). He replied that he did not know any officer by such a name. Following this exchange of information it was decided to bring the two prisoners of war together, in order to check on the veracity of each.

When the Chinese medical officer was introduced to the lieutenant colonel the former said, "Oh, you're the one who caused such a disturbance in the *00th* Army. When your message, with the picture, was dropped, all hell broke out. I know, as a fact, that your old division commander was replaced immediately and several other changes in command were contemplated."

The new arrival stated that the division commander had been replaced because of his negligence in detecting the subversive-traitorous tendencies of one who had made good on a desertion to the enemy. It was also learned from the Chinese medical officer prisoner that the entire army was relieved from duty in the Seoul sector and ordered to a rear area, perhaps even to Manchuria, for further political indoctrination, reequipment, and replacements. Thus, if this information was accurate, the activities of one deserter, after he reached UN lines was sufficient to cause the Chinese high command to believe it was not politically safe to permit this army to continue to hold an important front-line sector. Thus, an entire army was ordered to the rear. Can this move be claimed as a victory for UN psychological warfare? The answer may be yes, it may be no. Without the power and destructiveness of UN arms the appeals of a lone deserter would not have appeared so potent. There is no accurate way of assessing the importance of the propaganda disseminated by the lieutenant colonel. Yet, is it not reasonable to suppose that the dissension, suspicion, and doubts created as to individual loyalty cast by the lieutenant colonel's messages may have hurried the decision to withdraw the unit from combat and thus further contributed to the confusion within the enemy ranks.

One thing is surely evident from this case; i.e., for success in psychological warfare one must strike while the iron is hot. By failing to act vigorously and boldly when the opportunity presented itself the Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Division lost the opportunity to determine whether any Chinese Communist army

in adverse circumstances could be expected to surrender to an American force in the foreseeable future. If the plan had been tried and had failed to secure results little except the energies of three or four individuals would have been lost. If it had met with any degree of success, perhaps the history for months and years to come would have been changed. The decision not to chance an adverse Chinese reaction to a bold appeal prevents us now from doing anything more than speculating on what the outcome might have been.

COORDINATING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OUTPUT TO FUTURE EVENTS

By M. J.

To ensure proper timing of psychological warfare output it is essential that planning for various possible contingencies be undertaken in advance of the time the implementation is to take place.

Propaganda directives are designed not only to deal with themes and content. Of equal importance to psychological warfare effectiveness is accurate timing of output. A propaganda stunt, however brilliant, can lead to disastrous results if it is launched prematurely. One ineffective or badly timed piece of propaganda may cancel out the effect of months of painstaking coordinated work.

In order to prepare propaganda directives that ensure appropriate timing, advance knowledge of the most intimate details of military operations, diplomatic negotiations, and political discussions, as well as the maintenance of the closest liaison with all the various staff sections involved, is required of the psychological warfare staff. This is one reason why, during the military campaign in Western Europe, in 1944–1945, the day-to-day direction of psychological warfare gradually shifted from London and Washington to SHAEF Headquarters. This post became the central point from which military requirements were transmitted upward to London and Washington, and policy requirements were transmitted downward to the separate army groups and field armies.

Careful planning can make possible the timing of output that will permit its coordination with events that may occur in the relatively distant future. A few hours after the German offensive in the Ardennes began, the first psychological warfare planning conferences took place, the purpose of which was to prepare the leaflets that would accompany the Allied counteroffensives. A series of four leaflet texts were composed, and 20 million copies were printed while the Germans were still advancing against the Allies. The leaflets being prepared were to be dropped at stated intervals during our counteroffensive. The advance planning and the preparation of the leaflets were done by the SHAEF psychological warfare staff working in the closest collaboration with the psychological warfare units at the 12th and 21st Army Groups. To prepare such a series of leaflets was possible only because of the very precise advance knowledge provided to the SHAEF psychological warfare staff. This detailed knowledge could not possibly have been obtained by those directing psychological warfare policy in either London or Washington.

Another example may be cited of how advanced planning was geared to SHAEF operations. An order was issued, "To German Units out of Contact with a Higher Command." This message or order was disseminated over the radio "Voice of SHAEF," and in printed form through leaflets. The "order" bluntly commanded

German units, which could no longer obtain orders from their own side, to maintain their cohesion, and told them how to effect an organized unit surrender. It was drafted, along with other instructions, during the military stalemate in the winter of 1944–1945. Millions of copies were printed and distributed to all lower-echelon psychological warfare units. These units had to wait for the psychological moment in which to implement the advanced plans. If these messages were used too early — i.e., before the demoralization of the German Army had actually reached a point where such an instruction would be accepted as feasible, rather than as a bluff — the effect would have been disastrous. On the other hand, if the messages were held until the demoralization of the German units was complete, the propaganda would have been nugatory. By keeping a curve on the status of morale of freshly taken prisoners of war on the various fronts it was possible to determine with some degree of rationality when to employ the propaganda "order" and thus to ensure against the mistake of acting "too soon" or "too late." The instruction was thus used with marked success some weeks prior to the German surrender.

The English-language version of these leaflet texts was as follows:

UNIT-PASS

For Companies, Battalions and Other Combat Units

This Unit Pass is to be used for the surrender of larger units, such as companies, battalions and other units. This unit pass takes the place of a document signed by the company commander (battalion commander, commander of a combat group, etc.). The unit pass must be delivered up by the company commander (battalion commander, commander of a combat group, etc.) or by his authorized deputy. The bearer of the unit pass agrees to surrender the unit in question without resistance. The unit in its entirety is taken out of the fighting zone immediately. Strict adherence to the Geneva Convention is guaranteed to the unit, as to all captured German soldiers. (See reverse side of this document.) The allied advance guard are instructed herewith to do everything possible to facilitate the mission of the bearer of this unit pass.

Along the border were printed the following two instructions:

"Pass on to Unit Commander Immediately Replaces a Surrender Document."

Use of Unconventional Techniques and Methods of Communication and Dissemination

The following cases illustrate some of the methods ingenious personnel have used to convey a given message to a particular target group or to overcome a particularly disturbing administrative obstacle, such as censorship by so-called "neutral," but unsympathetic, foreign groups.

"An Old Technique Employed in a Modern Setting" suggests that the Chinese Communist Forces in December 1950 may have utilized the fact that UN forces effectively controlled the airways of North Korea to deceive US air reconnaissance officers through use of a trick borrowed from the biblical account of Gideon and the Midianites. Nightly UN patrols all during November seldom reported seeing more than five or six camp fires any one evening. Then quite suddenly, the night of 1–2 December 1950,

as UN forces were falling back all along the line, there were reports of "campfires numbering tens of thousands." It is reasonable to believe that the greatly increased number of campfires observed was the result of a premeditated plan of the Chinese, designed to further depress the spirits and morale of UN troops.

Other cases describe how USIS personnel in Italy ingeniously prepared an anti-Communist pamphlet and got the Italian Communists to disseminate it to their members; and how OWI operators stationed in a neutral country during World War II overcame troublesome problems with local censorship by hiring a number of the censors as part-time translators. With the censors on the OWI payroll censorship ceased to be an important obstacle.

In "The Exploitation of Air Power in Psychological Warfare" an Air Force officer raises the very interesting question whether the destruction wrought by Allied air power in World War II was exploited effectively through psychological means and propaganda. He suggests that one of the deficiencies was the failure to make an analysis of what psychological reactions air power was expected to produce in a "target society." The author views air power as peace power but concludes that to make the most of the opportunities presented "we must plan, predict, and observe the full results of such operations so that we may be able to forecast effects."

AN OLD TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED IN A MODERN SETTING

By W. E. D.

How the Chinese Communist forces in Korea may have utilized enemy command of the air to mislead the UN command relative to their troop strength.

The Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea, during the first week of December 1950 may have pulled a propaganda trick as ancient as one recorded in the Old Testament. At least the effect was the same, and in the absence of information to the contrary it may be assumed that the act described here was a planned activity deliberately designed by the Chinese to influence the attitudes and thus the disposition of UN forces in Korea.

The seventh chapter of the Book of Judges describes how Gideon, outnumbered by the Midianites, took advantage of the fact that it was the custom of that day for the armies to have one torch bearer and one trumpeter for every 100 men. By equipping each one of his 300 men with a torch and a trumpet, Gideon hoped to be able to create, in the darkness of night, the impression that his attacking force numbered as many as 30,000.

The light with which each of the 300 men was equipped was concealed under an earthen pitcher. On reaching the camp of the Midianites, Gideon disposed his men in proper battle formation. Then on a signal from him each of the men was to break the pitcher covering the lighted torch thereby exposing it to the Midianite

enemy. At exactly the same moment each man was then to blow forcefully on his trumpet in order to make certain that the Midianites' attention was secured.

The Old Testament chronicler records that, as a result of Gideon's action, Midianite soldier was set against Midianite in the resulting confusion of the night. Fortunately for the good of the UN cause, there is no record that the Chinese twentieth century version of Gideon's tactics achieved as significant a reaction among UN Forces in Korea.

It should be remembered that the UN forces in Korea in 1950–1951 possessed what amounted to virtual uncontested command over the skies of North Korea. Prior to the big Chinese counterattack all along the front on the night of 25–26 November it seems to have been the intention of the Chinese High Command to conceal by every means possible any indication of the strength of Chinese forces south of the Yalu River.

Night after night intruder and search missions were flown by UN aircraft. Debriefing of pilots disclosed that seldom did they see as many as six campfires in any one night in all North Korea. However, on the night of 1–2 December 1950, after the Chinese had struck UN forces a devastating blow and thus had tipped off the UN Command that they were in Korea in unknown, yet considerable, strength, the night pilots brought back a different story. This was at a time during which the UN forces may be said to have been in full retreat. Thus it was apparent, if one may speculate, that the objective of the Chinese was to induce the UN Command to believe that the Chinese strength was greater than it may have been and thus to make it appear that the gigantic deception that the Chinese had put over on the UN was even more significant than previously believed.

The briefing officers at the headquarters of the US Eighth Army on the morning of 2 December 1950 reported that Air Force pilots had observed, during the previous night, "campfires numbering tens of thousands." In fact the pilots brought back the word, according to the briefing officer, that "Last night it looked as though most of North Korea was on fire."

It could be that it was merely a coincidence that so many fires were observed only a few days after Chinese troop units had been committed in unknown, but relatively large numbers, to an all-out attack. However, it seems just as reasonable to believe that the Chinese took advantage of the fact that the UN possessed air supremacy and therefore could and would observe from the sky what appeared to go on at night on the ground. If this suspicion is well-grounded, then it appears that the Chinese may have ordered their men to set a large number of fires apparently for no other purpose than to impress the UN forces with the vast number of troops committed to action in Korea, and also to cause the morale of their enemy, the UN, to be depressed, owing to the likely possibility that intelligence estimates of Chinese troops' strength would be greatly exaggerated.

There is no way to discover whether the number of campfires observed was the result of deliberately planned action of a psychological warfare nature, just as there is no effective way of calculating the impact of the action on the UN and the Eighth Army command. However, if a subjective estimate may be made, based entirely on the outward manifestations of one staff officer, the major who presented the briefing on the morning of 2 December 1950, it appears likely that the act, deliberate or otherwise, achieved a relatively high mark in effectiveness. What is more important than estimating one man's reaction is this, did the observation of such a large number of campfires lead the Eighth Army to exaggerated intelligence estimates, and thereby to a less effective disposition of its troops?

ITALIAN COMMUNISTS ASSIST USIS WITH THE DISSEMINATION OF ANTI-SOVIET PAMPHLETS

By W. E. D.

Pro-Communist Italian labor leaders naively accepted as pro-Soviet a document (prepared by USIS personnel) that was a direct slap at the Moscow-sponsored "peace" campaign.

It often has been alleged that the free world, and particularly the Americans, are losing the cold-war battle for the minds of men who are not committed irretrievably to the Communist cause. With the knowledge that there exists a doubt as to the competence of American propagandists it is pleasant to reveal how ingenuity and skill in sizing up a local situation enabled personnel in the USIS, stationed in Italy, to put one over on local Communists.

Communist headquarters in Rome in January 1952 released an order to local organizations warning them to be more careful relative to the literature they circulated. The order revealed how Italian Communists were tricked into circulating an American slap at Moscow's "peace" campaign. The Communist headquarters warned Italian comrades to be more alert because:

> "1. Careless 'partisans of peace' unwittingly helped circulate a leaflet, published by the United States Information Service, which contained 'defamatory' criticism of Russia's peace record. What apparently fooled the comrades was the red cover and the reproduction of the Picasso peace dove, familiar trademark of the Moscow-directed campaign.
>
> "2. Earlier, 'naive' Communists at Genoa and Florence were found to be teaching geography to their children from a Marshall Plan atlas, without noticing its 'shameless adulation of American imperialism.' Some comrades, headquarters complained, even pinned up pages from the atlas on walls of their homes."[4]

The order was a tip-off that the Communists had discovered they had been duped into aiding anti-Communists in disseminating anti-Soviet literature, and thus the secrecy that had previously surrounded the operations of some of our information personnel was lifted.

The editors of the *United Nations World* in the November 1950 issue of the magazine presented a three-page editorial, "The Anatomy of Russian Peace Moves." In this the following questions were asked, "How long does a Soviet treaty last, and what does it accomplish? . . . how sincere are Vishinsky's peace pleas? . . . Would the USSR and its satellites truly abandon their aggressive designs if the Soviet offer of a Five-Power peace pact were taken up?"

The editors answered their own questions by stating, "Part of the answer [to these questions] should certainly be gained from the study of past alliances and treaties the Soviet signed with various nations during the last quarter of a century."

The editorial concluded with a two-page layout of "a complete table of Soviet nonaggression and neutrality pacts, military alliances and participation in peace moves." The table was arranged in four columns showing first the year, followed by a short description, or title of the pact, the motive of the USSR in making it, and finally the results evident today. The first year listed was 1925, when the Turkish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed, only to be denounced by the

USSR in 1945. In all, 15 nonaggression and neutrality pacts were listed, followed by mention of 17 separate treaties of military alliance and 7 different international peace moves, all designed, according to implications to be drawn from the table, to lull the unsuspecting into a false sense of security where Soviet interests were involved.

The *United Nations World* editorial, including the table, was clipped, photostated, and reproduced and copies were forwarded to USIS overseas stations by personnel in the Washington office of International News and Publications' (INP) Mission Service. It was this document that inspired USIS personnel in Italy to prepare a leaflet so cleverly arranged that it actually hoodwinked local reds into disseminating copies among the Communist-dominated trade unions.

The Italian-language leaflet was prepared as a four-page pamphlet, with a bright-red cover, on which there appeared only the following words in a broken white section of the center, *Per una PACE stabile* (i.e., "For durable PEACE"), a well-advertised Communist slogan. On the back cover appeared the conventional Communist peace dove.

Those who designed the cover and format intended it to bear a faithful resemblance to literature the Italian Communists frequently disseminated to the red-dominated trade unions (the CGIL). It was hoped therefore that its Communist-like appearance would lead the Italian workers to accept and read it since the fear of being seen with US propaganda would thereby be greatly reduced.

On opening the pamphlet the reader was brought face to face with two bold statements, one at the top, the other at the bottom along the bright-red border. Neither of the statements was designed to arouse the suspicion or ire of the casual reader.

The caption at the top read, *25 ANNI DI ATTIVITA SOVIETICA PER UNA PACE STABILE* (i.e., "25 years of Soviet activity in behalf of a durable peace"). Along the bottom, below a table reproduced in Italian, appeared these words, *E proprio questa la maniera per ottenere una pace stabile?* (i.e., Is this the way to obtain a durable peace?).

The main body of the pamphlet contained a table that reproduced most of the information summarized in the *United Nations World* editorial. This tabulated Russia's actual record in observing treaties with other countries. Thirty different items were listed showing that Soviet spokesmen had either negotiated treaties with foreign governments, only later to denounce them at Russian convenience, or that they had proclaimed peace moves that the course of time showed had been undertaken in the absence of good faith. Below the table, the results of Soviet activity were summarized in Italian, which when translated into English reads as follows: "The Soviet Union has either violated or denounced 10 non-aggression or neutrality pacts in 16 years. The Soviet Union has broken 13 military alliances in 13 years. The Soviet Union in short, has shown that all of its pretenses at initiating peace are politically worthless."

Originally 1,250,000 copies of this leaflet were printed, but the ease of dissemination and the response received were so great that USIS Italy ran off several hundred thousand additional copies. Italian friends of the US in the Turin area managed to get some thousand of these in bulk into the hands of Communists who very cooperatively distributed them to the farm workers in the Orca Valley region.

The distribution of the atlas was a separate operation engineered by the information division of the ECA prior to the transfer of its functions to MSA on 1 January

1952. This operation, however, did not constitute any unusual type of activity for ECA personnel.

In Trieste in 1949, US ECA information officers undertook the preparation and dissemination of an Italian-language housewife's almanac, or account book, and a farmer's yearbook, or diary, in the Slovene language. A locally employed member of the ECA information staff conceived of both projects. Information personnel on the spot have reported that in the dissemination of the books results were obtained far in excess of what previously was believed possible, because American propaganda personnel undertook to disseminate a useful item for which there was already a consumers' demand and in which it was possible to incorporate a great deal of propaganda useful to the non-Soviet world.

On the first of each year Italian housewives in the Trieste area customarily buy an almanac, or home account book, in which they keep a running account of their household expenditures. Postwar inflation, shortages of material, etc., had caused these books to be priced beyond the reach of many families accustomed to buying them. Thus ECA was able to step into the breach with a plan to provide one at no cost to the housewife.

The housewives' almanac, as prepared by USIS personnel, was a combination account book, calendar, and recipe booklet. Information messages, religious and literary sayings, and colored photographs of ECA projects were scattered throughout the several pages. The calendar contained footnote references to the East-West struggle. For example, the anniversary date of the fall of the Czechoslovak democratic regime was footnoted somewhat as follows, "The anniversary of the capitulation of democracy in Czechoslovakia to Soviet aggression."

The farmers' yearbook, published in the Slovene language, included a great deal of information equally useful to the small-scale farmer. Such items of information as how to feed chickens, provide better or more economical care for pigs, plant crops, etc., were included in the booklet, along with the propaganda information that was designed to set the record straight relative to American policy and Soviet aggression.

In common with most propaganda disseminated, it was not possible to determine with any exactitude how effective these booklets were in achieving short-range objectives. However, there were a number of indications suggesting that they were highly effective as a media for disseminating American propaganda. In the first place the books were designed to be used in the home for a full year. Second they were useful articles that were likely to be consulted frequently, at least several times a week and usually by more than one person in the family.

An indication that the housewives' almanac was considered subversive by the Communists may be gathered from the fact that the Communist block leaders, in Trieste, went from house to house attempting to round up all copies that had been distributed previously. Many women who were forced to surrender a copy of the booklet appealed directly to the local ECA office for a replacement. Approximately 100,000 copies were produced on the first printing of the book and when this number failed to satisfy the demand, an additional 50,000 were run off. During the second year of the project (1950) the demand for copies led to the printing of an even larger number.

The Italian-language anti-Soviet leaflet that mirrored the Communist style and format, the housewives' almanac, and the farmers' yearbook are illustrative of ways and means that have been successfully employed by imaginative information personnel in meeting the challenge of Communist threats to free and open

circulation of anti-Soviet literature. Similar projects are possible elsewhere when careful studies are made of the customs, problems, and needs of a particular target audience. Target intelligence is a prerequisite for the formulation of an effective idea. It was this as much as any one single factor that made it possible to achieve the success reached by the propagandists who produced the articles discussed here.

CENSORSHIP AND HOW ONE OPERATOR OVERCAME AN OBSTACLE

By W. E. D.

Placing local civil servants on the payroll as part-time translators enabled OWI *personnel in one country during World War II to bypass a troublesome administrative difficulty.*

Information personnel who are sent to neutral countries in time of war, or who operate in friendly or seemingly friendly countries in so-called periods of "peace," frequently find that local censorship and police regulations hamper the effectiveness of their work. This account illustrates how one OWI official in World War II overcame some of the problems created by the existence of a rigid censorship. The officer concerned was stationed in a country that made an attempt to observe the legal requirements of neutrality. It was the mission of the American OWI contingent to that country to break down the government's policy of neutrality by convincing both government leaders and the public at large that it was to their interest to become pro-Allied in both thought and deed.

One of the major means utilized by Americans locally within the target area to accomplish the declared objective was the translation and dissemination of news items favorable to the Allied cause. Daily news releases were distributed through local channels, but before this was done the government insisted on exercising the prior right of censorship. The necessity for submitting all news releases of American origin to local censorship led to what seemed to be interminable discussion and delay. Delayed approvals often had the unfortunate effect of destroying the propaganda value of the particular news story involved. Attempts were made to reach a working agreement by which news stories would be acted upon more quickly by the censorship office, but these discussions were of little avail. The censors insisted on the justice of their procedure, claiming that they acted on censorship matters in the order in which the material was received. The information personnel in OWI were not impressed with such explanations; they were only interested in faster releases, and hence the explanations of why delays were unavoidable could not be taken by OWI as the final word in this knotty problem.

Finally a happy thought occurred to one of the OWI men. He realized that the civilian officials in the local censorship office were being pinched hard financially by the wartime inflationary price spiral. While the cost of living climbed steadily higher, the salary of government civil servants lagged far behind. At the same time the local office of the OWI was constantly faced with the problem of getting bilingual translators capable of translating English newscasts into the local language. "Why not," he thought, "try to employ on a part-time basis some of the government civil servants assigned to the local censorship office?"

The American agent visited the censorship office and described the difficult plight of the American information agency in obtaining qualified linguists and asked the censors to suggest where to go in search of a better-qualified lot. Finally he came to his punch line. He asked if any of them had spare time they might devote to such work, in return for which they would be paid at the usual rate of remuneration for such important professional-level activity. A number of censors volunteered for after-duty-hours' employment — as translators in the local OWI office. For their services, which in many cases were from 4 to 6 hours daily, the censors employed as translators were paid at the usual rate for such work. However, to civil servants living in an area of stable wages, but rising living costs, the supplementary income must have seemed a godsend. The real meaning of this account, for psychological warfare purposes, is not that a few poorly paid civil servants were better able to meet the rising cost of living, but rather the effect it had on the men in the censorship office in their official capacity as censors of material submitted to them for clearance by OWI officials, and thus, what effect it had on the American information program.

The Americans who were involved in this operation report that a change for the better was noted almost immediately. Stories that previously would have been held up and blue-penciled unmercifully, were now allowed to pass through the censorship process almost at once, seldom with any distortion or mutilation. The relations between the American staff of the OWI office and the censorship agency, which previously had been polite, but not cordial, soon became one embodying increasing good will, to the end that the effectiveness of the American information program in the country concerned was to increase manyfold.

THE EXPLOITATION OF AIR POWER IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

Lt Col Raymond Sleeper, USAF

To achieve maximally effective results in the use of air power a detailed analysis should be made of what objectives are to be sought and definite plans ought to be made to control the reactions obtained.

Historical Uses of Air Power

In World War I, the Germans bombed London with both aircraft and zeppelins.

> "In all, approximately 200 enemy airships and 430 German aircraft appeared in the skies over Great Britain during the war years. . . . 4,800 casualties, most of them among civilians, and property damage of approximately $14,000,000 provided for Britain a foretaste of what was to come in 1940–45."[5]

There is no clear-cut indication as to exactly what effect the Germans hoped to to produce in World War I with their spasmodic raids on England. Since most of

* Excerpts from an article "Air Power, the Cold War and Peace, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, 4:5–18 (Winter 1951–52). Views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the USAF or the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Ala.

the raids were directed against London, it would seem that the chief intent was to strike terror in the civilian population. The raids were not of sufficient size to have materially affected Britain's war-making potential, and, except as the center of government and the rail transportation system, London would not have been of primary importance as a target in any such plan. If creating panic was the object, it seems to have failed. Clamor went up for adequate air defense, roofs were sand-bagged, lights were dimmed, and the early patterns of air raid defenses began to appear. But no panic, no disintegration of the fabric of society, no economic effects, and, in general, no real military effects seem to have resulted.

The intent of the Allies in World War II is on record. The ultimate objective of the bomber offensive was stated to be "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."[6] In the interim years of 1919–1939 many prophets had appeared to argue that air war would quickly "destroy morale," "eliminate the administration," "produce great panic," and "destroy the will to fight." These effects were usually to be achieved by killing people or by destroying morale. With this single-minded mass of theory behind it, it was logical that the military thinking at the outset of the Second World War would follow similar lines. That this thinking continued through the war and beyond is evidenced in the reports of the morale division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). These reports focus largely upon the morale effects of bombardment rather than on the psychological effects. Thus the emphasis is upon the "will-to-fight" effect of bombing rather than upon guiding the enemy population's behavior to best suit our own ends.

The Hamburg raid was an example of the disintegration of social control through air power. Hamburg was brought under severe attack in late July and early August 1943. Probably well over 1,200,000 inhabitants fled from Hamburg as a result of these attacks. While these evacuations were reasonably orderly,(p 5)[7] only a portion who left were given departure certificates. Communications were destroyed, water power, electricity, and all transport were cut. Even four days after the first raid "feeding was still erratic because there were no facilities." (p 7)[7]

There is no evidence available to show that Allied forces made any attempt to exploit or influence the disintegration of social control in the Hamburg area precipitated by bombardment.

Over 60,000 casualties resulted, and these included 2000 political leaders in Hamburg. Over 75 per cent of all homes in Hamburg were damaged or destroyed. As a result, 1,200,000 evacuees left Hamburg, carrying tales of death and destruction with them. Thus people spread to outlying areas, and their stories produced rumors of great death and destruction.

Could the social disintegration have been made more complete through psychological preparations? Could the panic have been made more profound by propaganda? On the other hand, was social disintegration the desired reaction? Was the desired reaction of the populace one calculated to assist the Allies more directly, or was the objective of the attack really to kill 30,000 people and wound 37,000 more, and simple to neutralize the industrial facilities of Hamburg?

It is evident that the objectives of bombing urban areas, except for military effects, were not clearly expressed, either to the enemy or in the effects of these

attacks. It may well be that the effects desired can be summarized as "unconditional surrender." The difficulties that this unexplained ultimatum produced in both the European and Japanese war have been enumerated repeatedly since the war.* Be this as it may, air power can never be most effectively used unless there has been a detailed analysis made of what psychological reactions through air power it is desirable to produce in the "target society" and unless definite plans are made to control these reactions.

In Japan, where we made an effort to explain what we were doing,† the explanations emanating from different headquarters were contradictory, and in neither case were they fully desirable from a psychological point of view. Even the more obvious psychological accretions to carefully scheduled bombing, such as timing subsequent raids on a city at the periods of maximum rehabilitation from the last raid, were largely ignored. Much of this indifference to the psychological potentialities of air power can be traced to our fundamental thinking on the object of air warfare. We established as the objective the destruction of the enemy's economic war potential, and this required more and more power for more and more destruction. The net result was the beginning of the destruction of the enemy social fabric. Did we lose sight of the political objective of air war: to force our will upon the enemy? To control him?

Control through Air Power

Let us turn now to an example of a different concept in the use of air power, an example which is extremely fruitful in these twilight days of half-peace-half-war. This example was furnished by Air Chief Marshal Lord Portal, who commanded the RAF at Aden, in Saudi Arabia, in 1935. In his article[8] Portal analyzes the means of controlling rebellious tribes in Aden. He states:

> "We do not simply tell the tribe that they are going to be bombed and to clear out of their villages, and then give them a good bombing and a warning that if they misbehave again they will get a further dose of the same medicine . . . that may sound like the common sense thing to do . . . but it would be utterly useless against a tribe of any spirit.
>
> "This method of 'bombing and scuttle' fails because its use has given too little thought to the final question of 'what is the *object* of the operations?' Surely, the object of all coercive police action is to bring about a change in the temper of the person or body of persons who are disturbing the peace. In other words, we want a change of heart, and we want to get it by the use of the minimum amount of force. But to do what I have just described, we use the maximum of force and do not get a change of heart."

Portal goes on to explain the method of controlling rebellious tribes through air power:

> "1. You must be absolutely sure of the guilt of the people against whom you propose to take action. . . . Bombing the wrong people, even once, would ruin the government's reputation and would take years to live down.

* See "Unconditional Surrender" in Chap. 5.

† See "Bomb Warnings to Friendly and Enemy Civilian Targets" in Chap. 6.

"2. The law breaking tribe must be given an alternative to being bombed and . . . be told in the clearest possible terms what that alternative is, that is to say, the government's full, final and irrevocable demands.

"3. These demands must be adhered to throughout the operation, never increased or decreased by one jot 'til they are accepted.

"4. The government must 'never include in its terms anything which can be represented as being impossible or even unreasonable.' "

In the case Portal describes, a tribe raided a caravan in the mountainous country some sixty miles north of the Port of Aden. The tribe was given an ultimatum to pay a $500 fine and hand over the guilty raiders. The tribe was given ten days to comply, at the end of which time its villages would be bombed. The ultimatum warned the villagers to leave their homes and to take their property with them. The ultimatum was not met. The villages were bombed, though lightly, and a rather complete air blockade was established. After two months of this the tribes became bored and even worried about getting their crops planted. They then began to make an effort to arrive at a solution. At this stage the government tried to make it easy for the tribe to accept the demands of the government by arranging a meeting with the political officer and by emphasizing that the goal was to have the tribe rejoin the family of law-abiding, peaceful tribes.

Portal states that:

"The most remarkable thing and the most satisfactory from the political point of view is the way the tribe came back into the fold after the 'police action' with practically no ill will . . . . It would be the greatest mistake to believe that a victory which spares the lives and feelings of the losers need be any less permanent or salutary than one which inflicts heavy losses on the fighting men and results in a 'peace' dictated on a stricken field."[8]

It should be noted in passing that the RAF had complete air domination. It should also be noted that the "crime" of the tribe and the civilization of the tribe were simple. In the social science sense this was a quite distinct laboratory situation. Lord Portal further implies that the tribe was heavily "persuaded," through propaganda, that the government had informers in the area and that knowledge of the tribe was complete. Finally the loss of life and destruction of property was almost negligible.

Does not Lord Portal's statement that, "Surely, the object of all coercive police action is to bring about a change in the temper of the person or body of persons who are disturbing the peace" apply precisely to the present international situation — at least as far as the Western democracies are concerned? With our hatred of war, we have had to be driven to the final extremity of danger before we would take up arms in self-defense. When we did so, surely it was essentially for the purpose of forcing a change of temper on a malefactor nation which could not be persuaded by gentler means.

Ever since the last war we have been trying to convince the German and Japanese peoples that we had harbored no ill will against the populace of those countries but only against their criminal governments. The success of our effort is still in doubt. Now we are doing the same thing in our propaganda directed at the peoples of the USSR. The themes for psychological warfare against the USSR hold that we have no brief against the Russian people; it is the behavior of the Soviet

government that must be altered. It should be remembered in this light "that nearly one-fifth of the survivors (of Nagasaki-Hiroshima) hated the Americans for using the bomb."[9] It should be further noted that this expression of hate appeared spontaneously since the interviews did not investigate hate specifically. It is therefore highly probable that the reaction of hate was much more common than indicated in the interviews of the USSBS.

Is there a suggestion in Lord Portal's model which we might use? He said the objective of police action is to bring about a "change in temper." Is this what air power is trying to do in Korea or are we still operating on World War II concepts of destroying economic war potential and morale? Are we trying to understand the problem of bringing about a "change in temper" through air power? While it appears we must better understand this problem in terms of an all-out war, is it not even more urgent to review our present situation in terms of an integrated program in which air power could play its maximum part in the task of strengthening the resolution of the Allies and of persuading the Russians to mend their ways?

Accentuating the Positive

We made a magnificent start [in mobilizing our political-psychological forces] with the Berlin Airlift which unquestionably was a decisive point in the cold war. Did we predict the possible political-psychological effects of this operation before we executed it? Have we analyzed the political-psychological results of the operation? If we had dropped ten tons of bombs on targets to break the blockade, the Air Force would have taken pre-strike and post-strike reconnaissance pictures. A team of target experts would have chosen the target and predicted the effects of its destruction. Physical damage experts would have calculated the success of the attack. Did the Air Force send over a team of experts to assess the political-psychological effects of this operation?

For months we supplied a beseiged city almost entirely by air, making what was, in terms of our air resources at that time, a supreme effort to carry out the promise we had made to the people of Berlin. It was a dramatic countermove and received the widest publicity throughout the world. Most analysts are agreed that the success of the Berlin Airlift was the turning point in the battle for the allegiance of the West Germans. It was visible, tangible proof to them that we stood behind our word, that we could keep our word without precipitating the war which is the constant nightmare of people on the Continent. Are we in the Air Force aware of the magnitude of the psychological victory we won? How much concerted effort has there been to exploit this victory — to keep it in the minds of Europeans on both sides of the Iron Curtain, to fully realize the propaganda value from this overwhelming evidence of our good faith and our ability to deliver the goods?

Did we make political-psychological errors in this operation which we could avoid in the future? Did we realize political-psychological results from this operation of great enough magnitude to plan and execute similar operations?

Operations such as the Haylift and the Berlin Airlift are ideal expressions of the claim that air power is peace power. We must plan and execute such operations, not only in cases like Berlin where our military position is threatened, but in a wider sphere of emergencies where peoples need help.

Airlifting wheat to the hungry Indian nation could have done more to focus attention upon this theme than any other single recent item. This maneuver would have been a natural outgrowth of Operation Haylift and Operation Vittles and

would have identified air power as peace power, friendly to our Allies. All the needed wheat would not have been airlifted to India — simply enough to tide over the starving peoples; to recapture the psychological initiative lost through our long indecision; to show that although the democratic process of decision may take longer than a totalitarian process, we do have the operational know-how once decisions are reached; and finally to establish still more firmly the fact — not just the idea — that Western air power is peace power for the hungry and oppressed everywhere.

On the 5th of July 1951 there appeared a small item in a Tampa, Florida, newspaper that a flight of B-36's had departed from the US, overflown Western Europe on July the 4th, and returned on the 5th of July. Did we identify this forceful gesture with Western Europe? On July 14th, the 162nd anniversary of the founding of the first French Republic, 500,000 Frenchmen turned out to see a parade of 7,000 men, French aircraft, US F-84's, Helldivers, Hellcats, and British Vampires.[10] President Truman sent his congratulations to the French people. Would those 500,000 Frenchmen have enjoyed receiving a copy of the President's salutation dropped by B-36's non-stop from Washington, not on America's 4th of July but on France's Bastille Day, July 14th? How much more conscious the average Frenchman would be that the air power is his air power rather than it might be air power against him! How much more secure would he feel with the great strategic air power there ready to go on and strike down any aggressor in his defense?

The psychological victories that lie in the offing from such operations cannot be fully anticipated any more than the significant political-psychological victory of the Berlin Airlift was expected, but we must plan, predict, and observe the full results of such operations so that we may be able to forecast effects. Each of these operations requires precise timing and full analysis of the situation, or it may result in dangerous backfire. Operations of this nature obviously require broad inter-agency and intergovernmental coordination.

There are other ways air power can assist the political-psychological forces. We have already begun to establish air power in the minds of our Allies. Eighty B-29's have been reconditioned and transferred to the RAF, giving the British a substantial cadre for a long range air force, yet this transfer was done with almost no fanfare. Could we build on our own air power and join with other Western air forces to conduct the first world air parade? It could be announced in general information programs, designed to renew interest in air power, and planned to create confidence in the great strategic air power we now possess. The old cliché that air power is peace power could provide the theme that air power is the prime force supporting world peace and that it "belongs" to the powers that are creating a better world everywhere.

Could we even go so far as to propose a grain lift to the Albanians, who are reputedly suffering a great food shortage; could we in similar ways begin to identify our air power with the peoples behind the Iron Curtain?

By emphasizing that the objective of air power is the destruction of economic war potential and morale, we have almost ignored the significant political-psychological aspects of air power. But if we define that objective as compelling behavior on the part of the opponent government that is acceptable to the Western world, we find this modified concept of air power reasonably compatible with our own national goals. This concept involves on the one hand the real air power to retaliate

and on the other hand the use of air power in the cold war to enhance our political-psychological power. This results in utilizing current air power as peace power. But for air power to be peace power, we must politically and psychologically wage peace through air persuasion.

To wage peace through air persuasion requires a much better understanding of the political-psychological aspects of air power with emphasis not only on the possible emergency military objective but also on the immediate and long range political objectives. We have great strategic air power today, and in Churchill's words, it must be used while it is still superior to Soviet strategic air power. It must be used, not to deliver a "preventive war," not to "clobber the enemy," not to destroy the social fabric of an enemy, not to "panic" our friends in the enemy country, as well as our allies in other parts of the world, but as a power foundation for air persuasion to encourage international behavior that will build toward a solid world peace.

Superstitions, Rumors, and Incitement of Panic

The literature in psychological warfare methods contains relatively little on the subject of how superstitions, rumors, and panic conditions have been exploited in operations. However, such limited data as are readily available have been combed for articles or case studies that might be used in this volume. Three such studies — one dealing with each of these subjects — are included in the pages immediately following.

"Exploitation of Superstitions in Psychological Warfare" describes an actual operation that took place in Burma during World War II. An officer possessing intimate knowledge of the folklore of the country proposed that the death of General Wingate, the popular British commander in the area, be represented as an act of suicide, rather than as a result of Japanese military action, for Burmese historical traditions suggested that leaders in times of national crises frequently had taken their own lives as a means of freeing their spirits from their bodies in order to oversee the welfare of the whole country. There is no indication or suggestion that this action in Burma was a successful exploitation of superstitions in a psychological warfare operation, but the short case study does suggest the necessity for the most detailed and intimate knowledge of a people by the planner or operator wherever superstitions are to be exploited by any psychological warfare media.

The second study, "Use of Rumor in Psychological Warfare," is an abridgment of a report ("Rumor: A Review of the Literature") prepared for the Office of Naval Research by a private contract research agency. The study discusses the subject with reference to six major headings: "Possible Methods of Using Rumors," "Did the Germans Use Rumor?" "The Methods of Dissemination of Rumor," "The Purpose for Which Rumor Was Used," "Specific Rumor Uses," and "Evaluating Effectiveness."

A fairly superficial survey of existing literature in Western languages was undertaken to ascertain whether successful attempts had been made in the past to induce panic among enemy troops by psychological warfare means. The historical records of Ghenghis Khan and Biblical accounts of Gideon, among others, reveal that the incitement of enemy troops to panic may have been a more common practice in ancient times than in the more recent past. The survey of recent past experience revealed no evidence that attempts have been made deliberately to induce such behavior. However, an article dealing tangentially with the subject appeared in the January 1952 issue of the *Australian Army Journal*. It is reproduced under the title "Characteristics of Panic Behavior."

This article gives an analysis of the situation and underlying causes that led to panic among troops during the American Civil War at Missionary Ridge; at the battle at Adowa, in 1896; at Haitshong, among Russian troops in 1904; and at Panam-ni, among South Koreans, in 1951. There is no suggestion that psychological warfare in any way induced or contributed to the panic situations described. The reason for including the article in this volume rests solely on the belief that knowledge of what has produced panic behavior in past operations may provide useful clues to help the psychological warfare officer of the future to recognize the conditions making panic possible or inevitable and thus may enable him to exploit this condition by appropriate means whenever the opportunity presents itself.

THE EXPLOITATION OF SUPERSTITIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By W. E. D.

Intimate knowledge of a people and their customs may enable the propagandists to play effectively on the superstitious beliefs of a target people. Without intimate and up-to-date knowledge an operator ought not to try to use any such method.

From the beginning of recorded time man has sought through the use of superstition to exploit his enemy and to influence the thoughts and actions of actual and potential allies.

Both the military strategist and the propagandist have tried to capitalize on the weaknesses of enemy and other target groups by resort to practices, or the dissemination of messages, that play on their fears and superstitious beliefs. Recent experience has demonstrated that present-day people are as vulnerable to appeals based on superstitions as were the people of the more remote past.

Individuals who have made detailed studies of the subject tell us that people in all countries are superstitious; however, they warn us that however widespread superstitions are throughout the world they vary considerably in kind from country to country. Thus, to utilize superstitious beliefs successfully in a psychological warfare effort, the most intimate and current intelligence of a target group is required.

Insecurity appears to promote the spread of superstitious beliefs. Since periods of crisis and conflict are by their nature periods of personal insecurity, superstitious tendencies become more widespread in wartime.

In addition to the possession of an intimate knowledge of a target audience, it is equally desirable for those who would utilize superstitions in psychological warfare to know in considerable detail the current and future needs of a military and political campaign. Any act in psychological warfare planning should be based on a clear understanding of what it is that one wishes of the target addressed, i.e., what type of behavior or change in attitude is anticipated and desired.

The following account was dictated by a civilian who served effectively in two military theaters in the American psychological warfare effort in World War II. His story emphasized how one psychological warfare officer made use of a superstition in a propaganda campaign.

> "When I was in India in World War II, General Wingate (of the British Army) was operating in Burma. He was killed and the Japanese made capital of the killing for he was a resourceful commander. There was at that time on the staff of All-India Radio a Burmese captain by the name of Khin Zaw, who was responsible for psychological warfare broadcasts to the Burmese people. He operated under the general supervision of a British official. At that time Khin Zaw remembered one of the superstitions of the Burmese, which was that in ancient times Burmese leaders in times of trouble, realizing they could not be everywhere in their domain simultaneously, because of their physical nature, killed themselves so that their spirits could be released from their bodies. As spirits they were capable of instantaneous presence in any part of the areas over which they ruled or exercised leadership.
>
> "Khin Zaw recalled this superstition and wrote a dramatic broadcast around it, the theme of which was that General Wingate had by no means been killed by the Japanese as they insisted. Instead, the broadcast reminded the audience of the folklore of Burma and implied strongly that Wingate had taken his own life in order that his spirit might be free to protect not only that part of Burma in which his body could be at any given moment, but the whole of the country against the Japanese invaders."

THE USE OF RUMOR IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By John P. Kishler, Kenneth W. Yarnold, *et al.*

The Germans employed rumors in their psychological warfare output in World War II, but there are little reliable data by which to assess the effectiveness of such methods.

Rumor is potentially useful in psychological warfare since its source is not obvious and does not depend on a formal communication system for its dissemination. Typically its dissemination occurs in a friendly face-to-face situation of mutual

* Abridged from "Rumor: A Review of the Literature," prepared for Office of Naval Research by Dunlap and Associates, Stamford, Conn., 1 Jun 52, 121 pp. Excerpts are from pp 79–97.

trust. For this reason, rumor tends to be more credible than conventional means of propaganda. It is particularly suitable for use in primitive communities where formal communications are ill developed, uncontrolled and uncentralized. Verbal rumor leaves no written record.

During wartime, officials concerned with propaganda had to respond to immediate needs using the best information or the most insightful guesses of which they were capable at that time. They were much more concerned with doing a job than with documenting it, and much more concerned with operations than with scientific research likely to be useful in a future war. For this reason there is considerable difficulty in piecing together a complete history of the operations actually carried out, the reasons for choosing certain techniques rather than others, and the successes achieved. There is particular difficulty in estimating the scale on which rumor was used: while there are many references to occasions on which rumor was employed, we have practically no idea of the proportion of the total number of cases which are mentioned in fragments of the surviving literature.

The use of rumor in and against the United States is described in the confessions and diaries of German propagandists and in studies prepared for the Office of War Information. The OWI records are believed to be incomplete and the confessions of German propagandists are unsatisfactory: they are unspecific, overdramatic and evidently highly leveled by the process of memory. For these reasons the present review is less satisfactory than one which could have been produced six years ago.

POSSIBLE METHODS OF USING RUMORS

Consideration of German use of rumor in World War II demands some delineation of the meaning of the word "use." Rumor could have been used in at least the following ways:

In Connection with Psychological Warfare

a. The Propaganda Ministry could have instructed its agents in America to spread a number of specific rumors calculated to fit into their general propaganda attack.

b. Germany could have instructed her sympathizers in this country to "spread divisive rumors" without giving specific suggestions or specific themes but perhaps giving some guidance as to general themes and general techniques.

c. Germany could have instructed, encouraged or suggested that her sympathizers in this country spread the content of German short-wave radio propaganda in order that it would reach a wider audience through a medium not obviously of enemy origin.

d. German sympathizers in America could have spread rumors without suggestion or direction from Germany. These rumors might have been useful to the German propaganda attack and their themes would certainly have been attuned, to some degree, to the content of German broadcast.

To Discredit Allied Propaganda

Rumors might have been planted in foreign capitals in order that they should be picked up by Allied propaganda and news agencies. They would then have been broadcast by the Allies and denied by the Germans, or by subsequent events, in order to discredit Allied propaganda.

In Connection with Intelligence

a. Rumors which were current in this country and were picked up either by German agents or from the columns of rumor clinics might have been used by the Germans as valuable sources of information for their own short-wave propaganda.

b. Rumors might have been planted in order that they could be denied either officially or by unofficial but knowledgable persons. The denials might have been a valuable source of intelligence.

c. Rumors might have been planted (as, for example, in foreign capitals) whose content was calculated to lead our own intelligence agencies to false estimates of future German plans.

d. Rumors might have been used as a "smoke screen," again to disguise German intentions.

e. The technique of planting a considerable number of rumors might have so increased the workload on an enemy intelligence agency that valuable time and organizational effort would have been wasted in following up false trails.

f. Rumors might have been used to discredit the loyalty of efficient state servants and organizations.

To Encourage Their Own Population

Rumors of miracle weapons, impending enemy disorder, etc., might have been circulated as a part of one's internal propaganda.

DID THE GERMANS USE RUMOR?

Evidence that the Germans disseminated rumors in the United States comes from: German diarists and biographers, American investigations of German propagandists and agents, and parallelisms discovered by OWI and other agencies between current rumor and propaganda. All three sources suggest that the Germans used rumor in their war effort against this country and that they also used it before Pearl Harbor to keep the United States out of the war.

Rudolf Semmler, a member of the Propaganda Ministry of Nazi Germany kept a diary,[11] — albeit incomplete — which contains the following references to German use of rumors which came to his notice as a member of the "personal circle of a temperamental boss."

On 8 June 1941, Goebbels wrote an article for the *Völkischer Beobachter* entitled "The Example of Crete," stating that the Crete operation had been undertaken only to provide a general rehearsal for a mass attack on England by airborne troops. The article, kept secret until publication, implied that the invasion of England was imminent. On the morning of its publication, the police confiscated all copies of the paper. However, it had already been read by the foreign correspondents whose lines were tapped to make sure that they had cabled the main points to their papers. Apparently the ruse was almost completely successful in switching attention from possible hostilities against Russia to the well-worn theme of invasion of England. If Semmler is to be believed, only one English paper saw through this deception.

It is worth noting that the success of this ruse was only short-lived. A German Propaganda Ministry official, Boemer, talked in his cups and informed his audience that he was being transferred to Rosenberg's staff. From their knowledge of Rosenberg's Russian orientation, the Russians deduced that an invasion of their

own country was imminent. Boemer narrowly escaped execution, was imprisoned, released, and finally killed in action.

The only other reference to rumor given by Semmler deals with 17 December 1944. At a Press Conference, Goebbels said that now that the Ardennes offensive had commenced, the press could be told why Hitler had remained silent so long and had allowed the foreign press to believe that he was mad or dead. London and Washington had been lulled into a feeling of false security; they believed that Hitler was no longer a military danger but were getting rather an unpleasant awakening. "Four weeks ago," said Goebbels, "I spread the rumor through German agents abroad that Hitler was dead. By these rumors the general assumption that we could not stage a comeback was strengthened. Now imagine the immense surprise they have had in the British and American headquarters." It is interesting to note that the idea of this ruse probably came to Goebbels because Hitler had refused to speak in public or over the radio since the July plot on his life.

In his diary,[12] Goebbels admits to only a single case in which he used rumor. A Doctor Otto Kriegk was sent as an observer to the Moscow front. Upon his return he was dispatched to Lisbon where he was ordered to feign drunkenness and allow himself to betray the military secret that the major German drive would be on the Moscow sector. The attack, however, was actually intended for the Southern sector of the Russian front. This calculated leak of information was paralleled and supported by a news article presented by the Propaganda Ministry in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, for which the paper was publicly rebuked. The Propaganda Ministry also tried to plant a similar article in the Turkish (neutral) press. Goebbels gives no indication as to whether or not the rumor was successful since the section of the diary in which this assessment would fall has been lost.

Curt Riess, in his book *Joseph Goebbels*,[13] claims that his statements are based on testimony of those who knew Goebbels intimately, close relatives, his private secretary and members of the Propaganda Ministry. Riess says, "Goebbels' main task was to keep other nations out of the conflict." For this purpose he fought his propaganda battles in various foreign capitals and used every available means from bribes and threats, whispering campaigns and films demonstrating the overpowering strength of the Wehrmacht, to statistics on German production and to promises. It was waged most intensively in Switzerland and the United States.

The struggle for the isolation of the United States was regarded as of very great importance and was begun long before the outbreak of the war. Employees of the German Consulates in the United States were used under the administration of the Foreign division of the Propaganda Ministry whose agent in this country was von Giennanth of the New York Consulate. This man had been selected personally by Goebbels. . . . Von Giennanth launched whispering campaigns insinuating that Germany had practically won the war. This story is confirmed by von Strempel[14] . . . and by the large number of defeatist rumors current in the United States in the early days of the war.[15] Whispering campaigns were also employed against the French throughout the "phony" war [Winter 1939–1940]. . . . "The principal weapons of this campaign," says Riess, "were whispering campaigns, thousands of letters sent to private citizens, and violent attack over the radio." The typical rumor slogan was "England means to fight this war to the last Frenchman."

Concerning stories being planted in the foreign press via neutral countries, Riess says, "In order to trick foreign correspondents, the Nazis also operated

through the Bureau Schwarz von Berk, which supplied them with so-called authentic features. Another office for fabricating false news was the *Boemer Auslandspresse* (otherwise known as BAP), which specialized in inventing canards. After these stories had been approved by Goebbels, they were planted in the foreign press via neutral countries. Amusingly enough, they sometimes duped even prominent Nazis, including Hitler himself. During one of his visits to Hitler, Goebbels found him delirious with joy over the news that a British cruiser had been sunk before Trondheim. Ribbentrop was present and reported with obvious pride that he had been the first to inform the Fuehrer. Goebbels had great trouble in convincing Hitler that the item had been faked."

Dr. Herbert von Strempel, First Secretary of the German Embassy, in Washington, in charge of cultural relations, states that whispering campaigns were carried on by remnants of the Nazi Party in the United States under the control of Drager, who was consul in New York.[14] The whispering campaigns were financed by members of the Nazi party in the United States. Their themes were: (a) Germany would win the war, (b) to contradict atrocity propaganda against Germany, and (c) anti-Semitism.

In any consideration of parallelism between rumors and German propaganda it must be remembered that some parallelism will occur whether there is a causal connection between current rumors and current propaganda or not. For this reason, it is never possible to assert categorically that there is more parallelism than can reasonably be ascribed to chance causes.

Axis radio station "Debunk" — a "black" station — used news flashes in the Winchell manner (anecdotes and interviews with American farmers, officers, etc.) and suggested the formation of listeners' clubs which would disseminate the contents of the broadcasts. It was believed that the form of the broadcasts pointed to the function of spreading rumors.[16]

It appears that rumor dissemination was one of the major functions of Axis radio station Debunk.[7] A study of the comparative content of Debunk broadcasts and rumors collected for the Service Division showed a striking parallelism. Rumors paralleled in Axis propaganda statements include the following:

We are not being told of all our merchant shipping losses.

Washington is withholding true information on the state of the war.

If we can believe half of what we read (and I doubt it), then there is something wrong with our government.

The government exaggerates every little victory.

Good news is being held back until it can be used to offset bad news.

The only way to find out what is happening is to listen to Tokyo and Berlin.

The Navy seems to have sunk several enemy ships many times over.

They've got Elmer Davis muzzled.

High-ranking Naval officers give away secret information.

British troops are fighting badly.

Trouble between GI's and British soldiers is commonplace.

England got us into this war just the same as the last one.

Britain can't administer an empire, as proved by the disloyalty of her colonial troops.

British officers drink too much.

The Canadians hate the British; British are sending only Dominion pilots on the dangerous missions.

Churchill's last visit to the States was made because he wanted to escape the wrath of the people after the Egyptian disaster.

Churchill's last visit to Moscow was to persuade Molotov not to sign a separate peace.

Churchill and Roosevelt are cousins.

Savings accounts in the banks may soon be paid in war bonds.

There were Negro riots last night in Dallas, New Orleans and Atlanta.

Seven hundred and fifty Negro cadets have been admitted to officer training school while white men will do the menial tasks.

These constitute a sample of a total of 79 rumors paralleled in Axis propaganda during seven months.

Radio Debunk tried to persuade its listeners that promiscuity, venereal disease and prostitution were prominent in Army camp regions. Concurrently, in broadcasts beamed to the United States, Radio Manila alleged widespread prostitution along the Pacific Coast among 15-year olds and stated that juvenile delinquency had risen sharply in port cities. Such charges paralleled rumors collected by the Bureau of Intelligence during the same period.[18]

In the expectation that American news services were less guarded and suspicious of news emanating from neutral sources, enemy propaganda employed neutral media in the hope of reaching a greater audience with greater credibility and without endangering its own sources of information.[19] About 40 percent of the information which reached America came by way of dubious neutral news sources. Enemy countries maintained bureaus in neutral capitals whose express function was to plant "fake" news.[20] German propagandists also used misquotations from United Nations sources, or quotations taken out of context.[21]

Shils[22] states that one possible channel for diffusion of Nazi propaganda is rumor. He provides a list of eight parallelisms in content between German short-wave broadcasts to North American and German language newspapers in this country. The parallelisms are close both in point of content and time, but generally the newspaper gives a fuller and more "padded" presentation. However, the parallelisms cannot be regarded as categorical proof. There is also presumptive, but not conclusive, evidence that prior to the Battle of France, Nazi agents in France started and helped to spread defeatist rumors.

METHODS OF DISSEMINATION OF RUMOR

Use of Agents . . . to Spread Specific Rumors

There is some evidence that Germany used verbal rumor agents in a direct manner. The testimony of von Strempel[14] may be quoted to the effect that in 1940–41, German consular officials organized whispering campaigns through sympathizers with the Nazi party in this country. This method of spreading rumors is confirmed by Semmler.[11]

In general, it appears that *direct* German use of rumor was short-lived and not very effective. It may be that the whispering agents either lost their cover (von Strempel and his colleagues were expelled from the United States in June 1941)[23] or they were deemed more useful as intelligence agents.

Encouragement of . . . Sympathizers to Spread Rumors without Direct Suggestions of Themes

This connotes attempts by German sympathizers to spread small local rumors (in factories, offices, and small communities) as occasion offered, in order to do

harm to the war effort. Such rumors, if they were started, would be almost impossible to trace to their origin without the resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (The FBI is not prepared to disclose information on this subject.) There is no evidence available to prove (or disprove) that this method of using rumor was practiced by Germany.

Use of Word-of-Mouth and Other . . . Channels to Increase Audience of . . . Short-wave Propaganda

Investigations of Bruner[24] in the Italian North End of Boston show beyond doubt that many Italian-born families listened to enemy short-wave propaganda and then spread it by word-of-mouth.

The Axis black radio station Debunk suggested the formation of listeners' clubs and the writing of chain letters to spread anti-Semitic and other propaganda. The broadcasts were generally couched in terms highly suitable for verbal repetition: news flashes, stories, interviews and slogans.

OWI investigations of certain newspapers in the United States[25] show that the papers served to pass on to a wider public the themes and views expressed in Axis short-wave propaganda. There is, however, no evidence that this was done with the deliberate intention of aiding the enemy. Enemy propaganda was largely anti-Semitic, anti-administration, anti-Communist and anti-British, and it may have been merely that many honest editors agreed with one or another aspect of it. . . .

Unconscious Usefulness of Indigenous Rumors

Since many rumors are motivated mainly by hate, anxiety and aggression against minority groups, it is obvious that they would tend to parallel many German propaganda themes. It was the belief of OWI that the bulk of the rumors current in this country during World War II were started and spread by loyal Americans, but that they were, nevertheless, a danger to National unity.

In general, there is evidence that the Germans used deliberate whispering campaigns, started by word-of-mouth rumor agents, early in the war and just before Pearl Harbor. These efforts seem to have been short-lived and rather unsuccessful. Many Axis radio broadcasts seem to have been deliberately designed to start rumors in order to increase their audience, and radio Debunk certainly fostered this technique. There were marked parallelisms between short-wave propaganda and rumors current in this country; but while these rumors were doubtless useful to the Axis, there is little reason to regard the great bulk of rumor originators and rumor spreaders as deliberately subversive.

THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH RUMOR WAS USED

Available data suggest that the Germans used rumors, particularly in the early stages of World War II, for the following purposes:

1. To influence public opinion in neutral countries toward staying out of the war.
2. To create dissension and hostility within and between Allied countries by use of divisive attitudes or "anti" rumors.
3. To slow down the American war effort by rumors designed to evoke over or under confidence, fear and uncertainty.
4. To discredit Allied propaganda by knocking over false rumors (i.e., straw men) planted by Germans.

5. To increase the credibility of German propaganda by embedding correct items in a context of rumors.
6. To deceive the Allies about the true military and political activities of the Germans.

SPECIFIC RUMOR USES

To Keep America Out of the War

Riess[13] and von Strempel[14] both agree that one of the main tasks of Goebbels' propaganda organization was to keep the United States neutral. Riess states, "Goebbels' most important task was to succeed where his colleague Ribbentrop had . . . failed . . . to keep other powers out of the war . . . it was fought with . . . whispering campaigns." And again, "The employees of the German consulates . . . launched whispering campaigns insinuating that Germany had practically won the war." These campaigns were waged most intensively in Switzerland and the United States.

As Divisive Propaganda

Divisive propaganda was used to create or widen cracks between allies, between races, between classes, between government and civilians, and between armed forces and civilians, as well as between officers and enlisted men. Perhaps the most important German effort was the attempt to separate the people from the administration, civilians from the armed forces, America from Britain, and neutrals from anti-Semites. It is seldom possible, as already stated, to demonstrate enemy origin for this: only a parallelism between rumor and radio can be shown, and not always that.

To Increase Absenteeism

Jacobson[26] states that rumors were circulated to cause absenteeism. For example, a rumor was circulated that a girl working in an explosives plant got powder in her hair and, while sitting under a dryer, had her head blown off. This story was given by the Axis short-wave radio in February, 1942. Allport[27] mentions rumors that women became sterile after working in certain war production plants.

To Induce Fear

There is little evidence connecting German propaganda with fear rumors current in this country although many fear rumors did spread in America in the early days of the war. For example, a visit of the ship Queen Mary to Boston was followed by rumors that it had been (1) sabotaged, (2) set on fire, and (3) exploded while loading ammunition.[28]

In the German campaign against France in 1940, there is evidence that the Germans started whispering campaigns concerning the skill and ubiquity of their own intelligence services, treason in high places among the French, and German super weapons. There can be little doubt that rumor was one of the main causes for clogging the French roads with refugees and the consequent hampering of military movements. A good account of this is given by Edmond Taylor.[29]

To Engender Overconfidence

There were many rumors current at various periods of the war to the effect that Hitler was dead or was dying of cancer of the throat, etc. Goebbels (according to Semmler[11]) claimed the authorship of at least one of these for the purpose of engendering overconfidence among the British and American publics and governments.

To Enhance the Effect of a War of Nerves

Like fear rumors, war-of-nerves rumors were not directed to any great extent against the United States. The chief victims were Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Low Countries and France; to a lesser extent, England was also involved. The general techniques are described excellently by Edmond Taylor. The war of nerves forms a good field for the use of rumor in that it depends upon the existence in the countries attacked of fear of war and strongly divided opinion on the best tactics to pursue. In these circumstances, a country with a free press will be flooded with polemical articles arguing for or against some course of action and branding as dishonest or incompetent one set of politicians. All the enemy need do to stimulate this phenomenon is to maintain a steady stream of contradictory rumors on his intentions, to be disseminated through neutral capitals, through interviews to the press and through persons who may be deemed to be in positions to know the truth. If the items of false news are made to coincide with ambiguous symbolic acts (troop movements, notes, etc.) their effect is increased.

In the campaign against Poland (according to Taylor[29]) the Germans carried the war of nerves onto the battlefield. They broadcast news of Polish victories and a flood of contradictory stories over the same wavelengths as those used by the Polish radio stations.

To Discredit Allied Propaganda

Childs and Whitton[30] stated, as their opinion, that German propaganda falsely ascribed statements to the BBC in order that Germany could later deny them explicitly and convincingly. Germany also planted false news items in foreign capitals so that they could be picked up by Allied information media and later denied by Germany.

The OWI study of parallelism between rumor and the output of radio Debunk gives the following examples of rumors about the mendacity of American news releases paralleled by themes used by Debunk.

> "War news is sugared. The government is withholding bad news."
>
> "It is useless for the Navy to withhold information on sailings of convoys because the enemy already knows the facts."

To Increase the Credibility of Enemy Sources

The views of Riess[13] and the OWI[31] have already been stated. They agree that the Germans frequently planted news items and propaganda in neutral countries rather than at home in order that they would be more readily believed. OWI also states[21] that German propagandists used misquotations from United Nations sources. For example, Berlin on March 12, 1942, purported to quote Donald Nelson's speech on "Bottlenecks in American War Industry" and stated that according to Swedish correspondents these frank statements alarmed both London and Moscow.

To Aid Deception

Two examples of the use of rumors for deception have already been mentioned: Goebbels' article on the Crete invasion, intended to suggest the invasion of England instead of Russia, and the mission of Dr. Otto Kriegk (of the German *Nachtausgabe*) to the Central Eastern front and then to Portugal to get drunk and spread rumors that the major German attack would be on the Moscow front. He was backed up by an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* which had been planted by the Propaganda Ministry, but for which the paper was publicly rebuked.[12] The attack was actually intended on the Southern front.

America used rumor to deceive the Gestapo as to the whereabouts of Herr Gisevius who was implicated in the July plot to kill Hitler. Oss spread the rumor that Gisevius had succeeded in escaping from Berlin (where he was actually in hiding) to Switzerland, with the result that the Gestapo hunted him in Switzerland thereby allowing him to escape from Berlin.

EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS

Unfortunately, few data exist with which to evaluate directly the potential effectiveness of rumors in psychological warfare. This, it must be noted is true for most methods of propaganda and psychological warfare. As shown earlier, the effectiveness of rumor as a tool in psychological warfare can only be evaluated from (1) interpreting the results of experiments to modify attitudes, (2) observations of people's reactions to spontaneously generated and experimentally-planted rumors, and (3) estimates of the success of German use of rumors during World War II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PANIC BEHAVIOR*

By Lt A. Argent, Royal Australian Regiment

Knowledge of the symptoms of panic among front-line troops may enable their exploitation or inducement through psychological warfare.

[It has been said that no military unit is panic-proof. A study of military history reveals that panic may strike veteran and well-trained troops just as disastrously and quickly as it strikes inexperienced and badly trained units. Two classic examples may be cited to support this contention — Confederate troops at Missionary Ridge in 1863 and the German XVII Corps at Gumbinnen in 1914. In both instances experienced and well-trained troops broke and fled before the battle had been completely joined. At the other end of the scale one may cite Caporetto (1917) and Bull Run (1861) where ill-trained units and troops with low morale were involved.]

[There is no suggestion that psychological warfare, or any deceptive ruse, played any significant role in the instances cited, in inducing a state of panic among enemy troops. However, it is well for the propagandist to recognize the more common symptoms of panic behavior so that he might be in a better position to induce or to exploit them should these become evident and widespread among opposing forces.]

[What are the factors that appear to induce panic, and what if any are the tell-tale signs that a military unit is panic-ripe? What can a military command do to exploit these tendencies most effectively among the enemy once they appear? These and other similar questions a commander might ask himself. His unit intelligence and psychological warfare personnel are in the most advantageous position to advise him on such matters. The illustrations given may supply some of the answers to the questions suggested.]

* Adapted from *Australian Army Journal*, No. 32, 37–40 (1952).

Missionary Ridge — 1863

The Confederate Army of Tennessee with two and a half years' service to its credit and its great victory of Chickamauga only two months old was occupying commanding ground known as Missionary Ridge. Although this Army was not as strong in numbers as the opposing Federals, it was considered that the ground held was such as to make the position almost impregnable. The Confederates occupied trenches at the foot of the ridge and on the crest. The Federals were deployed in full view of the Southerners on the plains below Missionary Ridge.

The Federal plan of attack called only for the capture of the trenches at the foot of the Ridge. These were quickly taken and, completely disregarding orders, the Federal troops continued attacking up the Ridge. When a Federal flag appeared at the top of the Ridge something snapped in the Confederate ranks. Panic swept through one Confederate division after another. General Bragg, who commanded the Confederates, later reported: "A panic, which I have never before witnessed, seemed to have seized officers and men; and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety regardless of his duty or his character. . . . Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could have ever dislodged us. . . ."

Some of the reasons for this rout were:

(a) The unpopularity of the Commander-in-Chief, General Bragg, who had only recently quarreled with many of his subordinates and had dismissed a number who were respected and beloved by the Confederate troops. Furthermore, some of his high-ranking officers were openly disloyal to him, though not to the Southern cause.

(b) The forming-up of the Federal troops in full view of the Confederates. Their great numbers undoubtedly dismayed the defenders.

(c) The Federals were commanded by General Grant who had by far the greatest reputation for success in the Northern Armies.

(d) The splitting of Bragg's force by deploying at the foot of the Ridge as well as on the crest. On capturing the lower trench system, the Federals followed hard on the heels of the fleeing Confederates and thus the fire of the defenders on the crest was masked by the withdrawal of their own troops.

Adowa — 1896

Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1896 with a trained and equipped force of 15,000 men. They were opposed by 100,000 Abyssinian spearmen. The Italians, supported by artillery, advanced on Adowa during the night. Due to the wild and tortuous mountain terrain, the column lost its cohesion and at dawn was divided into three groups. All groups were too far apart to give mutual support. The Abyssinians swarmed to the attack at daybreak and the left group of Italians fled panic stricken. Unchecked, the spearmen continued their attack and quickly overran the center group. Only the right group stood fast and withdrew in good order at nightfall. The Italian artillery was ineffective due to the difficulty of estimating the correct range in such mountainous country.

Only 3,500 of the original 15,000 Italians escaped from this debacle.

On the surface there seems to be no reason for such a disaster. However, the underlying causes were these:

(a) The officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Italian force were comparative strangers to each other as the force comprised detachments from

various home regiments. The artillery had never worked with the infantry. Therefore, there was a lack of mutual trust, understanding and confidence.

(b) The knowledge that the Abyssinians tortured their prisoners is an important cause when one considers the vivid Latin imagination and mercurial temperament.

(c) The men were exhausted by a long and badly conducted night march.

(d) The Italian commander of the left group, in the presence of some of his troops, expressed his fears at being separated from the main body.

Haitshong — 1904

The Russian 140th Infantry Regiment and a rifle brigade were in Army reserve near Haitshong. Between them and the Japanese were the main Russian Armies. Local outposts provided additional security and precluded surprise.

One evening shortly after dusk several Russian soldiers from the rifle brigade were in a nearby ricefield. One of them saw something that apparently frightened him. He immediately rushed back into the camp shouting: "The Japanese are coming." Panic was instantaneous throughout the brigade. Men seized their rifles and fired wildly. In a short time the brigade was racing in two columns to the rear — one towards Haitshong and the other towards the 140th Infantry Regiment. The Corps supply units stationed in Haitshong were soon infected with this mass madness. Soon a hopeless, milling tangle of men, vehicles and animals were streaming northwards. Days elapsed before this part of the brigade was rallied.

The fate of the column fleeing towards the 140th Infantry Regiment was markedly different. The noise of the firing and the screaming had reached the regiment. The buglers sounded the call to arms and the men fell in quietly. They ignored with phlegmatic calm the panicky troops streaming past them. The sight of the orderly and unperturbed regiment in the gathering darkness calmed the imaginary fears of this part of the brigade and they were soon able to re-form their ranks.

Outwardly both units were the same. They were well equipped, trained and led. They were rested. In common with the rest of the Russian Armies at that time they were pessimistic, due to the repeated Japanese victories. However, despite this, the morale of the 140th Regiment was high as the Commanding Officer was respected and his officers loyal and cooperative. There was *esprit de corps*. The reverse was the case in the rifle brigade. There was dissatisfaction and petty feuds amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers. As a consequence there was no *esprit de corps*. Thus, when a test came, one unit was a regiment; the other a crowd of men.

Panam-ni (North Korea)

In April, 1951, a South Korean Division moved out of reserve and took over the advance from the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. After continuing the advance another few miles they occupied commanding ground with one regiment forward and two in reserve.

The Division was equipped with United States small arms and was well supplied with ammunition. Artillery and air support were available on call. The troops were rested and the units were up to strength.

Yet when the anticipated Chinese night attack finally came, the South Koreans immediately broke and fled, abandoning arms and ammunition. Quickly moving groups of Chinese infiltrated to the rear and wreaked havoc on command posts and withdrawing transport columns. Officers tried unsuccessfully to create some

order out of the confusion. The efforts of the Divisional Commander and his US army advisers were without avail. Two weeks elapsed before the Division was re-formed.

The causes of this dramatic collapse can be summarized:

(a) Morale was low, due to the false but widely circulated statements concerning the prowess of the Chinese. Furthermore, on all previous occasions upon being attacked by the Chinese, the Division had withdrawn. They had never had the opportunity to stay and fight. Confidence in their own abilities had fallen to a dangerously low level.

(b) Many of the South Korean soldiers had grown "soft" through false impressions gained by association with other troops.

(c) No system of leave existed for South Korean units at the time and many of the troops had not seen their families for two or three years, although the war had been in progress less than twelve months.

Conclusions

To sum up, panic seems to split logically into two phases. These phases are:

(a) The gradual building up of a tense psychological state of mind; and then

(b) The sudden surprise or shock, either real or imaginary, which sets off the actual panic.

Bearing in mind the above examples, the first or preliminary phase is characterized by:

(a) Excessive nervousness and with it, a quickened imagination;
(b) Pessimism;
(c) Growth of wild rumors;
(d) Loss of faith in leadership.

Defeats, loose talk by officers within hearing of the troops, national characteristics, and lack of faith and confidence in a unit that has not lived, played, and trained together all go towards producing the state of mind found in the first phase.

In the second phase, consider the trivial incidents that precipitated the panic — at Haitshong, a soldier frightened by a shadow; at Missionary Ridge, the appearance of a single Union flag on the crest. So it usually happens when troops become supercharged with nerves.

History abounds with further instances of panic — the Prussian Army of Hohenlohe at Weimar in 1806, the Austrian X Corps at Trautenau in 1866, the Rayau Cavalry Division at Coulmiers in 1870 and other French formations during 1871, some units during the Battle of France in 1940, and Malaya, 1941–42, to mention but a few of the more historically recent cases.

Nature and Uses of Black Propaganda

Personnel engaged in overt propaganda operations are seldom if ever directly involved in covert (i.e., black) propaganda activities. The need for the maintenance of security is such that it is desirable that few people be in the position to compromise the success of a black operation by either premature or careless disclosure of its true origin. There is absolutely no reason why overt operators should engage in covert activities and many reasons why they should not.

Two accounts were selected for inclusion in this volume on the theory that any general treatment or discussion of propaganda, even though intended to serve exclusively as a training guide to overt operators, should give sufficient information to enable an operator to detect black propaganda when he encounters it and to react properly so as not to compromise its success by unnecessary reference to it.

"Black Propaganda: Its Techniques and Requirements" consists largely of excerpts from a book by Ladislas Farago.[2] In this account the author describes the activities of Sefton Delmer, a Britisher, who became recognized during World War II as a gifted artist in such operations. The second account, "Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," appeared originally in the *American Sociological Review*. The author, an American college professor, was engaged in covert operations during World War II, and in his account he describes various types of black propaganda and the lessons learned from its usage during the war against the German Nazis. Many of the lessons, with slight modification or change in emphasis, are believed to be just as applicable to white as to black operations.

BLACK PROPAGANDA: ITS TECHNIQUES AND REQUIREMENTS*

By Ladislas Farago

Covert psychological warfare has its strengths and its limitations; for the overt operator it is better that he not become directly involved in its use.

[It is not anticipated that a person assigned to routine activities in the field of policy planning or psychological warfare will have much direct contact with covert or black propaganda operations. However, it is essential that all psywar personnel know what it is, how it works, and if possible be able to recognize it when it appears to be employed by one's own forces, at least to the point of not compromising its effectiveness through careless talk.]

[As a general rule in propaganda warfare, it is not necessary or desirable that the overt propagandist know what the covert operator is doing. In otherwords, it is not necessary or desirable that the right hand know what the left hand is planning. The most efficient way to keep a black propaganda operation secure is to not reveal its existence to anyone except on a strict need-to-know basis.]

[The following account is taken from a recent book* and is reproduced below in order to illustrate the relation of an effective operation to the highest requirement for security and intelligence support as well as to explain some of the special techniques involved.]

Black propaganda is a fundamental intelligence operation, not only because it uses intelligence material solely as its ammunition, but because it is an independent maneuver conducted in an atmosphere of surreptitiousness. Black propaganda never identifies its real source. It pretends to originate within or close to enemy or enemy-occupied territory, and to be conducted by subversive elements in the

* From *War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence*, Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, 1954, pp 330–33. Copyright Funk & Wagnalls Co. Reproduced with permission.

enemy's midst. This is a highly secret activity, since its exposure would terminate its usefulness. Today there are several agencies conducting black propaganda on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but they flourish mostly in times of war. Britain is particularly adept at conducting black propaganda. The two most successful such efforts to date were both conducted by British agencies during World War II. One of them was a clandestine radio station called *Geheim Sender Eins* or "Secret Transmitter No. 1," over which the broadcasts of a propagandist called *Der Chef*, The Boss, were beamed. The Boss was a British journalist named Sefton Delmer. He became one of the authentic men of mystery of World War II when he suddenly vanished from sight. Even his name became taboo. His colleagues called him "the Beard," because of the whiskers he cultivated. In the United States, we used to refer to him as "Henry VIII," because this corpulent, bearded, whimsical, quarrelsome Briton reminded some of us of that long-dead king. His skill was universally admired, and today Delmer is regarded as one of the outstanding exponents and practitioners of black propaganda.

On the air, Delmer pretended to be a senior officer of the Wehrmacht with a good record in World War I. He was intensely "patriotic" in a rather petulant German way, but he was against everything. He hated the British, the Jews, the Russians, the Nazis, everybody in the world. This lively combination of boisterous hatred made him irascible and truculent, and soldiers, usually full of beefs of their own, loved to listen to someone who seemed to echo their collective grievances. There was something else that attracted listeners to The Boss. He was the most profane and obscene broadcaster ever to soil the air waves. He bandied about the usual words of trench lingo, but in his scathing delivery they sounded like so many words of endearment.

The Boss went to extreme lengths to gain the confidence of his German audience. At one point he picked a notoriously inefficient German officer whose blunders had resulted in the annihilation of a battalion, and had him denounced on one of the regular "white" BBC broadcasts beamed to Germany. Later he learned that the denunciation had drawn blood. The German High Command had the officer arrested and made him face a court martial. At this stage The Boss decided to intervene. He launched into a bitter denunciation of the German High Command for acting on a tip from the British radio. "Since when are we taking our orders from those confounded British?" he asked with pathos. "Who are they, anyway, to tell us what to do with our own officers? If this goes on, we'll soon have all our officers before court martials — and isn't that exactly what the bloody Englander wants? To err is human, isn't it? Most of our officers err once in a while and they cannot help it if it results in the annihilation of a battalion. Such is war!"

Several times each week the ribald Boss went on the air to hammer at the Germans with his blasphemies, obscenities — and extremely interesting information in which propaganda was shrewdly concealed. He supplied the most intimate details of Hitler's private life. He revealed controversies within the German High Command over operational plans. He mongered gossip and peddled scandal. This, in a sense, was as much a triumph of intelligence as propaganda. It showed the excellence of the intelligence material on which The Boss had based his uncouth, vulgar rantings.

Although the German soldiers listened regularly to *Der Chef*, they rarely doubted the fact that it was an enemy broadcast. Incidentally, until June, 1942, even the US Military Intelligence Service had no positive proof that *Geheim Sender Eins*

was where it was. The British let no one in on the secret and conceded their parentage of this fabulous intelligence-propaganda operation only when a couple of American intelligence specialists confronted them with conclusive evidence obtained through a smart piece of detective work the details of which cannot be discussed.

In addition to radio, black propaganda employs a great variety of media. They include underground newspapers which imitate the appearance of well-known dailies. A famous example of this medium was the imitation of the mass-circulation *Soir*, which the Belgian underground published during World War II. Another means of black propaganda is the smuggling of subversive material to specific addressees through the mail. German operations in this field included the sending of letters to French soldiers from their home towns, alleging that their wives were committing adultery. The Nazis sent enormous quantities of their propaganda through the U.S. mail, and similar material was disseminated by the Japanese, most of it from clandestine sources.

Mass-mailing of propaganda material is practiced with the realization that many of the communications may never reach their addressees. It is still effective, however, because it overburdens censorship and ties up the regular mail and thus interferes with morale.

Black leaflets and pamphlets are most effective when properly composed and efficiently distributed. This is an art in which the Communists excel because they were dependent on leaflets and pamphlets as news media for so long before the radio was available for propaganda.

The means of black propaganda are many. Some of them represent bold violations of international law but cause endless embarrassment to the enemy. Among these more violent forms are the counterfeiting of enemy currencies and the forging of ration cards and identification papers. If nothing else is gained, the enemy's bureaucratic apparatus is tied up and his secret police is kept busy conducting investigations. The essence of this, as of all black propaganda, is to confuse the enemy authorities.

NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK PROPAGANDA*

By Howard Becker

An exposition on the types of covert propaganda used in Europe in World War II and the lessons learned from the experience.

. . . "Black" propaganda is that variety which is presented by the propagandizer as coming from a "source" inside the propagandized. "Inside" is the key term . . . the scope is the widest thinkable. A salesman may so propagandize a prospect that the salesman never appears as such; the prospect makes his decision on the basis of information furnished him by other persons whom he unwittingly

* Extracted from an article of the same title in the *American Sociological Review*, 14:221–35 (1949). The account reproduced here has been *drastically* abridged from the original account. For a more complete discussion of the subject it is recommended that the reader read Professor Becker's article in its entirety.

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identifies as fellow prospects. The information he then self-deludingly interprets as his own. In this sense, then, the source is presented as inside the propagandized. Like white propaganda, however, black is usually directed at groups; a subversive rumor in a battalion is started by an enemy agent in the guise of defeatist utterances made by its high-ranking officers; a representative of an old-line automobile company manages to have a book presumably written and financed by a disgruntled purchaser of a new make of car circulated among others contemplating purchase, and the like.

"Gray" propaganda is a misnomer occasionally encountered. The term usually rests on the erroneous introduction of the veracity criterion. . . . a workable definition does not include the question of how much of the propaganda is true or how much is false. Gray is incorrectly thought of as a mixture of the two. A second erroneous use of the term sometimes met with is in the effort to label the probably low credibility of certain black propaganda. If it is held unlikely to encounter belief in it as really coming from outside, it is called gray. Although the introduction of the credibility criterion is perhaps not as damaging as the veracity criterion, experience has shown that it can lead to confusion, and should be rejected.

Black and white are all that need be considered, and this paper confines itself to black. The division between the two was recognized during the recent war (WWII); the Office of War Information (OWI) was restricted to white, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to black. . . .

It should also be said that our consideration of black propaganda can be limited, to a considerable extent, to the strategic type. . . .

Strategic black propaganda has, as the adjective "strategic" implies, goals transcending the immediate combat situation. What is tactically a defeat may be strategically a victory, and vice versa. If an occupation lasting for an indefinite period is planned, to the end that the defeated may eventually acquire action patterns having a minimum of overtly aggressive components, then even wartime strategy becomes in a certain sense tactical. A propaganda victory during the combat period may be a propaganda defeat in the occupation period if the victory is gained at the cost of the long-run objective. Hence it is of the utmost importance, where propaganda of any variety is concerned, to have a foreign policy that does not depend on the leading personalities of the moment, an armed forces hierarchy, or the whims of the electorate — but that is another matter. Our immediate concern is with black propaganda that is not governed by hour-to-hour combat tactics, and therefore is strategic in degree at least.

Kinds of Black Propaganda

Among the more important kinds of black propaganda is the planted bit of gossip or rumor. Such rumors of course proliferate rapidly, and often become changed almost beyond recognition as they spread. Easy to plant but hard to control, they can usually be relied on only for morale-sapping, confusing and disorganizing purposes. They may be useful in "softening up" an opponent in preparation for wedge-driving, but the actual driving of the wedge — between Nazi Party and German Army, let us say — requires tools of greater precision.

Another word-of-mouth kind of black propaganda is the planted witticism, ironical remark, or joke. Ranging all the way from the simple pun to the elaborate "build up" anecdote, the joke has the advantage of remaining relatively constant while being disseminated; it does not have the inherent instability of a mere rumor. Its chief disadvantage is the fact that it may not actually "soften up" the opponent,

but on the contrary may heighten his morale by releasing tensions which would otherwise find damaging outlets. When black it is certainly more effective than white, but nevertheless the joke requires great skill and caution in its use.

Planted slogans and visual symbols also have the advantage of remaining relatively unaltered during transmission. When the word-of-mouth repetition of a subversive slogan is excessively dangerous, resort may be had to night-time chalking or the painting of it on walls, advertising kiosks, etc. Although sometimes quite risky to carry about, for obvious reasons, the sticker, printed or otherwise previously prepared, is also a good way of getting slogans and symbols before a wide public with a minimum of personnel. At times it is possible to use the opponent's slogans in a negatively subversive sense; "Every sacrifice for victory" and "For this we have the Führer to thank" made excellent decorations for bombed German public buildings. Further, the possession of stickers bearing these slogans was not *ipso facto* incriminating at first glance. Positively subversive slogans are harder to devise, for they must proceed under their own steam, as it were. Moreover, they must be fitted into the culture pattern with greater care, and are much more dangerous to the disseminator. . . .

Leaflets are primarily tactical instruments, used for front-line attacks on morale, and when so used are nearly impossible to present black. . . . Much better results were secured [in Germany] . . . by printing black newspapers and tearing them up. Relatively little risk is involved for the distributors and a surprising amount of reading is done under the appropriate circumstances.

Black newspapers in general, however, are very hard to produce. The greater the length of a document, the greater the chances of detection. Type faces, make-up, style of journalese, and a thousand and one details increase difficulties *à la* an exponential curve. Even the way in which news stories are constructed may reveal the source . . . at least one respectable black job was produced by the British, and until forced to "go tactical" by higher authority, received a fairly good credibility rating as determined by prisoner interrogation, report of agents, and other intelligence sources. . . . When well and credibly presented, the black newspaper has great strategic advantages. . . . Full length ideological articles, positive and negative, can be provided, and if native journalists having sufficient integrity, intensity of conviction, identification with the "best interests" of the group being propagandized, and persuasive skill can be secured, long-term propaganda effects may be forth coming. Unfortunately most journalists of this type were too rigidly supervised by higher authorities who lacked the training necessary to define the situation properly; the results were all too often pedestrian and uninspired. When aiming at mass effects, a heavy and sincere emotional content is a vital necessity; unless the black newspaper has this, its drawbacks are so great that little if any effort should be wasted on it. . . .

. . . All black propaganda requires operatives thoroughly acquainted with every relevant aspect of the society and culture in question, but here the poison pen letter makes demands second only to black radio. The letter is so highly personalized that mastery of the most intricate detail is necessary if it is to be credible. Self-defeating if used too frequently, it is a little known but powerful black tool.

Black radio, one of the most interesting of all forms of propaganda, is the kind with which the writer is most familiar. There have been several stories in the British and the American popular press about it, one of them by General Donovan's son-in-law, who ran operation Annie at Radio Luxemburg — a primarily tactical job. Another was a British account of the Soldier's Station, West; this

was a mixture of strategic and tactical, with the tactical gradually winning the upper hand. . . .

Take it all in all, black radio is a very powerful means of propaganda in areas where privately hearable receiving sets are found in numbers of any significance. At the same time, it imposes by far the greatest demands of the propagandist. One slip, and the given broadcast not only loses credibility but future black sendings are almost certain to encounter an increased number of skeptical listeners. One amusing slip, which by fortunate accident did not discredit future sendings, was that occurring when the well-known Gustav Siegfried Eins program went off the air. GSE had been running for about fourteen months, and the mobile sender yarn was beginning to wear thin. Germans found it harder and harder to believe that a roving radio truck could elude the Gestapo for so long a time. It was therefore decided to kill off the redoubtable Gustav, and with appropriate sound effects the deed was done and properly recorded for broadcasting. Unfortunately, the technicians in charge of the GSE broadcast were not briefed as to the character of the sending, and they had become somewhat bored as well. They therefore did not listen closely to what they were transmitting, in spite of the fact that the "Gestapo raid" which eliminated GSE made a lot of unusual noise. After the customary interval, they proceeded to transmit Gustav's Last Stand again; he was killed off twice! Fortunately, the Germans were jamming GSE heavily on the first broadcast; only a very small number could have heard the first killing. For the second broadcast, the technicians shifted the beam to a different area to minimize the effects of jamming, and in addition the Germans neglected to jam because they may well have thought that nobody would be likely to die twice. Consequently the second sending finished Gustav off in proper style, and a later survey (after V-E Day) showed that the high credibility rating the sending had always enjoyed had not been diminished. . . .

Accurate Detailed Intelligence: A Top Requirement

Of the utmost importance in all black work is accurate intelligence and its equally accurate evaluation. White propaganda can make blunders without much damage, for the white operative has no need to keep cover. If he makes a mistake about the Führer's birthday, no harm is done, for to most of his hearers he is an ignorant foreigner or malevolent refugee by definition — but what German inside Germany, even if irrevocably opposed to Nazism, would commit such an error? The black propagandist must *know* what he is talking about; good intentions will not do.

Among the most important of all sources is ordinary overt information contained in encyclopedias, histories, textbooks, newspaper files, commercial catalogs, neutral newspapers, and the like. Frequently a special branch carries out the necessary research in these overt sources, and prepares reports for the field branches. Washington and London were full of OSS researchers of this type during the war; they were never near the front lines, but they were indispensable. Enemy overt communications, are also useful, and are readily obtainable in or through most neutral countries. Evaluation of even overt enemy information must of course be carried out with great skill and circumspection; instance the fact that statistics may be faked for domestic consumption as well as for swallowing by the opponent. Further, it is usually necessary to scrutinize one's overt intelligence with great care. All too often the black propagandist encounters a researcher's report containing a rumor which the self-same propagandist planted three months earlier,

and which now turns up in a neutral newspaper as a "hard fact" to be duly registered by the faithful research branch. . . .

There is one kind of overt intelligence where collection and evaluation ordinarily go hand in hand, namely, prisoner interrogation. Given the large number to be handled, at most times, a rapid evaluation of the probable range and reliability of information to be gleaned by questioning is necessary if worthless prisoners are to be sifted out. This evaluation, under wartime conditions, is necessarily of rule-of-thumb type, but it has to be carried out in one way or another. While polling techniques were applied to prisoners in a few instances, they are of little use to the black propagandist, valuable as they may be for other purposes.

Official organizations collecting covert intelligence *i.e.*, through espionage, are manifestly indispensable. . . .

. . . . .

Covert interrogation and interception of messages furnished a substantial part of the intelligence used in black propaganda. Where the interrogation was concerned, most of it was done by disguised agents who mixed with prisoners, but in a few instances such agents actually worked within the German Army and among the civilian German population. . . .

Even the Best Intelligence Requires Interpretation

. . . it must always be remembered that utilizable interpretations of intelligence must be utilizable in at least two ways. First, the black radio team, composed at a minimum of intelligence man, script writer, recording and/or transmitting director, speaker or speakers ("voices") and operation technician must be able to interpret the intelligence so that they all agree as to what if anything they can successfully do with it. This sounds simple, but is not so by any means . . . the task of the team is to weave otherwise disconnected items into a coherent, plausible, and probable whole.

Second, what is coherent, plausible and probable to the broadcasters is not necessarily so to the listeners. The chances that it will be so are increased in the degree to which the broadcasters can identify themselves with the listeners, but a certain gap always remains. . . . Only intimate acquaintance with the society and culture . . . plus the elusive quality that makes good actors, enables the critics to project themselves into the roles of listeners with any prospect of success. . . . Sincerity or the semblance thereof is an asset even to those who do commercial broadcasting; it is absolutely indispensable to the black radio propagandist. If after repeated trials a speaker cannot carry emotional as well as intellectual conviction to his critics in their projected roles, another speaker who can do so must be found. . . .

In broadcasting to Germany, with its well-marked dialects and its distinct dialect traces even in the speech of the highly educated, it goes without saying that the proper local twang must be used if the character of the operation demands it. . . .

When intelligence is interpreted so that it makes sense to the broadcasters, both in their roles as observers with superior knowledge of the relevant facts and in their projected roles as participants defining the situation as it is possible for them to know it, such intelligence has been properly utilized. Beyond this lies only the task of timing sendings correctly, evading jamming, gauging the right kilowatt strength, and so forth. This part of the job was usually done amazingly well by

American radio technicians, but their skill was not always matched by other members of their teams. . . .

Consequences of Black Propaganda

. . . The credibility of any black broadcast is finally demonstrated only when the effort to "impose one's will" has met with success as demonstrated by appropriate action attributable to the credibility. Hence consideration of credibility should come after consideration of the correlated actions, but convenience in exposition prescribes the reverse order.

Going on the basis of what people say rather than what they do, which at best is risky at any time and not only every four years, it can be stated there was great variation in the credibility of programs. The sources of "what people say" were prisoner interrogation, interviews with civilians by US Strategic Bombing Survey, a survey of listeners to black broadcasts which was carried out by an OSS team supervised by the writer . . . and interviews with German radio experts. . . .

. . . Strategic [black] propaganda should rarely if ever be subordinated to tactical considerations; whenever possible the line between the two should be firmly fixed. [Ed. This was not observed with respect to the activities of the Soldiers' Station at Calais, which was ordered in the midst of a highly successful black operation to go tactical — to broadcast in such a manner as to get the German population out on the roads with the objective of hampering the retreat of the German Army.]

Operation Annie . . . makes this even more clear. The apparent desire to get immediate results led to greater and greater stress on tactics. Finally, the use of the powerful Luxemburg station to divert a few German Army trucks to a route leading behind American lines and hence to capture showed how a 16 mm gun may be used to shoot a mouse.

. . . let us now review some of the actions that resulted from black radio operations of tactical type.

The Soldiers' Sender counseled sabotage, among other things and even gave detailed instructions on how to make explosives and incendiaries, and how to use incendiary packets dropped by Allied planes. As nearly as can be determined, little sabotage by Germans ever resulted; a few foreign workers made sporadic attempts, but nothing much came of them. The Soldiers' Sender broke its rule, in its sabotage broadcasts, of adhering to what was probably true; it carried "news" of extensive sabotage that never took place. This has unfortunately been reflected in the widespread German belief that part of the defeat was the result of sabotage. . . . Tactical use of black radio has already had undesirable long-run strategic consequences if out of the sabotage myth a fresh stab-in-the-back legend should develop.

The Luxemburg station, headquarters of Operation Annie, also counseled sabotage, and in addition told how to organize smaller towns and villages so that they could not be defended by the retreating German Army.

. . . Black radio, and perhaps black propaganda in general should keep well over toward the strategic end of the strategy-tactics continuum. . . .

But the end is not yet. Comes the melancholy task of pointing out that "a propaganda victory during the combat period may be a propaganda defeat during the occupation period if the victory is gained at the cost of the long-run objective. . . ."

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CHAPTER 9

EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

PROBLEM OF ASSESSING RESULTS

No problem discussed in this work is more basic than the requirement that periodic attempts be made to assess results obtained in past operations. Yet no requirement is more difficult to implement satisfactorily. Some writers go so far as to say that if one is completely honest in his answer he must admit that he can never prove that the propaganda disseminated achieves the results sought. Others argue that adequate means for determining the effectiveness of propaganda acts and campaigns are available.

The problem of determining effectiveness is complicated by a number of factors. Modern social science has developed evaluative techniques useful in estimating the reach of a program, but far less has been achieved in developing methods for measuring scientifically the effect that a given message or series of messages may have on an audience group. In other words it is relatively easy to ascertain whom one is reaching but extremely difficult to find out what impact has been made on the recipient's mind.

Communications and market research personnel have developed many approaches to the problem of assessing results of propaganda and advertising campaigns. Such methods are in widespread use for ascertaining attitudes and attitude changes in domestic audiences, and with appropriate and necessary adaptations many of these have been found useful in measuring results in foreign information and psychological warfare operations. That the results obtained by any one method may not reach a high degree of exactitude should not prevent utilizing such methods as are appropriate and useful.

In assessing results in psychological warfare, unlike assessment studies in domestic market research, the problem is not so much one of choosing between alternative methods, but rather one of utilizing ingenuity, imagination, and improvisation in the application of multiple research techniques in order to estimate the probable reach of a program or act and to ascertain the known or probable effect on the group or groups receiving the transmitted propaganda messages.

In this chapter, 12 articles or case studies are presented to describe some of the problems encountered and to illustrate some of the methods employed in past efforts to evaluate foreign information and psychological warfare operations. The first two studies, "Evaluation of Combat Propaganda" and "Contributions of Opinion Research to Evaluation of Psychological Warfare," were selected for inclusion in this chapter because they describe many of the obstacles yet to be overcome before we will be able to ascertain with a high degree of exactitude the effects obtained in any particular effort.

Following the two general discussions case studies and journal articles, based on recent past experience, are presented to illustrate the use of techniques that have been found useful in estimating results obtained. There is no implied suggestion that all methods and techniques useful in evaluating work have been discussed in this chapter.

For clarity in presentation the evaluation process may be described as comprising at least three different types of activity: (1) the measurement of output, including a determination of the operational efficiency of equipment used; (2) a determination of the probable pattern of reception for the various media of propaganda employed; and (3) a determination of the probable or known effect of the message, campaign, or strategy on the group against which the propaganda action is directed; in other words, a determination of what changes in behavior and attitudes among the target group may be ascribed to the psychological warfare effort.

MEASUREMENT OF OUTPUT

Among the most simple of evaluative devices employed in psychological warfare operations is that of compiling a summary statement of output listed in terms of the number of items, such as leaflets, newssheets, program hours broadcast, etc., and themes covered. For example, in leaflet and newssheet media the number and variety of each are recorded; in press and publications the circulation figures are tallied; in film and art exhibits the number of individuals who view each are listed. With radio and loudspeaker operations an account of the number of hours spent in broadcasting and the number and variety of separate program types transmitted are often preserved and even cited as though the amount of activity is itself evidence of effectiveness.

One must not push too far the presumption that the quantity of output or the variety of programing bears any necessary relation to the degree of effectiveness, yet, propaganda administrators, lacking scientifically valid criteria for determining effectiveness, have cited such figures as prima-facie evidence of such. Many case studies in this and other chapters of this volume amply illustrate that there is no readily apparent direct relation

between quantity of propaganda output and the effects obtained in terms of changed attitudes and behavior patterns among groups toward which propaganda has been directed.

The compilation of data on output is a device for maintaining operational control as well as a technique by which later analysis may permit effectiveness studies to be made. "Auditing International Radio Broadcasting Output," is a case in point. In this study the objective of the evaluation staff of VOA was described. This was to determine, through use of both qualitative and quantitative content analysis, whether new propaganda policies, directives, and guidances were being properly and effectively translated into short-wave broadcasts by the script-writers and program producers.

An example of how compilations of output may be utilized in effectiveness studies is the following. In FEC during the first year of the Korean campaign the theater psychological warfare staff, although woefully undermanned, maintained and preserved excellent records of the number of each leaflet produced, and of when and where they were dropped. During the first 6 weeks of the campaign in Korea, several million leaflets were printed and disseminated. From the very beginning of the operation combat intelligence personnel — individuals not directly involved in the propaganda operations — interrogated North Korean prisoners of war as to what effect if any the UN propaganda had in inducing them to lay down their arms to become prisoners of war. Approximately one-third of the prisoners interrogated stated that UN propaganda had played a significant role in inducing their defection. The psychological warfare staff responsible for the planning and production of the leaflets expressed great satisfaction in these findings. However, their own figures showing production and distribution were later used by analysts to show that they were being misled by answers given by North Korean prisoners of war to G2 interrogators.

The undermanned psychological warfare staff in the Tokyo headquarters of FEC in June, July, and the first week of August 1950 were more than kept busy on an around-the-clock schedule. Many leaflets were designed and processed and millions of copies disseminated, but in every instance during these hectic first weeks of fighting these leaflets were addressed to South Korean forces and sympathizers and in no instances were any appeals made to North Korean Communist forces.

It was not until the seventh week of the campaign that the first leaflet specifically designed to appeal to the North Korean soldier was produced and dropped. Notwithstanding this, G2 interrogators, unaware of the limited audience appeal of the UN leaflets, reported that approximately one-third of all North Korean Communist soldiers captured during this

early period claimed to have responded to UN propaganda appeals. Psychological warfare was given credit where it was not due.

More apropos to the topic of evaluation of effects is the case study "Checking Operational Efficiency of Loudspeaker Equipment." This is an account of how propaganda administrators and psychological warfare operators in Korea in 1950 and 1951 naively assumed that the operational efficiency and the capabilities of airborne loudspeaker systems provided FEC were such as to produce effective results when in fact after months of operation in the combat zone it was discovered that the quality and age of the equipment, the manner of its installation in the aircraft, and the method of utilization were all such as to produce results that could only have been virtually zero. Again, psychological warfare personnel were misled by prisoners of war who reported to G2 interrogators that they had heard and understood UN airborne loudspeaker voicecasts. The rather simple device of checking periodically to ascertain whether all parts were functioning properly was not undertaken by anything resembling a serious or continuing basis.

EVALUATION OF COMBAT PROPAGANDA

By W. E. D.

The nature of propaganda and the condition of its employment in combat preclude any exactitude in the measurement of results.

If the evaluation of a psychological warfare activity is considered something distinctly different from the intelligence process then it must be concluded that it is the least satisfactorily provided for of all the various phases of a propaganda operation. This appears to be true whether one is primarily concerned with the broadly strategic phases of an operation or only with those designed to influence enemy troops just across the lines. Yet everywhere the psychological warfare administrator is asked, "Does psychological warfare really work, and how do you know?"

All too little thought has been given to the problem of providing valid answers to questions such as these. In fact the present Department of the Army field manual,[1] presumably one incorporating current military doctrine on psychological warfare, neither lists the topic of evaluation nor makes any mention of the desirability of providing for it in a psychological warfare organization. The topic "Propaganda and Opinion Analysis" is covered in one chapter, but the orientation is strictly that for satisfying intelligence requirements and not for meeting the broader needs for assessment of results or effects.

It is the opinion of the writer that insufficient thought has been given to the problem of evaluation and that as a consequence of the failure to provide an adequate assessment system the total psychological warfare program suffers. Evaluation of psychological warfare is important for two reasons: first, information secured through the evaluative process provides a feedback to the intelligence section to inform operators and others to what extent and in what specific ways the

intended target is being reached and influenced; second, evaluation based on proper techniques enables the military command, or other decision makers, to ascertain, on grounds other than intuition, whether or not it would be desirable to invest a greater or lesser percentage of currently available resources in manpower and materiel in psychological warfare operations. Without some provision being made for scientific evaluation, decisions involving both the determination of how big a program to provide and in what direction and with what intensity to direct day-to-day operations in psychological warfare are of necessity largely based only on informed guesses or intuitive hunches.

Most of the claims that have been advanced to the effect that psychological warfare has proved itself an effective weapon in past operations have been put forth by personnel intimately and emotionally involved in such programs. Most of the evidence they have cited in behalf of their claims has been largely based on data of a nonscientific character. To a very large extent the data cited are based on isolated dramatic incidents of apparent success, but where it is clearly impossible to establish a cause-and-effect relation between the propaganda output and the observed reaction on the part of the target audience.

One authority has attributed the difficulty of measuring the effects of propaganda scientifically to the fact that "propaganda had to be developed into a science before it could be conducted and evaluated scientifically, which was what the propagandists had maintained all along." (p 145)[2] Yet he points out that as of the present propaganda is largely an art, not a science. The same author goes on to caution that our failure to inject exactitude or certainty into our assessment of propaganda effects should not discourage us from making such progress as is possible. In writing concerning problems of research and evaluation he suggests, "the tendency is toward realism which accepts the limitations that exist and endeavors to make the most of the knowledge, talents, and facilities available. Research is aimed not so much at the discovery of exact formulas as at a broader understanding which will increase the probability of effectiveness. Evaluation is based more on experienced judgment than on scientific measurement." (p 147)[2]

Major Purposes Served by Evaluation of Current Programs

Evaluation personnel utilizing such approved social science techniques as may be adapted for use in the combat area may provide useful clues that will satisfy the urgent and continuing requirements for greater knowledge of whether the propaganda output is reaching the target intended in the manner desired and with the results anticipated. Evaluation data, of both a quantitative and qualitative character, are useful as a feedback to intelligence. Thus, useful data enable an operator to determine how the impact of tomorrow's program can be increased over that of yesterday's.

A second purpose served by evaluation may be described as "public relations" oriented. Administrators of propaganda programs from the highest levels in the national government in Washington to the part-time psychological warfare officer on a combat division staff have from time to time come under vigorous attack for the "wasteful and unrewarding nature" of their activities. Members of Congressional committees, unsympathetic staff officers in military commands, and others have demanded evidences of effectiveness as a condition for continued support of psychological warfare programs. It has not always been possible to satisfy the objections of such critics because so little had been accomplished in measuring

scientifically the outreach of such efforts and the results obtained. Equally important, all too frequently neither the critics nor the operators have had a clear understanding of the propaganda mission and the nature of its processes.

Lacking scientific data to use in replying to critics, both administrative officers and operational personnel have had to fall back on such unsatisfactory evidence as the following to justify their programs. The testimony of prominent individuals in both friendly and enemy camps have been cited as evidence of propaganda impact. Evidence of enemy concern, as noted through propaganda rebuttals, has been pointed to as further evidence of impact. Instances both of an isolated and a dramatic character have been described relating, first, the nature of the propaganda output and, second, certain known or observed behavior patterns among the target audience following the propaganda release. The inference has been that there is a cause-and-effect relation between the propaganda stimulus and the behavior response. There have been but few instances where this could be proved satisfactorily through the use of approved social science techniques.

Thus much of the discussion of psychological warfare effectiveness has been by administrators appearing before budget officers and Congressional committees, or in personal accounts appearing in newspapers, news magazines, and memoirs. Much of it has had a distinctly public relations flavor produced for the purpose of satisfying one's sense of importance or for meeting and offsetting the criticism of individuals unsympathetic to the use of psychological warfare to achieve national and military objectives.

Difficulty of Establishing a Scientifically Reliable Evaluation Process

Much of the evaluation effort of the past has had limited value for three major reasons. First, propaganda personnel as well as postoperation evaluators have not possessed a clear and consistent understanding of the nature and mission of the activity. Second, along with the lack of understanding of the mission of psychological warfare it must be recognized that no clear or acceptable criteria exist today for measuring propaganda effects except in rather limited controlled situations. Third, even were propagandists to enjoy a clear understanding of the mission of psychological warfare, and were they to be provided a rigid and acceptable set of criteria to measure effects as well as the reach of programs, there would be other factors that would greatly limit the success of evaluators in studying results of combat operations. Meaningful evaluation would be so dependent on conditions in the combat zone that inevitable compromises with acceptable scientific practices would greatly reduce the demonstrated validity of the findings.

(1) *Understanding of the nature and mission of psychological warfare in combat operations is lacking.*

In the opinion of the writer the effects of a propaganda activity can be measured or assessed only in terms of the specific objectives as these are envisaged by the planners and output personnel. The attempts some naive individuals have made to measure the effectiveness of psychological warfare in general are believed to be useless exercises. Those few who have attempted such evaluations demonstrated that they did not understand or were unwilling to take into account the fact that (a) psychological warfare is likely to achieve little if any success if used alone — it is a support weapon; and (b) the effects of a propaganda activity may be achieved only after repeated stimuli. It is not such a simple matter that one can provide a stimulus in the form of one, two, or three leaflet barrages and then reasonably expect to obtain immediate results. There seems to be no question but that the

cumulative effect of past propaganda operations as well as the current war situation are other factors equally as important as today's propaganda output in leading enemy troops to desert or to behave in other desired ways.

It would seem at first glance that it ought not to be possible to cite evidence that operators themselves, let alone evaluators, do not always agree what the mission of a psychological warfare effort may be. However, the fact is, as illustrated below, that personnel have not always agreed, and such records of past operations that have been preserved cannot always be relied on for evaluation purposes for the simple reason the records are seldom complete or accurate, and the objective of the activity, which seems so apparent from the surface, can be misleading.

The writer while in Korea in November 1950 asked the military officer then in charge of Radio Seoul, a quasi-tactical psychological warfare installation of the FEC, what his mission was. His reply indicated that either he was not interested in or that he did not understand the peculiarly important responsibility entrusted to him. This is what he said.

> "Native Korean communications' personnel have little understanding of the desirability for punctuality. Native script-writers who work under my supervision will hand in a script for a 15-minute newscast or commentary that can't possibly be aired in less than 17 or 18 minutes. Announcers and commentators who are supposed to go on the air at 12 o'clock noon have been known to begin operations as late as 7 minutes after the hour. Because of the length of their scripts and the uncertain moment of their commencement of operations they seldom finish in less than 10 or 12 minutes beyond the time they are scheduled to leave the air. I thus conceive as one of my most important tasks the training of these friendly South Korean broadcasters in the necessity for beginning operations on schedule and closing them at the appointed time."*

The writer had supposed that the administration of a mass communications network such as Radio Seoul had been taken over by American military personnel to ensure a concentrated effort to bolster the morale and confidence of those sympathetic to the political and military goals of the Republic of Korea and to weaken the will to win and confidence of those committed to North Korean Communist objectives. However, since the latter was not considered by the officer in charge to be the major mission of the radio installation at Seoul it would be useless to apply many of the evaluative devices, developed by social scientists, to measure effectiveness or assess results. It would be a rather simple matter to determine, after given periods of time, whether the indigenous personnel at Radio Seoul were reaching the objective outlined by the American station manager.

The above account is an extreme instance of the perversion of what should have been the objectives of such an installation. It is however a true statement of the situation as the writer found it to exist on his visit to the station in November 1950.

Daniel Lerner in his excellent and detailed analysis of psychological warfare in the European theater in World War II reports that he polled a relatively large number of individuals with propaganda experience in this area. Among the questions he asked was this: "How would you describe the mission of Sykewar in Europe during World War II?"[3] He received 29 usable responses, with 56 separate missions described.

* Not in the exact words of the speaker, but a close paraphrase of what was said.

It would appear to the writer that Lerner made one or more implied assumptions in asking his question that was basically false. The question suggests that there may have been only one or, at least, only one major objective of psychological warfare in the European theater as employed by the American-British personnel in PWD/SHAEF. This is hardly an accurate assumption unless it is pitched on a broad base such as "to assist in winning the war" and/or peace. The question also implies that one can assess results of combat propaganda and other devices of psychological warfare in general without specific reference to known objectives. It is one of the main theses of this article that such an exercise is not likely to lead to any significantly useful results.

TABLE 1

POLL TO DETERMINE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OBJECTIVES
(European Theater, World War II)

Objectives	Mentions
To *weaken* enemy will to resist	13
To *undermine* enemy will to resist	6
To *destroy* enemy will to resist	4
To destroy enemy *will to win*	1
To induce surrenders	8
To shorten the war	6
To encourage resistance in enemy-occupied areas	6
To lay foundations of a "good peace"	3
To undermine prestige of Nazi government	2
To present clearly Allied aims and ideals	2
To make enemy easier to handle after surrender	2
To support the military mission	2
To control populations of enemy-occupied areas	1
Total mentions	56

In Chap. 6 of this casebook an effort was made to show that many objectives may be sought in a foreign information or psychological warfare program or campaign. In some instances the same action may have several objectives, and the message may be addressed to several targets simultaneously. It thus would appear that any assessment that attempts to determine the general or over-all effectiveness of psychological warfare is largely without meaning.

In the opinion of the writer the only valid objective use of assessment devices is to determine results in particular actions; i.e., effectiveness can be determined only in terms of what psychological warfare attempts to do. Yet the objective in any specific instance in the past may be obtained only from the few individuals who were immediately involved in an action. Preoccupation with the major task and the lack of supporting personnel may have prevented the recording of pertinent facts that might have enabled a more acceptable evaluation at some later date.

The character of those official records of past actions that have been preserved have been largely such as to leave many doubts in the minds of evaluators on such a simple matter as what the objective of a given propaganda action might have been. Equally important for evaluation purposes are accurate records that will show (a) what happened after a propaganda barrage; (b) what concurrent or subsidiary activities may have influenced results; (c) the nature of the target attacked,

i.e., did it possess high or low morale, etc.; (d) the nature of the terrain; (e) the conditions of weather and time of day; and (f) the amount and accuracy of the intelligence concerning the target. All or any of these factors may very well have influenced the degree of success achieved in a particular action, and yet few of these facts are preserved in combat records for use in after-action evaluation.

It might be assumed that the objective sought in a given psychological warfare action could be determined by reference to the leaflet or broadcast script used. However, this may not be the case in many instances such as those known to the writer where the apparent objective, as judged by the propaganda disseminated, was not the real objective as outlined by the planner of the action. The following report illustrates this.

In March 1951, when UN forces in Korea were delivering trip-hammer blows on the North Korean–Chinese lines in central Korea, at a heavy cost in casualties to the UN forces, psychological warfare personnel in the Eighth Army headquarters decided the most effective way they could support front-line troops by psychological warfare was to help create the impression among enemy forces that a second front was to be launched by an amphibious landing on the Korean east coast. Ordinary surrender leaflets were dropped in great quantities many miles behind the front lines, yet only a short distance from the east coast beaches. It was hoped that these leaflets, usually dropped just before a UN assault, when combined with naval amphibious feints and an increased display of UN aerial activity in the area, would make the enemy believe that an amphibious attack would be immediately forthcoming. It was expected that if the enemy accepted this conclusion the enemy command would be forced to move troops from the defense of the existing front lines to the area of the anticipated assault.

Any attempt to assess the effectiveness of this operation would be greatly handicapped unless the evaluators (a) disregarded the contents of the message on the leaflets dropped as implying the objectives sought, and (b) discovered after-action reports that listed in sufficient detail concurrent factors that had an influence on the results obtained. Only individuals possessing intimate knowledge of how the surrender leaflets were used and other facets of the operation could be expected to assess accurately the impact of the operation on enemy behavior. Since such personnel were so few in number and were engaged in other actions both at the time and immediately following, it is highly unlikely that a very complete account of the action was recorded to be available for later assessment by personnel not immediately involved in the planning and implementation of the campaign.

Thus it is the conclusion of the writer that to have a scientifically meaningful evaluation of a psychological warfare activity or action one must have a clear understanding of what the operator intended as the desired effect, the evaluation must be in terms of specific rather than general objectives, and records of actions of both a direct and contributing nature must be preserved in such detail as to leave little doubt in the mind of the assessment personnel of what was intended and what actually happened. Thus far all too little thought has been given to the necessity for preserving such data as would enable scientific assessment.

(2) *Any general agreement as to criteria for assessing results from the use of combat propaganda is lacking.*

It is generally agreed that an evaluation process in psychological warfare has two major phases. First, it is necessary to determine whether the desired target is being reached with the intensity and consistency desired, and, second, it is

desirable to ascertain what effect the effort is having on the individuals and/or groups addressed. It is not enough to know merely that a target audience is exposed to a particular propaganda effort. Of far greater importance is the ascertainment of the knowledge of how the attitudes, opinions, and overt behavior of target groups are being altered as the result of psychological warfare.

Propagandists and social science personnel assigned to psychological warfare operations have not as yet developed any highly sophisticated or scientific criteria for assessing psychological warfare results. This is inevitable in a situation in which understanding or agreement with respect to the objectives to be sought is lacking. But even to the extent that there is agreement as to the mission of psychological warfare there are difficulties inherent in establishing acceptable criteria for measuring results or assessing effects.

As a general rule social science personnel who have attempted to evaluate psychological warfare results have favored the use of quantitative measurement devices. Propaganda personnel themselves have frequently relied on the practice of citing impressive figures on output, such as the number of leaflets printed and disseminated, the number of radio programs or program hours broadcast, and the number of missions and total time consumed in loudspeaker broadcasts on the front line as though there was necessarily any connection between the quantity of output and the results obtained.

Because so much of the propaganda effort in the past has appeared to be directed at inducing enemy soldiers to surrender, and because it is a relatively easy matter to calculate the number who surrender in given periods of time, the tendency has been to give undue weight to the reliability of such data in ascertaining effects. It is easy to count heads but it is no easy matter to ascribe accurate motives to the behavior of enemy troops. Even the prisoners may not be able to describe accurately what induced them to behave in certain ways. For example, who is to say with a high degree of certainty that an enemy soldier surrendered because of a leaflet message rather than because he was hungry, out of ammunition, and generally "fed up" with the war. The raw data used in evaluation must come in very large measure from prisoners of war, from the answers they give in interrogations, interviews, and panel discussions. Regardless of the means used in analyzing the data the results cannot be any more reliable than the answers from prisoners that are fed into the analysis. As discussed below there are many factors inherent in a combat situation that can adversely influence the data collected for analysis.

Those who have cited the large number of enemy soldiers surrendering after specific intensified leaflet barrages or loudspeaker broadcasts have assumed that there was a cause-and-effect relation between the stimulus and the observed result. At best such information is never more than presumptive evidence of effectiveness.

In determining whether a target of a combat leaflet has been sufficiently saturated to obtain the results desired, a number of rules of thumb have been employed in the past. None are based on scientific criteria. In Korea, division personnel reported to the writer that they concluded a given hillside combat objective had been sufficiently covered with leaflets only if there were copies of leaflets scattered about on the ground on the arrival of friendly forces. If leaflets were not in evidence on such occasions division personnel reported to higher echelon that more leaflets should be disseminated over future targets. This led to the operational rule that was expressed in the exaggerated statement, "let 'em wade knee deep in paper

in order to ensure they all receive at least one copy." Fortunately recent research has progressed to the point that we now know better how to disseminate leaflets to ensure the probability of adequate coverage of combat targets without the necessity of waste inherent in the "knee-deep-in-paper" philosophy.

Other means that have been used to ascertain the adequacy of leaflet coverage include careful tabulation of enemy soldiers entering friendly lines to surrender who carry one or more propaganda leaflets. If a relatively large or increasing number of such prisoners in the past carried leaflets the assumption was made not only that coverage was adequate but in addition that the messages on the leaflets had had some desired impact on the recipients. Also prisoners have been questioned concerning their exposure to friendly propaganda of all kinds prior to their defection or capture. Where prisoners can recall and describe fairly accurately the contents of leaflets or broadcast messages that were disseminated while they were still in the enemy camp their accounts and assessment of adequacy of coverage provides somewhat more reliable data on which to base future operations.

Even though there is no easy or reliable method for obtaining highly accurate assessments of adequacy of dissemination, the problem offers fewer difficulties than are encountered by individuals attempting to assess the impact of a message, series of messages, or other psychological warfare actions on the opinions, attitude, or behavior of targets addressed. This difficulty is greatly increased by conditions inherent in operating in a combat zone in time of armed conflict.

If what people say is a reliable clue to what they think, it then becomes obvious that the combat propagandist enjoys one substantial advantage over his counterpart who is engaged in strategic cold-war information operations. In such combat actions observed in the past there have always been relatively large numbers of prisoners of war on whom to test new ideas and on whom to base estimates of probable effectiveness of past efforts.

In evaluation activities prisoners have been employed in three principal ways: (a) as subjects from which to obtain quantitative data through use of both oral and written questionnaires carefully constructed to reveal certain desired information; (b) to obtain data of a more qualitative or subjective character, usually obtained from carefully selected prisoners of war through interviews in depth or life-history type of interrogations; and (c) through carefully monitored accounts of discussions of prisoners of war where the attention of the respondents is directed along desired lines or in specific channels of interest to psychological warfare personnel.

In the use of prisoners of war to obtain quantitative data the techniques developed in the US and other Western nations to measure public opinion and the like through means of public opinion polls — response and analysis — have been used. Lerner described the large number of German prisoners of war in Europe in World War II available for questioning by Allied interrogators as "a pollster's dream." Quantitative analysis of responses requires a fairly large sample, homogeneous in at least one important respect.

It may be debated how representative prisoners are of enemy forces still engaged in combat, and yet there is no denial that the enemy forces and prisoners have many attributes in common, such as a common cultural heritage, a common language, and similar national aspirations. The major difference between them that must be taken into account in analyzing their responses is that prisoners by the very nature of their captivity are beset by a completely different kind of immediate problem than

are the soldiers of the enemy still actively engaged in combat. This fact, depending on circumstances and cultural background, may both consciously and unconsciously color the responses given during interviews and interrogations.

Prisoners of war are seldom if ever interrogated for psychological warfare purposes in the early hours of their captivity. Other activities have an understandable and logical priority in the collection of intelligence. Thus, it is not uncommon to interrogate prisoners about psychological warfare matters in rear-echelon enclosures days, if not weeks, after capture. After the lapse of days in which to think about his last hours behind the enemy lines and the first few confusing hours in friendly territory the prisoner is frequently able to rationalize his behavior in such a way as to present himself to others in a light most acceptable to his cultural heritage. Even under the best conditions, with prisoners with the most honest intentions, it is not reasonable to expect that they will be able to assign any valid degree of importance to the varied factors that motivated their actions.

Accounts of friendly front-line personnel may provide more accurate descriptions of how enemy troops behaved after leaflet barrages or loudspeaker broadcasts than can ever be obtained from prisoners of war interrogated days after capture in rear-echelon command posts. In World War II it was a common practice for interrogators to ask Japanese prisoners of war to describe how they became prisoners. Almost to the last man they described how they had been tricked or caught while asleep or without means of committing suicide. In rear-echelon areas they frequently insisted that they had been taken captive against their desire, in circumstances beyond their control. These accounts seldom agreed with those given by the capturing unit. The discrepancy was due to the Japanese soldier's rationalization of his behavior so that it might conform to that pattern expected of a Japanese subject.

Although the use of prisoners of war for interrogation purposes may prove to be a boon to those interested in employing the pollster's tools of opinion surveys, attitude scales, etc., there appears to be little doubt that when employed with too little regard for the cultural traits of the respondents weird results may be obtained. Of the many instances that could be cited to support this observation the following one is typical.

The writer observed reports of attitude responses given by Chinese prisoners of war in Korea that suggested that among the prisoner-of-war sample interviewed there were more Christians than Confucianists and more Kuomintang than Communist sympathizers. It was obvious to the individual aware of the cultural peculiarities of the Chinese that these results were misleading. The respondents had in large numbers given the type of response they thought the American interrogator would most appreciate. The construction of useful and reliable questionnaires requires a considerable familiarity with the cultural patterns of behavior of the national group or groups to be interrogated.

The responses of prisoners must be carefully analyzed with full knowledge of the culture patterns of their nationality and within the context of the military situation at the time of their surrender. The situation in Asian countries is especially relevant to this matter. The answers to questions secured in response to direct interrogation are especially suspect. The average person in Asia, particularly one in a semiliterate or illiterate classification, is seldom asked for his opinions on any matter. Because of his lowly status in society and the teachings he has been exposed to he hesitates to go on record as disapproving or criticizing any course of action that originates on a higher level in the social scale.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of relying on indirect evidence secured from former enemy soldiers, prisoners of war have been questioned as to what if any effect psychological warfare may have had in influencing them to desert. Careful tabulations have been kept on the number claiming that propaganda was the dominant, if not all-prevailing, influence that induced them to lay down their arms to become a captive. Extravagant claims of propaganda effectiveness have been made that could not possibly be defended on objectively scientific grounds.

Prisoners of war who have surrendered following propaganda action have been cited as evidence of effectiveness for two apparent reasons. First, it is an easy way to quantify results, and, second, the surrender of enemy soldiers can be dramatized in such a way as to satisfy the uncritical minds of individuals groping for any clues to justify their activity.

Merely counting the numbers of enemy soldiers who surrender during or following psychological warfare barrages or broadcasts is not conclusive proof of anything; however, in the case of the enemy soldier who comes "across the lines" immediately following a loudspeaker broadcast there is a strong presumption that it was the appeal that served as a catalyst in promoting the disaffection.

Where prisoners of war have served as the major source of information concerning the probable impact on the enemy of a given propaganda effort, they have been utilized in one of three principal ways: (1) through interviews where the interrogator uses a specific structured questionnaire, either administered orally or handed to the prisoner to fill out, depending on the degree of literacy, the responses thus obtained being then carefully coded and a composite quantified answer given; (2) through interviews in depth, wherein the interrogator follows all fruitful leads of the respondent obtaining a detailed life-history type of response, such as can only be reported in qualitative terms; (3) through panels of prisoners, selected on the basis of some criteria for membership, wherein group discussions on matters of psychological warfare interest are encouraged and monitored. If skillfully led, panel discussions with cooperative prisoners of war may be reported in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

As with all matters dealing with psychological warfare, so with interrogations, the greatest success will be obtained by those interrogators with the greatest knowledge of and interest in the affairs of the target people. Beyond this it may be dangerous to generalize from one culture to another on how best to conduct oneself in order to achieve the most significant results in prisoner interrogation or social science type surveys. Practices that may succeed under certain conditions with one group may fail miserably with a different cultural group.

The use of cooperative prisoners of war in panels has been discussed in other parts of this work. Opinions vary as to how such groups should be organized and used to obtain the most reliable results. However, the consensus is that prisoners organized into cooperative panel groups may serve as very effective adjuncts to a psychological warfare organization. As such they can be encouraged collectively and individually to debate or discuss the utility of various propaganda approaches and probable degrees of effectiveness of proposed actions.

In organizing a panel of prisoners it may be desirable to have the group homogeneous in every respect possible, or it may be desirable to see that diverse points of view, levels of education, social classes, military ranks, and residents of various geographic areas are represented. By the same token it may be desirable that a panel be composed entirely of recently captured prisoners; in other instances prisoners with whom intimate rapport has been previously established may be pre-

ferred. There appears to be no one single hard-and-fast rule to apply. The particular mission to be performed by a panel may dictate the type of personnel to be selected and how the panel should be organized.

Data secured from the analysis of enemy broadcasts have likewise been cited as evidence of propaganda effectiveness. Data from this source take several forms: direct assault on the psychological warfare message, i.e., by attacking the credibility or accuracy of the data broadcast; indirect assault through the dissemination of contradictory data to the same target groups; and threatened punishment for any who listen to and/or disseminate charges that originate from enemy sources.

Captured military orders warning troops not to pick up propaganda leaflets or to listen to radio broadcasts have been cited as evidence of the effectiveness of propaganda. Such conclusions, Dan Lerner quite rightly says, rest "upon a chain of untenable inferences." There are any number of reasons an enemy commander may not want his troops to read such combat propaganda. He may conclude that it has a bad effect on the morale and *esprit de corps* of his men when in fact it might in no way adversely affect them.

The point need not be unduly labored — many of these data cited as evidence of effectiveness have limited value as indices of such. It is relatively easy to determine the reach of a given series of programs or propaganda operations, but as yet there are few if any scientifically reliable techniques or devices by which the effect on a group subject to propaganda can be measured. Even so this does not mean that there is not a lot that operators can do to increase their understanding of the combat situation in which the enemy finds himself. As one writer has said, "evaluation is based more on experienced judgment than on scientific measurement." (p 147)[2]

(3) *Conditions in the combat area greatly restrict the applicability or the feasibility of using modern social science techniques to measure the effectiveness of combat propaganda.*

Advertising specialists, social science research personnel, and communications analysts have collaborated in developing a number of techniques by which to judge effectiveness of given advertising campaigns and information programs. Some of these techniques are implied in such procedures as the use of prisoners of war to elicit responses to given questionnaires. However, there are many conditions inherent in a combat situation that make the utilization of these devices and techniques a difficult matter.

There is always a personnel ceiling, imposed by military considerations, limiting the number of individuals available at given military echelons for specialized tasks. The employment of the advanced techniques of opinion measurement used by the present-day public opinion pollsters calls for a sophistication and degree of specialized training in personnel not readily provided by the Army system of classification and assignment. The probability would not be great that the man with the requisite training and experience would be available for assessment duty at the proper echelon in time of urgent need.

Even if a person with such qualifications were located and assigned to this type of work, considerations of expediency — the necessity for obtaining an approximate answer for tomorrow's operation rather than waiting for a more exact answer next week when the combat situation would likely have changed anyway — rule out many of the sophisticated techniques of analysis used in modern advertising and public opinion surveys.

If the situation is as outlined and if modern social science development is so devoid of useful techniques that may be employed in combat areas to assess effectiveness, how, it may then be asked, did propaganda personnel in World War II and other combat actions ascertain whether they were hitting the mark intended and if so with what effect. There is no one answer to these questions, but a good one is provided by Martin Herz, one of the most able leaflet writers World War II produced. In the following account he draws on the experience he gained in Europe.

How Can Effectiveness Be Judged?

> ". . . the question may legitimately be asked just how it was known, during the last war, whether a combat leaflet was more, or less, successful. After all, the psychological warfare intelligence officer could only in the rarest instances observe the behavior in battle of those enemy units which had been subjected to a specific leaflet message. Since this question is important to consideration of the following case material, we will dwell on it briefly.
>
> "Evidence of effectiveness, or lack of it, was obtained chiefly from the following sources: (a) quantity of leaflets found on the persons of prisoners; (b) recollection of leaflets by prisoners, and comments about them; (c) favorable mention and detailed discussion by soldiers behind the German lines, as reported by cooperative prisoners; (d) detailed description of their surrender by prisoners; (e) preoccupation of German counter-propaganda with specific Allied leaflets, including plagiarism by German combat propagandists; (f) comments by the enemy Command, as learned from captured documents on troop morale.
>
> "In some cases, where continued dissemination of one special leaflet was deemed desirable, prisoner reactions could even be used to sharpen its effectiveness, as in the case of the well-known SHAEF Safe-Conduct leaflet. The first edition of that leaflet, produced in the early days of the Normandy invasion showed merely the seal of the US and the British royal crest, together with a standard text in English and German which called upon the Allied front-line soldier to accord his prisoner good treatment. By the time the Safe-Conduct leaflet went into its sixth printing the following changes had been made as the result of P/W interviews: (a) the German text had been placed above the English; (b) a note had been inserted, stating specifically that the English text was a translation of the German; (c) General Eisenhower's signature had been added; (d) his name had been spelled out, because it was learned the Germans did not recognize the written signature as Eisenhower's; (e) the leaflet was printed in red rather than in green, which made it more conspicuous on the ground; and (f) a note had been added under the word 'Safe-Conduct,' pointing out the document was valid for 'one or several bearers.' These improvements resulted from continuous testing of the leaflet's effectiveness."[4]

Thus, as may be inferred from reading Herz's conclusion, much of the useful evaluation accomplished during the conflict in Europe was of the qualitative rather than the quantitative variety. The few evaluators who have been sent into the field specially to assess results have on the other hand tended to give greater weight to the collection of quantitative data. Yet, it is the conclusion of the writer that

owing to the restrictive conditions of the combat area that limit ability to collect and analyze data scientifically, greater reliance must be placed on qualitative assessments even though these have their limitations. As with the evaluation of strategic information programs so with those of evaluating combat propaganda there is little that can be done to measure impact other than to continue to rely on indirect and nonscientific evidence. Such evidence, however, is believed to have considerable value. At least such evaluations provide clues and a point of departure on which to base future operations and research involving the use of psychological warfare in tactical operations.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OPINION RESEARCH TO EVALUATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By Joseph T. Klapper and Leo Lowenthal

Notwithstanding significant contributions of opinion research to evaluation of strategic propaganda many obstacles exist that are yet to be overcome.

This paper proposes to review the contributions of opinion research to one type of psychological warfare: specifically, its contribution to the evaluation of international broadcasting. Some of these contributions are adequate to the tasks at hand; others fall somewhat short of present needs. Such shortcomings, and suggested modes of overcoming them, will also be specified.

The psychological warriors of the United States are today engaged in mass communication by press, film, and radio. The government's radio voice, popularly and internationally known as the Voice of America, is currently the most extensively active of the three media.

At the time of this writing, the Voice broadcasts in 46 language services, several of which are being broadcast simultaneously at any given moment of the day. All programs are transmitted by short wave from the United States, and most are relayed on short or medium wave from various bases in Europe and the Far East. Individual local stations in all parts of the world provide additional relays or re-broadcasts.

The Role of Communications Research in Evaluating International Broadcasting

This entire communicational enterprise is subjected by the Office of International Broadcasting to continual evaluation. The Program Evaluation is charged with the task of evaluating all phases of this communication process, from broadcast output to the effect the broadcast has on its audience. In the language of communications research, the task assigned this division is the evaluation of a communication process in which a medium operating in one country is attempting to communicate its messages to mass audiences in most of the rest of the world.

The problems and procedures of such a task are in many ways similar to the familiar problems and procedures which define the daily work of domestic communication research: the daily work, for example, of the research division of an

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American network engaged in assessing the effect of its various sustaining and commercial programs. But additional and dissimilar problems arise as a result of the communication being government sponsored and aimed at foreign lands.

The evaluation of international broadcasting shares with all other communication research a common over-all approach and a common theoretical goal. Both the approach and the ultimate goal — an ultimate which, like so many ultimates, is probably unattainable — are implicit in Lasswell's familiar description of communications research as the process of analyzing *who*, says *what*, *to whom*, and with *what effect*. The ultimate success of communications research would include the ability to answer these questions precisely not only in relation to an existing communication situation, but also in reference to any contemplated or desired situation. In such a millennial development, the factors of content, audience, medium and effect would be merely elements in a precise formula, which could be algebraically solved for any one element. The psychological warrior would need only to stipulate to the researcher the effects he desired, and the researcher, now a mere technician, would need only to work out the mathematics to stipulate in turn the requisite content that should be disseminated over specific media to specific people in order to achieve the desired effects. Such a miracle would, of course, also eliminate the stimulation of the sudden guess, the idea of unrecognized genesis; the challenge of formulating the guess into a testable hypothesis; and the joy, the keener because of its rarity, of confirmation at the .01 level. Whether such a miracle would really be desirable is therefore a moot question which happily is not yet upon us. But it is useful in formulating plans for over-all communication research to think of the miracle as the goal, and of specific projects as a series of attempts to approximate the goal continually more closely. In current practice each of the questions — *who*, *what*, *to whom*, and with *what effect* — can be answered in part and under certain conditions. None can be answered with complete precision, and the relationship between the elements can be specified in terms of necessary and sufficient causality.

The Element of "Who"

In evaluating international broadcasting, the question of who is speaking is ordinarily deleted from the evaluators' task by the mere fact that the evaluation is ordered by the speakers themselves. . . . The question of "who is speaking" thus does not usually fall within the bailiwick of government agencies engaged in communications research proper.

The Element of Content

The question of what is said can be answered in considerable detail by content analysis. Although perhaps not by strict definition a part of opinion research proper, and thus not properly to be discussed at length in this particular paper, content analysis is certainly a sister discipline, and not to be excluded from the discussion. In fact, a plea will shortly follow that this sibling be more closely integrated into the opinion research family.

There is little need to review the capabilities of content analysis. Opinion researchers are well aware that, in the hands of skilled specialists, content analysis can describe a given content, such as a broadcast, in terms of any aspects that are themselves susceptible of description by objective criteria. At regular intervals, a week's VOA output in all languages is subjected to content analysis, and the resulting quantitative descriptions of the topics mentioned, favorable or unfavorable treatment, factual or interpretive tone, and the like, are of extreme value. VOA's

program producers are enabled to see how their policy is being implemented; the programs themselves can be compared with each other, and with broadcasts emanating from other countries.

Such content analysis research has the additional and important virtue of making explicit the actual working standards by which scripts and programming are developed. For example, a recent series of content analysis studies indicated that differences in mode of argumentation were present in broadcasts to different countries. In part these differences reflected the really different requirements involved in reaching and holding the different audiences concerned; but in part the differences represented somewhat haphazard biases toward particular modes of argumentation. As a result of the content analyses, such biases could be recognized and removed from the particular language services where they existed.

Quantitative content analysis, however, has to date dealt successfully only with parts of a broadcast — singly or in various combinations, to be sure, but nevertheless with parts. A challenge to analysis lies in the need for precise, objective descriptions of those aspects of content which, despite their obvious importance, are not susceptible of quantification. The over-all organization of the broadcast, for example, or emphases achieved by methods other than repetition, can of course be described by sensitive critics, and the VOA continually calls upon them. But their impressionistic evaluations, helpful as they may be, cannot be regarded with the same confidence as can objective, quantitative analyses, and thus cannot be introduced into any developing formulae relating content and effect. What is needed, then, is a technique for objectively describing elements of content that, up to now, have not seemed susceptible of being counted.

Further, no content analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, can be undertaken with any real assurance that the components thrown into conspicuous relief by the analysis are necessarily the contextual elements which are causally related to any observed or desired audience effect. If, for example, a political commentary is criticized as "a little too unemotional," we cannot be certain whether the listener's reaction was caused by subject matter too far removed from his immediate concerns, or whether the emphasis was laid too heavily on present international difficulties and too lightly on hope for a better world, or whether the listener's reaction was due to some aspect of idiom or delivery unsuspected by the analyst and often even unsuspected by the audience. At present, we can only guess at causal relationships. And while these guesses can, of course, be tested by submitting specially designed content to new effect studies, such testing and re-testing is, in the conduct of psychological warfare, so costly of time and money as to be practically unfeasible.

In short, a complete description of content, within the framework of the related communicational elements, can be achieved only when content analysis, or some other technique, can accomplish two things at present beyond its demonstrated capabilities: when it can describe the currently intangible aspects of content; and when it is able to link, in some systematic rather than trial-and-error manner, specific content or elements of content with observed or contemplated effects.

The Element of the Audience

With reference to the question of who constitutes the audience for international broadcasts, opinion research can and regularly does provide the psychological warriors with a great deal of very valuable information. But there is much more

information that the psychological chiefs of staff would like, and opinion research cannot currently provide them with it.

On the credit side of the ledger is all the information which can be provided by careful polling procedures. Where it is possible to define and to contact a representative sample of the national population, sample polling can state with considerable precision the size and the socioeconomic nature of both the audience and the non-listeners. Carefully designed polls or very similar techniques, including depth interviewing, seem capable also of providing considerable information about channels of informal communication: about the kind of material which is most widely discussed, and perhaps also about the speed and accuracy of dissemination. Polls or participant observation can also provide information about the communications habits of a given population. Similar techniques, planned and conducted with the cooperation of anthropologists and area experts — a union of research skills on which more will be said below — can provide data on effective symbols and dominant values among an actual or contemplated target audience. All such data are of inestimable value to the psychological warriors, and the Office of International Broadcasting has provided it in volume. The evaluation staff of this office has conducted or supervised fairly routine polls in nine countries: Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Chile and Uruguay. But the psychological warriors would like similar data about all the countries of the world. Their wish poses another challenge for social science because a sizable portion of the earth and its peoples is simply not available to systematic research.

The inaccessibility of a population to systematic research may stem from any of several causes, and each cause poses its own problems. In many areas, for example, quantitative social science is either virtually unknown or wholly in its infancy. In such a country, lack of adequate census data leaves us with so little knowledge of population characteristics that it is all but impossible to define a representative sample of the population. In addition, any overt systematic interviewing is so strange and alien a thing, and is regarded with such suspicion, bewilderment, and even resentment, that the data obtained from any overt survey, representative or not, can be used only with the most extreme caution. In the case of several such countries, the Office of International Broadcasting has successfully employed what might be called a "participant-anthropological" approach. The communications habits of the population have been studied by specially trained observers within the framework of the over-all patterns of culture and the over-all patterns of daily living. This rather broad research orientation has already produced very fruitful data. One is led to believe, in fact, that carefully planned university curricula, which provided training in a broad combination of social sciences, might produce opinion researchers of such imaginative depth and technical proficiency as are today relatively rare.

Another challenge to social scientists is posed by the vast populations who are politically inaccessible to systematic polling. Such inaccessibility develops, of course, whenever tensions exist between two nations or groups of nations, which is to say that such politically inaccessible populations are inevitable phenomena of psychological warfare. By the same token, and equally inevitably, these very inaccessible areas are the primary targets of psychological warfare, and evaluation of the salvos aimed at these areas becomes the most pressing and continual research need. The evaluation of psychological warfare must apparently contend

forever with this bogey of an inverse ratio: the evaluation which is most desired is, unhappily, the most difficult to accomplish; that which is most readily achieved is, unhappily, the least desired.

Obtaining information about people who are themselves unavailable for research is no new problem, but it now arises as a peculiarly timely challenge to social scientists. The very formulation of the problem suggests at least two approaches which seem worthy of exploration. But before defining these approaches it may be well to note how the same problem rearises when communications research attempts to answer the biggest question implicit in the evaluation of psychological warfare. That is, of course, the question of effect, the question of what the communicative ammunition is doing to its audience.

The Question of Effect

It is only with the greatest hesitancy that opinion or communciation researchers currently use the word "effect," even in reference to what an American radio commercial does to a socially familiar audience. It is perhaps more precise to speak not of "effect" but of specific reactions: reactions of purchase, of definably changed opinion, and the like. In keeping track of such specific reactions, the familiar implements of opinion research are of incalculable value. Program tests, program analyzer equipment, attitude scales, latent attribute analysis, used individually or in varying combinations, and set at times within the framework of controlled experiments with matched groups drawn from stratified population samples — all of these techniques have, of course, provided a wealth of information to the psychological warriors. The evaluation staff of the Office of International Broadcasting, has, for example, used program tests, sometimes with program analyzer equipment, in various countries of Europe and South America. We have used attitude scales both as devices for stratifying and matching groups and for tracing effects. But the familiar devices involved familiar inadequacies, and the scope and nature of the present task give rise to new problems.

The older problems need merely be mentioned. There is, for example, the familiar difficulty of relating cause and effect. Given an observed fact, what particular aspect or combination of content and socio-psychological situation was the necessary and specific cause? Under what conditions can the effect be repeated or prevented? There is the question of "sleeper effect": What will be the development over three or four months of a newly observed attitude shift? There are other familiar problems which communication researchers can mention practically by rote. But the evaluation of international broadcasting, particularly broadcasting which is political in content or purpose, involves new challenges.

The first difficulty pertaining to determining effect lies in the peculiar complexity of the type of effect in which we are interested. If we hesitate to speak with finality about the effect of a specific advertisement for a specific soap, then how much greater must our hesitation be when we talk of the complex stuff of personal political attitudes. Subtle shifts, which may very well be the first links of a chain reaction, are difficult and at times virtually impossible to identify. And even such shifts as are observed cannot be simply assumed to result from a specific communication. Several forces, no doubt, shape one's attitude toward soap. But how many forces combine to mould an individual's concept of world politics, and how can all influences but one be ruled out as possible causes? The answer to this challenge seems to lie mainly in continually greater rigor of experimental design, or, put somewhat more generally, in bettering our capabilities of precisely defining and employing experimental variables.

But an even more difficult problem arises in our attempt to determine the effects of international broadcasting. It is a challenge with which we are already familiar: the challenge of the inaccessible audience. The inaccessibility, as we have noted, may arise from the novelty of quantitative social science in the target area, or from the inverse ratio occasioned by international politics, or from other causes. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that in several areas of the world there is no chance of using as research subjects any significant number of the people who themselves constitute the group with which we are concerned.

The Major Challenge and Possible Solutions

Thus the social scientist asked to evaluate international broadcasting is faced, at two significant points in his operation, with the same challenge: to obtain accurate information about large populations without systematic use of the populations themselves. The challenge can be quite clearly and unambiguously stated. As yet it cannot be so simply answered.

Acute as it is, the problem seems to have been barely formulated, let alone explored, by social research. It has arisen before in research outside the fields of opinion and communication (in attempts to describe, for example, the behavior pattern of demi-monde society). In each instance some compromise has been made to meet, after a fashion, the needs of the immediate inquiry. Such compromises, as well as common sense, suggest at least two approaches which seem worthy of systematic exploration. These may be called, for lack of better names, the "most like" approach and the "qualified judge" approach. This paper will conclude by defining each, noting how they have been used by the Office of International Broadcasting, and noting the refinements, often major refinements, which those techniques currently demand. These problems are here bequeathed as a common heritage to opinion researchers in the hope that the fraternity may collectively and systematically arrive at some solutions.

The "Most Like" Approach

The "most like" approach consists of using respondents who, while not actually members of the inaccessible group, are of all available people "most like" the subject group. The vague rationale behind this approach seems to envisage a mythical individual who is like a member of the subject group in every respect except membership, and who thus would have the same psychological make-up. Short of finding such a mythical archetype, the rationale seems to presuppose a correlation of "overall likeness" and specific psychological similarity.

The problem implicit in this approach lies, of course, in the absence of a definition of "like." What characteristics of people are most highly correlated with opinion? Barring the impossible perfect duplication, in what ways is it most important for the substitute respondent to be "like" the inaccessible respondent?

The evaluation staff of the Office of International Broadcasting has used the "most like" approach in interviewing refugees to obtain information about groups behind the Iron Curtain. Refugees, after all, are like non-refugees in national origin and in cultural and linguistic background, and they can be grouped to duplicate the parent population in education, in age, and in practically every respect but one: the refugees have fled their native land and the others have not. Certainly this difference must be opinion-linked in a very complex way. But what is this way? And is it not possible that less obvious aspects of "likeness" might be better for our purposes? Is it not conceivable, for example, unlikely as it

might seem, that a closer psychological resemblance might exist between the willing residents of a Cominform and a non-Cominform totalitarianism than between willing residents and refugees of the same totalitarianism?

Lacking sure and precise knowledge of the nature of opinion-linked characteristics, the Office of International Broadcasting has attempted to get some estimate of the biases of "most like" respondents by carefully designed questions probing the refugee's own concept of the non-refugees, and by submitting all data to analysis by area specialists. Such devices have proved extremely helpful, but they are after all only the best possible estimates. And such estimation will remain the only possible technique until better definitions of "most like" can be empirically developed.

The "Qualified Judge" Approach

The second obvious approach to obtaining data about groups who cannot themselves be used as respondents is the "qualified judge" approach. A person believed to know the group in question is asked to make certain estimates about the inaccessible group. This is not simply a matter of narrowing down the "most like" approach to a single respondent, for the person chosen as a source of information need not necessarily resemble the subject group at all. He must rather be a qualified judge, a good estimator, of that group's behavior and opinions.

The "qualified judge" approach is extensively employed in the evaluation of psychological warfare. Thus the Office of International Broadcasting continually seeks persons apparently qualified to know inaccessible people and commissions them to perform observations or to make careful social analyses. This office is, in this context, actually sponsoring a veritable integration of the disciplines of social science. Data gathered by small scale surveys are analyzed by cultural anthropologists, and the best guesses of cultural anthropologists are in turn evaluated by political scientists and area specialists. But even this does not wholly overcome the limitations of the "qualified judge" approach. It need hardly be said that these limitations derive again from the absence of empirical knowledge of the requisite characteristics of a qualified judge.

A few months ago, for example, the office performed a series of "language tests" in which VOA programs in different languages were submitted to the criticism of specially chosen panels.* Since Satellite language programs could not be tested before an audience of actual Satellite nationals, a panel was substituted composed partly of refugees — that is of "most like" respondents — and partly of persons believed to be qualified judges. These judges were selected on the basis of their apparent familiarity with the linguistic habits of the target country, and among them were journalists, teachers, and the like. Their comments were extremely helpful. But still there is no assurance but what some other group, perhaps former railway conductors who travelled extensively throughout the country, might not have estimated more precisely the various reactions of different segments of the target audience. In brief, the requisite qualities for judgeship are unknown, and in using the "qualified judge" approach, we are again, as we were in the "most like" approach, reduced to the best possible guess.

* See "Language Panels for Estimating Effectiveness" at the end of this chapter.

Conclusion

It is to these areas where opinion research can offer only the best possible guess that we who lay claim to the title of "scientist" must direct our systematic attention. This paper has emphasized two such areas: the need for a systematic technique of relating content analysis and effect studies, and the need for empirical study of techniques for obtaining information about large groups of persons who are themselves inaccessible to research. Both of these needs are crucial in the evaluation of psychological warfare. In regard to both, opinion research, which has contributed heavily to psychological warfare, can currently offer only the best possible guess.

Guesses are not to be decried. They are the necessary forerunner of empirical research and of the eventual formulation of relationships. They are the stimulation of any vigorous science. Opinion research has been a vigorous contributor to the evaluation of psychological warfare. But vigor, to be fruitful, must always be followed by the discipline of maturity.

AUDITING INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING OUTPUT*

By M. J.

It is desirable that radio output be audited periodically to ensure that policies, directives, and guidances are fully and effectively implemented by all who are in a position to do so.

In a single week VOA broadcasts a total of 302 program hours, in over 45 languages, to all the major political target areas of the world. A small group of policy makers and strategists manages the details of this operation. Just as a businessman wants an audit of his ledgers to tell him how his business is doing, so does the propagandist require an audit of his output to tell him how he is succeeding. One question the policy maker is concerned with is whether or not the policy decisions expressed in the form of directives are being followed. They need also to know how the entire organization for radio propaganda is responding to world events, new policies, and new problems. For these and other reasons it is necessary that periodic checks on output and its probable effectiveness be made.

To assist in this over-all task of auditing output, content analysis is a useful tool. By content analysis is meant an objective, systematic, quantitative evaluation of mass communications' content. An interesting example of the result of such an audit emerged when a comparison was made of VOA output during two important periods of operation, one prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the other during the early stages of the Korean campaign.

Shortly after the close of World War II, VOA in its original mandate was directed to project an "image" of America to the world. In the name of this phrase, our

* Adapted from the report "Broadcasts in the 'Cold War' and Korean War Periods," prepared by the Research Center for Human Relations, New York University, 1951, for the Evaluation Staff of the International Broadcasting Service (IBS), IIA, Department of State.

first halting efforts to develop a peacetime formula for international radio communications were undertaken. This formula resulted in an orientation that sought to propagandize foreign target groups by emphasizing American virtues, rather than by dealing with specific and concrete problems in the world abroad. This meant that VOA initially talked mainly about America and the American people and far less about the target audience to which the broadcast was beamed.

Under the impact of deepening international conflict, US policy directors moved to adapt VOA to the emerging realities of the cold war. In effect, this meant overcoming the initial preoccupation with the domestic virtues of the US and altering the moralistic tone of most broadcasts. It meant converting VOA from a "Sunday supplement" to an "editorial page." When the Korean hostilities broke out in June 1950 these changes were already well under way. A content analysis of VOA output to the world before and after the Communist attack on South Korea highlights these shifts in emphasis. Whether the change in emphasis was adequate to meet the changed situation is a matter that can be evaluated from a number of policy standpoints, and some of these are presented in connection with the findings.

In all, broadcasts in 29 different languages were analyzed, paragraph by paragraph. The sample for the pre-Korean combat period that was studied consisted of broadcast scripts for 7 different days in the interval from the latter part of March to the middle of May 1950; the sample for the period after the outbreak of the Korean war consisted of scripts of broadcasts made on an equal number of days between mid-December 1950 and the end of January 1951.

Focus of Attention

Obviously, the listener will react differently to VOA if he hears comments about his own country than he would if the broadcasts focus major attention on the US. Actually, as Table 1 indicates, by the spring of 1950 VOA had departed radically from the earlier practice of emphasizing the theme "projecting" America to foreign areas. By 1950, only 33 percent of the themes dealt with the US, and thus, there was little change noted in this respect from the first to the second period studied.

The major differences noted between the emphasis in news given in the earlier precombat period and that of the winter of 1950–1951 concerned the increased attention devoted to the UN (from 4 to 12 percent) and to the Communist bloc countries (from 13 to 21 percent). Communist China, which was singled out for considerable comment, received greatly increased attention (11 percent), in the latter period, as compared to the former one. North Korea on the other hand was discussed in only 1 percent of all paragraphs analyzed.

The focus of attention varied greatly from country to country. Western Europe and Latin America heard considerably more about the US than did the rest of the world in both the earlier and the later period. Nearly 50 percent of the themes broadcast to those areas dealt with the US. In sharp contrast the corresponding emphasis placed on the US in radio broadcasts to the USSR in the later period was only 21 percent.

In every area of the world, with the exception of the USSR, listeners to VOA heard little about their own countries in the first period and even less in the second. Actually the USSR and satellites was the only target area in which themes about itself were more frequent than were themes about the US (27 and 31 percent respectively). The Korean War led to an intensification of emphasis on the USSR in VOA newscasts beamed to that country.

The question arises as to the appropriateness of this practice of dividing attention in output to different countries in this fashion: 33 percent of the themes addressed to the world at large dealt with the US, 10 percent dealt with the Soviet Union, and 5 percent concerned the target country. In defense of this distribution, it should be said that VOA is obviously better qualified to speak about the US — that its function is largely to acquaint other countries with American political practices, habits, and attitudes — whereas talking about the target countries may produce undesirable effects unless the information is accurate and completely up to date. On the other hand the heavy emphasis placed on the US in broadcasts to foreign areas might be interpreted by listeners as evidence of our being either too apologetic or boastful.

TABLE 1

ATTENTION TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN VOA BROADCASTS
(World total)

Country	Space devoted to country, %	
	Before Korean combat (spring 1950)	During Korean combat (winter 1950–1951)
US	32	33
USSR	14	10
Target area countries	7	5
Democratic bloc countries	19	16
Communist bloc countries	13	21
UN	4	12
All other nations	11	3
Total	100	100

Characteristically, in the periods studied, VOA spoke least about the US to the USSR, a target area approached in a much more aggressive tone. It is possible that had more attention been devoted to the problems of the target countries this might have helped to convince listeners of America's sincere interest in their welfare.

Themes about America need not be defensive in character. However, in concentrating on the US there is the ever present danger of playing into current anti-American stereotypes that exist in friendly nations as well as in Soviet-dominated ones. Common stereotyped views of Americans held by foreigners picture us as boastful, selfish, and complacent. When these are reinforced through thoughtless action by Americans there is increased resentment and envy of this country.

Image of the United States

What image of the US did VOA project abroad and how did the VOA broadcasters alter the image following the outbreak of the Korean struggle?

About 10 percent of the material broadcast by VOA during both periods was of purely descriptive, informational, or entertaining character. Included were descriptions or accounts of various aspects of American life such as American agricultural methods, psychical research in the US, how to become a lawyer in a typical American state, how to spend a Saturday evening in New York City on very little money, a

description of the exploration of the Sierra Nevada range, and a detailed listing of privileges accorded young children in America. Features such as these are, as a rule, free from explicit political content. They serve the major purpose or function of emphasizing to the target addressed the vast diversity of American life. Such broadcasts are obviously based on the assumption that listeners will react more favorably to American policy if they are familiar with our way of life. Table 2 indicates the major areas covered in such broadcasts to the world, and the change in emphasis that was noted in the two periods.

TABLE 2

IMAGE OF THE US PRESENTED IN VOA BROADCASTS
(World total)

Theme	Space concerning US devoted to theme, %	
	Before Korean combat (spring 1950)	During Korean combat (winter 1950–1951)
Economic and material life	34	23
Social relations	33	41
Religious and cultural life	18	18
Other	15	18
Total	100	100

An interesting shift in emphasis to different aspects of the American way of life occurred between the precombat and the combat period. In the latter period material values in American life were emphasized less, and interpersonal and social relations more. The particular materialistic aspects of American life that came to be emphasized less in the Korean combat period related to such matters as the high standard of living in this country (a drop from 11 to 5 percent) and accounts of scientific developments, especially as these concerned labor-saving gadgets and the convenience of living in America (a drop from 25 to 5 percent).

In contrast, certain aspects of social relations were given far greater emphasis, particularly those features that stressed the democratic equalitarian aspects of American society. Themes emphasizing economic democracy in the US rose from 3 to 7 percent whereas the emphasis on themes concerning equality in relations between social classes, i.e., as between whites and Negroes, and men and women, rose from 5 to 10 percent. It is interesting to note that this increased emphasis was particularly striking in broadcasts directed to countries behind the iron curtain. To the USSR, for example, themes emphasizing American social relations such as equality between human beings received little if any attention in broadcasts made prior to the outbreak of Korean hostilities, whereas 17 percent of all themes projecting images of the US were devoted to such problems as social security legislation, public housing, wages and hours laws, negro-white relations, the place of women in American society. In broadcasts to the Soviet satellites, discussions of economic democracy and equalitarian relations in America also were greatly increased after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.

The shifts in emphasis given to different themes that were noted between the two periods are of considerable interest in revealing how VOA responded to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Both the reduction of emphasis on the materialistic aspects of American culture and the increase of emphasis on democratic social relations indicate realistic adaptations of output so that broadcasts conform better to American requirements in the current world-wide struggle between the democratic and Communist systems of control. The Communists in their propaganda attempt to identify the interest of the common people with their program. Military aggression is justified — as in the case of Korea — by claims that Communist forces are merely defending the rights of common people. In the battle of words there are two types of answers that may be made to this Communist line.

One method employed by VOA in its broadcasts, which were designed to counter the Communist torrent of words, was to show that there was a wide discrepancy between Communist promises and actions. The other method that was employed was to demonstrate in a more positive manner what a free country achieves that is of lasting benefit to its people. This technique has been employed by VOA with increasing emphasis since the outbreak of the Korean hostilities. However, the question arises whether more emphasis could profitably be given to a discussion of the concern that the free world holds with respect to the welfare of the common people so as to break or to lessen the effectiveness of the Communist appeal to the "man in the street." Such emphasis needs always to avoid overtones of arrogance or boastfulness about the higher standard of living of the American people, especially since such claims are not likely to appear credible to the target audience.

Moral Values and Power

International relations, and especially international tension and conflict, are generally discussed in terms of two considerations: the "right" and "wrong" of a situation (moral values) and the power factors involved. The problems involved in making policy decisions about the relative emphasis that should be placed on moral values as opposed to discussions of power factors in radio broadcasts are numerous. Such decisions should be based on a comparative appraisal of the habits of political thought that exist in this country and abroad, on a determination of the desirability for VOA speaking within the context of American thought or that of the target area, and the necessity that an adjustment in emphasis be made in accordance with the international situation that exists at the time of the broadcasts.

Harold D. Lasswell, pioneer propaganda analyst, points out that American political thought is more concerned with ethics, whereas Europeans are far more concerned with power factors. Therefore it is interesting to note, from Table 3, that VOA in its broadcasts gave approximately twice as much emphasis to moral values as was given to power factors in international relations. The relative emphasis was scarcely changed by the outbreak of Korean hostilities.

The relative emphasis devoted to "rights" and "wrongs" and to a discussion of the strength with which they can be backed up varied to some extent in accordance with the subject matter discussed. VOA was almost exclusively concerned with moral values when talking about the USSR: 87 percent of the themes about the USSR in the first period and 92 percent in the latter period were themes emphasizing moral values. When talking about the US, power themes were stressed somewhat

more frequently, but even here greater emphasis was placed on moral values than on power themes in broadcasts to all areas.

One subject of discussion, however, underwent a radical change in treatment in this respect — the UN. Table 4 indicates that VOA switched from an almost exclusive emphasis on the moral aspects of the UN to one in which power considerations predominated, after the commencement of Korean hostilities. The change in emphasis was most conspicuous in broadcasts directed to the Soviet Union. During the earlier period VOA talked to the USSR about the UN exclusively in moral

TABLE 3

RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON MORAL VALUES AND POWER FACTORS IN VOA BROADCASTS[a]
(World total)

Theme	Total space devoted to theme, %	
	Before Korean combat (spring 1950)	During Korean combat (winter 1950–1951)
Moral values	66	65
Power factors	34	35
Total	100	100

[a] This table excludes neutral and purely informational themes that do not imply either category.

TABLE 4

RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON MORAL VALUES AND POWER FACTORS IN VOA BROADCASTS DISCUSSING THE UN
(World total)

Theme	Space concerning UN devoted to theme, %	
	Before Korean combat (spring 1950)	During Korean combat (winter 1950–1951)
Moral values	83	43
Power factors	17	57
Total	100	100

terms (83 percent); after the outbreak of war in Korea this figure dropped to 43 percent, whereas 57 percent of the themes dealt with the UN's strength. This shift in emphasis obviously resulted from a historical event unique in modern times — an international organization taking up arms to curtail aggression. The potential impact of this emphasis on the listener must not be overrated, however. After all, as was shown in Table 1, even in the period after the outbreak of Korean hostilities only 12 percent of all themes in VOA broadcasts dealt with the UN.

Let us assume that the observation of Lasswell — that American political thought is more concerned with ethics whereas Europeans are more concerned with power —

is a reasonably accurate one. It is clear then from VOA broadcasts that they reflect both American political thought, which stresses moral values, and European thought, which emphasizes power factors. The question then arises whether European listeners are not more likely to react with cynicism to VOA broadcasts, which lay so much stress on moral considerations. To be sure, moral support for and from people all over the world can of itself become a major element of power. The problem actually is one of finding the right balance between two extremes. It appears self-evident that after the outbreak of Korean hostilities and the UN condemnation of North Korean aggression, power considerations became uppermost in everyone's mind. Thus emphasis on strength would seem to offer a greater opportunity of making a forceful impression on a target audience unsympathetic with the American stand than stressing good will, moral principles, and platitudinous expressions of rights or wrongs.

Manner of Presentation

The effectiveness of any radio program on any given audience depends in part on the way the broadcast is presented. Presentation has numerous aspects; only a few were examined in this study. Some, such as the intonation of the announcer, could be studied only by analyzing live broadcasts as they were given in the original language. This was not done. Still other aspects were not studied in this project for they are not amenable to quantitative analysis.

Program direction involves such considerations as the amount of material that should be included largely for the purpose of building audiences and increasing listenership, in contrast to the volume percentage of output that should be employed to influence political attitudes. Even in informational features about American life, such as a description of court procedures in this country, paragraphs may be included that are designed clearly to serve a political function. An example of this would be a script emphasizing the principle of equality of all before the law and the democratic nature of the judicial process in the US in contrast with arbitrary proceedings employed in Communist-dominated countries. Features in psychological warfare programs in which such comments are completely lacking obviously are designed to serve a preparatory need, such as winning and holding the interest and good will of listeners. For the purposes of the audit such feature programs have been called "audience-building" broadcasts. At the other extreme are to be found those that may be clearly differentiated as political broadcasts. Often it is possible to provide material designed to accomplish these separate goals in the same script. For example, Table 5 indicates the relative amount of material VOA employed to serve the audience-building function and the percentage devoted to serving political ends.

VOA, immediately prior to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, was already devoting a major part of output time to a discussion of political matters; yet after the outbreak of the conflict in Korea the emphasis on political discussion was further increased. Broadcasts whose exclusive function was to build an audience through entertainment or information that did not explicitly draw a political lesson were less frequent in the later period studied than in the earlier one. In the later period, even the feature material broadcast frequently possessed content of political significance. It appears to be rather obvious that during periods of political crisis there is little need to devote limited broadcast time to such purposes as audience building.

After the outbreak of conflict in Korea, themes that could be interpreted as critical to the US or favorable to the USSR were much fewer in number as compared to the earlier prewar period. Material unfavorable to the US (or favorable to the USSR) consisted almost entirely of quoting within a largely favorable (or unfavorable) context the arguments used by the other side, in order to refute them. However, this practice seems to have been considerably deemphasized in the later period, in contrast to the earlier period reviewed.

TABLE 5

RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON AUDIENCE BUILDING AND POLITICAL OUTPUT IN VOA BROADCASTS
(World total)

Purpose	Total space devoted to purpose, %	
	Before Korean combat (spring 1950)	During Korean combat (winter 1950–1951)
Mainly audience building	13	9
Partly audience building	14	7
Mainly political	73	84
Total	100	100

Program direction, to the degree that it is linked to the tradition of American journalism, seeks to keep factual reporting and editorialization separate and clearly labeled. In general, the VOA sought to conform to this pattern and maintained it through the period of the Korean crisis in the winter of 1950–1951. Slightly more than half of the treatment of news during the first period was straightforward and factual, and this figure proved to be even higher in the second period. (To characterize a broadcast as factual is not to say that the material in it was not carefully screened and selected in order to elicit certain desired responses.) In addition, at least a third of the paragraph themes consisted of *opinions* that were clearly identified as such. A relatively small proportion of news was actually editorialized. Editorializing was of course much more frequent in the treatment of material other than straight news, such as political commentaries and special features. Nevertheless, even with the mounting international tension, VOA continued to maintain a fairly objective approach in its news treatment, and especially so to those countries that were members of the Soviet camp.

It may well be that the most striking feature of the VOA broadcasts as viewed by listeners in Communist countries was the factual reporting of news; i.e., the maintenance of a sharp distinction between news and political commentaries. This assumes an added importance because no such distinction in output is made in their own communications media. It cannot be assumed automatically that the awareness of this difference on the part of listeners in Soviet areas aids the effectiveness of VOA; however, if the awareness of this difference adds to the credibility of the broadcasts, then it would be worth emphasizing even more the desirability of the American practice. It was learned after World War II that among the Germans BBC had

enjoyed a high rating on credibility. The fact that a clear distinction was made between news and political commentary on BBC broadcasts greatly aided the British in developing and holding a listening audience.

Finally, the audit of VOA output in the two periods studied sought to describe approach and style. A subject matter can be approached by a broadcaster either in a matter-of-fact way, i.e., without conveying or appealing to emotions, or it can be approached in an emotional context. The sentence, "There are many slave labor camps in the Soviet Union," is a matter-of-fact statement. It does not betray the broadcaster's feeling about this matter, nor does it appeal to the emotions of the listener. However, if the same statement is preceded by a phrase such as "It is a horrible truth that . . . ." it clearly conveys the strong feelings of the announcer. Or, if such a statement is followed by a description of the suffering endured by the people in those camps, it is clearly designed to appeal to the humanitarian instincts of the listening audience. In other words a stylistic approach can either be free from emotion or not. The emotions appealed to may vary widely: the tone of the announcer may be one expressing approval or disapproval, praise or condemnation, humor, pathos, and sympathy.

One-third of the material broadcast by VOA was presented in a matter-of-fact approach; two-thirds in a manner that conveyed emotional overtones. Although there appeared to be very little change in this respect between the two periods in which the total world output was considered, there were, nevertheless, changes noted in broadcasts directed to specific areas. Broadcasts addressed to Western Europe became more matter of fact during the second period (from 14 to 31 percent); this was also true for broadcasts directed to the Near and Middle East (from 25 to 42 percent). However, broadcasts directed to the Far East in the second period utilized emotional appeals to a much greater extent than for the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities (the increase was from 46 to 54 percent).

When output embodying emotional appeals was more closely examined, the audit revealed a strikingly subtle but very significant finding. Although shades of style are very difficult to ascertain with any high degree of accuracy merely by an examination of the written translated word, an attempt was made to identify and to tabulate emotionally colored themes that expressed disapproval of the Communists. A typical example of this approach is taken from a broadcast to the USSR on 19 January 1951:

> "It is common knowledge that the Communist regime with its fanatical commitment to the destruction of all intellectual freedom, its everlasting purges of this or that group of its own subjects, its concentration camps in which 15 million slaves of the state languish — it is common knowledge, I say, that the Communist regime outshines both the West and the cruelest tyrannies of the past in brutality of its treatment of the human being."

This type of strong language constituted only 3 percent of all emotional approaches used in the spring of 1950 but 21 percent of all emotional approaches in the winter of 1950–1951. This increase was particularly marked in broadcasts to those target countries that are either geographically or politically involved in Korean hostilities. This crescendo of emotion in VOA output reflects — as dramatically as any other aspect of the audit — changes that took place in VOA broadcasts following the outbreak of Korean hostilities.

Thus the output of VOA in response to international events underwent many changes in emphasis all designed to make VOA a more hard-hitting instrument of

international propaganda. The quantitative information contained in this audit of VOA output supplied basic data to the policy makers as they sought to chart future courses of action in the international radio propaganda struggle.

CHECKING OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF LOUDSPEAKER EQUIPMENT

By W. E. D.

The operational efficiency and capacity of electronic equipment should never be assumed, rather it should be tested. This simple maxim was not observed in Korea in 1950 and the early months of 1951.

On 15 September 1950 two American combat divisions landed at Inchon, Korea, behind the main lines of resistance offered by the North Korean Communist forces. They pushed inland to liberate the Seoul sector and to threaten the security of Communists further south. The North Korean Army was thus forced into a hasty retreat from South Korea. With this withdrawal the UN forces broke out of the Taegu perimeter, pursuing Communists as they retreated northward to escape capture or destruction.

As the North Korean troops scattered in hasty retreat along the highways leading north it became evident to those Americans on the spot that the Eighth Army psychological warfare effort under such circumstances was severely handicapped by the lack of loudspeaker equipment sufficiently rugged to withstand the difficulties of terrain, mobile enough to reach the advanced outposts of resistance, and sufficiently powerful to carry an intelligible message above the din and noise of battle. It was then that the proposal was advanced to mount a loudspeaker system on an airplane.

This proposal was not original. During World War II the Navy mounted loudspeaker systems on planes for use in combat propaganda operations. Four PV-1's were outfitted with loudspeaker systems in the US during 1944. Three of these were sent to Europe and North Africa; however, two of the three cracked up and the third received but slight attention. The fourth PV-1 was dispatched to the Pacific area, where it was assigned to the psychological warfare section of the Central Pacific Command for use in operations against the Japanese. However, despite a big publicity build-up, tests designed to assess the audibility of messages from 2000 or more feet proved so disappointing that little support could be secured for promoting its use in contested combat areas.

Following the Okinawa campaign, in midsummer 1945, the original Navy voice plane "Polly" was abandoned for four Privateers — four-engine Navy version of the Army B-24 Liberator bomber. These planes mounted a larger speaker system, could carry more electrical equipment, and were equipped with heavier defensive armament. Only one of these planes actually reached the Pacific war theater, and this one did not get nearer to Japan than Hawaii prior to V-J Day.

A Navy veteran who was in Korea in 1950 remembered these attempts to mount a loudspeaker system on aircraft in World War II and suggested that an effort be made to get such equipment for use in Korea. Under conditions then prevailing it was believed that psychological warfare's most important requirement was a powerful speaker system so mounted that it could reach out to the heads of the

furthermost retreating columns to invite harassed troops to surrender. In a country so devoid of modern highways only an aircraft could fulfill such a need.

A transoceanic telephone call was therefore made to the USAF headquarters in Washington on 30 September. In this conversation the Korean requirements for a plane-mounted loudspeaker system were outlined. Steps were immediately taken to locate the required equipment. Two speaker systems believed adequate for the purpose were located at a Naval Air Station in California, and arrangements were made for these and three electronic technicians to be flown at once to the Far East. A transpacific radio message from Washington to FEC suggested that C-47's be secured for mounting the speaker equipment, as these were considered the most appropriate among the various types of aircraft then available.

On 3 October 1950, 3 days after the telephone conversation with Washington, the technicians and the equipment landed in Japan. The task of mounting the speakers and adapting the planes for combat loudspeaker missions was undertaken immediately. Nine A.M., 5 October, was set as the target hour for the completion of the installation on the first plane. However, even though the men followed a round-the-clock schedule, the speaker system did not pass a ground test until 7 October. On 8 October, 2:30 A.M., the first plane mounting a speaker system with newly assigned crew took off from Japan for Korea.

During the period when the equipment was being assembled and mounted, considerable advance discussion of the project occurred in Korea. As early as 1 October, Korean time, at precisely the time the equipment was being moved aboard aircraft in California, the psychological warfare officer at Eighth Army had notified the separate corps and divisions that "a powerful loudspeaker had been procured and shipped from the ZI," which would be mounted on a plane and probably placed in operation by 3 October. This premature announcement brought a flood of requests from the several divisions, each asking that psychological warfare missions be flown over their separate sectors of responsibility. Since the first plane was not placed in operation until several days later, these early requests led to much disappointment.

The plane, with the newly mounted equipment, reached Eighth Army headquarters early on the morning of 8 October. The first airborne loudspeaker mission undertaken in Korea was a test flight near the Eighth Army headquarters. The project officer assigned to supervise the maintenance of the equipment described this mission as "most unsatisfactory." Broadcasts were made in the Korean language, but no one was located to whom the broadcast message had been intelligible, and no Korean-speaking person had been designated to monitor the broadcast.

Yet, even though the first tests of the equipment proved so disappointing, the plane was assigned two flight missions the following day. Five separate messages were broadcast over each of the two targets, but again no one was assigned to check on either the audibility or the intelligibility of the messages broadcast. The next day, 10 October 1950, the plane and crew were directed to the northeast coastal city of Wonsan to broadcast messages appropriate to a city then under UN attack. Because the air over the city was a beehive of activity, with F-80's, F-51's, and B-26's flying combat missions, the *Voice* (the name given to this first plane) was ordered to fly at 10,000 feet for 30 minutes and then to come down to a height of 8000 feet for another 45 minutes. (It was later ascertained that messages broadcast from such altitudes could not possibly have been intelligible to anyone on the ground.) An American news correspondent who was in the city with Republic of Korea troops stated that a noise was heard coming from the plane, that Koreans,

civilian and military, stopped, looked, and listened with a bewildered expression. Yet, no one thought to ask these Koreans what, if anything, they heard or understood from the broadcasts. The crew aboard the plane was thus unable to ascertain whether their messages were intelligible to the target addressed.

With only time out for necessary maintenance of speaker and aircraft equipment, both the *Voice* and the *Speaker* (the second loudspeaker plane), which reached Korea in mid-November, continued in operation until mid-March 1951, with no one demanding that adequate tests be flown to ascertain the capabilities and limitations of loudspeaker systems mounted on fast-moving relatively low-flying planes. In mid-March, after a determined clamor by a few individuals in the Eighth Army PWD, tests were flown over the Army headquarters. Again, the results observed were most discouraging. When the plane was flown at altitudes higher than 1500 feet only a small part of the message was intelligible. When the plane flew at altitudes lower than 1500 feet the noise of the motors drowned out a great part of the message. Even when the plane flew at an altitude permitting maximum audibility the intelligible part of a broadcast message was not more than approximately 11 seconds in length. On at least two experimental flights, not a sound was heard on the ground, even though the individuals on the plane reported that the amplifying equipment was reproducing a terrific volume of noise. It thus became apparent that one could not test audibility, much less intelligibility, of airborne loudspeaker broadcasts from within the plane. For maximally effective results it was really necessary to have a ground-to-plane communications system, and someone should be stationed on the ground to communicate listening results immediately.

These tests, which were conducted during March and April after nearly 6 months of operations in the combat zone, clearly showed that a number of changes were desirable. First, the speaker panel should be mounted on the plane's fuselage to provide audibility from greater altitudes. Second, a two-way plane-to-ground communications system was required to test the audibility of messages broadcast. Third, since the electronics equipment proved to be so fragile it was desirable, if not necessary, that the system be checked out for operational efficiency prior to each mission flown.

Following this series of tests, which was conducted under field and pseudo-field conditions, a number of changes were ordered. First, the two planes were ordered to return to a Japanese airbase where the speaker horns were removed from the left rear door and placed under the fuselage. This was to permit greater audibility of broadcasts from higher altitudes. Second, radio sending and receiving sets, of the kind used by infantry patrols, were placed aboard each plane so that it became possible for the propaganda crew in the plane to communicate through two-way conversation with groups on the ground. This move was designed to accomplish two objectives. First, to permit a more effective and meaningful checkout of the equipment, and second, to allow for greater flexibility of control and direction when in flight over friendly units.

The airborne loudspeaker equipment used in Korea from October 1950 to April 1951 proved to have one characteristic in common with ground loudspeaker systems used both in Korea and in the various war theaters of World War II. The operational efficiency of the equipment was highly unpredictable. Tubes would blow out and generators would fail to start. These were all too often discovered just prior to the time set for broadcasts. This points inevitably to the conclusion that the operating efficiency of electronic equipment should be checked frequently and certainly prior to taking off on every important mission. Non- or malfunctioning

parts may be replaced, and if this is not possible in the time available, it may be better to forego a planned mission rather than risk the loss of men in what could only be an ineffective operation at best.

Loudspeaker equipment, of whatever design, no matter how mounted, is composed of many intricate and fragile parts. Poor adjustment of parts and rough treatment given equipment in combat surely leads to low output; i.e., the audible range of broadcasts may be lowered almost to the zero point of efficiency. As was discovered in Korea, any instrument as delicate as a high-powered loudspeaker system can be operating at a greatly reduced level of efficiency without the announcer or those near him being aware of this deficiency. Thus, to be certain that one is capable of performing the mission undertaken, periodic examination and assessment of equipment is essential.

Observations of loudspeaker missions undertaken in Korea in 1951 and reports of experiments performed in the Pacific area in World War II suggest that there may be wide variations in the hearing capacity of individuals of different cultures. A loudspeaker system installed in a jungle area in the last war was audibly and clearly heard by US Marines at a distance of 500 yards but could be heard by Japanese troops at a maximum distance of 300 yards. This experiment may have been performed in such a way that differences indicated were neither real nor typical of those that may exist between individuals from separate and distinct cultures. However, nothing would be lost in checking broadcasts with representative persons from target audiences under near field conditions. It is possible that some languages carry better over loudspeaker equipment than others, even when spoken by the same individual. Surely there are differences in the voice tone, modulation, and pitch among different announcers. Thus in checking the operational efficiency of equipment it is not enough merely that someone test the audibility of messages spoken in English, when this is not the language of the audience to be addressed.

In summary, before checking the effectiveness of any psychological warfare operation involving the use of loudspeakers either airborne or ground, a check should be made of the operating efficiency of the equipment. It is not enough to assume that it is operating efficiently as was done for 5 or 6 months in Korea, during which time, incidentally, there were numerous reports of how broadcast messages had influenced enemy soldiers to react in certain desired ways. Psychological warfare personnel, in attempting to evaluate results obtained from specific missions, became suspicious when they were unable to locate individuals who had heard or who could repeat what had actually been broadcast in any known broadcast utilizing loudspeakers. When actual tests were flown serious doubts were raised whether anyone could have been influenced to desert or surrender through the utilization of a medium that performed so poorly or inadequately.

PATTERNS OF RECEPTION FOR MEDIA EMPLOYED

It should go without saying that a target audience can hardly be expected to be influenced to react in certain desired ways if it has not been properly addressed. For example, radio broadcasts should not be expected to be effective in stimulating people who had no way of receiving the transmitted messages. Similarly printed messages are seldom, if ever, effective when employed against a population largely illiterate. Thus a second essential step in evaluating a propaganda effort is the determination of whether the audience addressed is capable of receiving the transmitted message.

This second step in the evaluation process is closely tied in with target analysis, discussed in Chap. 7. Obviously if through target analysis the propagandist has received accurate and complete data on the group or groups addressed any evaluation designed to test the audience's capability of receiving the transmitted messages would be unnecessary. However, there is seldom if ever such complete analysis of a target group, and furthermore an independent and later survey or check is usually helpful in assuring the most effective results.

The requirement that one ought to assess the capability of a target audience to receive a propaganda message has not always been observed in past actions. From approximately 9 December 1941 until the late spring of 1944, first the COI and later the OWI broadcast short-wave programs to the Japanese homeland, in the Japanese language, on the implied assumption that the broadcast messages were reaching the Japanese masses. This could not have been so because few Japanese families possessed receiving sets capable of receiving short-wave broadcasts.

Late in the spring of 1944 American propaganda administrators made a more realistic assessment of the situation and concluded that it was not likely that many Japanese people, beyond the circles of the governing elite, could possibly listen to foreign short-wave broadcasts, owing to the lack of proper receiving sets. As the result of this reassessment of the target, the content of American short-wave broadcasts to the Japanese Empire afterward was more deliberately slanted to reach the political-military elite segment of the population. It was believed that these individuals were either monitoring American broadcasts or had access to transcripts of such broadcasts on a fairly regular basis.

"Survey of Communications Patterns in Jordan" is an adaptation and summary of a report prepared for US strategic information agencies by a Columbia University research group. It is illustrative of a type of study designed to assess the ability of a given target group to receive propaganda that has been disseminated. The study shows the completely nonmonolithic character of a national target audience and the necessity to use various media of communications in order to reach the different segments of the population. As suggested earlier, the matter of assessing patterns of reception among target groups is so closely related to target analysis it would have been just as logical to have reproduced this study following the discussion on target analysis in Chap. 7. Thus, target analysis and assessment of effects, particularly those aspects relating to reception capability, must not be thought of as something greatly different and therefore independent of each other.

SURVEY OF COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS IN JORDAN*

By M. J.

Interviews were conducted with a representative sample of the Trans-Jordan population to determine by what media of communications they learn the news — local, national, and international.

Mass communications are generally directed to selected audiences since the major social groupings of a country have different communications habits and interests. Thus social groupings selected as key targets can be reached most effectively only if there exists adequate knowledge of their communications habits and the confidence these groups place in the information from the various media.

To chart the communications habits and interest of different social groupings, the sample survey is a most appropriate tool. Through this technique, it is possible to gather valuable data on public opinion, and to gage reactions to different media and their specific content.

In the early part of 1951, when American international information activities became especially preoccupied with the strategic areas of the Middle East, surveys were undertaken to determine the status of public opinion and the pattern of communications in this vital region. There was little previous experience and no research on which to rely for this portion of the world. The study reported here was designed to ascertain the comparative role of the several mass media and face-to-face communications in the lives of the various segments of the Jordan population. It was also designed to help anticipate reactions to continuing developments of the mass media in that area.

In studying the people of Jordan, four groups that are sociologically distinct were chosen, ranging from the "lowest" points in Jordan society to the highest. There is no claim that the sum of these parts equals Jordan. The analysis merely helps in understanding the attitudes and communications patterns of four numerically significant groups in Jordan society: desert Bedouins, village farmers, town and city bourgeoisie, and cosmopolitan elite. The farmers are principally those working their own parcels of land, not including the extremes of absentee landlord or landless laborer. The bourgeoisie are middle class, small entrepreneurs and white-collar workers of high-school education or less, while the elite represents the college-educated upper middle and upper classes.

Native interviewers, hired and trained by the Columbia University representative in the field, conducted 325 interviews. The interview itself was based on an interview guide of some 50 pages that covered exposure to both domestic and foreign radio broadcasts, the press, motion picture, and opinions and attitudes on local, national, and international affairs. Each interview took from 2 to 3 hours to complete.

Because of the study's focus on the role of the mass media, the sample was especially designed to overrepresent those members of the population who were regularly exposed to radio, and in this regard two radio listeners were interviewed for

* Adapted from a report of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, Aug 51, prepared for IIA, Department of State.

every nonlistener. The sample was controlled to provide respondents from urban and rural communities in a ratio of approximately 2 to 1. Three men were interviewed for every woman, and the sample was divided relatively equally between respondents who were in high-, medium-, and low-income brackets.*

In an interview lasting from 2 to 3 hours, in which an individual answers several different types of questions on the same subject, it is difficult, though not impossible, to conceal duplicity from the interviewer and/or the analyst. A careful reading of the questionnaires, interview by interview, left the impression that subjects were sincere and quite frank in their answers; e.g., many were outspoken to the point of freely criticizing the US. However, it is necessary to bear in mind possible pro-American biases arising from undetected prejudices present in the selective sample of radio-listening types and the tempering of political observations among those sampled.

Major Group Differences

Educational levels are, of course, radically different among the groups, and this has important implications for their information about the world and their interest in the mass media. Practically all the Bedouins are illiterate; and all the elite are college graduates. Thus, for example, the percentage who could correctly identify the Secretary General of the UN runs from 0 to practically 100 percent.

Not only do the groups of respondents differ in information, but in the types of news in which they are interested. For example, all were asked to report items of news they had heard most recently. Table 2 shows not only the kind of news they heard but the types of news *recalled* — in other words, the types of news that are most important.

Family and local news preempts roughly seven out of ten of the items reported by Bedouins, drops sharply in the farm group, and falls off to insignificance in the urban bourgeoisie, and elite. *International news*, on the other hand, nonexistent among Bedouin responses, represents nine out of ten of the items reported by the elite.

How are such news items heard? Do the groups differ in their sources of information as well as the types of news they hear? Table 3 shows the manner in which the news items were received.

The reliance on word-of-mouth news drops steadily from Bedouins to elite, whereas reliance on the newspaper increases. Radio as a source of information appears fairly constant in all groups except the Bedouin, but probably reflects the fact that radio listeners were purposely oversampled in all groups.

Checking these differences in utilization of the various information channels shows to what extent the five groups are regularly exposed to the three mass media. Table 4 represents the responses to the questions: "Do you listen to the radio? Read the newspaper? Attend the cinema?"

* Geographically the interviews were conducted in both rural and urban sections of the Belqua area surrounding Ammam, the Ajlun area surrounding Irbid, and the area surrounding the city of Nablus in Samaria, Palestine. This sample provides, then, a rough approximation of the more literate population of Jordan living in areas where the mass media tend to exert their greatest influence. It is therefore important that the findings of the study be interpreted in terms of the sample design and *not* as representative of the Jordan population as a whole.

TABLE 1

CORRECT IDENTIFICATION OF TRYGVE LIE

Group	No. of respondents	No. correctly identifying, %
Bedouins	26	0
Farmers[a]	12	17
Bourgeoisie[b]		
Rural	18	55
Urban	37	82
Elite	29	97

[a] Although 12 cases may be too few to be of any statistical significance, the fact that they consistently fall between Bedouins and bourgeoisie seems to validate their distinctiveness as a group.

[b] Rural and urban bourgeoisie are considered separately only where significant differences are apparent.

TABLE 2

NEWS ITEMS RECENTLY HEARD

Group	No. of respondents	No. of items	Type of item heard, %			
			Family or local	National	International	Other
Bedouins	26	19	68	16	0	16
Farmers	12	20	20	25	50	5
Bourgeoisie						
Rural	18	30	23	20	50	7
Urban	37	64	2	22	70	6
Elite	29	43	0	9	91	0

TABLE 3

CHANNELS OF INFORMATION FOR NEWS ITEMS RECENTLY HEARD

Group	No. of respondents	No. of items	Items received by various media, %		
			Word of mouth	Radio	Newspaper
Bedouins	26	26	100	0	0
Farmers	12	12	50	42	8
Bourgeoisie					
Rural	18	18	37	50	13
Urban	37	38	21	48	31
Elite	29	33	15	36	49

TABLE 4

EXPOSURE TO RADIO, NEWSPAPER, AND MOVIES

Group	No. of respondents	Each group actively exposed, %		
		Radio listeners	Newspaper readers	Cinema attenders
Bedouins	26	0	0	0
Farmers	12	58	25	25
Bourgeoisie				
Rural	18	84	55	50
Urban	37	79	67	62
Elite	29	97	93	83

TABLE 5

AWARENESS OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS[a]

Group	No. of respondents	Broadcast by country, %		
		Great Britain[b]	US	Russia
Bedouins	0[c]	0	0	0
Farmers	12	42	25	17
Bourgeoisie	55	69	27	22
Elite	29	97	62	59

[a] Only the most frequently mentioned non-Eastern stations are included in this table.
[b] This represents awareness of Great Britain as a broadcaster, and does not include mention of the British-controlled "Cyprus" station.
[c] The Bedouins know practically nothing of what is available on the radio.

TABLE 6

LISTENING TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS

Group	No. of respondents	Respondents listening, %
Bedouins	26	0
Farmers	12	28
Bourgeoisie	55	57
Elite	29	72

Exposure to all three media increases from Bedouins to the elite. This reflects availability of and interest in these media, as well as such factors as literacy and extent of poverty among the different groups.

Before a person can be a potential listener to foreign broadcasts, he must of course become aware that they exist. There are again large differences between the various groups in awareness of foreign broadcasts. As Table 5 shows, all groups were most aware of BBC, but this awareness of British broadcasts increases according to position in the social structure. Knowledge about broadcasts from both the US and Russia shows roughly the same trend.

Actual listening to foreign broadcasts also increases with the social level. More than seven out of ten of the elite listen to foreign broadcasts, whereas less than six out of ten bourgeoisie and three out of ten farmers listen to such broadcasts, as shown in Table 6.

What do the different groups like to hear on the radio? Table 7 presents the first and second preferences of programs of the groups.

TABLE 7

FAVORITE RADIO PROGRAMS

Group	No. of respondents	First and second preferences, %			
		News	Arabic music	Koran	Western music
Bedouins	26	0	0	0	0
Farmers	12	71	57	71	0
Bourgeoisie	55	90	57	14	14
Elite	29	64	42	4	68

News and music are popular with all three groups that listen to radio broadcasts but fewer if the elite singled out news broadcasts as one of their two favorite programs. This is probably not due to reduced interest in news but to richer tastes for other kinds of "favorite" programs among the elite. Particularly, Western music is among the favorites of the elite. Western music is not mentioned by the farm group, but seven out of ten of the elite refer to such jazz and classical European music programs. Nearly all the farmers cited the Koran as a favorite program but the percentage drops to insignificance with the bourgeoisie and elite.

This points up the striking differences in communication habits between particular groups. By contrasting the Bedouins with the elite in greater detail, the potentialities and limitations of the mass media in that area become clearer.

Bedouins

The Bedouins live in a nearly perfect communications vacuum with the outer world. A combination of geographic isolation, poverty, and illiteracy as well as a lack of interest in affairs beyond "our tents and our camels"[1] place them on the lowest rung in the communication ladder. Information trickles so slowly and so rarely into the Bedouin camp that half of the respondents had never heard of the US or Russia, and the remainder had only the most naive notions about these nations.

But ignorance of the civilized world extends beyond even such rudimentary political matters, and reaches into the awareness of modern means of communications as well. A good share of the group had never heard of motion pictures or radio, and a few had not heard of newspapers.

Unlike the illiterate Greek peasant or mountain villager of Lebanon, who are aware of their lack of information about the world and who are highly desirous of improving their own or children's education, the Bedouin is quite content with his present level of information. He feels that matters outside his tribe are none of his concern. His strong individualism and his resistance to civilization cause him to despise the "corruption" and "girlishness" of the cities, and to regard technology with some contempt and much suspicion.

The newspapers and cinema, for example, are associated with the soft civilization of Amman. As such, they are considered more for politicians and the decadent part of mankind than for decent human beings.

Reaction toward the radio, however, seems to be favorable among *all those who have heard it*, apparently caused by the fact that it transmits both Arabic music and the Koran and requires no girlish literacy for its reception. Favorable attitudes toward the radio (among those who have heard it) may also have something to do with the time-honored and exclusive means of communication in the Bedouin tribe — word of mouth. Information and opinions seem to stem from two oral sources: travelers who come in contact with members of the camp, and the sheik and tribal elders. It is the task of the sheik to judge and arbitrate in all important disputes, and his opinion is highly respected by members of the tribe. The Bedouin, then, is accustomed to oral sources of information and wisdom.

Ignorance, provincialism, and religiosity of the Bedouin all contribute to the impression of imperviousness against introduction of the mass media. This is a somewhat misleading impression. Though this conclusion seems sound for the sample of Bedouins, the few cases that deviate in some degree from this general pattern are important indicators of possible future trends.

Among the radio listeners are those few individuals who have had contact with the West. For example, one shepherd boy has been so exposed because he had a brother who worked for the Americans a few years ago, and who told him the Americans were "good and rich." This boy admires the Americans every time he sees their planes flying overhead. He regrets that he does not listen to the radio but blames it on the elders who "don't like the presence of a radio in the camp." He claims that these elders would have to be convinced before a radio would be allowed.

It would appear that the religious objections to the radio are in part due to lack of familiarity with its contents. For once the words of Allah and his prophet are heard from it, it must inevitably cease to be an instrument of the devil. Yet, several respondents related that the tribal chiefs and elders forbade the use of the radio. One young shepherd, for example, who felt that he loses nothing by his illiteracy and would not care to learn to read and write, is sufficiently interested in radio so that he would like to save enough to buy one.

> "Only it has to be very small and very easy to conceal so that I will not meet the disapproval of my father."

That such objections to the radio may largely be religious rationalization is pointed out by the only literate member of the Bedouin sample, a patrolman of modest existence.

> "We don't listen here because there is no electricity. I think that is the main cause *although some people might tell you the chief doesn't allow it. I know that you could get one.*"

It may be concluded that the *objections to the radio are threefold:* general lack of interest in anything coming from the outer world; ignorance of what the radio is, and lack of information of its programing; and absence of electricity in Bedouin tribes, as well as poverty.

Probably little could be done about the first problem, although it appears that some of these people might be stimulated to wider interests through their existing interest in music. If the second problem were attacked *by demonstrating that the radio broadcasts the Koran and Arabic music* as well as news of the outer world, it is probable that many people could be induced to listen. The scarcity of electricity, of course, limits Bedouin listening to those places and times when they come in contact with civilization or are provided with facilities. The main hope, however, is the effect that radio has already had on some Bedouins.

There is one final possible weak spot in the seeming insulation against the mass media: the desire of *some* Bedouins to gain importance within their community by being well informed. This interest was singularly absent from most interviews, for the Bedouins feel that to be well informed is to know only what is going on in their own community. One housewife of modest existence, however, may have been speaking for more than herself when she told of her interest in radio. It stemmed from an accidental encounter, but the interest is reinforced by the desire to be somebody in the community through having a monopoly on news and music from the outer world.

> "What do you think of the radio?"

> "That thing that sings? Ah, that, by God, sounds nice. Have you one like it? Let's see, bring it that we may listen to what it says. I heard the radio once while passing through the city. It was in a coffee house and I couldn't go in to see who was singing, but I took my sister-in-law and peeped through a back window and there I saw a wooden chest instead of a man singing, and many men were crowding around it. I was greatly amazed, and swore to a man to tell me what that strange thing was and he told me it was a radio.

> "I'm curious about the *sort of songs they sing in there.* They are so different from ours. *I like to learn them. They will arouse a new sensation among the tribesmen and women.*

> "*Those who listen to the radio must know more things to say in social gatherings and that makes them more interesting and more important in the tribe.*

> "What would have to happen for you to listen to the radio?

> "By God and the holy Prophet, get me a radio and I'll listen to what it says and I'll teach what I'll learn to all my friends.

> "How would that make you feel?

> "By God, grand. I'll have the word to say among the women. I'll surely get to know more than any of them does.

This woman either is or would like to be an opinion leader among the women. Using both music and news she would spread the radio content to other members of the female community — something that would raise her status as well as raise the informational level of her friends.

In summary then, most Bedouins are psychological as well as physical isolates, but a few among them show an awakening interest in radio.

*Elite**

The elite represents the peak of Jordan society in level of information, interest in the world at large, and exposure to the mass media. Practically all come from the major cities in Jordan, and though the occupations range from a wealthy and college-educated restaurant owner in Amman to a member of Parliament, more typical of the occupations are the lawyers, doctors, teachers, and government officials. This is the most Westernized group that occurs in the sample. All but two speak English, and one is Westernized to the extent that she can read Arabic only with difficulty. Half of this group have traveled in Europe, and 23 of the 29 read such western publications as the *New York Times*, *Time*, *Woman's Home Journal*, *Colliers*, and *Vogue*.

An equally striking evidence of their Westernization is the strong preference for Occidental music. Among those in other groups who mention any interest in music, Eastern music is usually cited; among the elite, however, 22 of the 28 radio listeners mention Western music (classical and jazz). The range of selections shows a definite cosmopolitan taste.

Their attitudes toward the mass media differ considerably from those of the other groups. Newspapers, motion pictures, and radio are not merely channels to education or entertainment, they are an integral part of civilization, and as such are necessities rather than luxuries. They think of radio chiefly in terms of its news value, but their programing preferences indicate their strong interest in classical music and jazz. With such respondents, all resistance to the motion picture on religious grounds disappears and, additionally, its educational value becomes dominant. But the following testimony seem to show more than this; it seems to indicate that the cinema is more than liked — it is revered.

One respondent said,

> "Movies are the best means of communicating a nation's culture and art through a tangible and visible way."

A college-educated housewife reported,

> "[Movies] can be very good, useful, psychologically and morally. . . ."

A wealthy college-trained architect said,

> ". . . I couldn't imagine how flat life would be without the movies. It has become *very essential* that everybody should go to the movies and learn many things about the secrets of life."

The elite have the highest degree of exposure to foreign broadcasting; only 8 of the 29 do not hear any foreign broadcasts. All but one respondent are aware that Britain broadcasts to Jordan, and over half are aware of the US and Russian

* No part of the account concerning "Farm Villagers of Jordan" (pp 26–42) and "The Bourgeoisie" (pp 43–77) of the original study has been reproduced in this account.

broadcasts. More than half of those who listen to foreign broadcasts have heard BBC within the past month, five have heard VOA, and one has heard Radio Moscow.

What differentiates the elite who listen from those who do not listen to US and British broadcasts? It might be suspected that the degree of previous exposure to the West or taste for Western music might distinguish them, but this was not the case.

Consequently, psychological factors must be considered as a possibility. Here the only difference that could be found seems to be a certain self-dissatisfaction, or at least dissatisfaction with the listener's own nation. A much higher percentage of BBC or VOA listeners give critical descriptions of Jordanians than do the other elite. Some of the adjectives used by the listening group in describing the people of Jordan are raw, rash, lazy, ignorant, credulous, in need of culture, stupid, bitter, and downbeaten.

These adjectives are not typical of the usual self-praising nationalistic spirit. It might be possible that those of the elite who are most critical of their own people look to other nations and foreign broadcasts more readily. If this were true it would be expected that they would be discontented with the local radio stations and turn to foreign broadcasts. This is also true. Of the total of 15 BBC and VOA listeners, only 4 gave their approval to the local stations.

Those who do not listen to the British and American broadcasts, although quite aware of them, are content with both their own people and their own stations. Their adjectives are considerably more favorable in describing Jordanians, and their reasons for preferring their own stations are merely expressions of satisfaction.

It might be thought that all those who fail to listen to BBC or VOA do so because of their political opposition to the West; but this cannot be so. For in answer to the question "*Why does (the United States, Great Britain) broadcast in Arabic?*" *all* the listeners to these BBC, VOA, and Arabic programs cite propaganda, deceit, imperialism, or "interests" in Jordan. In the case of Britain, most of the responses refer to her more direct interests in the Middle East. With regard to the US, however, only one respondent refers to specific interests in Jordan. The other responses fall into two categories: the US broadcasts "just for propaganda"; the US broadcasts either in atonement for her anti-Arab policy in Palestine, or to dupe the Arabs into thinking they are her friends despite this policy.

The respondents in the first group have nothing specific to which they attribute these motives of the US, yet they are uneasy about her intentions. Since they feel that it is neither out of love for Jordan nor for any direct interest in their country, it must be propaganda — just "general propaganda" as one respondent terms it. More respondents refer to the Palestine question in their remarks. They feel that the US is trying to appease the Arabs by her broadcasts, but that it is too late for such words. To two members of the elite, the idea that the US should broadcast after what had transpired in Palestine was absolutely infuriating. So infuriated are some Jordanians, comments one respondent, that they listen to Russia's untruths against the US out of spite! In other words, their hatred is so intense that they will listen to anything derogatory, however false. Perhaps the best statement expressing the general views of the elite comes from a college-educated Amman lawyer of modest circumstances.

> ". . . American and British propaganda, prevalent as they are here, have depicted Russia as an aggressive country seeking to drive the whole world into a ruthless and exterminating war to serve its own interests and welfare.

"Have you changed your attitude toward Russia recently?

"Who do you think in the Arab world believes American or English propaganda?"

The question that arises after a perusal of such attitudes toward foreign broadcasting is, why does anyone listen to them? There appear to be several answers, but they all revolve around a basic attitude. Although the motivation of these broadcasts is decried, the content of the programs is of sufficient interest to promote listening. Classical music and jazz, for example, are forms of entertainment highly valued by the elite, and an important reason for their listening to BBC. Technical and scientific talks were also mentioned by a few listeners, and these too can be enjoyed regardless of the distrust of the nation's motives.

But there are also one or two clues as to why foreign news is listened to. One may be in order to "know your enemy." An accountant who is both a BBC and VOA listener explained his listening to Israel this way: "I like to know what they say because it is wiser to know who is your enemy and how much does he know about you."

An auditor who listens to several Arab stations, as well as to BBC, explained his listening habits as a need to "average out" the statements of the various countries in order to determine the truth. Finally there may be a technical reason why the Jordanian elite listen to foreign broadcasts. Several respondents mentioned that they receive BBC quite clearly on their radios. It may also help to explain why VOA's audience is small even among so select a group as the elite. All five who have heard the VOA broadcasts hear them infrequently because of poor reception.

Among the four groups the elite is the most anti-American and anti-Russian. Only 1 of the 29 elite questioned can be classed as a real friend of the US, although there still appears to be a reservoir of good will toward the US. The Palestine incident has created bitter feelings. That Americans are children in politics and that they have blundered into water over their heads as far as foreign policy is concerned were opinions frequently expressed.

The reason for dislike of Russian foreign policy is ostensibly the same as that expressed for dislike of the US — imperialism. But there is one difference: US imperialism was somewhat vague; the respondents could not pin down US specific interests in the Middle East, they could only point to Palestine and occasionally to Korea. Where Russia is concerned, however, the imperialism is made a bit more specific by defining it more as expansionism.

Those who favor Russia do so for various reasons with no particular reason standing out. A few refer to Russian might; a few to her peaceful aims as evidenced by her lack of interference in the affairs of Jordan and Korea. Two respondents render an opinion that is quite interesting, and one that may be more common than its frequency of occurrence among the elite suggests. It is the feeling that Russia really has nothing to do with Jordan and with the Arab states. These countries are too poor and too unimportant even to attract Russia's attention.

There seems to be no relation between exposure to foreign radio broadcasts and attitudes toward Russia and the US. Of the seven respondents who volunteered favorable comments on Russia, four listen to the US or Great Britain. Of the 16 who oppose Russia, 6 listen to their broadcasts.

ASSESSING IMPACT ON AUDIENCE

In assessing the impact of a propaganda program or campaign on a target group the evaluator is handicapped in two very important ways: adequate techniques have not been developed for measuring such effects with any high degree of precision; and there is no general agreement as to criteria to use in assessing over-all results. Thus any discussion of this subject may prove something less than completely satisfactory to those whose training and experience have led them to value assessment results only when these reflect the use of the most vigorous and scientific statistical measuring devices.

The most that can be shown from the illustrative case studies that follow in this chapter is to demonstrate some of the possible range of techniques that may be utilized and how even these do not yield results that are entirely satisfactory. Among the useful devices that have been employed in past propaganda operations to assess psychological effects are the following.

Content Analysis of Intercepted Mail, Captured Military Documents, Monitored Radio Broadcasts, and Newspapers and News Magazines Printed in the Target Area

Content analysis refers to the use of various systematic and objective techniques for describing the content of the more important media of communications. These devices may be used to arrive at a summary description of the content or they may be used to draw inferences as to the intent of the originator of the communication, as to the attitudes of the audience toward which a message or series of communications is directed, or as to the effects of the communication on the group addressed.

Content analysis of communications may be reported in either *quantitative* or *qualitative* terms. For example, an analyst may report that a given percentage of a newspaper's content refers to a given subject, such as the US, the UN, or the cold-war struggle between the East and the West. Much of content analysis must, however, be reported in qualitative terms, i.e., confined to a listing of the major themes discussed in the communication.

Results obtained from content analysis should never be interpreted as definitive but rather as indicative of probable conditions and trends. Such analysis should always be supplemented by other intelligence data, whenever and wherever they can be obtained.

Textual analyses of documents, radio intercepts, etc., are crucial in psychological warfare evaluation because they involve the use of techniques that can be used to assess probable effectiveness of psychological warfare

communications in areas and groups that might otherwise be inaccessible to an evaluation staff. This is illustrated in "Inferences about Propaganda Impact from Textual and Documentary Analysis."

The case study by Alex Inkeles, "The Soviet Characterization of the Voice of America," is an analysis of references made in Soviet domestic broadcasts and news reports concerning VOA Russian-language broadcasts for a given period of time. The nature and vigor of the counterattacks made against American radio broadcasts, although not definitive evidence of effectiveness, are at least indicative of what propaganda themes left their mark on those members of the governing elite who were responsible for preparing and implementing the Soviet response.

Use of Questionnaires and Interview Schedules

Questionnaires and structured interview schedules are basic tools used by assessment personnel for obtaining information by personal interview, whether the interview is with a prisoner of war, a civilian line crosser, or a refugee from the land of the target group. The purpose of using a questionnaire is chiefly twofold: (a) to remind the interviewer of each question to be asked and (b) to secure replies from interviewers that may be compared to responses from others so that generalizations may be made.

Most interviews follow a prescribed pattern in which both the wording and the order of questions are decided in advance and rigidly adhered to. A less formal type of interview uses an interview schedule — a detailed list of subject matter to be covered — wherein the person conducting the interview is free to vary both the wording and the order of subject matter covered.

The construction of questionnaires and interview schedules is an important subject that cannot be covered in a general work of this kind. However, it is well for the novice to know that there is a growing body of literature on the subject that may be consulted whenever he finds himself saddled with this type of responsibility, and that an important step in constructing an effective questionnaire is the provision that early drafts be pretested on a representative group and that the drafts be revised in accordance with indicated changes.

The validity of the questionnaire as a tool for use in determining psychological warfare effectiveness is limited in the following ways. To be maximally effective the questionnaire should be simple and standardized, and an easy rapport should be established between the interviewer and the interviewee.

The main strength or utility of using a standardized questionnaire in assessment studies is that it thus becomes possible to interpret results obtained as trends or noticeable changes in those aspects of behavior are

being measured. The article by Gurfein and Janowitz, "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale," illustrates how questionnaires were used by American interrogators during World War II to interview Nazi prisoners of war. Five key questions were included in every interview, the answers of which formed the basis used in determining the trend in the status of German soldier morale.*

"An Appeal to German Railroaders," taken from a book by Saul K. Padover,[5] may be cited as an example of the use of a less rigorous interview questionnaire or schedule. Padover and other members of his intelligence team undertook to ascertain what response was received from the Allied propaganda appeal to German railroad workers to slow up operations. After interviewing a sizable group of workers in a liberated German town the team reported to the psychological warfare operators, "Don't waste your time appealing to German railroaders. They will continue to work for Hitler until the last possible moment."

The technique employed by Padover and members of his team has been described as informal interviewing. This involves the use of questions whose wording, form, and order are not prescribed in advance. Such interviews have been found especially useful in the following ways:

(a) To obtain reasons why people hold certain opinions and why they react in certain ways.

(b) To discover the effects of various communications media on them and to pinpoint decisive aspects of the source of influence.

(c) To expand and to clarify the meaning and significance of a respondent's replies.

(d) As pilot studies to determine the range and scope of opinions as preliminary background information useful in the preparation of formal questionnaires.

Use of Panels to Pretest and Posttest Printed Matter, Radio Broadcasts, and Films

When interviews are held with the same group of respondents on two or more occasions, the group involved is called a "panel." Panels are useful in psychological warfare evaluations for a number of purposes. They have been used in past actions to pretest propaganda material in advance of its dissemination in order to ascertain its probable degree of effectiveness.

* A number of case studies involving the use of interviews and questionnaires to obtain data about the target addressed in psychological warfare appeals are to be found in other parts of this volume, particularly in Chap. 7. For a more complete understanding of the role and technique of questioning respondents in order to assess psychological warfare effectiveness it is suggested that the following cases in Chap. 7 be read: "Observations on Russian Soviet Character," "The French Target Audience in 1944," "The Intensive Interview as a Means for Highlighting Target Vulnerabilities," and "A Guide for Interviewing Soviet Escapees."

A small group either representative of or "most nearly like" a propaganda target group is useful for this purpose.* Pretests used on such groups may show what appeals are likely to be effective, how people might react to certain stimuli, what to emphasize, and what to avoid in propaganda appeals.

Panels may be used to ascertain the probable degree of effectiveness of propaganda disseminated in the past. "Truth vs Credibility," in Chap. 8, illustrates how a panel composed of Chinese Communist prisoners of war in Korea was used in such a fashion. Such evaluation techniques are most properly called "posttests."

Panels to be most useful in correctly giving the probable reaction of target groups to a given propaganda stimulus must be nearly representative of the intended target. Since no small group is ever truly representative of a large population, it is necessary to know a lot about the panel members' backgrounds — how they differ from and how they complement the major characteristics of the target group — and it is mandatory that the results obtained in interviewing be interpreted in the light of these differences.

When prisoners of war or refugees are used as panel members it immediately becomes evident that they cannot qualify as truly representative of the population from which they have become separated. The very fact of their defection sets them apart from the target group. However, this fact of their lack of representativeness need not rule out the usefulness of panels, provided panel responses are properly interpreted.

Panels may be used for purposes other than to pretest or posttest ideas, messages, etc., that are to be disseminated or that have been disseminated to a particular population. Both in World War II and in Korea in 1951 and 1952 in the conflict against Chinese Communist Forces, panels of prisoners of war were employed to explore new propaganda approaches, to delve deeper into the cultural-linguistic patterns of the enemy target group, and to get the reactions of members to the use of various photographic and illustrative material that might be used in propaganda output.

Four specific case studies are reproduced in this chapter to show how panels have been used to pretest and posttest printed material, films, and radio broadcast material in recent past operations. Some of the more obvious lessons highlighted by this experience are discussed in the separate cases. "Credibility in Leaflet and Poster Illustrations" points up the need to pretest all aspects of a message, not just the intelligibility or clarity of

* See "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War," in Chap. 4.

the printed or verbal message. The case that follows illustrates many of the difficulties in getting representative and responsive panels that will provide useful meaningful responses.

The case studies "Pretesting Films in World War II" and "Language Panels for Estimating Effectiveness" illustrate some of the problems of getting a "most nearly like" panel for evaluation studies. Important characteristics of the panel, how they were selected, how they were used, and what their principal findings were are brought to light in the studies reproduced in this chapter.

Observation by Nonparticipant and Participant Observers

A method of assessing effectiveness of a psychological warfare effort for which no specific case is thought necessary is that of observation of how people react to a stimulus. It is possible to observe how enemy military troops respond to leaflet barrages and to loudspeaker broadcasts. If defections occur immediately after appeals for them no sophisticated social science technique is needed to ascertain the results secured.

Observation may be by either a nonparticipant, i.e., by one who remains outside the group being observed, or by a participant in the group's activities. As compared to other techniques of evaluation discussed and illustrated by case studies, observation, either by participants or nonparticipants, has certain advantages: first, observers frequently are more able than the interviewer to describe how people really feel; second, it is usually less expensive; and, third, certain kinds of information are more readily obtained by observation than by other means.

On the other hand, observations as a means of assessing propaganda effects has certain drawbacks: first, such information is usually gathered slowly and often in insufficient detail; second, observed data frequently need to be supplemented by other techniques; and, third, observers, particularly participant observers, tend to introduce some personal bias into their observations, usually as a direct result of their own interests and attitudes. Wherever the observer has a strong emotional involvement in the act being observed the bias will be all the greater. Bias may be reduced, however, if the observer uses a schedule that tells him what to observe, where to observe, and how to report what he observes and that provides elementary clues to proper sampling for him, such as may provide some measure of representativeness to his findings. A schedule makes observation systematic, easier, and more complete. However, as with questionnaire construction, observer schedules must be prepared with the most meticulous care to ensure effective results in their use.

INFERENCES ABOUT PROPAGANDA IMPACT FROM TEXTUAL AND DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS

By M. J.

Analyses of documents, radio intercepts, etc., involve use of techniques that permit evaluations covering areas that might otherwise be inaccessible to an evaluations staff.

Notwithstanding the development of questionnaires, surveys, and intensive interviews, research and intelligence on propaganda impact requires careful and sophisticated textual and documentary analysis. Press and radio content from target and neutral countries, speeches by opposition spokesmen and leaders, official documents, and various kinds of audience mail and letters are typically relevant for throwing light on psychological warfare effectiveness. Traditionally, documentary and textual analyses have been employed as research methods by historians, political scientists, and sociologists. The relevance of this approach has increased as skill in the handling of textual materials and documentary sources has increased.* In addition, as basic research on a foreign country or culture area accumulates, the more it is feasible and rewarding to engage in textual and documentary analysis. The evaluation of new data depends on the prior existence of a body of analyzed information.

Textual and documentary analysis is crucial since it can be performed on areas and nations that are otherwise inaccessible. For the Soviet Union the bulk of our knowledge and inferences depend on such textual and documentary analysis. This is of crucial relevance for psychological warfare research, when conditions of tension or actual hostilities make the textual material and documentary sources the only readily available sources.

If the basic objective of textual and documentary analysis is what can be learned of value in evaluating some psychological warfare campaign, then there can be no doubt that in the past this approach has been misused. Gross and unwarranted claims about psychological warfare impact have been made occasionally by those who are inexpert. At times, errors have been made by relying on false or fake documents. Careful scrutiny by experts familiar with the subject matter or the linguistic mode of expression, and who can check for internal consistency, can eliminate to a considerable degree errors arising from false or fake documents. However, the real problem is the misuse of documentary sources by those lacking expertness as well as the difficulties of evaluating these sources even by those who are diligent and comprehensive in their efforts.

For example, punishment and threats of punishment for listening to Allied broadcasts were plentiful during World War II, and they continued to appear in documentary sources from countries behind the iron curtain. This evidence cannot be taken as prima-facie proof of the effectiveness of psychological warfare. In the case of Germany at least, postsurrender investigations indicated that to

* Highly systematic documentary research that emphasizes statistical analysis is called "content analysis." The use of content analysis for evaluating psychological warfare effectiveness is exemplified in the next case, "The Soviet Characterization of the Voice of America." Content analysis can also be applied to one's own output in order to check compliance with directives, and to audit its main characteristics.

some important degree these acts were the result of German leaders' preoccupation with a bad military situation rather than because of the influence of Allied psychological warfare.

One civilian intelligence analyst is quoted as having concluded that:

> "The Nazis occasionally became extremely excited about our leaflets and from time to time chopped off the heads of people who were thought to be especially prone to accepting and diffusing the ideas contained therein. But I attribute this more to the hypersensitivity of the Nazis, who themselves greatly overemphasized the importance of propaganda, than to the actual responsiveness of the miserable Germans to whom they were addressed."[6]

This observation serves the useful purpose of indicating a special factor in evaluating Nazi documentary sources in Germany, namely, Nazi sensitivity to propaganda. This sensitivity seems to characterize all totalitarian leader groups. But the conclusion should not be drawn, as might be from these remarks, that repression of listening in Germany did not reveal anything to the intelligence analyst. The Allied propaganda placed a stress on the Nazi system; such stress could not be crucial even though they had to react to Allied listening with terror. The Nazi system, although it relied in the last analysis on terror, was vulnerable to propaganda in that listening to Allied broadcasting (or interest in foreign information) was an act of defiance in and of itself. Such action at least served to strengthen passive withdrawal and lack of support. The documentary information on the extent of repression of listening to Allied propaganda therefore was an indirect but relevant measure of the fact that our messages were getting through.

Normally, psychological warfare intelligence relies heavily on neutral and enemy press and radio as a source of evidence concerning psychological warfare effectiveness. Psychological warfare operators must perform their tasks under great pressure of time and speed. The contents of neutral and enemy open sources are the first sources that are available. Radio is monitored and its contents are at hand almost immediately. The highlights of press content are broadcast often directly from the target country as propaganda messages. From press attachés in the target countries or from neutral or allied countries where the enemy press is certain to circulate, press content can be quickly obtained.

Psychological warfare personnel are constantly on the alert for indirect and direct efforts by the opposition to counteract their output. Direct efforts may come either in quotations of denial or refutation from high official sources or statements by prominent individuals. Indirect denial or refutation emerge from careful and daily reading of the opposition's output. Denials and refutations of output, direct or indirect, have to be noted carefully; they obviously indicate enemy sensitivity to the issues raised. They do not imply *ipso facto* that the original output has been effective. Much American output is guided by the principle that direct and indirect contradiction may spread the original enemy assertion to audiences that previously were not aware that it had been made. Therefore the conclusion derives that usually denials and refutations ought to be avoided by propagandists. German propagandists were not bound by this assumption and in fact sought Allied claims that they could refute. The Russian, in line with the polemical traditions of Marxism, also engages in refutation and counterrefutation. Therefore if the Russians refute a US claim it is not prima-facie evidence that the original claim has hit home. It implies that the enemy has judged the

effectiveness of their counterpropaganda to be more effective than the damage that might be done by further circulation of the original claims.

One of the most interesting types of documents is the various forms of audience mail that become available during the course of a campaign. Among the captured German documents, for example, were thousands of letters and diaries written by German soldiers. The state of morale was a favorite topic in these writings, with fairly frequent estimates about the effectiveness of psychological warfare attempts to undermine morale. When these letters and diaries speculated about the state of German morale or the impact of propaganda, their value was usually very limited. When these letters dealt with the German writer himself, or his small circle of friends, they contained testimony of considerable value. Many of them made valuable propaganda documents, especially captured undelivered mail. When analyzed, they were indicators of attitudes and sentiments in the target audience, although they had to be scrutinized for the reasons why the writers wished to convey particular sentiments.

In World War I, for example, the German High Command, in order to study the degree to which the home front was undermined, made a content analysis of intercepted letters between soldiers at the front and their families. One indicator of the infectiousness of Allied propaganda was the increasing tendency to use German expressions in the special sense given to them in the Allied propaganda leaflets and whispering campaigns. It was found that the term "*Junker*" was increasingly employed in the year 1918 in a tendentious sense.

The intelligence officer is constantly on the lookout for original documents that have been prepared for use within the enemy's government or military establishment. Captured documents of this variety have the authenticity of primary sources, but their evaluation is a most complex task. For example, reports on morale made by the Nazi party apparatus were usually riddled by the writer's attempts to inject evidence of his own admirable political view. Party documents were generally much inferior to those made by the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*), the intelligence apparatus of the SS. Despite their authenticity, these reports were still estimates by individuals in the middle of complex situations and had to be evaluated with considerable reserve.

The SD often reported with tough mindedness the unfavorable aspects of a situation in order to embarrass Goebbels and to supply ammunition to encroach on propaganda ministry activities.

Goebbels in an entry in his diary for 17 April 1943 is fully candid about the situation:

> "The SD report is full of mischief. . . .The leaders of the Reich certainly don't have to know about someone in a little hick town unburdening his anguished heart. Just as the Führer need not know if somewhere in some company people complain about the way the war is run, just so the political leaders don't have to know if here or there someone damns the war, or curses it, or vents his spleen. The make-up of the SD report must be quickly changed. I ordered Brendt to effect collaboration between the SD and the Reich propaganda offices. If the material of the SD, which in itself is good, is sifted politically and brought into line with the political views of the Gauleiters and the Reich propaganda offices, it can develop into a good source of information."[7]

Goebbels was waging a personal war with Himmler. The SD reports were designed to help Himmler show that Goebbels was not controlling opinion by

propaganda techniques and that the job could be done better by his own techniques and organization. As such, their contents were hardly realistic in many respects.

Evidence of psychological warfare effectiveness came often from captured military orders. These also required great caution in evaluation. The military officer who signed an order dealing with the morale of his command, and the aide who prepared the text of this order, often based their instructions on nothing more than a morale report or directive from higher headquarters. The intelligence on which these reports were based was sometimes manipulated for ulterior purposes, as in the case of party documents. For example, a typical German Army order based on intelligence of this sort would forbid soldiers to read psychological warfare leaflets, on pain of punitive measures. The German officer may deliberately have misplaced his emphasis on psychological warfare in order to avoid acknowledging that the real reason may have been a loss of confidence among the troops in their commander. The action may have derived only from the desire of the Nazi commissar to show his superiors that he was active and efficient.

Cautions that need to be exercised in textual and documentary evaluation vary constantly. Thus they imply those critical skills that have been the traditional basis of sound historical scholarship. To this critical skill needs to be added knowledge of the specific dimension of psychological warfare. The rise of quantitative research methodology, regardless of its crucial role, will not in the near future displace a heavy reliance on critical evaluation of masses of fragmentary textual and documentary sources.

THE SOVIET CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA*

By Alex Inkeles

Shortly after the end of World War II the United States and the Soviet Union became locked in a large scale ideological struggle in which the weapon has been propaganda, the field of battle, the channels of international communications, and the prize, the loyalties and allegiances of men and women throughout the world. Undoubtedly, the most important aspect of this combat is its effect on the minds of men, and the implications of such effects for national stability and international peace. The specialist on mass communication and public opinion has a major responsibility for studying those effects. He has, as well, the additional and less ambitious task of studying the process by which competing agencies adjust the pattern of their communication to the fact of propaganda competition. This article will address itself to one manifestation of that adjustment process in the interaction of the Voice of America and Soviet mass communication media.

Under conditions of major propaganda competition, such as that between the VOA and the Soviet press and radio, at least three major processes of mutual adjustment on the part of the competing agencies may be discerned. The first involves significant changes in the general content, emphasis, and tone of the communications, made to adapt them to the challenge posed by the competing medium. For a broad understanding of the dynamics of propaganda competition this type of shift is perhaps the most important to study, but it is also the most difficult to

* Reprinted from *Journal of International Affairs*, 5: 44–55 (1951), with permission of the publisher and copyright holder and Dr. Inkeles, the author.

establish with any precision. This is due to the absence of adequate measures of past activity to use as criteria in the assessment of current policy and to the difficulty of accounting adequately for the influence of new situational variables other than the activities of the competing media and the content of their message. A second major type of adjustment is reflected in the simultaneous efforts made by both agencies to counter the message of the competing propaganda medium by directly challenging the particular, concrete assertions, claims, and statistics which it presents. Such studies can, unfortunately, be effectively executed only through relatively large scale research efforts based on quantitative methods of content analysis.*

A third type of interaction involves the reciprocal efforts by the competing agencies to develop general stereotypes of the opposing medium — a process which, fortunately, easily lends itself to study. The significance of these stereotypes derives from the fact that the audience's predisposition to believe is one of the crucial limiting factors on the effectiveness of any program of mass communication. This predisposition relates, furthermore, not only to the content of the material being disseminated, but equally to the source from which it emanates. Consequently, one of the main objectives of competing propaganda agencies becomes the inculcation in relevant audiences of an image of the opposing medium which seeks by discrediting the source to predispose that audience to disbelieve or discount the message. The development of such an image, furthermore, will be more efficiently and effectively fostered if the medium attacked can be identified with symbols which characteristically are powerfully laden with negative effect for the audience concerned.

The VOA began to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet Union on February 17, 1947. It was not thought unusual, of course, that the Soviet press and radio failed to reproduce the press release, issued by the American ambassador, which announced the Russian broadcast schedule of the VOA.[8] It was widely anticipated, however, that the Soviet regime would immediately react with a vigorous propaganda counter-attack against this first large-scale American effort to breach the Iron Curtain and to communicate directly with the Soviet people. There was considerable surprise, therefore, as the broadcasts continued without any open acknowledgement of their existence in the Soviet press or on the Soviet radio. Indeed, it apparently was not until April 10, 1947, almost two months after the initial broadcast, that the first comment on the VOA broadcasts appeared in any Soviet communication medium directed to the home audience.

Information is not available to explain adequately the reasons for the protracted interval between the initial broadcasts and the first acknowledgement of their existence in the Soviet press, and any explanation must therefore be frankly speculative. One possibility which must be examined is that the Soviet authorities at least considered, and perhaps actually tried out, a policy of meeting the challenge of the VOA by what might be labelled "a conspiracy of silence." Considering the nature of the Soviet system of mass communication and the special structure of the radio receiving network, this suggestion may have more merit than appears on the surface. At the time that the VOA began its Russian broadcasts there may have been under one million, and there were almost certainly not more than 1.5 million,

* A detailed study of this type of interaction between VOA and Soviet communications media has been conducted at the Russian Research Center under my direction, with the assistance of Mark G. Field and Rush Widmayer. The results are currently being prepared for publication.

regular radio sets in private hands which were capable of hearing the VOA.*,[9] These sets were, furthermore, highly concentrated in the large metropolitan centers. Moscow and Leningrad, for example, accounted for one-fourth of all such sets.

Considering the facts, the Soviet leaders may have concluded that the potential audience for the Russian broadcasts of the VOA would of necessity be highly restricted and that the controlled press could effectively keep knowledge of the broadcasts from becoming widespread. A major propaganda campaign against the Voice might have appeared, therefore, as likely to involve greater loss than gain. To launch a large scale counter-attack against the VOA would involve the risk of attracting attention to the existence of the Voice, and of creating an interest in finding means for listening to it, on the part of a major segment of the population which might otherwise be unaware of its existence. It would, furthermore, advertise to the entire Soviet population a fact of no small psychological significance — the fact that the ability of the regime to maintain a monopoly of communication had been seriously challenged.

An additional explanation may be that the regime was anxious, prior to launching any counterattack, to assess the extent of listening to the VOA, the types and distribution of the persons who listened, the reactions of these people to the broadcasts, the amount and kind of information which they disseminated to those who did not listen, and the reactions of the persons whom this second-hand information reached. It will be recognized that this explanation does not necessarily contradict the first one offered. It is certain that even if an initial commitment had been made to a policy of silence, the regime would nevertheless have been gathering this kind of information through the instrumentality of its network of agents. If this were the case, there would seem to be good reason and some evidence[10] for believing that the MVD found, at least in the great metropolitan centers such as Moscow, that the VOA programs aroused a great deal of interest, listening was extensive, and the contents of the broadcasts a subject of considerable discussion among Soviet citizens. Recognition by the regime of any such impact might well be expected to have been a major determinant of any decision to launch a counterattack on the VOA. Such information, of course, would also be expected to have affected the decision as to what the main themes of this attack should be.

Still another explanation which should not be overlooked is that the long delay in launching the counterattack may have been simply another manifestation of the characteristic functioning of the top-heavy and overly centralized Soviet bureaucracy. It seems reasonable to assume from our general knowledge of the pattern of authority and decision making in the Soviet system that determination of the correct "line" in regard to a phenomenon as important as the VOA broadcasts would require a decision from very high levels. It is conceivable, therefore, that the long delay which preceded the first attack on the Voice resulted from unwillingness on the part of lower echelons in the Soviet propaganda apparatus to commit themselves until such time as the line to be taken in countering the VOA came down from the upper reaches of the Party bureaucracy, in this case probably from the Politburo. This suggestion leaves unresolved, of course, the question of why the highest authorities should have required so long a period of time in which to settle on a policy, and lends additional support to the explanations advanced above.

* For citations to support these estimates and for further details on the Soviet radio receiving network see Alex Inkeles.[9] The number of such sets has risen markedly since 1947, some estimates placing the total at 4 million and over at the end of 1950.

Soviet Counterattack

In any event, whatever the cause of the delay or the nature of the precipitating factor, the counterattack against the VOA was eventually launched with the full force of the Soviet communications apparatus. With the passing of time, both the frequency with which the VOA has been mentioned in Soviet communications media and the intensity and vituperativeness of the attack have steadily mounted. The opening blow was delivered by no less a publicist than Ilya Ehrenburg, in the form of a long article under the title "A False Voice," which appeared in *Culture and Life*, the organ of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[11] Thus, the article took on the character of an official pronouncement with the full sanction of the Party's authority behind it. Ehrenburg's article was not concerned with refuting the specific message of the VOA. Rather, it was a general tone-setting article designed to present the official line to Party members, journalists, and others concerned with the mobilization of public opinion in the Soviet Union. A similar briefing was later performed for Party officials and propagandists of the satellite states and other countries with major Communist Parties by P. Todorov's article, "The Voice of the American Goebbels" which appeared in the Cominform organ *For A Lasting Peace*[12] in response to the intensification of VOA broadcasts to those areas.

One of the chief functions of these and similar statements has been to develop the main themes for the general Communist characterization of the Voice. These themes have then been picked up and diffused by other publicists in the course of their efforts to refute the specific messages sent out by the VOA. From these tone-setting articles and this subsequent diffusion has emerged a relatively standardized and official Soviet stereotype of the VOA as an instrument of communication, which the Soviet media have sought to inculcate as the basic image of the Voice in the minds of its potential audience in the Soviet Union, the satellite states, and other parts of the world. The remainder of this article will present the major themes which make up this composite characterization of the Voice. It is clearly not possible, within the scope of this article, to present all of the major themes, nor is it possible to undertake an extended discussion of the psychology underlying the themes and their mode of presentation, or of the propaganda logic accounting for their distinctive juxtaposition and linkage. In addition, to facilitate the exposition it has been necessary throughout to resort to extensive paraphrasing.

The central theme in the Soviet characterization of the VOA identifies it as the paid instrument and servant of Wall Street. This characterization thereby draws on one of the basic symbols of Soviet-Marxist propaganda, and perhaps one of the most widespread and potent. No effort is made to suppress the fact that the VOA is an instrumentality of the American government directed by the Department of State, but this is passed over almost as if it were not worthy of comment. Soviet communications both "assume" and directly suggest that every informed person knows that behind the US Government stands the power of monopoly capital, and that the government is simply a tool of that power. The VOA, therefore, is the "voice of Wall Street," the "Voice of the Dollar."

Why does Wall Street feel the need to control the VOA? Clearly, it is stated, because Wall Street recognizes that it must control the international air waves as an essential ingredient of its "ideological imperialism," which in turn supports its military and economic expansionism. The VOA is the "American radio octopus," whose tentacles reach out to all corners of the world. "Wall Street sends its long

fingers not only into the entrails, but also into the skies of Austria." The Voice is therefore just another instrument in the hands of imperialist world monopoly capital centered in Wall Street, its content just another commodity for export, its aim a "Marshallized Ether."[13]

But there is a deeper motive alleged, and a more potent symbol evoked, to explain this monopolist control of the air waves. The Voice is but one last futile effort to drown out the sound of that march of Communism which spells the doom of capitalism. The VOA, therefore, seeks to deflect attention away from the harsh realities of life under capitalism and to conceal the progress made in the lands of socialism and the People's Democracy.

The VOA is but a balloon tossed in the air, to distract attention from the capitalist "bubble" which is about to burst again. This theme of the bursting bubble is seized on by Ilya Ehrenburg, for example, to link both the "vulgarity" of American life and the uncertainty of capitalist economics in the symbol of "bubble gum." "The little boy chews and chews, then blows a balloon, and continues to blow until the balloon explodes," Ehrenburg quotes the Voice as saying and he responds with the question: "If you invented a special 'bubble gum,' why instead of peacefully blowing bubbles in the neighborhood drugstore do you spread them through the entire world?"[11]

The image of the VOA as the voice of Wall Street shares its central role with another symbol of comparable potency — the symbol of Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels. The threat of the bursting bubble of capitalist depression is linked to the threat of a Nazi and Fascist resurgence. Goebbels is dead, but he continues to direct the propaganda apparatus of the State Department from his grave: the dollar sign merely replaces the swastika on the microphones.

This double characterization of the VOA as the voice of Wall Street and the voice of Goebbels being established, all of the other salient features of the Voice follow in logical order. Being the voice of Wall Street and speaking the words of Goebbels, the VOA is clearly not the "true," the "real," voice of America. The radio Voice of America "thunders and slanders, mounting an attack against peace," while the true voice is heard when "Robeson sings 'Polyushko,' when the simple people come to Madison Square Garden to greet the delegates of Russia."[14] But this real voice of America is not to be heard on the VOA; it is suppressed voice, barred from the air, a voice which the VOA seeks to drown out so as to confuse its listeners as to the true feelings of America.

Since the people who really represent America cannot be heard on the VOA, who is it that comes to its microphones? They are, naturally, the opposite of the type of person cited as representing the true feelings of America — they are the "lackeys" and "paid hirelings" of the capitalists, men without scruples or honor, fascists and traitors, cast out by the populations of their homelands and rejected and scorned by all right thinking people.

> "In its struggle against the countries of the Peoples' Democracy the US radio uses the traitors of the peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe: Mikolajczyk, Ferenc Nagy, and other agents of the US secret service. . . . Rejected by the peoples of their own countries, these reactionaries have been allowed to use the microphones of the US radio stations."[15, 16]

This theme was most strikingly presented in an article in *Ogonek*, the most popular of Soviet magazines, which purported to depict a staff meeting at the VOA. Among those present are Zaburdaev, a former Cossack officer, "scraggy,

with bulging eyes and a scar on his right cheek;" Funtikov, former leader of the Russian Mensheviks, "bald, with an eternally wet, hanging lip;" and Kozel-Ragovsky, a former capitalist and owner of estates, "who had a triple chin and a purplish-blue nose."* These characters repeatedly take a vile green liquid dope to quiet their nerves; they haggle amongst themselves about the past; and they prepare for their broadcast by making up "eye-witness accounts" and writing diaries "uncovered" in slave labor camps. Grumbling about his pay, one reminisces that "Goebbels paid me more." They are clearly the dregs of the earth, outcasts from all humanity, which they themselves realize: ". . . we are all . . . so to say, the dust of the world, on the back side of the planet." Their American supervisors, who listen in on the conference with the aid of a hidden microphone, recognize that these people are "the scum of the earth" but feel that there is no alternative, for considering the nature of the job, "where will you find others?"[17]

The tone and orientation of the VOA broadcasts are treated as deriving directly from the nature of the group which controls it and the individuals who make up its staff. Being the "Voice of the Dollar" it preserves the stamp of its origin in everything that it does. No matter what it discusses, "one can feel the soul of the businessman,"[11] and can recognize in it the inevitable accompaniment of decadent bourgeois culture which "pollutes" the air "with all sorts of trash starting with 'boogie-woogie.' "[18] It treats ideas as it does goods, measuring them by the same standard, and selling them by the same commercial techniques.

The moral level of the VOA is depicted as being even lower than its intellectual and cultural level. It deals only in "lies," "slander," "hypocrisy," and "cynicism." "Double-dealing" and "double-talk" are the essence of its method. It claims to be interested in friendship, but it foments hate.[11] It talks about democracy, equality, and national independence, but instead "it tramples on the sovereignty of half the European continent . . . and every day and every hour violates elementary rights and liberties. . . ."[19] It promises to talk about facts, but is silent or suppresses them.[20] Its methods are those of the "swindler," for it broadcasts slander about the purported failure of the Czech Two Year Plan to Czechoslovakia's neighbors, but dares not report this lie to the Czechs themselves, and vice versa.[16] It "disturbs the festive mood" of the people on their treasured national holidays,† and then sheds "crocodile tears" over the supposed difficulties of the people of the Balkans.‡ Its shame knows no bounds, for it lies even in the fact of the flat contradiction of its claims in statements by the President of the United States "which

* The names given these characters are, in the tradition of Russian satirical writing, an essential part of the characterization. The terms used are not really strictly translatable. *Zaburdaev* is a term used to represent a man who is a tipster, an easy-going "good-for-nothing." *Funtikov* is literally "a 1-pound man," hence a lightweight, a "squirt," etc.

† Moscow, in Hungarian to Hungary, 12 March 1949. The national holiday referred to was the centenary celebration of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution, and VOA soured the festivities by pointing out to the Hungarian population that some of the objectives that Revolution fought for, such as civil liberties and press freedom, were no longer enjoyed in "democratic" Hungary.

‡ Soviet Radio, in Bulgarian to Europe, 17 July 1948.

unwittingly expose as lies the broadcasts made by American radio propagandists."[16] And "whom shall we believe, the Voice of America or President Truman. . . ?"‡[20]

Overshadowing the charges of lying and slandering is the Soviet depiction of the VOA as the voice of aggressive imperialism, the voice of war. Particularly as the Cold War mounted in intensity and the Korean fighting began, the most frequently and vigorously depicted aspect of the activities of the VOA was its alleged beating of the drums of war.

Voice Is Doomed

The general characterization of the VOA is rounded off with a constantly reiterated prediction that because of its repulsive features it is doomed to failure. It is indeed striking with what frequency and intensity these predictions of futility, of uselessness, and of defeat are made in the references to the Voice. To a significant degree this theme of failure is developed by emphasizing such facts as Congressional investigations of the VOA and efforts made to reduce its budget. Thus it is suggested that even American authorities recognize that the VOA is failing in its mission.

> ". . . The public in the countries to which the VOA broadcasts do not care to listen to this lying voice, and certainly do not believe it as Mr. Acheson would like them to. . . . How could it be otherwise. Who is going to listen to or believe even a word of the notoriously false broadcasts of the would-be rulers of the world?"[21]
>
> "The slanderous activities of the US radio do not give the results expected by the US reactionaries. The truth is that the democratic peoples . . . reject with contempt all the lies and slander broadcast by the American pupils of Goebbels." [quoted from *Syabad Nep* (Hungary)][15, 16]

As is so frequently the case with Soviet propaganda, nothing is left to the imagination of the audience. Rather than leave their efforts at characterizing the VOA to work their own way to the desired outcome, Soviet publicists seek by direct suggestion to secure the end sought. The Voice is so clearly an abomination, they suggest, that no right minded person will listen; and if he does listen, he will not believe but rather will meet its message with scorn and ridicule. There is, of course, another possible, but by no means conflicting, interpretation of these predictions of failure for the VOA. The frequency and intensity with which the Soviet publicists anticipate the frustration of the VOA's "design" certainly suggest that the individuals assigned to combat its effect may be rather lacking in faith that their challenge to it can indeed blunt its impact. Their comments, in this light, take on more of the character of a projection of their own anticipated defeat, leading them to dreams of wish fulfillment.

‡ The specific reference here was an alleged statement of the VOA that property in the US is no longer increasingly concentrated in the hands of any one small social group, to which the Soviet source opposed a statement by President Truman concerning corporate profits after taxes of $17 billion. Such juxtaposition of general statements by VOA with specific facts drawn from official and quasi-official documents is a standard Soviet technique for casting doubts on the veracity of the broadcasts.

In summary, the image of the Voice which Soviet published and radio comments seek to foster takes the following form: The VOA is officially an organ of the State Department of the US Government, but it is really under the control of Wall Street, which is the true master of the State Department. As such the Voice is just another arm of the aggressive, monopolist capitalists, whose tentacles reach out to all corners of the earth in their effort to enslave the poor, peace-loving peoples of the world. Its voice is not the "real" voice of America, the voice of the people who support the Soviet Union, for those people are suppressed and denied access to the microphones. It is, rather, the "Voice of the Dollar," the successor and heir to Hitler and Goebbels, staffed by the enemies of the people who have been cast out of their homelands as fascists and traitors. These lackeys and paid hirelings of the capitalists emulate their masters, and their work reflects the crass commercialism and decadent bourgeois culture of America. Their broadcasts "soil" the air. They seek to serve their master's will by exporting sugar-coated lies about life in the capitalist countries and slanders about the efforts of the people of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies to build a new and better life. Motivated by fear of the impending capitalist crisis and the contrasting example of the socialist world, Wall Street seeks to blind the workers, to confuse them, to turn them against their friend and only true hope. In desperation, spurred on by the failure of their imperialist schemes and by the growing world crisis, the capitalist monopolists seek to launch still another "senseless adventure" in the form of a new aggressive, imperialist, world war, with the atom bomb as their chief weapon of destruction. The VOA is the central mouthpiece for the proclamation of this new and mad policy. The decent, peace-loving people everywhere recognize these facts and are repulsed by the VOA's commercialism, its vulgarity, its lies, its slander, and its war mongering. For this reason they will not listen, but if by accident they should hear the VOA they will reject its message, cry shame, and turn away from it with nothing but scorn and contempt. Therefore, the Voice is as certain to fail in its special mission as are its masters to fail in their broader imperialist scheme for world domination.

The intent of this message is fairly obvious. It is, of course, not seriously designed to discourage people from listening to the VOA, and Soviet publicists must recognize that to some extent it may even arouse curiosity and interest and thereby actually increase listening. Its purpose is rather to so discredit the VOA in the minds of potential listeners as to undermine the impact of anything concrete which the Voice has to say.*,[22] As such it is based on a well-established principle of mass communication mentioned at the outset of this article. One of the most important factors determining the effect of mass communication materials is the basic attitude of the audience toward the communication source and that audience's general predisposition to believe or reject messages emanating from that source.

* There is another major propaganda objective of this characterization that is independent of the question of whether the audience to which it is directed does actually listen to the VOA. The Soviet regime is interested in discrediting all information emanating from American sources, and an attack on the VOA may therefore be justified on the assumption that its effect will be diffused enough to color the audience reaction to information coming from American sources other than the VOA. In its turn, of course, the attack on American communications sources is only part of a more general propaganda campaign to develop a negative stereotype of American institutions and policy.

Viewed in this light, the characterization of the VOA which Soviet publicists seek to develop can hardly be casually dismissed regardless of how grotesque and unreal it may seem to most Americans. The potentiality for success of the Soviet campaign against the Voice rests on the fact that it relies on firmly entrenched, deeply rooted, and widely operative symbols. The image of Wall Street and of capitalist imperialism, and the fear of crisis, depression, and atom-bomb warfare, do not have to be inculcated in the minds of the audiences toward which the Soviets direct their message. These symbols exist already as fears, as objects of hatred, and as sources of anxiety in the minds of enormous numbers of people throughout the world. It must be recognized, furthermore, that these symbols have great potency even in the case of many individuals who are anti-Communist and in general favorably disposed toward America and American policy. By basing its attack on such symbol systems Soviet propagandists have adopted what is perhaps the most efficient, certainly potentially the most powerful, method for countering an opposing propaganda medium by contaminating it as a source of information. By seizing on these symbols as the main basis for its characterization of the Voice, Soviet propaganda may well be able to capture, to harness, and to direct against the VOA much of the anxiety and hostility evoked by these frightening social forces.

One should not, of course, neglect the fact that the Soviet regime has viewed the VOA broadcasts as enough of a threat to warrant enormously complex and expensive jamming efforts. It is, however, necessary to approach this fact of Soviet jamming with some caution. The jamming may certainly be taken as an indication that the regime was extremely anxious to prevent the message of the Voice from reaching the Soviet people, and this may in turn be assumed to demonstrate that the VOA was intensively listened to in the USSR within the limits set by the structure of the Soviet radio receiving apparatus. We cannot, however, take the fact of jamming as assurance that the VOA was effective in communicating the message it sought to deliver. It is likely that the main motivation behind the listening which did take place was the widespread interest and desire on the part of the Soviet citizens to hear news, any kind of news, from outside the Soviet communications monopoly. This in itself does not guarantee that the messages heard were effective communications. It must also be considered that the Soviet jamming operations may be less a testimonial to the effectiveness of the broadcasts than they are a manifestation of the characteristic intensity with which the Soviet regime reacts to any force acting on the people which it cannot fully control, particularly if that force be one which weakens the regime's absolute monopoly of communications.

Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the struggle between the VOA and Soviet or Communist controlled communications media concerns not merely the Soviet and satellite populations but other people throughout the world as well. It is particularly with these audiences that the stereotype of the VOA which Soviet sources seek to disseminate may be most effective, since they have not had the experience of long exposure to Communist society. At least until very recently the VOA broadcasts have been more in the nature of an information program than an effective counter-message to the type spread abroad by Soviet sources. And it is by now painfully obvious that information programs as such are very poor instruments for effecting basic changes in human attitudes.[23] The success of such programs is very largely determined by the extent to which the

information offered can be related to the psychological needs, the values, aspirations, and symbol systems of the audience. There is, therefore, a major challenge to the VOA inherent in the Soviet effort to develop the kind of stereotyped image described in this article. This challenge can be met only if the VOA is prepared to recognize that under the conditions of propaganda competition which now exist, effective communication can be achieved only on the basis of frankly accepting the existence of major symbol systems as the basic sub-stratum underlying attitudes amongst audiences throughout the world. This is not to suggest, of course, that we emulate Soviet media in the kind of attack they have launched against the VOA. It does argue, however, that we give our message a better chance of being effectively communicated by carefully studying the symbol systems of our various audiences and adjusting our communications to take account of those systems.

TRENDS IN WEHRMACHT MORALE*

By Murray Gurfein and M. J.

Write-in questionnaires were prepared and periodically distributed to random samples of German prisoners of war. Key questions were included on all questionnaires; the answers were used in determining trends in status of German soldier morale.

In order to guide combat propaganda teams in their leaflet and loudspeaker missions and to direct strategic psychological warfare against the Wehrmacht, the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, under Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, undertook a continuing study of the fighting morale of the enemy's troops. The study, expanding the work started in North Africa and Italy, represented, perhaps for the first time in warfare, an attempt to evaluate trends by procuring and analyzing comparable data.†

Main reliance was placed on the systematic analysis of front line interrogations of captured prisoners as well as detailed psychological interviews gathered in rear areas, the results of which were systematically evaluated. Materials gleaned from captured enemy documents, reports of secret agents, recaptured Allied military personnel and the observations of front line combat observers were also evaluated. As an adjunct, a monthly statistical survey of attitudes among captured German soldiers was undertaken. This article summarizes the main trend conclusions of this statistical opinion poll.‡

The main findings underlined the conclusion that the ideology of the "average" German soldier remained singularly steadfast. Hitler — personification of evil

* From *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10:78–84 (1946). Reprinted with the permission of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the authors.

† The systematic study of Wehrmacht morale for psychological warfare purposes owes its origin to the work of Lt Col Henry Dicks, psychiatrict, Royal Army Medical Corps, and Prof Edward Shils, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago. Early in 1944 they prepared basic papers on the subject and outlined the goals of research that were followed up during the military operations in Western Europe.

‡ Elmo Wilson, Heinz Ansbacher, Hazel Gaudet of OWI, and Maj Donald McGranahan were active in launching this survey. Max Ralis was largely responsible for collecting and processing the data. A similar survey was undertaken by Lt Col Martin F. Herz in Italy for the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Fifth US Army.

to the democratic world — for example, held the loyalties of more than 50 percent of his army through the defeats of 1944 and until March, 1945, two months before V-E Day. Belief in secret weapons was also a source of vital strength. On the other hand, although the German army fought hard until the end, as early as June and July 1944 less than half of the prisoners of war thought that they could eject the Allies from France. Reverses in the fortunes of battle and the deterioration of the conditions of life at the front were reflected in further depression in the German soldiers' expectation of victory. This pointed to the wisdom of non-ideological lines of attack on the psychological warfare front.

Stimmung vs Haltung

Aside from the technical difficulties involved in measuring prisoner of war opinion, it has become a commonplace among those who worked in psychological warfare against the Germans that attitudes encountered before or after capture bore only a limited relationship to fighting behavior under combat conditions. The practical difficulties of surrender in modern battle, the habit of automatic obedience and the Nazi terror sustained a fighting effectiveness often unrelated to morale. The Nazis themselves emphasize the sharp distinction between *Stimmung* (Attitude) and *Haltung* (Behavior). It was felt, however, that, in strategic terms, sharp deviations from the established norm of attitudes would give the clue to disintegration. And, in fact, the clue was found prior to the last spring offensive, before which there had been no sharp deviation in attitude and, correspondingly, few large scale surrenders.

The conclusions from the attitude data gathered through statistical polling procedures, which this report sets forth, should not, however, be taken as the pattern of the collapse of the Wehrmacht. These polls must be viewed in conjunction with the more important mass of documents collected and prepared on the Wehrmacht as an integral fighting organization and as a social and psychological entity. The evaluation of this material still remains as a future task.

Method Employed

A write-in questionnaire, preceded by a standardized introductory talk, was administered to periodic random samples of prisoners of war collected at transit cages. This was necessitated by limitations of personnel and by field conditions. Such a procedure gave continuing samples of prisoners, rather than of the enemy army itself.* But, since the results of the questionnaire were considered only on a trend basis, it was possible to analyze important shifts in opinion, which should reflect important changes in attitude in the Wehrmacht itself.

The validity of the replies was dependent on two unique factors. First, the prisoners were almost wholly unfamiliar with the procedures of write-in questionnaires. Second, they who had been living for twelve years under Nazi controls might have become psychologically inhibited from stating their true opinions. Thus, Nazis might tend to hide their Nazism, and members of the non-political center might tend to exaggerate their anti-Nazism. To meet these difficulties, (1) a standard set of detailed instructions for filling out the questionnaires was

* Professional statisticians would certainly be amused at the prospect of being called on to draw a representative sample of the enemy army from prisoners of war. The exact size and composition of the enemy army was unknown, nor could it be assumed that all those taken prisoner were equal in fighting quality to those who were not captured.

administered to each sample. Spot checks revealed that the prisoners were making only an inconsequential number of errors in the completion of the forms. (2) Extreme care was taken to overcome resistance to expression of genuine opinion by the use of a standardized introductory talk which emphasized that the poll sought after free independent expression of opinion in line with American traditions and that the identity of the individual prisoner would be protected.* Although exact scientific tests were not undertaken to determine any significant differences between answers obtained through direct interrogation techniques with those obtained from questionnaire surveys, extensive matching of the results revealed a high degree of similarity.

The Theory of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire generally contained about twenty questions, most of them of current interest for psychological warfare. To measure basic attitudes on a trend basis, however, five key questions were used. These questions were selected on the basis of psychological evaluation of the patterns of German thought developed by interrogation. The aim was to select questions which would give not detached, objective answers but which would, rather, reveal a relative adhesion to the German ideological position and propaganda line, both in current belief and in longer term trends.

The key questions were thus selected to reflect: (1) Expectation of Victory, (2) Confidence in the Battle Situation, (3) Belief in Secret Weapons, (4) Fear of Revenge by the Allies (a favorite Goebbels' theme "Strength through Fear") and (5) Faith in Hitler. (See Table 1.)

Pattern of Collapse

When viewed as a whole, the five key questions represent strikingly the long term, relative stability of Wehrmacht attitudes until the beginnings of the final collapse in March 1945. Expectations as to the outcome of the war fluctuated with the success of Allied advances. As to ideological attachments, there was no significant break until February and March, 1945, at which point of time significantly large scale surrenders began to occur.

Expectation of Victory

The hardships of battle, the shock of capture and the sight of vast quantities of military stores and mobile equipment behind our lines limited "after capture" belief in victory among prisoners of war even during the first phases of the Normandy campaign. In June and July only about 40 percent of samples of prisoners of war thought "It is possible to eject the Allies from France."

* The stage of their imprisonment at which to administer the poll was not easy to determine. Theoretically, it might have been immediately after capture, or a long time after capture. There were no firm data on the point, but researchers in North Africa and Italy had indicated a marked difference in response depending on the time of questioning. It seemed that the shock of capture tended to obscure prevailing attitudes. On the other hand, long incarceration tended to create new postcapture attitudes, which were of slight interest. Either Nazi convictions were often strengthened as a result of the persistence of Nazi leadership in the camp or life in a static camp eliminated, among some, all political attitudes. Pragmatic tests indicated that by 1 to 2 weeks after capture the shock of battle had worn off, whereas the effects of prison life had not yet taken root.

TABLE 1

TRENDS IN WEHRMACHT MORALE BASED ON WRITE-IN QUESTIONNAIRES

Question	Reply	Number of prisoners and time and place of capture									
		363 capt. 26–28 Jun 44, Cherbourg	155 capt. 1–17 Jul 44, Carentan to St. Lô	160 capt. 1–10 Aug 44, St. Malo to Le Mans	643 capt. 1–10 Sep 44, Metz-Nancy region	634 capt. mid-Sep 44, West Front	345 capt. mid-Oct 44, West Front	453 capt. 15–30 Nov 44, Aachen-Metz	324 capt. 1–14 Jan 45, West Front	388 capt. Mar 45, West Front
		Percent of prisoners answering								
Do you trust the Füehrer?	Yes	67	57	68	65	60	42	64	62	31
	No	18	27	17	19	24	43	22	30	52
	NA	15	16	15	16	16	15	14	8	17
Do you think it possible to eject the Allies from France?	Yes	42	37	49	27	..	..	51	39	10[a]
	No	38	49	29	51	..	..	30	47	83[a]
	NA	20	14	22	22	..	..	19	14	7[a]
Do you believe Germany is winning the war?	Yes	..	..	52	38	46	28	50	44	11
	No	..	..	11	39	33	57	27	42	78
	NA	..	..	37	23	21	15	23	14	11
Do you believe revenge will be taken against the population of Germany after the war?	Yes	16	13	36	28	21	18	..	..	..
	No	75	81	51	61	67	74	..	..	..
	NA	9	6	13	11	12	8	..	..	..
Do you believe Germany still has war-decisive "secret weapons"?	Yes	37	44	66	49	48	33	53	47	14
	No	35	37	15	37	32	52	29	40	77
	NA	28	19	19	20	20	15	18	13	9

[a]Question on March 1945: "Do you think it possible to eject the Allies from Western Germany?"

But as the campaign progressed expectation of success among prisoners of war deteriorated as the Germans were pushed back across France until a low point of widespread and almost utter defeatism was reached in mid-October. The question naturally presents itself whether the group of prisoners captured in mid-October who were surveyed presented an atypically low morale group or whether the objective situation had deteriorated so as to affect attitudes in this fashion. (Col. 6 of Table 1) Observations at this time indicated no serious divergence in the type of prisoner in this randomly selected sample from earlier or later samples. The events of the late September drive which took the Allied armies to the borders of Germany had apparently caused this serious fall in German expectations.

The sharp rise in November troop morale similarly reflects the stabilization which set in after we failed to follow up what theretofore appeared a vast strategic retreat of the German army. (Col. 7, Table 1) This feeling grew in large measure out of the relative security of a temporarily stabilized front, and a sky partly free of Allied aircraft grounded by bad weather. Their conceptions of victory also underwent revision and meant in large measure an absence of total defeat. Nevertheless, the degree of recovery reflects faithfully the Wehrmacht's ability to effect as complete a defense as was technically feasible.

In January (Col. 8), expectation started to decline when the tonic of temporary advance after many months of retreat began to wear off. When the failure of the offensive was clear to the troops, Germany's psychological reserves became exhausted. In the spring of 1945, critical defeatism set in as the final combined two-front assault against the Fatherland developed. It was a defeatism which failed to develop into any positive efforts among large groups of soldiers to remove themselves from the battle. Group surrenders were relatively few. However, the troops and even their junior officers once cut off by our armored thrusts surrendered at the first opportunity.

In March, about 10 percent of the prisoners of war sampled still persisted in their belief of continuing the war. They were the fanatical "hard core" on whom events made no impression and who would have retired into the Bavarian Alps for the last ditch stand if they had been called upon or if it were technically feasible. They were the minority who had held the Wehrmacht intact during the constant defeats of the last months by their willingness to apply sanctions short of nothing.

Early in the Normandy campaign the approximate size of the fanatical "hard core" was first established at this figure of between 10 and 15 percent of the total Wehrmacht. Subsequent events proved that this figure was accurate. Although in the initial period of the Western campaign, the success of Nazi indoctrination gave the impression of much more widespread fanaticism, detailed interrogation made it possible to separate out the minority of "total Nazis." They not only held the full pattern of Nazi ideas — many more than 10 percent did — they held these concepts with a deep religious fervor. They were men who were profoundly shocked by capture, unlike their weaker comrades who, though hopeful of victory, were glad that they themselves had survived the battle.

Faith in Hitler

Throughout the entire Western campaign, faith in Hitler was expressed by well over fifty percent of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of one particularly low morale group. Many a German soldier, although personally despairing in ultimate victory, continued to resist vigorously, in part because of devotion to Hitler.

Hitler was a man who had done so much good for Germany. He had so clearly shown his affiliation with the interests of the common man, that he would not have continued the war had he not believed it to be to the best advantage of Germany, politically at least. This ideological prop remained intact throughout the ups and downs of the battle situation and the corresponding changes in optimism as to the outcome of the war. It was only in March, 1945, when the German armies were cut up and at the verge of disintegration that the figure dropped below fifty percent.

Yet thirty percent still professed confidence in Hitler under these conditions. This was the group composed not alone of hard core Nazi fanatics, but also of devoted followers, who clung to the hope that Hitler in the final moments of the war would produce a political formula which would soften defeat. A clash between the Western Allies and Russia was their main hope. What sort of citizens these soldiers are likely to make under American occupation is easy to estimate.

Belief in Secret Weapons

Related to ideological faith in Hitler was the positive contribution to morale arising from the belief that Germany *still* had a decisive "Secret Weapon." Belief in the secret weapon reached a peak in August (the V-1 had been employed in June) and propaganda, both official and word of mouth, among the German troops raised expectations for more powerful weapons. Naturally, the failure of the secret weapon to materialize during the critical months of the early fall undermined faith. However, it was maintained and even restored once the Wehrmacht made a stand at the borders of Germany. About half of a sample of November prisoners of war professed their faith in secret weapons. Hope and faith in secret weapons for many of the rank and file soldiers were merely irrational wishful thinking. During the fall and winter, front line life became unbearable. An understanding of the growing strategical hopelessness was dawning in the minds of all but the most unthinking soldiers, or at least, daily operations at the front were demonstrating the hopelessness of his own unit's position as far as replacements, armament, and supply were concerned. Under these conditions, the hope of a secret weapon was the only factor that could translate ideological attachments and the unwillingness to face reality into some sort of plausible explanation for continued resistance. As a result, many a German soldier held to this belief with fanatical fervor.

For many of the more educated soldiers belief in secret weapons supplied the same need, but was explained on some sort of a rational basis. It reflected their confidence in German industrial genius and inventiveness which would produce the weapons of war — new ones as well as the traditional ones — in such high quality, if not in numbers superior to the Allies, that the tide would ultimately turn.

Fear of Revenge

In general, fear of revenge against the population of the home front by the Allies was not widespread among captured German soldiers. Affirmative answers given to the question, "Do you believe that revenge will be taken against the population of Germany after the war?," seldom reached more than about 20 percent of the prisoners. Correlation to other key questions showed that they were confirmed Nazis whose opinions never varied on the subject. Clearly their opinions were fashioned by fear of revenge not only against Germany, but also against themselves personally. Countering the German propaganda line, the traditional respect

of the broad masses towards the American and British as people of dignity and fair play was at work. To be sure, the figure of expectation of revenge may have been somewhat decreased by the circumstance that the Germans were captives in American hands. This lack of fear or revenge after the war indicates again that an important aspect of motivation for continued resistance came not merely out of the negative fear of defeat and its consequences, but rather an acceptance of the positive elements of National Socialist doctrine which sought for victory.

The techniques employed, although subject to limitations as indicated, were undertaken for the purpose of determining psychological warfare output to the enemy. The steadfastness with which the German soldier held to his loyalty to Hitler, for example, indicated that a frontal attack on this particular ideological symbol was less likely to succeed than appeals based on non-ideological considerations, e.g., as promise of good treatment and survival through capture. In general, it was found expedient to concentrate on such primary appeals and on the hopelessness of the battle situation.

AN APPEAL TO GERMAN RAILROADERS*

By Saul K. Padover

An account of methods used to check effectiveness and feasibility of the appeal.

Instructions came from Psychological Warfare Headquarters to look into the question of the German railway workers. SHAEF had tried a propaganda experiment which, if it had succeeded, would have measurably shortened the war. For many days before the offensive, the BBC and Radio Luxembourg, speaking in the name of General Eisenhower, appealed on the air as well as with printed leaflets to German railroad workers to slow up operations and thereby bring an end to the war. The exhortations stressed that in paralyzing transportation the railroaders would perform a service to their country, since every German knew that the Reich had lost the war and so all further bloodshed was a vain sacrifice. To what extent did the railroaders hear or heed the appeals? We were asked to find out.

We interviewed a number of railroaders, and it was a dismal experience.

On the other side of the tracks a man opened the door of his small house. When he saw us, he turned pale, sweat broke out on his fat face, and he trembled all over. It was, obviously, a case of either shock or bad conscience, and after talking to him, I realized that it was both. He was a locomotive engineer who had been dive-bombed and severely burned; he had spent five months in the hospital, then, although he still suffered from shock, he returned to work. It was, he mumbled to us, his patriotic duty. He had become a Nazi Party member in 1933, worked loyally for Hitler and the war, and got well paid. "We live comfortably," his wife, a big, shapeless woman with a hard face, interjected defiantly. There were beads of perspiration on his bald skull as we talked to him. He was really terrified that we had come to haul him to the hoosegow. He admitted that he had

* From *Experiment in Germany*, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., New York, 1946, pp 314–16. Reprinted with the permission of Mr. Padover, the author and copyright holder.

heard the Allied radio appeals. But he felt that they were meaningless. He shrugged his shoulders and said that no locomotive engineer on the other side of the Rhine would heed them. No less than ten percent of his colleagues among the engineers and firemen had been wounded by our dive-bombers, but they went back to their jobs. "We are men in uniform," he said dourly, "and we obey the orders of our government." Now, he said, that the Americans were here, he was prepared to work for the new masters.

The station master was 36 years old, a Nazi Party member of long standing. He had never doubted Hitler's promise of victory and his faith was shaken only when the American armor broke into Krefeld. Had he heard our radio appeals or read our leaflets? He said that he did, and he, too, shrugged his shoulders most disdainfully. "Impossible and impractical," he said.

The *Oberinspektor*, the highest railway official in the city, received us in his office. He was a cold-faced bureaucrat who controlled his rudeness only because he noticed that we could hardly restrain our tempers. In an arrogant voice he informed us that German railroadmen were not workers but *Beamten*, civil servants, and that they were members of a self-respecting, patriotic profession. At the moment we were the conquerors, but such things do not last, and Germany's turn would come next. He hated us with every cell in his body, and he was not able to conceal his hatred.

We went to the railroad station and flagged a signal operator. He was an older man who cared nothing about anything. The Nazis had never molested him, so why should he bother his head about "politics"? He had heard the Allied radio exhortations but dismissed them as not even worthy of attention. "Such things," he said indifferently, "can't be done." In the basement of the station we talked to an old *Oberschaffner* (chief conductor) who growled that all politics was a swindle, that the pre-Nazi trade unions and the Nazi Labor Front were both rackets. He wanted us to know that he was a self-respecting German *Beamter*, wearing the uniform of the Reich, and that he did not indulge in breaking the law or disobeying the orders of his superiors. Not, mind you, that he had so much reverence for the Fuehrer; no, he himself believed only in the Kaiser. Feeling discouraged, we went into the goods yard and engaged an ordinary worker in conversation. His indifference to public questions was monumental. He knew nothing about the things we inquired into. Why were the Americans bothering with the likes of him? He was not discontented, and never had been. "Under the Fuehrer I've had plenty of work and freedom."

We reported to Headquarters: Don't waste your time appealing to German railroaders. They will continue to work for Hitler until the last possible moment. Then they will work for us with the same unquestioning obedience.

CREDIBILITY IN LEAFLET AND POSTER ILLUSTRATIONS

By W. E. D.

To be certain the operator should pretest illustrations as well as texts of proposed psychological warfare messages.

The leaflet illustration reproduced here as Fig. 6 was prepared in Korea in the early spring of 1951 by personnel of the psychological warfare unit attached to the American Eighth Army. It was addressed to Chinese Communist troops and

Fig. 6—Chinese Sterotype Unrecognized by Chinese

Leaflet 8028 produced by PWD/Eighth Army, Korea, March 1951. Caption in Chinese Reads "Death—in many forms—awaits you on this foreign soil."

warns whoever should pick up the leaflet that "Death — in Many Forms — Awaits You on this Foreign Soil."

The illustration shows a frightened person, apparently meant to represent a Chinese soldier, pursued by the combined might of armored, artillery, and air weapons. That is to say the frightened person is represented by a stereotype profile of what an American artist thought a typical Chinese soldier should look like under the circumstances shown. Few Americans have been found who have not agreed that the figure shown in Fig. 6 is a faithful reproduction of the appearance of a typical Chinese soldier dressed in padded winter garments. However, for psychological warfare purposes, the important consideration is not what Americans think, but rather, what do the Chinese, to whom the leaflet is addressed, think?

Several weeks after the leaflet's preparation and dissemination to units of the Chinese Communist forces, the original illustration, minus Chinese text, was shown to a group of friendly Chinese prisoners of war. There were eight individuals in the group, including two officers. They were asked if they could identify the nationality or the race of the individual shown in the foreground. At first, not a single one in the group of Chinese prisoners would venture a guess as to the probable race or nationality of the person prominently shown in the drawing. It

seemed obvious to the Americans present that the prisoners were all waiting and hoping for some clue from their questioner. Finally, the most articulate one in the group exclaimed, "Oh, I get it now, the figure is supposed to represent an American soldier." After pointing out certain specific details to his colleagues that he observed in the illustration, the others agreed with his conclusion.

Two lessons stand out from this case. First, we all possess stereotyped ideas of what a particular race or nationality of people look like. These stereotyped views seldom if ever coincide with those held by other races or nationalities. The average American would depict a Chinese in a manner wholly inconsistent with a Chinese person's stereotyped views of what a typical member of his own race is like. Second, there is only one way to be certain of not offending another race by depicting representatives of this race in either unflattering or unfamiliar stereotyped poses, and this sole means is by the use of pretests of planned illustrations as well as the texts of messages proposed for distribution. The pretests should be carried out on representative samples of the intended audience. To pretest messages on other groups would do little good and would not show how the target group would react to the message and illustration.

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PRETESTING LEAFLETS

By W. E. D.

Although it is desirable to pretest propaganda output for format and style in advance of dissemination, it is not an easy requirement to implement effectively, for many reasons.

No principle believed to be applicable to sound psychological warfare operations is thought to be more basic than the requirement that output should be pretested for both style and format before large-scale dissemination is undertaken. Yet, no requirement is more difficult to implement effectively. As a general rule pretests are undertaken with representative groups believed to be "most like" or at least in many ways similar to the target group to be addressed. Yet in no instance is it possible to obtain in a combat area a truly representative sample of a proposed target group. Hence, compromises with respect to procedures for selecting a pretest panel are inevitable.

The goal of pretesting is not to determine what policy should be, but rather how to express, within the limits of policy considerations, the content, form, and style of communications so as to maximize the psychological impact of the action and to create the understanding desired by the disseminator of a propaganda message.

In times of conflict, especially in the zone of actual combat operations, prisoners of war are frequently recruited to serve either as permanent or as *ad hoc* members of a panel to assess the form and the probable degree of effectiveness or the reaction that may reasonably be anticipated following the dissemination of a given message.

Pretesting of propaganda output inevitably involves the use of some form of question-and-answer procedure. The use of such techniques, especially when it involves working with groups alien to the culture of the interrogator, may compromise the validity and reliability of the responses obtained. Past experience

amply illustrates that this is an especially important limitation when working with Asians and may be a factor seriously limiting the utility of such procedures elsewhere.

The average person in Asia, including those who serve in the armed forces of their country, is a simple-minded, semiliterate individual, who is seldom if ever consulted for opinions on any matter. Thus when someone approaches him concerning his views on the contents of a proposed communication he understandably may hesitate to go on record as either approving or disapproving a suggested course of action. He surely would hesitate to express an adverse opinion on any action he believed to have originated on a higher level in the social scale from that which he occupies.

Almost universally when such individuals are asked to talk about such matters, there is an apparent eagerness to say that which is designed to please the questioner. As a matter of fact, in all Oriental societies it is considered to be a mark of bad manners for one to appear to be vocally critical of the efforts of another, especially if expressed openly to his face. Among prisoners of war there is likely always to be the further consideration that one should not slap the hand that feeds him.

The people in Asia have been told for centuries what to do, and in many cases what to think. The democratic precepts of the worth of individual opinions are entirely foreign to an Oriental's mental processes. Among the more highly educated classes, basic concepts of politeness prevail to such an extent that they are apt to color any expressions of opinion that are made. Under the very best of conditions it is difficult to get more than a rough approximation of what an Oriental thinks on a controversial item by questioning him about it.

Working through native interpreters further complicates the procedure, for the interpreter, in common with his fellow countryman, will hesitate to be brutally frank at the cost of being seemingly impolite. There is also the further problem of being certain that the ideas are communicated accurately in interpreting what is asked and in reporting the answers given. An interesting example of the difficulty of making interpreters understand the questions Americans may wish to ask is illustrated by the following incident.

During the early days of the Korean struggle, American interviewers wanted to determine the answers to two questions of obvious interest to psychological warfare. First, what treatment did North Korean POWS *hope* to receive as UN prisoners of war, and, second, what treatment did they *expect* to receive? After several hundred replies had been received it was discovered that the two words, hope and expect, self-evidently different in the US culture were not different in the Korean language. Although the English language version of the questionnaire was translated into Korean by a native linguist who "had an excellent knowledge of both English and Korean," and the translation was thoroughly checked, the difficulty of rendering two separate ideas from English into Korean was not immediately noted. This will always be a problem where native linguists have to be employed without individuals being present who are sufficiently bilingual in ability to meet such needs.

The difficulty in obtaining reliable estimates of the probable reactions of a target audience to any one given piece of propaganda literature may be shown by reference to Fig. 7. The graphic illustration appeared on a leaflet (7115), which was prepared in FEC and disseminated to Chinese Communist troops at the time of their New Year's celebration in 1952. The leaflet carries the caption in Chinese characters, "Your Place Will Be Empty."

Fig. 7—Leaflet Variously Misinterpreted by Chinese Prisoner-of-War Panel

Leaflet 7115, produced by Psychological Warfare Section, 1st RB&L Group, GHQ, FEC, December 1951, for dissemination to Chinese Communist troops in Korea prior to Chinese New Year. The caption in Chinese reads "Your Place Will Be Empty."

A copy of the leaflet came to the attention of a number of Caucasians in the US who were former residents of China. They were impressed with a number of features in the illustration that would appear to make the leaflet altogether inappropriate to drop on Chinese troops in Korea. First, the manner in which the members of the Chinese family were seated around the table would suggest a Western rather than a Chinese orientation. Second, the food shown on the table would suggest that the artist had little conception of how and in what order Chinese food and drink are served. Third, the abundance of food on the table appears to be inconsistent with a theme "life is not so good under Communist rule," which it would be desirable to plant and develop in the minds of the intended target audience, either directly or by implication. Fourth, the level of living of the Chinese family, as suggested by the table setting and background fixtures, would seem to indicate that the artist gave a distinctly American twist in his depiction of the Oriental family. It is wholly unlikely that (a) a family of such means, even in Communist China, would have a son in the army, and, if it did, (b) he would never expect to be able to return to his home, and his family in turn would not expect to see him again after he entered the armed services.

Because of these and other inconsistencies it was decided that a group of American social scientists, at work in Korea, questioning recently captured prisoners of war, would be asked to poll a representative sample of prisoners of war to get their reaction on a number of specific points:

(1) Is the family seated about the table in typically Chinese style?
(2) Do both old and young, men and women, sit at the table at the same time?
(3) Describe what you see in the picture, that is, name the items of food, etc., that you see.

A request was forwarded to Korea asking that a number of prisoners be quizzed with respect to this leaflet illustration, particularly its meaning, its appropriateness, and the degree of credibility a Chinese soldier target audience might be expected to give it. Unfortunately, at the time the request reached Korea only a trickle of prisoners were passing through Eighth Army channels, and hence only a few could be polled. However, the answers received were sufficiently varied to suggest the difficulties of drawing sound conclusions through the pretesting of leaflet messages on a Chinese soldier population.

Four Chinese Communist soldiers, all enlisted men, three literate, one illiterate, were polled individually and their answers recorded. Following this test, four others, all literate enlisted men were brought together and encouraged to discuss the leaflet, with a minimum number of questions asked and little prompting by the interviewers. The results obtained were reported back to the US and are recorded here in the same rough English translation that was made by the Oriental interpreter on the spot. It is believed that the answers will be less distorted if the wording given below faithfully mirrors the interpreter's notes, which were forwarded to the US from Korea.

For purposes of identification the prisoners are arbitrarily designated as A, B, C, and D. The answers received to the questions asked of the first group follow.

Question 1

Is the family, shown in the leaflet illustration, seated about the table in a typically Chinese style?

Answers

POW A "Yes, the picture shows the Chinese family seated in accordance with Chinese custom. But a round table is usually used in the town. In the rural areas we normally use a square [shaped] table."

POW B "Yes." [B gave much the same answer as A.]

POW C "Yes."

POW D "Yes."

Question 2

Do both old and young, men and women, sit at the table at the same time?

Answers

POW A "Yes we do in the modern family. At ordinary times the children and the mother are seated separately. At New Year's reunion feast men and women may sit together."

POW B "No we do not at ordinary times, but we do at the New Year's reunion feast."

POW C "Yes, we do in the country, but we do not do so in the towns of Hunan province, except at New Years."

POW D "Yes we do in the country."

Question 3

Describe what you see in the picture, that is, name the items of food, etc. that you see.

Answers

POW A "Oh that is *jozu* [a Japanese term meaning 'excellent,' which apparently entered the conversation only through Korean interpreters translation from the Chinese]. Items shown on the table are leg of chicken, a wine pitcher, and small fire pot to cook *chuan kuo*."

POW B "That is a high-class family. That is the son (pointing to ghost-like figure) whose parent, wife, and children are thinking about a member of the family at the front line during the New Year's feast."

POW C "Oh, that is a New Year's reunion feast. The family are thinking about a member of their family who is at the front line.

"That is not a family of a farmer. That is the family of a very high-class gentleman. Shown is the father, wife, fish, a leg of chicken. The food is *jozu* [Japanese term meaning excellent]. [Pointing to ghost-like figure] Maybe that is the spirit of his boy who is in the battle line."

POW D "Shown in the illustration is a vase, a picture and a spirit who has come back to his home for New Year's reunion feast."

In interpreting these meager results, certain things should be borne in mind. First, the questions were directed to prisoners by trained American social psychologists who, although they did not possess any high degree of area knowledge, did have available to them and did use qualified indigenous interpreters and translators, who were especially selected and trained for pretesting work. The inadequate answers obtained to a specific set of questions that were forwarded from the US would seem to indicate that it is not an easy matter to test leaflets for credibility and potential effectiveness in such a fashion.

Although not nearly enough prisoners were included in the poll for anyone to claim as defensible the conclusions reached, it is interesting to note that in the answers to both Questions 1 and 2 the prisoners, after giving what might be interpreted as an answer that would indicate the leaflet was based on erroneous facts, then hastened to add a qualifier, that is to suggest that the leaflet satisfied a condition of time (New Year's) or place (country area as opposed to city area) that could make this particular product acceptable.

In the answer given to Question 3 it should be noted that only two of the four attempted to identify the items of food. These two called what appears to be an uncarved ham, which rests directly on the table, a leg of chicken. Its size would suggest it was not intended to represent a chicken leg. Two of the four prisoners apparently found the items of food to be so unrealistic in appearance as to be unable to offer a suggestion of what they were supposed to represent. Three of the four were apparently unduly concerned with the ghost-like figure.

Next, the social psychologists, with their Korean–Chinese–English-speaking interpreters, turned to another group of four prisoners, all literate, and chatted with them informally about this particular leaflet. The results obtained, which are reported below, closely reflect the style of writing and language used by the interpreter in making his report.

For purposes of identification these prisoners are numbered serially 1, 2, 3, and 4. The four sat down around a common table and discussed the leaflet among themselves. Later on, specific questions were directed to the group. It is interesting to note that in recording the answers the interpreter suggests that all were in agreement, suggesting the strong possibility that there was an unwillingness on the part of the prisoners to differ radically from those who had previously commented. Perhaps there may have been only a subconscious tendency for the men to support the answers given by the first to reply to a given question or to comment.

Prisoner 1 is reported to have said, concerning the leaflet illustration and its meaning, in open discussion:

> "Because the strong man is away the family cannot hold a New Year's reunion feast. Only the old and the young (meaning children) remain in the family. The family are in a miserable circumstance."

Prisoner 2 explained:

> "Oh, (pointing to the ghost-like figure) he is the one member of the family who is in the army. Since the government doesn't help the family after he is conscripted the family is in a miserable circumstance."

Prisoner 3 is reported to have said:

> "All the young men were drafted so in this family only the oldest and the children remain. They have been unable to make any production, so the family became poor as is shown by the man as emaciated as the skeleton. In the family there is no food to eat. It is a miserable situation."

Prisoner 4 emphasized much of the same line in his discussion.

> "Because strong young man is a soldier, the family that is seated have no food to eat. They are emaciated as the skeleton shown in the picture."

It is interesting to note the degree to which each succeeding respondent was apparently influenced by what an earlier respondent had said. Even though the table appears to be well laden with food, including items that are expensive and hence normally consumed only at special feasts, all four of the respondents are said to have spoken of the adverse circumstances under which the members of the family shown in the illustration find themselves. If the report of their conversation is an accurate one, it appears that all four were completely confused with respect to the purpose of the leaflet.

When the four were asked if the illustration correctly depicted the seating customs of a typical Chinese family, all agreed that the leaflet was a faithful representation of Chinese practices in this respect. None of the four could point to a single error in the illustration.

When the group was specifically asked what significance the message held for them the reactions indicated that the prisoners of war missed the point completely that the leaflet writer apparently had in mind, which was to depress Chinese soldiers' morale. The text of the leaflet in the Chinese language, which accompanied the illustration, read as follows:

Because Communist officials continue
to stall at the Armistice Talks —
YOURS WILL BE THE EMPTY PLACE AT YOUR
FAMILY'S NEW YEAR REUNION. . . .
Because Communist leaders compel you to
continue this hopeless war. . . .
IN THE HEARTS OF YOUR FAMILY THERE IS
GREAT EMPTINESS

According to the remarks prepared by those who planned the leaflet and the art work, the phantom-like figure of the soldier shown in the illustration was supposed to represent the one to whom the leaflet was addressed. There is no evidence to support a finding that any one of the eight prisoners questioned looked on the addressee as the one so shown in the illustration.

When asked what meaning the leaflet, in its entirety, held for them, each of four prisoners who were questioned in a group, responded as follows (in this order):

Prisoner 3

> "The picture depicts the situation which exists today in communist occupied areas. It means that all young men have been drafted as a soldier, as a result there is no food for the family to eat."

Prisoner 1

> "The leaflet means the young man was involuntarily taken as a soldier so there is no young man left in the family. The family situation has thus become miserable."

Prisoner 2

> "The family situation has become hopeless with the drafting of the son, who otherwise would be available to work for the family."

Prisoner 4

"The family is unable to get together for a reunion. The situation in Communist occupied areas is hopeless. The old people and the children are unable to produce, thus they have no food to eat."

The Caucasian supervisor who oversaw the test added an additional comment, "all of these prisoners seemed to fix their attention on the ghost-like figure and thus, the interpretations seemed to center about the 'starving' figure."

When the reports of these interviews reached the Americans who had initiated the inquiries, it was decided to pass the leaflet along to some so-called "area experts" for their comments. Two were contacted and their comments were as follows.

The first one contacted is a young man who had only recently completed a doctoral dissertation on an important phase of Chinese political life. This respondent was born in China, of Caucasian parents; he read and spoke the Chinese language fluently; he had served in China with the American armed forces near the close of World War II; and long residence and study in China had given him an excellent understanding of the Chinese culture. Thus what he had to say concerning the leaflet may be taken as thoughtful comments of a well-informed person. He wrote with respect to it.

"I doubt that the leaflet (7115) would appear as credible to a Chinese soldier fighting in Korea. In fact, I feel it would have a negative effect which would compromise our psywar operations. The reasons for this are as follows:

"(1) The picture attempts to portray an extremely wealthy upper class family of the old tradition. It would be much like portraying the American GI as coming from a family that lives in penthouses or from a setting found only in a Hollywood version of society life as directed by Joseph Mankiewicz — white telephones and all. In short, I doubt whether a single Chinese soldier in Korea visualizes his home to be anything like the picture given.

"(2) The family gathering is not true to life. Given the lavish feast, the children certainly would not be present at the table and in their place would be many relatives and members of the extended family group. The children would have eaten beforehand or at a separate table.

"(3) The food itself seems to be quite odd. In the first place, there are too many dishes on the table since some of the dishes would have been finished and removed from the table before others had been brought in. Also I have never seen in North China a *Ku* or brazier used in a private home. You will find them in restaurants but even here mainly in restaurants serving Mongolian dishes. When it is served, it comes as a separate dish with others either before or after. Looking at the picture again, maybe that is not a *Ku*, but a soup dish which would be all right.

"(4) The picture of the ghost, or whatever he is, does not seem to me to conform to the Chinese concept of what a ghost or void is supposed to look like. The study of anatomy and bone structure is certainly more Western than Eastern and I would think that many Chinese with little education would find it extremely difficult to understand that he was looking at a skeleton.

"(5) The decorations in the background appear to be highly unrealistic. The high mantelpiece is something which has almost disappeared from Chinese homes. The art collection is much too extensive to belong to any one family. Even should the family possess all these artifacts of the traditional culture, they certainly would not display them in such a cluttered up manner. Each object would have a place of its own so that it could stand out by itself.

"(6) On the back side, the Chinese [text] appears to be a very accurate and literal translation of the English text. The result is that it appears to be somewhat labored in style and not particularly Chinese. The ideas expressed are very simple ones but the language appears to have a difficult time expressing them."

After this scholar had finished his comments, he then turned the leaflet over to a Chinese citizen scholar who had just received a PhD in English from a leading eastern university and one who is well steeped in the literature and traditions of China. His comments were recorded as he thought out loud. The report that follows is a mixture of the Chinese scholar's comments and those of the American who made stenographic notes of his conversation. It is interesting to note how, under 3 below, his comments are colored by his training in or exposure to English literature.

"(1) 'Being a soldier's family, they would not be so affluent. Much too rich. What would a rich man be doing in the army?'

"(2) 'I'm not sure whether the kids are his or not. Maybe that's his wife. No, that's his sister. Then whose are the children? I don't know. It's very funny.' (Note here how he's very upset over the family organization and the role that each person plays in the family. This is not surprising considering the importance of the family in Chinese culture. On the other hand, I missed that point altogether, and I think that most Westerners would not be immediately faced with the problem of attempting to identify the relationship of each person in the picture. This possibly is an indication of how even modern Chinese who are breaking away from many of the traditional attitudes of the family still find it necessary to identify individuals in terms of generation, age, sex, marital status.)

"(3) 'The soldier is very effective.' (Long pause) 'I don't know whether that's the best way to portray a ghost. It is like Shakespeare's Hamlet — It is interesting.' (His mention of Shakespeare, referring I presume to Hamlet's father, indicates, I believe, a Western orientation to the picture of the ghost, and his qualification appears to be a qualification arising from his deeper Chinese attitude about ghosts. I pushed him further on this point and asked him specifically whether the Chinese would picture a ghost in that manner and his comment was:) 'I don't think so but still it might be a very good way to do it. At least it interests me. In fact, it's the only thing that interests me in the picture. On the other hand, is the soldier supposed to be dead? The words on the back don't make this clear. First it says that he will be away and not home and now you picture him as a dead man. This is very confusing and I don't think any one could figure it out.'

"(4) 'What are the children doing? What do they see? I can't make out the expressions on their faces. Do they see a ghost or do they see an empty chair? One of them is laughing. Others are scared and others don't see anything. It doesn't matter anyway because the children shouldn't be there.' (Observe again the problem of family relationships and the concern over an inability to project himself into the position of those portrayed. I am not sure what to make of the comment, '*It doesn't matter anyway* because the children shouldn't be there.' I don't know whether he means the Chinese would ignore that part of the picture because it is unrealistic or whether he means just that the picture is already so unrealistic in so many ways that it really doesn't make any difference.)

"(5) 'It would be much more effective if it was a poor family. Actually you're playing into the hands of Communist propaganda by suggesting that the Chinese soldier has such a wealthy family. No one in China dares to be that wealthy now.' (Then he went into a long discussion of the problems that the middle and upper classes face in Communist China, coming back on several occasions to the theme that we actually were playing into Communist hands by suggesting that the Chinese could live in such a happy manner as suggested in the picture.)

"(6) 'The food on the table includes everything. It's a very good feast. It's a peacetime feast also. No one has feasts like that for a long time. Not since before 1937. In fact the whole picture belongs to a time that has gone forever in China. It would be nice if in the future we could live like that, but maybe it's best if we try to forget about those days.' (I suppose that personal nostalgia has entered into his answer to this question. But on the other hand, he is realistic enough to realize that it portrays an era that no longer exists in China. I pushed him further about the various dishes and he felt that it was perfectly all right in the old and grand manner for a private home to have a brazier. He was much more disturbed about the boiled egg dish, which should have been eaten first and been removed before the other courses, still being on the table and no one having touched it. Also he was upset that the children, the mother or grandmother did not have a cup of tea.)

"(7) 'The wording at the bottom of the picture is all right because the center of attention is the ghost.' (Once again it may be his Western education and Hamlet's father's ghost which makes the ghost the center of his attention, and for other Chinese this would not be the case.)

"(8) He had several criticisms to make of the wording on the back. I asked him to translate it and he came up with an almost identical translation of the one expected. He felt that the last sentence was very poor Chinese and ungrammatical. The expression *nei-hsin* standing for 'emptiness,' 'blankness,' should not be used with a plural subject. Only an individual can have emptiness. The family has other feelings. The whole thing could have been written in a much simpler way since the idea is very simple. His strongest criticism, however, was that the statement should have been much firmer. 'You should say it is a fact that "you will not be back." This is a fact and it is no use saying it in such a round-about way.' He is also quite critical of the use of the word 'because' introducing the two statements about the Communist behavior. According to him, 'All one should say is that the Communists have been stalling and you won't be home. Start right in with the Communists and not with any kind of qualification.' The Chinese do not follow the same type of logic that we do and, in particular, they do not feel it is necessary to give what we would consider logical or causal 'explanations.' To the Chinese mind, the thinking goes something like this: 'The Chinese Communists are stalling at the peace talks. I will not get home for New Year's.' The connection between these two phenomena is very involved but certainly there is a connection. It is not necessary or possible to explain all the relationships. When you introduce the word 'because,' it only confuses the issue. Also the Chinese tend to look for motives or moral implications, and the word 'because' usually implies to them some motive consideration. Thus the leaflet text is likely to be confusing to many Chinese as they would not be certain as to whether it means 'because' the Communists do not want me to go home, they are stalling at the peace talks; or what exactly the Communist motives are. The word 'because,' like other terms of causality, carries with it connotations about the motives and intentions of people and these motives can be very involved. It does not carry with it the idea that the existence of certain phenomena makes it logically necessary for certain other phenomena to exist. I've said this very poorly but I hope that I've given you at least a hint about a feature of Chinese thinking which we hope to develop in greater detail.

"(9) He also felt that the wording was quite unrealistic since the Chinese soldier in any case would not expect to be home for New Year's. Even should there be peace in Korea, he would still be a soldier and, in the Chinese army, soldiers do not expect leaves to visit their family on even such important holidays as New Year's. He suggested that a much stronger theme for New Year's would be one which suggested nostalgia or, if it were felt desirable to emphasize the idea that the soldier would not be able to go home, the obstruction to his wishes should be army life in general and not the peace talks which are completely unrelated to the probability of his being able to go home."

This discussion is not intended to suggest that one kind of pretest is superior to another, but only that when dealing with prisoners of war, under whatever circumstances, one can never be certain he is not being mislead, intentionally or otherwise. There is, in addition, a further conclusion one may draw from this leaflet illustration: i.e., the idea of this particular leaflet was based on inadequate target analysis.

PRETESTING FILMS IN WORLD WAR II

By W. E. D.

An account of how OWI *pretested American commercial films on German prisoner-of-war panels in World War II.*

Acting on the assumption that motion pictures would play an important role in the reshaping of the German mind to democratic thinking after World War II, the OWI Films Division requested the Surveys Section to pretest various American commercial films on panels of Germans in Allied custody.

The undertaking of the pretest mission was correctly understood to be a significantly crucial task. The showing in postwar Germany of inferior films that highlighted unsavory aspects of life in a democracy was to be avoided if at all possible. The task of selecting motion pictures for showing in the posthostility phase of the psychological warfare operation was especially difficult because to a large extent it was necessary to choose films from available stocks, most of which had been prepared for commercial distribution, rather than to convey any particular ideological message.

Such feature motion pictures as were available for selection had been produced primarily for politically healthy American or British audiences — audiences able to look on characterizations of their own foibles and shortcomings with a perspective that permits differentiation between the overdrawn and the usual. They were not produced for a sick-minded public incessantly drilled in the belief that abnormalities in democratic life were the habitual, that certain "fever spots" on the body politic were proof-positive of a thoroughly cancerous society.

In the second place it is important to note that American feature films, being largely commercial productions, had been planned and executed as vehicles of entertainment, whereas the prime objective of films for Germany was not to entertain. Rather the more sober purpose laid down in official directives was stated as follows:

> "In addition to . . . using film showings as a means of winning civilian acquiescence or cooperation, the Allied governments have declared their intention of reorienting and re-educating the German mind out of its enslavement to Nazi military doctrine."

More specifically the objective of the American films' program for Germany as it was implemented was to portray the attractiveness, freedom, and decency of life in the democracies; to show the humanity of democratic nations and their cultural and artistic achievements; and to dramatize peaceful rather than warlike pursuits. It was realized that in order to accomplish these things it would be necessary to dress the messages to be conveyed in attractive and entertaining feature films. The official policy further declared:

> "We cannot force a nation into its cinemas. Our task, therefore, is to attract and hold the spectator with motion pictures that will appeal to him on their own merits, while at the same time they embody the points of view we wish to push home."

In an effort to assist in the difficult task of choosing the best of the limited stocks available, modern public opinion polling techniques were employed by the OWI Surveys Section. At first only cooperative anti-Nazi prisoners of war were polled for their reactions to films they were shown on which German subtitles had been superimposed. Later, experiments were undertaken in which films were shown to unreconstructed Nazis, in some instances without the use of subtitles in German.

This account is a composite report adapted from several wartime memoranda published as guides to personnel charged with the responsibility for selecting films for showing in Germany during the first days of the Allied military occupation.

Prisoner Samples Used

In every instance where German prisoners of war were used to pretest films for showing in Germany in the postwar period, the viewing audience was quite atypical of the German civilian population, or for that matter, even of the German prisoner-

of-war population. The first prisoners used were selected by the British, not to pretest films but to offer constructive criticism of BBC radio output to Germany. These men were somewhat older than the average prisoner — more than half being over 30 years of age.

In nearly every instance the prisoners who viewed a particular film were strongly anti-Nazi; the groups were approximately equally divided between Protestants and Catholics, an unusual circumstance in that the former outnumbered the latter in the German population countrywide; and the prisoners used were better educated than the typical German soldier. In addition, almost six out of every ten were from the white-collar class in civilian life, a percentage out of line with those in both the civilian and military population.

Other important characteristics of the prisoners used in the pretest groups were these: Previous experience in the camp and repeated employment for pretests made the prisoners somewhat self-consciously "expert" in their judgments. They were, of course, all men, and this must be considered in the light of the well-established sex differences in movie preferences that are frequently found. Therefore in no sense could these prisoners be considered representative of the German population.

Even though it was impossible to consider the prisoners as even remotely representative of the German postwar population, they were nevertheless useful to the film selection personnel. They were keenly aware of the workings of the Nazi mind. As critics of the regime they, perhaps more than others, were more than ordinarily conscious of those parts of the Nazi propaganda line that had taken deepest root with the people. Thus they were especially well prepared to point out what aspects of a film might be resented by the German people.

The World War II records of the OWI Surveys Section reveal at least one pretest that also involved pro-Nazi prisoners. A short film *Toscanini*, was produced by OWI as a musical commemoration of the overthrow of Mussolini. The film opened with the Italian maestro conducting the NBC Symphony Orchestra. After several scenes depicting the activities of prominent Italians who had fled Italy to continue the fight against fascism from abroad, the scene shifts to Toscanini who, having heard of Mussolini's overthrow, leads the orchestra in a moving orchestration of Verdi's *Hymn of the Nations*. Interwoven with the hymn were the national anthems of France, Britain, the US, and Russia, with vocal accompaniment by the Westminster Choir and Jan Peerce.

The potentialities of the *Toscanini* film as an instrument of anti-Fascist propaganda led to the consideration of the feasibility of showing it to the population of occupied Germany in the posthostilities period. The question arose as to whether the film might not be so resented by a German audience as to destroy any possible beneficial effects. A particularly controversial point was the possibility that even the anti-Nazis within Germany might find it unpalatable; hence the pretest was suggested and carried out.

The pretest of *Toscanini* was significantly different from the others in two important respects. First, the film was not subtitled in German; instead, prior to each showing a short talk was given summarizing its content and purport. Second, the film was shown to two distinct groups — one a predominantly Nazi group in an ordinary prison cage; the other a selected audience of cooperative anti-Nazi prisoners who had been used on previous pretests. As with all films pretested, after each showing the prisoners were asked to fill out a standardized questionnaire giving their reactions to the film.

The innovation was significant in that it was the first instance in which an Allied film was shown to two such groups of prisoners for research purposes. It provided

for the first time a clear-cut comparison of the views of the fanatically Nazi and the potentially "reconstructable" German to a specific piece of Allied propaganda.

Pretest Method

With only a very few exceptions, such as the pretest of *Toscanini*, described above, the films were nearly all tested in the same manner. The films to be pretested were first carefully selected according to criteria set forth in the OWI memorandum "Film Policy toward Germany: Guidance for Selection of British and American Motion Pictures for Showing under Occupation." All the early films shown to the prisoners were edited by having subtitles in German added. It was not until the fifteenth in the series of pretests (*The Great Dictator* starring Charlie Chaplin) that an experiment was undertaken showing a film on which subtitles in German had not been added. In this case the showing was undertaken purely as an experiment to see how a group of Germans would react to a satirical comedy on the Nazi regime. *The Great Dictator* had not been on the list as a possible release in postwar Germany.

TABLE 1

AMERICAN FILMS PRETESTED

Film	Size of audience	Questionnaires returned	Response, percent	
			Liked "very well"	Suitable for Germany
Shadow of a Doubt	...[a]	...[a]	16	61
Tales of Manhattan	400	277	72	95
Moontide	400	217	58	91
Seven Sweethearts	400	202	86	97
Mr. and Mrs. Smith	400	217	20	74
Battle of New Britain[b]	400	203	66	..
Toscanini[b]	...[a]	154[c]	76[c]	..
	...[a]	118[d]	34[d]	..
	...[a]	23[e]	82[e]	..
Prelude to War[b]	400	189	92[f]	..
The Gold Rush	400	102	42	67
The More the Merrier	400	165	2	15
Pride and Prejudice	400	222	46	80
The Great Dictator	400	164	33	52
It Started with Eve	400	243	95	95
Air Force	400	203	4	8
All That Money Can Buy	400	132	23	65
Human Comedy	...[a]	...[a]	58	..[g]
Here Comes Mr. Jordan	...[a]	...[a]	53	87
Christmas in July	...[a]	...[a]	17	66
My Sister Eileen	...[a]	...[a]	8	34

[a] Original data incomplete.
[b] Documentary film.
[c] Anti-Nazi respondents.
[d] Pro-Nazi, pro-Hitler respondents.
[e] Pro-Nazi, anti-Hitler respondents.
[f] Percentage of respondents considering the documentary "good."
[g] Technical difficulties made the determination of this impossible.

Most pretest audiences numbered approximately 400 anti-Nazis. Where subtitles in German were added the films were shown without any preliminary discussion or explanation. After viewing the films all members of the audience were given a structured questionnaire to be filled in at their leisure. The respondents were asked to give their critical reactions to the film, but were asked *not* to sign their names. The number voluntarily completing and returning questionnaires is shown in Table 1. Likewise the percentage of each group returning questionnaires who liked the film "very well" and believed it suitable for showing in Germany is shown in the two right-hand columns.

Questionnaire Items

The number of items listed on the questionnaires the prisoners were asked to answer after viewing a film varied from 6 to 14; 12 was the usual number of questions asked. The following were typical:

1. How did you like this film — very well, fairly well, or not at all?
2. What did you like best about it?
3. Was there anything in the film that displeased you especially? What?
4. In your opinion were the actors good, mediocre, or bad?
5. What did you think of the photography? Was it good, mediocre, or bad?
6. Were you able to understand the film's action through the German subtitles?
7. What did you think of the story of the film? Was it satisfying, mediocre, or uninteresting?
8. In general, do you think this film suitable for presentation in Germany?
9. If you think there is anything in the film that is unsuitable, state what it is.
10. What sort of an impression of America did you get from this film?
11. How often did you see American films before the war?
12. How well do you understand spoken English?

Report of Findings

A report was prepared for each film pretested. These reports averaged about seven or eight pages typewritten single-spaced. A typical report in the pretest series gave a short paragraph introduction, a two-paragraph description of the film, and a summary list of the major conclusions reached.

By far the longest part of each report was devoted to a quantitative and qualitative report of the findings in detail, listed in accordance with following outline:

How Well Was the Film Liked?

——% said they liked it very well.
——% said they liked it fairly well.
——% said they did not like it at all.

Relative Popularity of American Feature Pictures with a Group of Anti-Nazi Prisoners

(Each report listed all films pretested to date of the report, listing them in order from the most to the least popular, in accordance with the percentage saying they liked it "very well," with bar graphs of appropriate length for each film showing its relative popularity in percentage.)

What Was Liked Best (or Least) about the Film?

	Liked	*Disliked*
Acting	(number)	(number)
Other technical aspects	(number)	(number)
Contents	(number)	(number)

Favorable Comments (typical)
(arranged under the following headings)
Acting
Other technical aspects
Humor, lightness, escapist qualities, etc.
Social scene

Unfavorable Comments (typical)
(arranged under the following headings)
Lack of timeliness
Superficiality
Dullness
Exaggerations and reactions

Reactions to Subtitles
(Typical comments given under this heading ranged from mention of errors in spelling and grammar to poor choice of idiom or expression to denote familiarity, formality, etc.)

Suitability of Film for Germany
The prisoner ratings of all films pretested to the date of the report were listed in the order from the most suitable to the least suitable with bar graphs of appropriate length showing percentage reporting their belief that the film was suitable for showing in postwar Germany.

The quantitative findings were followed by typical comments giving reasons why film should or should not be shown in the posthostility period.

Appendix
The appendix to a typical film study outlined the method for pretesting that was employed, described the pretest audience — its size and ideological bias, indicating the number who voluntarily returned completed questionnaires — and listed the items on the questionnaire disseminated after a particular showing.

Role of Pretests in Film Selection

Pretests, as employed by the OWI Surveys Section to assist in choosing films suitable for showing in postwar occupied Germany, did not provide an infallible method for assessing probable effects. The pretest audience was not representative of the country as a whole. The audiences were entirely composed of men older than an average lot of prisoners, and most of them were strongly anti-Nazi in outlook and better educated than a representative sample of men of like age would be. Therefore, since the audiences on whom the films were pretested were neither typical of other prisoner-of-war groups nor of the German population as a whole, one should be chary about extrapolating results to predict how a civilian postwar population would be influenced after viewing the film.

For these and other reasons the implications of the film pretest reports had to be applied with caution. The opinions of such nonrepresentative samples are at the very best only indications of what the reactions of normal audiences would in fact be. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the anti-Nazi prisoners were interested in the objectives of the Allied films program; they were extremely cooperative and quite sophisticated with respect to Nazi propaganda. They were therefore frequently able to give valuable advice on aspects of a film that would

support the Nazi line and thus give the wrong impression of life in a democracy in postwar Germany. Although the anti-Nazi prisoners of war were more likely to be kindly disposed toward American films than the average German, any film such a group might condemn was more likely to be even less well received by a Nazi or neutral German audience.

LANGUAGE PANELS FOR ESTIMATING EFFECTIVENESS*

An appraisal of the language and delivery characteristics of VOA *broadcasts in Mandarin.*

BACKGROUND

Purpose of Panels

The purpose of the Mandarin (Chinese) "language panels" was to make sure that the Mandarin programs of VOA contained no characteristics of presentation that might lessen the appeal of these broadcasts in the country to which Mandarin programs were beamed. The study was designed to procure from a group of qualified respondents opinions on such things as sentence structure and vocabulary used in radio scripts, and characteristics of delivery and style of presentation of various announcers including their pronunciation, accent, voice quality, speed, and smoothness of delivery.

Panel Procedure

In order to provide an adequate base for the test it was decided to analyze various types of broadcasts transmitted in the Mandarin language and to cover the delivery of all announcers and various types of script material that Mandarin-language personnel broadcast. Thus a selection of four recordings was made in accordance with these specifications. The selections that were chosen for analysis included two 8 A.M. 1-hour shows of 2 and 5 September and two 1 A.M. ½-hour shows of 22 and 25 August 1952.

These four broadcasts were divided into two sets, each of which contained one 1-hour and one ½-hour show (2 September and 22 August; 5 September and 25 August). Each set was played to two different panels of respondents so that the order of presentation could be changed around.

In the individual panel meeting the broadcasts were played to the panel as a group. After each half hour of listening each panel member was interviewed on the material he had just heard. Interviews were conducted individually in order to obtain a maximum of spontaneous comments. The hour broadcast was divided into two parts of approximately a half hour each to reduce the amount of material to be covered at one time in the interview. Thus each panel session consisted of three listening and three interviewing periods.

In the instructions given at the beginning of each panel session, the respondents were told that the study was being conducted for the Division of Radio Program Evaluation of the International Broadcasting Service (IBS) of the Department of

* Based on a study prepared under the direction of Dr. Herta Herzog, Associate Director of Research, McCann Erickson, Inc., New York, for the evaluation staff of IBS, IIA, Department of State, in May 1953.

State by an outside research agency; they were assured of anonymity of their comments. Panel members were then informed that the purpose of the study was to analyze the language and delivery characteristics of the broadcasts. To help them in the task at hand, they were given paper and pencil and asked to take notes of any observations while they were listening to the broadcasts. Such notes were to be taken along a program outline which listed the major content units of the program in actual sequence and identified by number the announcer or announcers who spoke this unit. In other words, the first voice heard on the program was assigned number 1 and subsequent appearances of this announcer on the program (if any) were again identified by placement of the number 1 next to the item he or she spoke; the second voice appearing on the particular broadcast was designated number 2, etc.

This procedure was evolved in previous tests and was adopted for several reasons. First of all, such division of the program into smaller units of observation helps to keep the respondent at the assigned task of judging presentation characteristics and prevents undue absorption with content matter. Second, it facilitates the interview following the listening period because the respondent is able to locate more readily just where he had made a particular observation.

Panel Members

Altogether there were 18 members of the panels who listened to a playback of the broadcasts. They were well educated natives of China and all were well versed in Mandarin. Sixteen of the 18 had come to the US since 1946.

The panels represented a fair cross section of the intended target by age. About half the members were 30 years of age or under. The remainder ranged between 31 and 60. The younger members had all been students when they left China, whereas the older panel members represented various occupations including teaching, newspaper work, research, and government service.

Opinions of the most recent arrivals from China were sought especially because it was believed that these individuals would be more sensitive to foreign elements in the broadcasts and they would be more familiar with the language spoken and used over native radio channels

Interview Methods

The interview of panel members followed an outline listing the major topics to be discussed. The original introduction of each session was conducted by an American study director; however, the interviews themselves were carried out by native interviewers. This procedure marked a departure from previous language panels in which American interviewers had been used. The change was instituted because there had been some concern on previous occasions over communication difficulties of respondents who were not fully familiar with the English language.

Although the doubt expressed that American interviewers might have difficulty in interviewing Chinese was a legitimate concern, the evidence collected in the Mandarin test suggests that, in the case of these particular language panels, native interviewers do not produce superior interview material. Even if they are as carefully selected as they were in this test they do not possess the specialized interviewer training that can be found in the reservoir of American interviewers.

Thus, although the Chinese interviewers who were employed in the test were all highly intelligent and had a social science background, none had ever done the kind of program-response interviewing asked for in this study. The fact that the

interviewers had an independent understanding of the material referred to by the respondent seemed to limit rather than enrich the detail and specificity of the interview material collected.

The American interviewer who lacks understanding of the test material is bound to ask more follow-up questions about a respondent's remark since this is the only way he can understand the reaction. Conversely the foreigner being interviewed by an American, even though and perhaps because his English may not be so fluent, seems to work harder at explaining what he feels and why, provided the communication difficulty is not insurmountable and is ameliorated by interviewing skill.

The ideal solution obviously would be to use native interviewers but to spend a good deal of preliminary time on their training. Where this is impractical because of the relatively small size of the study and where the respondents have a speaking knowledge of English, skilled American interviewers seem to have a slight edge over not specially trained though native interviewers.

FINDINGS

Linguistic Characteristics

The language employed on the programs analyzed by the panels was generally judged to be *correct Chinese*. The panels noticed no errors. However, the programs studied came in for criticism regarding stylistic characteristics. The majority of the panel members made some comments indicating that they thought the language used was at times "too literary" in sentence structure and phraseology, that it was "written," "bookish," and "classical" rather than the spoken Chinese.

Furthermore the panelists thought that the text occasionally showed the signs of translation in the use of "Western" expressions, employing words that were *literal translations* but awkward Chinese:

> "The texts might look very well on paper but good prose might not sound right when spoken. Some sounded bookish Chinese and some even English Chinese."

These two types of stylistic criticisms were made for the news as well as the features. The following are examples of critical comments on the news:

> "Good Mandarin but style of newspaper Chinese with literary terms here and there." (2 Sep)
>
> "A few formal expressions sounded unfamiliar. When it came to such points the program was sometimes too fast to follow — on the whole the language used was too much on the high level. I had the feeling it was translated." (22 Aug)
>
> "Text needs to be a bit more colloquial." (5 Sep)

The same types of comment were made for the features but there seemed to be some variation in degree and kind of criticism for the various features and lesser consistency of comment among the panel members:

Regarding the program of 2 September, for example, one panel member criticized the profile on President Syngman Rhee in quite strong terms for having contained "too many literary phrases — text came from translation and poor translation too and another singled out the feature on Marx for favorable comment — "sentence structure and selection of words sounded more like spoken."

Again in the program of 22 August the feature on Malenkov seemed to be more often termed translated than the "Ching Shih-Hua" commentary, which was sometimes praised for its use of "idioms" (although a couple of panel members found the language too emotional).

On the program of 25 August, the drama "Death Dealers" was criticized for having sounded "translated" (beginning with the title itself), a bit more than the feature "Revolutionary and Progressive," but the latter was considered too literary by a few of the panel members.

Altogether, the interview material was not detailed enough nor were there enough panel members tested per program to provide definitive comparisons of results by specific program units. The data merely indicate that the majority of panel members made occasional critical observations on the evidence of translation and the use of a too literary language and that such observations were not confined to news programs.

The interview data do not give the impression that these stylistic flaws interfere seriously with comprehension of the broadcast material on the part of the educated listener. They make listening harder at times — if a word cannot be understood here and there, or a more colloquial version would get the meaning across more readily and quickly. Panel members seemed to feel, however, that the literary style of the broadcasts was geared to the educated groups and might present problems of understanding for the "average" person. This feeling must of course be weighed against the type of audience the Mandarin broadcasts aim to reach. Perhaps radio-set ownership in China is such that a mass audience is not available to begin with.

General Delivery Characteristics

It must be remembered that all panel members belonged to the educated group. They were especially aware of stylistic shortcomings in the broadcasts. These stylistic shortcomings were all the greater because the nature of the language provided a certain handicap in terms of immediacy of rapport. A written text heard by ear, even if understandable, does not have the appeal value of the spoken language. Moreover, it induces "reading" on the part of the announcer. As a matter of fact the only general criticism regarding delivery had to do with the fact that sizable parts of the broadcast material *sounded read.* It did not seem as if the announcers were talking to the listener:

> "Sounded more like reading and not spoken — not attractive enough."
>
> "Sounded read from text — too stiff."
>
> "It sounded like recitals or lectures, not like somebody talking to the listener."

Thus the programs — particularly those which contained only talk elements — sounded too long and dry, were considered hard or even boring to listen to.

Other critical comments on delivery when made, seemed to be characteristics of individual announcers rather than general impressions. They occurred less often and without real consistency among panel members.

Each panel member was asked to rate the various announcers he had heard on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 percent. There were obviously not enough respondents to make this a statistically reliable measure of comparison between announcers. However, the scoring given the announcers serves as a crude yardstick for the assessment of their appeal.

The average score obtained by the various announcers tested ranged from 76 to 92 percent. The lowest rating any announcer obtained from any one panel member, was 60 percent. This is a good showing. It suggests that *all announcers* were considered satisfactory.

It is important to keep this over-all "rating" in mind when reading the following qualitative comments, since it is a general testing experience that respondents are more articulate in describing what they do not like than in specifying their likes. Obviously it is the function of any program test to delineate the points of dislike. At the same time, one must not lose sight of the weight of these criticisms in relation to the positive aspects. For this reason the average scores are always indicated, although it must be remembered that not too much significance can be attached to small variations among different announcers.

Program of 2 September

Announcer 1. This announcer presented the news on the program. Panel members felt that he had a "good clear voice" and spoke very correct Mandarin. The only criticism pertained to his delivery. It was criticized by some for having sounded "like reading," for "stiffness," for having sounded "a bit monotonous, too slow, pauses too long." (His average rating was 85 percent.)

Announcer 2. Comments on this announcer, who delivered the profile on President Syngman Rhee, were not consistent. A few panel members felt he "did not know how to read well," i.e., that he paused "too long" or "seemed to hesitate" as if he were not familiar with the text, while others found him quite "natural." Again, some thought he had a "good voice" while a few found it "too high pitched." (His average rating was 82 percent.)

Announcer 3. This announcer, who participated in the discussion on Thailand, was well liked. A number of panel members called her "appealing," "very pleasing," and praised her "beautiful rhythm and intonation." (Her average score was 89 percent.)

Announcer 4. Announcer 4 also participated in the feature on Thailand but was heard in other programs as well.

In the discussion on Thailand he was liked for his "pleasant voice" which was also termed "pleasing," "rich in volume." One or two people commented that the dialogue had not sounded like a natural conversation, that he did not have "enough expression." (His average score on this program was 87 percent.)

In two other test programs this announcer took part in a dramatization. He played the brother, Lin, in "The Hard Path" (a Burmese story on the 5 September program — Voice 5) and said a couple of lines in "The Death Dealers," playing one of the Communist border guards (which was presented in the program of 25 August — Voice 5).

The appeal of this announcer as a dramatic actor was not quite as high as in the Thailand discussion. Again the test panel (they were another group than those who heard him in the talk feature) liked his voice. However, although they found him a "smooth speaker," they did not consider him an "equally good actor." There was some criticism that he "lacked expression," that he was "not dramatic enough," that he had a "good voice, natural to a certain point, clear but too slow." (His score was 79 and 80 percent respectively; in the "Death Dealers" story, however, a number of panel members felt they really had not enough opportunity to appraise this announcer.)

Announcers 5 and 6. These announcers presented the Audience Mailbox.

There was far less complaint here on the point raised with previous announcers, namely that the delivery had not sounded spoken. This appears to be documentation of the previously mentioned general observation that the nature of the text was at least partly responsible for the impression created by the announcer.

On the other hand, both announcers in this more conversational piece came in for a few criticisms regarding their voices. Since the panels found it quite confusing to have two female voices in this feature, it is conceivable that there was some mix-up in the allocation of their criticism too. One of the voices (most often it was thought to be 5) was liked as "pleasant," and "sweet" by some but considered "too soft," "too feminine," by others. The other voice (6) was a few times called "a bit sharp" and criticized for a "peculiar pitch;" although correct she was thought to have an "artificial ring." (The average rating was 85 percent for 5 and 82 percent for 6.)

Both announcers again appeared in the program of September 5th. Announcer 5 played Nawit, the Burmese girl in the dramatic skit (Voice 4) and obtained the most favorable comments of all announcers on this show. The panel members thought she was "clear," "pleasant," "natural," "could express her emotions very well." They felt she had a "sense of drama." In both programs one panel member detected a "slight accent" but did not object to it. (Score of 88 percent.)

Announcer 6 presented the feature on the Library of Congress in the same script of 5 September (where she was Voice 10). Panel members pointed out her "good" Mandarin, her clear pronunciation. Some also specified that she had delivered the feature well, whereas others thought she had sounded "like reading" a prepared script although they were conscious of the "limits of the material." As in the other program a few thought her voice "not very appealing." (Average score 84 percent.)

Announcer 7. He presented the feature on "What Marx Did not Know" and was very well liked here. The panel thought his voice was "strong" and "forceful." There were no errors. His delivery was called "fluent" and "sincere"; although reading he sounded "natural — as if he was speaking to his audience." (His average rating was 92 percent.)

Again, this announcer appeared on other programs as well. Although he was well liked, he did not do quite as well as in his 2 September performance, a finding which may reflect also the varying appeal of the material presented. On the program of 25 August (Voice 2) he delivered the feature entitled "Revolutionary and Progressive" (with a score of 79 percent). Again his voice was liked. Several people here pointed out that the Mandarin was "not so good." Most of the critical comments, however, pertained to the delivery, which was either called "good at first, later read," or generally considered "dry," "monotonous," "stiff."

On the program of 5 September finally, this announcer presented the feature entitled "Slave Labor in a Textile Mill" (Voice 9). Again the voice was liked but there was a good deal of criticism that he had "read," that his delivery had been "too slow," having "too many and too long pauses." (Average rating 81 percent.)

Announcer 8. She presented the Labor Day commentary. Most panel members liked her voice, found that it carried well, and that she had a good "conversational delivery," that the text "sounded spoken even with such dry material." One or two thought she had talked "too slowly at times" and then "lacked power," or thought her voice was "untrained" — didn't have "enough control." (Her average score was 87 percent, but there was quite some range in the individual ratings.)

All told, it appears that the announcers came off very well. There was some variation in liking for the various voices. Occasionally an announcer was thought to have a slight accent or to have used the wrong intonation. These were occasional criticisms, however, and were never thought of as a handicap in terms of understanding or a serious defect. The only one consistent concern pertained to the programs lacking liveliness and naturalness of delivery. This was attributed to the skill or lack of skill of the announcer, to the style of the material, but also, in part, to the content of the broadcast material.

Comment on Content

The interview with the panel members concentrated on language and delivery, but interviewers were instructed to note any comments about program content volunteered by the respondents. The panel members did not find any major fault with program content, but they thought it could be improved in several directions — improvements that in their opinion would make for heightened listener interest. The major comments of the panel members include the following:

First, panel members pointed to certain disparity between *program language* and *program content.* They felt that the written, literary style of the broadcasts was directed to the educated groups. However, the program content was thought to be "too thin," "too elementary," or "too superficial" to hold the interest of these educated groups. Such criticisms pertained to the treatment of subject matter more often than the choice of topics. Panel members thought, for example, that a feature about President Rhee would be quite interesting but did not think that the particular feature had been "sufficiently impressive."

Second, the panel found the programs "too dry," "heavy," or "hard to listen to." This criticism was made even though panels were tested only on half-hour segments with an intervening pause for interviewing. The impression of heaviness seemed based on the similarity of program features, the technique of presentation as such, and also on the subject matter. For example, criticisms seemed to occur less often when talk units were interspersed with stories, dramatizations such as "The Hard Path," or dramatic narrations such as "The Death Dealers." Older as well as younger panel members seemed to appreciate the change in format — it made for greater liveliness. Also they liked the stronger emotional impact of a message in the form of a story, such as "The Death Dealers" as compared to a "report," such as that about the displaced Estonian. Finally, fairly abstract discussion such as the feature on "Revolutionary and Progressive" seemed to be more likely to be considered "too dry," than discussion of a more concrete, informative nature.

Third, the panel thought listener impact might be strengthened by a selection of material and treatment closer to the interest areas of the listener. There was less comment on this point than on the other two mentioned above. However, the Chinese, like previous language panels, seemed to feel that even more could be done to tailor the material and treatment to a Chinese orientation. Regarding "The Death Dealers," for example, which dealt with a fugitive from Hungary, panel members thought the story would have been even better if it had been a "Chinese story." In reference to the story about Noukas the displaced Estonian who had come to the US, the panel brought up the point that "they should talk about someone who came from China not Europe" or that the story is "impractical" for Chinese since "they can't come to America as easily." By comparison, the Burmese story was liked because it was closer home. In a similar vein, the panel pointed out that the references to China in the feature on the Library of Congress program served as a good "connecting" device.

Chapter 10

SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Ten case histories and articles relating to Soviet or Far East satellite employment of psychological warfare are included in this chapter. These case histories and accounts are presented in the belief that any casebook in psychological warfare would be incomplete without some further illustrative examples of Communist employment of psychological warfare.

These accounts may be divided roughly into three groups: those involving Soviet Russian organization for propaganda, those involving strategy and media employed in Soviet Russian propaganda, and three accounts involving propaganda activities in three representative areas of interest to the Russian Communists in the Far East: China, Korea, and Malaya.

In addition to the accounts appearing in this chapter there are at least three others appearing in other chapters that may prove of interest to those interested in Soviet employment of propaganda and psychological warfare.*

SOVIET CONCEPT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE†

By Wilbur Schramm

The Soviet concept of psychological warfare is anything but mysterious. It is conceived more as an organizational weapon than as a word weapon. With the Communists there is no sharp separation between words and deeds, between political and military warfare.

There is a folklore that the Communists have discovered some mysterious new power of the word. This idea is at best inaccurate, and may be dangerously misleading.

So far as the mystery is concerned, enough information is now available to remove most of the cloak from the Communist concept of psychological operations. Indeed, some of the best discussions of the subject have been available to

* See "Soviet Indoctrination of Red Army Troops" and "Indoctrination within the Chinese Communist Army" in Chap. 7, and "Magsaysay and the Philippine Huks" in Chap. 6.

† Extracted from "The Soviet Concept of 'Psychological' Warfare," in *Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory*, written under contract for USIA by the Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1955, pp 101–45. The excerpts that are reproduced here are with the consent of USIA and Dr. Schramm, the author.

us a long time, in the works of Lenin[1-3] and Stalin.[4,5] We have also the proceedings of the Supreme Soviets and other bodies before which these operations have been discussed, handbooks for agitators and textbooks for Communist schools, and many of the journals which serve both to propagandize and to inform the propagandists. We have also Selznick on Bolshevik theory and tactics,[6] Fainsod on how Russia is ruled,[7] Rostow on Soviet political dynamics,[8] Leites on the operational code of the Politburo,[9] Inkeles on the Soviet communication system and its control apparatus,[10] Nemzer on the Kremlin's professional staff,[11] to mention only a few of the excellent studies that have appeared in this country within the last five years. In addition, there are now numerous studies of Soviet propaganda and methods of infiltration and seizure, as well as a growing body of data derived from defectors and other sources from within the Soviet orbit. In the face of information like this, it is hardly accurate to call the Soviet concept of psychological operations mysterious.

In the second place, it is misleading to think of these Soviet operations in terms of the *word*. The word does not typically stand alone in Soviet planning. From the very first, Communists were told by their leaders that words were not enough, that words had to merge with deeds, and both into organization. The plain truth, as Harold Lasswell[12] and others have pointed out, is that the Communists are not fighting a battle for men's minds at all, except as it is necessary to win certain minds in order to gain the material sources of power by which the minds of the masses are supposedly influenced. When we try to describe Soviet psychological operations, therefore, we are talking not so much about a word weapon as about an *organizational* weapon, as Selznick calls it.[6] If the Communists have discovered anything new, it is not the power of the word, but the power of a dedicated, disciplined, ruthless combat party. We risk dangerous misunderstanding if we try to interpret this kind of operation in terms of our own most-commonly-held folklore about psychological warfare, which enters all too often into our public print and legislative hearings. According to this folklore, our psychological warriors are a rather special group of individuals, probably not psychologists and certainly not warriors, who are permitted to throw words at the enemy while our real warriors are at lunch. As to whether they can accomplish anything, there is an extremely wide difference of opinion. One group holds that they are boondogglers and should be junked in favor of another battleship or bomb. Another group holds that they can take over and fight the cold war so effectively that it will be unnecessary to use the real warriors at all. We shall never understand the Soviet operations from the starting point of that folklore. For the Soviet concept is at once more realistic and more unified. In the Soviet mind there is no sharp separation between words and deeds, or between political warfare and military warfare. There is rather a concept of a *party acting* — using words and deeds in such patterns and combinations as are needed, in war or in peace, to further the class struggle. The road to understanding Soviet psychological warfare is therefore through an understanding of this combat party, its beliefs and goals, its world view, its organization, and its tactical doctrine. . . .

The Pattern of Progress . . .

. . . the first step in the Communist pattern is to get agents, to recruit and build up the nucleus of a tough, disciplined combat organization. Lasswell calls this the "creation of primary nuclei in which fully indoctrinated individuals provide the solid corps of full-time labor for the cause."[12] This is carefully spelled

out in the party documents. Among the theses of the second congress of the Communist International, in 1920, was this one: "The fundamental principle of all organization work of the Communist Party and individual Communists must be the creation of Communist nuclei everywhere where they find proletarians and semi-proletarians — although even in small numbers." Eighteen years earlier, Lenin had written;

> "To train a network of agents for the rapid and correct distribution of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., is to perform the greater half of the work of preparation for an eventual demonstration, uprising. It is too late to start organizing literature distribution at the moment of interest, a strike, or ferment. . . . We must try to bring the machine to such a pitch of perfection that the whole working class population can be advised, and, so to speak, mobilized overnight." (pp 57–58)[6]

The problem in this stage is to gain adherents and transform them from mere "adherents, giving partial consent . . . into agents from whom total conformance can be demanded." Therefore, propaganda directed toward this purpose must have a high doctrinal content, and major reliance must be put on party schooling.

Once these nuclei are available, then the party can start to maneuver. It works at first from within, and its targets are the nerve centers of society — key industries, parties, and other organizations which fulfill enduring needs and which offer tensions that can be capitalized upon. The Marxist orientation of the Bolsheviks led them to concentrate on the working class. "We must be able to withstand all this, to agree to any sacrifice, and even — if need be — to resort to all sorts of stratagems, artifices, illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on communist work within them at all costs."[1] The fact that he mentioned the unions, rather than the working mass, is a significant reflection of the Bolshevik intention to mobilize existing organization. As the second International Congress said, "The Communists have no fear of the largest workers' organizations which belong to no party, even when they are of a decidedly reactionary nature (yellow unions, Christian associations, etc.) The Communist Party carries on its work inside such organizations and untiringly instructs the workers." As the focus of communism moved from the edges of Europe toward Asia and other less industrialized countries, so the efforts to organize and take over began to turn toward such groups as agricultural laborers. In China, for example, the center of gravity for the Communist movement was farms, rather than industries. But these represented the most readily available sources of mass tension and latent power, and the first maneuver was, as usual, to build up strength within these existing and potentially disaffected power groups.

Once the Party's agents have penetrated these nerve centers of society, then they can begin to maneuver in terms of government itself. They are now strong enough to act as parties, unions, etc., and to make alliances with other power groups. "Only those who have no reliance in themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliance with unreliable people," said Stalin.[4] But Stalin and the other leaders have warned the Party against improper use of an alliance. Not for a moment must it lose sight of the fact that its momentary ally is a future enemy. As Leites says, if the Party enters into any other relation than that of overt conflict with an outside group it must "use" that group, or itself be "used" by it.[9] It must never put more than momentary reliance on the support of outside groups.

These alliances are fleeting relationships, to be entered into with due caution and wariness, and used as steps to greater power.

This is apparently the stage of maneuver in France and Italy at the present time. Projected to a world theater, it was the stage of maneuver when Soviet Russia allied itself with the United States and the western European powers against Germany, maintaining a suspicious and wary attitude throughout the relationship, and discarding its allies as soon as the objective of the alliance had been accomplished. During this period, as we can observe, the task of propaganda is to "maintain a sense of mission among the faithful," as Lasswell puts it,[12] to foster among its present allies and potential enemies a sense of complacency toward the Party, to divert attention to a common enemy, and to encourage disunity and disaffection among other power groups.

This encouragement of conflicts among potential enemies is a late stage of the period of political maneuvering through alliances. Lenin said, ". . . we must know how to take advantage of the antagonism and contradictions existing among the imperialists. Had we not adhered to this rule, every one of us would have long ago been hanging from an aspen tree." (8:279–80)[2] This applies not only to maneuvering within a country, but also to maneuvers on the international scene. To quote Lenin again, "The practical part of Communist policy is . . . to incite one (enemy power) against the other." (8:284)[2] The objective is to set the stage for the final act in the drama, for which all the others are preparation: the seizure of power by the Party.

In a conflict between two powers, the Party will try to intervene late in the conflict and decisively. This was apparently the policy in the case of entering the war with Japan. In such a struggle, said Stalin, the party should "not sit still with idle hands. We will have to come out, but to come out after the others. And we shall come out for the purpose of throwing the decisive weight into the scales of fate." (7:14)[5] The Party should always be ready to take advantage of such a crisis, for in such periods there are often great opportunities to advance. Thus, for example, when Chiang-Kai-shek collapsed, and when Germany fell, the Party was ready. As Leites suggests,[9] if Russia had developed thermonuclear weapons before the United States, the Party would have been ready for another swift and dramatic advance. Indeed, that is the objective of the organization and training of the Party — to be ready, with proved techniques, unquestioning discipline, and a clearly understood goal, to take advantage of every opportunity small or large.

In the final stage of its patterned progress, when the Party is strong enough to liquidate its temporary allies and seize power itself, the task of propaganda is to demoralize the enemy, strengthen the confidence of the party, and then, when power is gained, maintain proper orientation of the mass. . . .

Words and Deeds

Stalin has defined political leadership as ". . . the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy." He said also, "If our Party propaganda for some reason goes lame . . . then our entire State and Party work must inevitably languish."

Lenin said that ". . . propaganda is of crucial importance for the eventual triumph of the Party." But he added at another time: "The dictatorship of the proletariat was successful because it knew how to combine compulsion with persuasion."[13] Words are not enough.

Both Lenin and Stalin heaped scorn on Party members who depended on the automatic effectiveness of verbal aggression. For example, in 1931, Stalin said: "I know a number of business executives who in their fight against lack of personal responsibility confine themselves to speaking at meetings now and then, hurling curses at lack of personal responsibility, evidently in the belief that after such speeches lack of personal responsibility will disappear."[4] That has never been the approved Bolshevik way. The leaders invariably have pointed out that even millions of propagandists could not alone bring victory. [Lenin said] "As long as the question was (and insofar as it still is) one of winning over the vanguard of the proletariat to Communism, so long, and to that extent, propaganda took first place; even propaganda circles, with all the imperfections of the circles, are useful under these conditions and produce fruitful results. But when it is a question of the practical action of the masses, of the dispositions, if one may so express it, of vast armies, of the alignment of all the class forces of the given society for the final and decisive battle, then propaganda habits alone the mere repetition of the truths of 'pure' Communism, are of no avail." (p 9)[6] The function of propaganda, then, is to persuade the vanguard. But the task of maneuvering the masses through the battle against capitalism is not one for the propagandist alone. . . .

In other words, propaganda, agitation, and organization represent an unbroken continuum within Soviet psychological warfare. Propaganda, of course, depends on techniques of communication. Agitation includes not only communication and example, but also disciplined penetration by indoctrinated cadres. This conception, as Selznick well points out underlies the continuity of propaganda, organization, and agitation. (p 10)[6] "Every nucleus and every Party workers' committee," said Lenin, "must be a base supporting the agitational, propaganda, and organizing work among the masses; i.e., they must go wherever the masses are going and at every step endeavor to direct their consciousness towards Socialism, they must associate every private question with the tasks of the proletariat, they must use every attempt at organization to further the cause of class consolidation, and by their energy and moral influence . . . gain the lead in every legal proletarian organization." (p 202)[14]

Plekhanov is the author of the famous distinction, so often quoted, between agitation and propaganda. A propagandist, he said, presents many ideas to one or a few people; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but to a mass of people.[15] Commenting on this distinction, Lenin said that the agitator will fasten his attention on a concrete injustice ". . . engendered by the contradictions inherent in capitalism," and against that background ". . . will endeavor to rouse mass discontent and indignation against the crying injustice, leaving to the propagandist the responsibility of giving a complete explanation for the contradiction. This is why the propagandist works principally through the written word and the agitator through the spoken word." (1:226)[3]

In Communist thinking, therefore, there is no sharp dichotomy between agitator and propagandist. They are both needed in the combat party, and both words and deeds fit into the organizational activities of the Party.

Organization for Combat

It is not necessary here to describe the total structure of the Party, but it may be desirable to indicate the relation of agitation and propaganda to the rest of the structure.

The first and obvious point to make is that control of these activities is at a very high point in the Party hierarchy. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is one of the seven administrative departments of the Party's Central Committee. For many years Andrei Zhdanov, who was high in the councils of the Politburo, assumed responsibility for this department, and for a while served as its head. Zhdanov's successors as director have not been of his stature in the Party, but the department has maintained its broad authority.

This authority, as Inkeles points out,[10] touches every realm of intellectual endeavor, every form of organized activity which might conceivably influence public opinion. The department does not make basic propaganda policies; that is the prerogative of the Central Committe itself. Nor does the department actually administer the program of propaganda, agitation, and related activities; responsibility for day-to-day operation of the program rests with the government agencies. But the department gathers and analyzes basic data on which the Central Committee can decide questions about psychological policies. Then the department interprets and disseminates these decisions. Through its subordinate and equivalent Party units in the regions and localities (the local departments and secretaries of *agitprop* stand in the same relation to local propaganda and agitation as the central department to the total activity) through these the department makes sure that the whole machine is running smoothly. . . .

The scope of this Party activity may be illustrated by indicating the subunits within the central department of propaganda and agitation.[11] There is a sector (or section) on propaganda, which is responsible for the education of Party members and non-Party intelligentsia in the Communist doctrine and practices. There is also a section of agitation, which is responsible for the political education of the masses, and also for mobilizing the population to do the Party's will. A central press section supervises the nationally-circulated Moscow press, calls together the editors for briefings and criticism, checks on performance. A local press section issues directives for the 7000 local newspapers, holds regional conferences for the editors, makes spot checks of what they are publishing. Another section performs a similar function for the Soviet publishing industry, which is perhaps the most extensive in the world. Although film and broadcasting are administered directly by government agencies, the department includes film and broadcasting sections to watch and guide these activities. Another section concerns itself with the content of literature, for as Lenin said, "Literature must become Party." Still another section exercises similar supervision over art affairs — theater, music, painting, etc. A science section supervises the indoctrination and use of scientific personnel, and a school section explains Kremlin policies, checks up on obedience, gathers data on problems that require new directives. Finally, a cultural enlightenment section guides the activities of more than 8000 clubhouses, trade union centers, reading rooms, and other "enlightenment" centers throughout the soviets. This structure is monolithic in two senses. It is certainly so in the extraordinary care and complexity with which the activities of artists, writers, actors, teachers, editors, scientists, and agitators are tuned to the will of the top Party leaders in Moscow. But, in another sense, too, it is monolithic. It is what Domenach calls a "total program."[16] The whole life of the citizen becomes the object of the program. The schools, from the primary grades on, din into him the Party line. The newspapers, as Lenin said, are expected to be not merely collective propagandists, and collective agitators, but also collective organizers. Science, music, art, films, and literature, as Zhdanov said, must ". . . express the will of the party." Agitators and observers are omnipresent and, in Dmitrov's words, must have ". . . an

irreconcilable opposition to all deviations from the Bolshevik line." These influences go into the citizen's home, his work, and his leisure. They are aimed at his entire thought and behavior. They have the purpose, to quote Domenach again, ". . . of creating a 'new Soviet man,' a nerveless and dependent individual permanently caught in the center of a tightly structured network of converging influences."[16]

We have been talking, in these last sentences, about Communist psychological operations within the Soviet orbit, where the Communist countries devote more than 90 percent of their propaganda effort. But outside the Soviet borders, the picture is different only in degree and timing. The combat party operates everywhere. It uses the same organizational weapons, responds to the same monolithic control. This side of the curtain, of course, the Party is in an earlier stage of its grand plan. In some places, it is still trying to establish nuclei. Other places, it is in the stage of penetration. In still other places, it is making alliances and maneuvering toward seizure of power. Some places it operates largely overtly, elsewhere covertly. But it is the same party and the same structure. . . .

Schooling

We have said much and will say more about the monolithic character of this system both as it extends downward from the central control apparatus and as it presents itself to its targets. The instruments of force and the instruments of persuasion work together. The forces of war and the armies of peace merge indistinguishably. The patterns of recruitment, indoctrination, organization, maneuver, seizure, and maintenance are all cut from one cloth. But it may be desirable here to single out one of the elements from this system and talk briefly about the schooling of the combat party.

As Zinoviev explained it, "With us, propaganda and agitation are based on instruction. . . . Propaganda, instruction, and agitation are a unity which must be realized according to the Leninist conception of education."[16] This conception might be said to have three parts: (1) the mastery of Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist) doctrine by the small group of advanced leaders, who in turn (2) supervise the instruction and organization of the masses in at least the "spirit" of this doctrine, by means of (3) all teaching devices, formal and informal, including schools, meetings, mass communications, and personal instruction and leadership.

Looked at from the outside, the work of this system seems to divide into three operations. In the first place, the indoctrination and preparation of Party leaders is conducted with extraordinary care. The schooling system for the Party is organized in a pyramid rising from the evening classes and study groups for Party members and candidates throughout the Soviet world, through the longer courses (some lasting two years) for local and regional Party leaders, up to the three-year curricula of the higher Party school and the Academy for Social Sciences. This is really a pyramid, and a promising leader can rise through it as he rises in party prominence. For example, as Schramm and Riley,[17,18] found from their Korean interviews, a promising Korean Communist might be sent to the Pyong-Yong central Party school to be trained for broader responsibilities. If his later work showed further signs of potential, he might be offered a chance to go to the Yenan Party school in China. And for a few chosen ones, there was the opportunity of the three-year course in Moscow.

Furthermore, this Party schooling is a continuous operation. Refresher courses are constantly in progress on all levels of the pyramid. A two-or three-year course is usually followed at appropriate times by a nine-months refresher. . . .

Implications of This Structure for Psychological Warfare

It hardly needs be said that we can expect the combat party to be well trained. The evidence for this is in the preceding paragraphs, and in the activities of the Party throughout the world. Soviet Russia is the first nation on earth to produce such a trained class of full-time propagandists, administrators, agitators, and organizers to serve in a combat party. Soviet Russia is the first nation on earth in which the activities of such a combat party are so honored and rewarded. Our own dim view of propaganda and agitation, our own rather feeble efforts to take advertising agency men, newspaper writers, and school teachers and make them into psychological warfare men in time of war, will be recalled. . . .

. . . the structure of the combat party has another implication for the conduct of psychological warfare. That is the sheer size and variety of the combat resources available. There is nothing to be gained here by mentioning large numbers, but yet it may be recalled that every Party member is to some extent a propagandist or agitator, and that the membership of the USSR Communist Party is over six millions. Communist China announced that it has four million agitators. In all the Soviet world, the entire communication systems are at the service of the Party, and so as well is the entire apparatus of leisure time. In all parts of the world, the combat party functions, drawing on as many of the proved devices as it can maintain. This is formidable opposition.

. . . we may confidently expect the Soviet program to be a *total* program. The combat party at work outside the Soviet orbit may be expected to approach its targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate — combining persuasion, infiltration, espionage, maneuver, blackmail, promises, threats, whatever is needed. Within the Soviet countries, the program is so designed as to touch the citizen at every time and phase of his life. It controls the songs he sings and the games he plays in his first school year, as well as the plays he views, the books and periodicals he reads, the music he hears in his old age. It determines the kind of organizations he belongs to. It monopolizes, as completely as any state can, what he is told from the first words he hears until the last. It controls his job expectancy as a young man, and it holds over him the threat of deprivation if his work falls down when he is older. We have said very little in this paper about fear and surveillance as Soviet psychological weapons, and yet it must be assumed that they are omnipresent. The outpouring of refugees from North Korea, the stories of the defectors from the Sovietized countries of Europe, the size and importance of the secret police in the USSR, the purges of men and the purges of music, books, and art, all testify to this weapon of control. Side by side in this total program, therefore, are the persuasive weapons and the coercive weapons, the instruction and the orders, the agitator and the NKVD.

It should be noted that Soviet psychological warfare does indeed follow the lines of Plekhanov's definition. In the conversion phase, the forming of nuclei for the combat party, and the life-long preparation of the Party faithful, there is most careful and extensive propagandizing in the approved doctrine. For the non-Party masses there are the agitators, whose numbers are in the millions and who have all mass communications as their allies, and whose tactic is the endless repetition of a few basic themes, varied to fit the particular audience being addressed. We shall have more to say later about these messages and tactics.

And finally, we should make note of an implication which is perhaps less definite, less concrete than the preceding ones, but which might well prove to be the most significant of the lot. That is the difference between the way psychological warfare fits into the plans and operational structure of the Soviets, and the way it fits into our own plans and structure. It is not necessary here to remind ourselves of the low estate of the word "propaganda" in the democracies, the reluctance with which all the western powers took up the practice of propaganda (or psychological warfare, as it came to be called), and the great difficulties we ourselves have put in the way of successful psychological operations. As one example out of many, consider the lack of communication, during World War II, between the policy-making centers of government and the OWI. Or recall the general estate of psychological warfare in our military services. As previously indicated, we tend to dichotomize the word and the deed in psychological operations. The Soviets do not. And because they do not, they have less trouble than we do in fitting psychological operations smoothly into politics and military action. Furthermore, they are able to reward their agitators, propagandists, organizers and other "psychological troops," as we are not, by giving them status. *Agitatsaya i propaganda* are honorific words in Russia. They are honorific because the importance of these activities in the pattern of world revolution is recognized and respected. Because this is so, the "psychological troops" may be expected to have a sense of mission, a sense of playing on the first team, which our psychological warfare operators typically have not had. We need not imitate the Soviets, but we should be foolish not to recognize the operative strength of their structure. . . .

The Targets

It is safe to assume that the Party leaders see three principal targets, outside the Party itself, for their psychological operations.

One of these, of course, is the main enemy himself. Here the approved tactic is pressure — diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and, if necessary and when appropriate, military. The only way the Party can make gains, is by intense struggle, maximum pressure. The leaders from Lenin's time on have warned against making anything less than a maximum effort, exerting any less than maximum pressure. One type of such pressure through propaganda is by incessant expression of hostility. Another is by means of threats, expressed or implied.

. . . a second kind of target is the part of the enemy's power structure — meaning the parts of the power structures not dominated by the Party — which is "ripe for the picking." This includes the areas of tension and dissatisfaction, the colonial countries, the semifeudal and underdeveloped countries, which are vulnerable to the Communist approach. The Party leaders make it clear that they must take possession of every doubtful area or the enemy will do so. No matter how "backward" a country is, still it is a worth-while target. In dealing with targets of this kind, the organizational weapon of the combat party is unsurpassed. No advance is too small to be worth while. The Party is warned that it must not expect in every instance to convert and communize one of these countries immediately . . . . This viewpoint helps to explain why throughout Asia the combat party offered, not collectivization, but rather a division of land among the common people. And also why, when North Korea was taken over and when China fell, such bourgeois arrangements as land reform were instituted; but still the Communist party was firmly in charge, guiding the country in the desired direction. All the colonial and ex-colonial and underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are regarded as targets for the combat party, which is willing to accept a small advance when a large one is not possible, and which is constantly engaged in these places, in a war of organization, infiltration, and maneuver in an effort to split areas from the anti-Soviet power structure.

The third principal target is the Soviet mass. Both Lenin and Stalin make it clear that even after the Party has seized power, still the proletariat will need persuasion and perhaps coercion. The struggle in this case will be against what Lenin called that "terrible force" of values and behaviors built up in long years under capitalism. All external evidence seems to indicate that the USSR Party leaders still feel that the Russian masses are swayed by the "bourgeois remnants" of the past. The tight surveillance, the instruments of force used to prevent formation of counterelites, the close control on communications, the "Iron Curtain" erected against outside ideas and information, the extensive program of agitation, the endless repetition of simple themes — all argue that the Party leaders put less faith than might be expected, after 35 Soviet years, in their masses.

In its way, each of these targets is essential to the program of the psychological operations of the combat party, and each is attacked with the "maximum effort" the situation and resources permit. . . .

A Note in Conclusion

It would be unfortunate to end this report by talking about propaganda lines as though the only weapons of Soviet psychological warfare were words.

The point we have tried to make is, rather, that we are facing a combat party, skilled, able, disciplined, and dedicated, guided by a doctrine based on the philosophy of class struggle, which conceives of every group not dominated by the party as an enemy, and which permits of no solution to world tension until the Party dominates all other groups — or is destroyed. This Party uses words skillfully, but only as one weapon among many. Throughout the non-Soviet world it is engaged in tactics of indoctrination, organization, infiltration, maneuver, and seizure. Throughout the Soviet world it is engaged in consolidating its advances, combining coercion with persuasion, trying to create the new kind of Soviet citizen needed for the master blueprint. This paper has neither space nor mandate to discuss the counterattack which the program of the combat party seems to invite and require. But it is self-evident that the answer to a "total attack," such as that of the combat party, which recognizes only nominal and formal difference between war and nonwar, the answer to that kind of attack cannot be merely in words, or even mostly in words. . . .

THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHINE*

By Alan M. G. Little

The Soviet Union maintains a propaganda machine that consists of two major parts — conventional mass media and a vast network of agents, or human transmitters of the Soviet propaganda line.

The use of mass media to sway public opinion is inherent in the Soviet theory of how to administer the state. For it was a Lenin doctrine, which his followers have adopted, that to perpetuate itself the Soviet State must maintain a balance between coercion and persuasion.

Following the tenet of persuasion, as well as that of coercion, the Soviet leaders through the years have created a vast propaganda machine. All the strands of

* Extracted from *The Department of State Bulletin*, 25:367–70 (1951).

internal and external policies are woven by this machine into a series of standard and Party-line messages for direct use in many countries, with different peoples, and with various occupational and income groups.

The machine itself consists of two parts: first, the conventional mass media common to all national propaganda services — which are discussed in this article — and second, a vast network of individuals who act as human transmitters for the propaganda message.

At home, operating behind the protection of censorship and radio jamming of incoming information, the Soviet propaganda machine exerts every conceivable pressure to convince the population of the correctness of the Government's policy. Abroad, this propaganda attempts to confuse and to isolate nations or individuals opposing Soviet policy — and to create and reinforce favorable opinions.

The message delivered by the machine usually finds its strength in quantity rather than quality, and in repetition rather than logic. Outside the USSR, it is most convincing to people who know least about the USSR. Inside the USSR, it misses complete effectiveness in convincing people who live under the Soviet system, because it is so insistently repetitious and oversimplified and because it disregards or denies the facts of their own existence. All basic Soviet propaganda recognizes only friends or enemies and rules out any accommodation to a middle view.

DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA

The propaganda system for domestic purposes in the USSR, Stalin has said, acts as a "transmission belt" between the Communist Party and the people. It is designed to reach down to all levels of the population and to serve a double purpose by relaying Party instructions downward and by permitting (to some extent) the return to the Party of public reactions to the propaganda. Stalin also has stated that, if the system failed to function, "all state and Party work would languish."

In the Soviet domestic propaganda, two kinds of appeals are generally employed. The first, "agitation," is directed in simple terms to the masses in order to achieve immediate goals. The second, "propaganda" in the narrower sense, is addressed to a more intelligent audience capable of grasping the broad aims of the Soviet state.

Both types of activity are under the control of the Section of Propaganda and Agitation (*Agitprop*) of the Party's Central Committee. This section must implement the decisions of the *Politburo*. *Agitprop* units at lower levels insure a relay throughout the Soviet system. A tight control over all media of information is centered in this section, which determines both the general line and the specific course of action in all matters affecting Soviet opinion. *Agitprop* procedures are based, of course, on the policy determinations of the *Politburo*.

Assistance in securing uniformity of facts and interpretations to be disseminated through the different media is given by the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (*Glavlit*) and by responsible subdivisions of the governmental ministry or the organization concerned.

For example, *Glavlit* insures that all publications, manuscripts, photos, pictures, radio broadcasts, lectures, and exhibits intended for the public are in accord with the Party's political and ideological doctrines. *Glavlit* also makes certain that such media do not divulge any economic or military secrets. The extent of this surveillance is apparent in the fact that *Glavlit* has representatives in local Soviet

governmental units (raions) as small as American counties. But approval of an individual item by *Glavlit* does not excuse the originating party if a mistake is made.

Use of the Press in the USSR

Despite a steady postwar growth, the output of the Soviet press has not reached its prewar levels. Stalin has said that the press is "the only implement which helps the Party to speak daily, hourly, with the working class" and that "no other such flexible tool is to be found in nature." Yet the Soviet Union since World War II has failed to publish as many newspapers, magazines, and books as it did in 1939 — the most active prewar year.

Much of this loss in Soviet publishing is accountable to wartime destruction of printing facilities. But in view of the Soviet preference for the press as a medium through which to influence public opinion, there also may have been a failure — or an inability — to direct sufficient resources into printing to match the prewar volume.

SOVIET PUBLICATION STATISTICS

Medium	Year	Number
Newspapers	1939	8,780
	1947	7,000
	1948	7,163
	1949	7,200
	1950	7,700
Magazines	1939	1,592
	1946	960
	1948	1,183
	1950	1,400
Books, etc.	1939	43,800
	1946	25,145
	1948	40,000
	1949	42,000

Use of Radio in the USSR

A heavy hand of control is placed in the USSR over what is broadcast and over the audience's choice of what it can hear.

Most radio listeners in the Soviet Union can tune in on programs only over a loudspeaker wired to relay stations. In 1950 the ratio of loudspeakers to individual tube radio sets was 8 million to about 4 million. Consequently, a majority of the Soviet people who have access to radio programs can hear only the propaganda which is being broadcast over their wired loudspeakers. At present the Soviet transmitting system reaches about one-eighth of the people.

In accounting for the widespread use of the loudspeaker system in the USSR, the relative cheapness of a wired loudspeaker compared to a radio set is undoubtedly second in importance to the Kremlin's desire to retain strict supervision over everything the Soviet people listen to.

Use of Films in the USSR

The Soviet film industry is relatively undeveloped, notwithstanding the importance attached to this medium by Soviet propagandists. This limitation naturally restricts the use of film as propaganda.

Because of the difficulties of meeting the ideological demands of the Party, the record of fulfillment on film schedules in 1950 was the worst in a decade. And, although the Government's first postwar Five Year Plan included intentions to expand facilities for the showing of films, it is not likely that many of these have been realized.

Production and release of 20 full-length feature films were called for in the 1950 schedule laid down by the Kremlin. But only 11 new films were made available to the public during that year, and 5 of the 11 had been in production since 1949. Before the war, on the other hand, from 40 to 45 feature films were produced each year in the USSR. In the United States, the annual output is about 350 films.

PROPAGANDA DIRECTED ABROAD

The *Agitprop* section of the Party's Central Committee is also the unit which controls propaganda directed abroad through the mass communication media. For the outside world, in addition to the usual propaganda media, the USSR employs its diplomatic and military missions, and national Communist parties in other countries, with their subsidized and controlled publicity operations.

The USSR also relies heavily upon various Soviet-dominated and interlocking international organizations, and their affiliates, for propaganda assistance, such as: the Cominform, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the World Congress of Partisans of Peace (headed by the World Peace Council).

These and other organizations are manipulated to influence mass opinion abroad in support of the policies of the Soviet Union, through such international agitation drives as the Stockholm Peace Appeal, the Five Power Peace Pact, etcetera.

Use of the Press Abroad

In making a choice of propaganda media, the Communist leaders have always preferred the press. Although they show flexibility in adapting each medium to their purposes, the most effective vehicle they have used abroad is undoubtedly the newspaper. In part, this may result from the fact that the Soviets give more attention to newspapers as a propaganda vehicle.

Many news stories originating in Moscow and conveying Soviet points of view are carried in the Western press, in both Communist and non-Communist papers. One reason why the Western press must necessarily give space to Moscow-inspired news stories, of course, is the near monopoly by the Soviet Union and its agencies on news about Russia.

But the publication of Soviet propaganda in editorials such as those carried recently in *Sheng Hua Pao*, Communist newspaper in Djakarta, and in the daily *Ta Kung Shang Pao* of Surabaya, and in original articles like one which appeared first in *Pravda* and was reprinted in Damascus by *Al-Manar* and *Al-Nasr*, tends to confirm that the product of the Soviet propaganda machine gets direct distribution in many places outside the geographical orbit of the USSR.

It is noticeable that the volume and direction of Soviet propaganda channeled abroad have changed since the war. Most of the Soviet effort prior to World War II was addressed to French, German, and, above all, to English-speaking audiences, with great stress on an idyllic picture of life in the USSR rather than on "world revolution." But every prewar publication for foreign consumption was discontinued either during the war or by 1950. The postwar Soviet foreign-language publications place more stress on the USSR's achievements, cover a wider range of languages, and no longer include newspapers.

Indicative of a more militant propaganda is the hard-hitting tone of *New Times*, a weekly periodical published in English, Polish, French, and German. This weekly deals with Soviet foreign policy and circulates what are frankly propaganda documents to a wide audience.

The Soviet publications in this category are distributed through the International Book Publishing Corporation, a branch of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade with sales outlets in 29 countries. Soviet representatives in other countries also sponsor publications printed locally, including the bulletins of the Soviet embassies.

The foreign Communist press is supplied by the USSR with news items through the information agency of the Soviets, the *Sovinformburo*. The Soviet telegraphic agency, Tass, which has a monopoly on collecting foreign news for relay to Russia, is also the ultimate source of most news emanating from the USSR. The difficulties encountered by foreign correspondents at Moscow inevitably buttress the Tass monopoly on news.

Sovfoto, a branch of Tass, supplies photographic material on a monopoly basis to foreign purchasers. Outside the countries in the Soviet orbit and the United States, Tass is most active in the Near East and India.

There is no doubt as to the official character of Tass. It is reflected, among many indications, in the use of Tass by the Soviets as an agency for training of Soviet diplomats, and as a vehicle for the dissemination of official statements and for denials of reports deemed injurious to the interests of the USSR.

Use of Radio Abroad

Foreign broadcasting by the Soviets increased during 1946–50, while broadcasting by both the United Kingdom and the United States was less in 1950 than in 1946. Over that period, the USSR almost doubled its number of program hours so that by 1950 the Soviet weekly broadcasts, in combination with those of the European satellites and China, surpassed the combined broadcasts of the United Kingdom and the United States for the first time.

In 1950 the Soviets broadcasted in 32 foreign languages and particularly stressed the languages of the European and Oriental satellites. They maintained a steady emphasis on Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, in that order.

Language units in the Soviet system prepare the broadcasts. Each unit has its own editorial staff, headed by a Russian but mainly composed of expatriates. In the English-language unit, there are reported to be white and Negro American expatriates, and British expatriates.

As far back as 1917 the Soviet leaders exploited radio for international propaganda. A comparison of total broadcasting on the international wave-lengths as between the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States clearly shows the effort made by the Soviets in recent years.

WEEKLY HOURS OF FOREIGN BROADCASTING[a]

Year	USSR	UK	US
1946	276	705	395
1948	334	664	186
1949	434	634	198
1950	516	636	210
1951	670	554	339

[a] These figures are based on rough estimates, subject to special qualifications.

The chief criteria in Soviet allocation of time to any given area appear to be the nearness of the area to the USSR, its strategic or political importance to Soviet foreign policy, and the capability of reaching the area by other means. The size of the potential audience and the number of receiving sets in an area seem to be less important factors in the Soviet calculations.

Use of Films Abroad

The Soviets claim that their films are seen annually outside the USSR by 400 million people. But their world-wide distribution is still uneven, and, in certain areas, the lack of diplomatic relations or the opposition from church, colonial, or civil authorities precludes the showing of Soviet films. In some areas, and for a variety of reasons, the films are shown only by embassy personnel.

The chief areas in which Soviet films have found a steady if limited public have been the United States, Britain, and western and northern Europe. These showings, however, have declined since 1946. A smaller number of Soviet films are shown in Israel, Japan, Finland, and in some Latin American countries.

Near Eastern and south Asian countries are the targets of a vigorous film effort by the Soviets, but the fields of the most aggressive film propaganda are in the European satellite countries and in China. These fields are cultivated by political influence insuring that Soviet films will be shown, and by the employment of Soviet film specialists collaborating in the local production of films.

The Cultural Exchange Program

As still another major propaganda effort, the Soviets have developed a cultural exchange program in all possible activities with the countries in its orbit. With the rest of the world, cultural exchange activities are more limited, and with the United States, for example, deliberately discouraged.

VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad) maintains contact with a network of foreign Soviet Friendship Societies, exchanges publications, and with the aid of *Intourist* (the State Travel Bureau) supervises the visits of foreigners in the USSR.

A constant flow of delegations representing sports, the arts, youth, trade unions, and women's activities is maintained to and from the USSR. On many occasions these delegations will comprise as many as 500 members.

Racial and religious ties, as with the Slavic and Armenian groups outside the USSR, are also played up for the purpose of promoting Soviet aims.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Within the geographical confines of the USSR, the policy guiding Soviet propaganda is extremely simple. The policy is to eliminate any views contradicting the official position on any subject and to create popular support for the Communist Party by repeating a uniform and slogan-like message in as many ways and as many times as possible.

The convictions of people in the USSR are believed to be less affected by official propaganda than is usually claimed by the Soviet leaders. The obviously artificial and controlled nature of Soviet propaganda, contradicting the facts of life, arouses widespread distrust. Nevertheless, the reiterations leave a lasting impression, exclude other facts from public discussion, and show the citizen exactly what he must say if he is to survive — much less "prosper."

The long-range effect is to reduce openly expressed interest in public affairs and to create an attitude of indifference among those groups whose prime interest is food, clothing, and shelter. The curious seek to read between the lines and listen to rumor. But fear of police repression discourages a serious searching for the truth by the average Russian.

Although from country to country the Soviet line is shaped to conform with local conditions, the main body of propaganda material designed for foreign consumption usually differs but little from that used within the Soviet Union. The principal themes of propaganda are often the same.

The effect of this propaganda abroad varies from area to area. Among the Soviet satellites, where political control might be expected to produce the same results as in the Soviet Union, continued resentment against these controls tends to diminish the impact of both Soviet and local Communist propaganda.

Soviet theorists are always endeavoring to develop a pattern of mass response, a conditioned reflex. One reflex is that the captive audiences in the Soviet sphere are learning to avoid open protests and to conform outwardly. Yet the ultimate effects may be only apathy, plus a sense of frustration, both at home and in the satellite countries.

In other parts of the world, the success of Soviet propaganda may depend chiefly on three things:

(1) The existence of conditions — social injustice and economic hardship — which would dispose an audience to believe the Soviet message.

(2) The great volume and intensity of Soviet propaganda applied to the area.

(3) The absence of a well-informed public opinion, able and ready to distinguish fact from fiction.

Soviet propaganda is undoubtedly most effective in colonial countries or in areas of the world whose recent history has predisposed them to distrust colonial authority. The aim of the USSR has been to encourage the populations of these countries or areas to suspect the motives of the English-speaking and other free nations, who are charged with "imperialism."

In this respect, as in others, Communist propaganda is a weapon of psychological attack which must be met and overcome by similar weapons.

COMMUNIST ATTACKS ON US AID TO EUROPE*

A case study of Communist opposition to the European Recovery Program

[On 5 June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall in addressing the graduating class at Harvard University said that assistance to Europe should no longer be ". . . on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative." Europe's economic problems must be dealt with as a whole and not country by country and ". . . before the United States can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this government." Thus, Secretary Marshall, speaking for the US government, invited the countries of Europe to draw up a program for economic recovery that would be the basis for further assistance by the US.]

* Extracted from "A Report on Recovery Progress and United States Aid," Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington, D. C., Feb 49, pp 141–50.

[This pronouncement by the Secretary of State, in addition to being an act of statesmanship was also an important act of psychological warfare. The war in Europe had ended 25 months earlier, but the problems of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction had proved so large that most European governments were near the end of their resources. Even though public and private sources in the US in the 2 years following V-E Day had sent billions of dollars to Europe as relief, it had become increasingly evident that further aid would be necessary if political and economic breakdown in Western Europe was to be avoided. Europe was far from being self-sufficient at politically tolerable living standards. For continued economic aid to be maximally effective it was necessary that the peoples of Western Europe develop a greater faith in their ability to restore their industrial and economic potentials to prewar levels.]

[The 2 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany had witnessed a menacing resurgence to power of Communists in nearly every European country. Aided and abetted, both directly and indirectly, by the forces of Soviet Russia, Communists were already in power in Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and were threatening the existence of democratic institutions in Greece and Turkey. In France and Italy the Communist Party constituted such a large and noisy sector of the population as to constitute a very grave danger to institutions and individuals oriented to the West.]

[Secretary Marshall in his Harvard speech stated, "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. . . ." General Marshall, in fact, held out the promise of US assistance to all the countries of Europe that would cooperate in the achievement of economic recovery. However, the Soviet Union was quick to challenge the program as inimical to its interests. The political and psychological warfare campaign waged by Communists to disrupt European recovery along democratic lines represents an interesting case study of Communist tactics and methods.]

COMMUNIST AIMS AND INTENTIONS

The first reaction of the Soviet press to Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech on June 5, 1947, was to attack it as " . . . an addition to the Truman Doctrine." A few days later, the Soviet Government accepted an invitation to join France and the United Kingdom in a conference on the European reconstruction in Paris on June 27. There the USSR representatives asked that the various national estimates of needs be added together and presented to the United States as Europe's requirements for assistance, without provision for the cooperative European effort which was one of the basic assumptions of the original American proposal. The British and French Foreign Ministers, however, insisted on approaching the determination of the needs and resources of Europe on a cooperative basis of mutual aid, in the spirit of Secretary Marshall's suggestion. On July 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov withdrew from the conference, warning of "consequences" which, he claimed, would split Europe in two.

The "consequences" were not long in developing. Czechoslovakia had agreed on July 4 to send an observer to future meetings in Paris on the Marshall Plan. But after the Czechoslovak Premier was summoned to Moscow, Czechoslovakia declined to participate, as did other Eastern European states, which had initially shown an interest in the Marshall Plan.

Ever since the Communists have deliberately attacked and sought to undermine the European Recovery Program (ERP). Their two principal instruments within the participating countries have been the propagandists directed by the Cominform, and Communist labor leaders who have tried to control organized labor in Europe and to turn labor against the Marshall Plan. They have systematically misrepresented and distorted the objectives and methods of the ERP, but their true aims can be clearly seen from their own statements. In the light of these, their course of attack in propaganda and in the field of labor can be easily traced.

A propaganda campaign originating in the USSR, and amplified by local Communist organizations throughout Western Europe, sought to confuse the issues and to define them in terms unfavorable to Secretary Marshall's proposal. The Communists denied that the ERP presented an opportunity to choose between recovery and economic collapse. Their propaganda was aimed to arouse suspicion, fear, uncertainty, and dissension among the Western European states. French fear of an industrially strong Germany, Britain's economic losses, Scandinavian apprehension of involvement — every possible theme was exploited to serve the Communist purpose, and all the media of Communist propaganda were used to attack American "imperialism." The objective, clearly, was to prevent development of any form of economic cooperation which might strengthen democratic Europe and, by preventing economic recovery, to create the conditions of chaos and misery in which communism thrives.

Organization of the Cominform

On October 5, 1947, an official communiqué was issued by representatives of the Central Committees of nine European Communist Parties — those of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. The communiqué summarized the action taken by an international Communist conference held in Poland during the month of September, 1947. The conference, according to the communiqué, decided " . . . to create an Information Bureau" (Cominform) made up of " . . . representatives of the Central Committees of the above-mentioned parties" whose tasks would " . . . consist in the organization of an exchange of experience between parties and, in case of necessity, in coordination of their activity on the basis of mutual agreement." The new Information Bureau was to be established at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where its official newspaper would be published and its editorial board would reside.

An accompanying resolution and manifesto provided a prospectus for this new agency of international communism. The resolution declared that " . . . the absence of connections between Communist Parties . . . is a serious shortcoming. . . . The requirement for an exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of actions of the separate parties has become particularly necessary now in conditions of the complicated postwar international situation."

The manifesto elaborated the " . . . complicated postwar international situation" and the political basis for the new Cominform in these terms: The wartime unity of the Allies had been sundered because of divergent aims of the former partners and two camps had emerged — " . . . the camp of imperialism and antidemocratic forces" led by the United States and an " . . . antiimperialistic democratic camp" led by the Soviet Union. "The imperialistic camp and its directing force, the United States of America," said the manifesto, "show a growing aggressive activity. This activity evolved at the same time in all spheres — in the sphere of military and strategic activities, economic expansion and ideological warfare. The Truman-Marshall Plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the United States of America in all parts of the world."

To counter "imperialistic plans of aggression," the manifesto alleged,

> " . . . the antiimperialistic camp has to close its ranks and draw up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the chief force of the imperialist camp, against American imperialism, against its English and French allies, against the Right-Wing Socialists, above all, in England and France. . . . The Communist Parties must grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries . . . fight against attempts at the economic and political subjugation of their countries. As the appeasement policy of Munich led to Hitler's aggression, today concessions to the United States of America and the imperialist camp may cause its instigators to grow even more shameless and aggressive. In consequence, the Communist Parties should place themselves in the vanguard of opposition . . . in the sphere of state administration, politics, economics, or ideology. . . ."

It is clear that the fight against the Marshall Plan and European reconstruction was given the Cominform's top priority.

Development of Propaganda

Soviet Politburo representative Andrei Zhdanov, in a report on the international situation before the International Conference which set up the Cominform, presented the main theme of the Soviet attack of falsification and distortion against the Marshall Plan:

> (1) "American economic 'assistance' pursues the broad aim of bringing Europe into bondage to American capital. The more drastic the economic situation of a country is, the harsher are the terms which the American monopolies endeavor to dictate to it. . . .
>
> (2) "American 'assistance' automatically involves a change in the policy of the country to which it is rendered: parties and individuals come to power that are prepared, on directions from Washington, to carry out a program of home and foreign policy suitable to the United States.
>
> (3) "The cornerstone of the Marshall Plan is the restoration of the industrial areas of Western Germany controlled by the American monopolies . . . to render aid in the first place . . . to the German capitalists.
>
> (4) "The Marshall Plan envisages the ultimate reduction of Britain and France to the status of second-rate powers.
>
> (5) "The invitation to the Soviet Union to participate in the Marshall Plan 'was taken in order to mask the hostile nature of the proposals with respect to the USSR . . . to lure the countries of East and Southeast Europe into the trap of economic restoration of Europe and American assistance.'
>
> (6) "The Marshall Plan would . . . restore the power of imperialism in the countries of the new democracy and compel them to renounce close economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union.
>
> (7) "The Marshall Plan strikes at the industrialization of the democratic countries of Europe, and hence at the foundations of their integrity and independence.
>
> (8) "Foreign credits must not be the principal means of restoring a country's economy. The chief and paramount condition of a country's rehabilitation must be the utilization of its own internal forces and resources and the creation of its own industry.
>
> (9) [As opposed to the] "unfair and unequal treaties [of the United States,] treaties with the USSR are of mutual advantage to both parties

and never contain anything that encroaches on the national independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties."

The Zhdanov speech emphasized that —

"... a special task devolves on the fraternal Communist parties of France, Italy, Great Britain and other countries. . . . If the Communist parties firmly stick to their position . . . take the lead of all the forces prepared to uphold the national honor and independence, no plans for the enthralment of Europe can possibly succeed."

Finally, the Soviet representative stated that "as for the USSR, it will bend every effort in order that this plan (the Marshall Plan) be doomed to failure."

Subsequent Communist pronouncements on the European Recovery Program have followed closely the main themes set by the Zhdanov speech, and developed variations. Since the creation of the Cominform, the propaganda campaign against the ERP has been carried on by large numbers of agents and used large sums of money. The Cominform can call upon the services of well-organized groups within the participating countries. Communist newspapers, overt and covert, are published in almost every ERP country. Many of those who disseminate Cominform propaganda call themselves national patriots. In most countries and in most media, the propaganda campaign is conducted with a high degree of technical skill.

COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO SET LABOR AGAINST THE ERP

Labor, more than any other group in the European community, has been singled out by the Communists as a special target for propaganda against the ERP. This action indicates the vital role labor plays in the European recovery effort.

As one instrument in their drive to undermine labor's support for the Marshall Plan, the Communists sought to use the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) as a sounding board for their propaganda against the ERP. This international labor federation had been formed early in 1945, when the atmosphere of allied unity was at its peak, by representatives of labor unions from all over the world. When in 1947 the Soviet Union announced its opposition to the Marshall Plan, Communists within the WFTU sought to prevent discussion of the recovery program against the vigorous opposition of the non-Communist trade unionists. From then on the rift between the Communist and non-Communist forces within the WFTU continued to widen. In January, 1949, the representatives of the CIO, the British Trades Union Congress, and the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions withdrew from the WFTU.

In attempting to control labor and use it against the ERP, Communist plans have been adapted to meet local conditions in each country of Western Europe. When these separate Communist campaigns are examined, however, they are found to conform to a consistent pattern. The following sections present an analysis of the most important local Communist efforts to obstruct economic recovery in Western Europe and of the measures which anti-Communist trade unions and the democratic political parties have taken to counter the Communist efforts.

France

Communist opposition to the ERP has been most intensive and persistent in France. It has not succeeded, in large measure because of the good sense and determination of a large part of the French labor movement, the firm actions of the

French Government, and the continued flow of American aid. The Communist effort, however, has not abated.

After the liberation, the Communists gained almost complete control of the largest labor organization in the country, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). Labor, mindful of its experience under the Vichy Government and impressed by the role of the Communists in the resistance movement after the Soviet entrance into the war, accepted the leadership of Communists who claimed to be good patriots working for national reconstruction. For more than two years the Communists played the game of cooperation in reconstruction. During this period, French workers, despite shortages of food and clothing and lack of heat in their homes, made the great effort in production which brought French industrial activity nearly up to prewar levels. The Communist hold on labor in this period made the French Communist Party, with over a million members and some five million votes, the strongest European Communist Party outside the Soviet orbit.

In May 1947 the Communists ceased to be members of the Government for the first time since 1944. In September came the Cominform attack on the Marshall Plan. These two events transformed the French Communists from a party of ostensible cooperation in national recovery to one of avowed opposition. Although many Communist Party members, and the vast majority of those who voted for Communist political candidates, thought of themselves as good Frenchmen, the party leadership bent its efforts to the goals set by the Cominform.

The 1947 Strikes and Split in the CGT. In November and December 1947 the Communist leadership of the CGT staged its first great attack on the French economy. Using the cover of understandable and not unreasonable wage demands, it led a series of strikes in basic industries which, in all but name, amounted to a general strike. As the strikes went on — in the coal mines, the railroads, the metalworking industries, the building trades, the ports, and elsewhere — the Communist leadership showed its political hand more and more openly through acts of violence and its refusal to allow democratic union procedures within the CGT. These tactics contributed to the collapse of the strikes. They also precipated a split within the CGT which resulted, in December, in the formation of a new national labor federation, the *Force Ouvrière* (Workers' Force), headed by the veteran Leon Jouhaux, who had been Secretary-General of the CGT since before the first World War. In a few months, over a million workers joined the *Force Ouvrière*. Between one and two million more quit the organized labor movement.

The new *Force Ouvrière* cooperated with the old-established French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC) of almost a million members to support the recovery program. Both organizations took an active part in the formation of the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee in March 1948 and in opening the Committee's Paris office to work directly with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The 1948 Strike against the ERP. The Communists had apparently weakened themselves by the 1947 strikes, in which it had been clearly demonstrated that the Communist leaders took their orders from the Cominform. During 1948, however, despite a good harvest and the high hopes placed in the continued flow of American aid, the economic position of industrial workers remained precarious. A series of drastic price rises followed the removal of price subsidies in midsummer.

The position of the *Force Ouvrière* and CFTC became increasingly difficult. On the one hand they urged their followers to have patience and await the results of Government price-stabilization efforts. On the other hand they pleaded with the

Government to hold prices in line, or, if it could not do that, to allow some increase in wages. In September the Government proposed a moderate wage increase, although hardly enough to make up the recent losses in workers' purchasing power. By then the situation had become sufficiently difficult and confused to permit the Communist leadership of the CGT to attempt its second round of strikes. This broke out in October 1948. Again, as almost a year earlier, coal was a chief objective for several reasons: its importance to the whole economy, the miners' demands, and the Communist strength in mining areas.

The strike was a tribute to the rehabilitation of French industrial production. If recovery had not been going forward in France, the Communists would not have needed to incur the risks they did in October and November 1948. They openly avowed their political aims, and paid less attention than in 1947 to the camouflage of interest in the workers' problems.

The Soviet and satellite countries and Communist-led unions elsewhere openly sent financial contributions — nominally workers' voluntary offerings — to aid the French strikers. By the end of 1948, the amount of aid which the *Pravda* in Moscow reported had gone to the CGT miners' "international solidarity fund" was about 652,000,000 francs. The French Minister of the Interior reported that, in addition to these avowed transactions, other large sums were transferred secretly.

A new Communist device was the open sabotage of the mines. Never, even under the Nazi occupation, had striking miners withdrawn maintenance crews. This time the CGT called out safety and maintenance men, leaving the way open for flooding, gas seepage, and other damage to the mines. The Government had no choice but to use police and troops to protect the pits and enable nonstriking miners to take over the maintenance work. Despite great restraint exercised by the Government, there were outbreaks of violence in which several miners were killed, incidents eagerly exploited by the Communist propaganda machine. Significantly, the casualty lists included almost as many police as strikers.

The coal strike was finally called off after eight weeks. It cost the French nation 5½ million tons of coal and damage to some pits requiring months to repair. Coal stocks were reduced from about 6½ to less than 3 million tons. France had to import about 2 million more tons of coal from the United States, thus using some 40 millions of scarce dollars that might otherwise have bought other goods badly needed by the French economy. Again, as in 1947, the CGT was apparently willing to sacrifice the interests of the membership for Communist political objectives. Many workers left the labor movement. Non-Communist unions also suffered and trade union strength reached a postwar low.

Italy

The difficult economic situation in Italy and the large number of unemployed workers, who total almost 2 million out of a labor force of about 18.6 million, have been of continuous significance in the Italian labor situation, and in labor's relations with the Marshall Plan. Unemployment, together with a chronically low standard of living, helps to explain the Communist Party's relatively large following.

Despite its strength, the Italian Communist Party at first felt obliged to moderate its public opposition to the Marshall Plan, since the prospect of aid from America was received with enthusiasm by the overwhelming majority of the Italian people.

With the formation of the Cominform in September 1947, Communist criticism of the ERP became more vociferous. But in face of the vitally important national elections scheduled for April 1948, the Italian Communists did not dare to risk

open opposition to the recovery program as a whole. Nor did they take any sharp line against two long-range moves towards recovery made by the Italian Government: the Rome Manpower Conference and the Franco-Italian Customs Union proposal.

At the beginning of 1948, however, shortly after the failure of the great wave of French strikes, the Italian Communists commenced their own strike action. Notwithstanding the precarious economic situation and the real grievances of millions of workers' families, these strikes petered out before they could develop into the threatened general strike. The workers refused to stay out under Communist leadership on what became recognized as purely political strikes, and the Italian authorities met the Communist threats of civil disorder with necessary firmness.

When the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) was invited in March 1948 to the conference of trade union representatives of ERP countries in London, the Communist majority of the CGIL Executive Committee voted against participating. But it did not attempt to forbid attendance by leaders of the minority groups within the CGIL. The London conference established the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee and the minority groups within the CGIL have continued to be active in the work of the committee and have set up an Italian Committee along similar lines.

Against this background, the elections of April 18, 1948, took place. They were a marked victory for the Christian Democrats, the principal party in the Government, who had heartily espoused the Marshall Plan. The Communists repeatedly straddled the issue of the ERP although their leaders were clearly anti-Marshall Plan.

In the summer of 1948 a crisis was provoked when the CGIL Communist leaders called a general strike to protest against the shooting of the Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti. Demanding the resignation of the De Gasperi Government, the strike was obviously political and non-Communist CGIL leaders were not even consulted about it. Once again the workers showed unmistakably that they would not support Communist political objectives. The strike's major accomplishment was the rupture of the CGIL. The Christian Democratic group left the CGIL and led in the formation of a new confederation, established in October as the Free General Confederation of Italian Workers (LCGIL).

The LCGIL declared itself to be a nonpolitical labor federation open to all workers. Other non-Communist groups within the CGIL have been working with the LCGIL in support of the recovery program, but so far they have taken only partial steps toward leaving the Communist-run organization. With the lines between Communist and Democratic labor not yet clearly drawn, the CGIL still includes three-fifths to two-thirds of the organized workers of Italy. But its Communist leaders can seriously damage the Italian recovery effort only if Italian workers should believe that their Government, their employers and the ERP are not moving toward alleviation of the widespread poverty, unemployment, and the glaring differences between conditions of the rich and poor in Italy.

Other Participating Countries

The Communists have made their greatest efforts to obstruct the Marshall Plan in France and Italy where Communist Party membership was largest and when the Communists controlled the great national labor federations. In the other participating countries Communists have been much weaker politically and in the trade-union movement.

The British Communist party, although not technically a Cominform member, faithfully adheres to the Cominform position on the Marshall Plan. A continuing

propaganda campaign, intensified since the summer of 1948, has been directed against the policies and leadership of the Labor Government and of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which are pictured as tools of capitalist America. The Communist Party has urged workers to withhold cooperation from the anti-inflation and national production campaigns. But, except for some unauthorized token strikes and slowdowns in which Communists have participated, they have not as yet succeeded in going beyond the stage of propaganda and infiltration.

Although Communists continue to hold some positions of influence in the trade-union movement, especially in coal mining and in the metalworking, engineering, and electrical trades, many Communists have recently been removed from union positions by the membership. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress has, during the past year, reacted vigorously to Communist agitation and has shown increasing determination to isolate the Communists, expose their tactics, and weed out the last remnants of their power.

Of the more than 9 million organized workers in the United Kingdom, the overwhelming majority, both of leaders and rank-and-file members, are devoted to democratic ideals and processes and opposed to Communist doctrines. It is highly improbable that the Communists will be able to put any effective brake on British industrial output.

In Scandinavia, Communist influence in the labor movements has shown a marked decline since the end of the war. The small Communist parties have supported the Cominform's position against the Marshall Plan, but the efforts of weak Communist minorities in the trade-union field have not resulted in any serious industrial stoppage. There was one important Communist-directed strike in a fertilizer plant in Norway which, opposed by the Norwegian Federation of Labor, collapsed after six weeks when the workers involved voted to abandon the strike.

In Belgium the Belgian General Federation of Labor has eliminated the small minority of Communist representation in its Secretariat and National Bureau. Although unable to initiate strikes which would seriously obstruct recovery, the Communists have exploited economic grievances and have intensified the extent and duration of strikes conducted by Socialist-led unions.

In Greece, the main Communist effort is, of course, in the military activities of the Communist-led guerrilla bands. As the Greek Communist Party has been outlawed, it is not possible accurately to measure Communist strength among Greek workers. It is clear, however, that Communism has little attraction and, with few exceptions, Greek workers have participated loyally in the national effort for security and recovery.

In Austria the Communist Party has always been a small minority. In the 1945 elections the Communists won only 5.4 percent of the vote, and they number only 5 to 10 percent of the more than 1 million workers organized in the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions. Encouraged, however, by the proximity of their Soviet sponsors in the Russian Zone of Occupation, the small Communist minority carries on a vigorous propaganda campaign exploiting hardships imposed on Austrian workers by inflation and trying to discredit the wage-price agreements made by the Socialist and other anti-Communist labor leaders. Communist efforts to incite strikes — for example the attempt to call a general strike in mid-September 1948 over the wage-price issue — have nearly always ended in failure.

In Western Germany, by the end of 1948, the trade unions had enrolled almost 5 million members. As in the other countries of Western Europe, they had become immediate targets for Communist attempts at infiltration and control. Communist effort increased when the unions showed they would support the ERP.

The Communist drive against ERP and economic recovery has so far achieved little success through the Western German labor movement. Communists have almost no important places in the higher echelons of trade-union leadership, and their influence has declined in many local labor organizations. But they have been able to win some victories — and they remain potentially very dangerous — on the local or plant level.

The labor organizations of Western Germany have made their support of the ERP unmistakably clear. This policy reduced the influence of the Communists who were forced by the Cominform doctrine to take a stand against economic recovery. The Communists decided openly to challenge the other Western political parties, denouncing them as "Quislings" of the Western occupation powers, "agents of foreign imperialism" and "splitters of German unity." This is the general Cominform-type attack, with special variations for their German unity and anti-occupation themes.

These tactics have brought the Communists to the point where they are no longer represented in any state government in Western Germany; they have either withdrawn voluntarily, or been forced out of the last few posts they held. They still have legislative representation, but their departure from the state governments has forced them to lay stress on activity in the labor movement. They will continue to present a great potential problem, as will the ultranationalists, as long as German workers are beset by rising prices and black markets.

THE COMMUNIST "PEACE CRUSADE" *

The Communists both within the Soviet Union and in satellite states have stressed the thesis that only they seek peace and that the US and associated states want war.

In building its defenses against aggression, the free world has learned that it must be prepared to meet the Soviet challenge on every level: political economic, military, and psychological. It is in this last area — the psychological — that the Soviet drive for power has reached new heights of intensity even as it has achieved a new low in morality.

International communism has resorted to the most callous exploitation of mankind's sincere desire for peace. Its propaganda machine is clearly geared to undermine the morale of the democratic peoples by selling the big lie: "The United States and its allies seek war while the Soviet Union and its satellites want only peace." In broadcasting that lie, Moscow's only criterion is that the end justifies the means. There is no deceit to which it will not stoop.

The Kremlin's propaganda apparatus is not only global in scope; it also employs a formidable variety of techniques. Among such techniques being used with increasing frequency is the so-called Peace Crusade, or Peace Drive. The American Peace Crusade, identified as a Communist-front organization by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, is the domestic offspring of a world-wide campaign to hoax free men into dropping their defenses.

The American Peace Crusade is directed by a small, tightly knit group of individuals long associated with Communist-front activities. It is particularly dangerous because it seeks to create the impression that it is the product of unsolicited

* Reprinted from Department of State Publication 4328, General Foreign Policy Series 65, Sep 51.

mass reaction against American foreign policy. This attempt at masquerade is implicit in everything it does.

The so-called American People's Peace Congress, staged in Chicago June 29 to July 1, 1951, was typical of the American Peace Crusade's efforts to becloud basic issues and break down American morale. Advance publicity appearing in the domestic Communist press boasted that some 5,000 participants "representing millions of Americans" would be on hand for the Congress. Panel discussions were devoted to such typical Communist watchwords as "colonialism and war," "educating our children — for peace or war," and "standards of living and the war budget."

The affair was further embellished by a dance, a "cultural festival," and a public rally. Sponsors took particular pains to entice youth into the fold with a "youth peace exposition" which featured essays, sports, dancing, and other competitions. Such competitions are routine weapons in the Communist psychological arsenal.

What the Congress really stood for can readily be deduced from the line taken by its progenitor, the American Peace Crusade. Though tailored for the American audience, the line is, in essence, that of Radio Moscow. In a manner of speaking, it is all too reminiscent of the cynical "war is peace" slogan of George Orwell's thought-provoking book, *1984*.[19]

The Crusade's prescription for American foreign policy would, if adopted, see the United States withdrawing into a shell that might be cracked by the Kremlin at will. The Crusade, therefore, fits neatly into the international Communist propaganda pattern. It plays the Communist game to the hilt.

Evidence supporting this contention is ample. Examination of the pertinent facts reveals that (1) the Peace Crusade in the United States can be considered to be a branch of the Soviet Union's international "peace" campaign, which, in turn, evolved from the ideological position taken by the Cominform; (2) the Crusade's avowed political program is, with minor variations, that of Communist parties and party fronts everywhere; (3) the technical aspects of the Crusade's operations — i.e., its mode of organization and the techniques by which its proponents are trying to sell "peace" to the American people — are all too characteristic of Communist fronts both here and abroad.

International Origins of the American Peace Crusade

In a letter to Representative Carnahan, of Missouri, dated February 16, 1951, Secretary of State Dean Acheson exposed the American Peace Crusade for what it was. "From the membership of the group, and the general tenor of its pronouncements," the Secretary wrote, "it is obvious that this 'American Peace Crusade' is merely a continuation or re-grouping of the spurious Partisans of Peace Movement, which as you know has been the most concentrated and far-flung propaganda effort of the international Communist movement in the postwar period."

The motivation for the American Peace Crusade can be traced back to September 1947, when the Cominform was organized. At the organizational meeting staged in Poland, Andrei Zhdanov, then widely hailed as Stalin's probable successor, laid down the line which was to become the heart of Moscow's global "peace" offensive. Zhdanov reiterated the Communist conception of a world divided into two major camps. The United States, he said, was the leader of the "imperialist aggressors" while the Soviet Union headed the "new democracies" in their efforts to keep the peace.

The Zhdanov version of international communism's role in a troubled world set off a chain reaction of "peace" conferences. The first major international meeting

of this type was the so-called World Congress of Intellectuals held in Breslau, Poland, in August 1948. The Congress' underlying theme was anti-Americanism. Only the Soviet Union, it concluded, could lead the way to preservation of peace in the face of "aggressive" activities indulged in by the United States and its allies. It is significant that the sizable American delegation attending this meeting included a number of persons subsequently active in the American Peace Crusade and other front groups in this country.

The World Congress of Intellectuals elected a Committee To Defend the Peace and adopted a program whereby national branches were to be established and a series of national "peace" meetings organized. An early offspring of this program was the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in March 1949.

The Scientific and Cultural Conference was a veritable mecca for old-line supporters of the Communist Party. The Conference's obvious aim was to "promote the peace" by discrediting American foreign policy vis-à-vis that of the Soviet Union. The theory, an old one in the Communist bible, was that intellectuals are best equipped to keep the masses moving in the "right" direction.

The international Communists' peace drive truly came into its own with the holding of the World Congress of Partisans of Peace, better known as the World Peace Congress. This Congress was staged in Paris and Prague simultaneously in April 1949. Speaking in "the name of more than one-third of mankind," the Congress beat the drums for the Moscow peace line and breathed defiance at Washington. Once again the American delegation included faces long since familiar at "peace" rallies thoughout the United States.

The World Peace Congress inspired Communist parties and fronts to new efforts. The following months witnessed the snowballing of the "peace congress" technique. In country after country the Communists and their sympathizers worked feverishly to whip up popular fervor against the democracies by boosting the Soviet Union as the savior of peace and humanity.

The World Peace Congress did not stop with the purely inspirational, however. It named a Permanent Committee which added a new wrinkle to the drive to destroy the free world's morale. The Committee decided to send "peace" delegations to the parliaments of the key non-Communist nations as well as to the Soviet Union.

The reasoning here was simple but clever. Should the democracies refuse to entertain the "peace" bearers, the latter could still end up with a royal reception in Moscow. The Soviet Union, the Communists hoped, would then appear to be the only nation interested in peace.

The Permanent Committee's next maneuver was the so-called Stockholm Conference held in March 1950. This Conference's major contribution was to launch a shrewd, carefully contrived drive for signatures to a "World Peace Appeal." The Appeal, making no mention of the Soviet Union's refusal to cooperate in setting up an effective atomic-control system, called for the immediate outlawing of the atomic bomb. It further urged that the government which first used the atomic weapon be branded as a "war criminal."

It is significant that the Appeal sought to pin the "war criminal" label only on the user of *atomic* weapons. Apparently, the Appeal's sponsors were well aware that a demobilized free world was leaning heavily on its edge in atomic bombs to deter Soviet aggression.

The insincerity with which the Stockholm signature campaign was launched can best be evaluated by noting that (1) the Appeal was widely circulated in North

Korea prior to the assault on the Republic of Korea, and (2) it was still being pushed elsewhere in the world long after the Korean attack began. International communism saw no incongruity in attacking an independent nation on one hand while prating of peace on the other.

A second World Peace Congress was scheduled to be held in England in November 1950 but was moved to Warsaw after a token meeting when the British Government refused to permit a number of known Communist "delegates" to enter the country. The phony peace theme was as predominant at the Warsaw meeting as at all of its predecessors. And the United States, as might have been expected, was labeled the "aggressor" in Korea.

The Peace Drive in the United States

William Z. Foster, chairman of the Communist Party, USA, sounded the clarion call for Moscow's peace campaign in this country in a key speech of March 1950. Foster called the "peace" movement "our most decisive political task." In an article written the following month, Gus Hall, the Party's general secretary, urged party stalwarts everywhere to intensify their peddling of the peace line.

"Every organization, every club, every section," wrote Hall, "must have a plan for peace."

A new front organization was set up in New York to coordinate the national "peace" campaign and, in particular to collect signatures for the aforementioned Stockholm Appeal. This organization, called the Peace Information Center, officially went out of business in January 1951, after being exposed as a front by congressional investigators. In February 1951 a grand jury indicted the Center and several of its officers for failure to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

The American Peace Crusade, sponsor of the American People's Peace Congress, was the Center's immediate successor. Organized with headquarters in New York in January 1951, the Crusade was not long in carrying the Cominform-inspired "peace" drive to the country at large.

The American Peace Crusade Program: Its Refutation

On March 15, 1951, the American Peace Crusade sponsored a "Peace Pilgrimage" to Washington. The "pilgrims" lobbied in the halls of Congress and visited the various executive agencies. In a lengthy interview granted by Francis H. Russell, Director of the Department of State's Office of Public Affairs, Crusade representatives laid down their "peace" platform. They demanded (1) withdrawal of United States troops from Korea; (2) negotiation of "a peace with China"; (3) negotiation by the United States of differences with the Soviet Union over atomic-arms control and mutual disarmament; (4) the end of America's "emergency" mobilization; (5) United States initiative in seeking a "fundamental American-Soviet settlement"; (6) no rearmament of Germany or Japan; (7) no American troops to be sent to Europe.

In short, the Crusaders went down the line for everything the Kremlin wanted. Their proposals, if accepted, would have negated the entire United Nations defensive action in Korea, condoned the Chinese Communist role in the aggression there, stripped the United States of its defenses, and left Europe to the mercy of the Soviet Union. This was indeed "peace" as only the Communist mind can conceive of it.

Mr. Russell refuted the Peace Crusade platform item by item. The essence of his rebuttal was as follows:

The United Nations had dispatched troops to Korea to meet Communist aggression and to restore security to the area. Until these UN objectives were achieved, there would be no thought of withdrawal.

As for the United States' taking the initiative in negotiating a peace with China, the United Nations had been seeking a basis for a cease-fire in Korea for months. All such attempts at settlement had met with nothing but "disdainful rejection by the Peiping regime."* The peace had initially been disturbed by the Communists — not by the democracies.

The inference that the United States was at fault in failing to negotiate a suitable settlement of US-Soviet differences on the atomic issue is totally invalid, said Mr. Russell. This country, under no compulsion whatsoever, first presented a plan for international control of atomic energy. The plan met with the overwhelming endorsement of members of the United Nations but was rejected by the Soviet bloc. The United States would have no part in plans "which would in practical effect provide no sure means of inspection and enforcement."

In response to the Crusaders' appeal that the United States halt its defense effort, it was pointed out that the Soviet bloc was obstructing all bona-fide attempts to lessen or eliminate existing world tensions. Such being the case the free world must be prepared, if necessary, to meet force with force.

The thesis that Germany must be given no arms whatsoever was flatly rejected by Mr. Russell. It was made clear that the democracies had no intention of rebuilding a German military machine as such or of forcing the Germans to take up arms without their consent. The exertion of aggressive pressure upon Western Europe by the Soviet bloc had caused the North Atlantic Treaty nations to invite Germany to cooperate in the common defense.

The defense of Europe is inextricably bound up with the American way of life. The United States, concluded Mr. Russell, must help Europe to protect itself at all costs. "If Western Europe should be overrun by communism, other economically dependent areas, in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, would be affected, with disastrous effects upon the United States."

Tactics of the American Peace Crusade

Among Lenin's major contributions to the doctrine of Karl Marx was the development of the technique through which positions of power could be infiltrated and control of the state seized. Lenin taught his disciples to be flexible in their drive to conquer the world for communism. He urged widespread use of labor unions and youth groups as fronts for the Communist Party. He even called for cooperation with democratic parliaments if such tactics could be used to blind unsuspecting opponents.

Stalinism has departed from Lenin's teachings in a number of respects. But international communism continues to subscribe to many of Lenin's organizational and propaganda theories. In the United States, as elsewhere, deception is the Communist order of the day. The so-called "Communist front" is the product of a philosophy based upon deceit.

The American Peace Crusade is an ideal front for domestic communism. It cloaks its real objectives beneath self-righteous demands for peace. It conceals

* The basic UN desire to negotiate a *just* peace in Korea was well illustrated by the willingness with which the Soviet (Malik) proposal for peace talks was accepted even though, at the time, UN forces were driving the Communists back along most of the battle line.

the basic issue — the Communist quest for world domination — behind an appeal which has obvious humanitarian connotations.

The Peace Crusaders are anything but allergic to the old Roman "circus" technique. The "Pilgrimage" previously noted is typical of the devices used to mobilize mass opinion. The "peace ballot," allegedly designed to poll the American people on whether or not they are behind the UN defensive action in Korea, is another typical tool. It seeks to becloud the public mind by oversimplifying the issues involved.

In the initial organization of the Peace Crusade, the time-tried Communist practice was adhered to. A lengthy list of sponsors was secured and exploited for publicity purposes. Many on the list are long-time supporters of Communist-front organizations in the United States. Others are unsuspecting dupes who have allowed their yearning for "the good society" to overcome their better judgment.

The Crusaders are currently organizing "peace committees" in major American cities. The *Daily Worker* — and it is significant that it has devoted column after column of space to the Crusade — has boasted that Americans are flocking to join the committees by "the thousands." It is also significant that the "peace committee" idea is fully in keeping with the published advice of American Communist Party headquarters.

The Communists' fraudulent peace campaign continues apace on a global scale. Stalin himself has made it clear that there will be no slackening in the all-out drive to lull the free peoples into a false sense of security. In a recent interview with *Pravda*, the Russian Communist Party mouthpiece, Stalin stated:

> "Peace will be preserved and consolidated if the peoples will take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands. . . . That is why the wide campaign for the maintenance of peace as a means of exposing the criminal machinations of the warmongers is now of primary importance."

Everywhere the Communists and their fellow travelers are taking Stalin at his word. The Communist-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth held a Third World Youth Peace Festival in Berlin from August 5 to 19. Several "peace" conferences for India's professionals, peasants, and workers for peace" are set for later in the year. Japan, the Scandinavian countries, France, the Near East are but some of the other areas in which the Communist master minds are planning to hold "peace" conferences — all designed to delude the great mass of free peoples into believing that the Soviet Union's only aim is a genuine peace.

COMMUNIST YOUTH RALLY IN BERLIN*

The Communists promoted a World Youth Festival in 1951 for the purpose of frustrating West German and West European defense efforts. The Festival did not prove to be the success the Communists represented it to be.

The World Youth Festival in Berlin, from August 5 to 19 (1951), climaxed a major Communist attempt to capture the minds and imagination of world youth in general and German youth in particular for the internationally-publicized peace

* Extracted from "8th Quarterly Report on Germany," Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 1 Jul–30 Sep 51, pp 46–50.

campaign of Communism. The West promptly responded with a broad hospitality program in West Berlin when Festival participants began to swarm over the sector borders by the thousands to catch a glimpse of the free part of the city.

The Festival was intended to be entirely a Communist production. East Berlin was to be the stage; 1,500,000 youth of the world were to be the actors; the Communist East Berlin and East Zone authorities, the principal directors; and the show's main theme, as indicated by the Festival slogan, was "Youth, Unite in the Struggle for Peace Against the Danger of a New War."

The Festival was sponsored by two Communist-front groups, the World Organization of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, but almost every Soviet Zone organization in existence was responsible for some phase of the program. Hosts to the young visitors were the Free German Youth (FDJ) and their junior counterparts, the Young Pioneers, the only youth groups permitted to organize in the Soviet Zone. The FDJ and Young Pioneers had begun as early as April to devote "voluntary labor Sundays" to the building of stadia, swimming pools and encampments in preparation for the event. And throughout the summer, East Germans made "voluntary" wage donations and watched reductions being made in their food and clothing rations to provide money, food and the typical blue shirts for the visiting youth.

The Festival, only one event in the Communist world "peace" movement, was aimed at influencing developments as far away as Japan but was directed primarily toward frustrating West German and West European defense. It strove (1) to lay the groundwork for mobilizing youth on an international, non-sectarian, ostensibly non-Communist basis; and (2) to harness this powerful "international" youth force behind the present Communist campaign to represent the West German Government as "imperialistic" and the main ally of "US aggression" in Europe.

There were three distinct though overlapping levels upon which the World Youth Festival was expected to exercise its influence in this direction: (1) The foreign delegations which, according to the Communist press, numbered 26,000 from 104 countries, provided the appearance of international solidarity and support for the "national resistance" movement to be undertaken by East and West German youth. Foreign youth were to receive in return the impetus for carrying on parallel movements in their native countries to alienate local sympathy from the Allied Governments' policies in Germany. (2) West German youth, numbering 25,000 according to the Communist press, symbolized the German will for peace and unity. They were to get a moral "lift" and practical experience to fit them for resistance to Allied and West German Government measures along the lines dictated by Walter Ulbricht, the East German Communist Party Secretary, in his call for "national resistance" on August 12. (3) East German youth, close to 1,500,000 in number, provided the supporting chorus for the peace and German unity campaign. They were intended to represent to the foreign delegations the "new Germany" in contrast to alleged West German "imperialism." They were to set the example and provide the well-trained fanatic leadership for future revolutionary actions.

How the World Youth Festival affected its participants will probably help determine whether or not youth can be made the spearhead of the present Communist program. Youth's future effectiveness may depend upon how much they were fired with enthusiasm for the slogans of "peace," "unity," "friendship"; how strongly they responded to increasing anti-American sentiment, the deification of Stalin, and the call to "defend peace to the utmost"; and how successful the Festi-

val was in imparting optimism, confidence and both practical and psychological preparation for future revolutionary action.

The Festival, as planned by the Soviets, stressed some cultural aspects, such as folk dancing, music and exhibitions, but nearly all events in East Berlin were political in purpose and character. Intermixed with sports and cultural affairs were formal political speeches, informal discussions led by trained propagandists, and "peace" demonstrations, as thousands of youth marched behind aggressive banner slogans and standards bearing pictures of Stalin, Mao, and other Communist leaders. Each event of the Festival was loudly heralded by the Soviet press and radio.

In the first few days of the Festival, however, it became quite evident that West Berlin was a competing attraction to the Communist youth. They came over in unprecedented numbers, swamping West Berlin youth homes and the small number of public events in the Western half of the city. It soon became evident, moreover, that the food ration provided Festival participants was inadequate, especially that for East German youth. Further, both the Festival authorities and the East German police proved ineffectual in preventing the youth from crossing over into the Western Sectors of the city.

West Berlin authorities reacted promptly. A West Berlin-wide feeding program was inaugurated at 50 youth centers to provide hot meals as well as simple refreshments for the visiting youth. American authorities made available 414,690 portions from its School Feeding Program; the British gave 50 tons of Army food supplies; and private German and foreign firms and individuals donated DM 60,000 in food and money. Central kitchens were established and 1,300 volunteer West Berlin youth were added to normal staffs. In addition, special entertainment of various kinds was set up, to include free movies, television shows, exhibitions of various sorts, and daily discussions at RIAS (Radio in American Sector), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) newspaper, *Telegraf*, and at various other contact points such as student centers and exhibition grounds. Abundant quantities of Western literature were made available.

The number of visitors increased as news of the cordial welcome provided by the West spread among Festival participants. Some 500,000 hot meals and perhaps 1,000,000 snacks were provided to an estimated 700,000 visitors from the East before the Festival was over. More than 13,000 visited RIAS, where groups were addressed by the US High Commissioner and other US and German officials. Thousands more attended the ECA "Europe Train" exhibit on the Marshall Plan, watched the exhibition of model trains set up for the occasion or visited Radio Free Europe and the West Berlin newspapers; other thousands enjoyed the hospitality of private families in West Berlin. Over 1,500,000 pieces of Western literature were carried away by these youthful visitors, indicating both an insatiable hunger for information about the Western world and considerable contempt for the East German police.

Perhaps the best indication of the success of Western hospitality was the decision of the Festival authorities to "invade" West Berlin on August 15. There is evidence that the Festival command was seriously concerned over the influx of Festival participants into West Berlin and the dwindling attendance at scheduled events in East Berlin. On August 12, for example, the high point of the Festival from the standpoint of the Communists, nearly 70,000 youth had wandered into West Berlin and August 13, a record of 107,000 border crossings was reached. Some dramatic propaganda event was obviously necessary to create sufficient tension

between the East and West Berliners to discourage Festival participants from this mass movement into the West Sectors of the city. Accordingly, on the 15th, several thousand East youth were organized by specially-briefed leaders, paid 20 marks apiece, transported to sector borders at three separate points, and ordered to conduct demonstrations and mass marches. The West Berlin police, in accordance with orders, broke up their formations. In the incidents that followed, the Communist leaders claimed the "proof" they wanted of Western "brutality" and "bestiality." However, the rest of the youth apparently saw through this trick, for the incident did not deter them from coming over in large numbers until the end of the Festival on August 19 and for several days thereafter.

Assessed from the Soviet side, it appears that the Communists were successful in stimulating at least the foreign delegates. Despite certain grievances and the inevitable political conflicts and jealousies which arise from the proximity of so many dissimilar groups, reports indicate that Communist and fellow-traveling foreign delegates were, all in all, impressed with the East German facade they were allowed to see. Some, at least, were impressed with what they were told of East German progress in reconstruction and in implementing the Five Year Plan. Non-Communist foreign delegates who already had some misgivings about the Communist program or tactics probably went home with their pro-Communist inclinations somewhat shaken. The ubiquitous claims of Soviet superiority and leadership were to them the most noxious feature of the Festival and affected many unfavorably. Much capital was made, however, out of the detention of some delegates en route to Berlin at Innsbruck in Austria. This incident was cited as an example of how the much-touted freedoms of the Western world are allegedly being violated.

On the whole, despite the defection of some few Communist delegates from Iron Curtain and Western countries, the World Youth Festival seems to have had a fair measure of success in furthering world Communist youth efforts, at least in increasing internal cooperation and as a public manifestation of strength. The mass parade of August 12 appeared to be highly effective as a mass participation and regimentation affair.

The West German delegates seem to have acquitted themselves creditably from the Communist viewpoint, and the hard core Communist element appear to have left the Festival keyed up for future actions in Western Germany. Like the foreign delegations, the West Germans were feted and kept apart from the East Zone German youth. Few seem to have visited West Berlin and very little contact existed between them and East German FDJ'ers. They were treated as heroes and clever adventurers for having defied and outwitted Allied measures to prevent their attendance at the Festival.

The case of the East German FDJ was different. They were dissatisfied with the physical and social treatment accorded them by the Festival authorities, notably the discimination against them in favor of foreign and West German delegates, not only in the matter of housing and food, but also regarding access to some of the Festival events. It was the East German youth who suffered from the shortage of food and housing, bearing the brunt of the organizational weaknesses and breakdowns in the World Youth Festival, and the inevitable deficiencies a mass operation of such a scale entails. Despite moral pressure and physical deterrents, probably over a third of them visited West Berlin during the course of the Festival, some of them returning several times. In any case, it was not to be expected that one and a half million youth, out of an East Zone population of 19 million, would

represent as high a standard of Communist indoctrination as the much smaller groups of devoted party members from Western Germany and abroad.

These facts, combined with the initiative of the Allies and West Berliners in exploiting their opportunity to influence the largest group of East German youth ever to come into contact with the West, enabled the West to make an important gain in its struggle against the Communists: It meant the strengthening of East German anti-regime and pro-West sentiment.

The large influx of East Zone youngsters into West Berlin and the hearty reception given them there should not, however, lead to over-optimistic assumptions regarding a positive pro-West attitude on the part of East-German youth as a whole. It must be recognized that the motives of many of the East German youth who came to West Berlin were non-political. Certainly a large percentage were impelled by youthful curiosity or by a free snack or entertainment. But interviews of youth indicate that the vast majority were bored or disgusted with the Festival, that they were eager for facts about the West, and that they were particularly appreciative of the fact that the West stepped in to care for them at a time when Communist authorities left them hungry and comparatively uncared for.

By their own frequent admissions, what many of this group enjoyed most of all was the sense of freedom in a non-Communist atmosphere, the free exchange of ideas with other Germans and Allies, and the opportunity to test Communist propaganda against the reality of their own experience. The ease of West Berlin and Allied hospitality, characterized by a willingness to listen to East German youth's problems without trying to force propaganda down their throats, seemed to impress the group. Non-Communist East German youth seemed to have a sensitive nose for the truth and to regard the admission of faults, however unflattering to the West, as an integral feature of Western democracy rather than as a sign of weakness.

Perhaps one-third of the youth attending the Festival had no contact with the West; for those who were able to participate to any extent in the major East Sector events, a sense of comaraderie and international solidarity will be associated with the Festival. This is a solid gain for the authoritarian East.

It is fair to conclude, however, that although the Festival probably did achieve the goal of injecting some fresh revolutionary zeal into the already convinced party-line members, for the rank and file of East German youth this was not true. For them it was a distinct disappointment in comparison to the Whitsuntide youth rally of last year. And, contrasting the freedom of West Berlin with the all too-familiar repressions in their Soviet-occupied homeland, the Festival embittered many and engendered in them at least a spiritual rejection of the current FDJ leadership.

THE "FREE GERMANS" IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By Eric H. Boehm

The Soviet Union formed a "Free German Committee" in Moscow in 1943. The Committee, composed largely of captured prisoners of war, was utilized by the Russians in making appeals to other Germans to surrender.

Soviet propaganda toward Germany, just as Soviet policy on many issues, bears testimony to the flexibility of the Soviet policy-makers; a flexibility which both

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the Communist faithful and foreign observers find confusing. The story of the Free Germans of World War II is a case in point, and may offer some insights into Russian methods of psychological warfare.

Moscow's wartime use of the National Committee of Free Germans and the League of German Officers is of particular interest for two reasons. First, these two bodies served as vehicles for harnessing German sentiments of nationalism to Russian policy. Second, this episode provides another instance in which Soviet policy-makers chose to abandon orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine when it fitted their needs.

Soviet appeals to German nationalism are nothing new. We may recall Radek's famous speech in support of the nationalistic, militaristic and reactionary groups which made a martyr of Leo Schlageter, after the latter had been executed for sabotage by the French occupation forces in the Ruhr. Yet Schlageter had fought against the Communists in a Baltic volunteer corps. And at present, the Soviet puppet government in Eastern Germany is attempting to cash in on all the nationalistic frustrations and hopes of a divided Germany.

Let us, to begin with, recall briefly the salient points in the history of the *National Komitee Freies Deutschland.* It was an organization founded in July 1943 among German prisoners of war in Russia. Up to that time, the attempts of German Communist *émigrés* in Russia to indoctrinate German prisoners with Marxism and to acquaint them with the virtues of the Soviet system had found little positive response among the captives. The creation of the Free Germany Committee constituted a total departure from the previous policy.

NATIONALIST APPEAL REPLACES COMMUNISM

The new policy dropped Communism entirely, and adopted instead German nationalism, stressing values which were claimed to be genuinely German, as opposed to Hitler's perverse values which led to destruction of Germany. The new line found an ear among enlisted men and officers alike, both because it was clever and because demoralization resulting from such staggering defeats as Stalingrad made the prisoners more receptive. While a meeting of the prisoners of war in 1941 ended in a *viva* for Stalin, the 1943 organizers studiously avoided references which might make the organization appear as not genuinely German.

At the initial meeting of the Free Germany Committee on July 12, 1943, veteran Communist *émigrés* such as Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, and the poet Erich Weinert shared the platform with Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, a pilot and great-grandson of Bismarck, and Major Hetz, an army engineer officer. Other speakers included a high-school teacher, an economist, a construction worker, a postal inspector, a student of theology, a pastor, a machine worker, a publisher, and a few professional soldiers. One of them, Lt Charisius, described his conversion from the SS as having resulted from his recognition of Hitler's betrayal of the Nazi cause to industrialists and trusts. It was his speech, rather than that of the Communist leader Pieck or the Communist poet Bredel, which came closest to Communist economic doctrine. The new line was clearly apparent from the predominant selection of non-Communist speakers, and from the non-Communist emphasis in the speeches of the few Communists taking part. It is the line of the nationalism of 1812. The ghost of General Yorck and the 1812 War of Liberation was recalled in the rousing Manifesto to the German People issued by the Committee:

> "Our history sets us a great example. 130 years ago, when German troops still stood on Russian soil as enemies, it was precisely from Russian soil that the best sons of Germany — von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, Yorck and

> others — appealed to the conscience of the German people over the heads of the traitorous German rulers, and called upon the German people to wage a war of liberation."

The flag in the meeting hall was the black-white-and-red of the Empire, the colors of the rightist factions in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic itself did not fare well in the opening speeches and the propaganda of the Free Germans.

The stress on nationalism and other values likely to receive widespread acceptance among Germans with eight years of Nazi education was also a reason for securing General von Seydlitz, descendant of Frederick the Great's celebrated cavalry general, as the head of the League of German Officers. The League was organized in September 1943 and was immediately integrated with the Free Germany Committee. Field Marshal Paulus did not come to adhere to the League until after the abortive coup of July 20, 1944, and the resulting brutal treatment of his colleagues in the general staff. His letter in *Pravda* (August 14, 1944) was one of the major landmarks in the propaganda of the League.

Creation of the Free Germany Committee led to the formation of small, underground Free Germany groups in the Reich. It found widespread echoes among German refugees all over the world. Most groups were of a popular front nature with a hard core of Communists, but their effectiveness was circumscribed by the fact that they were not in contact with those Germans who might change the course of the war. This was reserved to the psychological warfare organization of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow.

PROPAGANDA OF THE FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE

The psychological warfare conducted by the Moscow Committee was extensive, clever, and well-planned. (Much of the material cited below on the psychological warfare of the Free Germany Committee is derived from the reports of the wartime Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the US Federal Communications Commission.) It was conducted by word of mouth, leaflets, newspapers, and the radio. Speakers were sent to the various camps in Russia in order to win over the prisoners of war. Their success seems to have been closely correlated with the state of the food ration, being high where the daily lot of the prisoners was good, or where membership brought advantages such as more food. One member of the League of German Officers estimated that in the summer of 1944 the membership of the Free Germany Committee included 75 per cent of the enlisted men and 45 per cent of the officers who had been captured by the Soviet army.

Much of the important work of psychological warfare was carried out by the *Frontbevollmaechtigte*, the committee's plenipotentiaries at the front. These were small groups, often consisting of teams of two, equipped with loudspeakers, who went to the front lines to speak to the German soldiers across no-man's land. Their demands were usually directed to the immediate tactical goal of inducing the Germans to surrender. Such efforts sometimes took on the nature of a campaign. For instance, when ten German divisions were surrounded at Korsun, a large number of such loudspeaker operators, headed by General von Seydlitz, carried on what they called a "political offensive," trying to induce mass surrenders. They claim thus to have saved 20,000 men. Another such offensive was conducted at the Cherkassy pocket under the direction of General von Seydlitz, who in turn was guided by Colonel General Shcherbakov, the former Soviet Deputy Commissar of National Defense. Von Seydlitz sent letters across the front lines to Generals Lieb and Stemmermann, urging them to surrender, but without success.

Millions of leaflets were dropped over the German lines. One of these showed a strong Valkyrie-like Germania, who had broken her shackles, piercing a huge sword into a spider-like Hitler. The caption was the Nazi slogan "Deutschland Erwache" — Germany awake. Another leaflet showed Count Einsiedel in his Luftwaffe uniform, holding up a leaflet with a respect-inspiring picture of Bismarck, who was pointing to a scrawny Hitler and saying: "This man is leading Germany toward a catastrophe." Count Einsiedel is quoted: "A War of Germany against Russia is stupid and without a chance of success. This my great-grandfather, Otto von Bismarck, said again and again, and every soldier must daily become more convinced of its truth."

The Moscow Committee had its weekly organ, *Freies Deutschland*, which began publication in Moscow on July 19, 1943. It appears to have been the only newspaper available in camps for German prisoners of war. Shortly after the Committee was started, its radio claimed that 3,250,000 leaflets with the text of the Manifesto of the Committee and an equal number of copies of the paper *Freies Deutschland* were dropped over the front and in Germany (FBIS, Aug 25, 1943, N1–2).

Broadcasts from Moscow over the Free Germany station were beamed to Germany four times, and later six times, a day. The pause signal of this station was the patriotic tune to Arndt's "Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess. . . ." All broadcasts were reported to have closed with the slogan, "Germany must live, therefore Hitler must fall; fight with us for Free Germany."

Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels took notice of the propaganda, and thought that the appeal against Hitler "will not fail to have its effect upon public opinion." Other remarks by the little master propagandist and his effusions of anger over von Seydlitz showed that the Free Germans were hitting their targets. It might be noted here parenthetically that although Goebbels welcomed many Allied acts and statements as facilitating his own propaganda, he also praised the Allied "Calais Soldiers' Broadcasts," which purported to be a German station.

The broadcasting staff of the Free Germany station appears to have been large. Usually broadcasts were recorded on sound trucks taken out to a prisoner of war camp near Moscow. Majors Hetz and Homann, and later many generals, led by von Seydlitz, and including General Lattmann, commented on the military situation. A Captain Fleischer dealt with economic questions, a Captain Hadermann with political, cultural and educational questions. Others on the programs were Lt Charisius, the former SS officer, who spoke over the radio about his conversion from Nazism; two Protestant chaplains, Matthaeus Klein and Johannes Schroeder; a Catholic chaplain, Joseph Kaiser; Lt Kuegelgen, a Berlin editor; Lt Ruecker, a professor of civil law; and Pvt Kessler, a worker from Chemnitz, who often addressed German youth.

During the 1944 summer offensive of the Red Army the number of German generals who surrendered was so large that it was tantamount to a mass surrender. Twenty-two generals were taken in a five-week period. On July 17, 1944, twenty of them marched through Moscow at the head of a huge column of prisoners. Thirty of a total of seventy captured generals in Russia joined the League of German Officers. One of them, Lt General Hofmeister, commander of the forty-first Armored Corps, wrote a scathing indictment of Hitler which was broadcast on July 19, 1944.

This talk by General Hofmeister was the first of three notable broadcasts in which generals were given the opportunity to express their opposition to Hitler.

A second statement, on July 29, 1944, was made jointly by seventeen generals all veterans of World Wars I and II. (Amler, Baeumler, Conrady, Engel, Erdmansdorff, Gehr, Gollwitzer, Klammt, von Leutzow, Michaelis, Mueller, Mueller-Buelow, Schmidt, Steinkeller, Traut, Trowitz, and Voelckers.) On August 6, Generals Lindemann and von Kurowski adhered to this appeal, which stated in part:

> "All generals and officers who are aware of their responsibility are faced by this alternative: either to wait until Hitler has sacrificed everything or to resist him now and to make an end of his regime in order to bring about the end of the war . . . Adolf Hitler and his adherents want to continue the war under the slogan 'Victory or Doom' . . . Resist Hitler! Refuse to obey his commands! To fight against Hitler means to fight for Germany!"

On October 28, 1944, Field Marshal Paulus made a third spectacular appeal along similar lines. He attacked Hitler and Himmler for their atrocities and lies, and for driving the German people to ruin.

LEADING PROPAGANDA APPEALS OF THE FREE GERMANS

The Free German station in Moscow was among the radio stations monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). The FBIS daily reports provide material from which the principal propaganda themes of this station can be extrapolated. They are consistent with the slant of the Manifesto and the speeches given at the founding assemblies of the Committee and the League of Officers. Six main themes can be noted, of which the last two do not appear to have been as heavily weighted as the first four:

1. Defeatism, coupled with emphasis that the Nazi cause is a losing and criminal one.
2. "We [the Free Germans] are a respectable, genuinely German organization and will be successful. Our cause is right."
3. Attacks on Hitler. Overthrow him! Appeals to the Germans to rise.
4. To the troops: surrender!
5. Publicity for and warning against, atrocities and war crimes.
6. Reassurance with regard to the future of post-war Germany.

Defeatism

Defeatist propaganda took a number of different forms. In one broadcast the defeat at Kharkov is described as a consequence of the creaking Nazi regime, cabinet changes involving Frick and von Neurath, the futile Nazi terror, and the hopeless position of Germans (Aug 26, 1943, N1–2). An article written by General Lattmann, which was also broadcast, pointed to the inevitable doom of the armed forces and the necessity of an early armistice (Sep 2, 1943, N1–2). Shortages in metals were interpreted as dooming the Nazi war effort: Germany imported all her nickel, and suffered from shortages of tungsten and chromium. Hence her weapons were of poorer quality, and this would have a decisive effect on the course of the war (Sep 18, 1943, N1–2). The idea that the war was lost and that its continuation was hopeless was often stressed (Sep 21, 1943, M1–5). The dire food situation was described (EES, Sep 24, 1944, p 16). Other broadcasts painted pictures of stark disaster and hopeless situations; faded hopes raised the spectre of Napoleon (Feb 9, 1944, M2). The futility of fighting was illustrated by a broadcast on the battle of Kirovograd (Jan 10, 1944, N1–2). The total number of German prisoners of war was reported as having risen to a grand total of 1,230,000 (May 15, 1944, cc1).

After D-Day, the Anglo-American invasion was the chief topic on the Free German station, and June 6, 1944 was seen as opening the final phase of the war. Erich Weinert broadcast that Fascism's defeat was Germany's hope (May 15, 1944, cc1).

"We [the Free Germans] are a respectable, genuinely German organization, and will be successful. Our cause is right."

The Committee, being acutely aware of the normal suspicion of most Germans that it was a Communist organization and a Soviet tool, was anxious to overcome these views, since they limited the efficiency of its propaganda. In the founding assemblies this was done by emphasis on nationalism, by identification of people of all classes in the common cause against Hitler, by careful avoidance of Communist doctrine, and by giving the Committee a "respectable" letterhead with names such as von Seydlitz and von Einsiedel.

Coupled with this aura of respectability the Free Germans held out the prospect of their own success and ultimate victory as against the doom and ultimate defeat of the Hitlerite forces.

The Free German station pointed out that it represented a German movement with German aims (Mar 29, 1944, M1). Members from all walks of life and with different opinions spoke, and various broadcasts were designed for different groups in the population. An old Berlin Social Democrat talked to Social Democrats in Germany. Considerable propaganda was directed to religious groups. In a conversation between the Communist Walter Ulbricht and Monsignore Dr. Joseph Kaiser, Ulbricht acknowledged the heroic struggle of the Church in Nazi Germany. On July 5, 1944, Major Mannstein (?), a nephew of Count von Galen, Bishop of Muenster, asserted that the Church should assist the popular movement to overthrow Hitler (EES, Jul 15, 1944, pp 1–2). An appeal was made by the German Protestant and Catholic chaplains from the eastern front to all chaplains of the Wehrmacht to support Paulus and von Seydlitz, and to end the useless slaughter. This was rebroadcast from London on August 20, 1944 (EES, Aug 30, 1944, p 6). As a type of reward, prisoners were allowed to broadcast to their parents, and this induced Germans to listen to find out about the fate of their sons.

The success of the Free Germany Committee was mentioned from time to time. Prisoners were said to be changing their attitudes (Jul 28, 1943, N1). The Committee's Manifesto was said to be widely read (Sep 17, 1943, N1–2). The Committee was described as being strong and having great influence on Germany's future (Sep 17, 1943, N1–2). A Pfc Zippel reported that the propaganda efforts of the Committee had affected the German homeland and the soldiers at the front (Aug 25, 1943, N1–2).

The fact that the Free Germans represented a good and successful cause was suggested also by broadcasts such as one by General Lattmann, in which he said that all Allied powers were aiming to exterminate racial arrogance, to eliminate Hitler, his system, and his ideology of conquest.

Attacks on Hitler. Overthrow him! Appeals to the Germans to rise

Most speeches or articles included attacks on Hitler, attempts to discredit him in the eyes of the German people, and efforts to show how he alone, or he and a small clique around him, were responsible for military disasters. Such broadcasts were accompanied by appeals to overthrow him. It was said that Hitler would use poison gas, and would not care if the German people were destroyed

(Dec 2, 1943, M1–2). Hitler betrayed the officers, not vice versa; hence the officers were at liberty to fight him (Dec 13, 1943, J2). Luftwaffe General Luetzmann said that Hitler had defaulted on all his promises (EES, Sep 15, 1944, p 9). Hitler barred mail from Soviet prisoners (Mar 20, 1944, M1). General Hofmeister said that Hitler had no strategic ability.

Within a day after the Normandy invasion, the German people were asked to overthrow Hitler (EES, Jun 17, 1944, p 3). There were constant messages and appeals for the Germans to rise. On September 8, 1944, "Russia" called on the German people to turn against Hitler. Another time the civil servants were told to revolt (Aug 26, 1943, N1–2). The Germans were warned that the Teheran Conference represented their last chance to save the Reich and to join democratic nations (Dec 9, 1943, N1).

The Committee immediately saw the propaganda value of the attempted coup against Hitler on July 20, 1944. Although the Committee had nothing to do with the coup, it tried to enhance the importance of its following by making it appear as their work. In an appeal to the people and the Wehrmacht on July 21, General von Seydlitz said, "Courageous men rose against Hitler. They thereby gave the signal for the salvation of Germany," and General von Wartenberg claimed that the leaders of the Freedom Movement were still alive. In contrast, British leaflets described the plotters as "not worth anything," a judgment which the notorious Judge Freisler of the Nazi People's Court rejoiced in citing to them before he pronounced the death sentence.

Further broadcasts urging action included an appeal to German and foreign workers in armament industries to organize a national strike (EES, Sep 13, 1944, p 9), and advice to soldiers to take a few hand grenades or, if possible, a pistol and some ammunition to give to reliable friends at home (EES, Sep 20, 1944, p 9). The Volkssturm was told to rise against Hitler, instead of fighting for him (EES, Oct 25, 1944, p 7). And later, Dr. Hadermann warned in *Freies Deutschland* not to delay the revolt too long, else the good faith of the Germans would be questioned (EES, Nov 8, 1944, p 12).

An appeal by fifty generals in December 1944 marked an intensification of the propaganda campaign (EES, Dec 20, 1944, p 6). The East Prussian population was told to turn against the Nazis and that the Red Army would not revenge itself for crimes committed in Russia. Those who asked, "What can I do?," were given the answer: "End the war."

To the Troops: Surrender!

The surrender theme represented a more tactical aspect of the propaganda campaign. In an open letter von Seydlitz advised General Model to surrender, and Field Marshal von Manstein was urged by General von Daniels to do likewise (Feb 10, 1944, M1–2). In other broadcasts, encircled generals were described as favoring surrender (Feb 23, 1944, M1), and many Nazis were reported as having surrendered at Cherkassy (Feb 25, 1944, M1). As late as May 8, 1945, when some Wehrmacht units were still resisting the Russians, they were warned that it was useless to fight on (May 8, 1945, A3–5).

Publicity for, and Warning against, Atrocities and War Crimes

This theme was not so heavily emphasized, but the Free German station broadcast a considerable amount of information regarding war crimes, and attempted to use broadcasts as a deterring influence. For instance, Major Hetz, First Vice-

President of the Free Germany Committee, gave a detailed description of an execution van used by the Nazis (Sep 1, 1943, N1–2). Germans were told to avenge Nazi atrocities (Sep 9, 1943, N1–2). The Wehrmacht was warned to cease its scorched earth policy in Russia (Sep 28, 1943, N1). Judicial Officer Klein urged punishment of war criminals, and a trial of war criminals at Kharkov was given extensive publicity (Dec 17, 1943, L1–6).

In addition to Hitler, several Nazi leaders were particularly singled out as war criminals: Gauleiter Greiser, for looting in eastern Europe (May 3, 1945, B15); General Dittmar, who was described as the most dangerous type of war criminal because he called on soldiers to hold out (May 9, 1945, A3); Reich Minister Funk, because of his looting (May 14, 1945, A3); and General Schoerner, who was called a murderer and war criminal because he continued the war (May 12, 1945, A3).

Reassurance on Postwar Germany

In one of the earliest broadcasts on postwar Germany, Pfc Otto Sins emphasized that workers must build the future Reich, that they must have the right to work, and that the common good must be the guiding consideration. There would be freedom of speech and press, no association with fascists, and the trusts would have to be dissolved (Aug 27, 1943, N1–3). The Germans were reassured that no bolshevization of the Reich was planned (Mar 29, 1944, M1). Germany would be a strong democracy, ruled by the people, and she could return to the community of nations. Of course, there was no mention of genuine Russian intentions and reparations, as discussed in the Russian press designed for home consumption.

REACTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE'S FORMATION

The Allies were taken completely by surprise when the formation of the Free Germany Committee was announced. US Ambassador Standley had not been informed or consulted. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull declined comment. Foreign Secretary Eden announced in the House of Commons on July 28 that he had not been informed, and that he did not intend to recognize any similar committee in Britain. One reaction, more critical than most, suggested that this was a move in the direction of a separate peace, and noted that it certainly worked against the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. This independent step by the Soviet Union was interpreted by "US observers" in Moscow as constituting notice to Great Britain and the US that the Soviet Union would pursue an independent course in Europe after the war. *The New Statesman and Nation* believed either that it was a sign of Russian independent action, or a token of incitement to greater cooperation among Allies.

The Axis countries were quick to exploit the unilateral aspect of the Free Germans. Radio Rome spoke of "Disunited Nations" (Jul 26, 1943, H5). Tokyo's Domei news broadcast in English to its Greater East Asia Prosperity Zone on July 23, saying that the *Pravda* report on the Committee (a one-page spread) exploded like a bombshell among Washington political circles, and that officials showed unconcealed alarm over this latest Soviet step, which was indicative of Soviet aspirations in Europe (Jul 24, 1943, F2–3). Goebbels also noted this in his diary. Berlin saw it as a ". . . Soviet intention to gain a key position for the domination of Europe by establishing a Soviet government in Germany, giving further justification to Europe's defensive war under German leadership" (Jul 27, 1943, D14).

THE COMMITTEE AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT

But though the Russians were apparently quite willing to keep the Allies guessing, a broadcast shortly after the inception of the Committee warned the Nazis against hoping for a separately negotiated German-Russian peace. Following the Moscow and Teheran conferences the Committee's propaganda was closely adapted to the decisions taken at these conferences.

After the Yalta conference, however, the Russians started to play down the role of the Free Germans. On February 15, 1945, a report from Moscow stated that the Committee was tolerated on Russian territory purely as a military expedient, but that its value to the war effort was doubtful, and that no concessions had been made to it. A few days later Moscow was described as being irate over the surmise that the League of German Officers, particularly the generals, might head a Reich government. It was pointed out that Marshal Paulus was no political figure, and the publication *War and the Working Class* stated that any such rumors were poisonous lies.

The postwar political aims of the Committee were secondary or incidental to its primary military aim of psychological warfare. Creation of a future political core for Germany, or of a Soviet-inclined group of generals in the event of a government established by a coup of German generals, may possibly have been additional reasons for founding the Committee, but they could not have been basic. Too many efforts have been made to trace a direct connection between the Free Germany Committee and the present government of the Eastern Zone of Germany and its police force. Many former Free Germans hold leading positions in Eastern Germany, it is true, but they are the ones who were old Communists, who attended the "antifa" conversion schools, or whom the Russians considered trustworthy as military or police technicians. The fact is that the top leaders in the East Zone of Germany are veteran Communists like Pieck and Ulbricht, while von Seydlitz and Paulus have disappeared from the political scene. Seydlitz' usefulness ended after the war, when the Committee was dissolved, and Paulus passed into eclipse when he returned to a dacha near Moscow, having made a spectacular appearance at Nuremberg as witness before the International Military Tribunal. Count von Einsiedel now lives in the French Zone of Germany.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the propaganda efforts of the Free Germans. It seems that they hoped at best to get the people to rise against Hitler and put an end to the war. The Russians were not blind to German psychology, and tended to promote rather than hinder the internal opposition against Hitler. However, as events showed, a mass rising against the Nazi government did not occur. This appears to have been another instance in which Communist expectations were more closely aligned with wishful thinking than with reality.

On a more limited scale the Committee seems to have been a contributory cause for the German collapse in the East. The loudspeakers at the front, the radio talks, the leaflets, and the other calls to surrender no doubt brought over many Germans who would otherwise have fought on lethargically. But the propaganda was really effective and devastating only at those points of application where the military situation was hopeless. The Committee helped also to crystallize anti-Nazi forces in Germany, and contributed its little bit to demoralization there. But on the whole the propaganda of the Committee was of limited efficacy.

If the returns of psychological warfare as waged by the Free Germany Committee were small, so was its cost. The fact that it did not achieve the maximum results hoped for detracts nothing from the fact that Russian propaganda through

the Free Germans was shrewd in quickly exploiting favorable situations and clever in having been well attuned to German thinking.

SO YOU'RE GOING TO RUSSIA*

The care and spoon-feeding of visitors to the Soviet Union.

THE TECHNIQUES OF SHEPHERDING VISITORS

Great importance is, and always has been, attached by the Soviet Union to organized visits by "delegations" both from the Satellites and the rest of the world. These delegations to and from the Soviet Union have an important role to play in Soviet psychological warfare campaigns, a role the importance of which was stressed by Stalin as far back as 1925.

In presenting the political report of the Central Committee to the XIV CPSU Congress on December 18, 1925, Stalin indicated the significance of these visiting groups:

> "We do not need any special propaganda either in the West or in the East, now that workers' delegations visit our country, see for themselves the order to things here and carry their information about the order of things here to all Western countries. We do not need any other propaganda. This is the best, the most potent and most effective propaganda for the Soviet system and against the capitalist system."

Although there have been some indications recently that supervision, certainly in Moscow, is not quite as stringent as it has been in the past, the Soviet authorities have developed a technique which combines an appearance of spontaneity with the greatest possible degree of surveillance. The visitor's program is overloaded and most delegates are constrained by their duty towards their hosts to fit in with the pre-arranged schedule. Ignorance of the language and locality prevent freedom of movement. Since all expenses are met by the Russians, the tourists have no Soviet currency.† Furthermore, other techniques have been evolved which almost automatically place the foreign delegation in a controlled situation.

Original Selection

Almost all visits to the Soviet Union are by invitation. The delegations‡ thus become quantitatively the most important "first hand" source of information about the USSR available to the rest of the world and hence their "impressions" are seized upon and quoted.

* Reproduced from the Department of State *Psychological Intelligence Digest*, No. 21 (1 Dec 53), which in turn reproduced the original article "Group Visits to the USSR," a 20-page addendum to *The Interpreter* (Jul 53).

† It is true that most delegates are paid for the broadcasts they make and that this enables them to buy presents; but if they require additional money for other purposes they have to change their own currency at the official rate of exchange. This is so disadvantageous that few of them do so.

‡ The number of such delegations has increased sharply in the past few years. Between 1945 and the end of 1952, 290 foreign workers' delegations, including 140 from capitalist and colonial countries, had visited the USSR,[20] and a Tass correspondent in May 1953 disclosed that 120 delegations had visited the Soviet Union in 1952.

As regards the selection of delegations, it seems that in a large number of cases most of the members are neither Communists nor Communist sympathizers. But, to compensate for this, each delegation, as a rule, contains at least one Communist or Communist sympathizer, or a woolly minded well-wisher who can be depended upon to guide the others in the required direction, to handle the publicity required of the delegation, or to speak in the delegation's name.

From reports published by the delegations on their return from the Soviet Union, it appears that they are invariably accompanied by one or more officials, whether interpreters, guides or hosts, a certain number of whom are attached to them throughout their stay. Questions by delegates are dealt with at the highest level, usually by members of the leading body of the appropriate agency.

During visits to enterprises or institutions, the delegates are shown round by the chief. They are, in fact, treated as honored and influential guests, a consideration which predisposes them to respond as expected. Indeed, no matter who the delegates are, more or less tacit emphasis is laid on their role as "ambassadors of peace" or "pilgrims" whose duty it is to impart their experience to others. This may be conveyed in such questions from workers as: "What are you doing for peace?" or it may take the form of the invariable pledge to their hosts to tell the truth about the Soviet Union on their return home.

Reception and Accommodation

On arrival, usually at Vnukovo Airport, Moscow, visiting delegations are met by a committee of high-ranking Soviet officials. Satellite delegations are usually welcomed and seen off by representatives of their respective Embassies, but this is the exception with non-Satellite delegations. British trade-union delegations, for instance, are met by officials of the All-Union Central Council of Trade-Unions and include one or more of the Council's departmental heads. Other delegations are met by appropriate committees: members of the Union of Soviet Writers meet an authors' delegation, members of the Soviet Peace Committee meet peace delegations, and members of the Soviet Women's Anti-Fascist Committee meet women's delegations.

Delegates are, with few exceptions, accommodated in Moscow's luxury hotels during their stay in the capital. There are six main hotels in Moscow — Grand, Moskva, National, Metropole, Savoy, and Sovetskaya, the latter a new hotel opened for the Moscow Economic Conference and used by a number of the delegates to it. Accommodation in these hotels is usually reserved for high Soviet officials or Party members and for foreigners. The standard of service, food and general comfort is superior to those in other hotels in the Soviet Union. This also applies to the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad, at which delegations to that city usually stay. The standard is also probably greatly superior to any previously experienced by the average visitor to the Soviet Union, who is not accustomed to staying in luxury hotels in his own country. Hotels in the large cities of the Soviet Union exist primarily for officials and industrial employees on business missions. No private individual may stay in them unless he has the requisite documents. Agricultural workers visiting towns stay either with relatives or at a "Kolkhozny Dom" (collective farm hostel).

Hospitality

Hospitality is lavished on the delegations. Banquets and receptions are held in their honor; they are given the best seats for the ballet, theater, or opera and

they travel by plane, train, or car in the utmost comfort. When they visit collective farms, they eat enormous meals.

Conducted Tours

One fact that evidently helps the Soviet organizers is the length of the visits. To travel long distances, visit several towns, and carry out a detailed excursion program during the normal stay of 10 days to 3 weeks, means that the delegates, even if they know Russian, which few do, and are unhampered by lack of currency, have little time to roam around by themselves. Although several delegates have reported recently that they had been "spontaneously" invited to a meal by a Russian, for anyone who knows conditions in the Soviet Union and the harsh legislation which exists to prevent close contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners, it is difficult to believe that the invitation was "spontaneous." Despite this, however, living conditions of approximately 209 million people cannot be judged by one such visit. (The inability to find out how the mass of Soviet citizens live was admitted by the British workers' delegation to the USSR in 1952.) Other delegates have referred to the obstacles put in their way to prevent them from seeing the things they wanted to see.

Visiting delegates can also be deceived into thinking external appearances are the whole truth. One women's delegation which visited Stalingrad gave an enthusiastic interview on its return to Moscow in which it was said that they had seen no forced labor in the rebuilding of Stalingrad and it was therefore obvious that forced labor did not exist in Russia.

Though it is impossible to give an absolutely accurate analysis of the towns visited by delegations, a general idea can be obtained from the localities visited. From January through December 1952 the number of delegations visiting the following cities (excluding Moscow, to which almost all delegations went, and Leningrad, which was visited by a great many) was estimated as follows:

Kiev	12	Stalingrad	4
Tashkent	11	Zaporozhe	3
Tiflis	9	Kislovodsk	2
Alma Ata	8	Sverdlovsk	2
Sochi	8	Yalta	2
Kharkov	7	Baku	1
Rostov-on-Don	6	Irkutsk	1
Dniepropetrovsk	5	Kishinev	1
Erivan	5	Molotov	1
Odessa	5	Sukhumi	1
Donbas	4	Tula	1
Minsk	4		

It is perhaps worth noting that whereas the number of delegations to the Central Asian republics has increased over past months, a large number of the visitors to these places have been Asians. Alma Ata, for instance, was visited by delegations from China and Korea, and two each from Mongolia, Japan, and Pakistan.

Generally speaking, until now by far the majority of places which figured in the stock itineraries are in the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Georgia. There does not seem to be a single instance of Western delegations visiting the Baltic States since the visit by the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society's delegation in June, 1946. Hence Soviet organizers can expect that delegates will, on the whole, tend to generalize about the impressions obtained from a brief tour of some of the more prominent centers, assuming that what they saw was typical of the USSR as a whole.

Excursions

It cannot be overemphasized that the amount of rigging undertaken for visiting delegations is a wholly subsidiary feature of their tour. There is no wholesale fabrication of things for visitors to see, but a distorted or incomplete picture is created (1) by the types of towns visited; (2) by the official handouts; and (3) by the judicious selection of real but model, and hence unrepresentative, institutions as the objects of the excursions. This "judicious selection" is a foremost feature of all visits by delegations.

Moscow	Moscow Underground, Lenin Library, Stalin Motor Works
Leningrad	Palace of Pioneers
Stalingrad	Tractor Factory and the Volga-Don Canal
Tiflis	Palace of Pioneers
Sverdlovsk	Uralmash Works

These are among the best of their kind in the Soviet Union and bear comparison with their counterparts in the West. Certain outstanding Soviet factories, schools, and kindergartens are shown to successive delegations.

There are even show prisons, to which delegates are taken to give them an impression of the humanity and progressiveness of Soviet penal procedure. The best known of these is that of Bolshevo, a truly model prison to which certain privileged petty criminals are sent and which differs radically from the mass of the penal camps throughout the Soviet Union.*

Information

The factual information with which delegates are presented necessarily comes, for the most part, from their official organizers and hosts. The similarity of the accounts, for example, of Soviet trade-union functions in statements and pamphlets issued by the delegates on their return home, confirms this. The difficulty of getting statistical information was commented on in the report of the National Union of Students' delegation, in particular at the Stalin Motor Works and the Moscow Medical Institute. The technical director of the motor works "did not remember" the number of employees, but thought it must be "several tens of thousands," and could not give either the 1950 output of the works or the cost of production of a car.

Misinformation on wages, conditions of work, production figures and so forth is naturally difficult to track down, and delegates with relatively little knowledge of the USSR cannot be expected to detect it, or even to verify all the information they receive. It can be argued that the information given to delegates is slanted rather than deliberately incorrect, but that there is a modicum of outright falsification cannot be doubted.

* One of the many delegates who visited Bolshevo was Jerzy Gliksman, a Polish lawyer, who was a member of the committee of the Jewish Socialist Bund and one of its representatives on the old Warsaw City Council. In his book *Tell the West* he describes his visit to the camp and tells of the good bedding, fine washrooms, light and airy classrooms and good food. "Back in my hotel," he writes, "I had to bring some order into the multitude of new impressions. These were not only examples of humane treatment of prisoners, but also audacious experiments in tune with the latest accomplishments of educational and criminological thought." He began to doubt all that he had heard about Soviet malpractices. But five years later he found himself a prisoner in an ordinary Soviet labor camp where he said he "found an answer to these questions."

Free Time

The time made available to the delegates to "explore" on their own cannot always be forecast with certainty. Usually, however, they have little free time and owing to language difficulties are permanently accompanied by an interpreter or guide. (Several of the delegates to the Moscow Economic Conference who did enjoy some leisure, however, saw something of the seamy side of Moscow life.)

Delegations' reports concentrate almost exclusively on the best aspects of Moscow to such an extent that one tends to forget that that is precisely and exclusively what they have seen: the broad streets in the center of the city, Gorky Street, show flats, and the ballet. This is hardly surprising, perhaps, for wherever the visitor goes he usually selects the "sights" of the place for first inspection. What is surprising, however, is that countless delegates after a two- or three-weeks' visit to the Soviet Union talk as if they were authorities on the subject, and feel able to pronounce, also, on what they have not seen.

THEMES AND CONTROLS IN GUIDED-TOUR PROPAGANDA

While the comments and reports of visiting delegations present many striking similarities and, in effect, present what the Soviet authorities evidently want to emphasize in propaganda to the outside world, this output also reveals target areas and vulnerable topics for psychological warfare.

Propaganda Highlights

"Peace" and "Peaceful Co-existence." [These] are so much in the forefront of present-day Soviet propaganda that their content and implication have been examined many times before. To the delegates, however, this theme is always driven home (1) on all occasions when delegates talk with workers and passers-by, or visit workers in their homes; (2) by association with governmental concern for the welfare of the worker, and concentration on large-scale construction; and (3) in connection with May Day parades.

Construction Program. This figures high on the list. It is emphasized by visits to new flats, the new Moscow University buildings, and to reconstruction sites in Stalingrad and Leningrad.

State Projects. Visits to the Volga-Don Canal now figure frequently on delegations' programs and are used as a further indication of Soviet peaceful intentions.

Workers' Welfare. This theme is of great importance to justify delegates' preconceived ideas that Russia is the country of Socialism. Hence the particularly warm tributes paid by delegates to the system of public health, sanatoria, factory-safety precautions, conditions in the mines, social insurance and workers' accommodations, to which a great many of the excursions and conferences are devoted, the inference being that in the USSR the worker is not only well-off but a person of importance.

Freedom of Religion. This subject is one to which great attention is paid because the Soviet government realizes its natural propaganda value. Delegates report on the crowded churches as proof of religious freedom and of the survival of religion, not as an indication of the lack of churches. (Moscow, a city with more than 6 million inhabitants, has only 55 churches used as places of worship.)

The regular series of antireligious lectures delivered under the auspices of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge, the law making the teaching of religion to minors in schools a criminal offense, and the antireligious articles published in the press, are not noticed by Soviet admirers.

In fact, a recent delegate reported that there was no evidence of antireligious propaganda in the Soviet Union today, and that the slogan "religion is the opium of the people" had long been removed from the front of the Historical Museum in the Red Square. The slogan was certainly displayed at the Lenin Museum in May 1953, and if indeed it has been removed it can only be to make delegates believe that antireligious propaganda has been abolished. Christianity, however, still represents a major problem to the Kremlin, and towards the end of last year the *Moscow University Herald*, a journal edited by 25 of the most important Soviet professors, printed the most detailed attack on Christianity published in the Soviet Union since the war.

Education and Culture. Whether by visits to schools and universities or by attendance at the theatre, ballet, concert, or places of culture, a wealth of material designed to prove the high quality and all-embracing scope of education in the Soviet Union is put before the delegates.

Miscellaneous Themes. Other topics pressed on visiting delegations include the equality of the sexes and the care of children (with visits to crèches and kindergartens).

Significant Omissions and Tactics

A striking feature of delegates' reports is the little attention given to the political structure of the Soviet Union. Emphasis is laid on attempts to find evidence of the solidarity of the people as a whole. The May Day and November 7 parades are also used to impress this idea on delegations, though the vast rallies held on these occasions are, of course, in no way voluntary.

There is a striking contrast between the Soviet presentation of the impressions of foreign delegations and the delegations' own publicity. On the whole, the comparisons drawn in favor of the USSR by visiting delegations, particularly in their own reports, are confined to particular issues.

The general tenor of the delegations' own propaganda is that — (a) there is a lot the West could learn from the Soviet Union, and (b) that the information generally available about the Soviet Union is false and should be exposed in the interests of world peace and mutual understanding. The picture given and the comparisons drawn naturally tell against the governments of the west, but no conclusions are drawn about the desirability of advancing the cause of Communism. From the Soviet point of view, the primary use of the delegations is a means of reinforcing pro-Soviet sentiment in the outside world.

Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, draws, where necessary, the widest conclusions desirable. Thus a commentary in *Pravda* (December 11, 1952) on an exchange of correspondence between a Scottish and a Russian miner, the latter pointed out that Watson, the Scot, had said that the capitalist system was not eternal, as the "bourgeois priests both with and without surplices" kept drumming into his head. "He sees with his own eyes that Socialism is incomparably superior to capitalism, that capitalism is not capable of progress, that it represents an obsolete reactionary social system, that workers who have thrown off capitalism are better bosses than the stupid capitalist slave-owners."

An interesting feature of this exchange of correspondence between two miners was that Watson's replies to the Russian miner's questions, published in *Trud* (December 10, 1952) were so favorable to the Soviet Union that the writer in *Pravda* asserted that the capitalist press would not dare to acquaint its readers of the exchange. In fact, the capitalist press did inform its readers of Watson's

remarks and Watson was quoted as having emended a number of his most important misstatements. So far the Soviet press has failed to report this fact.

Press conferences arranged for the delegates are another means whereby the Soviet government attempts to elicit statements criticizing the delegates' own governments. Frequent use is also made of comments by delegates long after they have left the country, both in internal propaganda and especially in Moscow Radio transmissions abroad, as a source of corroborative evidence for such talks as "Religious Freedom in the USSR," and "The Rights of Women."*

Spontaneous Comment by the Man-in-the-Street

It has become more and more apparent recently that the Soviet government is anxious to dispel the idea that delegations to the Soviet Union are on "conducted tours" and not free to talk to the man in the street if they wish. Delegates of late have made a particular point of saying that they received a spontaneous invitation from a worker to visit his flat, or that they stopped and asked questions of people in the street. In most cases the delegates will have conversed through an interpreter, which means that they had at least one Soviet official with them. This in itself would prevent any Soviet citizen, whatever his standing, from expressing himself freely. But by far the most important Soviet inhibition which makes it virtually impossible for a visitor on a two to four weeks' tour to gauge the real attitude of the population or to obtain reliable information, is the informer system peculiar to all totalitarian societies. In the Soviet Union the system is found in its most highly organized and all-pervasive form. Even if the Soviet press and all Soviet propaganda media did not periodically indulge in special "security" drives,† the memories of the purge trials with their crudely exaggerated emphasis on "foreign spies" and the knowledge of what often happened to those of their fellow citizens who had had contact with foreigners or who merely had friends and relations abroad, effectively seal the lips of Soviet citizens when it comes to conversations on "forbidden topics."

Often, of course, such topics are raised by earnest and sincere foreigners, and it is in the answers given by Soviet citizens that the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and conditioning is best observed. In a country and under a system where no one dares to speak openly and freely, even to acquaintances who are also his countrymen, it is, to say the least, highly improbable that he will do so to a visiting foreigner, who is, at best, the officially approved guest of the authorities and, for all he knows, a Communist or, at worst, not a foreigner at all but an agent provocateur of the secret police. These are factors of vital importance when considering the claims of some delegates of having "conversed freely with the man-in-the-street." Such conversations may well have been "free" in the sense of being uncontrolled and even unobserved by officials, but they will almost never have been uninhibited on the part of the Soviet citizen. Even if the Soviet citizen has reason to think that a foreign visitor is not a pro-Communist, it is rarely that he will risk trusting to the stranger's discretion.

* The Soviet Union's claim of "rights of Soviet citizens guaranteed by the constitution," which appeared for the first time on the last May Day slogans, was dropped from the recently published list of November 7th slogans.

† For example, the recent notorious "vigilance" campaign, which reached its peak shortly before Stalin died, was patently designed to frighten the Soviet people into even closer xenophobia and mutual distrust than already existed.

COMMUNIST PATTERNS OF PROPAGANDA AND CONTROL IN SOUTH KOREA — 1950*

The Communists' plans for South Korea were highly developed. Amnesty was promised to ROK *government employees, teachers, and technicians if they renounced loyalty to the South Korean government and accepted employment under Communist auspices.*

For 5 years prior to the invasion of South Korea, in the summer of 1950, Korea had been under Soviet domination. For 3 months the Communists controlled a large part of South Korea, including the capital city of Seoul. In order to understand the techniques they employed to effect control of a subjugated people, field studies were carried out in Korea during the latter part of 1950 and the early part of 1951. How the Communist Party operated in Seoul and in two selected villages was the subject investigated by a small group of American social scientists. The Americans were able to interview a large number of South Koreans, who had spent nearly 3 months under Communist control, as well as a fairly large number of refugees from North Korea. From their report, "A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Communism upon Korea," it is possible to identify many aspects of Soviet propaganda techniques and of propaganda impact that have relevance for United States psychological warfare officials.

THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA

The Communist invasion of South Korea had been planned for many months. When the North Korean armies marched into Seoul they had carefully planned arrangements for the occupation. The organization and activities of the People's (Communist) Party and the Home Ministry (which included the internal police and domestic propaganda organization) were the most carefully prearranged parts of the control system. The Home Ministry that was to be imposed on South Korea, arrived with all of its top personnel selected and with freight cars full of propaganda material. The designated leaders had complete lists of local citizens who were reputed to be sympathetic to communism and who could be used in the information of so-called "People's Committees," which were to enforce Communist policy in every industrial, professional, and voluntary organization. In Seoul, some of the inhabitants chosen by the Communists to serve their objectives were already known as "leftists," but many had hitherto not been known as Communist sympathizers. The Communist leaders were armed not only with a list of overt and covert Communist sympathizers, but also with a "blacklist," which included most of the high officers of the dispersed Republican government and intellectuals well known for their opposition to communism or support for President Rhee's regime. Those on the "blacklist" who could be found were speedily rounded up and quietly disposed of.

While these moves were going on the Communists seized the Seoul radio station and broadcast a promise of amnesty to former ROK employees, industrial personnel, technicians, and professionals. Admittance to the Communist fold was promised to all but incorrigible "reactionaries" if, instead of fleeing or hiding, the individual

* Adapted from Psychological Warfare Research Report I (unclassified), Human Resources Research Institute, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., May 51. This account is based largely on those parts of the study that concern mass communication.

would take up his old tasks under Communist direction. Whether these promises actually were fulfilled depended on the potential usefulness and submissiveness to the new regime of the trained personnel who returned to their old duties. In the villages promises of amnesty were general, but here the purges were less extensive than in Seoul, since political activity has been far less extensive in the rural areas of the Republic.

"Cultural" officers of the Party and Home Ministry who were assigned to the factories, hospitals, and schools went to work at once to organize approved People's Committees and meetings for the purpose of disseminating Communist propaganda. In the villages People's Committees replaced the village administrative officers who served under the Republic. The Women's Alliance and Youth organizations were two major adjuncts to Party control in both city and village. Although all of these organizations might have non-Communists serving as "fronts" in nominal positions of leadership, such individuals were carefully watched and supervised by police and party officials, some of whom served in the organizations as nominally inferior officers. However, frequently such persons actually wielded the decisive power.

The "puppet" leaders for these organizations were most frequently chosen from among those who had most cause to resent the ROK regime. In the city this meant that rank-and-file laborers were preferred in the factories to former officials. Those who were known to have a grievance against the ROK police were brought to the fore, often from the South Korean prisons. Particular mistrust was shown for the intelligentsia and the professionals, who were placed under close surveillance. Special efforts were made to take up such persons' free time by requiring that they attend indoctrination meetings supervised by "cultural" officers.

In the rural areas tenant farmers were preferred as officers of the People's Committees over those who owned land. In one small village the Communists reversed the 400-year-old superiority status of the older branch of a clan by elevating to positions of leadership members of a younger branch. They made members of the cadet branch the nominal heads of the local People's Committee and the Communists looked to this group alone for recruits for the People's Party. By such means, the Communists strove to develop within new groups a "vested interest" in supporting the Communist domination. By giving to new leaders positions of power and prestige that they had not enjoyed under the old regime, they hoped to win their support. Other sources of resentment under the old regime were exploited by Communists through their personnel policy. The "rights of women" having been proclaimed, women were speedily appointed as officers in the various People's Committees. Women and young people were "bribed" to break with the old family system by promises of emancipation from the control of the older male heads of their family. In a society still predominately patriarchal this was a radical departure from past practices.

MAIN PROPAGANDA THEMES

The program of "social welfare," which was publicized by the Communists in South Korea, undoubtedly had widespread appeal among the population. Refugees from North Korea indicated however, that the longer the Communists held control, the greater was the peoples' disillusionment and disgust with Communist policy. However, Communist dominion in South Korea did not last sufficiently long for the difference between promises and practice to become clearly evident. Therefore, active reaction against the Communist regime was neither as widespread nor as

intense as that in North Korea. The main "planks" in the program of "social reform" announced by the Reds follow.

The "Emancipation" of Women

The Communist program for the emancipation of women was widely publicized. Women were given political and other institutional posts and a new system of laws designed to protect women was promulgated. The new "rights" given women included the revamping of the divorce laws so as to diminish the power of the husband over his wife. Under the new laws, if the man sued for divorce, he lost half of this property to his wife, if his wife sued for divorce, she was given all of his property. Concubinage and licensed prostitution was abolished. These measures, together with the pronouncement of the "right" of women to labor in any field of endeavor, had the effect of greatly enlarging the potential labor force in the cities. At the time of the evacuation of Seoul, in September 1950, there was no conscription of South Korean women into the Communist army, although women already were serving in the combatant forces in North Korea. It was obvious to many South Koreans that the Communists, by their control system, sought to weaken the prestige and influence of the family, by sowing seeds of doubt within it.

The "Emancipation" of Labor from "Capitalist" Exploitation

This policy was publicized only in the major cities. However, the nationalization of all industry was not announced as an immediate objective of Communist policy. Small business was officially encouraged but actually squeezed to the wall by heavy taxes and such official acts as restrictions on supplies.

Workers in Seoul industry were promised shorter working hours and an equitable government rice ration. In actuality, a quota labor system was introduced, which meant working overtime if the assigned quota was not fulfilled within an 8-hour period. In addition to this, special "voluntary" labor (unpaid working time) was frequently exacted of laborers for "special" purposes. Indoctrination meetings held in the factories served further to lengthen the time required to be spent at the plant.

Some workers reported that the extra rice ration seldom materialized, except for the party functionaries in the factory. Paid vacations at summer resorts, which the workers were promised, of course, did not materialize, and sick leave, which had been guaranteed, was indeed difficult to get. However, 3 months of Communist control in South Korea was apparently insufficient to reveal the fundamental oppressiveness of Communist-directed working conditions. Persons of low income status, fleeing from North Korea, were much more apt to mention restrictive controls and forced labor as a reason for leaving than were low-status South Korean refugees, who had lived under Communist domination for only a relatively short period of time.

Opportunities for the Young

The promises held out to cooperative young people and to their parents mainly related to increased opportunities for education and social advancement. Education was to be made available to everyone, and thus illiteracy was to be abolished. Children of laborers were to be especially favored under the new regime. Students achieving distinction in elementary and secondary schools were to be rewarded with university scholarships and possibly even the opportunity for further training in

North Korea, China, or Moscow. In addition to promises of education, additional efforts were made to secure the cooperation of young people in both city and country districts. Membership in the "Democratic Youth Association" was acknowledged to be the first step in rising to positions of power within the party.

In 5 years, 1945–1950, the size of the student body in North Korea had greatly increased and substantial progress had been made towards reducing illiteracy. This had been done partly by a marked decline in the quality of the teaching body and, thus, in a lowering of educational standards. Following the ouster of Japan, in 1945, the Korean phonetic alphabet replaced the more difficult system of Chinese characters formerly employed throughout all Korea. The popularization and use of the phonetic alphabet facilitated indoctrination, for the Communists limited the things that could be reproduced in the phonetic script to those things that supported Soviet objectives.

In South Korea the 3 months of occupation was marked by a disorganization of the school system. Teachers were few in number, many who had taught previously fled from the Communists and others were purged as untrustworthy. Those who fled were replaced by persons who had merely graduated from the primary schools. Parents frequently tried to keep their children at home, because the schools were a place where army drafts were made and they believed "nothing was taught but Communist songs." Indoctrination in Communist dogma became a major part of the curriculum and Russian replaced English as the second language.

The Redistribution of Farmland

During the 3 months of Communist occupation of the Seoul area, the Communists began the redistribution of land in South Korea. Communist performance, especially in North Korea, had already revealed that there was a great difference between what was promised and what was delivered. The Communists promised the farmers an equal distribution of land and this was contrasted with the "unequal distribution" plan announced by the ROK government, which, incidentally, was just being put into effect at the time of the invasion. Under the Communist plan land was to be distributed on the basis of the number of persons in a household. This plan was seemingly more popular with heretofore landless peasants than was the ROK plan. The Communist plan provided for "confiscation without compensation," whereas, the Rhee government had announced a scheme that called for "just compensation" for those from whom the land was taken, with the recipients of the redistributed land paying for it on the installment plan. The Communist plan called for a state tax of 25 percent of the value of the annual crop, which was not considered unreasonable by farmers who had formerly been share croppers and tenants. They were soon to learn, however, that in actual practice (because of additional levies of rice for "special" purposes, *corvées* of labor, and the necessity for billeting soldiers) the tax amounted to more than 70 percent. This was especially so in areas where there were few large-scale holdings. Thus the Communist land redistribution soon lost its appeal. Definite conclusions cannot be drawn concerning the extent of disaffection among South Korean farmers at the time of the Communist withdrawal, but it seems likely that it was at least as great as that among the urban population.

Ideology and Nationalism

The material benefits offered in Communist propaganda were the items most remembered by North Korean refugees. However, the "ideological line" was

repeatedly drilled into the ears of both North and South Koreans. There are indications that the Communists recognized important vulnerabilities in the ROK cause, by aiming their attack in accordance with existing Korean predispositions.

For instance, anti-Rhee sentiment was more vigorously developed in both city and country, North and South Korea, than was the anti-US line. Of course, the US was always referred to as "imperialistic," and responsible for the "puppet Rhee"; however, greater emphasis seems to have been placed on the deficiencies and incongruities of the known ROK government, rather than on the US government, which was comparatively unknown. The Soviet charge that the Rhee government was corrupt and exploitative undoubtedly received a sympathetic hearing among some Koreans, as indicated by the following response of one North Korean refugee: "I heard on the radio that some dignitaries of ROK received splendid profits by using the public money, and ECA materials were disposed of secretly for their private avarice. I think the latter may have some truth in it. . . ."

Attempts were made to associate the US with another known and resented evil force — Japan — whereas Russia was linked in propaganda with favorable symbols in association with the "strong, free" North Korean government of Kim Il Sung. The assistance provided by the US to South Korea — past, present, and future — was belittled by various devices. Communist propaganda addressed to the South Korean villages mentioned the role of the US less often than in that addressed to the cities. The US was depicted as weak, and as apt to withdraw from South Korea. The Communists seemed mainly concerned that the peasants might develop the belief that the US would help the South Korean armies make a "comeback" after the initial North Korean assault. Attempts were made in both North and South Korea to depict the Soviet Union as the "fatherland"; however, it appears that this line was later abandoned, presumably for lack of favorable response. The unification of Korea — "Korea for the Koreans" — was a major theme of Communist propaganda, and illustrates the importance the Communists attached to the use of national symbols and themes that had the greatest amount of meaning to the public at large.

THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM OF CONTROL

The Police System

The police were ruthless in applying sanctions. Sanctions were applied both overtly and covertly, sometimes with propaganda after the fact. Those who were marked for elimination disappeared, usually in the night, and except when the Communists were forced to withdraw from Seoul in September, open violence was indeed rare. The tactics pursued served not only to increase the people's fear of the police, but they apparently prevented the kind of expressed hatred that arises from the sight of open brutality and violence. Both North and South Koreans often described the police as most courteous and some stressed the fact that their behavior contrasted favorably with that of the Japanese and the ROK police. This admiration for the "good behavior" of the police was not inconsistent with repressed feelings of abject fear, for retribution from the police could fall swiftly, without forewarning, and with complete finality. In one of the South Korean villages that was studied intensively, the occupying Communists initially shot only one member of the community, a leading local supporter of the ROK government. Yet, when they discovered that an American soldier was hiding in the house of a local peasant they shot the peasant as he attempted to flee.

The police authorities made use of a pervasive network of spies, typical of a totalitarian state. It was generally known in the cities of North and South Korea that Party spies and secret police were everywhere to be found. In the small village, mentioned previously, the community was able to maintain confidence in its solidarity, and even to plant its own spy in the People's Committee. However, in Seoul, where interpersonal relations tended to be less intimate, friends were made to fear friends, parents to fear their children, and workers their colleagues. Since denunciations for "reactionary thoughts" were encouraged by the police, citizens lived in fear that their neighbors or friends would denounce them for personal reasons. Many reported instances where parents had been denounced by their children. Thus, the system of intragroup communications within clans and private organizations, which keep alive the possibility of resistance to totalitarian control, was severely threatened.

Nevertheless, the hostility to the Communist regime, which survived the police system, still found its expression through such intimate contacts. Friends and trusted members of families listened by means of concealed radios to UN broadcasts. During the occupation of Seoul, fugitives from the police found hiding places in the houses of friends. If the reports of the individuals interviewed in the survey are typical, a great many people had at least one friend or relative whom they could trust. US and UN information and propaganda were passed along through these private channels, and in South Korea, at least, important news would be generally known throughout the city shortly after it had been broadcast over the radio. The police forbade the populace to pick up American propaganda leaflets and thus overt controls by the police were more effective here. In the villages, however, where there were often no radio communications to the outside world, leaflets frequently provided the only source of information hostile to the Communists, and thus villagers reported that leaflets were more prized and could be picked up in relative safety at night and in outlying areas.

Monopoly of Communication Media

Mass Media. The first recorded action of the Communist occupation forces, in connection with the communication system, was the seizure of Radio Seoul. The Communists began at once to broadcast messages to the people: "Your government has fled, the People's Republic is now in control, go back to your work. Everyone will be forgiven if he goes back to work." The fact that Radio Seoul, a 35-kw station, which was powerful enough to cover all Korea, was not destroyed by the ROK Army in June, is indicative of the lack of planning desirable in a period of defensive attrition. The destruction, or immobilization, of the station would seem to have been dictated by sound military policy. The explanation why the station was not destroyed might be that while in precipitate flight, the Rhee government continued to broadcast to the very end in order to cover the government's departure from Seoul.

The top-echelon personnel utilized by the Communists at Radio Seoul were imported from the North Korean radio system. The chief engineer was trained in Moscow. Every effort, however, was made to utilize the lower-echelon personnel, especially the technicians, who had served the ROK cause. The engineers, the writers, and the announcers, who had served the Rhee government, were all assured that they had nothing to fear if they would cooperate. The content of all broadcasts was thus determined by trusted Communist representatives, but the work of putting the broadcasts on the air was carried out by personnel long employed at the station.

All seven newspapers in Seoul were suspended by the occupation authorities. In their place, two papers previously suspended by the ROK government because of their communistic bias were reinstated. These were the *People's Daily News* and the *Liberation Daily News*. Their editors seem to have been South Korean Communists who had edited the papers during their earlier publication in Seoul. These papers were nationalized, and were printed in Seoul's largest newspaper offices, which had been confiscated for the purpose. All news services except Tass were forbidden. In addition, there were many releases and articles sent to the newspaper offices by the Communist Government Public Information Office. Thus, the common pattern was repeated: the technical work was done by continuing personnel (printers, circulation men, et cetera) and policy line and content were controlled by the Party and the government.

Control of the motion picture offerings in Seoul theaters was maintained through the Cultural Bureau of the Home Ministry. All US and British films were excluded. Of every five films shown, it was estimated that three were of Russian origin. The others, it appears, were made in North Korea, or China, or were films from other "noncapitalist" countries, all chosen for their ideological or propagandistic content.

For some weeks admission to the theaters was free. This contributed greatly to the popularity of the occupation government and kept attendance high. Then, so it is said, one night the theater doors were locked, and all able-bodied men of military age in the audience were seized and conscripted into the army. This story was encountered so often in the survey, that the analyst making the study concluded that there was little reason to doubt its authenticity.

Reports of the content of these mass communications during the occupation period agree that there was a great sameness among all the media. The same news and many of the same articles would appear in both newspapers. The newspapers would often be read over the radio, and the same political articles would be sent by the Public Information Office to papers and radio alike. News for all the media was filtered through Tass. The movies, with their strong ideological content, repeated the same line, with many of the same illustrations, as the newspapers and radio. Thus audiences of any of the media soon began to feel that they had heard this before.

But to say that the Communist mass media in Seoul were a little on the dull and preachy side is to miss some of the essentials of the operation. The Communists were, of course, depending on monopoly to remove their need of competing for an audience. They conceived of newspapers and radios, especially the former, as kinds of textbooks. Indeed, they so used them. At the culture hours, newspapers were read. "We had to pass on to others the exact content of the speeches given by leaders without adding a single word of our own," explained one Seoul resident.

With this use in mind, the Communists made several important changes in media form and content. For one thing, they seem to have used almost entirely the Korean phonetic characters rather than the Chinese ideographs. Of course, the reason for this was to extend the audience as widely as possible. There is also testimony that they rearranged the contents of the papers in such a way as to make them easier for unlearned readers to use.

On Radio Seoul they made frequent spots for laborers and farmers to be interviewed and to speak their political thoughts.

These changes were for the sake of audience. For the sake of Party they used the front page of the newspaper for speeches by Russian Communist leaders or for messages to and from Kim Il Sung. They programed a large amount of military

music, and a large number of political talks — "sometimes one and a half hours," a respondent said, "often read mechanically without pause, from the newspaper." They seem to have carried only news favorable to the Communists. They carried an uncommon amount of abuse of the US and the UN.

The Public Information Office in Seoul was headed by personnel imported from North Korea. As in the case of the other communications activities, the lower echelon personnel were encouraged to stay on, particularly the artists who drew posters and placards. One reason for the encouragement of artists in the Public Information Office was the widespread use of pictorial communications from the Communists in Seoul. In general, the pictorial quality was excellent and frequently printed in bright colors. Many of the posters were imported, a few even came from Russia. Often these imported posters bore pictures of Kim Il Sung, Stalin, or Lenin, and employed very simple propaganda lines. Tons of such posters and leaflets were sent in with the occupation troops. Despite this ready supply, the occupation authorities preferred to have their first posters hand-lettered in Seoul. These posters welcomed the People's Army, and were painted in fairly crude fashion to give the impression of a spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm.

Steps were taken for the construction of a public loudspeaker system in Seoul. The monopoly and repetitiousness of all these media had the effect of ensuring that the population was heavily "saturated" with the Communist propaganda line. Posters, "comic" books, newspapers and radio all repeated the major themes.

The Communist occupation government showed a respect for accomplished musicians and writers that often contrasted favorably with the attitude of the ROK government. During the years between 1947 and 1950, the North Korean government had invited many South Korean musicians and writers to come north. They offered to send some of these North Korean government artists to Moscow for further training. After the invasion, they took further steps to make friends among these groups. They appeared to be quite willing to forgive past cooperation with the ROK's. They even went so far as to forgive the musicians and artists for past opposition to the Communists, on the condition that they express a willingness to cooperate in future endeavors. The conductor of the Seoul Philharmonic, an internationally known musician who had studied and conducted in the US and who had spurned previous invitations and urgings from the Communists, was excused for his past deviations on his promise that he would conduct programs sponsored by the new government. He was put into a North Korean military uniform and named director of the Red Army Chorus.

In the search for communication media and devices, occupation leaders made almost continual use of ideological songs (North Korean, Russian, and International Communist) at their meetings, in the schools, and in the streets. They also made frequent use of short plays that illustrated some point in their propaganda line. These drama were presented by visiting North Korean actors, or by casts recruited from the local Communist Party or schools. They also arranged parades as often as possible, in which members of various associations and North Korean troops marched. One of the most ironic chapters in the history of the occupation is the account of one of the largest parades in the history of Seoul, minutely organized by the Communists and featuring all the Communist organizations and many colorful groups and exhibits. This parade was held on the day after the Inchon landing, (16 September 1950) and was alleged to celebrate the "fact" that the invaders had been pushed back into the sea.

When the Reds packed up and left Seoul, it is important to note, that they took with them all the distinguished musicians and writers they could round up, in addition to the contents of numerous museums and the books from many of the libraries in Seoul.

Face-to-Face Pressures, Individual and Group. In all Communist countries, regardless of the extent of literacy and the developmental stage of the mass media, the Communists greatly increased their propaganda impact by systematic applications of personal and oral propaganda. In Korea this was especially the case because of low literacy and limited radio facilities. Almost all individuals interviewed commented on the widespread use of meetings that the Communists made in all phases of Korean life. Propaganda that failed to reach the individual by means of the mass media could scarcely fail to reach him through Communist agents at his door or in the form of Communist lectures, "readings," or "self-criticism" sessions held at his place of work, whether on farms or in factories.

In Seoul the Communists employed Party and affiliated organization agents to conduct house-to-house canvasses, admonishing parents to send their children to school, urging housewives to attend the Women's Alliance meetings, and insisting that children join in the Democratic Youth activities. Communist police shook hands with Korean women — an unprecedented event, in which they took advantage of the opportunity to deliver a personal lecture on the rights (and duties) of women under the New Order. The Women's Alliance held weekly propaganda lectures and discussions. The continuing subject was that the women should have equality with men — that the ROK government had subjugated and restrained women, and that now under the People's Republic the women had their first opportunity to break the traditional patterns of male hegemony.

The leaders of this organization came from North Korea. A subleader was designated for every village and for every small section of Seoul. Each leader was made responsible for every house in her district. Her duties were to distribute pamphlets, make speeches, and go from door to door to tell people about the program. The association was built up slowly and after some weeks the leaders began to check attendance. When attendance became compulsory, absence from meetings was considered prima-facie evidence that the absentee was opposed to the government. Attendance at the weekly meetings was not equivalent to joining the association; actual membership was an honor reserved for only a few.

The Democratic Youth Association was organized in the same meticulous way, but through the schools. This organization was characterized by secretiveness; it had a secret sign and a password. Members of a small secret group were guardians of the association's policy, and each day orders were issued to the membership, assigning such duties as writing signs or visiting certain houses for propaganda purposes. The ultimate source of these orders was veiled, and even the transmission process was kept hidden, for members knew only the other members who passed orders to them and the members to whom they passed on the word in turn. It was this organization that was ordered to visit all the houses in town in an attempt to persuade parents to send their children to school after attendance had fallen off.

An appalling frequency of meetings pervaded the whole life of South Korea under Communist occupation. No professional, industrial, family, or agricultural group was immune from the merciless demands on free time. In addition to the extra work exactions made by the Communist occupiers farmers, teachers, doctors, workers, and businessmen found much of their waking hours occupied by attending indoctrination meetings.

The Communist device of "self-criticism" — the "confession" of political errors in a group surrounding — was the basis of many meetings. Self-criticism served a multiple purpose. It gave information to the police, since whole political histories were demanded from citizens at large. It was a device for enforcing a learning of the Communist line — if one is to criticize oneself acceptably one must learn what to confess to, and what to promise to guard against in the future. It was a device for offering rewards for conformity — positive rewards were offered for sincere repentance of political sins and a resolution to submit to Communist discipline. Public confession not only reinforced the learning processes among those who confessed, but also simultaneously taught the auditors the acceptable modes of behavior. At the same time the auditors, properly supervised, acted as critics and reinforcers of the penance performed by the self-criticized. Everyone was encouraged to watch and to judge his neighbor, while he himself was watched and judged. Finally, self-criticism was a punishment — it involved a risk of exposing oneself to censure and worse. To be required to criticize oneself in public constituted a warning that more drastic measures would be necessary if corrections were not forthcoming. Social scientists in the US have pointed out the effectiveness of group pressures in face-to-face situations as means of communicating ideas and modifying attitudes. The success of the Communists in teaching their propaganda line to so many in so short a time may be in good measure the effect of these self-criticism meetings.

Meetings were also used to "discuss" articles that appeared in the newspapers or were broadcast on the radio. Lectures, often apparently memorized by rote, were another feature of these small "agitational" meetings, common in all Communist countries, where a simple theme is taught by repetition in face-to-face situations. The simplicity of the themes, coupled with the frequency of self-criticism meetings, meant that one had an incentive to learn the line since one might at any time be held responsible for knowing it well enough to repeat it. Backed as these inducements were by powerful and ruthless sanctions, it is not surprising that many learned very quickly the details of the Communist line and thus found themselves acting in turn as unwitting propagandists.

Propaganda Activities in a Typical Village. In two typical villages that were under Communist occupation for the 3 months that were studied, the same pattern of Sovietization of communications and propaganda took place. By far the great majority of the residents of both villages were incapable of using most modern means of communication. The literacy rate is not known, but 55 percent of the respondents of the general sample had had no education, and another 31 percent had received no more than an elementary school, or old-fashioned Chinese-type school education. Thus, well over half the population could not read newspapers, and most probably could not read even simple messages, such as those written in all-phonetic script on propaganda leaflets and posters. The level of educational achievement found among the leaders interviewed was considerably higher, but 25 percent of them had had no formal education and 56 percent had received only an elementary, or Chinese-type schooling.

Before the occupation, newspapers from Taejon were delivered to the village office and a few other addresses, mostly the village leaders, who are said to have read them fairly regularly. The radio had not become a means of communication of any direct importance to the villager. The only set in one of the villages was owned by the mayor.

To say that few persons in the village are capable of using modern communications, however, does not mean that information from the outside world was not of keen interest to the villager or that it did not make its way to him with considerable speed. When newspapers were available, their contents were passed rapidly by word of mouth throughout the village and settlement. Within a single day, information received in the morning appears to have reached the settlements along the main road and, depending on the movements of individuals, into the most remote settlements in the hills.

During the occupation, the mayor went into hiding with his radio. From time to time, the mayor or some other underground radio listener in neighboring villages, passed on to others particularly important information monitored from the UN radio broadcasts, but for most people, information from the UN side came only through leaflets. The UN effort to drop leaflets for settlements along the main roads was wasteful since it was unlikely that people would be able to pick them up under the eyes of the police or informers. Dropping leaflets in large numbers was also said to be wasteful since any information in a leaflet read by one friendly person in a settlement, deep in the mountains, would be quickly transmitted to all individuals in the villages.

Under the occupation the only newspapers that came into the village were reprints published in Taejon from the official Communist paper of Seoul; these reprints came only once a week, in very small numbers, and were available to the individual reader only at the village office or local People's Committee office.

The village had one primary school, and no opportunities locally for higher education. The occupation began during the summer vacation, and the educational machinery was not revived in any significant form before the Communists left in September.

Meetings were undoubtedly the main means of indoctrination. From reports of the villagers, as in the case of Seoul, they seem to have been in session somewhere in the village at almost all times of the day and night.

Meetings were usually held in the separate settlements of the village. The persons in charge varied with the nature of the meeting — from reformed non-Communists through professional propagandists of the Party. Topics discussed at such meetings covered a wide range of subject matter. Some were simply educational in character and consisted of lectures on communism or of reading newspapers aloud. Others were hortatory, as on the occasions of an election, a drive to encourage cooperation with some new movement, a meeting to attract volunteers for the army, or the visit of a more important Communist official.

Most villagers claimed that they seldom attended these meetings, and that attendance was generally poor. The settlement chief was made responsible for an ample turnout and usually came around to notify people of the meetings and to urge them to attend. If only members of the village were holding the meeting, little trouble arose because of poor attendance. But if an outside Communist leader attended the meeting, the settlement chiefs, sometimes accompanied by members of the Youth League, made the rounds of the households insisting that people turn out immediately, and scolding them for laxness. It is, of course, difficult to evaluate such reports. There is reason to believe that attendance was probably better than was pictured because of the fairly heavy pressure put on people to attend. It is equally difficult to determine what the villagers got out of these meetings. A majority of them said that they found most of the meetings uninteresting, unintelligible, and a tiresome waste of time. Nevertheless, most

respondents gave the impression that the village people reacted very passively to these meetings. There is certainly little evidence that the Communists were able in the short occupation period to stimulate really active discussion, which would have been useful to them as a gauge of the underlying attitudes of the community or as a device for basic reorientation.

System of Reward

Since most of the promises of peace, prosperity, and social justice for the masses went entirely unfulfilled, rewards for most people under Communist domination in South Korea simply consisted in not being punished by special police action. For a few, however, there were real rewards in new prestige and status and even a certain kind of prosperity. Special rewards were those given to recruits to particular branches of the Communist Party. Even in the short period of 3 months, membership in the Party was made a prerequisite for advancement in almost any profession or endeavor. Those who sought membership in and were admitted to the Party had good reason to be grateful to the new regime, since they were most often persons who would not have achieved promotion under the previous regime. As has been seen, educational benefits were deliberately meted out to groups, such as women and working-class offspring, who had not previously enjoyed such benefits. Thus a certain underprivileged group of persons was given a stake in the new society that must have been doubly appreciated because of its contrast with its previous status.

Membership in the Communist Party is not without its worldly drawbacks in Communist countries — since it increases the risks for survival and by no means implies the desirability of relaxing one's effort. Sacrifice of personal relations and even personal feelings were required of Communist Party members. These sacrifices had the effect of "burning one's bridges," and resulted in reinforcing the allegiance of members to the Communist regime. On the other hand, many testified freely to the benefits Communist Party members enjoyed in worldly goods — housing accommodations, and rations in particular. In the presence of so much misery and fear, such prerequisites were especially gratefully received by the new ruling class.

All evidence points to the fact, as mentioned previously, that even in the short period of occupation in South Korea, most inhabitants learned the Communist propaganda line to a sufficient extent to be able to repeat it in public meetings. Some city dwellers asserted that the pervasiveness of the pressures to repeat the line, and the invasion of private refuge from it, were so thorough that no alternative remained but to accept the line itself or go into actual opposition to it. In any case, the control system was sufficiently effective to secure conformity in overt behavior. Still, it must be asked, how complete was *inner* conformity to Communist propaganda, and how effective were UN propaganda efforts in combating the inner surrender of South Koreans to the Communist pressures. The findings of the sample interviews were designed to answer this question. However, since in the study there were many refugees from the Communists only, and since no representative sample of South Korea was possible, evidence on these points is not conclusive. Nevertheless, some partial conclusions may be cited.

Among the refugees who were interviewed from both North and South Korea, the reason most frequently given for flight from the Communist area was the fear that some member of the family was marked by the Communists for liquidation. Other hardships imposed by Communist rule were given as more important reasons

for the flight of North Koreans than for that of the South Koreans. This merely indicates that 3 months of Communist domination were not sufficient to make its generally restrictive character the compelling reason given by those who had and took the opportunity to escape. There are some indications that South Koreans of the lower economic stratum who fled the Communists felt the restrictions of communism less intensely than the other groups. Also they were not so apt to fear retaliation threatening a member of the family. Thus, it appears that the restrictive character of the Communist social program did not impress the lower occupational groups early enough to counteract the initial appeal of the program to them as it was presented in propaganda.

Those who were most overtly aggressive toward the Communists were the North Korean refugees who had had the most experience with the operation of the system. It is not surprising that in all cases the members of the upper status groups were the ones most apt to feel a direct personal threat to members of their families. The young were less likely than the old to feel themselves marked for liquidation, but they were more likely than the old to feel that aggressive opposition to Communism would have been the only possible mode of conduct had they been forced to remain under Communist rule.

There is abundant evidence that the output of the Communist media of communication tired and bored its listeners. But although tedium may be the price of continual single-minded indoctrination, it put the Communist media at a disadvantage in comparison with any competitive UN media that were able to break through.

On one point the Communists were apparently successful in scoring a sustained favorable "audience reaction." This was through the propaganda value of the behavior of their representatives, soldiers, and officials alike. In the first place, the privileged position of the official class seems not to have made the poor impression on Koreans that it might otherwise have done, since all officials gave manifest evidence of sleepless hard work and general industry. Both in city and country areas Koreans reported that they were impressed with the businesslike conduct and the courteous behavior of Communist officials. "They did not beat people in the streets" is an overt expression of a tacit comparison that was made by many, to show differences between the Communists and the Japanese, and in some cases, between the Communists and the representatives of the South Korean government. Although violence was fully unleashed in Seoul when the Communists were about to withdraw in the face of the UN comeback, this deviation from previous action was excused by some citizens in view of the soldiers' and officials' previous consistently good behavior.

PROPAGANDA PATTERNS IN THE KOREAN OCCUPATION

What conclusion, if any, can be drawn about Communist strategy and tactics in psychological warfare from the case of Korea? What observations about Sovietization of a country emerge from the occupation of South Korea that might be relevant for a psychological warfare operation? The following conclusions would appear to be warranted.

1. *Every phase of Communist organization and policy must be accompanied by premeditated psychological warfare support*

The extreme importance that the Communists attach to controlling the *mind* (as distinguished from controlling behavior) by means of symbol manipulation has

little parallel in the Western world. There were many features of the control system established in South Korea that testified to the great importance with which the Communists view propaganda. In fact, the activities of the North Korean Communists revealed that they had an even greater preoccupation with propaganda than the Nazis. This can be seen from the following observations:

(a) The North Korean Communists placed a great importance on propaganda activities and propaganda training at all levels of the civil-military hierarchy. The Home Ministry, which had control of propagation of the Communist line in South Korea, was one of the most efficient and earliest organized of all branches of the Communist control system. Great pains had been taken to make the early propaganda efforts of the occupying forces achieve the greatest possible impact on the local inhabitants.

More impressive than the content of the Communists' propaganda efforts were the range of persons in the official hierarchy who performed propaganda functions. "Every official a propagandist" might be said to be the Communist maxim. Every official who had contact with citizens was apparently trained, not only in the Communist line, but also in how to act towards his clientele as a propaganda agent of the regime. The courtesy of occupying troops, and the industry and disciplined behavior of the civil officials at all levels greatly impressed the South Koreans. Initially, Communists created in many quarters a favorable impression, as a South Korean university professor was led to believe:

> "Sincerity or friendliness to the other races is needed. Russians have more sincerity or friendliness to other nations than any other country, I insist. It seems that they have no sense of racial superiority at all. On the other hand, the people of every democratic nation have prejudice."

The discipline that Communists exert over officials at all levels was apparently calculated to give the most powerful effect possible to the propaganda value of the contrast.

The training given to propaganda officers bears out the thoroughness with which the Communists implemented their policy of stressing the importance of propaganda organization and activity. Propaganda units appear in the North Korean Army down to the company level. Army recruits and prisoners of war were exposed to as much propaganda as they were exposed to military training and indoctrination.

Propaganda was conducted on all official fronts. In addition to the cultural branches of the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Culture itself, no "line" function of government (such as agriculture, for instance) was without its "cultural" activities.

(b) A wide range of persons were considered as suitable targets for propaganda. In both North and South Korea all evidence seems to point to the fact that if a person was not hostile enough to be shot, he was to be subjected to the most relentless indoctrination possible. This applied, then, to almost all South Korean citizens and captured prisoners of war. It seems that a soldier was more likely to be sent into battle without military training than without ideological training. Housewives were brought within the new indoctrination system. No technical specialty was so "nonpolitical" in Western eyes as to preclude those skilled in it from continual "cultural" sessions. Although the Communists undoubtedly possessed, theories that some were more likely than others to be successfully indoctrinated they usually redoubled, rather than relaxed, their efforts in the less hopeful cases.

The technique of self-criticism was apparently used up to the *very point* at which the authorities thought that they had succeeded or at which they concluded that the person was hopeless and must be disposed of in some way or another. The policy of stressing the necessity for the indoctrination and "rehabilitation" of hostile elements appears to serve the end of keeping the zeal of the officialdom up to a fever pitch.

(c) Propaganda activity appears to have been extended into every sphere of life. Not only was every official and semiofficial contact with citizens utilized for propaganda, and all "free" time used for meetings, the extention of Party activity into family life was pressed almost to the point of complete elimination of privacy. Officials, overt and covert, tried as far as possible to be ubiquitous, and thereby they sought to make all personal activity public. Into the void that was created, the official line was poured during all waking hours in order to make the citizens respond automatically.

2. *Propaganda techniques must be geared to long-range objectives at all times and must never be adjusted to short-run "popularity" goals if it means deviation from long-run goals.*

Despite Communist emphasis on propaganda goals, it would be wrong to infer that popularity of the Communist cause was a primary objective stressed by the Communist invaders of Korea. The Communists did not aim at the goal of "selling" their ideological product in the way of advertisers in a free market.

Their objective was to secure conformity among Koreans, in behavior and, if possible, in thought, with the long-run policy goals of Communist strategy. Whatever these long-run goals were or might be, the important fact for propaganda was that *nothing in sight is an end in itself*. Every form of behavior and attitude that propaganda was designed to achieve was a *means* to further goals. Thus the Communists emphasized unpopular themes because they thought such were indispensable because of the goals to be furthered. Similarly, popular themes could be abandoned if they seemed no longer the best means to achieve the long-run goal for which they were designed. These points can be seen from the following observations:

(a) The boredom caused by the use of the media and the remorseless repetition of single themes in mass media and face-to-face contacts was a function of Communist concentration on distant ends. The Communists frequently sacrificed the popularity and possible enjoyment of their mass media if they thought long-run goals were better served. The Communists hold that enjoyment, "fun," education, art are not ends in themselves but (if allowed at all) are only tools for the achievement of long-run goals. This was the case in North Korea before the outbreak of hostilities.

(b) Communist policy toward communications and propaganda personnel always emphasized long-run considerations, regardless of the immediate hardships that might result.

Observers of the Korean occupation often commented on the abandon with which trained teachers and writers were rejected by the Communists in a society where literacy was low and education scarce. Such persons were speedily replaced by quickly trained personnel of low capacity, but the probability is that such losses in technical reservoirs were of little consequence to the Communists. Writers and artists were valued for the service they could render and the Communists tried a soft policy, forgiving them for their past political sins when they could be

made positive forces and active sponsors of Communist propaganda. However, personnel from the old regime were eliminated readily if they were considered doubtful, or if the effort of retraining them was adjudged to be more costly than that of training new ones who, though they might have less talent, could be used as complete tools for the long-run goals.

From the Communist point of view, a skill that cannot be turned to long-run aims is of little value, whereas those persons with very limited skill, who are entirely devoted to Communist aims, are truly valuable. Thus, schools were manned by primary-school graduates, skilled writers were replaced by unskilled ones, and doctors purged even when there was no one to replace them. All of this was done without any signs of hesitation. Of course, the complete ruthlessness of this program must have gone far to secure outward conformity even from the most highly trained. Apparently, under the Communist system there is no such person as the indispensable man.

(c) "Propaganda of the deed" was utilized only when it did not interfere with the implementation of an efficient control system. Thus, the behavior of officers and soldiers towards citizens was polite and courteous in public, yet premeditated violence was unleashed as soon as Seoul was threatened again by UN forces. Open brutality prior to this time was used sparingly. Similarly, it cost nothing to arrest suspected offenders against the regime at nighttime, or covertly, since it detracted nothing from fear of the police and yet prevented possible public spectacles of police brutality.

When the Communists arrived in South Korea they intensified the propaganda efforts to encourage enlistment in the People's Army. In one rural village they staged a scene where a visitor made an impressive exhortation to the young men, at the climax of which, in an apparent burst of enthusiasm, he announced that he was going to volunteer for military service. It was reported that this same agitator was later seen in a neighboring village going through the same routine. Toward the end of their South Korean occupation, the Communists raided movie theaters and whole villages, without any warning, in order to summarily "round up" all eligible young men for the army. Toward the end of the occupation, when it seemed probable to the Communists that they would have to withdraw, acts of open force displaced "propaganda of the deed." Similarly, great efforts were made through exhortation to enlist doctors in hospitals, but resort to persuasion alone was abandoned near the end of the occupation when all technical experts were rounded up suddenly and taken to North Korea.

Giving the impression that the government was popular and democratic was desirable so long as it was not detrimental to the system of controls. It was as cheap and much more convincing to make poster drawings and demonstrations appear like spontaneous acts of local citizens as not to do so. At times, in People's Committee meetings, the Communists preferred to hold an election for the same office several times, until the acceptable officer was finally chosen, rather than dictate openly who should be elected, thus abandoning a "show" of democracy. This cost nothing but time, and the Communists were free in the sacrifice of such amounts of time since such were not deducted from working hours, but from such time as would otherwise be spent on private, as opposed to public, undertakings.

SUMMARY: BASIS OF ADHERENCE TO THE COMMUNIST REGIME

In general, the basis of popular adherence to the Communist regime during the occupation of South Korea can be explained simply in terms of necessity — the

control system was efficient and there was no alternative to it. The popular appeal of communism was greatest for the largest number when it was in its earliest stages. This was the period when the promises of a more equitable distribution of social goods (land, wages, etc.) were most prominent in the minds of the public and when the probability of their not being achieved were not yet apparent. At the same time, this was the period when the Communist control system was actually the weakest. Escape and defection were more likely to occur successfully during this period, when Allied forces were nearby and Communist police not yet ubiquitous and familiar with the area, than later when controls were more firmly established.

Judging from the Korean experience, it appears that the initial promises of the Communists are more apt to appeal to the lower income and status groups, whereas the upper status groups are less apt to be deceived by hopes of admission to the fold. The longer the Communist occupation lasts, the more class differences tend to disappear. Controls are tightened and the Communists begin to recruit a new elite that has something to gain by attaching itself to the new regime. There is some indication that in Korea the greatest *sustained* strength of the Communist rule in getting voluntary allegiance lies in its demonstration of the impersonal courtesy of its officials, and in its efficiency in "getting things done" (including public works, schools, et cetera). The concept of freedom was viewed as an *escape* from the onerous restrictions of the early regime, but not necessarily in terms of *positive* benefits of a material kind. Thus many North and South Koreans thought of the Rhee government as "loose" and "chaotic," and apparently did not picture to themselves any positive material gains that might be secured by flight to the UN refuge. Although there may be a tendency for young people — those persons least familiar with an old democratic regime and those subject to pressures from the Communist indoctrinators — to be more easily reconciled to life under Communist rule than older persons, still there are strong indications that it is the younger group that is most likely to become *actively* hostile when it becomes disillusioned with the Communist regime.

Finally, it should be remembered that in 3 months Korean Communists were able to establish over a large area of South Korea a remarkably pervasive control system. Under these early conditions, overt hostility by the citizenry was entirely out of the question. Except in the farthermost outlying rural areas, covert active hostility, and even concealed mental resistance became sufficiently dangerous to inspire general anxiety.

PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY IN WORLD WAR II*

A Political Affairs Department of the Chinese 18th (Communist) Group Army undertook to provide political education for the Chinese soldier and for the citizen in the countryside in which the army was at the time operating. Elements of this department were active in every combat division, regiment, and company of this army.

A distinguishing feature of the Chinese 18th Group (Communist) Army is the accent on political training. This training is not given just to officers but to every man in the regular armies and in the partisan bands, and political training is given all the people in the territories occupied by the Chinese 18th Group Army.

* Extracted from an operations intelligence report prepared for OWI, 19 Jan 45, on file in US Archives.

Soldiers are not regarded as fighting machines, but as members of a totally mobilized people whose specific part in the common struggle is to bear arms. One of the 18th Group Army tactics, and by no means the least important, is the "political offensive," in which soldiers and peasants alike join in an ideological assault on puppet and Japanese troops.

Political Affairs Department

The Political Affairs Department of the Chinese 18th Group Army is charged with the political education of soldiers and the people among whom they live. The director is Cheng Chih-pu. The Director of Field Operations is Lo Jui-ch'ing. The Political Affairs Department is divided into four sections.

Li Ch'u-li is Chief of the Section for Work against Japanese and Puppet Troops, with which this paper is concerned. This section is commonly called the Antienemy Work Section and is subdivided into the Japanese Army Work Section and the Puppet Work Section. The latter attacks not only puppet troops but also puppet governments, puppet officials, and puppet people's organizations.

The Antienemy Work Section has a bureau in each division or brigade of the 18th Group Army, a section in each regiment, and a cell in each company.

Policies and plans are formulated for psychological warfare campaigns by the Political Affairs Department headquarters in Yenan. Instructions and directives are sent to brigade bureaus, which instruct and inform the lower divisions. Company cells indoctrinate the soldiers with the proper attitudes toward prisoners, distribute pamphlets and leaflets, and carry out policies toward Japanese and puppet prisoners. The soldiers also learn and shout slogans in Japanese and do all the front-line work such as collecting Japanese documents, letters, diaries, orders, etc. From these, much intelligence is furnished the headquarters of the 18th Group Army. A large part of the psychological warfare work directed against the Japanese is now carried out by the Japanese People's Emancipation League.

Psychological Warfare, 1937 – 1938

The Political Affairs Department of the Chinese 8th Route Army [original Chinese-Communist] was well-developed even before 1937. Such techniques as distribution of leaflets and handbills, use of posters and slogans written on walls, and shouting of slogans had been tried and had proved successful during the civil war.

At first the 18th Group Army tried using its old Chinese slogans and promises of good treatment against surrounded Japanese units. However it soon discovered such techniques were useless. It then tried using a few simple Japanese phrases such as "Wounded soldiers will be given medical aid," and "Those who surrender will not be killed." Every man was required to learn these in Japanese. A few prisoners were taken as a result, but on the whole this tactic was not successful. The Japanese troops often replied in Japanese and no one could understand them.

The first leaflets and pamphlets used in the psychological warfare against the Japanese were radical in tone, with such exhortations as "Overthrow the Emperor," "Down with the militarists," and "Carry out the revolution in Japan." The only result of such literature, as reported by prisoners, was to antagonize the Japanese troops.

In November 1938 at the Communist Party Central Committee session, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the war was equally hard on the common people of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. He urged a "united front" of all these peoples

against the war of aggression, and a resolution to work for such a united front was passed. The troops and the peasants were indoctrinated with this concept and the Antienemy Work Section began to use it in its psychological warfare.

The desired reaction among the Japanese troops was still not forthcoming, however, so the Antienemy Work Section began to work with Japanese prisoners to learn why their methods were unsuccessful and to try to work out better ones.

It found that prisoners responded amazingly to friendly sympathetic treatment and learned that the principal reason for the failure of all its techniques was the universal fear among Japanese troops of the treatment they would receive if captured by the Chinese.

Psychological Warfare, 1938 – 1942

The Antienemy Work Section soon decided that its first task was to overcome Japanese fear of mistreatment at the hands of the Chinese. The first thing it did was to formulate the "Battle Discipline" for its own troops on the treatment of prisoners. The following order was issued to Chinese soldiers:

> "Japanese soldiers are the sons and brothers of the toiling masses. Deceived and coerced by the Japanese warlords and financial oligarchs, they have been forced to fight against us. Therefore:
>
> "1. Any injury or insult to Japanese captives is strictly forbidden. No confiscation of or damage to their belongings is permitted. Officers and men of our army who disobey this order shall be punished.
>
> "2. Special and proper care shall be given to Japanese captives who are wounded or sick.
>
> "3. If Japanese captives wish to return to their own country or return to their original troop units, all possible convenience shall be given them to reach their destination safely.
>
> "4. Those Japanese captives who may wish to remain in China and work for the Chinese Army shall be given proper work. Those wishing to study shall be helped to enter suitable schools.
>
> "5. Facilities shall be given to captives who wish to correspond with their families or friends.
>
> "6. Japanese soldiers killed in battle shall be buried and suitable tombstones erected.
>
> "Signed: Commander in Chief — Chu Teh
> Vice Commander in Chief — Peng Teh huai"

This order was actively carried out by the Chinese 18th Group Army troops who also passed it on to the peasants in their areas. Li Ch'u-li explains the reason behind the order: "Through softening their hostile feelings toward us we build a bridge for our propaganda to reach them." They have also found that their only really effective psychological warfare workers are prisoners who have learned from experience that the "Battle Discipline" is a reality.

In 1939 Japanese prisoner-of-war volunteers formed the "Awakening League," which soon became the Japanese People's Antiwar League, as a branch of the same organization founded in Chungking by Kaji Wataru. In August 1942 the North China branches of the league met in conference at Yenan. Various prisoners of war reported to the conference on their own experiences in various Japanese army units and the effect of Chinese propaganda on Japanese troops. They reported on specific grievances and discontents among the Japanese soldiers.

Psychological Warfare in 1943

As a result of the August 1942 conference, 228 specific "demands," such as the demand for more food, for protection against mistreatment by officers, were formulated and incorporated into a pamphlet called "Demands of the Soldiers."

The Antienemy Work Section decided to direct its efforts toward stirring up discontent among the Japanese troops. The best evidence that such tactics are successful and that the "Demands of the Soldiers" has proved a powerful weapon is furnished by captured documents. These prescribe severe punishment for anyone in the Japanese army caught reading or in possession of the pamphlet.

Until the conference of prisoners of war and the members of the Japanese Antiwar League, psychological warfare work was carried out by the Political Affairs Department of the Chinese 18th Group Army, with gradually more and more participation by the Japanese workers. After 1942 the Japanese workers began to take over this phase of the Political Affairs Department's work until now it is practically all done by Japanese. The Japanese Workers and Peasants School, established at Yenan in November 1940, and similar training places, educate Japanese prisoners of war to carry on this psychological warfare work.

Psychological warfare results began to show the effectiveness of the improved methods. Prisoners report increasingly severe punishment of Japanese soldiers caught with Chinese propaganda. Surrenders have increased. Though these may be explained partially by war weariness and poorer troops used in North China, some undoubtedly are due to the knowledge, now reported to be general among Japanese troops, that they will be well treated by the 18th Group Army.

Psychological Warfare at Present (1945)

Since the second conference of the Japanese Antiwar League in January 1944, the psychological warfare work has been expanded. The league was dissolved and a Japanese People's Emancipation League was formed early this year. It is now directed against Japanese civilians in China and in the homeland as well as the troops in North and Central China. Goals of the league were set up to appeal to Japanese everywhere.

Shortly after the founding of the Japanese People's Emancipation League the Chinese 18th Group Army decided to turn over to the league all psychological warfare material against Japanese troops. Policies are decided by the league leaders, in conference with the Antienemy Work Section, but for all practical purposes the Japanese People's Emancipation League functions as an independent, wholly Japanese organization.

The Chinese believe that only Japanese can appeal to Japanese effectively — for one thing, they know the idioms and tricks of speech; for another, their suggestions and exhortations are not resented as would be those from a "foreigner."

The Antienemy Works Section supports and assists the Japanese People's Emancipation League and does some of the front-line work where the Japanese league units are not adequate. Also, the policies and attitudes that give teeth to psychological warfare appeals are carried out by the Chinese 18th Group Army and the people as a whole.

Directives

The Japanese Workers and Peasants School in Yenan has set up a Propaganda Committee of 18 "students." They work out programs and policies and write some leaflets. These are radioed to Japanese People's Emancipation League units

in the field. Most of the leaflets are prepared by the field units in accordance with the headquarters' directives.

The Antienemy Works Section sends telegrams twice a week to its field bureaus giving summaries of Japan's military and economic position and of conditions in the Japanese North China army. They also include suggestions as to the propaganda use of the news. Part of the telegrams relate the experience — the success or failure — of the various psychological warfare units.

"Don't's" in 18th Group Army Psychological Warfare

T'ang Cheng, one of the 18th Group Army psychological warfare leaders, in 1939 warned against ineffective, abstract, stereotyped antienemy propaganda. He said that the following mistakes in propaganda must be avoided:

(1) Attempting to attain long-range policies immediately by stating them in short-range propaganda.

(2) Merging long-range objectives and concrete tasks.

(3) Underestimating the ability of the militarists to control Japanese troops.

(4) Neglecting "agitative," sentimental, and stimulating propaganda techniques in favor of fundamental principles.

(5) Disregarding changes of feelings and emotions in the rank and file of the Japanese army.

Positive Propaganda and Immediate Aims

T'ang Cheng stated the immediate aim of the Antienemy Works Section to be the weakening of the fighting power of the Japanese army, the loosening of its organization, and the lessening of its stubbornness.

Positive propaganda is aimed at awakening a class-consciousness among the Japanese soldiers. The evil effects of the war on Japan and the Japanese themselves is stressed.

All types of war weariness, known through prisoner-of-war reports, are stimulated and utilized in propaganda — anger, suicide, desertion, opposition to officers. T'ang warns that the psychological warfare workers cannot expect immediate uprisings and desertions and also that concrete psychological warfare tasks must not be mixed up with long-term political tasks. The personal feelings and interests of individual Japanese soldiers must be played on and therefore must be known to the worker. The psychological warfare workers should first arouse the blind spontaneous antiwar feeling in Japanese soldiers by playing on the discontents and irritations known to exist. Minor issues should then be enlarged and popularized. The effect of propaganda as it begins to be apparent should be studied and antienemy tactics thereby increased, modified, or changed as the situation demands.

The stubbornness of Japanese soldiers is due largely to prejudice and fear. T'ang Cheng states as the first task of the Antienemy Works Section that of minimizing the blind antagonism of the Japanese against the Chinese. The approach must be through the emotions.

Prisoners of War

The good treatment of prisoners of war has become the keystone of Chinese 18th Group Army's psychological warfare. The aim, after all, of all psychological

warfare is essentially to take prisoners, or to so influence the enemy that he will lose his will to fight, with capture or desertion the usual result. But soldiers must first be reasonably certain that capture will not mean a fate worse than death, and the general policy of the enemy toward prisoners is soon known to the soldiers.

Captured Japanese, as soon as they are disarmed, are treated like friends by the 18th Group Army. That the peasants who have suffered so much from the sadistic treatment of Japanese troops always treat captured Japanese well is to be doubted. There is irrefutable evidence, however, that in many places captives have been well cared for, and this, under all the circumstances, seems remarkable.

Prisoners are given first-aid treatment, if it is needed, on capture, and then sent to the rear for preliminary education. Workers of the Antienemy Work Section supervise this education, with the assistance of Japanese league units. The latter do all of the work where they are adequately staffed.

A pamphlet in Japanese is prepared to give to each captured Japanese soldier as soon as he is taken. This explains the nature of the 18th Group Army and its war aims, as well as its conception of the true nature of the war and the way it has affected Japan and China.

At first the aim is merely to assure prisoners of good treatment and to overcome their antagonism. Little attempt is made to do more than answer their questions and explain as much of the 18th Group Army attitude and ideology as they seem interested in learning. There are no concentration camps and no compulsory labor for prisoners of the Chinese 18th Group Army. Prisoners enjoy almost complete liberty. They are segregated along officer-soldier and recalcitrant-cooperative lines, but the same treatment is given all groups.

After a couple of weeks of good treatment, the prisoners who want to go back to their units are released. The more hostile the prisoner, the sooner he is released. The 18th Group Army workers believe that this is logical action — if the hostility of a Japanese cannot be overcome he will be even better proof to his fellows that prisoners are not mistreated by the Chinese. Each prisoner released is given a little farewell party (often joined in by the peasants) and generally small gifts. It is not the policy of the Antienemy Work Section to send back Japanese soldiers who do not want to return, though it is admitted that this probably is done by some guerrilla bands ill-equipped to care for prisoners. For security reasons, no prisoner is released after he has been in Yenan or, probably, in any other permanent headquarters.

The prisoners who respond to the kind treatment and show an interest in the ideology or concepts of the 18th Group Army or the Japanese People's Emancipation League are further instructed and indoctrinated and are used as soon as possible in psychological warfare units. Some prisoners after their several months' education are used to instruct 18th Group Army men in the use of Japanese weapons. One Japanese engineer is working as an engineer in an 18th Route Army brigade; one Japanese doctor is head of one of the 18th Group Army hospitals.

At first the 18th Group Army was afraid to return prisoners for fear they would only have to fight them again. They also feared the prisoners would be killed by their own officers. Even when they did allow them to return it was only after a long period of indoctrination and when the prisoners proved receptive to instruction.

Now the 18th Group Army leaders advocate releasing most prisoners who express a desire to go back to their own lines, and within a very short time after capture.

They explain that, so far as having to oppose them again is concerned, there are too few to make much difference. Also, no matter what their officers do to returned prisoners, they cannot hide the fact the 18th Group Army has permitted their return and that they have not been mistreated while in Chinese hands. The Chinese do not expect that returned prisoners will form resistance cells in the Japanese army or even cease to be their bitter foes. But one thing their very presence will incontrovertibly prove — 18th Group Army soldiers do not mistreat prisoners. In this way they also prove that this much, at least, of Chinese propaganda is true.

The Chinese 8th Route Army has so far captured more than 2500 Japanese and the New 4th about 500. Of this number many have been released to return to their units. Over 300 have been instructed to help in psychological warfare work in the 18th Group Army.

Propaganda Leaflets

Propaganda leaflets used by the 18th Group Army fall into several fairly distinct categories.

Demand Leaflets. This type urges Japanese soldiers to demand better treatment, better food, shorter marches, proper burial for their dead, etc.

Greetings Leaflets. These are friendly holiday greetings, letters to Japanese soldiers from prisoners or 18th Group Army men, letters containing little gifts or accompanying comfort bags containing hankerchiefs, playing cards with slogans written on them, stationery, peanuts, soap, etc. These contain propaganda of a nonpolitical nature aimed merely at lessening the hatred and antagonism of Japanese troops for the Chinese.

Antiwar Appeal Leaflets. These play on the soldiers' homesickness and war weariness. They recall the peace and beauty of Japanese homes, the love of family, the hard work their women now have to do, etc..

Pamphlets. These are fairly comprehensive and deal with social and political conditions or hardships of the Japanese troops or those inflicted by them on the Chinese people. Some by the Japanese People's Emancipation League explain the long-term aims of that organization. (For other propaganda techniques employed by the 18th Group Army, see Opintel Report No. 289.)

Reasons for Success of Psychological Warfare Work

The success of the 18th Group Army in psychological warfare is due to a number of factors. First, it is based firmly on a clear conception of the nature of the war and its own war aims, which in turn have been inculcated into every man in the 18th Group Army and into the people of the territory controlled by it. Second, the troops of the 18th Group Army have been taught to treat prisoners well — and why. This, too, has been passed on to the people. Third, the work has been turned over as far as possible to Japanese. Fourth, the 18th Group Army is in a position to collect a wealth of material about the Japanese army, the particular discontents and grievances of particular units. It has a great deal of knowledge about Japan, gleaned from documents, newspapers, magazines, etc., which can be used effectively. Fifth, its close contact with the people, not only in their own areas but in those held by the Japanese and puppet Nanking forces, facilitates its collection of information and distribution of propaganda.

THE APPEAL OF COMMUNISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By Lucian W. Pye

A report of a field study among former Communist Chinese in Malaya.

The character of any political group is conditioned by the way it gains its membership and the types of people it can recruit. For the Communist parties the recruitment process is especially important because of their peculiar need to find people who can successfully approximate all the qualities expected of one who joins their ranks. That is, they must find people who can become true Bolsheviks.

By comparative study that focuses on the problem of recruitment it becomes possible to distinguish different types of Communist parties. There are those that appeal mainly to individuals who are maladjusted and who feel themselves alienated from the general society. Such parties can only operate on the fringes of the dominant political process. Another type may have mass support but still appeal only to certain distinct and limited elements in the total society, such as the working class or types of intellectuals. In distinguishing these types of parties the vulnerabilities of particular parties may become more apparent.

Possibly most important of all, such an approach can set some limits on speculation about the significance of cultural differences and general social and economic conditions to the development of communism. Then in analyzing the recruitment process it may be found that cultural features conspicuous in some spheres of life may be of little relevance as far as the acceptance of communism, whereas other less striking cultural differences may turn out to be quite critical.

One way of obtaining data on the recruitment process is to talk with people who have joined Communist parties and then subsequently left them. How did these people arrive at their understanding of communism? What was the meaning of this more than political movement to them? What were the social and economic circumstances of their lives? What were their attitudes about politics in general at the time they were exposed to communism? How did they perceive the party once they joined it, and what were the reasons that were most compelling in causing them to break with communism?

It was in search of answers to these and related questions that the Princeton Center of International Studies made it possible for the writer to carry out a project of interviewing former Communists in Malaya.

Time does not permit a detailed discussion of methodological problems. It is only possible to say that the sample consisted of 60 life-history interviews of both those who had achieved leadership positions and those who remained rank-and-file members. Some had served only short periods, and others had defected after over a decade of full-time work for the cause of revolution. The object in the

* Extracted from an unpublished manuscript, "The Appeals of Communism in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Chinese in Malaya," a preliminary report of a field study sponsored by the Princeton Center of International Studies, Princeton, N. J., part of a larger study dealing with the appeals of communism in a Western setting under the leadership of Professor Gabriel Almond. For the reader wishing to read more widely about the problems of Southeast Asia and the spread of communism there, a recent volume by Dr. Pye is recommended.[21]

interviewing was to collect life histories of these people and to relate the pattern of their acceptance of communism to their general attitudes about politics. Some of the interviews lasted for 3 days, and none were shorter than a tropical working day.

All those interviewed were, of course, Chinese since they constitute at least 98 percent of the Malayan party membership. Slightly over half were born in Malaya. It had been expected that there might be some interesting differences between those who grew up in China and those who knew life only in the Chinese community of Malaya. However, in all the tabulations made on attitudes there appeared to be no significant differences between these two groups. The differences between leaders and rank and file, between early joiners and late joiners, and between the sexes were all more significant. The only important difference was that the China-born tended to be a little older when they first joined the party and they tended to have slightly longer careers in the party. The explanations of these differences does not seem to lie in any cultural difference, but rather in the fact that the China-born were not as exposed to communism and once committed to the party they felt less confident of their abilities to find another career if they should break with communism.

In general the former Communist had received more years of formal education than is common for Malayan Chinese. It is well recognized that in Asia the development of communism is closely associated with the problems and frustrations of intellectuals. Usually attention has been given to the difficulties of individuals who have developed high expectations from their training in Western knowledge and who subsequently learned that their societies were unable to utilize them according to their new talents. The interviews with the former Malayan Communists suggest that there is a comparable problem for those who are not intellectuals but who have received slightly more education than most of their contemporaries. In their case their educational experience was enough to make them aware of the possibilities for better employment, but not enough to meet even the low Malayan standards for white-collar work. Feeling superior to those with no education, they felt keenly the frustrations of having invested, on the average, 6 to 7 years in schooling and still working side by side with illiterates on rubber estates and in tin mines.

It is, of course, impossible here even to survey briefly the numerous characteristics of those interviewed. To single out only a few is to risk leaving the impression that they were the most important and that they were not supported and complemented by others. There are, of course, many appeals that operate on various types of susceptibilities. Therefore it will be recognized that in talking about only a few no attempt is being made to give a complete picture.

One of the significant findings of the interviews was the dominant attitude of most of these former Communists toward the West. It has been common to suspect that throughout Asia there run strong currents of anti-Western feeling. The rise of Asian nationalism and the end of the colonial era suggest that such may be the case. Granted the interview situation may not have been an ideal setting for exploring such a delicate question, but it was used to touch on far more sensitive personal questions with more success than might have been suspected. Thus we should not ignore the rather complex attitude toward the West that came out of the responses. Their attitudes seem to suggest that possibly only a few of the Asians who turn to communism have unqualifiedly antagonistic feelings about the West. It is possible that we, as Westerners, have tended to sense a simple

and direct hostility because of our propensities to find self-satisfaction in criticism and at the same time to crave warm and friendly responses from others.

Be that as it may, these former Communists seemed to have been disturbed by a very deep sense of ambivalence toward all things Western, and not by clearly negative feelings. In the first place, all of them had turned their backs on their traditional cultures, and they were all quite critical of things indigenous to their parents' way of life. They were all strongly, almost compulsively, oriented to all that was new and modern. Early in their lives they had discovered that their parents were not up to the times and had turned to their peer group for guidance in their behavior. In the process they tended to identify their parents with all that was old and outmoded. In many respects they were like the children of American immigrants who seek to disassociate themselves from their parents and to conform in a compulsive manner to the culture of their peers.

In seeking out what was new they were trying to identify themselves with that which was Western. For some this meant Western knowledge and education. Those who had been forced to spend any time on the Chinese classics felt that they had been unjustly imposed upon, and their feelings appeared to be far stronger than that of the American child who can see no point in learning Latin. For others modernity was to be found in the conveniences and gadgets common to the daily life of Westerners.

Their ambivalence came when the more they came to appreciate Western ideas and things, the more they began to appreciate Western standards. When this happened they also become aware of their own inferiority according to these standards, which they now respected. Those who were students and prized education began to realize that in spite of their years of study they were not the equals of those who were more at home in the Western tradition. Others, for example, whose interests were in athletics spoke of how they knew that they could not equal the physical skills of Westerners.

In communism this ambivalence was resolved. They accepted communism as representing the most advanced form of modern knowledge and the way of the future. And in spite of the difficulties in becoming good Bolsheviks, the standards were not impossibly high. The intellectual effort necessary to become a theoretician of Marxism-Leninism was not as exacting as that required to gain recognition in any of the fields of Western knowledge. They could now feel satisfaction in meeting the standards of something new and modern.

In numerous ways they expressed these attitudes, some quite explicitly, others in more indirect fashions. For example, most of them spoke of how important it had been to them that communism was an international movement with parties in every country in the world. Several of those who had become party functionaries announced with pride that because of their rank in such a world-wide organization they were superior to the mass of rank-and-file members of the British and American parties. Others found undeniable satisfaction in boasting of how they had been members of a party that was superior to the British and American Communist parties. Even though they had broken with communism they still seemed to find satisfaction in the thought that they had been able to realize standards of achievement that Englishmen and Americans were unable to match. Also, many of them spoke of the satisfaction they had gained from knowing that Washington and London were disturbed and worried about communism and what they as individuals were doing. Although they frankly said they did not fully understand the implications of communism at the level of the heads of governments, they did

feel that there must be something to communism to cause those they had recognized as their intellectual superiors to worry so. Thus their achievements and the standards of being a good Communist could not be entirely meaningless.

One reason why they may not have had as clear-cut anti-Western sentiments as some Asians who do not become Communists appear to have is that they were generally rather unsophisticated in intellectualizing about things they had not personally experienced. At the same time most of them had had no personal experiences that might have produced hostile feelings toward Westerners. Much of what they appreciated about the West had come to them second-hand. Thus, they did not have clearly defined impressions about Westerners as individuals. At the same time they did not appear to be able to conceptualize a more abstract level of relation between the West and Asia. They tended to be bound by the concrete and the particular.

Their lack of more universalistic concepts and standards was relevant to much of the apparently opportunistic quality of much of their behavior. They tended to act according to what they considered to be the dictates of the moment and not according to more generalized standards of behavior.

This feature of their behavior seems to have been very basic to their social backgrounds. As we have indicated, they had little respect for their parents and instead looked to their groups for guidance. In part this was because they appeared to have been keenly aware of distinctions in social and economic status and the possibilities of upward social mobility. Thus the vast majority indicated that they had expected to realize a higher social and economic status than that of their parents. They felt that their parents knew little of the realities of modern life because they had belonged to a more status-bound and tradition-oriented society.

However, the greater opportunities for social advancement that they now had stemmed mainly from the very instabilities of social and economic life in their world. Social mobility had not come from the development of a more open society, but rather from the unpredictableness of life in modern Asia. Such major developments as war and economic crises, over which they had no control, could drastically alter the situations in which they found themselves. Each new circumstance could and had to be exploited if they were to maintain or advance themselves. In short, although they recognized the possibilities of social mobility they did not feel that there was a stable social ladder up which they could climb if they desired to get ahead. Rather, out of the turbulent times they expected that situations might arise that, if they exploited them, could bring them advantage.

An even deeper reason for their apparently opportunistic behavior was that they were not far removed from a tradition-oriented society. In spite of their rejection of the old, much of their behavior was influenced by considerations basic to a traditional type of society. In such a society the cues for guiding an individual's behavior are to be found in the particularistic and fairly well-defined relations that bind him to others. The demands for stability result in the behavior becoming formalized, and the system is maintained by strong pressures for conforming.

The interviews suggest that most of the former Communists felt an almost compulsive need to conform to the primary group they were oriented to, i.e., with their peer group. Also they sought to find the cues for their behavior in the relations that they had with others. However, these relations were far from stable, and thus there was no possibility for them to become formalized. To ignore the attitudes of those about them was practically impossible because of their great sense of insecurity over becoming socially isolated. They were constantly looking for guidance from others.

These characteristics of their behavior resemble in many ways the qualities that Eric Fromm has identified in his "market-oriented" character and David Riesman in his "other-directed" personality. Of course, both Fromm and Riesman have in mind the type of character common to an industrialized, consumer-oriented society. However, our sample suggests that something comparable may be common among people who are just breaking away from tradition-oriented societies. These qualities may make them vulnerable to charismatic leaders and increase the likelihood of political instability.

In the case of those interviewed this, what might be called "tactical orientation" of much of their behavior, meant that when they became Communists they felt that they were identifying with something that was powerful. In the party they felt that they saw stability in an otherwise unstable world. They were quite frank in discussing how they expected that by joining the party they would find personal advantage. Communism offered to most of them a career opportunity. In the situation they found themselves in it seemed the wise and smart thing to join the Communists.

Their lack of any strong commitments to more autonomous values meant that they had little difficulty in accepting the Communist position that all should be sacrificed to gaining power. Strongly tactically oriented in their own lives, they felt that it was eminently reasonable that the party should place primary value on power and hold up the skilled power tactician as the ideal. In this respect there was a great difference between the former Malayan Communist and the former Western Communist. In the West one of the major problems of the Communists appears to be finding recruits who are not excessively concerned about the ethical question of ends and means. This problem does not seem to have been an important one in the training of recruits to the Malayan party.

Also, the pride of the former Communists in their abilities to understand and exploit any situation meant that none would admit that they had joined front groups without knowing that they were Communist-led. On the contrary, most of them insisted that they had joined such groups precisely because they knew that they were Communist dominated. To join something without knowing its source of leadership would be to act irrationally in their way of thinking. They were not disturbed that such groups did not frankly indicate the motives of their leaders since intelligent behavior requires that one not advertise all one's intentions. This also meant that when they joined the party itself they were not shocked, as many former Western Communists were, that the inner doctrine of the party was not the same as its propaganda. Rather they seemed to feel that they were coming in closer contact with a meaningful source of power that could give them security.

In coming to the party, most of them denied that they had been carried away by emotional appeals. Rather they felt that they had kept their feet on the ground and had been highly pragmatic in their calculations. It was only after they had fully committed themselves and feeling that they could not turn back that they began to become strongly emotionally involved in the cause of revolution. Far less motivated by general humanitarian and idealistic considerations, they were better prepared than most Western recruits to communism for the training in how to become a good Bolshevik.

Few of them indicated that they had been disturbed by the Communist reliance on violence. In fact one of the most striking features of their pre-Communist views about the nature of politics was their association of political activity with violence, conflict, and struggle. In characterizing their parents as being apolitical, many said such things as "my father was a peaceful, quiet man who didn't like to fight.

I used to like to argue and that is why I got interested in politics." Their introduction to politics had not been through civics courses, but had come from knowledge, usually firsthand, of Chinese civil wars, Japanese occupation, and the British struggle with the Malayan Communists. Their political "awakening" had come about as a result of having to meet the consequences of war and violence, and not as the result of dreaming new ideals. Their whole experience had taught them that he who was strongest in the military field would be the one who had political power. Thus in their minds the Communists, in using violence, were behaving as any other important political group.

In joining the Malayan Communist Party most of them, although recognizing its international affiliations, felt that they were conforming to Chinese behavior. This was particularly true of those who joined after the victories of the Chinese Communists in the homeland. However, even among the early joiners the feeling was that they were identifying themselves with the strongest group in the Chinese community. Interestingly enough, however, once they were committed they tended in their own minds to think of the party as being led by the Soviet Union rather than China. This may have been due to their need of feeling that they were a part of a great international movement. Also, they had to feel that they were identified with something more than just a Chinese group since they placed such value on the new. Four of the respondents said that the main reason that they had broken with the Malayan Communist Party was that they had finally decided in their own minds that Russia was not in fact leading them. They sensed that there was something absurd in a group of half-educated Chinese trying to challenge the might of the British Empire.

In this respect it is interesting to note that even after they had broken with communism they did not feel that China had lost her sovereignty to the Soviet Union. They would point to what they considered still to be the facts: In two short years after the Chinese Communists came to power, the traditionally weak country had been able to defeat the United States and all its allies in Korea. This they felt was no mean achievement. They could find no precedent in history for a country that had lost its sovereignty scoring such victories. Their complaints against the Peking government did not include the charge that it had made China a vassal of the Soviet Union.

This set of attitudes, which made much of the former Communists' behavior appear to be opportunistic, seems to have been related to the tumultuous conditions under which they had broken their ties with a traditional society and found the opportunities for social mobility. Extremely sensitive to the attitudes of others and seeking to find the appropriate guides for their own actions in the immediate situation, they had little difficulty in adopting many of the qualities basic to the Bolshevik model. However, they also had certain qualities basic to this constellation of attitudes that made it extremely difficult for them to meet the standards of Communist behavior. In particular the insecurities they seemed to have over the dangers of becoming socially isolated meant that they attached great importance to personal relations. Their desire to conform to prevailing attitudes was in part a reflection of their search for personal ties that would give them security. None had gone out of his way to find communism. Rather they had been led to the party by personal associations. Thus in identifying with the party they felt they were establishing a personal relation that would give them security.

However, once in the party they were disturbed by the more impersonal qualities of life in a Communist organization. As might be expected, they were unprepared

for the character of Communist discipline and the apparent inability of the party to forget or forgive whatever they did wrong. Expecting to find security in highly personal and particularistic relations, they were unnerved by the impersonal and generalistic standards common to relations in the party. How they sought to adjust to this problem and to meet the other demands of being a Communist is another story.

The interviews, of course, also revealed other attitudes that were important in understanding how these people came to communism. But in general these also reinforce the impression that for this group of former Communists the main appeals of communism were those that touched very close to the desire for personal security, and appeared to offer them possibilities for what might be called "career advancement." What seemed to have been critical was their inability to find any alternative to communism at their level of society that would have offered them opportunities of gaining security,status, and a formal recognition of their limited leadership abilities. With the traditional Chinese groups and organizations that previously gave the individual a place in society breaking down or becoming obsolete, these people seem to have felt insecure in a more impersonal and competitive world. What the West and democracy had to offer could be viewed as good and desirable, but it lay far beyond their reach. Within their own setting it was the Communists who were the most active and who often represented the only alternative to social isolation.

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